Computer Privacy Digest Sun, 02 Oct 94 Volume 5 : Issue: 042
Today's Topics: Moderator: Leonard P. Levine
Reason 8: Writs of Assistance
EPIC Seeks FBI Docs
The Crypto Dilemma
Re: Find E-Mail Address?
Encryption Program
How to verify your phone number
Conference on Telecommunications R&D - Privacy Issues
Re: Post Office Boxes
Info on CPD, Contributions, Subscriptions, FTP, etc.
----------------------------------------------------------------------
From: Marc Rotenberg <rotenberg@washofc.epic.org>
Date: 29 Sep 1994 16:04:52 EST
Subject: Reason 8: Writs of Assistance
Organization: Electronic Privacy Information Center
100 Reasons to Oppose the FBI Wiretap Bill
Reason 8: The American jurist Louis Brandeis described
wiretapping as worse than the practices of the British
government that gave rise to the Fourth Amendment
restrictions on search and seizure.
In the first wiretap case to go before the U.S. Supreme Court (Olmstead
v. United States, 1928), Justice Brandeis wrote, "writs of assistance
and general warrants are but puny instruments of tyranny and oppression
when compared with wire-tapping." These writs and general warrants
gave British troops virtually unlimited authority to search homes and
seize personal property. The Fourth Amendment sought to limit such
powers. But Brandeis believed that wiretapping would expand the
ability of government to search and seize, even exceeding the powers of
the original general warrants and writs of assistance used by British
troops.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
What To Do: Contact your Senator. Urge a no vote on S. 2375, the
FBI Wiretap proposal. Fax Rep. Jack Brooks 202/225-1584. Express
your concerns. Staff in both the House and Senate report that these
messages are making a difference.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
100 Reasons is a project of the Electronic Privacy Information Center
(EPIC) in Washington, DC. For more information: 100.Reasons@epic.org.
------------------------------
From: Marc Rotenberg <rotenberg@washofc.epic.org>
Date: 30 Sep 1994 13:58:22 EST
Subject: EPIC Seeks FBI Docs
Organization: Electronic Privacy Information Center
PRESS RELEASE
Embargoed until 10 a.m.,
September 30, 1994
Contact:
Marc Rotenberg, EPIC Director
David Sobel, EPIC Legal Counsel
202 544 9240 (tel)
EPIC Opposes FBI Delay
Seeks Documents About Wiretap Plan
WASHINGTON, D.C.- The Electronic Privacy Information Center today
opposed a government motion to delay release of two documents in a
lawsuit concerning the FBI's "digital telephony" proposal. The case is
pending in federal court as the Congress considers legislation that
will authorize the expenditure of $500 million to make the nation's
communications system easier to wiretap.
EPIC, a public interest research group based in Washington, DC, filed
the Freedom of Information Act requests earlier this year. The group
is seeking the public release of two surveys cited by FBI Director Lou
Freeh in support of the FBI's plan.
EPIC filed the FOIA lawsuit on August 9th, the day the wiretap
legislation was introduced in Congress. The FBI then moved to stay
proceedings in the case until June 1999, more than five years after the
filing of the initial request.
The FBI asserted it was confronted with "a backlog of pending FOIA
requests awaiting processing." The FBI revelead that there are "an
estimated 20 pages to be reviewed" but said that the materials will not
be reviewed until "sometime in March 1999."
In the papers filed today, EPIC charged that the materials are far too
important to be kept secret. "The requested surveys were part of the
FBI's long-standing campaign to gain passage of unprecedented
legislation requiring the nation's telecommunications carriers to
redesign their telephone networks to more easily facilitate
court-ordered wiretapping," said the EPIC brief.
EPIC contends that the federal court should give special consideration
to the fact that the records have already been reviewed for public
release and also that the records concern a matter of great public
interest.
"It is disingenuous for the Bureau to suggest that the twenty pages of
material at issue in this case are at the end of a long queue awaiting
review for possible disclosure. The FBI has already considered Rep.
Don Edwards' request to make the information public and has made a
determination to release only a one-page summary," said EPIC.
EPIC argues that under new procedures developed by the Department of
Justice for FOIA cases, the processing should be expedited. "There can
be no doubt that the subject matter of plaintiff's requests --
legislation to re-design the nation's telephone network to facilitate
wiretapping -- is of considerable interest to the news media."
The brief concludes, "The records sought by plaintiff are of
substantial current interest to news media and the general public.
