Date: Sat, 03 Sep 94 08:30:15 EST
Errors-To: Comp-privacy Error Handler <owner-comp-privacy@uwm.edu>
From: Computer Privacy Digest Moderator <comp-privacy@uwm.edu>
To: Comp-privacy@uwm.edu
Subject: Computer Privacy Digest V5#030
Computer Privacy Digest Sat, 03 Sep 94 Volume 5 : Issue: 030
Today's Topics: Moderator: Leonard P. Levine
Re: Online Stalking
Re: Online Stalking
Cordless Phone Privacy
Big Brother (not just) on the Autobahn
Re: Post Office Boxes
INS Signs Deal to Help Catch Illegals
Re: Bank Account Numbers
Re: Bank Account Numbers
Re: Internet White Pages
Re: Internet White Pages
Databases, was DM News Article
Re: Electronic Cash
Re: WA State DOT "Congestion Pricing" Project
Re: Fingerprinting/Identifying Children
---------------------------------------------------------------------
Housekeeping information is located at the end of this Digest.
----------------------------------------------------------------------
From: beuchaw@ocdis01.tinker.af.mil (Brian Beuchaw)
Date: 01 Sep 94 10:15:01 -0500
Subject: Re: Online Stalking
"BETH GIVENS" <B_GIVENS@USDCSV.ACUSD.EDU> writes: Regarding "What
can one do with an e-mail address...Try to stalk me? Haha." We got
a call on the Privacy Rights Clearinghouse hotline last year from
a woman who was being stalked via e-mail at her job. The stalker
worked on the same campus and also made his presence known in the
building in which she worked. Because of the persistence of the
messages and the threats they contained, she left her job and
moved to another city. -- Beth Givens, PRC
David A. Honig writes: How could the stalker send email and not
incriminate herself? The stalker would need to be root to go
around the mailers and systems can be set up to log who becomes
root, unless the stalker is cleverer than the rest of the sysops.
The stalker could remain unincriminated very easily. There are quite a
few anonymous remailers (and a World Wide Web server) that a person
could use. The remailers generally strip off the userid, but leave the
site that the original email came from in the header (although I
understand that some strip all the headers).
Brian Beuchaw
beuchaw@ocdis01.tinker.af.mil
------------------------------
From: jya@pipeline.com (John Young)
Date: 01 Sep 1994 17:29:24 -0400
Subject: Re: Online Stalking
Organization: The Pipeline
"BETH GIVENS" <B_GIVENS@USDCSV.ACUSD.EDU> writes: Regarding "What
can one do with an e-mail address...Try to stalk me? Haha." We got
a call on the Privacy Rights Clearinghouse hotline last year from a
woman who was being stalked via e-mail at her job.
A federal bill has been introduced to prohibit electronic harassment:
From: "EUGENE VOLOKH" <VOLOKH@law.ucla.edu>
To: Multiple recipients of list <cyberia-l@birds.wm.edu>
Subject: A bill amending the telephone harassment statute to cover e-mail
FULL TEXT OF BILLS
103RD CONGRESS; 2ND SESSION
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
AS INTRODUCED IN THE HOUSE
H. R. 5015
1994 H.R. 5015; 103 H.R. 5015
SYNOPSIS:
A BILL To amend section 223 of the Communications Act of 1934 to
prevent the harassment by computer modem or other electronic device.
DATE OF INTRODUCTION: AUGUST 21, 1994
DATE OF VERSION: AUGUST 24, 1994 -- VERSION: 2
SPONSOR(S):
Mr. MFUME introduced the following bill; which was referred to
the
Committee on Energy and Commerce
TEXT:
A BILL To amend section 223 of the Communications Act of 1934 to
prevent the harassment by computer modem or other electronic device.
* Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the
United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. This Act may by cited as the "Electronic
Anti-Stalking Act of 1994".
SEC. 2. AMENDMENT. Section 223(a) of the Communications Act of 1934
(47 U.S.C. 223(a)) is amended by adding at the end thereof the
following new sentence: "For purposes of subparagraphs (B), (C), and
(D), the terms 'telephone' and 'telephone call' include communications
by means of computer modem or any other two-way wire or radio
telecommunications device.".
