Date: Thu, 02 Mar 95 09:25:55 EST
Errors-To: Comp-privacy Error Handler <owner-comp-privacy@uwm.edu>
From: Computer Privacy Digest Moderator <comp-privacy@uwm.edu>
To: Comp-privacy@uwm.edu
Subject: Computer Privacy Digest V6#023
Computer Privacy Digest Thu, 02 Mar 95 Volume 6 : Issue: 023
Today's Topics: Moderator: Leonard P. Levine
Re: Cordless Phone Privacy
Re: Cordless Phone Privacy
Re: Cordless Phone Privacy
Re: Question Regarding Wiretapping
A True Story
Re: Use of Mailboxes
Question on Clipper Status
Re: Compuserve Sued for Delivering "Junk E-Mail"
The IRS and The INS
Re: The National Computer Security Organization
Can You Buy Boxes to Fool CallerID/ANID?
EPIC Legislative Update 2.2
Info on CPD [unchanged since 12/29/94]
----------------------------------------------------------------------
From: eck@panix.com (Mark Eckenwiler)
Date: 28 Feb 1995 00:01:15 -0500
Subject: Re: Cordless Phone Privacy
Organization: Saltieri, Poore, Nash, deBrutus & Short, Attorneys at Law
rthomas007@aol.com sez: I am not in the know about the bill you
just spoke of. However, up until a year or so ago, the U.S. Supreme
Court ruled that there is no expectation of privacy on a cordless
telephone. There is on a cellular.
Cite, please.
And even if such a case existed, the 1994 Digital Telephony Act's
amendments to Title III have now *created* a legal expectation of
privacy for cordless calls.
BRENDZA@gould-tm.mhs.compuserve.com sez: Does this mean that
cordless phone signals that are broadcast between the handset and
the base are not encrypted (and then de-encrypted for the phone
line) because of some federal legislation against it? If so, is
this so that law enforcement agencies can monitor the broadcast,
like a wire-tap without a warrant (a wireless tap?).
The effect of the 1994 amendment to Title III -- bringing cordless
phone transmissions within the protection of federal wiretap law -- is
to prohibit warrantless taps by law enforcement.
------------------------------
From: Christopher Zguris <0004854540@mcimail.com>
Date: 28 Feb 95 08:48 EST
Subject: Re: Cordless Phone Privacy
<BRENDZA@gould-tm.mhs.compuserve.com> writes: Does this mean that
cordless phone signals that are broadcast between the handset and
the base are not encrypted (and then de-encrypted for the phone
line) because of some federal legislation against it? If so, is
this so that law enforcement agencies can monitor the broadcast,
like a wire-tap without a warrant (a wireless tap?). I always
wondered why AT&T or some other phone manufacturer never
manufactured a "scrambled signal" phone unit. I guess I never
really thought about why no one did. Is this why? Does that mean
it's illegal to install your own encrypted broadcast scheme if you
were inclined to?
Last I heard, Radio Shack sells an "scrambled" phone. Of course, it's
not digital descrambling, so -- as I understand it -- it's fairly easy
to unscarmble. I'm thinking there's another manufacturer, but the name
escapes me. I don't think it's becuase of legislation or a conspiracy,
I think it's simple economics. I don't think people would have payed
the extra money for a scrambled phone, we're talking more than your
average cordless phone. Besides that, I also don't think the people
selling the phones want to publicize the fact either way. Bringing up
scrambling means acknowledging someone might/is listening, and that's a
bad thing for sales :-) .
--
Chris
czguris@mcimail.com
(just another happy MCI customer)
------------------------------
From: knauer@ibeam.jf.intel.com (Rob Knauerhase)
Date: 01 Mar 95 07:03:20 GMT
Subject: Re: Cordless Phone Privacy
Organization: Intel Corporation
<BRENDZA@gould-tm.mhs.compuserve.com> writes: Does this mean that
cordless phone signals that are broadcast between the handset and
the base are not encrypted (and then de-encrypted for the phone
line) because of some federal legislation against it? If [...]
why no one did. Is this why? Does that mean it's illegal to
install your own encrypted broadcast scheme if you were inclined
to?
