Date: Sun, 03 Apr 94 10:40:41 EST
Errors-To: Comp-privacy Error Handler <owner-comp-privacy@uwm.edu>
From: Computer Privacy Digest Moderator <comp-privacy@uwm.edu>
To: Comp-privacy@uwm.edu
Subject: Computer Privacy Digest V4#048
Computer Privacy Digest Sun, 03 Apr 94 Volume 4 : Issue: 048
Today's Topics: Moderator: Leonard P. Levine
Re: Anonymous Phoning
Re: Anonymous Phoning
Re: Anonymous phoning
Re: Anonymous Phoning
Australian Gov't Regulation of BBSs
Telemarketing
Re: Clipper Chip
How does lack of Clipper change the "status quo"?
Re: Clipper Chip
Activist list subpoenaed
Protecting Privacy
What is legal?
The Computer Privacy Digest is a forum for discussion on the effect
of technology on privacy. The digest is moderated and gatewayed into
the USENET newsgroup comp.society.privacy (Moderated). Submissions
should be sent to comp-privacy@uwm.edu and administrative requests
to comp-privacy-request@uwm.edu. Back issues are available via
anonymous ftp on ftp.cs.uwm.edu [129.89.9.18]. Login as "ftp"
with password "yourid@yoursite". The archives are in the directory
"pub/comp-privacy". Archives are also held at ftp.pica.army.mil
[129.139.160.133].
----------------------------------------------------------------------
From: alexandr@fconvx.ncifcrf.gov (Jerry N. Alexandratos)
Date: 31 Mar 94 10:10:48 -0500
Subject: Re: Anonymous Phoning
Organization: Frederick Cancer Research and Development Center
Leonard: Italy has the telephone card system which you discussed. Ten
thousand Lira instead of ten dollars; the cards are read by a magnetic
strip reader only in certain telephones; and are sold in tobacco
shops. Otherwise, they're exactly what you described, and work very
well for Italy and Italians. There is absolutely no reason why this
will not work anywhere else. Ours could be based on the current
calling card protocols with *no* changes to hardware. Americans are
just getting used to credit and no privacy, that's all.
------------------------------
From: Bruce Taylor <blt+@CMU.EDU>
Date: 31 Mar 1994 13:49:21 -0500 (EST)
Subject: Re: Anonymous Phoning
Prof. L. P. Levine (levine@blatz.cs.uwm.edu) wrote: There is even
more. If the caller enters a *67 before dialing, then the card
vendor could keep no link between the incoming callerid and the
outgoing number. You then can call this 800 number from a
residence, and since the call is made out of the card owners pool
number, there is no sure trace possible of which incoming call was
connected to which outgoing call. If no data is kept, no
subpeonaed...
Unfortunately, *67 has no effect on whether the caller's number is
delivered to the 800 service. The caller's number is *always*
delivered to the 800 service account holder, either by paper or by more
realtime means.
One other point -- The carrier will also have copies of the ANI data
from a particular 800 account.
While there are certainly safguards of various sorts in place to
prevent random riffling thru the records, I would feel much safer with
the payphone method (call it "one call in a million" security).
[Moderator: There were several other people who pointed out my error:]
brumba@maize.rtsg.mot.com (Alan J. Brumbaugh) added:
This has been discussed several times in the comp.dcom.telecom group.
Many people seem unaware that an 800 number provides no privacy, and
there are no guarantees of what the recipient of your number will do.
roy@sendai.cybrspc.mn.org (Roy M. Silvernail) added:
Much more risky, actually. I'm afraid you have confused Calling Number
ID with Automatic Number Identification. CNID is a
residential/business option that can be blocked and typically only
operates within an exchange. ANI is the delivery of the originating
number as billing information. It's available on 800 lines (in real
time, if the purchaser wants it that fast), and it's _not_ blockable.
The 800 provider number will always know the originating phone number,
regardless of the *67 code being used.
------------------------------
From: Sharon Shea <sshea@world.std.com>
Date: 31 Mar 1994 17:48:32 -0500 (EST)
Subject: Re: Anonymous phoning
I can't agree that anonymous phone calling is a privacy right. While we
all agree that we want the right to privacy, we have to recognize where
that is - and is not - appropriate.
You (should) have the right to do your private thing in your own home,
or say, with your own stuff. However, when making a phone call, you
have engaged another person in the space that you are defining as a
private area.
If we're taking about your _home_, we can get into all the usual
privacy issues. But what about you entering mine? Do the same rights
follow you in my door, so to speak? It's pretty standard expectation
that if you want entrance to another's territory, you'd better be
prepared to present ID.
