Date:       Wed, 12 Apr 95 15:47:20 EST
Errors-To:  Comp-privacy Error Handler <owner-comp-privacy@uwm.edu>
From:       Computer Privacy Digest Moderator  <comp-privacy@uwm.edu>
To:         Comp-privacy@uwm.edu
Subject:    Computer Privacy Digest V6#036

Computer Privacy Digest Wed, 12 Apr 95              Volume 6 : Issue: 036

Today's Topics:			       Moderator: Leonard P. Levine

                       USPS to Offer eMail Crypto
                   Lots of Misses in Polk Directory?
         Re: Private Medical Records Available Online in Mass.
                  Useful URL for Them That Can See It
                  Neighbor Peruses My Medical Records
                          Re: Use of Mailboxes
                   Big Brother Aids in Car Servicing
                     Privacy "Remailer" for Phones
                        Email/VoiceMail Privacy
            Church of Scientology, Privacy, and Criminality
                     BC News Articles about FOI/POP
               Re: Family Privacy Protection Act of 1995
               Re: Family Privacy Protection Act of 1995
                        Internet Porn Censorship
                     Conferences/Events of Interest
                 Info on CPD [unchanged since 12/29/94]

----------------------------------------------------------------------

From: jyl@riesling (Jacob Levy)
Date: 07 Apr 1995 11:12:21 -0700
Subject: USPS to Offer eMail Crypto

Please forward this message as widely as you see fit.

INTRO
 -----

This is a "trip report" of sorts. Thursday (4/6/95) evening I attended
a Smart Valley sponsored talk at Rickey's Hyatt by the VP of Advanced
Technology at the US Postal Service, Bob Reissler (sp?) and by the
technical architect, Richard Rothwell. The purpose of the talk was to
give USPS an opportunity to present their plans for "electronic mail
and electronic commerce for the general population".

I was the only one from Sun there as far as I could tell. There was a
big contingent of people from HP, Apple and some IBMers, many
one-person companies and startups, some trainers and educators and many
unaffiliated individuals - a total of about 150 people attended,
standing room only.

OVERVIEW
 --------

Mr Rothwell's talk was the more substantive and interesting among the
two.  He presented USPS's plans for offering electronic access to their
email delivery system to the 80 million US households and businesses
that are currently not reached by online service providers or the
Internet. After his talk, Mr Rothwell presented a short video on how
they intend to educate their customers on the new product, and another
USPS employee demoed the client side of their system online. Their
client side system works under Windows 3.1 with MS Mail and Lotus
Notes.

Overall points to note: They are very concerned about privacy. They do
not want to be in the business of managing or issuing escrowed
key-pairs. They are very concerned about the new possibilities for
abuse of privacy that become available when public keys and identity
certificates are widely used (I didn't understand this part - what
would these oppties be?). They are interested in working with whoever
cares to make the US Govt and legislative branch relax the rules about
using crypto and the export controls. They are working on a system that
works globally, and active collaboration with other postal services is
high on their agenda.  Canada and European services were mentioned
several times.

TECHNICAL POINTS
 ----------------

The system they are building is based on a transliteration of the basic
principles that make hardcopy mail work today, into the electronic world:

Stamp                   -> Digital Signature+digital money
Privace (envelope)      -> Encryption
Dating+location         -> Per-client digital time stamp (dts)
Identity (signature)    -> Digital signature (ds)

In regular hardcopy mail, the stamp proves that you paid and provides a
guarantee that the postal service will deliver your hardcopy. The
envelope provides privacy and is protected by privacy laws from
tampering. The dating is provided by the cancellation on the stamp. The
location is provided by each post office having its own cancellation
label with its name and serial number listed. The identity is provided
by the signature of the sender on the hardcopy stored within the sealed
envelope carrying the cancelled stamp.

