Computer Privacy Digest Mon, 19 Sep 94 Volume 5 : Issue: 035
Today's Topics: Moderator: Leonard P. Levine
Reason 3: Public Opinion
Reason 22: Encryption
Roadway Monitoring
Internet Spies
Wiretap Emergency
Net Security
Help With Bugging Devices
Re: FBI Wiretap Bill
Re: PGP Back Door
Re: PGP Back Door
Re: Afraid of Big Brother?
Re: Government Survailance
---------------------------------------------------------------------
Housekeeping information is located at the end of this Digest.
----------------------------------------------------------------------
From: Marc Rotenberg <rotenberg@washofc.epic.org>
Date: 16 Sep 1994 13:55:48 EST
Subject: Reason 3: Public Opinion
Organization: Electronic Privacy Information Center
Reply to: Reason 3: Public Opinion
100 Reasons to Oppose the FBI Wiretap Bill
Reason 3: Americans from all walks of life oppose wiretapping.
Surveys taken every year by the Bureau of Justice Statistics
on public attitudes toward wiretapping show that American oppose
wiretapping by roughly a three to one margin (Question: "Everything
considered, would you say that you approve or disapprove of
wiretapping?"). The opposition to wiretapping is found across all
demographic groups, from sex, race and education to region, religion
and political affiliation.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
What To Do: Fax Rep. Jack Brooks (202-225-1584).
Express your concerns about the FBI Wiretap proposal.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
100 Reasons is a project of the Electronic Privacy Information Center
(EPIC) in Washington, DC. For more information: 100.Reasons@epic.org.
========================================================================
------------------------------
From: Marc Rotenberg <rotenberg@washofc.epic.org>
Date: 16 Sep 1994 16:13:21 EST
Subject: Reason 22: Encryption
Organization: Electronic Privacy Information Center
100 Reasons to Oppose the FBI Wiretap Bill
Reason 22: The wiretap bill will require communication carriers to
decrypt private messages and will discourage the
incorporation of encryption features in future network
services.
The wiretap bill says that RA telecommunications carrier shall not be
responsible for decrypting, or ensuring the government's ability to decrypt,
any communications encrypted by a subscriber or customer, *unless* the
encryption was provided by the carrier and the carrier possesses the
information necessary to decrypt the communications." 2602(b)(3). This
provision could have an immediate effect on the deployment of
privacy-enhancing technologies, such as encryption, in wireless
communication networks and other network services.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
What To Do: Fax Rep. Jack Brooks (202-225-1584).
Express your concerns about the FBI Wiretap proposal.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
100 Reasons is a project of the Electronic Privacy Information Center
(EPIC) in Washington, DC. For more information: 100.Reasons@epic.org.
========================================================================
------------------------------
From: flb@flb.optiplan.fi (F.Baube[tm])
Date: 15 Sep 94 18:56:32 EET
Subject: Roadway Monitoring
anonymous <levine@blatz.cs.uwm.edu> stated: I have noticed, and you
may also have noticed, this form of surveillance going on right
here in Milwaukee. On I-94 and I-43 I have noticed communication
towers and surveillance cameras that have been erected within the
past two months. It makes me a bit paranoid too.
Your average freedom-loving American would probably not be worried by
this under ordinary circumstances.
But let us not forget that Ollie and crew had plans for handling
dissent if the US had invaded Nicaragua. Concentration, er, detention
camps for trouble-makers. Weren't there some other nasty ideas ? In
the heat of the moment, how much would he and his ilk be able to "get
away with" before Guardians of the Constitution like William Rehnquist
got around to (maybe) stopping it ?
Besides, the totalitarian fantasies of Oliver North that came to light
were just that, *only* the parts that came to light.
How useful such roadway monitoring might be, some time, some place, in
a land so very similar to late 20th-century America ..
--
* Fred Baube(tm) * Greece out of the
* GU/MSFS/88 * European Union NOW !
* baube@optiplan.fi
* #include <disclaimer.h>
------------------------------
From: Kissell@gacsrv.gactr.uga.edu (Laura Kissel)
Date: 15 Sep 1994 20:35:50 GMT
Subject: Internet Spies
Organization: Georgia Center
Have you noticed the people on the NET from SEARCHNET? I would be very
careful about what I said with these people around.