I think this concept extends to getting me on the phone. If you want to
engage My space, you have to concede that I have some rights as well.
Otherwise, what you are asking for is privacy in your territory - and
your privacy in mine.
Phone calling is obviously and act that requires more than one person.
Both people's rights have to be respected.
------------------------------
From: roedder@netcom.com (Spencer Roedder)
Date: 1 Apr 1994 00:17:10 GMT
Subject: Re: Anonymous Phoning
Organization: NETCOM On-line Communication Services (408 241-9760 guest)
Prof. L. P. Levine (levine@blatz.cs.uwm.edu) wrote: One of the
issues that is often addressed in privacy groups is that of
anonymous phone calls. Making calls from residences is now far
from private what with the presence of callerid capabilities.
I have always been a staunch advocate of privacy, but I find I come
down on the opposite side from a lot of people, who bemoan the lack of
privacy brought about by CallerID. They are concerned about the
caller's privacy; I find more to be concerned about in the callee's
privacy.
As I see it, the ability to make an anonymous phone call is a
historical anomaly which has only been with us for the last century.
Before that time, if you wanted to talk to someone you came to their
door or confronted them in public; the only alternative was the
much-maligned anonymous letter. I see CallerID as simply restoring the
historic status quo: the _right_ of a person "called to the door" of
his own home to know who is on the other side of the door.
I acknowledge two specific situations where the current assumption of
anonymity seems to serve society better. The most important one is the
need for people in certain rare situations, such as a battered women's
shelter, to make phone calls without identifying where they are. Such
organizations should be able to block CallerID. The other is the
concern that commercial establishments might use CallerID to collect
the IDs of people who contact them. This could be handled in several
ways: (1) Make a law against it (though who wants yet another law).
(2) Create a culture where it's just not the "right" thing to do, by
having people object strenuously to any actual _use_ of such a list.
(3) Minimize the value of such lists by making it illegal to sell
them. (4) Allow per-call blocking so that when I call an organization
that I _really_ don't want keeping track of me, I can explicitly block
it.
The one "fix" I don't think is right is the complete "per-line" block
of CallerID that has been made a condition for institution of CallerID
in some areas. To me, this tilts the scale too far toward the privacy
of the anonymous caller, which I previously pointed out is a historical
fluke.
------------------------------
From: "Prof. L. P. Levine" <levine@blatz.cs.uwm.edu>
Date: 31 Mar 1994 09:54:02 -0600 (CST)
Subject: Australian Gov't Regulation of BBSs
Organization: University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee
Copied from CUD the Computer underground Digest Wed Mar 30, 1994
(6:28). The privacy implications of this sort of this are obvious.
Date: 29 Mar 1994 14:35:32 +1000 (EST)
From: Mr Rhys Weatherley <rhys@FIT.QUT.EDU.AU>
Subject: File 3--Gov't Regulation of BBSes in Australia
Well, it's finally on. The Australian government has announced a task
force that is to develop options for regulating BBS'es here in Oz.
Attached is the call for submissions which was posted to the aus.*
newsgroups by Tom Worthington of the Australian Computer Society
(ACS). Tom has given me permission to re-post it here. Comments can
be posted to CuD, or sent to Roger Clarke who is preparing the ACS's
submission, or sent to me for my submission. Roger's e-mail address is
roger.clarke@anu.edu.au and mine is rhys@fit.qut.edu.au.
As odious as the prospect of BBS regulations are, there's not much that
can be done except ensure that the regulations address the concerns of
the net population rather than being railroaded through. I for one am
adamant that any regulations have built-in protections for the network
community alongside any control measures. Maybe we can get the
much-needed "common carrier" like protections if it is worded carefully
in the submissions.
I must say that I'm not surprised at this move by the government, given
the recent stories with the usual bogey-men of "computer porn" and
"information about making bombs" that the traditional media have been
reporting. Computer games were recently placed under the Australian
censorship scheme, and BBS'es were the next down the list. *sigh*
Any assistance would be greatly appreciated. Any ideas, no matter how
radical are welcome: I'll take care of toning them down from the
setting of "foaming-at-the-mouth lunatic" to just plain "lunatic". :-)
Once I have a draft, I'll be sure to post it to CuD for comments before
hitting the Australian government with it. The deadline for
submissions is 29 April 1994.
Cheers,
Rhys.