The postal service will offer:

- An electronic mechanism for stamping a message and adding a dts so that
  it proves payment and dates the message
- Registered mail equivalent where the message gets signed by the USPS
  private key and the signature is returned to sender
- Mechanisms for managing public keys (see below - no escrow)
- Certificate mechanisms (see below - no escrow)
- Archival services for both messages, certificates and message signatures

In their new system, the "stamp" will be replaced by a digital
signature on a receipt returned to the sender and archived by the
service. The receipt will contain "enough bits to track the message
through the system" (his words). The service replaces the traditional
envelope with encryption: it accepts messages that are already
encrypted and it will also offer RSA public key encryption as a
service. Dating is achieved by adding a dts plus a digital signature
identifying the client from which the message was received (if desire)
or a more generic signature. Finally the service offers extensive
mechanisms for corporate and individual public key management and
certification with various levels of identity checking, all the way
from biometrics based to a simple send-in-by-mail "under penalty of
perjury I hereby certify that I am Jacob Levy and this key is my public
key".  The service also offers a certificate and public key lookup
service based on an ISO 509 standard (?) without a publishing database,
i.e.  modelled after the "Moscow city phonebook" (his words). The idea
is you can get anyone's public key if you know who they are but you
cannot harvest the phone book for, e.g., all postal employees living in
San Mateo (apparently they are concerned about e-mail bombs :).

Some new services that he talked about:

- Receipt notification through the equivalent of "sign here to receive
  your package" and delivery of the signed receipt back to the sender
- "Bonded mail" which as far as I could tell includes archival and
  delivery upon the occurrence of an event specified by the sender.
  He called this "Forever mail", i.e. you send something which is
  potentially never delivered, and he noted that this is already a
  service offered by the current USPS (many laughs..) and so it should
  be offered in the new system, in the interest of preserving their
  current product offerings (more laughs).
- Automatic tamper-proofing through the addition of a USPS generated
  signature that notarizes the text of your message.

--
JYL


------------------------------

From: bo774@freenet.carleton.ca (Kelly Bert Manning)
Date: 10 Apr 1995 06:25:45 GMT
Subject: Lots of Misses in Polk Directory?
Organization: The National Capital FreeNet, Ottawa, Ontario, Canada

I've seen statistics about unlisted numbers in publications such as
Privacy Journal and Communications of the ACM, for the USA and Japan,
but have never seen any for Canada.

BC Tel refuses to release statistics about these, something that John
Grace, Federal Access to Information Commissioner, supported in a
recent decision. This data is contained in Telco annual financial
statements filed with the CRTC.

Commissioner Grace rejected my suggestion that this was an open secret
because BC Tel publishes paper directories, and through Dominion
Directory, a CD-ROM version, of all published numbers.

I stated that it seems to be straightforward to dial up the unlisted
numbers and seem which ones give you "moved to new number", "not in
service", busy, or give you one or more rings to indicate that they are
actually in service.

Commissioner Grace wrote that "The exercise you proposed ... would
involve considerable effort and expense". Since this issue seemed so
clear in his mind I thought I'd do a sanity check about it.

I went to the local library and got ranges of missing numbers from the
numerical index section of the local Polk directory for 1993, using an
exchange in an older, stable residential neighbourhood, containing
mostly high priced single family homes occupied by people with higher
than average family incomes.

I have a touch tone line and a touch tone memory phone that I set to
repeat the first 4 digits of the number range I was surveying.  All I
had to punch in was the last 3 digits of each missing number.

BC Tel seems to give a recorded message without a ring for numbers that
aren't in service, so I simply waited for a single ring or a busy
signal at each line. I felt that a single ring would be a minimal
intrusion, since anyone not directly beside their phone should notice
that it stopped after the first ring, rather than waste any time
answering it.

It took me less than an hour, over 2 evenings, to work from 952-4000 to
952-4299. Only 1 of the 131 "Polk unlisted" numbers in this range of
300 gave me a "not in service" message. Polk seems to have less than
60% of the in-service numbers in it's directory.

The threat of reverse directories seems to be somewhat overrated.

How complete are Polk directories in comparison to Telco directories?

Would every residential number in the BC Tel directory be entered in
the Polk one, or do they just enter the ones for people dumb enough to
fill in their nosy questionaires?


------------------------------

From: ctobola@rrnet.com (Cloy D. Tobola)
Date: 10 Apr 1995 07:27:22 -0500
Subject: Re: Private Medical Records Available Online in Mass.
Organization: Exactly! Publications

    pmcvay@interramp.com wrote: "Mental Health professionals at Harvard
    Community Health Plan routinely put detailed psyciatric notes into
    patients'  computerized medical records, making supposedly
    confidential information available to hundreds of physicians and
    staff members who work for the health maintenance organization.

I'm sorry... I don't understand. Do you think that docs take their
records home and hide them under the bed??? Nurses, transcriptionists,
records clerks, lab techs, visiting nurses, pharmacists, peer review
committees, physican therapists, hospital social workers, etc., etc.,
have ALWAYS had fairly unlimited access to records.

