Date: Fri, 22 Jul 94 11:01:30 EST
Errors-To: Comp-privacy Error Handler <owner-comp-privacy@uwm.edu>
From: Computer Privacy Digest Moderator <comp-privacy@uwm.edu>
To: Comp-privacy@uwm.edu
Subject: Computer Privacy Digest V5#011
Computer Privacy Digest Fri, 22 Jul 94 Volume 5 : Issue: 011
Today's Topics: Moderator: Leonard P. Levine
SSN Dial In Database
SSN Required by Sprint in U.S.
Re: University of New Mexico use of SSN as ID
Re: Companies Recording Phone Calls
Re: Government E-Mail Directive
On Authoritarian Information Technology
The Computer Privacy Digest is a forum for discussion on the effect
of technology on privacy. The digest is moderated and gatewayed into
the USENET newsgroup comp.society.privacy (Moderated). Submissions
should be sent to comp-privacy@uwm.edu and administrative requests
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with password "yourid@yoursite". The archives are in the directory
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[129.139.160.133].
----------------------------------------------------------------------
From: glr@ripco.com (Glen Roberts)
Date: 21 Jul 1994 16:27:21 GMT
Subject: SSN Dial In Database
Organization: RCI, Chicago, IL
It's done all the time. Mostly for profit! Your SSN is traded,
exchanged, sold and whatever else you can think of. There might be some
subtle benefit for you. But, others do it for the money. Like the
credit bureaus. They sell a trace of your SSN for the bucks.
Now, there is something new. SSN-BASE, a public, free, interactive SSN
database. It's easy to check out. Just call from your modem (2400
baud): (708) 838-3378.
--------------------------------------
Glen L. Roberts, Publisher, Directory of Elect Surv Equip Suppliers
Host Full Disclosure Live (WWCR 5,810 khz - Sundays 7pm central)
Box 734, Antioch, Illinois 60002 Fax: (708) 838-0316
Voice/FAX on demand: (708) 356-9646
------------------------------
From: Blout@aol.com
Date: 21 Jul 94 21:33:47 EDT
Subject: SSN Required by Sprint in U.S.
I recently called Sprint here in the United States to get one of their
voice activated phone cards. I was asked for my SSN number, to be used
as my calling card number. I asked the gentleman who was helping me if
it was required; I indicated that I did not like to give it out because
I felt it infringed on my privacy. He said that Sprint required my SSN
in order to issue a voice activated phone card; I could have a regular
card without giving my SSN.
--
Ben Blout blout@aol.com
------------------------------
From: Chuck Weckesser <71233.677@compuserve.com>
Date: 21 Jul 94 02:59:53 EDT
Subject: Re: University of New Mexico use of SSN as ID
With respect to state colleges and universities and the use of one's
SSN, I specifically informed the University of South Florida that they
were not in compliance with the Privacy Act with respect to the very
issue you have raised.
If your University does not comply with the Privacy Act, inform them;
if they do not respond, contact the Department of Education. While it
is true that it does in fact take some time for the federal government
to get around to addressing your complaint, all in due course I say.
Regards,
Chuck Weckesser
------------------------------
From: David Ruggiero <osiris@halcyon.com>
Date: 21 Jul 1994 06:04:18 GMT
Subject: Re: Companies Recording Phone Calls
Organization: Organizazed? _Me?_
tenney@netcom.com (Glenn S. Tenney) writes: Personally, I do NOT
want to have any of my phone calls recorded (unless absolutely
necessary). I have no assurances that AAA *only* uses the
recordings for those purposes. Does anyone share my concern that
this ever increasing recording of calls is a potentially
significant violation of our privacy...?
Sorry, nope, I regard this as unproductive paranoia. My calls to 911
are recorded, my calls to my mutual fund company are recorded, and my
calls to AAA are recorded. No big deal. As long as they're upfront
about it, I see this as both necessary and useful (protecting both
sides in a telephone order to sell stock at a certain price, for
example).
If you did business with a company through the mail, you'd certainly
expect that they'd save a copy of your letters and their replies. I
don't see a great deal of difference between saving a letter and
recording a phone call, at least in the cases I've described.