From: tomw@ccadfa.cc.adfa.oz.au (Tom Worthington)
Subject--Regulation of computer bulletin boards call for submissions
Summary: Australian Attorney-General investigating BBS regulations
Organization: Australian Defence Force Academy, Canberra, Australia
Date: 21 Mar 1994 03:26:45 GMT
ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S DEPARTMENT
Call for submissions on the regulation of computer bulletin boards
The Attorney-General and the Minister for Communications and the Arts
have established a joint Task Force to develop options for the
regulation of computer bulletin hoards.
SUBMISSIONS
The Task Force invites submissions from members of the public on
options for the regulation of computer bulletin board systems.
Submissions may include comments on the feasibility of a Code of
Practice governing the use of bulletin board systems.
TERMS OF REFERENCE
The Task Force is to consider alternatives for developing a regulatory
system that would:
* allow bulletin board users, parents and guardians to make informed
entertainment choices for themselves and those in their care: and
* provide adequate protection to children from material that mi~ht be
considered harmful or disturbing.
The Task Force is also to assess whether:
* existing Commonwealth offences covering the misuse of computers and
telecommunications services are adequate to deal with bulletin board
abuse;
* import/export restrictions are capable of controlling the
international trafficking and subsequent copying and distribution of
otherwise banned material;
* State and Territory laws such as those dealing with the misuse of
computers and possession of child pornography are adequate to deal with
bulletin boards;
* current law enforcement powers are adequate to deal with the new
technology; and
* specific offences should be enacted for the use of bulletin boards
for unlawful purposes.
For further information contact the Criminal Law Branch on (06) 250
6459.
Submissions can he sent to:
Bulletin Boards Taskforce
Criminal Law Branch
Attorney-General's Department
Robert Garran Offices
BARTON ACT 2600
Or via The Internet address:
bbs.taskforce@ag.ausgovag.telememo.au
Or via the X.400 address:
G=BBS,S=Taskforce,O=AG,PRMD=AUSGOVAG,ADMD=TELEMEMO,C=AU
Closing date: The closing date for submissions is Friday 29 April 1994
-------------------
Posted by Tom Worthington <tomw@adfa.oz.au>, Director of the Community
Affairs Board, Australian Computer Society Inc. Fax: +61 6 2496419, as
a public service. Please address enquiries and submissions to the
Taskforce's e-mail address <bbs.taskforce@ag.ausgovag.telememo.au> 21
March 1994
------------------------------
From: rccall@babel.ho.att.com (Chris Call 908-946-1133)
Date: 31 Mar 1994 19:45:36 GMT
Subject: Telemarketing
Organization: AT&T
I once saw an article (I believe in this newsgroup) about laws
governing the behavior of telemarketers; in particular, there was a
discussion of a law that requires telemarketers to supply their company
name and address, and to remove people from their mailing list if they
have called those people twice and the people ask to be "de-listed."
Can anyone post a reference to the law, or quote the law for me?
------------------------------
From: sutter@verisoft.com (Paul Sutter)
Date: 31 Mar 1994 14:38:48 +1700
Subject: Re: Clipper Chip
Much of the controversy over the Clipper Chip misses the real privacy
issue.
The real concern is that the government might attempt to BAN OTHER
FORMS OF ENCRYPTION! Clipper by itself is not a privacy problem as
compared to unencrypted communication.
Clipper itself causes NO LOSS IN PRIVACY. Point-to-point encryption is
virtually useless anyway on the internet, or on any future national
infobahn. Clipper is simply stupid, not frightening.
If Clipper were required in every modem, every communications device,
etc... the only problems are the additional expense to pay for that
extra hardware, the likely situation that clipper technlogy will trail
other developments and hinder the pace of progress in communications
equipment, and of course the administrative nightmare of tracking all
those keys. Will I have to register the serial number of every modem I
buy with the government? The paperwork is the nightmare. Especially for
something as irrelevent as Clipper.
The horror would be if the government tries to prevent the use of other
forms of encryption. Since only end-to-end encryption can be useful,
especially during authentication, and since this MUST BE IMPLEMENTED IN
SOFTWARE, Clipper cannot be an actual and useful encryption solution.
We just need to be sure the government, in its grand ignorance, doesn't
prevent us from implementing useful encryption.
Paul Sutter Verisoft
------------------------------
From: hoffman@xenon.stanford.edu (David Hoffman)
Date: 31 Mar 1994 23:52:17 GMT
Subject: How does lack of Clipper change the "status quo"?
Organization: Computer Science Department, Stanford University.