The article uses the word "supposedly confidential," but is seems to me
that the information is still confidential because it has not left the
organization.

    The article is long, with several references to abuse of the
    system.  For example, employees in a training class routinely
    called up the medical records of Paul Tsongas and Michael Dukakis,
    both prominent national political figures.

Once again, I don't understand your concern. These people are being
trained to handle and access these records. Is it so unusual that they
might actually LOOK at one of them?

Several years ago I worked for a company that had numerous accounts --
including some famous people. When I was being trained, we used Jackie
Onasis' account as a "sample" to open, look up information, etc.

What's the big deal?? I worked with these records EVERY DAY -- and
frequently came across the accounts of famous people (among them, John
Elway and Leo Kottke). It is so surprising that I actually opened my
eyes and looked at them?

This whole article seems to be based on the concept that nobody
actually uses the information we give to health care providers. Not
true. Granted, there may be abuses of the system -- but I don't see
anything inappropriate or unethical in the information you listed.

--
 ctobola@rrnet.com


------------------------------

From: "Prof. L. P. Levine" <levine@blatz.cs.uwm.edu>
Date: 08 Apr 95 18:29:19 PDT
Subject: Useful URL for Them That Can See It

Taken from a private posting:

To those of you interested in privacy on the 'net, I recommend this
page:

http://www.paranoia.com/~ebola/yow.html

It has some summaries of current privacy issues & cases, as well as
lots of pointers to other info.

--
Chris Long | allanl@cs.berkeley.edu | http://infopad.eecs.berkeley.edu/~allanl
PGP key info: 1024/E58613A5 87 60 9C D4 AC 01 83 3D  5A EC A2 46 11 89 90 03
"With the first link, a chain is forged.  The first speech censured, the first
thought forbidden, the first freedom denied, chains us all irrevocably."
                                - Captain Picard, ST:TNG, "The Drumhead"


------------------------------

From: Richard.Drumn@ncal.kaiperm.org
Date: 10 Apr 1995 09:06 -0700 (PDT)
Subject: Neighbor Peruses My Medical Records

As a condition of working at a medical center, many organizations have
you sign a Confidentiality of Patient, Employee and Organizational Info
form (I have enclosed a version).  As an employee of a medical
institution we are instructed that all interaction at the medical
center are confidential -so if by chance you run into a friend while
working at the medical center you are not to disclose to others that
you saw that friend at the hospital.

Confidentiality form below

The Organization acknowledges both a legal and ethical responsibility
to protect the privacy of patients.  Concequently, the indiscriminate
or unauthorized review, use or disclosure of personal information,
medical or otherwise, from any source regarding any patient is
expressly prohibited.

Except when required in the regular course of business, the discussion,
use, transmission or narration , in any form, of any patient
information which is obtained in the regular course of our employment
is strictly forbidden.

Any violation of this policy shall constitute grounds for severe
disciplinary action, including possible termination of the offending
employee.


------------------------------

From: horowitz@nosc.mil (Alan M. Horowitz)
Date: 11 Apr 1995 06:38:09 GMT
Subject: Re: Use of Mailboxes
Organization: NCCOSC RDT&E Division, San Diego, CA

It is illegal to put something into a person's mailbox if the proper
postage has not been paid.

There is no regulation specifying that you must let the USPS be the
deliverer.


------------------------------

From: wjwinn@kocrsv01.delcoelect.com (Bill Winn)
Date: 11 Apr 1995 16:47:13 GMT
Subject: Big Brother Aids in Car Servicing
Organization: Analysts International Corporation

    The below was pulled from another newsgroup: In case you haven't
    heard, California Air Resources Board is starting to talk about an
    OBD III standard. Part of this new standard incorporates some
    Hughes developed remote monitoring technology.  Each car will have
    on-board telemetry that will allow monitoring of your vehicle's
    diagnostics. If your "Check Engine" light turns on, you get a nice
    letter from CARB that tells you to get your engine fixed pronto.

Boy, is this loaded with invasion of privacy implications.  You can
imagine the State of California (or any state), when confronted with a
need for money, selling the diagnositic informationto private
businesses.  Even worse, they could sell direct access to the
telemetry. Just think, you would receive junk mail every 3,000 miles
reminding you to change your oil.  After 40,000 miles the car
dealerships would deluge you with offers to trade in your car.  Also,
if this telemetry include speed information it would be rather trivial
for the State to issue tickets.