My every move is captured by your bank's security cameras each time I
enter the branch. I have no idea how long those tapes are kept or what
they're used for, either, but that doesn't make me stick my money in a
mattress instead. Some things aren't worth worrying about; YMMV.
--
David Ruggiero (jdavid@halcyon.com) Osiris Technical Services, Seattle WA
Nature bats last.
------------------------------
From: huggins@quip.eecs.umich.edu (Jim Huggins)
Date: 21 Jul 1994 14:34:48 GMT
Subject: Re: Government E-Mail Directive
Organization: University of Michigan EECS Dept.
Bob Inskeep <binskeep@crl.com> wrote: Two friends had been
corresponding with me via a Military and Government net. Both
recently stopped their e-mail with me and stated that they had
received a rather lengthy instruction prohibiting personal e-mail
on gov systems. I would like to obtain a copy of the instruction,
if it exists. Any help would be appreciated. Thanks.
I don't have any information on such an instruction, but it doesn't
sound all that unusual to me.
A couple of summers ago I worked for IBM in Austin, TX and got Internet
e-mail access in order to remain in touch with my thesis advisor back
at school. I was given permission given that I signed a statement
saying that I would 'greatly restrict' my use of personal e-mail on the
system (or words to that effect). (Actually ... the mailer I used that
summer had much stronger statements [i.e. NO personal e-mail] that were
shown each time I used it, but I disregarded them.) The theory being,
of course, that IBM wasn't paying for Internet access so that I could
talk for free with my girlfriend (now my wife).
I'm sure the reasoning is similar for the government.
--
Jim Huggins, Univ. of Michigan huggins@eecs.umich.edu
"You cannot pray to a personal computer no matter how user-friendly it is."
(PGP key available upon request) W. Bingham Hunter
------------------------------
From: Roger.Clarke@anu.edu.au
Date: 22 Jul 1994 07:54:28 -0500 (CDT)
Subject: On Authoritarian Information Technology
Taken from Computer underground Digest Wed July 20, 1994 [6:66]
ISSN 1004-042X
----------------------------------------------------------------------
Date: 23 May 1994 13:33:48 -0400 (EDT)
From: Stanton McCandlish <mech@EFF.ORG>
Subject: Roger Clarke on authoritarian IT
From--Phil Agre <pagre@weber.ucsd.edu>
Subject--Roger Clarke on authoritarian IT
INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY
WEAPON OF AUTHORITARIANISM OR TOOL OF DEMOCRACY?
Paper being presented at the IFIP World Congress, Hamburg, 31 August
1994
Roger Clarke
Department of Commerce
Australian National University
Canberra ACT 0200
Roger.Clarke@anu.edu.au
Strong tendencies exist to apply information technology to support
centralist, authoritarian world views. It is argued that alternative
architectures can be readily created, which are more attuned to the
openness and freedoms which are supposed to be the hallmarks of
democratic government. It is questioned whether authoritarianism will
be capable of surviving the complexities, dynamism and widely
distributed power which are features of the emergent information
societies.
Keyword Codes: H.1, J.1, K.4
Keywords: information systems; administrative data processing;
computers and society
1. INTRODUCTION
The genre of 'anti-utopian' novels described futures repugnant to
humanity. The classic image of an information-rich government
dominating citizens' thoughts and actions is associated with Zamyatin's
'We' (1922) and Orwell's '1984' (1948), but the technological basis of
the surveillance culture had been established as early as the late
nineteenth century by Jeremy Bentham's designs for a model prison,
incorporating the all-seeing and ubiquitous 'panopticon' (1791).
Foucault (1975) argued that the prison metaphor was the leitmotiv of
authoritarian society. Bradbury's 'Fahrenheit 451' (1953) and Umberto
Eco's 'The Name of the Rose' (1980) speculated on the process and
implications of denying information to the public.=20
Art anticipated reality. Information technology (IT) is now being
systematically applied to public administration in ways consistent with
the anti-utopian nightmare. This paper's purpose is to review the
authoritarian model as a basis for applying IT in government, and to
champion an alternative, democratic model of IT use.
2. AUTHORITARIANISM'S UNDERLYING ASSUMPTIONS AND VALUES
An authoritarian society favours obedience to Authority over individual
freedoms, to the extent of demanding subservience of the individual to
the State. The notion clusters with tyranny (the cruel exercise of
power), despotism and dictatorship (the exercise of absolute power),
totalitarianism (single-party government) and fascism (a usually savage
blend of authoritarianism with nationalism).