A net is something you use to catch something or search for something.
The NET has a net or is a net.
I suggest that the people from SEARCHNET are seeking, marking and
dealing with those on the NET who will not fit in with the New World
Order....Just a suggestion.
------------------------------
From: nzook@bga.com (Nathan Zook)
Date: 16 Sep 1994 14:33:29 GMT
Subject: Wiretap Emergency
Organization: Real/Time Communications - Bob Gustwick and Associates
[ Article crossposted from talk.politics.misc ]
[ Author was Nathan Zook ]
[ Posted on 16 Sep 1994 14:31:07 GMT ]
From nzook@bga.com Thu Sep 15 22:42:08 1994
Date: 15 Sep 1994 21:05:42 -0500 (CDT)
From: Nathan Zook <nzook@bga.com>
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Wiretap Emergency
I just spoke with Joe Barton (R) from Texas about the FBI wiretap
bill. He is on a subcommittee that is hearing the bill. He has heard
_no_ citizen opposition to it. I was not prepared, but he did invite
me to send him my concerns :-D
Congressman Joe Barton
1514 Longworth Building
Washington, D.C. 20515
p:202-225-2002
f:202-225-3052
Folks, if we can generate a few hundred calls and well-thought-out
faxes tommorrow, we might have some effect. I don't know a lot about
him, but he seemed to be of the opinion that he didn't really know that
much about the bill. It's up to us to educate him.
--
Nathan
------------------------------
From: Kissell@gacsrv.gactr.uga.edu (Laura Kissel)
Date: 16 Sep 1994 18:22:43 GMT
Subject: Net Security
Organization: Georgia Center
Because of recent negative activity observed I ask, has anyone noticed
the people on the NET from SEARCHNET? I would be very careful about
what I said with these people around.
A net is something you use to catch something or search for something.
The NET has a net or is a net.
I suggest that the people from SEARCHNET are seeking, marking and
dealing with those on the NET who will not fit in with the NEW WORLD
ORDER....Just a suggestion.
------------------------------
From: Carl Evert Smith <cs6q+@andrew.cmu.edu>
Date: 18 Sep 1994 17:25:57 -0400
Subject: Help With Bugging Devices
Organization: Carnegie Mellon, Pittsburgh, PA
THIS IS FOR SECURITY REASONS
Hello
I am in quite a jam. I am looking for the postal adresses of all mail
order companies dealing in communication equipment/ microphones,
receivers, and transmitters. Also on the detection of microphones,
receivers, and transmitters. Any information of any companies would be
great.
Thank you
--
Marc Madjaric - Infojunkie - Forum - Pittsburgh PA
cs6q@andrew.cmu.edu
------------------------------
From: mea@intgp1.att.com (Mark E Anderson +1 708 979 4716)
Date: 19 Sep 94 04:50:00 GMT
Subject: Re: FBI Wiretap Bill
>Reason 52: The FBI wiretap bill will cost taxpayers at least
> $500,000,000.
I happened to watch a C-SPAN rebroadcast of Tuesday's Congressional
hearings over this issue with FBI head Louis Freeh as one of the people
testifying. The only thing that was an issue was who should pay this
$500M. Each of the Congresscritters on the panel expressed their
support for providing law enforcement every tool they need in
continuing their wiretapping capabilities. Some of the
Congresscritters, IMHO, obviously didn't seem to know that much about
telephony in particular and telecommunications in general from the
content of their statements.
My take on this situation is pretty onerous. If there aren't any
dissenting opinions on the sub-committee, can there be many votes
against in the general House on a subject as complicated as this? Can
public support be enmassed to block these bills when it's extremely
difficult to explain to the average Joe as to their implications? I
know, I've tried. It's almost impossible to get people concerned about
this because this bill's content only can be understood by technical
people and the bill's wording can only be understood by technical
people who happen to be schooled in law. I have a feeling this bill
will pass.