Last night I was at the Clipper debate at the Law school, and the
assistant U.S. attorney's arguments seemed to revolve around the claim
that the digital telephony bill and its buddy the Clipper chip don't
provide the government with any new wiretapping capability - it simply
allows them to keep their current ability to conduct legal wiretaps.
Maybe I was asleep when he explained this, but I don't understand how
failing to institute this bill would affect the status quo. Since he
repeatedly agreed that additional user-provided layers of strong
encryption would make federal wiretaps useless, how does a
government-encrypted government-tappable network differ from what we
have now? Assuming strong crypto for telephones etc. will come
commercially whether the digital telephony bill is passed or not, just
what ability is the bill supposed to prevent the FBI from losing?
I guess my bewilderment revolves around the government's claim that
non-Clipper cryptography will not be made illegal. And you know the
Feds wouldn't lie to you.
------------------------------
From: bernie@fantasyfarm.com (Bernie Cosell)
Date: 1 Apr 1994 04:40:26 GMT
Subject: Re: Clipper Chip
Organization: Fantasy Farm, Pearisburg, VA
Sixto Armando Roman writes: -Technology enables people to do
things that they could not do before. For example, the airplane
allowed people to travel all throughout the world. Well,
encryption also enables people to do something new. Thanks to
encryption, people are better able to protect their confidential
information on computer hard disks ...
This is mostly incorrect. The current opinion [based on the Federal
Rules of Evidence] is that if you are subpoenaed you will have to turn
over a *decrypted* version of the file [or go to jail for contempt, of
course]. I think it is more than a little hard to make a case [but
some of the more wild-eyed fanatics try] for how laudable it is to be
able to frustrate subpoenas.
-Now imagine a world in which the government places a camera inside
of each room in every home, in every auto, in every restaurant, in
every airplane, in every bathroom, in short-EVERYWHERE! The
government installs these to watch criminal activity.
Why would one want to imagine such an outrageous thing? That is almost
at the same level of crazy-fantasy as the "CHIPS worse that CLipper"
tempest in a teapot.
However, the government kindly establishes rules that prevent any
law-and-order government agent from turning on any camera
indiscriminately. In order to observe people's activities, police
officers and federal investigators must obtain warrants and access
to the central control rooms for these cameras.
Look, this kind of wild paranoia-mongering is really very off the
mark. There is *much* to criticize about Clipper, but this is _not_
one of the issues. Clipper doesn't open *ANY* avenue to observation by
LEOs with warrants that is not open _now_.
This whole 'camera' analogy is basically a load of hogwash.
-People will also feel uncomfortable communicating with others and
saving their records on disk if the government indeed establishes a
"clipper chip" in every encryption device used to prevent others
from seeing private information. People will be afraid to save
their tax information on disk for fear that someone will just be
able to break into it without any serious trouble.
Guess what: their tax information is almost certainly NOT now beyond
subpoena. The only real arena that clipper directly affects is
on-the-air digital communications [be it voice or fax]. And the real
issue THERE is nothing at all like the quesiton of a 'camera in every
john'.
If you voice any objection to anything intrusive that the
government does to protect the public, such individuals would say,
"What have you got to hide?"
Well, this is a double edged argument: first is clipper isn't really an
'intrusion' --- if/when you understand what is going on here, you'll
realize taht it is a _preemption_. Which is a very different [and more
subtle] matter.
Second, we've batted that around before. Back a long time ago [before
Prof Levine took over the newsgroup] we debated precisely that point.
It is remarkable how _difficult_ it is to make an argument in favor of
privacy. especially since [if you actually do some looking into it]
you'll see that it is done by _coercion_ rather than by _command_.
Folks will be constantly presented [**JUST** as they are now!!] with a
tradeoff of money/convenience/availability/functionaligy/whatever for
some bit of privacy. And the record is completely clear: left to their
own devices, folks unquestionably opt for the short-term-reward and the
sacrifice of privacy. [for example, you might ask yourself why a
secure-cordless-phone isn't a standard commodity? No problem with
standards and compatibility, since the only thing that matters is that
your handset and base cooperate. And there are _some_ available
[although none that are as secure as the real crypto-crazies would
prefer], but the fact is that overwhelmingly folks don't care: so what
if their neighbor can overhear their cordless phone, what matters is
that it was on sale at K-mart].
