Date:       Mon, 23 Jan 95 19:10:12 EST
Errors-To:  Comp-privacy Error Handler <owner-comp-privacy@uwm.edu>
From:       Computer Privacy Digest Moderator  <comp-privacy@uwm.edu>
To:         Comp-privacy@uwm.edu
Subject:    Computer Privacy Digest V6#008

Computer Privacy Digest Mon, 23 Jan 95              Volume 6 : Issue: 008

Today's Topics:			       Moderator: Leonard P. Levine

               Re: Tax Forms Display SSN on Mailing Label
                    Is the Post Office Subsidized?
                            Re: Opening Mail
                            Re: Opening Mail
                         Mail Marked "Refused"
                            Offshore Privacy
                        Re: Phone Numbers as IDs
                    Radio Shack Respects My Privacy
                    DOJ Computer Seizure Guidelines
                       Taken from EPIC Alert 2.01
                 Info on CPD [unchanged since 12/29/94]

----------------------------------------------------------------------

From: daniel@genghis.interbase.borland.com (Dan Veditz)
Date: 20 Jan 1995 22:32:34 GMT
Subject: Re: Tax Forms Display SSN on Mailing Label
Organization: Borland International

    <privacy@interramp.com> wrote: It will take until more innocent tax
    payers have their SSNs used fraudulently that this insensitive
    practice will stop.

It will take until more innocent **Congresscritters** have their SSNs
used fraudulently. It'll take tons of us normal folks otherwise.

--
Dan


------------------------------

From: Rich24@aol.com
Date: 21 Jan 1995 00:44:29 -0500
Subject: Is the Post Office Subsidized? 

Does the Post Office make money or lose it on those post-paid blow in
cards commonly seen in magazines? Would the Post Office reap a bonanza
if everyone just dropped all those annoying blow in cards into the mail
box with no information filled in?


------------------------------

From: madnix.uucp!zaphod@nicmad.nicolet.com (Ron Bean)
Date: 21 Jan 95 11:12 CST
Subject: Re: Opening Mail

    "David C. Frier" <duvie@digex.com> writes: Also, the analyses I've
    seen indicate that first-class mail costs MUCH less than 32 cents a
    piece to process, and it subsidizes your 6" a day of junk mail.
    It's strictly a matter of who has the better lobbyists, eh?

Do you have references on this? I think the general assumption is that
junk mail allows the overhead to be spread out over a larger volume.
It's also usually pre-sorted, which saves the Post Office some time.
Any evidence to the contrary would be most interesting.

--
madnix!zaphod@nicmad.nicolet.com (Ron Bean)
uwvax!astroatc!nicmad!madnix!zaphod


------------------------------

From: bear@fsl.noaa.gov (Bear Giles)
Date: 23 Jan 95 17:55:47 GMT
Subject: Re: Opening Mail
Organization: Forecast Systems Labs, NOAA, Boulder, CO USA

    travis@netrix.com (Travis Low) wrote: Go to the post office which
    handles your mail and inform them that you are being harassed by a
    XXX at xxxxx address and you wish this to stop immediately.  If I
    remember correctly, postal inspectors then notify the company that
    the mailings to you must stop or they will face stiff fines and
    federal prosecution.  However, you must first have followed steps
    such as printing "REFUSED" clearly on the front of the mailings and
    having it returned to sender at least once

First class mail will be returned to the sender if it can't be
delivered; junk mail won't be.  Postal carriers have the legal right to
drop such mail into the trash can; the direct mailer will never get the
refused mail and you'll have no legal grounds for a complaint.  That's
one reason why the bulk mail rate is lower than first class -- less
service.

The "obvious" solution is to mail it back to them registered, so they
can't deny receiving it, but some companies refuse to accept unexpected
registered mail.  Can you say "sure you can serve a summons to me, but
it will cost more than a few bucks in postage!"?  Think any direct
marketers would fall into this category?

On the bright side, if you mail the first "refused" package back and
the stuff keeps coming, the local post office will probably be much
more willing to check it (verifying that you have, indeed, written
"refused" on the package and mailed it to the proper address), and if
the problem continues they can act.

