Date: Tue, 06 Dec 94 15:26:06 EST
Errors-To: Comp-privacy Error Handler <owner-comp-privacy@uwm.edu>
From: Computer Privacy Digest Moderator <comp-privacy@uwm.edu>
To: Comp-privacy@uwm.edu
Subject: Computer Privacy Digest V5#070
Computer Privacy Digest Tue, 06 Dec 94 Volume 5 : Issue: 070
Today's Topics: Moderator: Leonard P. Levine
Re: DC Metro Smart Cards
Re: DC Metro Smart Cards
Re: DC Metro Smart Cards
Re: Is Per-Call Blocking Worthless?
Re: Is Per-Call Blocking Worthless?
Re: Is Per-Call Blocking Worthless?
Re: Is Per-Call Blocking Worthless?
Dynamic Negotiation in the Privacy Wars (Article)
New Penal Code in Spain
Three Hits and you're Out
DMV Records
DMV Records
Help Needed for Internet Study
Internet Security Monthly
Information Highways for a Smaller World (long)
Info on CPD (unchanged since 11/28/94)
----------------------------------------------------------------------
From: Paul Robinson <PAUL@tdr.com>
Date: 03 Dec 1994 10:30:49 -0500 (EST)
Subject: Re: DC Metro Smart Cards
Organization: Tansin A. Darcos & Company, Silver Spring, MD USA
rutgera@rd.mey.nl (Rutger Alsbach), writes:
[Quoting Dave Moore about the card:] because if you lost it,
you could report it stolen and have it disabled. I infer from
this that your personal ID is tied to the card and that it is
not anonymous.
It could also be that the card is identifiable by a number...If the
card is stolen, DC Metro can disable the card and pay a refund
(minus charges) to the person that reports its number. All this
can be done anonymously (as long as you pay cash and receive a cash
refund). DC Metro could still track the use of the card but they
don't have a name to connect it with.
WMATA, which operates the DC Metro System would, at best, probably
provide a replacement card in the amount of the unused card. As an
actual user of the system, I can state categorically that DC Metro
would never refund the money. Metro *never* issues refunds. Not for
any reason, even for their own mistakes. All they will do is issue
credit valid toward future uses of the metro system. Metro *never*
issues cash refunds.
------------------------------
From: mduman@astro.ocis.temple.edu (Michael Duman)
Date: 04 Dec 1994 07:42:03 GMT
Subject: Re: DC Metro Smart Cards
Organization: Temple University, Academic Computer Services
Rutger Alsbach (rutgera@rd.mey.nl) wrote:
Dave Moore <davem@garnet.spawar.navy.mil> writes about the DC
Metro Smart Card: It also stated that it was far more secure
than a standard fare card because if you lost it, you could
report it stolen and have it disabled. I infer from this that
your personal ID is tied to the card and that it is not
anonymous.
It could also be that the card is identifiable by a number. You
could write that down and keep it at a safe place (away from the
card). If the card is stolen, DC Metro can disable the card and
pay a refund (minus charges) to the person that reports its
number. All this can be done anonymously (as long as you pay cash
and receive a cash refund). DC Metro could still track the use of
the card but they don't have a name to connect it with. Additional
advantage is, that it is harder for personal enemies or practical
jokers to have your card disabled (and get the refund) by saying
your name and reporting it stolen - they need the number.
Yes, but, as somone else said before, how would this be of any
benifit? You would still need a turnstyle, or some method of stopping
those without/with a forged/disabled card...
Maybe they should just use armed guards.
--
Mike
[mduman@astro.ocis.temple.edu]
[Is it time to go home yet?]
------------------------------
From: dave.moore@tcbbs.cais.com (DAVE MOORE)
Date: 03 Dec 94 23:53:00 -0500
Subject: Re: DC Metro Smart Cards
Organization: The Tech Connect BBS / Tech Connect Computers / 703-590-5198
From: rutgera@rd.mey.nl (Rutger Alsbach) It could also be that the
card is identifiable by a number.
I got a chance to dig the article out of the recycle. Here are some
quotes:
"... Only the rider will know how much is in the account, although
Metro will keep track of who owns a GO CARD in case it is lost."
