Date: Fri, 15 Sep 95 17:44:35 EST
Errors-To: Comp-privacy Error Handler <owner-comp-privacy@uwm.edu>
From: Computer Privacy Digest Moderator <comp-privacy@uwm.edu>
To: Comp-privacy@uwm.edu
Subject: Computer Privacy Digest V7#022
Computer Privacy Digest Fri, 15 Sep 95 Volume 7 : Issue: 022
Today's Topics: Moderator: Leonard P. Levine
Re: 20/20 Security Camera Report
WWW access records
Concerns about BC "PharmaNet" Computer System
Re: Grocery Purchases and my Privacy
Re: Grocery Purchases and my Privacy
Re: Grocery Purchases and my Privacy
Re: Grocery Purchases and my Privacy
Re: Grocery Purchases and my Privacy
Re: Privacy Guard
Re: Privacy Guard
RSA Crypto Software on Web for Download and Evaluation
AOL and the FBI
Computers and the Law Conference
Open Letter to Geoff Greiveldinger
Info on CPD [unchanged since 08/01/95]
----------------------------------------------------------------------
From: WELKER@a1.vsdec.nl.nuwc.navy.mil
Date: 12 Sep 1995 10:47:09 -0400 (EDT)
Subject: Re: 20/20 Security Camera Report
On September 8th ABC Television on its weekly 20/20 show produced a
piece describing closed circuit TV cameras that are now being
installed in England for public security purposes ... She compares
the system with that in the US where most cameras are installed by
private parties for business reasons but points out that one such
camera provided a picture of what might well have been the truck
used in the Oklahoma bombing ...
It would seem to me that personal privacy interests might be protected
by having a "grass roots" camera network, possibly organized by local
neighborhood watch organizations. Thus the government is not in
custody of the tapes, and individual volunteers can review them for
useful info in response to police requests. Those worried about spying
neighbors can deal with it on a case by case basis without having to
fight city hall.
I wonder how Watergate would've turned out if "Deep Throat" had been
caught on a parking lot surveillance tape? Or the burglars, for that
matter.
------------------------------
From: rseoeg@site33.ping.at (Moss-Jusefowytsch OEG)
Date: 14 Sep 1995 20:38:00 +0100
Subject: WWW access records
Records are kept of website access. This may lead to embarassing
results. A post in alt.current-events.clinton.whitewater contains a
copywritten letter from someone who maintains a Web site concerning
Whitewater. Apparently people from White House computers were
accessing his site and downloading his files, all of which showed up in
his auditing records. He wrote a letter to the White House asking for
clarification about their statement that they did not monitor
anti-Clinton activity on the Internet. Two concerns here: government
monitoring and web access records.
Chris Mathews
P.S. Sites involved were
"Washington Weekly" (http://www.federal.com),
"The Whitewater Scandal Home Page"
(http://www.cs.dartmouth.edu/~crow/whitewater/)
"Whitewater & Vince Foster"
(http://www.cris.com/~dwheeler/n/whitewater/whitewater-index.html)
www.federal.com apparently contains the specific letter, but, as I don't
have web access, cannot confirm.
[moderator: The following are some excerpts from this copyrighted
letter.
[...]
Virginia M. Terzano
White House Office of the Press Secretary
The White House
[...]
It has come to my attention that several dissident sites on the World
Wide Web have been visited by White House computers this week.
Apparently, all information regarding Whitewater, Foster, and Mena has
been transferred to White House computers.
[...] have been visited by White House computers ist1.eop.gov,
ist6.eop.gov, ist7.eop.gov, and gatekeeper.eop.gov between August 28
and August 31, and a total of 128 files have been transferred to those
White House computers. For all sites, this constitutes a significant
increase over previous access by White House computers.
In light of this information, I have the following questions:
(1) Does this constitute "casual browsing" by White House staff, or is
it, in light of the considerable time and effort spent during regular
business hours, part of a monitoring or intelligence operation?
(2) For what purpose is the information transferred to the White House
used?
(3) Does the White House keep information from these web sites on file,
and does the White House keep a file on the persons responsible for
these web sites?