-- 
Bear Giles
bear@fsl.noaa.gov


------------------------------

From: "Virginia Matzek" <VMATZEK@alumni.berkeley.edu>
Date: 20 Jan 1995 16:01:13 PACIFIC
Subject: Mail Marked "Refused"
Organization:  California Alumni Assoc.

    I got myself off the supermarket & other ciruclars by mailing a
    do-not-send notice to the address on the card that mandatorily
    accompanies the wad.  My mail carrier knows that I don't get the
    stuff, also.

    However, you must first have followed steps such as printing
    "REFUSED" clearly on the front of the mailings and having it
    returned to sender at least once

Can someone please elaborate or be more explicit on the procedure for
getting off random junk mailings? If I get an unwanted solicitation
for, say, a new credit card from Visa, can I just write REFUSED on it
and put it back in the mailbox, or do I have to fill out some kind of
card? And does the evil corporation get charged for the cost of
sending/resending the mail to me? (I hope so--I'd relish the pleasure
of sending THEM junk mail at THEIR expense! Tee hee!)

    The next time someone wants my signature on a digitizer pad I think
    I'll just sign with "X".

The last time UPS came by our door, my boyfriend decided to scribble
something unrecognizable. The UPS guy looked at it, said he couldn't
read the signature, and asked him to try again. After three (totally
different and thoroughly unconvincing) scribbled tries, the UPS guy
gave up and punched my boyfriend's first and last name in on the manual
punchpad. A small victory for privacy...

+----------------------------------------------------------------+
| Virginia Matzek                 "I love being a writer.        |
| Associate Editor                What I can't stand is the      |
| California Monthly              paperwork." -- Peter De Vries  |
|                                                                |
| vmatzek@alumni.berkeley.edu                                    |
| phone: 510/642-5781     fax: 510/642-6252                      |
+----------------------------------------------------------------+  


------------------------------

From: styvesan@cosricon.com
Date: 21 Jan 95 03:41:09 EST
Subject: Offshore Privacy
Organization: Costa Rica Online

In review of Computer Privacy Digest and the concerns of the forum
members concerning caller ID blocking.  My firm offers a private caller
card that completely stops this problem. This card gives complete
security to the caller and can be used from any phone. IT IS IMPOSSIBLE
TO LOCATE THE CALLERS LOCATION OR NUMBER!  If you have interest on this
type of privacy or learning more about offshore privacy and the
opportunities to operate in a tax-free environment, please contact us
directly at:

    Trans-Atlantic Commercial
    Internet SJO-966
    P.O.B. 025216
    Miami, FL  33102
    ATTN: Dr. Styvesant J. Fishdt

or contact me here at:  styvesan@cosricon.com We are an international
consulting firm, specializing in legal work for the offshore
corporation or individual who wishes to maintain privacy.  I will
gladly send you a free copy of our international newsletter " Financial
Privacy News " Our newsletter also includes a list of our offshore
publications for your information.  Since I can't reach the Internet
directly from Costa Rica, I don't know of the proper forums to sign
on.  Would you please be so kind to send this where you think it may
provide the most information for those who need it.   Thanking you in
advance and looking forward to hearing from you.

--
STYVESANT


------------------------------

From: bear@fsl.noaa.gov (Bear Giles)
Date: 23 Jan 95 20:54:38 GMT
Subject: Re: Phone Numbers as IDs
Organization: Forecast Systems Labs, NOAA, Boulder, CO USA

    Mike Rollins wrote: With all due respects, I am a name not a
    number!

Granted, but do you have any idea how many John Smiths, Jon Smythes,
etc there are in the U.S.?  Even "Mike Rollins" is unlikely to be
unique.

Worse, many of use have "reversible" names.  "Giles" is my surname, but
I've seen more people on the 'net who have it as their given name.  My
"legal" first name is also a surname; a coworker once claimed to have
known someone with my name, reversed.  Because data's occasionally
entered incorrectly "Bruce Giles" and "Giles Bruce" are considered
equivalent names -- both pass reasonable consistency checks.  (Sigh, my
middle name has the same property; my parents must have really hated
me. :-)  Or thought I would need a wide variety of aliases based on all
permutations of my name.)

Sure, individuals can be distinguished by looking at addresses,
birthdays, etc., but it takes time.  The additional time for each
customer won't be much, but in aggregate it may require an extra 20-30%
in staff, corresponding equipment (phone lines, terminals), etc.  Or
customers may be forced to wait 10 minutes for the "next available
representative," instead of only 5 minutes.

