Date: Mon, 19 Jun 95 14:15:51 EST
Errors-To: Comp-privacy Error Handler <owner-comp-privacy@uwm.edu>
From: Computer Privacy Digest Moderator <comp-privacy@uwm.edu>
To: Comp-privacy@uwm.edu
Subject: Computer Privacy Digest V6#055
Computer Privacy Digest Mon, 19 Jun 95 Volume 6 : Issue: 055
Today's Topics: Moderator: Leonard P. Levine
Re: Defences Against Cyber-Seduction
Re: Freedom to Read
Re: Protecting Kids From Porn on Web
Simon Weisenthal Plea for International Censorship Jurisdiction
Re: Smart Cards and Privacy
Information Warfare Online Conference
Credit-Privacy Resources
eCash - Comments from Users
Info on CPD [unchanged since 12/29/94]
----------------------------------------------------------------------
From: Out of his mind <amigagod@vaxu.org>
Date: 13 Jun 1995 16:11:56 -0400
Subject: Re: Defences Against Cyber-Seduction
Mich Kabay [NCSA Sys_Op] wrote:
o I will tell my parents right away if I come across any
information that makes me feel uncomfortable.
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
I find this the most important line in the brochure. All this talk
about "protecting kids from pornography".... The truth is, that those
that do not know about sex *will* be uncomfortable with that kind of
material, and those who are more educated about sex will be more
comfortable with this kind of information. A ten-year-old boy may say
"Oh look! Boobies!" while his friend's over at the house, and think not
much more of it. The fifteen year old, however, is under a hormonal
surge and this material, while 'pornographic', is actually also
*educational*. Don't forget that.
-----
=== Todd Vierling - UFNet, AmiNIX - todd@ufnet.ufl.edu, aminix@aminix.org ===
== Have you done your reality check today? == Hey Kids...what time is it?? ==
== LAISSEZ-FAIRE - No Internet Censorship! == (It's Pol-i-ti-cian Time!!!) ==
== Go Woody! Now I wonder how the Shuttles stand up to those meteorites... ==
------------------------------
From: taliesin@netcom.com (Glenn R. Stone)
Date: 14 Jun 1995 00:36:19 -0400
Subject: Re: Freedom to Read
In CPD V6.54, Carl Kadie submitted the ALA Freedom To Read statement as
a position to take on censorship in cyberspace. It is my belief that,
while this is the extreme position, it may also be the most viable.
Freedom To Read essentially says nix to anything that even smacks of
censorship, be they labels, reviews, compartmentalizing, etc. It does
not allow for even the smallest iota of leeway, instead embracing
freely and with eyes open the very danger the censor-wannabes pound
their bully pulpits about. The policy encourages, nay, demands, the
way pointed to by the age-old Yiddish adage, "Think for yourself,
schmuck!" It recognizes very explicitly that freedom is, in fact,
quite dangerous, and that life itself is, in fact, quite shocking, and
tacitly encourages us to pull our heads out of the sand and deal with
it like the men and women we claim to be.
Knowledge is power. Censorship is the effort to restrict that power.
A censor is someone with the audacity to think that he knows better
than we do what we should know. That person is also a few fries shy of
a Happy Meal for thinking I'm going to let him get away with usurping
my right, endowed to me by my Creatrix, to think for myself. Freedom
is also power, because freedom is the knowledge that each of us has the
ability to shape, at least in part, our own destiny, and the knowledge
of how that shaping is done. Thus censorship is an attack on ALL
freedom, not just a single right... and must be defended against in all
its forms and at all costs.
The ALA has defended its position for over 40 years, against the likes
of McCarthy, the Silent Majority, and the New Right. It has a proven
track record in the print media. It also means we here in cyberspace
need do nothing insofar as programming, configuring, etc.; we need only
stick to our idea(l)s and not let folks get to them and change them
without our consent. If it ain't broke, don't fix it.
Yes, this is the extreme position. No compromise. But, as I have
pointed out, it is one which is defendable, having no "slippery slope"
down which to slide... and, furthermore, by joining the librarians (and
the print media publishers in general) we gain their credibility, which
may well have been lacking as the proverbial propellorhead behind a
CRT, and they gain our ability to network and thus send and receive
large amounts of on-topic data about a given subject.
We can fight this thing, gang. But, in Poor Richard's timeless words,
we had best all hang together, or we shall surely all hang separately.
--
taliesin
he who gives up a little freedom for a little security
DESERVES to lose them both.