Correction: I had previously stated that that the card had to be within
14 inches of the reader. That's incorrect, it says "4" inches.
"... "If we could wave a magic wand and have anything we want, we would
have a computer chip implanted in people at birth so you could just
walk through" a fare gate, said Raymond DeKozan, chairman of the board
and chief executive of Cubic, the San Diego company that has spent six
years developing the smart transit cards. "So we tried to create
something that comes pretty close to that."
dave.moore@tcbbs.cais.com
--
* A good catchword can obscure analysis for fifty years.
* CMPQwk 1.42-17 1347
------------------------------
From: wbe@psr.com (Winston Edmond)
Date: 03 Dec 1994 18:41:29 GMT
Subject: Re: Is Per-Call Blocking Worthless?
Organization: Panther Software and Research
Someone (the attribution was missing in Prof. Levine's reply)
asked: ... I have been told that when using the per call blocking
feature (i.e., *67) to suppress my phone number, that the number is
*still* being sent, but with a 'packet' that only suppresses it
being displayed. Can this be confirmed?
"Prof. L. P. Levine" <levine@blatz.cs.uwm.edu> replied: My
understanding is that unlisted phone numbers with per-line blocking
have no greater security; that the calling number information is
passed through the entire network and is stopped only at the very
end, before the final user. Is that correct?
I'm no expert, but since the caller's number would have been delivered
if the called party had ANI (Automatic Number Identification), it makes
sense to assume that the phone system always forwards the number to the
far end, and decides there what, if anything, to do with the
information.
--
WBE
------------------------------
From: fd@wwa.com (Glen L. Roberts)
Date: 03 Dec 1994 18:54:21 GMT
Subject: Re: Is Per-Call Blocking Worthless?
Organization: WorldWide Access - Chicago Area Internet Services 312-282-8605 708-367-1871
Prof. L. P. Levine (levine@blatz.cs.uwm.edu) wrote: I have been
asked the question: I have been told that when using the per call
blocking feature (i.e., *67) to suppress my phone number, that the
number is *still* being sent, but with a 'packet' that only
suppresses it being displayed. Can this be confirmed? I am
currently on hold from my phone company -- Ameritech in
Indianapolis (whose motto seems to be: "we don't care -- we don't
have to -- we're the phone company") to get the 'official'
response. I was also informed that per line blocking is neither
available, nor would it be.
The information (caler's phone number is ABSOLUTELY NOT sent down the
telephone line to called party when blocked with *67. It may well, be
sent to the switch that handles the called party. The called party gets
an "P" in place of the number in the data stream.
The problem is, then, if it only suppresses the display of the
information, then it is as useless as my unlisted phone number.
Of more concern, I suspect is that if you have an unlisted number and
call someone... without blocking... your NAME & NUMBER is transmitted.
(of course, name service is more limited than number... but it is
expanding quickly).
--
Glen L. Roberts, Editor, Full Disclosure
Host Full Disclosure Live (WWCR 5,065 khz - Sundays 7pm central)
email fd@wwa.com for catalog on privacy & surveillance.
Does 10555-1-708-356-9646 give you an "ANI" readback? With name?
email for uuencoded .TIF of T-Shirt Honoring the FBI
Remember, fd _IS FOR_ Full Disclosure!
------------------------------
From: johnl@iecc.com (John R Levine)
Date: 03 Dec 94 16:25 EST
Subject: Re: Is Per-Call Blocking Worthless?
Organization: I.E.C.C., Cambridge, Mass.
Calling Line ID (please don't call it caller id) is designed so that
it always sends the calling phone number. When you set blocking,
either per call or per line, it sends along a do not display flag.
The reason they do it that way is that CLID is part of a package of
other features such as priority ring, call block, call trace, and
return call, all of which still makes sense if call display is
blocked.
I am among those who believe that CLID is more useful for telemarketers
than for dealing with annoying calls (and who finds it outrageous that they
charge for call trace, since the annoyance call bureau was always free).
But the way that CLID is deisgned makes technical sense.