Authoritarianism is associated with logical positivist and utilitarian
philosophies. These perspectives place very high value on rational
social engineering, law and order, and resource efficiency. The
populace is perceived as unsophisticated, uneducated, unreliable,
chaotic, and/or incorrigibly venal and immoral. For their own good,
the organised State must impose control on the unruly people.
A further assumption of the authoritarian perspective is that there
exist humans with a level of both intelligence and morality superior to
the common herd. In different ideologies, their innate superiority
derives from different sources, such as the divine right of kings,
wealth, force of arms, mystical power, what Machiavelli called virt=FA,
wisdom, intellectual merit, technical capability, political cunning,
demagogery, and/or public popularity. These superior humans are
accepted as being the appropriate ones to make judgements on behalf of
their society, with a minimum of checks and balances. They do this
through social engineering; that is to say by organising and
re-organising society in what they consider the rational way of
achieving order and efficiency, and hence of delivering material
well-being, and therefore spiritual happiness, for all.
3. THE AUTHORITARIAN MODEL OF I.T. APPLICATIONS
Under an authoritarian regime, the populace must be managed. Tools and
techniques that have proven effective in managing raw materials,
manufactured goods and animals, can be applied to humans too. A unique
identifier for each person, and its general use by government agencies
and other organisations which conduct transactions with people, are
highly desirable tools for efficient social administration. Public
administration systems must be designed to exercise control over
people, in all of their various roles. There may be scope for at least
some semblance of choice by individuals, but employees need to operate
within a corporate culture, consumer demand needs to be statistically
predictable, and citizens' freedom of choice needs to be constrained,
lest unworkable parliaments eventuate, with too many splinter parties,
independents and conscience votes.
It is only logical that an authoritarian society should recognise the
benefits of a unary executive branch, in which the boundaries between
agencies are porous. In this way, data can flow freely (such that
transaction data and client histories can be cross-verified, and
changes of address and status cross-notified), and systems can be
tightly integrated and efficient (and hence misdeameanours by people in
one arena, such as traffic fines, can be readily punished through
another, such as denial of a marriage licence, permission to move
apartments, or approval for travel).
Authoritarian IT-based systems use a centralised architecture.
Elements may be physically dispersed, however, to achieve efficiency
in data transmission, and to provide resilience against localised
threats such as natural disasters and sabotage by dissidents. The
general shape of such systems is that provided by cyberneticians: a
cascade of control loops, culminating in a master-controller. In
authoritarian regimes, information privacy and data security play
important roles. These have little to do with the protection of
people, however, but rather serve to protect the integrity of data, and
of the system, and to legitimate the repressive system through the
provision of nominal rights for data subjects.
for discussions of the authoritarian application of technology in
general, see Ellul (1964) and Packard (1964), and of IT in particular,
see Rule (1974), Weizenbaum (1976), Kling (1978), Rule et al. (1980),
Burnham (1983), OTA (1986), Laudon (1986), Clarke (1988), Davies (1992)
and Ronfeldt (1992, pp.277-287).
4. INSTANCES OF AUTHORITARIAN APPLICATION OF I.T.
The reader is by now (hopefully) annoyed by the extent to which the
foregoing description has been a caricature, hyperbole, a 'straw man'
designed to be easily criticised. However there are manifold instances
of just these features in IT-based public administration systems, both
those in operation and being conceived, in countries throughout the
world. In North America, whose use of IT has been well ahead of that
in most other countries, a 'national data center' was proposed as early
as 1966. Elements of it have emerged, such as the widespread use of
the Social Security Number (SSN) as a unique identifier, proposals for
a health id card, and the all-but uncontrolled use of computer matching
and profiling. Some protagonists in the current debates surrounding
the national information infrastructure (NII) are seeking a network
consistent with authoritarian control; for example, by insisting on
use only of those cryptographic techniques which are 'crackable' by
national security agencies.