--
Bill Winn
Software Engineer - Analysts International Corporation
 -------------------------------
wjwinn@kocrsv01.delcoelect.com
wwinn@klingon.iupucs.iupui.edu


------------------------------

From: prure@aol.com (PruRE)
Date: 12 Apr 1995 02:57:33 -0400
Subject: Privacy "Remailer" for Phones
Organization: America Online, Inc. (1-800-827-6364)

I want to get around "caller ID".  Is anyone aware of a service that
accomplishes for a phone call the same thing that remailer does for
email?  Thanks!


------------------------------

From: storm@panix.com (Frank Field)
Date: 12 Apr 1995 17:41:12 GMT
Subject: Email/VoiceMail Privacy
Organization: CBS

The issue is email and voice mail privacy in the workplace. I see
several postings dealing with legalities of email and the boss...I'm
doing a story on the privacy issues surrounding that and voice mail. Am
looking for people in the New York city metro area who feel or know the
boss has taken a look or a listen to their email or voice mail.

Am also looking for companies or sysops with progressive, well-stated
privacy policies for their workers.

Responses will be kept confidential. Email me at winb@interport.net or
real world calll 212-975-2571 or voice mail 975-9753.

--
win baker
technology producer, wcbs tv


------------------------------

From: noring@netcom.com (Jon Noring)
Date: 12 Apr 1995 19:27:44 GMT
Subject: Church of Scientology, Privacy, and Criminality
Organization: Netcom Online Communications Services (408-241-9760 login: guest)

[Note that follow-on discussion should go to a.r.s. misc.legal, and
alt.privacy]

[Feel free to cross-post *where appropriate*]

The recent attempted "outings" of anonymous posters by the "Church" of
Scientology's Office of Special Affairs (OSA, their intelligence org),
is very troubling from net.privacy and net.freedom perspectives.  It is
even possible, as some evidence indicates (but needs to be proven of
course) that OSA violated the law in gathering the information.  There
are now inquiries with the FBI and other law enforcement agencies on
the attempted "outings".

This post is to give my perspective on CoS' "theological" views on
anonymity, privacy, criminality, and the law.  In their view of the
world, these appear to be inextricably linked.

First, Scientology considers it a sign of criminality for a person to
seek or desire privacy.  You see this in their high-level orgs such as
Sea Org, OSA, etc.  Thus, not only are CoS' critics considered to be
hiding crimes even if they openly post (see next paragraph), being
anonymous is itself a crime.  And according to CoS "theology", by
revealing the identities of the anonymous posters, you reveal their
criminality.  They even believe that by revealing a person's "crimes",
they will actually help that person!  They use this as one moral
justification for digging into other people's privacy.  Of course, many
OSA people are themselves posting anonymously, but CoS is authorizing
it and knows who they are, so from CoS' perspective, they are *not*
anonymous.

And the whole issue of "criminality" is itself very interesting as CoS
will define criminality by their frame of reference and not by the
society at large (the "wog-world").  If it is not a crime according to
"wog-world" law, it can be declared to be a crime by them if it serves
their purpose.  CoS considers their law to be the only legitimate law
of the universe and that they are not subject to any other law,
especially "wog-world" law.  They will, interestingly enough, use and
even subject themselves to "wog-world" law when and until it serves
their long-term purpose of instituting their law as the law of the
universe.

Another interesting observation from reading comments by Milne and
other OSA posters regarding Dennis Erlich and other very vocal critics
of CoS is their total blindness to and rejection of the morally correct
view that people are innocent until proven guilty by due process.  In
fact, according to Scientological "theology", a critic of CoS is
automatically and unquestionably guilty of some crime or crimes (and as
I said above, they define what are crimes!), thus the principle of
innocent until proven guilty cannot exist in the world of Scientology.
Or, to put it another way, a loyal supporter of CoS has no hidden
criminality and thus is innocent, while a critic *must* be hiding
criminality and is therefore *guilty* -- there are no other options, no
"gray" areas.  *All* riticism of them is "criminal".  Their posts so
far to alt.religion.scientology make this very clear, as well as
supporting the other points I make in this post.

Of course, I welcome Scientology supporters to point out where my
assessment above is incorrect.  Let's dialogue on this.