Regards,
John Levine, johnl@iecc.com
Primary Perpetrator of "The Internet for Dummies"
------------------------------
From: rem@world.std.com (Ross E Mitchell)
Date: 03 Dec 1994 16:44:13 GMT
Subject: Re: Is Per-Call Blocking Worthless?
Organization: The World Public Access UNIX, Brookline, MA
Prof. L. P. Levine <levine@blatz.cs.uwm.edu> wrote: the per call
blocking feature (i.e., *67) to suppress my phone number, that the
number is *still* being sent, but with a 'packet' that only
suppresses it being displayed. Can this be confirmed? I am
currently on hold from my phone company -- Ameritech in
You are correct that your phone number is passed throughout the
network, regardless of the privacy setting of your line. However, a
"privacy bit" is also set which informs the carriers that you do not
want the number displayed on the receiving end to subscribers who have
purchased Caller ID service.
The FCC requires that phone companies honor the setting of this bit.
Unfortunately, the FCC has also ruled that, beginning in April '95, per
line blocking may NOT be used to block display of the caller's number
interstate calls; only *67 (1167 for rotary phones) is to be used!
I have an article in the current issue of MIT's Technology Review which
addresses the Caller ID privacy issue in it's entirety. I will post it
here under its title: Dynamic Negotiation in the Privacy Wars.
--
Ross Mitchell - rem@world.std.com - Phone: 617-965-7010 - Fax: 617-630-0140
------------------------------
From: rem@world.std.com (Ross E Mitchell)
Date, 3 Dec 1994 17:01:12 GMT
Subject: Dynamic Negotiation in the Privacy Wars (Article)
Organization: The World Public Access UNIX, Brookline, MA
The following article, which I co-authored, has just appeared in the
November/December 1994 issue of MIT's Technology Review. This article
is distributed with permission of the publisher. The entire issue is
available on the World Wide Web. The home page can be found at:
http://web.mit.edu/afs/athena/org/t/techreview/www/tr.html
If you would like to re-post this article elsewhere, please be sure to
include the Copyright notice.
-----------------------------------------------
Dynamic Negotiation in the Privacy Wars
Ross E. Mitchell and Judith Wagner Decew
New telecommunications technologies are undermining our ability to
remain anonymous. The situation has inspired a sensible solution that
would make privacy self-regulating.
People want information about others but are reticent to divulge it
about themselves. Nowhere is this conflict more apparent than in the
telephone feature known as caller identification, or caller ID, which
allows those receiving calls to see the telephone number and name of
the caller before answering the phone.
Telephone companies are promoting and installing caller ID throughout
the country. Proponents of the technology argue that it provides a
valuable service to those pestered by obscene or harassing phone calls
or persistent telemarketing. But some privacy advocates vehemently
disagree, maintaining that callers should be able to choose to remain
anonymous. In a world of interlinked computer networks and massive data
banks, they say, people already give away too much personal information
without their knowledge and consent. They further worry that the
prospect of identification will deter anonymous police tipsters and
callers to hot lines for drug abusers, AIDS victims, or runaways.
There is, however, a logical and intuitive way to implement this
technology that should satisfy both camps. This new way of thinking
about privacy regulation, which we call ``dynamic negotiation,''
permits us to enjoy the benefits of new telecommunications technologies
- including, but not limited to, caller ID - without sacrificing our
right to privacy.
Most caller ID systems automatically release the caller's phone number.
To prevent this information from being divulged for a particular call,
the caller must enter a code (typically *67) before dialing the number.
In other words, callers must take an extra step to retain the privacy
that they had taken for granted. They must learn how to block
transmission of the data, and must remember to dial the code each time.
This is known as ``per-call'' blocking.
Some phone systems allow ``per-line'' blocking - the caller's number is
kept private by default and is released only when the caller enters an
``unblocking'' code. But in rules scheduled to take effect next April,
the Federal Communications Commission has decided that the potential
public value of caller ID outweighs the privacy concerns of those who
want automatic blocking of numbers. The commission stated that per-line
blocking was ``unduly burdensome'' and ruled that on interstate calls,
only per-call blocking is to be permitted - preempting state
regulations that allow per-line blocking. We propose an alternative -
a system that allows people to dynamically negotiate the degree of
privacy they wish to sacrifice or maintain.