Moreover, the FBI has already reviewed the material to determine
whether it should be publicly disclosed. Under these circumstances,
the Bureau's request for a five-year stay of these proceedings is
wholly lacking in merit."
Earlier documents obtained through the FOIA in similar litigation with
the FBI revealed no technical obstacles to the exercise of
court-authorized wire surveillance.
The Electronic Privacy Information Center is a project of Computer
Professionals for Social Responsibility, a membership organization
based in Palo Alto, California, and the Fund for Constitutional
Government, a Washington-based foundation dedicated to the protection
of Constitutional freedoms. 202 544 9240 (tel), 202 547 5482 (fax),
info@epic.org.
------------------------------
From: weyker@wam.umd.edu (Shayne Weyker)
Date: 30 Sep 1994 21:03:34 GMT
Subject: The Crypto Dilemma
Organization: University of Maryland, College Park
Hi. The following is a little bit dated now (it responds to Bruce
Sterling's article on crypto some month's back in Wired magazine's "Spy
vs. Nerd" issue), since it has been languishing in my account for
several months while I waited to see if Wired would run part of it as a
letter. They didn't.
It's probably worth noting that I wrote David Chaum, the leading
advocate of Digital Cash, and asked for some ideas on how "validating
authorities" and other stuctures he mentions in his Scientific American
article might be able to deal with some of the concerns I express
below. I did this hoping I could revise the article and make it more
constructive and less alarmist about crypto's possible realtionship to
future white-collar crime. Unfortunately Mr. Chaum never wrote back.
Much of this piece is raw speculation and I welcome corrections from
people who are better informed about the intricacies of crypto,
net.privacy, and computer/financial crime.
This article has been submitted simultaneously to Computer Underground
Digest.
Shayne Weyker
weyker@wam.umd.edu
the text of the piece follows:
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
Clipper:
How much privacy can we afford?
How much security do we need?
by Shayne Weyker
weyker@wam.umd.edu
Three cheers for Bruce Sterling. Finally someone on the privacy side of
the Clipper debate has the courage to admit that Clipper might indeed
provide some needed protection against crooks and terrorists. I want to
try and do a bit more of what Bruce has done: to try and pin down what
the real dangers are both of strong crypto and of bans on strong
crypto.
To date, the anti-clipper faction has tried to deny the force of the
"law enforcement needs wiretaps" argument. They have claimed that
wiretaps aren't truly necessary and that law enforcement officers will
just have to work a bit harder.
This often-repeated argument has a flaw in it that I've heard no one
else mention. It doesn't acknowledge the fact that more and more crimes
that used to be susceptible to discovery through means other than
wiretapping (witnesses, visual or audio surveillance, physical
searches) may soon be concealed to all forms of discovery *except*
wiretapping and its variants. More and more of our life will take
place over the wires, so it is no surprise that more and more crime
will take place there as well.
FROM PAPER TO DIGITAL VAPOR Criminals who wanted to share things like
military secrets, monthly sales reports for drugs or stolen
merchandise, and lists of stolen credit card numbers used to have to
keep a lot of this stuff on paper. But more and more folks own
computers and modems, and software will eventually make using and
sharing the computer files even easier than paper. How long will it be
before cops long for the days when they could arrest someone and search
their premises for incriminating documents and actually expect to find
anything that isn't encrypted with RSA or PGP? Cops will be less able
to find incriminating paper evidence if crooks are smart enough to keep
things on computers and encrypted. And while I think privacy advocates
too often tend to make the criminal in their own image, the privacy
advocates' argument is that crooks are indeed smart and careful with
incriminating data.
"IF YOU WANNA ROB A BANK YOU MUST BEWARE,
YOU'VE GOTTA USE THE COMPUTER UPSTAIRS"
Criminals who want lots of quick cash now often go stick-up a bank.
And even if hacking into and diverting money from banks' Electronic
Funds Transfer (EFT) systems or a company's billing system is more
their style, they still have to work at it. The hackers who claimed
to have diverted funds from an EFT system gave an involved story
about how they went to multiple banks, used phony identities, and
altered their appearance and handwriting each time when they opened
an account and again when they went back to withdraw their loot
over several visits. Somewhere in all those visits they may have
slipped up and given a clue as to who really picked up the money.
But if those hackers could bypass all this by just transforming
other people's bank deposits into their own digital cash with a few
keystrokes, all these opportunities to screw up and leave clues
behind go away.