--
Mark Anderson
mea@intgp1.att.com
------------------------------
From: ws@shore.net (William Stallings)
Date: 15 Sep 1994 10:21:38 -0400
Subject: Re: PGP Back Door
Organization: North Shore Access/Eco Software, Inc; (info@shore.net)
Ryan Wilson (ryan_wilson@kvo.com) wrote: Is there any truth to the
rumor that certain versions of PGP, released after a certain date
or version number, contain a back door which is accessible by the
NSA or other so-called intelligence entities?
IMO, the answer is almost certainly no. First, every executable version
is signed by one or more of the developers. You can take the trouble to
verify the key of the signer and then verify the signature. Second, the
source code is also available and can be re-compiled to make sure that
you have the correct object. While most people do not have the time
and/or expertise to check the source code for back doors, enough people
do have such time and expertise that if the source code did have a back
door, its presence would be detected and announced, with high
probability. Third, most of the concern has been centered on the MIT
versions (2.6, 2.6.1). These versions were developed by a group well
known to the PGP community and included involvement of Phil Zimmermann,
who has blessed the final product.
--
| Bill Stallings | PGP fingerprint: | public key from Stable
| Comp-Comm Consulting | B1 4E 2A BD 96 08 8B A4 | Large Email Database
| P. O. Box 2405 | 67 83 D1 09 FE 52 56 6C | contact
| Brewster, MA 02631 | | sledinfo@drebes.com
------------------------------
From: "Michael T. Palmer" <palmer@chmsr.isye.gatech.edu>
Date: 16 Sep 1994 21:30:52 GMT
Subject: Re: PGP Back Door
Organization: Georgia Institute of Technology
ryan_wilson@kvo.com (Ryan Wilson) writes: Is there any truth to the
rumor that certain versions of PGP, released after a certain date
or version number, contain a back door which is accessible by the
NSA or other so-called intelligence entities?
Why take anyone else's word for it either way? If you must have
absolute trust in it, then get the source code (which is available via
ftp from many sites) and check it and compile it yourself.
Note that many net.personalities have done so and found nothing. But
sometimes it pays to paranoid, eh?
--
Michael T. Palmer (palmer@chmsr.gatech.edu) RIPEM Public Key available
Center for Human-Machine Systems Research, Dept of Industrial & Systems Eng
Georgia Institute of Technology, Atlanta, Georgia 30332-0205
------------------------------
From: bernie@fantasyfarm.com (Bernie Cosell)
Date: 16 Sep 1994 02:13:25 GMT
Subject: Re: Afraid of Big Brother?
Organization: Fantasy Farm, Pearisburg, VA
Daryl George Thornton II writes: I market smartcards blah blha bhal
blah....but No one ever asks or mentions or voices corncern (though
it would seem obvious to do so) the big brother-national ID aspects
of smartcards EXCEPT government employees and in particular
military employees.
IMHO It would seem to me that government employees are the most
aware of the abuse possibilities. Most likely from thier own day to
day inside view of the government at work.
I don't quite understand. What does "smartcards" have to do with "Big
Brother"?
also see : Forbes ? Fortune? mining the datadump? American
Expresses use parallel computer processing machines to figure when
you would buy something in the future from what you have purchased
in the past and send coupons/discounts etc. to entice to repeat
such purchase again. (i.e. ever three months you buy XXX you have
not purchased XXX in 9-months send discounts/promo.)
In short business loves big brother(s).
But this strikes right at the heart of the true point, and why it is
*NOT* "Big Brother" [perhaps more folk should go reread 1984]. I am
under no compulsion to use my AmEx or MasterCard or anything else.
"Smart" or not, the use of such cards is purely discretionary and I
have the *CHOICE*, realizing that I'm trading the convenience [and
cash-flow advantage and perhaps the luxury of the "on the spot loan"]
and in exchange they get some information about me [and other things,
but the point is that the _information_ is part of the transaction].
If I prefer not to have that information disclosed, I can simply choose
not to use their card. I don't see the problem [other than for the
naive or uninformed, who will be surprised [or at least feign surprise]
when they learn that "information" was part of the transaction].
The key point about a _real_ "Big Brother" is that it is *compulsory*.
Is the government big brother Is the government afraid of big
brother(s)? Can any one big brother control/influence thousands of
big brothers? Can thousands of big brothers control/influence one
big brother?