Here's how such a system would work with caller ID. Initially, all
phone subscribers' lines would, by default, block the release of the
caller's number. Subscribers could choose to release their number on a
per-call basis by dialing an unblocking code (other than *67). So far,
this is just per-line blocking. But in the system we suggest, phones
with caller ID displays can also be set up to automatically refuse
calls when the number has not been provided by the caller. When an
anonymous call is attempted, the phone doesn't ring. The thwarted
caller hears a short recorded message that to complete the call, the
originating phone number must be furnished. This message then instructs
the caller what code to dial to give out the number. Otherwise, the
call is incomplete and the caller is not charged. Thus, a caller has
the chance to decide whether a call is important enough that it is
worth surrendering anonymity.
This solution preserves choice and ensures privacy. Callers can control,
through a dynamic and interactive process, when to give out their
numbers; recipients can refuse anonymous calls.
Most callers, of course, will want to release their number when calling
friends and associates. And if such calls dominate their use of the
phone, they might choose to change the default on their line so that it
automatically releases their number unless they dial in a blocking
code. Thus, a dynamic negotiation system may well lead many people to
change from per-line to per-call blocking - precisely what the phone
companies and the FCC favor. But when these customers change their
default setting, they will know what they are choosing and why; they
will be actively consenting to give out their numbers as a matter of
course.
Most businesses will want to take all calls, whether numbers are
provided or not. But certain establishments might want to reject
anonymous calls - for example, pizzerias that want incoming numbers for
verification to avoid bogus orders. Most callers will happily unblock
their numbers when such a business asks them to.
Some display units that can be purchased for use with caller ID are
already able to reject anonymous calls, but they are a far cry from the
dynamic negotiation system that we propose. With these caller ID units,
every call, whether accepted or not, is considered to have been
answered - and charged to the caller. But a call that is rejected
because of its anonymity should entail no charge. This requires that
the call be intercepted by the phone company's central office
switchboard before it reaches the recipient's line.
Although inspired by the debate over caller ID, the concept of dynamic
negotiation of privacy can apply to other telecommunications
technologies. One likely candidate is electronic mail. With traditional
paper mail, people have always had the right - and the ability - to
send anonymous correspondence. Delivery of the envelope requires
neither that a letter is signed nor that a return address is provided.
On the receiving end, people have the right to discard anonymous mail
unopened.
Applying the principles of dynamic negotiation, senders of electronic
mail would have the option to identify or not identify themselves.
Recipients could reject as undeliverable any e-mail with an
unidentified sender. The sender would then have the option to
retransmit the message - this time with a return address. As with
caller ID, the users negotiate among themselves. The system itself
remains privacy neutral.
Several criteria guide such an approach: the need to protect individual
privacy for all parties to a communication, the importance of letting
new technologies flourish, and the need for national guidelines to
provide consistency in system use and privacy protection. Since
technological innovation proceeds rapidly, we must continually examine
how best to make possible new features while preserving or enhancing
our existing level of privacy. The technology for implementing dynamic
negotiation is already available. All that is needed is for the FCC to
amend its recent ruling. If the FCC refuses, the House
Telecommunications Subcommittee should propose legislation to require
dynamic negotiation. With this system as the national norm, privacy
concerns would become self-regulating.
------------------
ROSS E. MITCHELL, based in Newton, Mass., is a designer of
telecommunications software. JUDITH WAGNER DeCEW is a professor of
philosophy at Clark University in Worcester, Mass.; she is working on a
book on legal and ethical disputes over privacy protection, to be
published by Princeton University Press.
------------------
TECHNOLOGY REVIEW ON-LINE COPYRIGHT NOTICE
Technology Review (ISSN 0040-1692) , Reg. U.S. Patent Office
Copyright 1994, Technology Review, all rights reserved.
Published eight times each year by the Association of Alumni and
Alumnae of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. The editors seek
diverse views, and authors' opinions do not represent the official
policies of their institutions or those of MIT.