BACK TO THE FUTURE:
TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY GRIFTERS
[Con artists' schemes in the 1800s] often presupposed the
anonymities of a mobile society. Con men slipped from place to
place; geographically speaking; they also milked the fact of
social ambiguity. . . . boundaries between classes (of every sort)
were more porous than before. It was possible to pass oneself off
as a lord, a professor, or a rich investor, which simply could not
have been done in a tight, controlled, barnacled society where the
markers of class are more obvious, if not indelible. . .
. Technology permitted the more obvious forms of
emulation [of the upper class]: cheap copies of hats or dresses;
mass-produced artifacts and furniture.
Lawrence Friedman noted that in 1800s America fraud skyrocketed. Two
of the reasons he gives for this have fascinating parallels with the
social environment of the net.
The first was the anonymity of people in communities with a high
turnover in their membership. There was no opportunity to develop a
moral track-record on the community's members which people could use
when deciding who to trust. The second was the new high-tech
mass-produced objects, furniture, and fashionable clothes could be used
to let the con artist appear in all ways to be a member of the
respected upper class.
Does any of this sound familiar? Modern people have adapted to the
above circumstances, but the net society with crypto looks like it's
going to give us heightened anonymity and entirely new means to
simulate respectability which will lead to another whole generation
getting being ripped off.
Privacy advocates have been saying, with some good reason, how nice the
anonymity of the net is. And indeed it is good in some ways that we
judge professors, high schoolers, and street people only by their
words. It is also empowering for some to be able to use the net to
create virtual personas for themselves in communication with other
people that will appear to be real.
But there's a dark side to this. Yes, anonymity does mean one can
escape retribution for whistleblowing and avoid unfair prejudices of
others based on one's appearance and surroundings. But anonymity also
means one can escape retribution for actions that fully deserve
punishment like spamming the net, e-mail bombing, or forging nasty
posts in widely-read newsgroups. This can be done by hiding behind
chains of anonymous remailers or getting a new account with a new name
when too many folks have started to warn others about you.
Also, one can create a virtual persona for oneself in e-mail and
postings, such as that of a cancer victim, designed to elicit trust and
confidence from those of a similar background who may be emotionally
vulnerable. This trust is undeserved and subject to abuse, while the
eventual discovery of the lie damages the tricked person's (and
others') ability to trust people they meet on the net. If this kind of
abuse becomes common, the cloud of suspicion hanging over people's
communications on the net will hinder the very trust needed to form
those kinds of associations of private individuals that Bruce Sterling
and others are so fond of.
Finally, returning to con artists, there may be increased gullibility
on the users' part once teleconferencing becomes common and buying
stuff on the net is an everyday practice. Con artists could then use
set design and image processing for the video end of the scam and fancy
programming to appear established and credible to folks checking out
their site on the net. So, the con artist never has to meet the victim
in person and anonymity based on encryption makes it nigh-impossible to
connect the grifter with the victim's money.
REACH OUT AND TOUCH SOMEONE
For an extreme, if unlikely, case, consider the murderer who remotely
reprograms some victim's household robot to electrocute him. No hope of
witnesses or physical evidence there. Finding out who made the suspect
call to the house to plant the code is the only hope. Sometimes the
cops will be lucky and have a suspect who happens to be a programmer,
but convicting this person without his being caught with the killer
program code or being identified as party to the suspect communication
to the victim's house will be tough.
THE RUN-DOWN
People interacting with others using cryptography-aided
telecommunications are currently expected to be able to:
- be totally anonymous in cyberspace
- create multiple pseudonymous virtual identities for themselves--
each with separate and un-crosscheckable personal associations and
finances
- secretly conduct financial dealings
- secretly exchange valuable commercial or government secrets
- secretly exchange socially-disapproved-of (or illegal)
information
Libertarians and anarchists may think all these things sound great.
They may be excited by opportunities for whistleblowing, anonymous
political expression, secret political organization for oppressive
environments, riskless sharing of erotica and other sometimes-legal
data, and so on.
But responsible adults should spend equal amounts of time thinking
about opportunities for easier planning of terrorism, easier evasion of
punishment for abusing innocent people on the net, and very real
benefits for con artists, money launderers, embezzlers, tax cheats, and
other white-collar crooks.