It almost certainly isn't illegal to encrypt the transmission between a
cordless handset and base; as an example, the Motorola model 550
cordless phone boasts what they call "secure clear technology" for just
such a purpose. The unit includes a "demo mode" so you can hear what
someone with a 46/49MHz scanner would hear.
(Some may claim that analog voice inversion isn't "encryption"; I'm not
sure if there are subtleties to the definition or not.)
--
Rob Knauerhase [knauer@ibeam.jf.intel.com] Intel Mobile Technology Lab
"It would be quite possible to control a distant computer by means of
a telephone line." -- Alan Turing, 1947
------------------------------
From: Mike Rollins <mjr@conan.ids.net>
Date: 27 Feb 1995 06:50:37 -0500 (EST)
Subject: Re: Question Regarding Wiretapping
Organization: IDS World Network Internet Access Service, (800)IDS-1680
Michael Benedek wrote: Pardon me if this is not an appropriate
usergroup on which to post this question: If the government is
tapping your phone line, is there anyway, theoretically to make an
untraceable phonecall or send an untraceable computer
transmission?
The best way to place a telephone call with minimal risk of having it
traced or intercepted, is to use an encryption scheme such as PGP,
while placing the call from a pay phone which is located at a distance
from the location of the residence or business that you believe to be
under surveilance. In other words, make a point of driving past a few
pay phones to one which is chosen at random. Please note that this
will not protect you from the risk of a tap being placed on the
receiving end of your call. In order to try doing that, you would need
to have the recipient of your call waiting at a second randomly chosen
pay phone. Unless the desired privacy is related to an issue of
extreme importance, this is really not worth the effort. Even then, be
warned that people are likely to get careless.
--
Mike Rollins
mjr@conan.ids.net
Speaking only for myself.
------------------------------
From: pbrennan@world.std.com (Patrick M Brennan)
Date: 01 Mar 1995 23:12:22 GMT
Subject: A True Story
Organization: The World Public Access UNIX, Brookline, MA
I went to the local Sears to buy a new clock radio this afternoon over
my lunch break. I needed some help on getting a price from the
salesman on the floor, and I eventually selected a model and we went
over to a register to complete the purchase. The salesman, a regular
white guy in his late 30s or early 40s, logged in to the register, and
after a short sparring session during which he tried really hard to
sell me the extended warranty (I said no three times!), he began to key
in the purchase. I swear I am not making this conversation up (but I
am recalling it from a 3-hour old memory):
====================================================
SALESMAN : Cash, check or charge?
ME : Cash.
SALESMAN : Can I get your phone number, please?
ME : xxx-xxxx.
SALESMAN : (keys it in) Where's that?
ME : Brighton.
SALESMAN : Hm. Name?
ME : Brennan.
SALESMAN : (keys it in) Address?
ME : I don't think you need that.
SALESMAN : Yes, I do.
ME : Why?
SALESMAN : Because that's what the computer wants.
ME : Well, I don't really think it's necessary.
(At this point the SALESMAN voids the transaction, and starts it again
to get to the menu choice which allows him to bypass the address
screen. His face displays his displeasure.)
ME : I'm sorry, I don't mean to make your life rough.
SALESMAN : I don't see what's wrong with it.
ME : Everywhere I go lately, these companies want me to give them my
address. I don't see why it's necessary and I don't want your
company's computers keeping tabs on me.
SALESMAN : It's necessary in order to prevent fraud.
ME : This is a cash transaction we're doing here. I think it's
unlikely that I can defraud your company.
SALESMAN : Well you know, somebody else could just bring it back and
return it for money.
ME : m-Hm.
SALESMAN : The company's just looking to protect its ass. You know,
Sears has a big credit card division. Without their credit card
business, the company couldn't stay in business. We can't even check
people's credit ratings, and that's just stupid.
ME : Well, I think people have a legitimate right to protect their
privacy.
SALESMAN : Ahhh, you've been listening to too many liberal college
professors. Privacy, Shmivacy. If you're not doing anything wrong,
you have nothing to worry about.
ME : Yeah, right -- until they change the definition of what's
"wrong".
