Date: Mon, 29 Nov 93 10:33:15 EST
Errors-To: Comp-privacy Error Handler <comp-privacy-request@PICA.ARMY.MIL>
From: Computer Privacy Digest Moderator <comp-privacy@PICA.ARMY.MIL>
To: Comp-privacy@PICA.ARMY.MIL
Subject: Computer Privacy Digest V3#083
Computer Privacy Digest Mon, 29 Nov 93 Volume 3 : Issue: 083
Today's Topics: Moderator: Dennis G. Rears
re: Guns Control/Registration/Confiscation
Re: Privacy of cellular phones [Subject field chosen by MODERATOR]
Questions
California DMV's SSN requirements
Voice authentication
The Computer Privacy Digest is a forum for discussion on the
effect of technology on privacy. The digest is moderated and
gatewayed into the USENET newsgroup comp.society.privacy
(Moderated). Submissions should be sent to
comp-privacy@pica.army.mil and administrative requests to
comp-privacy-request@pica.army.mil.
Back issues are available via anonymous ftp on ftp.pica.army.mil
[129.139.160.133].
----------------------------------------------------------------------
From: David Horvath <dhorvath@sas.upenn.edu>
Subject: re: Guns Control/Registration/Confiscation
Date: Thu, 25 Nov 93 9:10:45 EST
> I have been taking all of this Brady Bill info in with utter amazement
> at the NRA stand, which is that once an instant background check is
> available, the waiting period should be phased out. Am I missing
> something here? An instant background check sounds to me like a
> [more stuff about registering and confiscation of firearms that in
> theory should be protected by the 2nd admendment DELETED]
> Where is the NRA's head at with this, anyway? This whole "instant,
> computerized" nonsense scares me more than any stupid waiting period (which
> by the way, we have had here in Minnesota for years).
While I share many of these same concerns, I feel it *would* be
possible to implement such a system without identifying *what* or *how
many* you were buying. A simple NCIC check would show if you were a
convicted felon and the addition of a 'mental stability' flag to the
database would be a simple matter.
In Pennsylvania, we do *not* have an instant check system and we *do*
have a 3 day waiting period. But during those three days, a copy of the
paperwork is sent to the state police so they can report back if you are a
member of the "excluded from owning" list (ie felon or mentally ill).
In order to get a permit to concealed-carry a handgun in Pennsylvania,
you have to supply references, answer a questionaire (are you a drunkard,
etc), supply 2 passport sized photos, and pay a fee. The references, the
local police (who better to know if you're a trouble maker), and often
your neighbors are contacted. I assume a lookup is done in the NCIC.
Recently the City of Philadelphia passed an ordinance preventing certain
types of guns (like Smith & Wesson 9mm semi-automatics [looks like an Army
Colt-45 used in WWII]) - the courts threw it out because of the state
constitution and gun control laws. The state legislature is in the
process of passing a law *preventing* local governments from regulating guns.
- David Horvath
------------------------------
From: Percival Wendel Wippenheimer <wef4m@galen.med.virginia.edu>
Subject: Re: Privacy of cellular phones [Subject field chosen by MODERATOR]
Organization: University of Virginia
Date: Fri, 26 Nov 1993 14:07:10 GMT
The answer to this is simple: Do not use Cellular Phones until
proper scrambling becomes widespread.
Furthermore, any ham radio operator who knows even a little bit
can modify a cellular phone so that monitoring can take place.
PWW
------------------------------
Date: Fri, 26 Nov 93 17:59 EST
From: WHMurray@dockmaster.ncsc.mil
Subject: Questions
Two decades ago I was on a program on privacy and computer security in
Vienna, Austria with Joe Wiezenbaum. In those days the two issues were
so intertwined as to be inseparable. The good professor was trying to
make the audience understand the threat to individual privacy that the
computer represented. In part because of the general confusion
surrounding the issues, I saw his position as being that the generality
and flexibility of the computer could not be restricted in such a way as
to preserve its utility while, at the same time preventing a compromise
of the confidentiality of the data. Having just presented my
masterwork, an access control system, I considered this to be a solved
problem and could not understand why he did not see it as such.
In fact, the good professor's point was that the threat to privacy
represented by the computer had much less to do with whether or not the
computer could preserve the confidentiality of the data than with the
data that would be collected in its presence that would not be collected
without it . I thought that he was talking about the deficiencies of
the technology, my technology, while in fact he was talking about its
capabilities.