Australia has followed the North American tendency. It flirted with a
national identification scheme in the late 1980s (Greenleaf & Nolan
1986, Clarke 1987, Graham 1990). When that was overwhelmingly rejected
by the populace, senior executives in public sector agencies 'went
underground'. They have variously gained Parliamentary support for,
and smuggled through, a series of measures whose cumulative impact is
in some ways already more emphatic than the 'Australia Card' would have
been (Clarke 1992).
The cultures of many Asian nations are well-suited to authoritarian
regimes. There are elements of high-social-efficiency applications of
IT in such nations as Singapore. Busy Asian countries have shown
especial interest in vehicle monitoring systems. Thailand and the
Phillipines appear eager to act as laboratories for United States
corporations developing identification and surveillance technologies.
Under China's strongly authoritarian political system, it is unlikely
that IT will be applied in any way other than to bolster existing
relationships between its citizens and the State.
In Western Europe, Scandinavian countries lead the way with their
social welfare systems and the heavy dependence of their citizens on
the State. Denmark's citizen register is a model for authoritarian
regimes everywhere, and a looming export success. Other countries are
keenly adopting proposals to use IT to constrain the populace, by such
means as identification cards (variously for football fans, patients,
and the public in general), and the integration of data systems between
government agencies, and between countries within and beyond the
European Community.
In Central and Eastern Europe, there was an expectation that
democratic, free enterprise systems would arise to replace the
authoritarianism of the collapsed communist regimes. In practice, few
of those countries have ever known freedom of choice, and genuine
democracy (as distinct from variants of authoritarianism referred to in
local lexicons as 'democracy') is not on the agenda of many of these
countries. Their focus is on economic growth, rationalist solutions to
economic and social problems, and centralism. IT is seen as a tool of
authoritarianism, not of democracy; of centralised power, not of a
pluralist body politic; and of control, not of freedom.
It can come as no surprise that public administration systems are being
conceived in these ways. Applications of all kinds are developed by
well-trained and self-confident engineers, using unequivocally
rationalist techniques. System design comprises the expression of
relevant parts of the present and near-future world in a formal model
which has the important characteristic of being 'mappable' onto a
machine. The application's users and 'usees' (i.e. the people affected
by it) are treated as objects to be modelled, not as stakeholders with
interests in the process and its outcomes. Human language is treated
as though it were an (imprecise) formalism, rather than a means of
interaction among people. The designers fail to notice that their
formalisms cannot reflect the complexities, ambiguities and dynamism
inherent in social systems, and the negotiation and accommodation
processes which take place among humans and social groups (Clarke
1992b, Ciborra 1992, Agre 1994, Gronlund 1994).
Hence the problems highlighted in this paper are to a considerable
degree inherent in the techniques currently used to develop IT
applications generally. Nonetheless, their greatest impact on people's
freedom is by way of public administration systems.
5. THE DEMOCRATIC ALTERNATIVE
The technological determinism notion has been applied to IT. In
particular, IT has been accused of being inherently de-humanising,
centralist and authoritarian (e.g. Roszak 1986). The standpoint
adopted by this author is that technology is essentially morally
'ambivalent' (i.e. it has potential applications and potential impacts
variously supportive of, and inimical to, any particular social value -
Ellul, 1990). IT may make some paths easier than others, but the
choice is made not by blind fate, but by politicians, government
executives, and, not least, IT professionals.
The alternative political philosophy to authoritarianism is democracy,
popularly expressed as 'government of the people by the people for the
people', and commonly implemented through representatives chosen
regularly and frequently by the combined and equal vote of all
competent adults. The democratic ideal derives from the assumption
that no class of people has the right to dominate other classes. It
reflects the renaissance conception of mankind, whereby each individual
should have the opportunity to access and interpret for themselves the
ideas of other people and of Gods; and, in more modern terms, should
have the scope for self-determination and self-fulfilment.
Early computer technology may indeed have encouraged centralisation,
but since the marketplace debut of integrated circuitry and the
mini-computer about 1970, modern IT has been readily applied in the
service of democracy. Open IT-based systems involve nodes which are
'peers', with equal authority in respect of particular functions. For
example, in a national health network, each node might take
responsibility for all processing and storage relating to a particular
aspect of the system's functionality (e.g. support of a particular
regional clinic, or epidemiological research into a particular class of
diseases), and have special rights recognised by all other nodes in
that regard (e.g. the right of access, respectively, to identified data
relating to specific patients, and to identifiable data relating to
particular diseases and procedures). Similarly, particular kinds of
data held at each node (e.g. data identifying a patient) might be
recognised as being controlled by that node and require special
authority before it could be released to any other node.