Phone numbers are convenient because they're relatively unique and
there's no question of spelling.  Account numbers would be better, but
few people remember them unless they're on something like a credit
card.  (Even that doesn't work for people like me, who generally leave
our credit cards at home unless we're specifically planning to make a
purchase.)  SSN's would also work, for U.S. nationals and resident
aliens, but have the same problem as account numbers for others...  to
say nothing of the people who object to global use of SSNs as
identification numbers.

Finally, identifying a person by something like a phone number (or any
other number) does *not* mean you'll be treated "like a number"
(totally indistinguishable from other people) instead of a unique
individual.  In fact, since it gets the tedious work of identifying you
out of the way companies can use it to highly personalize the
interactions.  (E.g., "Are you satisfied that the improper charge you
reported last month was taken care of, Mr. Smith?").

On the other hand, I've dealt with some companies which couldn't be
bothered with account numbers or the like, but which clearly had the
attitude that if I didn't want to deal with them, someone else would.

In the big picture, firms asking for a telephone number is a pretty
minor concern because it solves as many problems as it causes.  The
only systemic problems (I see) are:

1) firms quietly collecting extra information on you -- your home,
   work and cellular numbers, not just a single point-of-contact #.

2) firms quietly sharing those numbers with other firms.  I don't
   mind firms I actively deal with having my unlisted number, but I
   don't want them passing it along to others.  Unfortunately, the
   "courtesy" is to help other companies, not the customer.

   Beyond that, maybe there are a few situations where I honestly do
   not want to end up on what I see as being the wrong mailing list, or
   even the wrong telemarketer's calling list.  What happens if I do
   not want anyone to call me back?

Well run companies will always have "escape" options.  I've done that
occasionally, where I would call for general information and when they
ask for my account number I respond that I'm just trying to get a rate
quote (or whatever).  Most well-run companies don't mind this, since it
saves *them* time as well.

-- 
Bear Giles
bear@fsl.noaa.gov


------------------------------

From: "Prof. L. P. Levine" <levine@blatz.cs.uwm.edu>
Date: 23 Jan 1995 15:21:07 -0600 (CST)
Subject: Radio Shack Respects My Privacy
Organization: University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee

In a recent visit to a local Radio Shack I saw, for the first time, a
poster on the cash register with a picture of the big boss saying that
Radio Shack Respects Your Privacy.  He then goes on to discuss their
long standing policy of asking for phone numbers.

Seems that they might be getting the point, let's watch.

--
Leonard P. Levine               e-mail levine@cs.uwm.edu
Professor, Computer Science        Office 1-414-229-5170
University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee  Fax    1-414-229-6958
Box 784, Milwaukee, WI 53201     
         PGP Public Key: finger llevine@blatz.cs.uwm.edu


------------------------------

From: Dave Banisar <banisar@washofc.epic.org>
Date: 20 Jan 1995 21:08:18 EST    
Subject: DOJ Computer Seizure Guidelines
Organization: Electronic Privacy Information Center

EPIC Analysis of New Justice Department Draft Guidelines on Searching
and Seizing Computers

Dave Banisar Electronic Privacy Information Center

The Electronic Privacy Information Center (EPIC) has obtained the
Department of Justice's recently issued draft "Federal Guidelines for
Searching and Seizing Computers."  EPIC obtained the document under the
Freedom of Information Act.  The guidelines provide an overview of the
law surrounding searches, seizures and uses of computer systems and
electronic information in criminal and civil cases.  They discuss
current law and suggest how it may apply to situations involving
computers.  The draft guidelines were developed by the Justice
Department's Computer Crime Division and an informal group of federal
agencies known as the Computer Search and Seizure Working Group.

Seizing Computers

A major portion of the document deals with the seizure of computers.
The draft recommends the use of the "independent component doctrine" to
determine if a reason can be articulated to seize each separate piece
of hardware.  Prosecutors are urged to "seize only those pieces of
equipment necessary for basic input/output so that the government can
successfully execute the warrant."  The guidelines reject the theory
that because a device is connected to a target computer, it should be
seized, stating that "[i]n an era of increased networking, this kind of
approach can lead to absurd results."