(4) Is the April 9 statement by David Lytel of the White House Office
of Science and Technology to Amy Bauer of Copley News Service that the
administration does not monitor anti-Clinton activity on the web still
operative? ]
------------------------------
From: klassen@sol.UVic.CA (Melvin Klassen)
Date: 12 Sep 95 19:57:09 GMT
Subject: Concerns about BC "PharmaNet" Computer System
Organization: University of Victoria, Victoria B.C. CANADA
In response to a newspaper editorial about the "PharmaNet" system in
British Columbia, Canada, which is a computer system for cross-province
tracking the distribution of prescription drugs, the following "letter
to the editor" was written.
It seems to allay the "security" and "privacy" issues raised in the
editorial.
Source: Victoria (BC, Canada) "Times-Colonist", September 10, 1995.
Your Aug. 31 editorial ["The first question: Who wants to know?"]
implies that pharmacists (we dismissed with the "druggist" label
decades ago) now have easy access to "... open a PharmaNet file and
find out if you're taking drugs for alcohol dependence". That just
isn't true.
Pharmacists have no more access to confidential patient-information
that they ever had, and even that is very strictly controlled by
legislation. Pharmacists have been dealing with extremely sensitive
patient-information for as long as the profession has been around, and
in B.C., there has never been a single complaint of that access being
abused.
PharmaNet makes that access even more restricted. With the new system,
every patient-record inquiry is permanently recorded in the system.
Your personal pharmacy records are available to you, through a request
to the College of Pharmacists of British Columbia. If you want to know
who has looked at your file, you can now easily find that out; all
pharmacists know this.
Also, as a result of the implementation of PharmaNet, the regulations
have changed such that the misuse of patient-records is now considered
professional misconduct, and if found guilty by the College, a
pharmacist may lose his or her license to practice. In fact, no other
health professional is subject to such extreme regulation and
limitation with respect to access to patient-records.
If, given all of these restrictions, you still feel that you want
tighter control of access to your personal files, you now have the
right to assign a "key word" to your own file. The use of the "key
word" is not for the pharmacist, as you state, but rather for the
patient. Once this is done, no pharmacist can look at your records
unless you give them that "key word" in the course of getting your
prescription filled.
Robert John Kucheran,
Executive Director,
BCPA,
Richmond, British Columbia, Canada.
------------------------------
From: Andrew_Hastings@transarc.com
Date: 12 Sep 1995 17:34:42 EDT
Subject: Re: Grocery Purchases and my Privacy
Phil Kingery noted his concerns with a scanned check cashing card
introduced by an Indianapolis-area supermarket. Giant Eagle
supermarkets (which has the largest market share in the Pittsburgh
area) has introduced a similar scanned check cashing card called the
"Giant Eagle Advantage."
To obtain a card, you fill out an application that requests your name,
address, telephone number, and SSN. The card can be used as a check
cashing card and video rental card at any participating Giant Eagle
(many of which are franchises).
In this week's advertising circular, Giant Eagle introduced a
requirement that you present the card in order to receive discounted
prices on any of the advertised specials. Without the card, you pay
full price.
Federal law prevents Giant Eagle from disclosing to third parties the
names of the videos you rent. No law prevents Giant Eagle from
disclosing information about your purchases.
I had not applied for the Giant Eagle Advantage card for obvious
reasons. I was dismayed to learn of Giant Eagle's tactics to encourage
use of the card. The sad thing is that I'm sure most customers won't
give it a second thought.
--
Andrew Hastings
------------------------------
From: "Jongsma, Ken" <kjongsma@p06.dasd.honeywell.com>
Date: 12 Sep 95 17:18:00 MDT
Subject: Re: Grocery Purchases and my Privacy
[Author raises privacy concerns regarding store electronic check card]
First, the store has always had this capability. They could have hired
someone to do nothing but record the name on the check and cross
correlate that with the transaction details. It has now become economic
for them to do so. If you value your transaction privacy, you can
always stop by an ATM and withdraw the cash you'll need to use at the
store. Many stores have ATMs on premise.
A local discount/grocery store did this some years back. (Those in the
Midwest may be familiar with the Meijer chain.) They were using a
flimsy plastic card with the name of the check cashier typed on the
card. It also had a proprietary number that linked the card to a paper
application file containing the bank and drivers license numbers. The
registers were programmed with card numbers that were no longer
acceptable. You didn't have to have one of these cards to cash a check,
but it avoided the hassle of showing a drivers license and waiting for
the clerk to record the number.