------------------------------
From: peter@nmti.com (Peter da Silva)
Date: 14 Jun 95 14:37:16 GMT (Wed)
Subject: Re: Protecting Kids From Porn on Web
Organization: Network/development platform support, NMTI
Philip H. Smith III, (703) 506-0500 <PHILS@RELAY.RELAY.COM> wrote:
Ah yes, now I know why it WON'T work.. kids could simply access a
URL for an adult GIF (or JPEG, or ...) directly if they knew what
it was. And you can bet they would find such URLs. No HTML. No
<adult_only> tag. No security.
If a kid wants to get around the security, they can. Just like they can
get an older kid to buy their Playboy or Hustler. And if you have the
browser look for the tag in the header as well as the body you can
block GIFs as well.
Surfwatch won't work because it can't keep up with the exponential
growth of the net.
--
Peter da Silva (NIC: PJD2) `-_-'
Network Management Technology Incorporated 'U`
1601 Industrial Blvd. Sugar Land, TX 77478 USA
+1 713 274 5180 "Har du kramat din varg idag?"
------------------------------
From: mckeever@cogsci.uwo.ca (Paul McKeever)
Date: 15 Jun 1995 03:52:29 GMT
Subject: Simon Weisenthal Plea for International Censorship Jurisdiction
Organization: University of Western Ontario, London, Ont. Canada
It was reported that a representative of the Simon Weisenthal (SP?)
centre gave a speech today (Wednesday, June 14, 1995) in which he said
that the governments of all of the worlds countries will have to be
involved, and should be involved, in setting up a legal system (e.g.,
an international agreement) to:
(a) ban the transmission of 'harmful' messages and information
(e.g., bomb-making instructions, racist propoganda, etc.)
(b) regulate service providers (including BBSs), and treat them
in the same manner as television stations (i.e., content
censorship by hook or by crook).
There are any number of intelligent readers out there who will point
out that such laws would be unenforceable given today's encryption
techology (and other technologies, such as embedding encrypted messages
in certain bits of images).
BUT: my problem is that such laws are (a) in conflict with the
constitutions of many countries (most notably that of the USA), and are
therefore laws which would be unconstitutional in one or more
countries, (b) encouraging countries to compromise differences between
their respective constitutions (especially those differences relating
to the extent to which a country protects the freedom of expression),
(c) in conflict with democracy (preventing the flow of information is
prevention of *informed* choice), (d) a threat to freedom of speech
generally (any compromise of a guarantee of non-interference by
government renders the "guarantee" meaningless...thus, creating an
exception for the sake of international cooperation (i.e., a new
exception for many countries) constitutes the removal of a freedom),
and (e) a threat to political asylum (when a centralized, single,
government with jurisdiction over every inch of the globe has legal
jurisdiction respecting speech, anyone who expresses a so-called
(usually by the people standing to lose something as a result of the
expression) "dangerous" political view will have no country in which to
seek political asylum.
If *any* matter is a matter over which it is dangerous to give
world-wide jurisdiction to a single governmental body, expression is
that matter.
I would strongly urge all who value political freedom, and freedom of
expression more generally, to give serious consideration to the danger
implicit in world-wide legal jurisdiction over censorship. It is a
radical idea, supported by the frightened or by the authoritarian.
--
Regards in freedom,
Paul McKeever
------------------------------
From: renaud@CAM.ORG
Date: 16 Jun 1995 06:50:00 -0400
Subject: Re: Smart Cards and Privacy
I think that may me of general interest. Following my precisions about
Mondex and the smart electronic purse, Dick Mills wrote:
You seem quite knowledgable about smart cards. Perhaps you can
answer this question I saw on CPD, or some other forum recently.
If a smart electronic purse has a unique serial number, say X, and
there is a record that X was sold to person Y, and X was used with
merchant Z, then Y's privacy is endangered, even if the audit trail
to Y is not ironclad. Is this the case?
I have two things to say. First, the privacy of Y depends on the link
between the card X and Y. If the card was sold like another object in a
store, nobody can made a link btween the card anthe person who bought
it. I f it's generated by a bank, it is really possible that a link was
made by the bank between the card and the owner of the account. You
have to know wich information is stored in the card.
Second, a unique serial number is difficult to keep. I have to
introduce a little technology about that. It the first generation of
smart cards, the memory is an EPROM. That means that you can't rewrite
information at the place where an information is still stored. A unique
serial number is possible without alteration.Now, the new generation
has a Double EPROM memory. That means that you can erase previously
stored information and replace it. That depends on the possession of
the hardware to do that.