However, the guidelines also note that computers and accessories are
frequently incompatible or booby trapped, thus recommending that
equipment generally should be seized to ensure that it will work.  They
recommend that irrelevant material should be returned quickly.  "[O]nce
the analyst has examined the computer system and data and decided that
some items or information need not be kept, the government should
return this property as soon as possible."  The guidelines suggest that
it may be possible to make exact copies of the information on the
storage devices and return the computers and data to the suspects if
they sign waivers stating that the copy is an exact replica of the
original data.

On the issue of warrantless seizure and "no-knock warrants," the
guidelines note the ease of destroying data.  If a suspect is observed
destroying data, a warrantless seizure may occur, provided that a
warrant is obtained before an actual search can proceed.  For
"no-knock" warrants, the guidelines caution that more than the mere
fact that the evidence can be easily destroyed is required before such
a warrant can be issued.  "These problems . . . are not, standing
alone, sufficient to justify dispensing with the knock-and-announce
rule."

Searching Computers

Generally, warrants are required for searches of computers unless there
is a recognized exception to the warrant requirement.  The guidelines
recommend that law enforcement agents use utility programs to conduct
limited searches for specific information, both because the law prefers
warrants that are narrowly tailored and for reasons of economy.  "The
power of the computer allows analysts to design a limited search in
other ways as well . . . by specific name, words, places. . . ."

For computer systems used by more than one person, the guidelines state
that the consent of one user is enough to authorize a search of the
entire system, even if each user has a different directory.  However,
if users have taken "special steps" to protect their privacy, such as
using passwords or encryption, a search warrant is necessary.  The
guidelines suggest that users do not have an expectation of privacy on
commercial services and large mainframe systems because users should
know that system operators have the technical ability to read all files
on such systems.  They recommend that the most prudent course is to
obtain a warrant, but suggest that in the absence of a warrant
prosecutors should argue that "reasonable users will also expect system
administrators to be able to access all data on the system."  Employees
may also have an expectation of privacy in their computers that would
prohibit employers from consenting to police searches.  Public
employees are protected by the Fourth Amendment and searches of their
computers are prohibited except for ""non-investigatory, work related
intrusions" and "investigatory searches for evidence of suspected
work-related employee misfeasance."

The guidelines discuss the Privacy Protection Act of 1980, which was
successfully used in the Steve Jackson Games case against federal
agents.  They recommend that "before searching any BBS, agents must
carefully consider the restrictions of the PPA."  Citing the Jackson
case, they leave open the question of whether BBS's by themselves are
subject to the PPA and state that "the scope of the PPA has been
greatly expanded as a practical consequence of the revolution in
information technology -- a result which was probably not envisioned by
the Act's drafters."  Under several DOJ memos issued in 1993, all
applications for warrants under the Privacy Protection Act must be
approved by a Deputy Assistant Attorney General of the Criminal
Division or the supervising DOJ attorney.

For computers that contain private electronic mail protected by the
Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, prosecutors are advised
to inform the judge that private email may be present and avoid reading
communications not covered in the warrant.  Under the ECPA, a warrant
is required for email on a public system that is stored for less than
180 days.  If the mail is stored for more than 180 days, law
enforcement agents can obtain it either by using a subpoena (if they
inform the target beforehand) or by using a warrant without notice.

For computers that contain confidential information, the guidelines
recommend that forensic experts minimize their examination of
irrelevant files.  It may also be possible to appoint a special master
to search systems containing privileged information.

One important section deals with issues relating to encryption and the
Fifth Amendment's protection against self-incrimination.  The
guidelines caution that a grant of limited immunity may be necessary
before investigators can compel disclosure of an encryption key from a
suspect.  This suggestion is significant given recent debates over the
Clipper Chip and the possibility of mandatory key escrow.

Computer Evidence

The draft guidelines also address issues relating to the use of
computerized information as evidence.  The guidelines note that "this
area may become a new battleground for technical experts."  They
recognize the unique problems of electronic evidence: "it can be
created, altered, stored, copied, and moved with unprecedented ease,
which creates both problems and opportunities for advocates."  The
guidelines discuss scenarios where digital photographs can be easily
altered without a trace and the potential use of digital signatures to
create electronic seals.  They also raise questions about the use of
computer generated evidence, such as the results of a search failing to
locate an electronic tax return in a computer system.  An evaluation of
the technical processes used will be necessary:  "proponents must be
prepared to show that the process is reliable."