Only one of those, the "government" one, is really a 'Big Brother', and
the answer is that *of*course* they can control/influence the thousands
of little information collectors: they simply pass a law requiring that
the little information collectors *must* turn their records over to the
gov't [as they already have to do for a rather broad spectrum of
transactions].
You see, that's the real point about a "Big Brother". AmEx has no way
to convince MasterCard to give them info about your buying patterns.
Now, they might -agree- to share data, and, indeed, Master Card might
well offer to _sell_ AmEx that info. But AmEx has no way to *force*
Master Card to help with their market research. By contrast, the
government wields a *huge* amount of coercive power, and they *can*
compel MasterCard and everyone else to tell them what they want to
know, if they so choose.
--
Bernie Cosell bernie@fantasyfarm.com
Fantasy Farm Fibers, Pearisburg, VA (703) 921-2358
--->>> Too many people; too few sheep <<<---
------------------------------
From: bernie@fantasyfarm.com (Bernie Cosell)
Date: 16 Sep 1994 02:30:51 GMT
Subject: Re: Government Survailance
Organization: Fantasy Farm, Pearisburg, VA
anonymous writes:
The following excerpt is from the newsgroup: sci.military 616.
Rome to aid highway managers GRIFFISS AFB, N.Y. (AFNS) ---
America's highways should become less congested as the result
of signal processing and computer technologies developed at the
Air Force Material Command's Rome Laboratory here.
[Obviously the USAF is putting a "government is your friend" spin
on this story, but this program is just a small step from more
draconian forms of surveillance.]
Care to expand on that rather paranoid remark? First off, you talk
about 'spin' but don't actually address the issue at hand. In many
places around the country, traffic congestion is a nontrivial problem.
Having worked on the ARPAnet routing algorithms [back in the old days],
I know some about this problem and I can attest that it is a *very*
difficult one. It is almost impossible for drivers sitting in their
cars to get [or derive] the information they need to make proper
"routing" decisions; but conversely, the quality of those
distributed-decisions will have a first-order impact on the performance
of the overall network[*]. And so I don't think it is at all
unreasonable to investigate techniques to gather information and
provide proper feedback for drivers. What about the release did you
find 'spin'-like?
[*] This is not a place for a technical discussion of routing
algorithms, but let me elaborate a tiny bit: most drivers drive VERY
selfishly. Now the "greedy algorithm" works in some venues, but is
really quite dismal for routing. BUT: even if a driver _does_
realize that he is one component of a complicated, distributed
problem, for the most part there's not much he can do. Making a
proper [local] routing decision _inherently_ depends on having
access to information that is not available locally. And so to do
routing effectively you need _some_ way for the participants to
exchange information. In networks, since the agents involved are
cooperating, the information exchange is explicit. Obviously, no
such scheme could work for cars [what would you use... CB?] and so
some plan to gather global flow information and use it to provide
feedback to allow for better local-routing decisions is, technically
at least, a perfectly reasonable plan. And so that's why I think
that calling it "spin" is inappropriate.
As for the second part, what "small step" and what "more draconian"?
Are we going to get a rehash of the "ID transponder in every car"
stuff? It is always interesting [for me at least] in chatting with
folks who are seriously into paranoid conspiracies to find out just
what they think a "small" step is, since that seems to almost always
end up being the place where we end up disagreeing.
--
Bernie Cosell bernie@fantasyfarm.com
Fantasy Farm Fibers, Pearisburg, VA (703) 921-2358
--->>> Too many people; too few sheep <<<---
------------------------------
The Computer Privacy Digest is a forum for discussion on the effect of
technology on privacy or vice versa. The digest is moderated and
gatewayed into the USENET newsgroup comp.society.privacy (Moderated).
Submissions should be sent to comp-privacy@uwm.edu and administrative
requests to comp-privacy-request@uwm.edu.
Back issues are available via anonymous ftp on ftp.cs.uwm.edu
[129.89.9.18]. Login as "ftp" with password "yourid@yoursite". The
archives are in the directory "pub/comp-privacy".
People with gopher capability can access the library at
gopher.cs.uwm.edu.
Mosaic users will find it at gopher://gopher.cs.uwm.edu.
Archives are also held at ftp.pica.army.mil [129.139.160.133].
End of Computer Privacy Digest V5 #035
******************************