Articles may not under any circumstances be resold or redistributed for
compensation of any kind without prior written permission from
Technology Review
--
Ross Mitchell - rem@world.std.com - Phone: 617-965-7010 - Fax: 617-630-0140
------------------------------
From: Rafael Fernandez Calvo <rfcalvo@guest2.atimdr.es>
Date: 05 Dec 94 00:23:33 -0100
Subject: New Penal Code in Spain
Organization: ATI (Asociacion de Tecnicos de Informatica)
Could you please post the following urgent message at your fora?
Thanks in advance,
Rafael
-------------------------------------------
Subject: New Penal Code in Spain
A new Penal Code is about to be discussed in the Parliament of Spain.
CLI (*) is putting up a proposal on crimes related to misuse of
Information and Communications Technologies against the rights of
citizens (specially --but not solely-- privacy). That proposal will be
sent to the political parties represented in the Parliament.
Legislation to that respect existing in different countries would be of
great help to achieve our purposes. Please send text of such
legislations --before Dec. 12-- via email or fax to the following
addresses:
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
Rafael Fernandez-Calvo | rfcalvo@guest2.atimdr.es
Member of the Presidential Board of |
CLI (Comision de Libertades e Informatica) * | (34-1) 309 3685 Fax
(Commission for Liberties and Informatics)| (34-1) 402 9391 Phone
Padilla 66, 3 dcha., E28006 Madrid Spain |
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
* CLI is an independent coalition created in Madrid on Dec. 1991 by
several entities (consumers leagues, trade unions, associations of
human right advocates, DP professionals and judges, and the direct
marketing sindicate) with a joint membership of about 3 million
people. Its main purpose is to promote citizens' rights, specially
privacy, against misuse of Information and Communications
Technologies.
------------------------------
From: "Prof. L. P. Levine" <levine@blatz.cs.uwm.edu>
Date: 05 Dec 1994 22:43:33 -0600 (CST)
Subject: Three Hits and you're Out
Organization: University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee
Taken From RISKS-LIST: RISKS-FORUM Digest Monday 5 December 1994
Volume 16 : Issue 60 FORUM ON RISKS TO THE PUBLIC IN COMPUTERS AND
RELATED SYSTEMS ACM Committee on Computers and Public Policy, Peter G.
Neumann, moderator
Date: 05 Dec 1994 16:29:30 GMT
From: gsk@world.std.com (Geoffrey S Knauth)
Subject: 3 hits and you're out? (SSN use)
Last week, a friend was writing software to make credit checks as part
of a large project involving government loans to individuals. He
returned home and told his wife we'd been using my social security
number to test the interface, with my permission. His wife works at a
bank, and she told him he'd better not do three checks on me, or I
wouldn't get any more credit. I was surprised to hear that a credit
check carries with it this sort of penalty. Can anyone from the credit
industry confirm this?
My friend was recently given a "test" SSN to use, so I shouldn't have
to worry more.
Geoffrey S. Knauth <gsk@marble.com> http://www.marble.com/people/gsk.html
Marble Associates, Inc., (617) 487-0050 CRASH-B Sprints, Cambridge Boat Club
------------------------------
From: Robert Ellis Smith <0005101719@mcimail.com>
Date: 05 Dec 94 12:02 EST
Subject: DMV Records
John Kwiatkowski (Nov. 29) asked what services compile motor vehicle
files and market them. Dataflo Systems, a subsidiary of Equifax (which
runs one of the major credit bureaus), dominated this field for many
years but in 1994 TRW, Equifax' major competitor, entered the field, by
marketing its Motor Vehicle Database with data from 30 states (and
growing).
This information is from PRIVACY JOURNAL newsletter. A sample copy of
the electronic edition is available upon request,
0005101719@mcimail.com.
--
Robert Ellis Smith, Publisher
------------------------------
From: Nancy_Welborn@bendnet.com (Nancy Welborn)
Date: 06 Dec 94 12:55:24 PST
Subject: DMV Records
Organization: Electronic Communities Limited
With just a little bit of research I discovered a virtual directory of
online sources for investigating people. It appears any of these
information suppliers will supply to the public. The directory is "How
to Investigate by Computer", is marketed to private investigators (but
available to anyone), and published by: Thomas Investigative
Publications, Inc.