THE OTHER SIDE OF THE COIN:
Remember though, it was said earlier that more and more of human life
is going to take place over the wires. Clipper advocates may well say
that they're only trying to maintain the same ability to wiretap that
the government has had for decades. But if more and more of our lives
are there to see in our telephone and data communications, and those
communications remain less protected than other forms of communication
such as face to face, then our overall privacy is going to be eroded.
Bulletin Board Systems aren't as private as the local coffeehouse or
bar. 900-number sex lines aren't as private as a visit to a lover.
Videoconferences aren't as private as face to face meetings. E-mail
and ftp aren't as private as postal mail. The list goes on.
This erosion of privacy is rightly thought to be a bad thing in and of
itself, and unrestricted crypto looks like the only way to stop it.
THE SEEMING ALL-OR-NOTHING DILEMMA OF CRYPTO
We seem to have two choices.
We can let crypto run free. This probably means more terrorism, some of
it with really impressive body-counts. It means lots more white collar
crime, and somewhat more distrust on the net. The terrorism and crime
may mean that the public hastily agrees to give up other freedoms if
they think the government has suddenly become ineffective in protecting
them.
Or the developed nations can get together and ban crypto and watch most
people's privacy quickly disappear. The technology-elite corporations
and individuals will still develop their own, and some criminals will
pay hackers for secure internal communications. Meanwhile, in the
developing world, oppressive governments gain a powerful new weapon.
Heavy regulation of crypto will have much the same effect.
It's an ugly choice. And I've heard too many people dismiss the folks
on the other side as either voyeuristic fascists or paranoid anarchists
with a "don't worry, be happy" attitude towards public safety. Both
sides are doing public who depend upon the quality of the debate a
disservice. The debate should have less fear-mongering about what is
goin to happen if "the other side" wins, and more brainstorming about
exactly what new technology, new laws, and new behaviors we can develop
which will protect us against the very real dangers of a world with too
much or too little crypto in the public's hands.
-------
Shayne Weyker
weyker@wam.umd.edu
------------------------------
From: ltd@netcom.com (Larry Drebes)
Date: 01 Oct 1994 02:12:24 GMT
Subject: Re: Find E-Mail Address?
jaburns@zooul.jcpenney.com wrote:
<levinson@sunbow.dab.ge.com> writes: Does anyone know how to
locate someones E-Mail address. He is an old high school buddy
and has a unique last name. Thanks..
Try the Internet White Pages, available in the technical section of
most bookstores!!
How about Four11. Email: info@four11.com
Web: http://www.four11.com
------------------------------
From: stark@rtsg.mot.com (George Stark)
Date: 01 Oct 1994 04:15:02 GMT
Subject: Encryption Program
Organization: Motorola Cellular Infrastructure Group
Can someone please tell me where I can find either an 88K Unix program
or C code for an good encryption program for data files that is not too
large.
thanks in advance for any information.
--
George Stark | WAR IS PEACE; FREEDOM IS SLAVERY
stark@rtsg.mot.com | IGNORANCE IS STRENGTH.
Motorola-Aftermarket Support Center | - George Orwell
------------------------------
From: pp000837@interramp.com
Date: 01 Oct 94 14:11:49 PDT
Subject: How to verify your phone number
Organization: PSI Public Usenet Link
If you dial 1-800-MY-ANI-IS (1-800-692-6647), you should be able to
ascertain/verify the number you are calling from. This technique is
particularly useful when calling from a pay phone (that accepts incoming calls
but is missing a listed number) or when calling from an unlisted phone that you
want to crack.
[MODERATOR: This does not work from my phone in 414 land.]
copyright Privacy Newsletter 1994
---------------------------------
John Featherman
Privacy Newsletter
PO Box 8206
Philadelphia PA 19101-8206
------------------------------
From: chakravaa@willow.uml.edu (Ananda Chakravarty)
Date: 01 Oct 94 16:52:23 -0500
Subject: Conference on Telecommunications R&D - Privacy Issues
Organization: Univ Mass-Lwl
Announcement: Technical Conference on Telecommunications R&D in Massachusetts
Conference Date: Tuesday, October 25, 1994
Conference Time: 8:30AM to 5:30PM
Conference Location: University of Massachusetts, Lowell
One University Ave.
Lowell, MA 01854
The First Annual Technical Conference on Telecommunications R&D in
Massachusetts will be held to provide a forum for universities, industry,
and government to disseminate information on the technical advances and
policies for the significant achievements in telecommunications.
The Challenge: Massachusetts, already recognized as a leading center in
the international telecommunications playing field, will be bringing
in major players to design, build, and navigate the architecture of the
future Information Superhighway.