In retrospect I realize that it was the government bureaucrats that were
casting the issue in terms of the preservation of confidentiality, not
Professor Wiezenbaum. They have done an extraordinary job of keeping
the question miscast in those terms. They do not want us to see the
question in terms of the data collected.
We have three cases in point. The first is the Clinton Health Plan.
The bureaucrats have got us arguing about the inability of the
technology to restrict the use of the data in the intended direction.
We are talking about the "unauthorized use of the data." We are talking
about whether the identifier of the data should be the social security
number or some other number, about whether the card should be smart or
dumb. What we are not talking about is what data ought to be collected
in the first place.
The second case is the Brady Bill. We are talking about whether the
waiting period of five days should be replaced by a computer-based
"background inquiry" in four years or five. We are not talking about
the chilling impact of such a system. We are not talking about whether
or not we should have such a system or what ought to be in it. We are
not talking about what data should be in the system or how it is to be
kept accurate and current. We are not talking about what response from
the system should disqualify you from the purchase of a gun. We are not
talking about whether a record should be made of the inquiry or how long
such a record might be kept. We are not taliking aobut what may
legitimately be inferred from such an inquiry.
The third case is the government's cryptography initiatives. We are
arguing about whether or not the Skipjack algorithm is strong. We are
arguing about who the "escrow" agents ought to be or what procedures
they ought to use. We are arguing about whether or not a marginal
denial of strong crypto to foreigners justifies putting American
software publishers at a huge competitive disadvantage. We are not
arguing about whether the right of the citizen to have a private
conversation in a language of his own choosing is superior to the right
of the government to investigate crime. We are not talking about what
level of real abuse of cryptography by criminals is required to justify
a general restriction on its legitimate use.
I marvel at the effectiveness of their misdirection.
If the bureaucrats can succeed in getting us to focus on the wrong
questions, then they need not worry about what answers we reach.
William Hugh Murray, Executive Consultant, Information System Security
49 Locust Avenue, Suite 104; New Canaan, Connecticut 06840
1-0-ATT-0-700-WMURRAY; WHMurray at DOCKMASTER.NCSC.MIL
------------------------------
From: bruces@sco.com (Bruce Steinberg)
Subject: California DMV's SSN requirements
Organization: The Santa Cruz Operation, Inc.
Date: Fri, 26 Nov 1993 23:07:05 GMT
Thanks to TJ Merritt's original query on the subject of "SSN
required to renew Cal. DL" (posted October 29th, 1993, and by
now expired online on my system), I was motivated to directly
contact my California State Senator (the Senate Majority Leader,
it turns out) and get some answers to specific questions straight
from an elected legislative representative who had to have voted
on this recent law (of which I was previously unaware, having
submitted neither a driver's license nor vehicle registration
renewal form requiring an SSN since its apparent passage).
Having received a timely written response at this point, I'd like
to now share this complete correspondence with you, FYI.
Those of you who have been following this thread from early on
will recognize that I have incorporated some of the more salient
issues that were raised in this newsgroup during initial
discussions, and I would like to thank everyone for those ideas
and concerns.
I also trust that my letter represented the views of many others
on this newsgroup and elsewhere, and that the response I received
(and its virtual non-response to any of the actual privacy or
confidentiality issues) is useful in stimulating more substantive
thought, discussion, and action in this regard.
(Please also note that in the response letter -- as well as in
certain other discussions here on the net -- the point appears to
be getting effectively lost that SSN usage now applies to new and
renewed vehicle registrations, as well as driver's licenses.)
In fairness, it should be noted that in the actual language of
the final amended law as passed, the SSN -- while mandatory for
license and registration applications and renewals (as well as
DMV-issued ID cards, BTW) -- is proscribed from *appearing*
anywhere on any license, reg, or ID certificate issued by the DMV
(including any magnetic tape or strip on the license). Instead,
the DMV is authorized "to require all applications for driver's
licenses to contain other number or identifiers," presumably like
the existing CA driver's license ("CDL") number.
The law also stipulates that the SSN "is not a public record and
shall not be disclosed by the department" except for requests
from such specific "authorized agencies" as the Controller, the
Franchise Tax Board, or the CA Lottery Commission, for info
related to the pursuit of outstanding fines, taxes, assessments,
penalties, etc. related to a wide range of concerns -- from
parking and traffic violations, to income tax, to child support,
to lottery winnings.