P.O. Box 33244
Austin, TX 78764
(512)928-8190
I called and received information from two such services who will
provide background info. on individuals or businesses (DMV records,
credit reports, real estate owned, personal property owned, previous
employer comments, school records, worker's comp. claim histories, etc.
etc.) for a minimal fee.
Those two services are: Online Searches
Lynwood, WA
1-800-858-5294
AVERT, Inc.
Fort Collins, CO
1-800-367-5933
It seems our lives are now an open book to anyone who wants to look!
------------------------------
From: c2fine@hermes.acs.ryerson.ca (Corbett Fine - AIMD/F94)
Date: 05 Dec 1994 01:39:31 GMT
Subject: Help Needed for Internet Study
Organization: Ryerson Polytechnic University
I am a senior university student doing a research paper on privacy on
the internet. I would appreciate it if you would take a minute to
respond to the following questions. Thank you in advance for your
assistance in this matter. (Please respond to the address listed below)
QUESTIONS:
1) What is your sex/age?
2) Where do you live (country)?
3) What are your feelings regarding privacy on the Information
Highway? Is it a concern of yours, and what actions do you take
to ensure it (if any)?
Please send response to: yu125859@yorku.ca
------------------------------
From: nso@tam.cs.ucdavis.edu (NSO account)
Date: 06 Dec 1994 08:22:19 GMT
Subject: Internet Security Monthly
Organization: Department of Computer Science, University of California, Davis
NETWORK NEWS RELEASE
USA - Washington DC
Network Security Observations, leading international research journal
on network security, announces the birth of its sister publication
INTERNET SECURITY MONTHLY.
Internet Security Monthly will serve as the International News Bulletin
for the Security, Safety and Protection of Datacommunications on the
Information Superhighway. Internet Security Monthly s contents will be
specially composed for the new users of datanetworks linked to the
Internet, as international service providers Prodigy, America Online,
Delphi, PSI Link, CompuServe, and many others.
A mix of news briefs on incidents, accidents and potholes on the
datahighway, and a carefully selected set of essentials of immediate
importance to the network user, fill Internet Security Monthly.
Professional reporting on and senior network experience in network
system security warrant so. Focussing on firewalls, unix security,
cryptography, privacy, legislation, and contributions to the
international debates on how to protect your connections, the security
of the net , integrity of data/messages, risks, and many more vital
topics are covered.
Internet Security Monthly will be published in the English language and
Worldwide distributed. As with Network Security Observations, the
definitive source for complete technical and research information on
computer network security, Internet Security Monthly is a
not-for-profit initiative, hence it features no advertisement.
Special sponsorship has made it possible to keep the subscription rates
low: including airmail delivery an international subscription costs US
$ 120, in the United States US $ 95.
The introduction rate (valid until December 31, 1994) for international
subscribers is US $ 100, in the United States US $ 75.
If you order a subscription to Internet Security Monthly and Network
Security Observations at thesame time, before December 31, 1994 and pay
with your American Express card, you will be enrolled free of charge
for the 1995 personal membership of the Internet Society.
Overwhelming Worldwide interest prevents to honor requests for
trial-orders,samples and review copies.
For details and subscription ordering contact:
Network Security Observations/Internet Security Monthly
Suite 400, 1825 I (eye) Street NW, Washington DC 20006
United States
Tel.: +1 202 775 4947 Fax +1 202 429 9574
Internet: nso@delphi.com
_______________________________________________________
NETWORK SECURITY OBSERVATIONS Tel: +1 202 775 4947
Suite 400, 1825 I Street NW Fax: +1 202 429 9574
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20006 UNITED STATES
--------> email: nso@delphi.com <---------------
------------------------------
From: jyl@yiscgw.yonsei.ac.kr (Lee JaiYong)
Date: 05 Dec 1994 12:33:06 GMT
Subject: Information Highways for a Smaller World (long)
Organization: Yonsei University
Following is the SECOND CALL FOR PAPER for ICCC'95(revised version) to
be held in Seoul Korea 1995.
