Date: Sat, 27 May 95 21:41:52 EST
Errors-To: Comp-privacy Error Handler <owner-comp-privacy@uwm.edu>
From: Computer Privacy Digest Moderator <comp-privacy@uwm.edu>
To: Comp-privacy@uwm.edu
Subject: Computer Privacy Digest V6#049
Computer Privacy Digest Sat, 27 May 95 Volume 6 : Issue: 049
Today's Topics: Moderator: Leonard P. Levine
Re: Nautilus
Re: Sending VISA Card Details Across the Net
Re: Databases
Re: CIBC and Royal Bank to do MONDEX pilot
ACLU's Analysis of Revised Exon
ACLU Cyber-Liberties Alert #5
Prodigy Held Liable
Info on CPD [unchanged since 12/29/94]
----------------------------------------------------------------------
From: Linda_Collette@brown.edu
Date: 22 May 1995 15:40:11 -0400
Subject: Re: Nautilus
Is there a similar program for the Macintosh?
--
thanks
Lin Collette
Brown University School of Medicine
Medical Faculty Affairs Office
Box G-A215
Providence, RI 02912
401/863-1139
Email: Linda_Collette@brown.edu OR
Bi599128@brownvm.brown.edu
[moderator: I know of none at the moment.]
------------------------------
From: bo774@freenet.carleton.ca (Kelly Bert Manning)
Date: 24 May 1995 06:52:49 GMT
Subject: Re: Sending VISA Card Details Across the Net
Organization: The National Capital FreeNet, Ottawa, Ontario, Canada
Recently I've seen several suppliers saying something like "as the
internet is not a secure network, you may not wish to post your
credit card details across the net" Is this caution necessary?
After all, in order to use a credit card down the phone one has to
give one's card details to a total stranger, and we all do that
(don't we?) My understanding is that unless the
Well, I've never had a credit card account, so I can honestly say that
I don't give my visa number over the phone, or is it that I've done
this with every visa card I've ever had?:-)
Seriously though, it is common for RCMP to advice the public not to
give credit card numbers, or their bank card PINs(!) over the phone,
particulary not in response to an incoming call and not to a business
they haven't dealt with before.
But on the other hand I've had people give me quite ignorant responses
when I've gone to an ATM and had them hang around the machine after
they've done their business and urge me to use it saying "I'm done now"
while they peer at their transaction receipts or shuffle them around
and slowly put them in their wallets or purses.
They seem quite taken aback or facetious when I state(in a few more
words) that I'm well aware of police advice not to use one of these to
enter your PIN when someone is standing near you. From the frequency of
seemingly amused responses to this simple statement it seems that there
are a lot of sheep out there waiting to be sheared. I never leave my
transaction receipts around either, since they seem to have the card
number on them and I've heard news reports that an ATM fraud ring used
them and shoulder surfing in a major ripoff.
A credit union I used to deal with just didn't get the point when their
system had a programming error once and retained transaction receipts
to spit out for the next client to use the machine. When I complained
about this the manager droid who replied to me commented that it is
common for people to toss receipts into the scrap bucket. Guess why I
don't keep my money there any more. If they can't see the problem or
issue in handing my financial information out to whoever happens to use
a machine next I have no doubt that they may have trouble exercising
good judgement about loaning my money to credit seekers and other about
matters.
Point of sale debit card machines have become common in the past few
years in my province. I've yet to see a privacy shield around one of
these. Even in I didn't have a professional interest in computer system
authentication and security I hope I would be unfavourably impressed
about seeing no privacy shield around PIN entry keypads carrying Royal
Bank logos in McDonalds restaurants. It is also galling to see shields
around all of the staff PIN entry keypads behind a bank brank counter
and none around the client keypads at ATMS and in front of the counter.
Obviously someone around the bank has an inkling that this is an issue,
but it hasn't been addressed consistently wherever people have to enter
PINs.
Even if I didn't care about leaving a electronic purchase trail I
wouldn't be very eager to punch in my PIN at a restaurant where over a
score of people can see me do it. This cash replacement concept has a
way to go.