SALESMAN : Well, I've got nothing to worry about.
====================================================
Is this poor schmuck as dumb as he sounds? I have to admit I am
baffled by the zeal displayed by this hourly wage-drone. Above and
beyond the call of $6 per hour, which leads me to the conclusion that
this guy is exactly the dittohead type that voted in the fascists this
past fall. I imagine that Sears's nose has already had the full tour
of every orifice of this guy's life (they don't trust just *anybody* to
run their registers!). Not only does he have no concept of the
enormous power of large corporate databases to corrupt and degrade
individual privacy, he doesn't care! And most perplexingly : he
actually defended the company's prerogative to gather information, and
the computer's demand to have the information, OVER a PERSON's right to
keep the information. Hey, if I haven't done anything wrong, I have
nothing to worry about. Companies come before people, anyway. He
might as well have come from Mars : I cannot relate to this guy at
all. And it scares me that his may represent a substantial segment of
the popular opinion. If that is so, then I am glad I've listened to
too many liberal college professors.
--
Patrick Brennan
------------------------------
From: mjh9@lehigh.edu
Date: 01 Mar 1995 19:27:17 -0500
Subject: Re: Use of Mailboxes
wicklund@Intellistor.COM (Tom Wicklu nd) writes: Christopher Zguris
<0004854540@mcimail.com> writes: I thought it was _illegal_ to put
anything in someone's mailbox! Private delivery companies can't put
magazines in private mailboxes because it's against the law and the
post office will sue them into the stone age. How does a campus
post office get away with fiddling with private mail? This also
means that your campus mailbox isn't technically a mailbox under
postal regulations, which may have other implications.
I posted the post to which Christopher Zguris responed, and I think I
can add a little to the explanation. Our campus wide post office is a
Contract Postal station. The university pays the U.S. Postal service
to have the privlage of opperating a post office. This allows the
university to have full Post Office Services on campus (postal money
orders, exrpress mail, etc) while also using the boxes for their own
campus mail.
All U.S. mail is addressed to the building and also has a box number on
it.
The contract Post Office arrangement saves the Postal Service money
(they don't need to pay as many workers), is more convienient for the
University, and is better for the students (their other option would be
to rent a box at the local town Post Office). I think the Post Office
may also pay the University something for the service.
Finally, the post office must abide by all postal regulations (eg, they
cannot accept personal checks, they cannot just trash first class mail
with a bad address, they must forward mail, etc.).
Hope this clears it all up.
--
Mario Hendricks
mjh9@lehigh.edu
------------------------------
From: bill griffith <72613.2133@CompuServe.COM>
Date: 28 Feb 1995 16:22:58 GMT
Subject: Question on Clipper Status
Organization: Pennex Aluminum Co.
Hi all,
I am new to the group so please accept my appoligies if this is a
repeat. Could someone please tell me the status of the Clipper Chip?
Please post here if appropriate or email me at
72613.2133@compuserve.com
------------------------------
From: gmcgath@condes.MV.COM (Gary McGath)
Date: 28 Feb 1995 20:16:06 GMT
Subject: Re: Compuserve Sued for Delivering "Junk E-Mail"
Organization: Conceptual Design
Privacy Rights Clearinghouse <prc@pwa.acusd.edu> wrote: Robert
Arkow, a Compuserve subscriber, is suing the service for delivering
two unsolicited advertising e-mail messages to his mailbox on
December 21, 1994. The suit, believed to be the first of its kind,
challenges the right of advertisers to deliver so- called "Junk
E-Mail" under the Telephone Consumer Privacy Protection Act of 1991
(TCPA). Arkow argues that the TCPA prohibits the automated calling
of "any service for which the calling party is charged for the
call." Also named in the suit is Compuserve Visa, the business
responsible for the ads.
The implications of this are as frightening (assuming equal probability
of success) as those of S. 314. If service providers become responsible
for conveying "junk mail," and can be legally held reliable for it,
then providers will have to scan all messages and somehow decide which
ones are "junk mail."