Publicity Chair,
ICCC'95
----------------------------------------------------------------------
CALL FOR PAPERS
ICCC '95
"Information Highways for a Smaller World & Better Living"
Seoul, Korea
August 21 - 24, 1995
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
The ICCC, the International Council for Computer Communication
(ICCC), founded in 1972, is an Affiliate Member of the
International Federation for Information Processing (IFIP).
Its purposes are to foster: scientific research and the development
of computer communication; progress in the evaluation of
applications of computer communication to educational, scientific,
medical, economic, legal, cultural and other peaceful purposes;
study of the potential social and economic impacts of computer
communcation and of policies which influence those impacts.
This 12th conference aims at providing a forum to exchange ideas, discuss
key issues and to present the late research results for "Information Highways
for a Smaller World & Better Living." The main program includes technical
presentations, invited talks, tutorials, and technical visits.
TOPICS : Areas of interest include but are not limited to
. Strategies, Policies, and User . Wireless Communications
Perspectives of Information . Intelligent Networks
Superhighways . Personal Communications Systems
. Social and Economical Impacts . Broadband Communication
of Information Superhighways . ATM Switching
. Computer Communication for . International Emergencies
Developing Countries . Distance Learning
. Network Planning . Optical Communications
. Security and Privacy in Computer . Multimedia Communication and its
Communications Applications
. Evolution towards the High-Speed . High-Speed Protocols
Networks including Frame Relay . Network Management
and SMDS . Protocol Engineering
. Packet Radio Technologies
. Satellite Communications
SUBMISSION OF PAPERS
Prospective authors should send 5 copies of a full paper to the following
address;
ICCC'95
Dr. Seon Jong Chung
ICCC'95 Technical Program Chairman
ETRI, Yusong P.O.Box 106, Taejon, Korea, 305-606
Tel: +82-42-860-8630
Fax: +82-42-860-6465
E-mail: iccc95@giant.etri.re.kr
The manuscript should not exceed 4000 words in length and
should include author's name, affiliation, and
addresses(telephone, e-mail, fax), and 150-200 words abstracts
in the title page. Also, authors are encouraged to send a
Postscript version of their full paper to the Technical Program
Committee Chairman by e-mail iccc95@giant.etri.re.kr
|-------------------------------|
| Important Dates |
| Submission of Paper |
| February 1st, 1995 |
| Notification of Acceptance |
| May 1st, 1995 |
| Camera-ready Papers |
| June 15th, 1995 |
|-------------------------------|
----------------------------------------------------------------
Sponsored by
The International Council for Computer Communication
Hosted by
Electronics and Telecommunications Research Institute
Korea Information Science Society
Under the Patronage of
Ministry of Communication, The Republic of Korea
Conference Governor
Ronald P.Uhlig, Northern Telecom, U.S.A.
Conference Organizing Committee
Chair : Chongsun Hwang, KISS, Korea
Co-Chair : Seungtaik Yang, ETRI, Korea
Local Arrangement
Dongho Lee, Kwangwoon Unvi., Korea
Publication
Keosang Lee, Dacom, Korea
Publicity
Jaiyong Lee, Yon-Sei Univ., Korea
Registration
Samyoung Suh, NCA, Korea
Treasurer
Seungkyu Park, Ajou Univ., Korea
Tutorial
Sunshin An, Korea Univ., Korea
Social Program
Nosik Kim, KTRC, Korea
Secretariate
Yanghee Choi, SNU, Korea
Jinpyo Hong, ETRI, Korea
Technical Program
Chair : Seonjong Chung, ETRI, Korea
Co-Chairs : Serge Fdida, MASI, France
Nicholas Georganas, Univ. of Ottawa, Canada
Roger Needham, Univ. of Cambridge, U.K.
Otto Spaniol, Aachen Tech. Univ., Germany
Hideyoshi Tominaga, Waseda Univ., Japan
Pramode Verma, AT&T, U.S.A.