------------------------------
From: danpatents@aol.com (DanPatents)
Date: 24 May 1995 03:35:05 -0400
Subject: Re: Databases
Organization: America Online, Inc. (1-800-827-6364)
This is in response to your questions about what huge databases exist
with personal information. One is the Medical Information Bureau,
Inc. They keep all your medical info so that insurance companies can
use it when you apply for insurance. There may be other uses of which
I'm not aware at this time. To see what information they have on you
that they will allow you to see, and possibly change, write to P.O. Box
105, Essex Station, Boston, MA 02112. You'll receive a questionairre,
which you'll need to return with a check for $8. I did this and got a
questionnaire, a schedule of charges, a pamphlet called, "The
Consumer's MIB Fact Sheet," and a return envelope. I still have not
yet sent in the $8. The questionnaire states that you may receive "the
nature and substance of any information that MIB may have in its files
pertaining to you, the name(s) of the MIB member companies that
reported information to the MIB, and the name(s) of the MIB member
companies that received a copy of your MIB record(s) during the 6
months preceding your request for disclosure." By the way, I learned
of the existence of the MIB long ago, but I learned of the
availablility of records from page 104 of the June 1995 issue of
"Kiplinger's Personal Finance Magazine."
Hope this helps. Good luck.
--
DanPatents
------------------------------
From: mckeever@cogsci.uwo.ca (Paul McKeever)
Date: 25 May 1995 19:17:26 GMT
Subject: Re: CIBC and Royal Bank to do MONDEX pilot
Organization: University of Western Ontario, London, Ont. Canada
Kelly Bert Manning <bo774@freenet.carleton.ca> wrote: The Canadian
Imperial Bank of Commerce and the Royal Bank have announced plans
to pilot a "smart" cash card. Apparently this is based on a chip
based card used in Europe.
Unlike a credit card there would be no name or other personal data
on it. Users would supposedly refill it at an ATM or by dialing
into their bank if they are unconcerned enough about banking by
phone to get it activated for their account.
The cards would have no PIN or other password and if they were lost
or stolen the user would be out of pocket unless it was returned to
the bank.
Is this one likely to take off? The bank representative I spoke
with seemed quite up front about the idea of it being a cost saving
measure for the banks(an attempt to reduce the use of cash in ATMs)
as a well as one that would let them charge new fees to the users
and merchants.
I, for one, think that this card is a MUST for electronic purchasing.
If it is true that the smart card allows one to buy goods anonymously,
then it is the only form of electronic payment to date (among debit and
credit cards) to protect the privacy of the buyer and, thereby, to
protect freedom.
It is perfectly acceptable for a buyer to choose to tell banks and
stores what sorts of things they buy. The problem to date has been
that MOST users don't realize that information about their buying
behavior is recorded and potentially sold for profit (with the buyer
not receiving a dime of the profit for his/her disclosure of personal
information). And, for those who have realized that banks and stores
pay you nothing in exchange for information about your preferences,
they have found that a term of holding the debit/credit card is to give
that info to the banks for free.
By launching the smart card, the CIBC and the Royal Bank have acted
quite morally, and have demonstrated that they are not as opposed to
anonymous purchasing as some other banks (an article about TD's "war on
cash" and anonymous purchasing comes to mind... TD's president, in
1990, praised his own position that, without cash, we could catch all
of the 'bad guys'....which, of course, would include any member of
society that held unpopular believes or engaged in unpopular behavior:
the nudie-bar frequenter, the communist, the cigar lover who visits
Cuba, etc. could not avoid authoritarian stoning by paying
cash...neither would the frequenter of bars for homosexuals, the paying
user of an abortion clinic, the person who donates money to the
religious organization of his/her choice, or the person who pays the
kid next door $5 to mow the lawn...but doesn't pay GST).
This is not to say that smart cards should replace government-issued
bills and coins. You must pay to use a smart card (though, I still
have been unable to find out what the fee schedule will be/is). You
don't have to pay to take a $20 bill out of your wallet. Secondly, it
is immeasurably more easy for government to regulate the use of the
machines that will transfer credits from one's card to a business's
account than it is for government to regulate the use of your hands and
fingers to exchange bills and coins for goods and services....for those
who fight the GST by not paying it, smart cards will probably allow
government to tax you by grabbing extra cash from your card each time
you pay someone with it.
Finally, a word on the morality of issuing the smart card: things that
fall into disuse are more easily legislated out of existence. Smart
cards may (or may not) allow people to buy goods and services
anonymously, but one should take care to remember the benefits of paper
and coin that place a duty on all of us never to let government
dispense with it:]
1. You don't have to pay a bank to take cash out of your
pocket (though, in some cases, there may be a small charge
to take money out of your account).