Experts

The DOJ guidelines recommend that experts be used in all computer
seizures and searches -- "when in doubt, rely on experts."  They
provide a list of experts from within government agencies, such as the
Electronic Crimes Special Agent program in the Secret Service (with 12
agents at the time of the writing of the guidelines), the Computer
Analysis and Response Team of the FBI, and the seized recovery
specialists (SERC) in the IRS.  The guidelines reveal that "[m]any
companies such as IBM and Data General employ some experts solely to
assist various law enforcement agencies on search warrants."  Other
potential experts include local universities and the victims of crimes
themselves, although the guidelines caution that there may be potential
problems of bias when victims act as experts.

Obtaining a Copy of the Guidelines

EPIC, with the cooperation of the Bureau of National Affairs, is making
the guidelines available electronically.  The document is available via
FTP/Gopher/WAIS/listserv from the EPIC online archive at cpsr.org
/cpsr/privacy/epic/fed_computer_siezure_guidelines.txt. A printed
version appears in the Bureau of National Affairs publication, Criminal
Law Reporter, Vol. 56, No. 12 (December 21 1994).

About EPIC

The Electronic Privacy Information Center is a public interest research
center in Washington, DC.  It was established in 1994 to focus public
attention on emerging privacy issues relating to the National
Information Infrastructure, such as the Clipper Chip, the Digital
Telephony proposal, medical record privacy, and the sale of consumer
data.  EPIC is sponsored by the Fund for Constitutional Government and
Computer Professionals for Social Responsibility.  EPIC publishes the
EPIC Alert and EPIC Reports, pursues Freedom of Information Act
litigation, and conducts policy research on emerging privacy issues.
For more information email info@epic.org, or write EPIC, 666
Pennsylvania Ave., S.E., Suite 301, Washington, DC 20003. +1 202 544
9240 (tel), +1 202 547 5482 (fax).

The Fund for Constitutional Government is a non-profit organization
established in 1974 to protect civil liberties and constitutional
rights.  Computer Professionals for Social Responsibility is a national
membership organization of people concerned about the impact of
technology on society. For information contact: cpsr-info@cpsr.org.

Tax-deductible contributions to support the work of EPIC should be made
payable to the Fund for Constitutional Government.

_________________________________________________________________________
Subject: DOJ Computer Siezure Guidelines
_________________________________________________________________________
David Banisar (Banisar@epic.org)       * 202-544-9240 (tel)
Electronic Privacy Information Center * 202-547-5482 (fax)
666 Pennsylvania Ave, SE, Suite 301  * ftp/gopher/wais cpsr.org 
Washington, DC 20003                * HTTP://epic.digicash.com/epic


------------------------------

From: tc@epic.org (Dave Banisar)
Date: 22 Jan 1995 12:00:41 -0400
Subject: Taken from EPIC Alert 2.01
Organization: Electronic Privacy Information Center

    Volume 2.01 January 18, 1995 Published by the Electronic Privacy
    Information Center (EPIC) Washington, DC info@epic.org

=======================================================================
A Portion of the Table of Contents
=======================================================================

 [1] Nader Speaks to Privacy Advocates
 [2] European Privacy Directive Moves Forward
 [6] IRS Initiates New Database System
 [8] Upcoming Conferences and Events

=======================================================================
[1] Nader Speaks to Privacy Advocates
=======================================================================

Consumer advocate Ralph Nader urged privacy activists and academics to
put a "hard edge on the privacy movement" at a meeting sponsored by
the Electronic Privacy Information Center and the Privacy Journal in
Washington, DC in mid-January. The conference brought together more
than thirty leading privacy experts and advocates from across the
country. The group discussed prospects for privacy reform in the new
Congress and efforts to support local and international privacy
initiatives.

Mr. Nader, who thirty years ago won a landmark privacy case against
General Motors, said it was time to "name names" and present the
"rogues gallery" of privacy violators. He noted that greatest privacy
invaders are "super private." "They know everything about you, and you
have no idea who they are."

Mr. Nader said that privacy advocates need to hold government and
corporate privacy violators accountable. "Invasions of privacy are a
system of control that must be challenged," said Mr. Nader.