Worse yet, the criteria used -- that sending mail to a list constitutes
"automated calling" -- could outlaw all automated mailing lists, and
perhaps all mail programs which batch mail, if they became legal
doctrine. Thanks for calling this to our attention.
--
Gary McGath
gmcgath@condes.mv.com
PGP Fingerprint: 3E B3 62 C8 F8 9E E9 3A 67 E7 71 99 71 BD FA 29
------------------------------
From: Jannick Johnsson <wiking@neosoft.com>
Date: 28 Feb 1995 21:51:52 GMT
Subject: The IRS and The INS
Organization: NeoSoft Internet Services +1 713 968 5800
Does anybody know if some body has a disagreement with IRS, like not
filing your taxes if this is reported to INS, so next time somebody
returns from a trip they have you in the computer.
Is it possible to find out what INS has in their computer just by
asking. I asked the agent once when I returned if I could see what he
had on the screen. He said he was not allowed to show it to me. I did
verify I was returning to the right the right country!!! I do know the
police does not send your name to INS just because you are not paying
you ticket or a warrent for your arrest not showing in the court. I am
not convicted and do not intent to be, but just curious.
--
Jannick Johnsson
email wiking@neosoft.com
------------------------------
From: "Bob Bales [NCSA]" <74774.1326@compuserve.com>
Date: 01 Mar 95 10:01:23 EST
Subject: Re: The National Computer Security Organization
Kevin,
Perhaps you have missed some of <our> bylines and extensive information
written about us in:
PC Magazine, Byte, Computerworld, Network World, Information Week, LAN
Times, Info World, and dozens more that you most likely have not heard
of. :) We are the official security product testing organization for
Network World (check masthead) and operate a widely respected product
certification service which is subscribed to by the likes of IBM and
Intel, to name two you <might> have heard of. :) :)
Also, if you have read more than one issue of Privacy Digest or RISKS,
you will have seen the very thoughtful and well-received postings of
our highly respected Director of Education, Dr. Mich Kabay. Dr.
Kabay's work regularly appears in national trade publications, and his
paper on the impact of social and psychological factors in InfoSec was
awarded best Paper at the National Computer Security Conference. His
book, Enterprise System Security, will soon be published by
McGraw-Hill.
For your information, the NCSA to which you refer was "no name" in
1989. Believe it or not, we started out by picking a name which
describes what we are and do. The letters just sort of followed. It's
not like "NCSA" is easy to pronounce. Back then, IBM would have been
better initials to use if we were seeking to trade on someones
reputation.
Forgive the sarcasm reflected in my previous message, but it was in
direct response to what I felt was unprofessional public criticism and
unfounded inuendo about an organization and people (me for instance) of
which you <are> truly ignorant.
I hope this clears things up for you.
--
Robert C. Bales
Executive Director
National Computer Security Association
------------------------------
From: bo774@freenet.carleton.ca (Kelly Bert Manning)
Date: 02 Mar 1995 05:44:45 GMT
Subject: Can You Buy Boxes to Fool CallerID/ANID?
Organization: The National Capital FreeNet, Ottawa, Ontario, Canada
A recent article in Macleans magazine stated that some Canadians with
the new pizza sized Direct Broadcast Satellite receivers are using
devices to make their pay per view calls look like they are coming from
a US area code.
There are apparently licensing disputes involved related to some
Canadian businesses apparently have paid for "exclusive" rights to
broadcast particular shows in Canada. Canadians can use PO boxes to
handle billing for regular service, but apparently the Pay Per View
services require a call for each viewing. If a call shows a canadian
area code the clock starts ticking on a service termination deadline.
CNID is reportedly relatively easy to fool, but I doubt that this would
get past ANID unless they are calling through some sort of US call
forwarding service.
The article also said that some callers call an 800 service to bypass
this problem. That doesn't seem to make much sense, since the call
would show up in the billing details, unless it is some sort of call
forwarding operation. I'd expect that to be a 900 pay per call service,
not an 800 service.