2. Bills and coins can be exchanged without government
knowing it...the same cannot be guaranteed with cards which
are read by machines (card readers) that can be used to
record who gave how much to whom...all that is required is
the stroke of a pen to pass legislation requiring card
readers to record info, or to subtract GST etc from one's
card automatically, and without the consent of the buyer.
So, the morality of the CIBC and Royal Banks is dependent upon their
motives for issuing the smart card. If those banks, like the TD, are
actually at "war" with bills and coins, then the smart card is being
issued to discourage people from using bills and coins so that they can
be phased out of existence (this, by the way, is in the bank interest
not only because of the expense of handling cash, but because effective
taxation of EVERY transaction increases the likelihood that the federal
and provincial governments will be able to pay the banks what is owed
to them).
For now, I give the CIBC and the Royal Bank the benefit of a doubt. I
probably will pay for the convenience of paying electronically yet
anonymously. If, however, I hear either bank issue statements about
the "evils" of paper and coin, I'll be turning my "smart card" in for a
refund.
Regards,
Paul McKeever
------------------------------
From: ACLUNATL@aol.com
Date: 25 May 1995 16:49:42 -0400
Subject: ACLU's Analysis of Revised Exon
ACLU Cyber-Liberties Analysis:
Revised Exon Amendment
May 25, 1995
----------------------------------------------
The American Civil Liberties Union has previously expressed its strong
opposition to the "Communications Decency Act," introduced by Senator
Exon as S. 314 and adopted by the Senate Commerce Committee as an
amendment to the Telecommunications Competition and Deregulation Act of
1995.
Yesterday, we obtained a revised version of the Exon Amendment, which
was apparently written by members of Senator Exon's staff in
consultation with representatives of online service providers, the
Department of Justice, and pro-censorship lobbying groups. The
following analysis presents the ACLU's objections to the revised draft
and clarifies the ACLU's continuing concern that the Exon amendment, in
its existing or revised form, violates both free speech and privacy
rights.
I. Interactive Cyberspace Must Not Be Constricted by Old Media Models
The most fundamental flaw of the revised Exon amendment is that it
still wrongly attempts to force the new interactive environment of
cyberspace and online services into the censorship straitjacket foisted
on old media. In fact, the Exon amendment even uses as its model the
most restrictive of the old media.
This is wrong-headed policy. It is also a violation of the Free Speech
and Privacy guarantees of the Constitution and therefore
unconstitutional.
The Exon amendment would make the interactive environment one of the
most censored segments of communications media when logic dictates that
cyberspace, with its emphasis on user-choice and user-control, should
make it the least censored. At a minimum, the extremely limited rules
of content-regulation for print media, and the safeguards against
censorship for print materials, should be applied to online
communications. The ACLU, moreover, believes that the characteristics
of cyberspace, including the private and interactive nature of the
communication, dictates that cyberspace should be even more free than
print.
We stress that there is no revision of the Exon amendment -- no
tinkering of its censorship provisions -- that eliminates this
problem. The Exon amendment cannot be "fixed." It must be rejected.
II. The Exon Amendment Would Still Restrict Online Communications to
Those Appropriate for Children
Section (d) of the revised Exon amendment would still
unconstitutionally restrict all online content to that which is
suitable for children.
Even under existing case law, non-obscene speech that is deemed
"indecent" is protected by the First Amendment. _Sable Communications
v. FCC_, 492 U.S. 115 (1989). The Government may only regulate
indecent speech if it establishes a compelling governmental interest in
the regulation AND narrowly tailors the restriction to achieve that
interest. _Id._ at 125. See also _Pacifica Foundation v. FCC_, 438
U.S. 726 (1978); _Carlin Communications v. FCC_, 749 F.2d 113 (2d Cir.
1984) (Carlin I); _Carlin Communications v. FCC_, 787 F.2d 846 (2d Cir.
1986) (Carlin II); _Dial Information Services v. Thornburg_, 938 F.2d
1535 (2d Cir. 1991).
Indeed, much of what consenting adults prize about some of their
personal communications could well be deemed by outsiders as "indecent"
if addressed to a child.