(There is, BTW, a notion of literal "urgency" in this law having
been passed when it was, presumably in the face of a serious
financial crisis, so any railroading is at least understandable:
"This act is an urgency statute necessary for the immediate
preservation of the public peace, health, or safety within the
meaning of Article V of the Constitution and shall go into
immediate effect.")
In any case, I've clearly put myself on record here as being
against the use of SSNs in any relation to any DMV activities,
whether driver's licenses or vehicle registrations. If you don't
agree, please spare me any flames and simply take comfort in the
fact that you're in some good political company: introduced by
Assembly Member Bentley in March, 1991, the amended law passed
both the California State Senate and Assembly *UNANIMOUSLY* in
August, 1992 -- 35 to 0, and 68 to 0, respectively -- and was
signed into law by the governor in September, 1992.
If, on the other hand, you do agree that this law is highly
questionable (if not downright objectionable), then let the
unanimity of this vote by the entire California State Legislature
be a reminder and measure of their best recent collective privacy
consciousness, and a rude wake-up call to action where it counts.
It's not hard to locate an appropriate elected respresentative to
whom to similarly express your views: if you live in California,
ANY CURRENT State Senator and Assemblyperson (barring any recent
mid-term special replacement elections) clearly voted to sweep
this bill into law -- yours, and every other single one of them.
I don't know how many of these 103 legislators directly represent
California readers of this newsgroup, but I think it would be a
compelling and powerful application of the "information
superhighway" (or even just our current "online two-lane
blacktop" :) if a large number of them were to suddenly hear from
concerned professional constituents on this issue, in writing
and/or by phone (and perhaps in some progressive cases, even by
Internet itself, where possible).
It would certainly appear that no one effectively expressed any
doubts or objections to any of these folks in August of 1992 --
if indeed anyone outside of the legislature and the requesting
agencies knew anything about the bill at all.
FYI, and thanks,
Bruce Steinberg
--------
THE CORRESPONDENCE:
////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
November 9th, 1993
Senator Henry J. Mello
Senate, California Legislature
701 Ocean Street, Room 318A
Santa Cruz, CA 95060-4096
Dear Senator Mello:
Thank you very much for your prompt November 5th letter of
response to my telephone call to your Santa Cruz office on
November 2nd regarding the new requirement of providing one's
Social Security Number to the DMV for application or renewal of
one's driver's license as well as automobile registration.
In your letter you explained that this requirement became law
under AB 1823 in 1992, and kindly provided an accompanying copy
of the bill for my information. (Actually, I already had a copy
of this bill, thanks to <...> in your office, with whom I spoke
when I first called.)
You also provided the telephone number of the DMV Public
Information Unit in Sacramento (916/657-6560) in case I needed
any further clarification of these requirements.
Unfortunately, however, there appears to be a miscommunication
about the purpose of my call, which I will attempt to restate and
clarify here.
Since both my latest license renewal and auto registration
apparently occurred before these requirements went into effect, I
only recently found out about this law through heated discussions
on the issue which have been occurring among computer
professionals on the Internet (e.g., the "comp.society.privacy"
newsgroup, if you or your staff have "Usenet" access).
I am personally very concerned for a variety of compelling
reasons about the creeping use of Social Security Numbers as
universal identification numbers, an application far afield of
their intended purpose of identifying Social Security and related
personal tax accounts.
Since this requirement is authorized by a new 1992 law, I assume
that it was passed by a majority vote of the legislature, and in
particular, that you participated in the vote, one way or the
other.
So in short, the reason for my call (and now the purpose of this
letter) is to ascertain:
(1) by what margin (and by whose votes) this bill became law,
(2) in particular, how you voted on this bill, and,
(3) how you stand on this issue today.
Without going into great detail here, the use of the Social
Security Number as a personal identifier provides relatively low
confidence in uniquely and accurately identifying individuals,
while unnecessarily providing a powerful key for compromising
one's privacy in matters involving confidential records in many
areas having no relation to the initial SSN solicitation.
* * *
Senator Henry J. Mello
November 8th, 1993
Page two
This is not some personal paranoid vision; one needs to look no
further than the Privacy Notice required by federal law when
Social Security Numbers are being solicited for any purpose to
confirm that potential for abuse is a serious legislative
consideration regarding the use of SSNs.