------------------------------
From: "Dave Banisar" <banisar@epic.org>
Date: 01 Mar 1995 01:18:21 -0800
Subject: EPIC Legislative Update 2.2
Privacy Legislation 104th Congress
Electronic Privacy Information Center
Last updated 2.23.95
An updated version of this document and the text of the bills are
available from cpsr.org /cpsr/privacy/epic/104th_congress_bills/
Quality Assurance in Drug Testing Act (HR 153). Introduced by Rep.
Solomon. Prohibits random drug tests, requires that employers have
explicit written policies and education, use certified labratories.
Referred to Committee on Commerce.
Individual Privacy Protection Act of 1995 (HR 184) Introduced by Rep.
Collins (D-ILL).Creates national Privacy Commission with authority to
oversee enforcement of Privacy Act. Referred to Committee on Government
Reform and Oversight.
Antitrust Reform Act of 1995 (HR 411). Introduced by Rep. Dingell
(D-MI). Telecommunications reform bill. Includes section ordering FCC
to conduct privacy survey of new technologies and places limits on use
of Customer Propriety Number Information (CPNI). Referred to Committee
on Commerce.
Postal Privacy Act of 1995 (HR 434) Introduced by Rep. Condit (D-CA).
Prohibits Post Office from selling personal information to direct
marketers. Referred to Committee on Government Reform and Oversight
Fair Health Information Practices Act of 1995 (HR 435). Introduced by
Rep. Condit (D-CA). Health Care privacy bill. Sets limits of
access,use and dissemination of personal medical information. Referred
to Committee on Commerce and 2 other committees.
Consumer Reporting Reform Act of 1995 (HR 561). Introduced by Rep.
Gonzales (D-TX). Updates 1970 Fair Credit Reporting Act to require
better accuracy, less expensive credit reports, limit use of credit
records for direct marketing and prohibit most uses of reports by
employers. Referred to the Committee on Banking and Financial
Services.
***Bills that will negatively affect privacy***
The Taking Back Our Streets Act of 1995 (HR 3). Introduced by Rep.
McCollum. Republician Crime Bill. Includes provision to substantially
limit judicial sanctions for illegal searches (exclusionary rule).
Referred to Committee on the Judiciary. Hearings held 1/19/95
FBI Counterintelligence Act of 1995 (HR 68). Introduced by Rep.
Bereuter. Authorizes easier access to credit reports by FBI for
"national security purposes." Referred to Committee on Banking and
Financial Services
Interstate Child Support Enforcement Act (HR 195) Introduced by Rep.
Roukema (R-NJ). Extends access to federal, state, local and commerical
databases for purposes of enforcing child support. Increases use of
Social Security Numbers. Creates database of new hires. Referred to
Committee on Ways and Means and 3 other committees.
Social Security Account Number Anti-Fraud Act (HR 502). Introduced by
Rep. Calvert (R) Amends the Social Security Act to require the
Secretary of Health and Human Services to establish a program to verify
employee social security information, and to require employers to use
the program using 800# to verify employee. Referred to Ways and Means.
Immigration Reform Act of 1995 (HR 560). Introduced by Gallegly.
Requires introduction of new tamperproof id cards for immigrants.
Referred to the Committee on the Judiciary.
Act to enforce Employer Sanctions law (HR 570). Introduced by
Beilenson. Requires issues of new Social Security Card which is
"counterfeit-resistant ... contains fingerprint identification, barcode
validation, a photograph, or some other identifiable feature." Card
will be sole identification allowed for work authorization. Referred to
Committee on Ways and Means and Judiciary Committees.
Exclusionary Rule Reform Act of 1995 (HR 666). Introduced by Rep.
McCollum (R-FL). Allows introduction of evidence obtained by illegal
search or siezure that violates 4th Amend, statute or rule of procedure
if "objective belief" that search or siezure legal. May allow illegal
wiretaps, house searches to be used. Does not apply to IRS and BATF.
Rejected amendment by Watt (D-NC) to replace language with that of 4th
Amendment. Passed by House Feb 8, 1995.
Criminal Alien Deportation Improvements Act of 1995 (HR 668).
Introduced by Smith (R-TX). Authorizes wiretaps for investigations of
llegal immigration. Passed by House Feb 10. Referred to Senate
Judiciary Committee.