Jon Noring

(For discussion on the particulars about the revealing of the
information on anonymous posters (not given here), start reading the
newsgroup alt.religion.scientology.  Discussion there has been
extremely lively and interesting, to say the least.  I'll guarantee
a.r.s. to be the "hottest" newsgroup on Usenet, and one where breaking
issues of grave ramification to net.freedom occur almost weekly if not
daily.  Do support discussion there as what happens there will
eventually reverberate through the entire Internet.)

-- 
OmniMedia           | The Electronic Bookstore.  Come in and browse!  Two
1312 Carlton Place  | locations:  ftp.netcom.com  /pub/Om/OmniMedia/books
Livermore, CA 94550 | and  ftp.awa.com  /pub/softlock/pc/products/OmniMedia
510-294-8153        | E-book publishing service follows NWU recommendations.  


------------------------------

From: bo774@freenet.carleton.ca (Kelly Bert Manning)
Date: 10 Apr 1995 06:47:36 GMT
Subject: BC News Articles about FOI/POP
Organization: The National Capital FreeNet, Ottawa, Ontario, Canada

In an article "Shutters falling on lien information", on page B10 of
the 1995/April/05 Victoria Times-Colonist, Norman Gidney writes "Last
Friday, the Land Title Office cut off a long standing practice of
allowing researchers to gather lists of the latest liens, a practice
know as 'bulk searching' or 'grazing'." [...] "Provincial land title
registrar Malcolm McAvity said release of this information in bulk
contravenes the new provincial freedom of information and privacy law.

Anyone may still go to a land title office and ask to see any
outstanding liens on a particular property, but the practice of
gathering lists of the latest liens for publication has been stopped."

The article goes on to quote a number of publishers of these lists, and
their clients, predicting the end of the world as we know it.

It fails to note that anyone can inquire about the liens against a
particluar property over the phone on almost a 24x7 basis. It is not
neccessary for someone to actually go to the land title office during
normal business hours, or even during Government working hours.:-)

Farther down on the same page there is an article "Tailor data base to
track snoops", by Les Leyne, which describes Information and Privacy
Commissioner David Flaherty's comments about the conclusions of his
recent inquiry about the use of government records by a Delta police
officer active in the anti-abortion movement. Commissioner Flaherty's
comments leave me with the distinct impression that he feels that
authorized staff engaging in a bit of private enterprise are more of a
privacy threat than hackers or people from the outside. My own reading
of BC's FOI/POP act is that there is an implied requirement to maintain
an access audit trail and retain access audit records for at least 1
year.

Some TP systems already generate these kinds of trails in a rudimentary
form. For example IMS/TM systems generate type 01 and 03 log records of
all input and output messages for recovery purposes, in addition to
undo/redo log records generated by updates to databases using IMS/DM.

I haven't read whether these kinds of logs were used to trace the
access of motor vehicle records at ICBC by this rogue cop. ICBC may
have had a head start because of the earlier tracing of improper access
by ICBC staff to the driving records of ICBC head Robyn Allen, who lost
her job after her history of moving violations was leaked to the
press.  Whatever ICBC did before was probably recycled to handle this
FOI/POP request by staff at a Vancouver Abortion Clinic who received
harassing mail at their non-published home addresses.

An access auditing system based on such logs would be impossible to
defeat, without access to the logs themselves, or without modifying
vendor TP monitor code.

Someone using an IMS MPP, for example, cannot prevent their input
transaction, and the output from the transaction, from being logged in
the OLDS and archived to the SLDS. Someone would have to have separate
access to the logs, and any tampering with them would show up in SMF,
which records who accessed which dataset and when.

Do other TP monitors have similar logging facilities? I've heard that
CICS, for example, doesn't log transactions for recoverability, and
that it depends on DBMSs such as IMS/DM or DB2 handling their own
logging and backout/recovery.


------------------------------

From: hpux_gtown_mail!tpeters@uunet.uu.net (Thomas Peters)
Date: 10 Apr 1995 16:54:02 GMT
Subject: Re: Family Privacy Protection Act of 1995
Organization: Hughes Network Systems Inc.

    The Act was part of the Republican Contract With America.  ...  I
    offer a few observations about the bill.  First, it appears that
    this is part of the agenda of the new right.  Buried

I think you are too concerned about the identity and motives of
proponents of this law rather than what it actually does. As I
understand your article, the key points are:

1. The bill's sole effect is to prevent Federal government money from
being spent on certain activites. It doesn't authorize anyone to do
anything they can't do now. It doesn't affect the rights of anyone who
isn't using government money.