The point is that the discussion is MUCH more subtle than the rather
shallow "what have you got to hide". What you'll have to deal with is
"What have you got to hide that is worth $5/wk on your food bill" or
"what have you got to hide that is worth paying an extra $100 for your
next cellular phone? or "what have you got to hide that is worth
having to carry piles of cash around with you so you don't have to mess
with credit cards and checks" or .... In reality Clipper is just mre
of the same. MUCH more heavyhanded than most, but still just the
same-old tradeoff: you'll have the choice "send it in the clear", "get
a cheap and easily available clipperphone" or "go to some bother [and
expense] to get some fancy-phone which you may or may not be able to
call your mother on].
When the drug-testing debate was raging in the late 1980s,
supporters of these tests simply said, "What have you got to hide?
If you haven't done anything wrong, then you shouldn't worry about
a simple drug test. All that these tests are designed to do is
protect the public from hallucinating truck drivers, train
operators, etc."
-At face value, this argument is strong; however, drug tests are
unquestionably intrusive.
But once again, you manage to completely miss the point. there are *NO*
mandatory drug tests for civilians at the moment. The only folk who are
subject to drug testing are folk who:
1) practice a profession that is regulated by the Feds, or
2) whose employer chooses to impose such a test as a condition of
employment.
Private employers are free NOT to drug test their employees [and even
the drug-free-workplace act does not require testing... it just bluffs
employers into doing so, but if you consult the "great usenet piss test
list" you'll see that there are _plenty_ of places to work that have
not knuckled under.
Again, by truly exaggerating the case and really stomping roughshod on
the real issues, you make for a _very_ difficult discussion.
-How can the "What have you got to hide?" argument be more
effectively fought against with regard to the "clipper chip"?
After all, the "clipper chip" sounds like a simple wiretap. And
the government seems to be taking precautionary steps similar to
those required for conducting wiretaps that often only require
placing alligator clips on a phone line in order to intercept phone
conversations.
Actually, you're misinformed AGAIN. Clipper isn't taking
"precautionary steps similar" --- the administrative stuff people
wrangle about all comes *AFTER* the requirements for a wiretap are
met. So Clipper's red tape is *on*top* of those precautions. There is
nothing in Clipper to change the wiretap laws or make a
Clippered-wiretap anything other than a wiretap.
Certain segments of the government abused wiretapping through this
gigantic hole in privacy protection on telephone lines. However,
the courts and lawmakers eventually straightened things out enough
that the average phone user does not need to worry about being
indiscriminately monitored.
Hee hee. Folks who work with LEOs seem to think that there's a lot
more illegal wiretapping than you do. But regardless: Clipper will
*only*make* *it*harder*. Any protection or mechanism _in_place_now_
will still be in place, and if it is an effective disincentive now it
will, presumably, continue to be one. Clipper will make it *harder*
for Sheriff Opie to decide that you're a pain in the ass and just
cliplead in and see if you're up to anything nasty; perhaps not
_impossible_, but unquestionably _harder_ than it is now.
I hesitate to say that in your enthusiasm, I think you've managed the
nontrivial task of managing not to hit a _single_ substantive clipper
issue. You certainly got all the 20pt-headline ones, but those are,
and have always been, mostly off the mark. Those are SOP stuff on the
more hysteria-prone forums, but I'd hope that here we would focus more
on the _real_ issues and leave the grandstanding to the grandstanders.
There is MUCH to be discussed in and about clipper [the nature of
privacy and its general worth to the average person is a nontrivial
component of it!], and I'd just as soon we tried focusing on some of
those issues. [sample: it should be obvious that folks largely don't
care. They use credit cards, they order stuff over the phone, they
DONT particular express any market pressure for a secure cordless
phone, computer encryption stuff is mostly the realm of businessfolk
and paranoids, but hardly mainstream [would your sister-in-law encrypt
her recipe data base?]. This drum-thumping about privacy seems certain
to fall on deaf ears when folks _voluntarily_ care so little about
their own privacy? How can you convince people that going to some
bother and expense for "security" is worth it? Will just defeating
Clipper [especially with a tidal wave of misleading and largely
incorrect propaganda] serve that purpose? I'd say not [and worse, the
general-populace will really have not learned anything at all. If
anything, this kind of stuff will lead them to believe that they *have*
privacy _now_, which is of course a joke.
Same with Lotus Marketplace: the politically correct thumped the drum,
circulated petitions, organized marches, got on the evening news.
Totally obfuscated the real issues, just as here, and the result: the
crowed that they won the battle [when Lotus withdrew it] but the fact
is that they completely lost the war, since that info was trivially
available before, during and after the brouhaha. Ostrich activism at
its finest. And just as here with Clipper, I argued that they were
missing the point: they *MISSED* the chance to _educate_ the people.