One form of democratic topology is the unconstrained network, with
maximum inter-connectivity, and dominion by each node over the services
it provides. Another model is a variant on simple-minded cybernetics:
a cascade of controllers which folds around, such that the ultimately
controlled (the populace) are also the ultimate controllers (the
voters). Before modern communications became available, the only
practicable democratic mechanism for geographically large countries was
periodic (typically, 3- or 4-yearly) election of representatives. In
information societies of the very near future, however, major policy
decisions can be instigated, formulated, and decided by direct
democracy. Voters may choose to delegate the articulation of broad
policies to their elected representatives, but even this can be subject
to the over-riding of unpopular decisions, and the removal of
representatives the electorate considers are not performing their
functions.
Hierarchical topologies serve authoritarianism, whereas
non-hierarchical ones are consistent with a free society. Access to
data under the control of each node must be restricted, until and
unless, via due process, disclosure is justified in fulfilment of some
higher interest. Such topologies provide not only robustness and
adaptability, but also integrity, because clients can trust them, and
there is a lower risk of loss of quality (through suspicion and
uncooperativeness), and of sabotage (through active attempts to
mislead, and direct, destructive action).
6. INSTANCES OF DEMOCRATIC APPLICATION OF I.T.
Is this image of democratic computing just a caricature too? Possibly,
but examples exist. Local Area Network architectures are inverting the
old notion of centralist processors accessed by terminals. The
now-conventional names reflect the fact that 'client' workstations
demand data and processing from 'servers': the user's device is in
control, and the central facility performs at its bidding. In
wide-area networking also, peer-to-peer protocols are rivalling and may
be progressively replacing the older, hierarchical or 'star'
configurations. At the level of inter-networking, the topology of the
world-wide TCP/IP-based Internet is essentially flat, the systems
software is highly distributed, the redundancy is very high, and its
robustness, its resilience and its capacity to resist authoritarian
governments are therefore all of a high order.
The Internet's technical features have resulted in a culture very
different from that on hierarchical nets. It provides a space in which
imaginations have substantial freedoms. Some people use those freedoms
to create new services and products; others to experiment with
self-expression and group-experiences; some as a 'cybernetic' analogue
to psychotropic drugs; and some just to distribute pornography or
racist materials. Nor are the boundaries between these activities
always clear-cut.
It seems ironical that the Internet was sponsored by the United States
military complex, but the irony is more apparent than real. Systems
which support military operations cannot risk the fragility of
centralisation, but rather demand robustness and resilience, and
therefore redundancy. Moreover, aero-space-defense R. & D. is
dispersed across vast numbers of universities and private sector
research laboratories. It then seeks to complement competition by
collaborative interaction among individual researchers and among
potential research partners. To retain its technological and
intellectual leadership, it was essential that the U.S.A. avoid the
temptation to sustain centralised, authoritarian topologies; and to its
credit it knowingly spawned a dynamic, world-wide, democratic network
laboratory.
7. A SYNTHESIS
This paper has considered the extremes of authoritarianism and
democracy. Clearly, any society will demand not only freedoms, but
also protections against those who use those freedoms to harm others.
Naive authoritarian models are doomed to fail, because they deny
freedoms; and naive democratic models are doomed to fail too, because
they deny protections. Ronfeldt concluded that IT-based public
administration (which he calls 'cyberocracy') "far from favoring
democacy or totalitarianism ... may facilitate more advanced forms of
both" (1990, p.283). How should new 'cyberocracies' be designed, and
how should existing public administration systems be adapted to exploit
the new opportunities, while balancing the needs for control and
freedom?
Authoritarian aspects of schemes could be justifiable in some societies
as interim measures. Lenin and then Stalin judged that the country's
large peasant population, and its institutions, were insufficiently
mature for immediate implementation of the full Communist platform.
Unfortunately the repression inherent in their interim arrangements
became ingrained, and was only relieved by counter-revolution.
Authoritarian elements in public administration should therefore be not
only justified, but also demonstrably interim, i.e. the means must be
shown whereby they will be replaced, by evolutionary processes, with
alternative mechanisms consistent with democratic principles.