2. The bill limits the right of the government to ask intrusive
personal questions of children without getting parental consent.  There
has to be a good reason, as described in the exceptions.  Maybe there
are too many exceptions, but currently there is no protection at all.

Personally, I don't like the immigration/internal revenue/customs
exception, but I recognize that it may be the price of getting a
majority to support it. Half a loaf is better than none.

The bill provides valuable protection to parents against people using
their children as tools to invade their privacy. If you want to know
something, ask me, not my son. It also enhances parents' ability to
fulfill their right and responsibility to protect their children. A
child who tells his teacher that he is homosexual, or a Pagan, or a
nudist, for example, may face some consequences. It's the parent's job
to help him make an informed and unpressured decision about his
privacy--and decide if he is even old enough to make such a decision.

--
Tom Peters                   Speaking for myself as always


------------------------------

From: Bill Hensley <bhensley@oceo.trw.com>
Date: 12 Apr 1995 03:55:08 GMT
Subject: Re: Family Privacy Protection Act of 1995
Organization: Questar Network Services

    Robert Gellman <rgellman@cais.cais.com> wrote: A privacy bill was
    approved by the House of Representatives on April 4, 1995.  The
    bill is the Family Privacy Protection Act [...  remainder deleted]

I don't really have any substantial comment on this bill, except that
it is probably one of those pieces of "law" that, IMHO, has no
worthwile purpose, "contract" or no "contract".

I would comment that I find it very strange that a law like this would
even be considered by the same body that approved the Digital Telephony
bill without any real debate.  On the one hand, we have a proposed law
that criminalizes asking a teen about some "sensitive" topics, while on
the other we allow the FBI to easily tap any phone call or other
telecommunication in the entire country.

--
Bill Hensley
bhensley@oceo.trw.com
75542.2343@compuserve.com


------------------------------

From: cpsr-global@Sunnyside.COM
Date: 06 Apr 1995 02:58:41 -0700
Subject: Internet Porn Censorship

Taken from CPSR-GLOBAL Digest 123

    Date: 05 Apr 1995 09:02:17 -0500
    From: Ms Roisin Ni Mhaille Battel <R.N.M.Battel@uel.ac.uk> (by way of
    Subject: Re: internet/porn/censorship (@)

Sender: Ms Roisin Ni Mhaille Battel <R.N.M.Battel@uel.ac.uk>

The use of the internet to disseminate pornography, hate-mail etc.
interests me a lot, but I despair of the 'tramlines' the discussions
always seem to get caught in.  I think there's a lot of point-missing
going on - like discussing whether or not 'little Johnny' is going to
be damaged by paedophile material [what about 'little Jane' in all
this?].  For me a more central issue is the nature of the internet
itself, and the hype surrounding it.  It has been presented as a
wonderful new medium for communication, bringing people and peoples
together, a tool for radical contracts untramelled by boundaries,
capable of turning the world into a global village, a limitless
information superhighway for a brave new world of the future [cue
orchestra and massed choirs in the background]..  And what's the
reality?  That it's used for the same tired old abuses - porn,
paedophilia, racism, homophobia - as all the other media.  I'm not
actually *surprised* that this has happened - I call it 'The Tomcat
Effect' - you name the media, and it is very quickly 'marked' as
territory by those who call the shots in the wider society; it happened
with print, film, telephones, so why not the internet?  But if not
surprised, I am slightly disappointed that as soon as cyberspace was
called into being, the same oppressive structures which exist in 'real'
society sprang into existence there as well, and that few people want
to address this issue, because they see it as either inevitable or just
not a problem.

*HOWEVER*...mention spamming and suddenly it's the end of civilisation
as we know it..misuse of the internet..lack of respect for the
medium..not the done thing, old chap..something must be done..groups
formed..letters to The Times..  Funny, isn't it?


------------------------------

From: Susan Evoy <evoy@pcd.Stanford.EDU>
Date: 06 Apr 1995 01:16:06 -0700
Subject: Conferences/Events of Interest

CPSR Members and Friends, If you are planning to attend one of these
conferences, or another that may be related to CPSR's work, please
contact CPSR at cpsr@cpsr.org  or (415) 322-3778  for easy ways for you
to be a presence for CPSR.