The revised draft, like the original Exon amendment, is
unconstitutional because requiring users and content providers to
reduce their content to what is suitable for children is not the least
restrictive means for protecting minors from indecent material. The
"justifications" for regulation of indecency in broadcasting and
telephone audiotext services do not apply to interactive
communications, in which users - including parents - have much more
control over the content of the messages they receive. We are also
prepared to argue that the "justifications" asserted for censorship in
any of the old media, including print, do not apply to cyberspace.
III. Some Specific Problems in the Revised Exon Draft
Again, the ACLU strongly believes that the anti-cyberliberty Exon
amendment cannot be "fixed." It needs to be defeated. So, even if all
of these specific problems were solved, the Exon amendment would still
be a terrible idea. Still, it may be useful to consider briefly some
of the specific problems in the revised Exon draft.
*Revised section (d) outlaws the online transmission of obscene
materials without defining "obscenity." Using the test for obscenity
articulated in Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 1 (1973), the federal
government has chosen to stage prosecutions of online obscenity cases
in conservative jurisdictions in order to take advantage of more
restrictive "community standards." See Thomas v. United States, U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, No. 94-6648 and No. 94-6649.
This trend poses a severe threat that online users and providers will
be forced to reduce content to that which would be acceptable under the
"community standards" of the most conservative jurisdiction. The ACLU
has filed an amicus brief in the Thomas case strongly opposing the
government's misuse of the censorship laws.
*Revised sections (d) and (e) extend liability for transmission of
obscene or indecent communications to non-commercial in addition to
commercial providers. This change would render the revised draft more
restrictive of free speech than the original Exon amendment.
*While revised section (f) provides some defenses for online
service providers, these defenses place smaller system operators at
risk because they cannot afford to assert the defenses in court.
Moreover, the defenses are incomplete and many larger service providers
would likely find themselves in jeopardy at the hands of prosecutors
motivated by the political advantages of currying favor with certain
pro-censorship groups.
*Revised section (f)(2) fails to protect providers who cede
editorial control to an entity "which the defendant knows or had reason
to know intends to engage in conduct that is likely to violate this
section." This could pose serious problems for Internet providers that
may have "reason to know" that certain sites are likely to contain
communications deemed to be obscene or indecent.
*Revised section (f)(3) gives the Federal Communications
Commission the power to issue regulations regarding methods in which
providers may restrict access in order to avoid liability. Giving
federal regulators the authority to determine the rules for
distributing online content will radically affect the freedom of
cyberspace and will have a severe direct effect and an equally severe
chilling effect on online speech.
*Revised section (f)(4) could still make it impossible for users
or content providers to remedy a violation of rights by an online
service provider if the service claimed it was attempting to comply
with the Exon amendment.
Conclusion
The revised Exon draft continues to subject an industry that has
blossomed without government control to an unprecedented amount of
interference and intrusion over content. It gravely threatens the free
flow of information and the diversity of content transmitted over
online networks.
To achieve the liberating potential of the information superhighway,
Congress must ensure that interactive technologies enhance rather than
stifle democratic values.
The American Civil Liberties Union therefore opposes the Exon
amendment, both in its original form and as revised.
--
ACLU Free Reading Room
gopher://aclu.org:6601
**NEW** ACLU Constitution Hall on AmericaOnline: keyword ACLU
------------------------------
From: Lynnclu@aol.com
Date: 26 May 1995 18:35:05 -0400
Subject: ACLU Cyber-Liberties Alert #5
ACLU Cyber-Liberties Alert: 05/26/95
Feinstein Amendment Would Censor Online Info About "Explosive Materials"
Senator Feinstein (D-CA) has indicated that she will offer an amendment
to the broad counter-terrorism bill (an incredibly unconstitutional and
anti-liberty bill) now pending in the U.S. Senate.
The ACLU opposes the Feinstein amendment as a blatant violation of the
First Amendment's free speech guarantees. While the amendment applies
to all media, it grew out of Senator Feinstein's vilification of the
internet at the Senate's May 11 counter-terrorism hearings.
The Feinstein amendment must be **rejected** -- it cannot be "fixed."
Join the ACLU, People for the American Way, and others in opposing this
amendment.
**ACT NOW**
Fax, write, or call Senator Feinstein to express your opposition to the
amendment.