In any case, the feasibility of grafting democratic features onto an
essentially hierarchical model must be regarded as very slim. All
power vests in the centre, and any softening of the system's features
is by gift of the powerful. Moreover, the system can be manipulated by
the powerful (for example, by monitoring nominally confidential
communications), and privileges can be withdrawn by the powerful. No
freedom-loving populace could regard such a system as credible, and
would therefore only submit to it as a result of coercion.
Is the alternative feasible: to graft control mechanisms onto an
essentially open model? Communication channels can still be tapped and
storage devices searched (under warrant). Evidence arising from such
interceptions and searches can still be presented in a court of law.
Certain actions and uses of IT can be expressly made illegal. The ex
post facto controls can therefore still function within open,
democratically conceived public administration. Toffler distinguished
this form of IT application by coining the term 'practopia' (1980,
p.368).
What is not so simple to contrive within open systems is effective
real-time monitoring and control: Foucault's 'prison' is readily
implemented using hierarchical topologies, but if the nodes and arcs of
networks are not all under the control of Authority, then preventive
controls become much harder to bring to fruition. That, then, is the
essential battleground between authoritarian and democratic models of
IT: should someone or some class of people, and in particular
politicians and senior public sector executives, be permitted to have
the power to prevent transgressions? Because it is that kind of
control over the public which is at the very heart of the anti-utopian
nightmare.
8. CONCLUSIONS
Power does not need to be explicitly and consciously granted to public
administrators by the voting public, or by their elected
representatives. It can accrue, slowly and gently, through
developments in IT, through new applications of established techniques,
through the gradual 'creep' of existing schemes into new functions, and
through seemingly harmless refinements to statutes. As frogs are
reputed to do, a society might resist being put into boiling water, yet
be lulled to sleep in warm water slowly brought to the boil.
This paper commenced by referring to early literary premonitions of
authoritarian applications of IT. The fictional literature has
undergone a transition. The turning-point was John Brunner's 'The
Shockwave Rider' (1975), which explicitly owed a debt to Alvin
Toffler's 'Future Shock' (1971). For much of the novel, the hero
appears to be putting up a brave fight against inevitable defeat by the
State. By turning the power of the net against its sponsors, the hero
discovers pockets of surviving resistance, and galvanises the latent
opposition to the State. Unlike anti-utopian novels, the book ends on
an ambiguous, but (from the humanistic perspective) an optimistic
note.
Subsequent novels have adopted a quite different pattern. In such
works as William Gibson's 'Neuromancer' (1984), and the 'cyberpunk'
genre it spawned (see Sterling 1986), people are prosthetic-enhanced
cyborgs, plug directly into the net, and induce their 'highs' through a
mix of drugs and cyberspace. More importantly for the argument being
pursued here, national and regional governments exercise very little
power. The hypercorps (successors to the transnational corporations)
are responsible for organised economic activity, the majority of the
net, and a great deal of the information. Outside this limited, polite
society skulk large numbers of people, in communities in which formal
law and order have broken down and tribal patterns have re-emerged.
Officialdom has not been able to sustain the myth that it was in
control; society has become ungovernable.
Little echoes of these patterns are evident in contemporary societies.
The use of the Internet for anti-social purposes is proving much harder
to control than similar behaviour using the telephone network. IT
contributed significantly to the breakdown of the Soviet Union because,
in addition to improving production effectiveness and efficiency, PCs
delivered 'samizdat' - the means for cheap reproduction of dissident
newsletters. Lies that had been lived for seven decades could not
withstand the heat generated by eager users of a potentially
democratising technology. And that was before inter-networking and
computer-mediated communications had achieved any degree of
sophistication.
IT may be applied to public administration in ways consistent with
authoritarianism or with democracy. Proponents of hierarchical
structures and social engineering, chief amongst them senior public
sector executives, must at the very least appreciate the limits of
tolerance of authoritarian measures within their society. Preferably,
governments should ensure that social administration schemes are not
emphatically centralised and incapable of adaptation towards more
liberal patterns. And most desirably, public servants, governments and
voters themselves, should be exploiting the opportunities for more
effective democracy which are being created by information technology.
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End of Computer Privacy Digest V5 #011
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