The basic format will consist of three components: addresses, technical
presentations, and panel discussions, all focusing on key areas in
telecommunications research and policy.
Addresses will include:
Opening speaker:
The Honorable William F. Weld, Governor of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts.
"The Future of Telecommunications and the Massachusetts Economy"
Keynote speaker:
Dr. Robert E. Kahn, President, Corporation for National Research Initiatives
"Enabling the National Information Infrastructure"
Featured Luncheon speaker:
The Honorable Senator Edward M. Kennedy, United States Senator, Massachusetts.
"Creating the Communications Future in Massachusetts"
A series of technical sessions will present research scientists and industry
experts encompassing the broad range of topics to be addressed.
Leading universities, industrial laboratories, and government institutions
will present work vital to the foundations of the emerging infrastructure.
Proceedings, including submitted papers and abstracts, will be distributed
to the registrants.
Technical sessions:
1. Applications Layer Support:
Topics: PAX agent system; ATM support for telemedicine; ATM/SONET access
technology; business intelligence software; collaborative design;
home health care; medical information databases; service model quality;
multimedia and telecomputing in the factory; discrete event simulation;
transactional data inference; models for high variability in data
traffic.
2. Audio and Speech Processing:
Topics: Speech recognition; production and coding; analysis of
teleconferencing environments; acoustic devices for teleconferencing;
audio and video teleconferencing; teleconferencing applications.
3. Wireless Information Networks:
Topics: Discrete multitone modulation; over the horizon communication;
mobile and personal communications; advanced vessel tracking systems;
stochastic models for space and time dynamics; composite
spread-spectrum modulation; wide area communication architectures;
spread-spectrum and waveform coding; VHF, UHF, and troposcatter
transmission; Mobile IP systems; Enabling technologies.
4. Visual Multimedia:
Topics: Bi-directional video distribution systems; user interfaces;
structured multimedia information; document architectures; interactive
multimedia; intelligent video processing; multimedia-video servers;
multimedia delivery.
5. Network Protocols, Signaling, Control, Management, and Performance:
Topics: Traffic control in ATM networks; reliable multicast; credit-based
flow control; ST2 network management; ATM PNNI routing.
6. Broadband Networks and Switching Technologies:
Topics: Optical switching; broadband trials to the home; desk area
networking; ATM switch architectures; Switch design; buffer design
and management; Flow control.
7. Security/Privacy:
Topics: Security and Privacy issues in electronic communications; internet
security standards; commercial uses of security; legal standards for
public-key certification; ethical issues.
Speakers will include scientists and experts from the following organizations:
VMX Technologies GTE Laboratories Raytheon
Legacy Technologies UMASS/Amherst Merrimack College
UMASS/Worcester Open Software Foundation Hewlett-Packard
Harvard Medical School Worcester Polytechnic Institute UMASS/Dartmouth
Rivier College AT&T Bell Laboratories Haskins Laboratories
Acentech Picture Tel Multilink
Dragon Systems Mitsubishi Electric UMASS Medical Center
Digital Equipment Corp. Aware, Inc. Signatron Tech. Corp.
Harvard University Volpe National Transportation Systems Ctr.
Telco Systems Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Avid Technology Boston University T.E. Consulting, Inc.
InteCom Wellfleet Communications TASC
MITRE Meetinghouse Data Communications
BBN NYNEX Science & Technology
Independent Monitoring UMASS/Lowell
The General Chairs:
Sidney Topol, Chairman, Massachusetts Telecommunications Council
Michael K. Hooker, President, University of Massachusetts
CONFERENCE STEERING COMMITTEE:
Co-Chairs:
W. Richards Adrion, UMASS/Amherst
Howard Salwen, Telco Systems
Committee:
Michael R. Brown, MITRE Corp.
Thomas M. Costello, UMASS/Lowell
C. Eric Ellington, GTE Govt. Systems
Michael G. Hluchyj, Summa Four
H. T. Kung, Harvard University
James F. Kurose, UMASS/Amherst
Tom D. C. Little, Boston University
Paul J. Tanzi, Raytheon
David Tennenhouse, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Program Coordinator:
Charles Thompson, UMASS/Lowell
--------------------------------------------
Registration Form:
Technical Conference on Telecommunications R&D in Massachusetts
Corporate $195
Academic $150
Mass. Telecommunications Council Member $100
Student $25
No refunds after October 19, 1994.