FYI, I also attach the text of 47 USC 223(a):
| 223. Obscene or harassing telephone calls in the District of
Columbia or in interstate or foreign communications
(a) Whoever-- (1) in the District of Columbia or in interstate or
foreign communication by means of telephone--
(A) makes any comment, request, suggestion or proposal which is
obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, or indecent;
(B) makes a telephone call, whether or not conversation ensues,
without disclosing his identity and with intent to annoy, abuse,
threaten, or harass any person at the called number;
(C) makes or causes the telephone of another repeatedly or
continuously to ring, with intent to harass any person at the called
number; or
(D) makes repeated telephone calls, during which conversation
ensues, solely to harass any person at the called number; or
(2) knowingly permits any telephone facility under his control to be
used for any purpose prohibited by this section,
shall be fined not more than $ 50,000 or imprisoned not more than
six months, or both.
-- Eugene Volokh, Acting Professor, UCLA Law School
------------------------------
From: Shawn Leard <71370.2551@compuserve.com>
Date: 02 Sep 94 23:24:16 EDT
Subject: Cordless Phone Privacy
I am in the process of pondering over purchasing one of these 900 MHz
cordless phones and was wondering if anyone has any recommendation?
What I am mainly looking for besides good reception is a very solid &
secure Tx between the handset and the base. This being unlike the
normal cordless phones that Tx in the 400 MHz band and offer so called
secure Tx that can still be picked up and understood with a normal
scanner.
Thanks,
Shawn Leard
------------------------------
From: anonymous posting <levine@cs.uwm.edu>
Date: 03 Sep 1994 12:00:00 -0500 (CDT)
Subject: Big Brother (not just) on the Autobahn
Dear Moderator:
Please remove my return address from this message.
The following excerpt is from the newsgroup: sci.military
Subject: AF News Svc 30 Aug 94
Sender: military@ranger.daytonoh.ncr.com (Sci.military Login)
Organization: Hq Air Force News Agency/SCX
Date: 31 Aug 1994 16:19:13 GMT
616. Rome to aid highway managers
GRIFFISS AFB, N.Y. (AFNS) --- America's highways should become
less congested as the result of signal processing and computer
technologies developed at the Air Force Material Command's Rome
Laboratory here.
Rome Laboratory entered into an agreement in July with federal and
New York transportation agencies to pioneer development of an
automated traffic monitoring system. The system will assist
traffic managers in planning for --- and relieving --- congestion
on major U.S. highways.
The system will make use of advanced signal processing, neural
network and distributed systems technology, all of which are major
technology areas to Rome Laboratory.
By employing video sensors, processors, communications services,
and a closed-loop feedback system to monitor expressway traffic,
engineers will be able to gain insight into congestion build- up,
officials say. This will permit early action --- such as
electronic messages to motorists or altering traffic signals ---
to reduce or eliminate problems caused by accidents, poor weather
conditions or peak driving periods.
Rome Laboratory will serve as the executive agent and will have
the primary responsibility for managing the program. The Federal
Highway Administration will provide funding, while the New York
transportation department will provide housings for the monitoring
sensors, technical services and expertise to assist with the
operational aspects of installing and testing the system.
[Obviously the USAF is putting a "government is your friend" spin on
this story, but this program is just a small step from more draconian
forms of surveillance.]
------------------------------
From: "Dennis G Rears (FSS" <drears@pica.army.mil>
Date: 01 Sep 1994 14:53:53 GMT
Subject: Re: Post Office Boxes
Organization: U.S Army ARDEC, Picatinny Arsenal, NJ
Re: the article about PO boxes. There are actually two issues here:
1. The Post Office releasing your address
2. Somebody finding out your address
Issue #1: USPS regulations state that to have a PO box the USPS must
have your current "real address". To get the Box you must give them
your address and they then send you a card at the address which you
bring in for your Box. One way around this is to have the card go to
your work address or your friend's house. In my case I have moved six
times since I originally got my PO Box. I have never given USPS an
updated address.
Issue #2: Ok, you have gone to USPS and they don't have my correct
address. You then try through the phone company (one of my numbers is
listed) the address is most likely in the phone book. That doesn't
work. You do social engineering through the electric or gas company.
If the person owns property you check various tax records in
communities around the PO box town. That doesn't work. You then wait
untiul the person picks up the mail and follow them.
dennis
------------------------------
From: "Mich Kabay [NCSA Sys_Op]" <75300.3232@compuserve.com>
Date: 01 Sep 94 13:22:42 EDT
Subject: INS Signs Deal to Help Catch Illegals
The major newswires (AP, UPI, Reuter) all carried stories on 94.08.30
concerning the largest contract in the history of the U.S. Immigration
and Naturalisation Service (INS). The $300 million, five-year contract
with Electronic Data Systems Corp (EDS) will speed up border agents'
work by eliminating paperwork and manual data re-entry.