Members : Sunshin An, Korea Univ., Korea
Yanghee Choi, SNU, Korea
Jin Pyo Hong, ETRI/PEC, Korea
Byungchul Shin, KAIST, Korea
Yongjin Park, Hanyang Univ., Korea
Donggyoo Kim, Ajou Univ., Korea
Seungkyu Park, Ajou Univ., Korea
Dongho Lee, Kwangwoon Univ., Korea
Kwangsue Chung, Kwangwoon Univ., Korea
Daeyoung Kim, Cheoungnam National Univ., Korea
Ilyoung Chung, ETRI, Korea
Chimoon Han, ETRI, Korea
Woojik Chon, ETRI, Korea
Hoon Choi, ETRI, Korea
Jaiyong Lee, Yonsei Univ., Korea
Tadao Saito, Tokyo Univ., Japan
Tahahiko Kamae, HP Lab., Japan
Reigo Yatsuboshi, Fujitsu Lab., Japan
Kinji Ono, NACSIS, Japan
Michel Diaz, LAAS-CNRS, France
Christophie Diot, INRIA, France
Jean-Yves Le Boudec, IBM, Zurich Lab., Swiss
Georgio Ventre, Univ. di Napoli, France
David Hutchison, Lanchaster Univ., U.K.
Augusto Casaca, INES,Portugal
Martina Zitterbart, Univ. of Karlsruhe, Germany
Ulf Koerner, Lund Univ., Sweden
David J. Farber, Univ. of Pennsylvania, USA
Reg A. Kaenel, Marcicopa-County Comm. College, USA
Ira Cotton, USA
Martin E. Silveretoin, USA
Albert Kuendig, Swiss Federal Inst. of Tech., Swiss
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------------------------
From: "Prof. L. P. Levine" <levine@blatz.cs.uwm.edu>
Date: 28 Nov 1994 08:46:14 -0600 (CST)
Subject: Info on CPD (unchanged since 11/28/94)
Organization: University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee
The Computer Privacy Digest is a forum for discussion on the effect of
technology on privacy or vice versa. The digest is moderated and
gatewayed into the USENET newsgroup comp.society.privacy (Moderated).
Submissions should be sent to comp-privacy@uwm.edu and administrative
requests to comp-privacy-request@uwm.edu.
This digest is a forum with information contributed via Internet
eMail. Those who understand the technology also understand the ease of
forgery in this very free medium. Statements, therefore, should be
taken with a grain of salt and it should be clear that the actual
contributor might not be the person whose email address is posted at
the top. Any user who openly wishes to post anonymously should inform
the moderator at the beginning of the posting. He will comply.
If you read this from the comp.society.privacy newsgroup and wish to
contribute a message, you should simply post your contribution. As a
moderated newsgroup, attempts to post to the group are normally turned
into eMail to the submission address below.
On the other hand, if you read the digest eMailed to you, you generally
need only use the Reply feature of your mailer to contribute. If you
do so, it is best to modify the "Subject:" line of your mailing.
Contributions generally are acknowledged within 24 hours of
submission. An article is printed if it is relevant to the charter of
the digest and is not redundant or insulting. If selected, it is
printed within two or three days. The moderator reserves the right to
delete extraneous quoted material. He may change the subject line of
an article in order to make it easier for the reader to follow a
discussion. He will not, however, alter or edit or append to the text
except for purely technical reasons.
A library of back issues is available on ftp.cs.uwm.edu [129.89.9.18].
Login as "ftp" with password identifying yourid@yoursite. The archives
are in the directory "pub/comp-privacy".
People with gopher capability can most easily access the library at
gopher.cs.uwm.edu.
Mosaic users will find it at gopher://gopher.cs.uwm.edu.
Older archives are also held at ftp.pica.army.mil [129.139.160.133].
---------------------------------+-----------------------------------------
Leonard P. Levine | Moderator of: Computer Privacy Digest
Professor of Computer Science | and comp.society.privacy
University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee | Post: comp-privacy@uwm.edu
Box 784, Milwaukee WI 53201 | Information: comp-privacy-request@uwm.edu
| Gopher: gopher.cs.uwm.edu
levine@cs.uwm.edu | Mosaic: gopher://gopher.cs.uwm.edu
---------------------------------+-----------------------------------------
------------------------------
End of Computer Privacy Digest V5 #070
******************************
.