In conclusion, I repeat what I put in my previous message: the security
and the privacy of the information on a smart card depends entirely on
the architecture of the supplier of the card and the security
architecture of the application: encryption, keys,... I heard of
projects with smart cards that aren't more secure that magnetic strip
cards.
I hope that responds to your question.
--
Renaud
renaud@cam.org
------------------------------
From: "Mich Kabay [NCSA Sys_Op]" <75300.3232@compuserve.com>
Date: 16 Jun 95 18:09:35 EDT
Subject: Information Warfare Online Conference
* * Information Warfare On-Line Conference (GO NCSAFORUM) * *
The National Computer Security Association (NCSA) is pleased to
announce an on-line conference to explore the subject of Information
Warfare. This on-line conference will be held in Conference Room 1 of
NCSA's Information Security Forum, GO NCSAFORUM on CompuServe, on July
20th at 2:00 PM EDT.
According to noted security expert and author Winn Schwartau:
"Information Warfare is the use of information and information
systems as weapons in a conflict where information and information
systems are the targets".
Information Warfare is broken down into three categories. Our guest
speaker, Winn Schwartau, will examine each of these areas:
Class I: Personal Privacy. "In Cyberspace You Are Guilty Until
Proven Innocent." The mass psychology of information. Privacy
versus stability and law enforcement.
Class II: Industrial and Economic Espionage. Domestic and
international ramifications and postures in a globally networked,
competitive society.
Class III: Global Information Warfare. Nation-state versus
Nation-state as an alternative to convention warfare, the
military perspective and terrorism.
This on-line conference will be moderated by Dr. Mich Kabay, NCSA's
Director of Education. Mich can be reached at
75300.3232@compuserve.com; feel free to provide him with advance
questions and suggestions. Detailed procedures for this on-line
conference can be found in file conf.txt in library 1 of NCSAFORUM.
--
M.E.Kabay,Ph.D. / Dir. Education, Natl Computer Security Assn (Carlisle, PA)
------------------------------
From: "Y.Landman" <mlandman@ort.org.il>
Date: 17 Jun 1995 10:44:15 GMT
Subject: Credit-Privacy Resources
Organization: Tel-Aviv University Computation Center
Hy everyone,
I am a law student making a research about the right to privacy and the
computerized world. I'm focusing mainly on _CREDIT-REPORTS PRIVACY_ and
on law and consumers dealing with the problem of electronic trails left
by credit-cards and afterwards used by direct-mailing companies.
After days of surfing the net, I came up with very little material
about it (mainly from EPIC). I'm looking for online articles and
working-papers about this subject, which could help me in my research.
If possible (but not necessarily), with some international aspects and
comparative point of view.
Any help would be appreciated.
Thanks in Advance,
--
Yoav Landman
<mlandman@ort.org.il>
------------------------------
From: mcrisp@toursr.tas.gov.au (Martin Crisp)
Date: 19 Jun 1995 03:29:55 GMT
Subject: eCash - Comments from Users
Organization: Dept. Tourism, Sport & Recreation
Hi,
I've only recently started wandering the www and in my meanderings came
across a page advising that to order goods they only accepted ecash...
After browsing through the digicash home page I decided it looked
interesting enough to warrant further/closer examination.
If anyone reading this group knows about ecash thru tales of horror or
delight could you email (this is the first time I've looked in this
group, unlikely to get back to it given the volume of the ones I do
read) me some info on the product or their experiences with it.
I'll gladly summarize if people are interested...
--
Have Fun
Martin
try this: <http://www.tas.gov.au/tourism/tasman.html>
(one day that'll change to my own home page)
------------------------------
From: "Prof. L. P. Levine" <levine@blatz.cs.uwm.edu>
Date: 29 Dec 1994 10:50:22 -0600 (CST)
Subject: Info on CPD [unchanged since 12/29/94]
Organization: University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee
The Computer Privacy Digest is a forum for discussion on the effect of
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---------------------------------+-----------------------------------------
Leonard P. Levine | Moderator of: Computer Privacy Digest
Professor of Computer Science | and comp.society.privacy
University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee | Post: comp-privacy@uwm.edu
Box 784, Milwaukee WI 53201 | Information: comp-privacy-request@uwm.edu
| Gopher: gopher.cs.uwm.edu
levine@cs.uwm.edu | Mosaic: gopher://gopher.cs.uwm.edu
---------------------------------+-----------------------------------------
------------------------------
End of Computer Privacy Digest V6 #055
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