The group also heard from Hill staffpeople, members of the
Administration and other about prospects for privacy reform.  Among
the issues discussed were medical record privacy, privacy protection
for the information infrastructure, Intelligent Transportation
Systems, and consumer privacy.

The group agreed to take specific action to oppose the $500 million
appropriation for the FBI wiretap bill, to support efforts to improve
medical record privacy, and to work together on privacy efforts around
the country.

=======================================================================
[2] European Privacy Directive Moves Forward
=======================================================================

The Council of Ministers of the European Community have adopted a
common position on the European data protection directive. As a
result, the directive will now go to the European Parliament for a
second reading. The directive is considered to be on a fast track for
adoption.

The directive is significant for European privacy because it will
require changes in existing privacy laws and necessitate the adoption
of privacy safeguards in the remaining European countries that do not
yet have legislation.

According to Professor Joel Reidenberg of Fordham Law School, "The
common position takes a stronger position on data protection than
existing national laws. There are also important implications for the
United States.  The directive will result in greater scrutiny of
countries without a data protection commission and without adequate
legislative protections."

=======================================================================
[6] IRS Initiates Massive New Database
=======================================================================

On December 20, the Internal Revenue Service announced in the Federal
Register that it was planning a new database to monitor compliance of
taxpayers in a project entitled Compliance 2000.  The database would
contain information on all individuals in the U.S. who conduct certain
financial transactions and would be segmented by different criteria:

   Any individual who has business and/or financial activities. These
   may be grouped by industry, occupation, or financial transactions,
   included in commercial databases, or in information provided by
   state and local licensing agencies.

The new database will combine private and public sector databases in a
single searchable entity.  A number of federal financial databases from
the IRS will be enhanced with state, local and commercial sources. The
Federal Register notice describes the non-tax databases:

   Examples of other information would include data from commercial
   databases, any state's Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV), credit
   bureaus, state and local real estate records, commercial
   publications, newspapers, airplane and pilot information, U.S.
   Coast Guard vessel registration information, any state's Department
   of Natural Resources information, as well as other state and local
   records.  In addition, Federal government databases may also be
   accessed, such as, federal employment files, federal licensing data,
   etc.

Finally, even though the proposed system would use frequently
inaccurate "commercial databases" such as direct marketing records,
taxpayers would not be able to review their records to ensure that they
are accurate and up to date:  "This system is exempt from the access
and contest provisions of the Privacy Act."

EPIC is filing comments asking the IRS to reconsider its use of
commercial databases and to ensure that there are greater safeguards
on the collection and use of personal information.

A copy of the Federal Register notice is available at cpsr.org
/cpsr/privacy/epic/IRS_compliance_2000_notice_txt
Comments on the proposed system must be received by January 19, 1995,
and sent to Office of Disclosure, Internal Revenue Service, 1111 Conn.
Ave, NW, Washington, DC 20224. EPIC's Comments are available at
cpsr.org /cpsr/privacy/epic/epic_irs_compliance_2000_comments.txt

=======================================================================
[8] Upcoming Privacy Related Conferences and Events
=======================================================================

Privacy, The Information Infrastructure and Healthcare Reform. Ohio
State University, Columbus, OH,  Jan. 27.  Contact:
vberdaye@magnus.acs.ohio-state.edu.

Cryptography: Technology, Law and Economics. New York City. Mar. 3, 
1995. Sponsored by CITI, Columbia University. Contact: 
citi@research.gsb.columbia.edu

Towards an Electronic Patient Record '95. Orlando, FL. Mar. 14-19,
1995. Sponsored by Medical Records Institute. Contact: 617-964-3926
(fax).

Access, Privacy, and Commercialism:  When States Gather Personal
Information. College of William and Mary, Williamsburg, VA, March 17.
Contact:  Trotter Hardy  804 221-3826.

Computers, Freedom and Privacy '95. Palo Alto, Ca. Mar. 28-31, 1995.
Sponsored by ACM. Contact: cfp95@forsythe.stanford.edu.

ETHICOMP95:  An international conference on the ethical issues of
using Information Technology. DeMontfort University, Leicester,
ENGLAND, March 28-30, 1995.  Contact: Simon Rogerson srog@dmu.ac.uk 44
533 577475 (phone)  44 533 541891 (Fax).