Please complete and Mail/Fax to
Dr. Charles Thompson, Program Coordinator
Center for Advanced Computation and Telecommunications
University of Massachusetts, Lowell
One University Ave.
Lowell, MA 01854
FAX: (508) 458 - 8289
OR
Massachusetts Telecommunications Council
One Financial Center, 17th Floor
Boston, MA 02111
FAX: (617) 439-3190
I am enclosing a check for $__________ for _____ registrants from my
organization to attend the conference.
I am most interested in technical session (circle one)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Name:_________________________________Title:__________________________
Organization Name:__________________________________
Address:____________________________________________
____________________________________________________
Telephone:____________________Fax:__________________
Additional Registrants:
Name:________________________________Title:__________________________
Interested session: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Name:________________________________Title:__________________________
Interested session: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Name:________________________________Title:__________________________
Interested session: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
--
chakravaa@woods.uml.edu
Center for Advanced Computation & Telecommunication
University of Massachusetts - Lowell
------------------------------
From: poivre@netcom.com (Serrano)
Date: 02 Oct 1994 02:53:44 GMT
Subject: Re: Post Office Boxes
Organization: NETCOM On-line Communication Services (408 261-4700 guest)
John Medeiros (71604.710@compuserve.com) wrote:
Mark Mullins <mark.mullins@chaos.lrk.ar.us> asked: Is there a
way for one to find out WHO paid the $2 fee to find out your
home address?? Is the information recorded permanently?? How
long does it take to find this information out??
Current Post Office regulations state that individual home and P.O.
Box address information is NOT to be disclosed. Business address
and P.O. Box information may be disclosed to anyone who requests
it for a $3.00 fee.
I wonder what i am doing wrong?? I went to the post office a few days
ago to see what i would have to do to get information on a business
P.O. Box and the post man said that they are not allowed to give info
on business boxes. I asked if this was a new rule and the post man
said that it was...sort of...that they are in the middle of writing up
a new rule so in the mean time, no information of any nature on
business boxes are to be disclosed. Is this true or am i going about
it the wrong way?? Thanks.
--
poivre@netcom.com : #include <disclaimer.h>
------------------------------
From: "Prof. L. P. Levine" <levine@blatz.cs.uwm.edu>
Date: 26 Sep 1994 12:45:51 -0500 (CDT)
Subject: Info on CPD, Contributions, Subscriptions, FTP, etc.
Organization: University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee
The Computer Privacy Digest is a forum for discussion on the effect of
technology on privacy or vice versa. The digest is moderated and
gatewayed into the USENET newsgroup comp.society.privacy (Moderated).
Submissions should be sent to comp-privacy@uwm.edu and administrative
requests to comp-privacy-request@uwm.edu.
If you read this from the comp.society.privacy newsgroup and wish to
contribute a message, you should simply post your contribution. As a
moderated newsgroup, attempts to post to the group are normally turned
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On the other hand, if you read the digest eMailed to you, you generally
need only use the Reply feature of your mailer to contribute. If you
do so, it is best to modify the "Subject:" line of your mailing.
Contributions generally are acknowledged within 24 hours of
submission. An article is printed if it is relevant to the charter of
the digest. If selected, it is printed within two or three days. The
moderator reserves the right to delete extraneous quoted material. He
may change the subject line of an article in order to make it easier
for the reader to follow a discussion. He will not, however, alter or
edit or append to the text except for purely technical reasons.
A library of back issues is available on ftp.cs.uwm.edu [129.89.9.18].
Login as "ftp" with password identifying yourid@yoursite. The archives
are in the directory "pub/comp-privacy".
People with gopher capability can most easily access the library at
gopher.cs.uwm.edu.
Mosaic users will find it at gopher://gopher.cs.uwm.edu.
Older archives are also held at ftp.pica.army.mil [129.139.160.133].
---------------------------------+-----------------------------------------
Leonard P. Levine | Moderator of: Computer Privacy Digest
Professor of Computer Science | and comp.society.privacy
University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee | Post: comp-privacy@uwm.edu
Box 784, Milwaukee WI 53201 | Information: comp-privacy-request@uwm.edu
| Gopher: gopher.cs.uwm.edu
levine@cs.uwm.edu | Mosaic: gopher://gopher.cs.uwm.edu
---------------------------------+-----------------------------------------
------------------------------
End of Computer Privacy Digest V5 #042
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