Senator Dianne Feinstein
FAX 202/228-3954
Voice 202/224-3841
SH-331 SOB
Washington, DC 20510-0504
-----------------------------------------
Earlier today, the ACLU faxed the following letter in opposition to the
amendment to all U.S. Senators.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
American Civil Liberties Union
Washington National Office
122 Maryland Avenue, NE
VIA FAX
RE: The Feinstein Amendment on Disseminating Information on Explosives
Dear Senator:
The American Civil Liberties Union has already communicated its
position on the proposed anti-terrorism legislation. Senator Feinstein
has indicated she intends to introduce an amendment making a criminal
offense out of the dissemination of information about manufacturing
explosives.
The Feinstein amendment would, for example, make it a felony,
punishable by 20 years imprisonment, for any person "to disseminate by
any means information pertaining to, in whole or in part, the
manufacture of explosive materials if the person . . . reasonably
should know that" the materials are likely to be used to further a
federal crime.
Because it covers pure speech, without even a focus on a particularized
threat of violence, the Feinstein amendment is clearly
unconstitutional. In fact, it is difficult to contemplate an amendment
in this area that would be more demonstrably unconstitutional.
The amendment is also unnecessary. Current law, 18 U.S.C.sec. 231,
makes it a felony to teach explosives to any person if it is known or
should have been known that that person intended to use the explosives
unlawfully in furtherance of a civil disorder. Current law, however,
focuses on a particular person using the information for a particular
criminal purpose.
The Feinstein amendment, however, criminalizes merely putting out
information -- in print, on radio or television, in cyberspace --
without any requirement of knowledge of the particular would-be
criminal or would-be crime.
In fact, the media coverage of the Oklahoma City bombing has left
everyone with sufficient knowledge so that everyone could be prosecuted
if he or she published information on explosives, regardless of the
purpose. Even an article that described how a fertilizer-based bomb
was built in order to suggest prophylactic measures to preclude such
threats could be the basis of its author's prosecution.
Under the Feinstein amendment, all the newspapers and broadcasters who
described how bombs are built in the coverage on Oklahoma City could be
prosecuted if they ran similar stories again.
There are many reasons -- quite distinct from engaging in violence --
why individuals might wish to disseminate information about
explosives. These range from county extension agents with suggestions
on tree stump removal, to OSHA guidelines on demolition of buildings,
to construction company planning excavations, to newspapers reporting
on current events. The Feinstein amendment would subject to criminal
prosecution the people involved in all these situations -- because,
after Oklahoma City all of them would meet the absurdly low standard
for criminal culpability in the amendment.
As the ACLU, People for the American Way and others have noted: The
Feinstein amendment takes the lowest standard used for culpability
under the criminal statutes and seeks to apply it to actions the
Constitution requires be given the highest level of protection -- the
exercise of their right of free speech.
Because the Feinstein amendment would criminalize such a broad scope of
First Amendment-protected activity, it would also enormously increase
the investigative and surveillance authority of the FBI. In order
words, the Feinstein amendment would turn a whole host of actions into
crimes thereby establishing the criminal predicate for which the FBI
guidelines allow an investigation to be pursued.
Even worse, the FBI investigates when it merely has a "reasonable
indication" that a crime might have been committed. This means that
anyone who simply disseminates -- on paper, over the airwaves, or in
cyberspace -- information on manufacturing explosives is made subject
to investigation by the FBI. This would happen even if the
disseminator had no grounds to believe the information could be used
for a crime, because the FBI could claim merely to be investigating to
see whether a crime had been committed
The Feinstein amendment would also have the effect of forcing the
internet -- as well as libraries, broadcasters and publishers -- to do
the impossible task of prescreening the recipients of their
information. Such a requirement is obviously impossible to meet. It
also destroys the very purpose of both the internet and libraries --
providing the widest possible access to information.
The American Civil Liberties Union strongly urges the United States
Senate to defeat the Feinstein amendment on disseminating information
relating to explosives.
Sincerely,
Laura Murphy Lee, Director
ACLU Washington National Office
Donald Haines
Legislative Counsel
--
For more information about the ACLU's Cyber-Liberties efforts and our
opposition to the counter-terrorism bill, see our online resources:
ACLU Free Reading Room -- gopher://aclu.org:6601
ACLU Constitution Hall on America Online -- keyword ACLU
To request our FAQ, or be added to/dropped from our list, write to
infoaclu@aclu.org
------------------------------
From: Dave Rasmussen <dave@opus.csd.uwm.edu>
Date: 27 May 1995 08:32:56 -0500 (CDT)
Subject: Prodigy Held Liable
Forwarded message:
From: "Dave Banisar" <banisar@epic.org>
Date: 26 May 1995 23:12:00 -0400
Subject: Prodigy Held Liable
To: "Interested People" <interest@epic.org>
------
A New York state trial court ruled on May 24 that Prodigy is responsible
for the libelous statements of its users because it exercises editorial
control over their posts. In the case, an anonymous Prodigy user made
statements against New York Investment firm Stratton Oakmont accusing it
of criminal and fraudulent acts. Stratton Oakmont sued Prodigy and the
volunteer moderator of the forum where the statements were published.