The new systems will also link INS computers with those of other
agencies; e.g., the FBI. Database linkages will help identify
criminals and reduce fraud, said the press reports.
[MK comment: it will be interesting and important to monitor this
project to protect highly confidential and critical data and to prevent
unauthorized tampering with the files.]
M.E.Kabay,Ph.D./DirEd/Natl Computer Security Assn (Carlisle, PA)
P.S. COMPUTER PRIVACY participants who have access to CompuServe's
NCSAFORUM will find interesting discussions in our Ethics/Privacy
section.
------------------------------
From: day11@aol.com (DAY11)
Date: 01 Sep 1994 16:18:06 -0400
Subject: Re: Bank Account Numbers
Organization: America Online, Inc. (1-800-827-6364)
Bank One informed me that if you ARE goint to let a company withdraw
funds from your account through ETF, it is VERY IMPORTANT that you
include an EXACT AMOUNT on your agreement with the company.
Banks can only stop an ETF by an amount number, so if your payment
amount is 150.00 and you decide to stop the draw, a company CAN
withdraw $149.99, and it will go through (unless your agreement says
$150.00)
------------------------------
From: glr@ripco.com (Glen Roberts)
Date: 01 Sep 1994 23:27:55 GMT
Subject: Re: Bank Account Numbers
Organization: Ripco Internet BBS, Chicago (312) 665-0065
Albert Zhou (skypatrl@crl.com) wrote: If the bank decides not to
give you money back, then you have to try to collect it, possibly
taking them to court. If it's a small amount, you probably don't
want to spend a lot of legal fees to pursue it. So you lose money.
If it's a charge on the credit card, you can simply refuse to
pay. To get money from you, the credit card company has to
initiate legal actions against you. If it's small amount, or if
they don't think they can won, they'll just forget about it. So you
DON'T lose money.
See the difference?
I am not sure it is an EFT transfer either. What the telemarketers do,
is collect the account number and bank number information (from the
bottom of the check) and send that information, along with the amount
to a service bureau that prints a fascimile check. It looks like the
real thing, has encoded numbers at the bottom like the real thing. A
deposit slip is written up by the merchant and the back is endorsed
like the real thing. Just, it wasn't written nor signed by the issuer.
--
Glen L. Roberts, Editor, Full Disclosure Magazine
Host Full Disclosure Live (WWCR 5,810 khz - Sundays 7pm central)
email glr@rci.ripco.com for information on The Best of Full Disclosure,
four volumes to blow your mind. Voice/Fax on demand: (708) 356-9646
email for uuencoded .TIF of T-Shirt Honoring the FBI
------------------------------
From: hedlund@teleport.com (M. Hedlund)
Date: 01 Sep 1994 14:55:29 -0700
Subject: Re: Internet White Pages
Organization: Teleport - Portland's Public Access (503) 220-1016
Shawn Leard <71370.2551@compuserve.com> wrote: Could someone
please post the e-mail address to be taken off the Internet White
Pages?
To remove yourself:
delete@whitepages.com
*Be sure to send a message from each account you use!*
To add yourself:
add@whitepages.com
To speak your mind:
comments@whitepages.com
Obviously, changes will only take effect if and when a second edition
is published. I know of no deadline to pull yourself from the second
edition; yet another reason why I wish these people would post a
monthly announcement to news.announce.important. (They never responded
to my request that they do so.)
<hedlund@teleport.com>
------------------------------
From: Paul Robinson <PAUL@tdr.com>
Date: 02 Sep 1994 12:53:05 -0500 (EST)
Subject: Re: Internet White Pages
Organization: Tansin A. Darcos & Company, Silver Spring, MD USA
John Medeiros <71604.710@compuserve.com>, writes:
skypatrl@crl.com (Albert Zhou) writes: What can one do with an
e-mail address? Sending junk mails? They are much easier to
dispose than paper junk mails. Try to stalk me? Haha..
Tempt not fate, lest those with less regard for you fill (as in
several thousand messages) your electronic mailbox with material
that an old sailor would find objectionable. Then again, if you
don't mind sifting through to find your mail, I guess its okay.
Personally, I'd be mad.