Illegal Immigration Control Act of 1995 (HR 756). Introduced by
Hunter. Authorized Wiretaps for illegal immigration investigations,
false id. Requires issuence of "enhanced" Social Security cards to all
citizens and resident aliens by year 2000 that will include photo, SSN,
and are machine readable. Orders Attorney General to create databases
for verification. Referred to Committee on Judiciary.
Child Support Responsibility Act of 1995 (HR 785). Introduced by
Johnson (R-Conn). Makes SSN of parents public record by requiring their
use on birth cirtificates and marriage liscenses. Referred to the
Committee on Ways and Means.
Paperwork Reducation Act of 1995 (HR 830). Introduced by Controversal
provision to benefit West Publishing limiting access to public records
removed after Internet campaign by TAP. Passed by House Feb. 22
(418-0). House Report 104-37. See S. 244 below.
Communications Decency Act of 1995 (HR 1004). Introduced by Johnson
(SD). Same as Exon bill (see S. 314 below). Referred to Commerce and
Judiciary Committees.
****************************************************************
Senate Bills
****************************************************************
Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Improvement Act of 1995 (S.
3). Senate Republician Crime Bill. Introduced by Dole. Includes
provision to substantially limit judicial sanctions for illegal
searches (exclusionary rule). Allows wiretapping for immigration, and
false documents, allows participation of foreign governments in
domestic wiretapping and disclosure of info to foreign law enforcement
agencies. Referred to Committee on the Judiciary
Family Health Insurance Protection Act (S. 7). Introduced by Senator
Daschle(D-SD). Democratic Health Care Bill. Sets national standards for
transfer, privacy of medical records. Referred to Committee on
Finance.
Exclusionary Rule Limitation Act of 1995 (S. 54). Introduced by
Thurman. (See HR 666 above).
Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (S. 244) Introduced by Sen. Nunn
(D-GA). Renews 1980 Paperwork Reduction Act. Sets OMB as controller of
information policy in government. Sets standards for collection, use,
protection of statistical information. Referred to Committee on
Government Affairs. Approved by Committee Feb. 14.
Immigrant Control and Financial Responsibility Act of 1995 (S. 269).
Introduced by Sen. Dole and Simpson. Creates national registry for
workplace verification. Increases use of wiretaps for immigration
purposes. Referred to the Committee on the Judiciary
Communications Decency Act of 1995 (S. 314). Introduced by Sen. Exon
(D-NE). Revises Communications Act to make transmittal of sexually
oriented communications a crime. Makes anonymous communications that
are "annoying" a crime. Senate Committee on Commerce, Science and
Transportation. See EPIC alert 2.03 for more information.
Interstate Child Support Responsibility Act of 1995 (S. 456).
Introduced by Bradley (D-NJ). Creates databank of new hires. Allows
datamatching with SSA for verification. Increases use of SSN. Referred
to the Committee on Finance.
--
EPIC Legislative Update 2.23
David Banisar (Banisar@epic.org) * 202-544-9240 (tel)
Electronic Privacy Information Center * 202-547-5482 (fax)
666 Pennsylvania Ave, SE, Suite 301 * ftp/gopher/wais cpsr.org
Washington, DC 20003 * HTTP://epic.digicash.com/epic
------------------------------
From: "Prof. L. P. Levine" <levine@blatz.cs.uwm.edu>
Date: 29 Dec 1994 10:50:22 -0600 (CST)
Subject: Info on CPD [unchanged since 12/29/94]
Organization: University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee
The Computer Privacy Digest is a forum for discussion on the effect of
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This digest is a forum with information contributed via Internet
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---------------------------------+-----------------------------------------
Leonard P. Levine | Moderator of: Computer Privacy Digest
Professor of Computer Science | and comp.society.privacy
University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee | Post: comp-privacy@uwm.edu
Box 784, Milwaukee WI 53201 | Information: comp-privacy-request@uwm.edu
| Gopher: gopher.cs.uwm.edu
levine@cs.uwm.edu | Mosaic: gopher://gopher.cs.uwm.edu
---------------------------------+-----------------------------------------
------------------------------
End of Computer Privacy Digest V6 #023
******************************
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