The Court found that Prodigy was acting as a publisher and therefore
was responsible for the content of the posts. The Court distinguished
the case from the earlier Cubby v. Compuserve decision, which
found that Compuserve was subject to the standards of a bookstore or
library. It that case, the US District court ruled that Compuserve
had no editorial control over the text. According to the New York
state court:
In contrast, here Prodigy has virtually created an
editorial staff of Board Leaders who have the ability to
continually monitor incoming transmissions and in fact do
spend time censoring notes. Indeed, it could be said that
Prodigy's current system of automatic scanning,
guidelines, and Board Leaders may have a chilling effect
on freedom of communications in Cyberspace, and it appears
that this chilling effect is exactly what Prodigy wants,
but for the legal liability that attaches to such
censorship.
Let it be clear that this court is in full agreement with
Cubby and Auvil. Computer bulletin boards should generally
be regarded in the same context as bookstores, libraries
and network affiliates...It is Prodigy's own policies,
technology and staffing decisions which have altered the
scenario and mandated the finding that it is a publisher.
The court also attempted to downplay the significance of its
decision on the greater area of electronic networks:
Prodigy's conscious choice, to gain the benefits of editorial
control, has opened it up to greater liability that Compuserve
and other computer networks that make no such choice. For the
record, the fear that this Court's finding of publisher status
for Prodigy will compel all computer networks to abdicate
control of their bulletin boards, incorrectly presumes that
the market will refuse to compensate a network for its
increased control and the resulting increased exposure.
The Court also found that the volunteer "Board Leader" of the Prodigy
Bulletin Board was acting as an agent of the company. The Court found
Prodigy exercised control over the Board Leaders though the the
Bulletin Board Leader Agreement and the actions of Prodigy's
employees.
Prodigy has said that it will consider appealing the decision. EPIC has
materials on free speech available at http://epic.org/free_speech/ We will be
making a copy of the decision available in the next few days.
--
David Banisar (Banisar@epic.org) * 202-544-9240 (tel)
Electronic Privacy Information Center * 202-547-5482 (fax)
666 Pennsylvania Ave, SE, Suite 301 * ftp/gopher/wais cpsr.org
Washington, DC 20003 * HTTP://epic.digicash.com/epic
--
Dave Rasmussen - Information & Media Technologies (ex-CSD) Client Services
Internet: dave@csd.uwm.edu Phone: 414-229-5133 2m HAM Radio: N9REJ
USmail: Box 413 Bol213, Milwaukee, WI 53201
------------------------------
From: "Prof. L. P. Levine" <levine@blatz.cs.uwm.edu>
Date: 29 Dec 1994 10:50:22 -0600 (CST)
Subject: Info on CPD [unchanged since 12/29/94]
Organization: University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee
The Computer Privacy Digest is a forum for discussion on the effect of
technology on privacy or vice versa. The digest is moderated and
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Submissions should be sent to comp-privacy@uwm.edu and administrative
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This digest is a forum with information contributed via Internet
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If you read this from the comp.society.privacy newsgroup and wish to
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A library of back issues is available on ftp.cs.uwm.edu [129.89.9.18].
Login as "ftp" with password identifying yourid@yoursite. The archives
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Older archives are also held at ftp.pica.army.mil [129.139.160.133].
---------------------------------+-----------------------------------------
Leonard P. Levine | Moderator of: Computer Privacy Digest
Professor of Computer Science | and comp.society.privacy
University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee | Post: comp-privacy@uwm.edu
Box 784, Milwaukee WI 53201 | Information: comp-privacy-request@uwm.edu
| Gopher: gopher.cs.uwm.edu
levine@cs.uwm.edu | Mosaic: gopher://gopher.cs.uwm.edu
---------------------------------+-----------------------------------------
------------------------------
End of Computer Privacy Digest V6 #049
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