CONFERENCE /EVENT  SCHEDULE

Security on the I-Way, NCSA's 1995 Technical Symposium, Stouffer Concourse 
Hotel, Arlington, VA, April 10-11.    Contact:  74774.1326@compuserve.com

The First Amendment in Cyberspace, University of Texas, Austin, April 18.
Contact:  m.norkunas@mail.utexas.edu     512 495-4515   512 495-4542(fax)

Information Security and Privacy in the Public Sector. Herdon, VA.
Apr. 19-20, 1995. Sponsored by AIC Conferences.  Contact: 212/952-1899.

1995 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, Oakland, CA, May 8-10.
Contact:  sp95@itd.nrl.navy.mil

Health Care, Privacy & Cyberspace, Albany, New York, June 21-22.
Contact:  ds3789@albany.edu

17th International Conference of Data Protection and Privacy 
Commissioners, Copenhagen, DENMARK, Sept. 6-8.  
Contact:  45 33 14 38 44   45 33 13 38 43 (fax)

International Cryptography Institute 1995:  Global Challenges,
Washington, DC Sep. 21-22.  Contact:  denning@cs.georgetown.edu 800 301
MIND (US only)     202 962-9494      202 962-9495 (fax)

Managing the Privacy Revolution, Washington, DC, Oct. 31-Nov. 1
Contact:  201 996-1154


------------------------------

From: "Prof. L. P. Levine" <levine@blatz.cs.uwm.edu>
Date: 29 Dec 1994 10:50:22 -0600 (CST)
Subject: Info on CPD [unchanged since 12/29/94]
Organization: University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee

The Computer Privacy Digest is a forum for discussion on the effect of
technology on privacy or vice versa.  The digest is moderated and
gatewayed into the USENET newsgroup comp.society.privacy (Moderated).
Submissions should be sent to comp-privacy@uwm.edu and administrative
requests to comp-privacy-request@uwm.edu.  

This digest is a forum with information contributed via Internet
eMail.  Those who understand the technology also understand the ease of
forgery in this very free medium.  Statements, therefore, should be
taken with a grain of salt and it should be clear that the actual
contributor might not be the person whose email address is posted at
the top.  Any user who openly wishes to post anonymously should inform
the moderator at the beginning of the posting.  He will comply.

If you read this from the comp.society.privacy newsgroup and wish to
contribute a message, you should simply post your contribution.  As a
moderated newsgroup, attempts to post to the group are normally turned
into eMail to the submission address below.

On the other hand, if you read the digest eMailed to you, you generally
need only use the Reply feature of your mailer to contribute.  If you
do so, it is best to modify the "Subject:" line of your mailing.

Contributions to CPD should be submitted, with appropriate, substantive
SUBJECT: line, otherwise they may be ignored.  They must be relevant,
sound, in good taste, objective, cogent, coherent, concise, and
nonrepetitious.  Diversity is welcome, but not personal attacks.  Do
not include entire previous messages in responses to them.  Include
your name & legitimate Internet FROM: address, especially from
 .UUCP and .BITNET folks.  Anonymized mail is not accepted.  All
contributions considered as personal comments; usual disclaimers
apply.  All reuses of CPD material should respect stated copyright
notices, and should cite the sources explicitly; as a courtesy;
publications using CPD material should obtain permission from the
contributors.  

Contributions generally are acknowledged within 24 hours
of submission.  If selected, they are printed within two or three days.
The moderator reserves the right to delete extraneous quoted material.
He may change the SUBJECT: line of an article in order to make it easier
for the reader to follow a discussion.  He will not, however, alter or
edit or append to the text except for purely technical reasons.

A library of back issues is available on ftp.cs.uwm.edu [129.89.9.18].
Login as "ftp" with password identifying yourid@yoursite.  The archives
are in the directory "pub/comp-privacy".

People with gopher capability can most easily access the library at
gopher.cs.uwm.edu.

Mosaic users will find it at gopher://gopher.cs.uwm.edu.

Older archives are also held at ftp.pica.army.mil [129.139.160.133].

 ---------------------------------+-----------------------------------------
Leonard P. Levine                 | Moderator of:     Computer Privacy Digest
Professor of Computer Science     |                  and comp.society.privacy
University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee | Post:                comp-privacy@uwm.edu
Box 784, Milwaukee WI 53201       | Information: comp-privacy-request@uwm.edu
                                  | Gopher:                 gopher.cs.uwm.edu 
levine@cs.uwm.edu                 | Mosaic:        gopher://gopher.cs.uwm.edu
 ---------------------------------+-----------------------------------------


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End of Computer Privacy Digest V6 #036
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