In alt.sex.stories is an article entitled "The Engineer: Scorched
Earth" which, if it hopefully has expired by now, is the kind of thing
that gives a bad name to Internet. I have a copy of the article as
well as my own replies to it, and I'll send it on to anyone that wants
to read it. Let me warn you, if you have any decency at all the story
will sicken you. The damn thing facinated me the way a mongoose
fascinates a rattlesnake, however. If I wanted to list the worst, most
vile and degrading things that could be done to someone, I couldn't
have thought up even 1/2 of the things that appear in that article.
"Stalk you", laugh not, remember, he who laughs last, laughs best.
Some of the crackers around us are quite capable of doing just
that.
Everything that someone can do to you in the "real world" can be
done to you here. Well, almost everything.
After reading "The Engineer: Scorched Earth" I realized that there are
some people infesting the 'Net who have the kind of perverse ideas that
make Marquis DeSade look like a Trappist Monk.
---
Paul Robinson - Paul@TDR.COM
Voted "Largest Polluter of the (IETF) list" by Randy Bush <randy@psg.com>
------------------------------
From: glr@ripco.com (Glen Roberts)
Date: 01 Sep 1994 23:34:36 GMT
Subject: Databases, was DM News Article
Organization: Ripco Internet BBS, Chicago (312) 665-0065
Prof. L. P. Levine (levine@blatz.cs.uwm.edu) wrote: DM News is a
weekly trade newspaper that calls itself "the weekly newspaper of
record for direct marketers." A commentary by Ray Schultz in the
August 15th issue discusses the opinions of direct marketeers and
of privacy advocates with respect to the privacy of the databases
they use. In this review of his commentary I have quoted the
italicized portions of his remarks, and paraphrased the rest:
Discussing a cooperative arrangement of two corporations to combine
databases to enhance and model data:
He ends with a tongue in cheek comment about how crazy these
privacy advocates are. I believe his intent is to warn his
industry about improper practice. Even the list buyers are
beginning to know that they are going very far and are risking
legislation to control them.
Well (as I have posted in other areas), a collection agency,
Check-Rite, has decided that I am a Lawrence XXX because somewhere they
got my home telephone associated with Lawrence. They are SO SURE of
themselves, that have has disclosed all the details of Lawrence's
alleged financial difficulties to me. They have even persisted after I
filed a complaint with the State of Illinois (with whom they have a
license), a copy of the first complaint was faxed to Check-Rite. The
second complaint was filed today.
Remember, the COMPUTER IS ALWAYS RIGHTS!
p.s. I spoke with the business that hired Check-Rite and they assured
me that they would look into it and get back to me today... no call
back.
But.. I did spend about 2-1/2 minutes of my time, and located the real
Lawrence....
Obviously, Ray Schultz needs his privacy raped!
--
Glen L. Roberts, Editor, Full Disclosure Magazine
Host Full Disclosure Live (WWCR 5,810 khz - Sundays 7pm central)
email glr@rci.ripco.com for information on The Best of Full Disclosure,
four volumes to blow your mind. Voice/Fax on demand: (708) 356-9646
email for uuencoded .TIF of T-Shirt Honoring the FBI
------------------------------
From: Paul Robinson <PAUL@tdr.com>
Date: 02 Sep 1994 13:05:02 -0500 (EST)
Subject: Re: Electronic Cash
Organization: Tansin A. Darcos & Company, Silver Spring, MD USA
Nevin Liber <nevin@cs.arizona.edu>, writes:
Paul McKeever <mckeever@cogsci.uwo.ca> wrote: Anonymity is not
a problem with digital cash. For example, I hold a card for a
photocopier....
The technology you describe is no different than paper cash is
today, There isn't much value added by this approach over paper
cash ... I'd suspect that it is fairly easy to forge.
Often too easy. The saving grace is that unless you work for a
department that owns equipment to make magetized tokens (a 'token'
meaning an access device similar to the one indicated, e.g. the
photocopier card), it's too expensive for casual use EXCEPT and unless
the person is SELLING bogus cards. They caught some people doing this
with the magnettic cardboard cards issued for train fare by the
Washington Metropolitan Transit Authority a few months ago, and I think
a few other cities have had this problem every so often.
People want to be able to use digital cash for things like paying
for goods and services over the Internet. What this does is free
me from being physically present when I want to do an anonymous
transaction. The scheme above is inadequate for this.
I have an idea on what can be done. This solves a number of problems
that we currently have on the Internet with respect to the transfer of
very tiny charges, e.g. charging someone 2-4c per megabyte for FTP
transfers.