To realize that Lotus Marketplace was the _messenger_ not the message,
and they should have tried to use the public outcry to _really_ address
the issues... but just it seems is the case with Clipper, they were
more interested in their agendas than they were in actually making a
_change_ for the better.
It is not too late to strike for _substance_ rather than _form_ in the
Clipper debate.
------------------------------
From: bruce@jise.isl.melco.co.jp (Bruce Hahne)
Date: 31 Mar 1994 22:46:55 -0600
Subject: Activist list subpoenaed
Organization: UTexas Mail-to-News Gateway
(Forwarded from the THESEGROUPS mailing list)
From: Steve Barber <sbarber@panix.com>
Subject: Activist list subpoenaed
Date: 31 Mar 1994 23:11:12 -0500 (EST)
The following from today's Edupage:
SMOKING OUT THE OPPOSITION Lawyers for the American Tobacco Co.
were granted a subpoena for the membership list of a computer
network used by anti-smoking groups. The move to acquire SCARCNet's
(Smoking Control Advocacy Resource Network) records is believed to
be the first legal action of this kind. The subpoena also demands
the names of those funding the network and copies of all posted
strategy sessions. Attorneys for the Advocacy Institute have filed
papers seeking to deny the subpoena on First Amendment grounds.
(Wall Street Journal 3/30/94 B1)
I don't know about you folks, but I thought subpoenas of this type were
outlawed 50 years ago when the Supreme Court found that a subpoena for
an NAACP membership list was an improper government intrusion upon the
freedom of association.
[Moderator: Reading the original article it is clear that the subpoena
was issued, but this only means that the information was requested.
There are legal steps yet to be taken.]
------------------------------
From: ahooper@eniac.seas.upenn.edu (hoop)
Date: 1 Apr 1994 20:44:43 GMT
Subject: Protecting Privacy
Organization: University of Pennsylvania
How worried are you about whether or not your privacy has been
compromised?
Do you use luggage tags without lids/covers?
Do you throw away your name and address on pieces of mail?
Do you use mail order?
Do you think about how someone could track your life through your
phone calls, credit card uses and/or other kinds of similar
electronically-recorded "convenience" items?
Basically, to what extent do you protect your own privacy?
Please email your responses to ahooper@eniac.seas.upenn.edu
Andy Hooper---------------University of Pennsylvania---------------
ahooper@eniac.seas.upenn.edu---------------------_--_ -_- .__o -
http://www.seas.upenn.edu/~ahooper/hoop.html---_- - _ _-\_<, -
"How can I miss you if you won't go away."_______-_-____(*)/'(*)__-
------------------------------
From: "John P. Quinn" <p00737@psilink.com>
Date: 1 Apr 94 16:47:34 -0500
Subject: What is legal?
Organization: QCADD
I have a few things happening to me that I feel are a bit strange but
I'm not quite sure if it's classified illegal or not. Perhaps some of
you out here can answer some of my questions. I'm going to itemize the
things that have happened in the recent past, they are:
1. Bugging my office.
2. Monitoring my office phone, who I called and who called me.
3. Going through the entire contents of my office, files and
everything, in the evening on a regular basis.
4. Finding my all passwords to the company computer system (I'm a MIS
Director) and then using them to get in and snoop around.
5. Opening all my mail and perhaps not being given some of it.
6. Going through the beeper records and calling numbers they don't
recognize and asking who they are and how do they know me.
These are most of the things that have been occurring that I aware of.
Please bare in mind that when answering to these outrages, that I have
nothing to hide. I know that you don't know that for sure, but for
arguments sake. Also take at face value that I'm not conducting illegal
business's or giving away secret information or anything of the
nature. Just for your information, All the items that have occurred
have happened behind my back, and I hav'nt said anything to them about
it, and they hav'nt said anything to me.
I feel that these items are crossing the line of was is legal. What do
you think? Also, why do you think a place of employment would practice
such a thing on someone that is just doing a normal good job and has
nothing to hide, hell they would have found it with the way they have
robbed me of my personal privacy. I think that this would piss anyone
off to no end no matter who they are and what they do, I just want to
know if it's legal or not and what can I do about it.
Thanks in advance...
****************************************************************************
John P. Quinn !!! MIS Director !!! XXXXX XXXXXXXXXXX XXXX !!!
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
Internet Email Address: p00737@psilink.com
****************************************************************************
------------------------------
End of Computer Privacy Digest V4 #048
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