National Net '95: Reaching Everyone. Washington, DC.  Apr. 5-7, 1995. 
Sponsored by EDUCOM.  Contact: net95@educom.edu or call 202/872-4200.

Information Security and Privacy in the Public Sector. Herdon, VA.
Apr. 19-20, 1995. Sponsored by AIC Conferences.  Contact: 212/952-1899.

1995 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy. Oakland, CA, May 8-10.
Contact:  sp95@itd.nrl.navy.mil.

INET '95. Honolulu, HI. June 28-30, 1995. Sponsored by the Internet
Society. Contact inet95@isoc.org.

Key Players in the Introduction of Information Technology: Their
Social Responsibility and Professional Training. July 5-6-7, 1995.
Namur, Belgium. Sponsored by CREIS. Contact: nolod@ccr.jussieu.fr.

Advanced Surveillance Technologies. Sept. 5, 1995. Copenhagen, Denmark.
Sponsored by Privacy International and EPIC. Contact pi@epic.org.

          (Send calendar submissions to Alert@epic.org)
  
=======================================================================

The EPIC Alert is a free biweekly publication of the Electronic
Privacy Information Center. To subscribe, send the message:

SUBSCRIBE CPSR-ANNOUNCE Firstname Lastname

to listserv@cpsr.org. You may also receive the Alert by reading the
USENET newsgroup comp.org.cpsr.announce.

Back issues are available via FTP/WAIS/Gopher/HTTP from cpsr.org
/cpsr/alert and on Compuserve (Go NCSA), Library 2 (EPIC/Ethics). An
HTML version of the current issue is available from epic.digicash.com/epic


------------------------------

From: "Prof. L. P. Levine" <levine@blatz.cs.uwm.edu>
Date: 29 Dec 1994 10:50:22 -0600 (CST)
Subject: Info on CPD [unchanged since 12/29/94]
Organization: University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee

The Computer Privacy Digest is a forum for discussion on the effect of
technology on privacy or vice versa.  The digest is moderated and
gatewayed into the USENET newsgroup comp.society.privacy (Moderated).
Submissions should be sent to comp-privacy@uwm.edu and administrative
requests to comp-privacy-request@uwm.edu.  

This digest is a forum with information contributed via Internet
eMail.  Those who understand the technology also understand the ease of
forgery in this very free medium.  Statements, therefore, should be
taken with a grain of salt and it should be clear that the actual
contributor might not be the person whose email address is posted at
the top.  Any user who openly wishes to post anonymously should inform
the moderator at the beginning of the posting.  He will comply.

If you read this from the comp.society.privacy newsgroup and wish to
contribute a message, you should simply post your contribution.  As a
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On the other hand, if you read the digest eMailed to you, you generally
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do so, it is best to modify the "Subject:" line of your mailing.

Contributions to CPD should be submitted, with appropriate, substantive
SUBJECT: line, otherwise they may be ignored.  They must be relevant,
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not include entire previous messages in responses to them.  Include
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publications using CPD material should obtain permission from the
contributors.  

Contributions generally are acknowledged within 24 hours
of submission.  If selected, they are printed within two or three days.
The moderator reserves the right to delete extraneous quoted material.
He may change the SUBJECT: line of an article in order to make it easier
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A library of back issues is available on ftp.cs.uwm.edu [129.89.9.18].
Login as "ftp" with password identifying yourid@yoursite.  The archives
are in the directory "pub/comp-privacy".

People with gopher capability can most easily access the library at
gopher.cs.uwm.edu.

Mosaic users will find it at gopher://gopher.cs.uwm.edu.

Older archives are also held at ftp.pica.army.mil [129.139.160.133].

 ---------------------------------+-----------------------------------------
Leonard P. Levine                 | Moderator of:     Computer Privacy Digest
Professor of Computer Science     |                  and comp.society.privacy
University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee | Post:                comp-privacy@uwm.edu
Box 784, Milwaukee WI 53201       | Information: comp-privacy-request@uwm.edu
                                  | Gopher:                 gopher.cs.uwm.edu 
levine@cs.uwm.edu                 | Mosaic:        gopher://gopher.cs.uwm.edu
 ---------------------------------+-----------------------------------------


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End of Computer Privacy Digest V6 #008
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