What we need is some specification for a "funds transfer system" or FTS
(so as not to be confused with FTP) protocol that allows me to give to a
site an FTS transaction authorization, which would be the following:
(1) my authentication (so it knows what account to debit). Note that I
can open an FTS account either by mailing money to the operator of the
service and specifying my own passcode, or by charging it to a credit
card or wiring him the funds via Western Union or American Express,
depending on what he wants to offer, or even by paying the owner of a
current authorization to transfer funds to create an authentication.
I can either ask for an account anonymously by specifying an identifier,
or by requesting one directly. I can add money to the account at any
time either via direct payment or via someone else sending an FTS
transaction to it. I can withdraw money from the account at any time
(subject to hold/clearance on escrow transfers) and will receive either
a check, travelers' checks or money orders depending on what the request
is for. I would be charged a service charge to withdraw money according to
the cost of delivery.
(2) my passcode (so it knows I am the one who authorized it). This
ensures that I am the one who issued the transaction.
(3) a possible "magic cookie" (either the result of my last FTS
transaction or the next sequence number in a private list). (This
prevents "replay" transactions since the sequence number, for maximum
protection, should be "one shot" and once used, it can't be reused.
(4) the amount of the transaction or a limit maximum. Using a "credit
limit" allows me to do a set of transactions without having to get a
fresh one each time I need to do something. Once the transaction is
completed, then the total amount can be charged. This could be useful
for doing a series of ongoing transactions at one time.
The FTS recipient would use the FTS transaction identifier to query the fts
server for authorization to begin the transaction. The FTS recipient
would either be given permission for the transaction or denied for any
of various reasons (duplicate cookie, bad cookie, amount requested
exceeds value of cookie, amount requested exceeds funds in account,
cookie accepted, credit cookie accepted for up to $nn.nnn).
The FTS server would charge a small fee, let's say 2c per transaction,
in order to recoup costs. Anyone can open an account with any amount of
at least, say, $3. There would be a transaction charge to open an
account, say $1 to cover postage. Anyone who has an account can use it
to either make payments or to receive them. If I want to order something
from someone I can give him a cookie for the amount of the order; I don't
have to mail him a check or anything else.
Further, let's tie the transaction identifier into the recipient's own
fts account number; this would then prevent someone intercepting the
transaction since they could only use it to credit the destination
recipient.
What would it take to make this possible?
1. Availability of a standard protocol for making requests for funds
transfers. Not difficult. The request and reply should use
authentication to prevent spoofing. This could be tied into Kerberos
services in a similar manner.
2. Availability of a standard site or sites to handle transactions.
Mainly it's the cost of setting this up that's a problem.
3. Legal issues. Doing this may constitute the legal equivalent of
running a bank, but since casinos and pawnbrokers routinely handle money
transfers, as does Western Union and American Express. Beyond which, the
only thing that is being transfered is authorizations; no real money
changes hands until someone actually requests that they be sent cash.
4. Soundness of the authenticator. Does the operator have enough
resources to cover the cost of operating the network connections and
computers, and will they make enough to cover their costs plus profit,
and to pay out transactions?
5. Security of the authenticator. Does the authenticator's software
have sufficient protections against overdrafts, transaction spoofing,
and pre-release of escrowed funds? How fast can he make payment without
allowing for scams, where someone sends him a credit card payment,
then uses his account to make a transaction to a third party, who then
closes their account, gets a refund, and then the original charge is
disputed as a charge on a stolen card?
6. Integrity of the authenticator. Does the operator have
insurance/bonding against errors and omissions, or embezzlement? Where
does he put customer's funds while waiting for actual requests for
payment? In a checking account or in T-Bills, and how fast can he redeem
funds in the event of a large withdrawal?
One example would be if wuarchive.wustl.edu was to start charging, say 2c
per megabyte for downloaded files. (The administrator once posted that
this was what it would cost them including all overhead, based on the
30 billion bytes of file transfers during one month last year, e.g. about
$7500 a month.) With that, the first 1 meg would be 4c to cover the
authenticator's service. So a download of a file like the shareware game
DOOM, which is about 3 1/2 meg uncompressed, would cost 10c in transfer
costs. Not a tremendous amount of money, but enough that a place could
afford the cost of "all those leaches" that are sucking down huge amounts
of bandwidth using FTPs.