I understand that there are a number of arguable economic and
social motivations for wishing to use SSNs in this way (e.g.,
catching up with "deadbeat dads," among others), but I
strenuously object to this misuse of the SSN -- and its attendant
potential for abuse -- as an even greater long-term threat to our
society.
The "guilty until proven innocent" spirit of this requirement is
to me reprehensible. And as a "fishing expedition" by which all
applicants are screened for a variety of potential prior misdeeds
completely unrelated to their ability to drive or maintain a car,
it also reflects a major backslide in legislative privacy
consciousness and progress.
(I also find it incredible that the State of California still
cannot seem to enact a reasonable requirement of mandatory
insurance before registering and/or driving a car on its public
highways, but can enact a law to catch tax and child-support
scofflaws through DMV licensing procedures.)
A logical extension of this kind of thinking (which would
actually have more bearing on real driving issues) would be to
require applicants to submit for screening complete medical and
criminal records, family histories of substance abuse, and
consumer credit reports before being approved for license and
registration -- all in "confidence," of course. Where does it
stop?
As you are most likely aware, the entire issue of using SSNs as
universal identifiers of various kinds (particularly by state
governments) is controversial, and specious uses have in fact
been challenged and prohibited by court rulings.
One recent case worthy of note occurred in Virginia, where a
newly legislated requirement for providing SSNs in order to
register to vote was struck down as presenting too great a burden
on exercising one's right to vote by compromising one's
reasonable desire for assured privacy and SSN security (again,
with the "unique identifier" aspect presumably argued as a
compelling benefit in ensuring legitimately qualified, individual
voters).
I realize the long-standing principle in California (as
elsewhere) that "driving is a privilege, not a right." But I
still do not agree that this distinction gives the State the
right to force such coercive requirements on those who must
drive, but whose privacy principles and confidentiality concerns
are also both legitimate and reasonable.
I also think it's safe to presume that many people who truly fear
having some major misdeed being caught in a DMV SSN screen will
risk a misdemeanor of driving unlicensed and/or unregistered, and
we already have enough illegal and/or uninsured drivers on the
road as is.
I know I share the views of many other concerned citizens here
and I look forward to hearing from you at your earliest
convenience on this matter of personal importance. Please let me
know where you stand on this law, as well as your views on the
chances for its timely repeal.
Sincerely,
/s/ Bruce Steinberg
/////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
November 17, 1993
Bruce Steinberg
<...>
Aptos, CA 95003
Dear Mr. Steinberg:
Thank you for your letter of Nov. 9th, 1993, regarding your
concerns with AB 1823 which requires a person to provide their
social security number (SSN) when applying for a California
drivers license.
On January 1, 1992, legislation (AB 1823, Chapter 635, Statutes
of 1992) went into effect requiring social security numbers be
provided when applying for an original California drivers
license, and beginning January 1, 1993, California driver license
renewals also require a social security number. I voted in favor
of AB 1823 when it was presented on the Senate Floor. Both the
Senate and the Assembly voted in favor of this bill. The Senate
voted 35 to 0 and the Assembly voted 68 to 0.
I continue to support the requirement to use the Social Security
Number at the time of application and renewal of the driver's
license. If legislation is presented to repeal the requirement
for Social Security Number, I will have your letter in on file
for my reference as I hear testimony and prepare to cast my vote.
Again, thank you for sharing your concerns with me. Please do
not hesitate to contact me again on any state-related business.
Sincerely,
/s/ HENRY J. MELLO
Senate Majority Leader
HJM:dp
///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
--
Bruce Steinberg (uunet!sco!bruces, bruces@sco.com)
The Santa Cruz Operation, Inc.
"What if there were no hypothetical questions?"
------------------------------
From: Amit Zavery <az24+@andrew.cmu.edu>
Newsgroups: alt.security,comp.society.privacy,comp.org.eff.talk,talk.politics.crypto,sci.crypt
Subject: Voice authentication
Date: Sat, 27 Nov 1993 17:20:54 -0500
Organization: Masters student, Information Networking Institute, Carnegie Mellon, Pittsburgh, PA
Hi,
I am looking for information on any security system based on voice
authentication. So if anyone has knowledge of any implemented voice
authentication system then please let me know. I would also like to find
out what kind of problems people face using it and how successful is it
in authenticating users.
Thanks in advance
--Amit
------------------------------
End of Computer Privacy Digest V3 #083
******************************