At the end of the month, for example, perhaps 40,000 accounts had been
debited an average of 19c each for the FTP downloads they made. The
service would get the $7500 that this is costing them for the T1 service,
the disk space, and the electricity and partial salaries of the service
people. The processor would receive $1500 in transaction charges based
on possibly 30,000 connections at 2c each. Each of these people would
see their Internet cash accounts reduced by the average 19c or whatever
they used.
A transactional system such as this can be a win-win situation for
everyone; people can make lots of small-cost transactions without the huge
overhead usually involved (it would be cheaper for me to pay the processor
for a transaction [perhaps 10c for small transaction volume users] and
include a transaction ID in an E-Mail message for something I want to
order, than it would be for me to go buy a money order and mail it [75c
for the money order plus 30c for the stamp).
There are two basic problems with this scenario. First, is that a lot of
people wail and whine about not wanting to pay for resources that are now
free, and the second question is whether there is enough interest in
automated funds transfers to support this sort of activity.
In answer to the first question, the heavy loads and long delays to get
access to most of the popular FTP sites shows what happens when there is
no way to get others to pay for usage of resources where someone else is
consuming them. As it is, with FTS transaction capabilty, all those
connections translate into *money* which pays for itself. So you're
getting 5,000 people each hour trying to log on. The amount of traffic
they generate pays for the amount of traffic they generate. If it keeps
up on a regular basis, you use the funds they generate to purchase more
equipment, and so on.
Anyone care to try a simulated experiment?
---
Paul Robinson - Paul@TDR.COM
Voted "Largest Polluter of the (IETF) list" by Randy Bush <randy@psg.com>
------------------------------
From: weh@SEI.CMU.EDU (Bill Hefley)
Date: 02 Sep 1994 14:49:20 EDT
Subject: Re: WA State DOT "Congestion Pricing" Project
Organization: The Software Engineering Institute
Peter Marshall <rocque@connected.com> writes: Proposal for the
"Puget Sound Congestion Pricing" project was initiated by United
Infrastructure Washington, Inc., and describes "a phased approach
to introducing the concept of congestion pricing in the urban
growth areas of Puget Sound," involving use of "peak period fees."
A recent Scientific American (the same one that had the big article on
software, if I recall) also had an article about the theories behind
"congestion pricing". Interesting reading, even if you don't agree with
their conclusions.
--
Bill Hefley Software Engineering Institute, Carnegie Mellon University
Pittsburgh, PA 15213 U.S.A.
Office: +1-412-268-7793, Fax: +1-412-268-5758, internet: weh@sei.cmu.edu
------------------------------
From: Paul Robinson <PAUL@tdr.com>
Date: 02 Sep 1994 11:58:07 -0500 (EST)
Subject: Re: Fingerprinting/Identifying Children
Organization: Tansin A. Darcos & Company, Silver Spring, MD USA
You have reason to doubt me when I tell you that this child is
mine, you might even suspect that the child is kidnapped...so you
run the kid's prints and discover that your intuition was correct.
I might have pretty convincing stories about the fire that
destroyed our only copy of the birth certificate, the tragic death
of all the relatives who could have vouched for my being his
father...but if those prints match the prints of a child listed as
missing, no amount of tapdancing will get me off the hook.
Are you referring to the fire that destroyed the county courthouse
where the original birth certificate is stored and is available for
less than $10, and can often be ordered by mail in a week, or the
alleged copy you supposedly had? Unless the courthouse burns down
there is always a copy of the BC available, which can be certified.
---
Paul Robinson - Paul@TDR.COM
Voted "Largest Polluter of the (IETF) list" by Randy Bush <randy@psg.com>
------------------------------
The Computer Privacy Digest is a forum for discussion on the effect of
technology on privacy or vice versa. The digest is moderated and
gatewayed into the USENET newsgroup comp.society.privacy (Moderated).
Submissions should be sent to comp-privacy@uwm.edu and administrative
requests to comp-privacy-request@uwm.edu.
Back issues are available via anonymous ftp on ftp.cs.uwm.edu
[129.89.9.18]. Login as "ftp" with password "yourid@yoursite". The
archives are in the directory "pub/comp-privacy".
People with gopher capability can access the library at
gopher.cs.uwm.edu.
Mosaic users will find it at gopher://gopher.cs.uwm.edu.
Archives are also held at ftp.pica.army.mil [129.139.160.133].
End of Computer Privacy Digest V5 #030
******************************
.