A few years ago, the chain converted to a machine readable card with a
twist. You could fill out a standard application and use the card just
as a check card or you could also give them your bank name and account
number and use the card as a debit card, good only at Meijer. Few if
any stores in town accepted debit cards at the time, so this was a
major change. For the first 6-12 months, the only debit card accepted
was the Meijer card. Then they opened things up to allow the use of any
local ATM card, negating the need for a Meijer unique card.
In the check card mode, it really wasn't much different than the old
card. Instead of having the clerk key your check card number into the
register, you swiped the card in the card reader. The information
requested was the same as before, the natural assumption being that the
data was now online and could be correlated with the transaction.
In the debit card mode, it worked just like an ATM card. The only
difference being that Meijer could if they chose to, associate a name
with an address and zipcode.
As soon as they started accepting local ATM cards, I gave them back
their proprietary card for the privacy concerns you cite. Since my name
is recorded on my ATM card, I suppose they could still do some
correlation if they wanted to, but I never worried about it that much
to deal just in cash
------------------------------
From: hrick@gate.net (Rick Harrison)
Date: 13 Sep 1995 09:52:28 -0400
Subject: Re: Grocery Purchases and my Privacy
Organization: Cybergate, Inc.
I do NOT believe, however, that they have the right to compile data
on "what" I buy.
I do not share your opinion. I feel that they _do_ have a right to
compile this data. They own the store, for heaven's sake. I once
managed a retail health food store with a very small clientele; I knew
which days of the week and month would see the onslaught of the major
bread-eaters and the largest vitamin purchasers, and I used this
information to keep the right amount of inventory in the store at the
right times. Did I violate a certain microbiotic customer's right to
privacy by knowing that she came in to buy seaweed every other
Thursday? Or did the information enable me to serve her better? If
the grocery store that tracks your purchases later sends you coupons
for items that you routinely buy, in order to encourage your continued
patronage of their store as opposed to ther stores in the area, have
you been harmed or helped?
--
Rick Harrison (hrick@gate.net)
P O Box 54-7014, Orlando FL 32854 USA
------------------------------
From: Jason Good <jason@minster.cs.york.ac.uk>
Date: 15 Sep 1995 10:27:04 GMT
Subject: Re: Grocery Purchases and my Privacy
Organization: Dept of Computer Science, University of York
In the UK, the two major gorcery chains (Tesco and Sainsbury) have
issued "loyalty" cards. These have no use for ID purposes, but are
used to accumulate discounts and for mailing promotional vouchers.
These are being used in connection with traditional supermarket
customer analysis techniques (cctv, product tracking etc) to monitor
buying patterns, see the effectiveness of particular campaigns, etc.
All purchases are itemized from barcodes, and presumably stored to
build the kind of profile Phil Kingery mentioned. A recent mailing
from Tesco said something to the effect 'if you have special dietary
needs, such as being a vegetarian, let us know by phoning this number
and we'll ensure you aren't sent inappropriate vouchers'.
So, the stores have my purchasing details, know what credit/debit
cards I use to pay with, and have my postal code. Thus they have at
least as accurate a profile of my lifestyle as any other institution.
I am sure that their major reason for harvesting this data is for
inventory planning and pricing, but I have no idea what other uses
this data may be put to.
Given the strong cashflow these stores have, I suspect it won't be
long before this card turns into a food charge card, and if the stores
are thinking along these lines they will also be in a position to sell
this data as credit reference material.
And most people seem to think these nice, kind stores are just trying
to give us discounts...
--
Jason Good
jason@minster.york.ac.uk http://dcpu1.cs.york.ac.uk:6666/jason/
HCI Group, Dept. of Computer Science, University of York, York, UK
------------------------------
From: Ellis Weinberger <ew3@soas.ac.uk>
Date: 15 Sep 1995 15:38:42 GMT
Subject: Re: Grocery Purchases and my Privacy
Organization: University of London Computer Centre
The answer is to pay cash.
------------------------------
From: Lane Lenard <llenard@monmouth.com>
Date: 12 Sep 95 17:22:56 -0500
Subject: Re: Privacy Guard
Albert S. Woodhull wrote: I received an ad for a 3 month
introductory membership in a service called Privacy Guard, operated
by a company called CUC International, a Delaware corporation with
ossices in Stamford CT.
It seemed like an interesting idea at the time, the company claims it
can get credit reports, medical records, and motor vehicle records so
you can determine whether there are errors in any of these.
When I actually got the initial packet from the company I began to
wonder[...]
I had some similar reservations re: Privacy Guard, although it does
provide a service to people who might not otherwise think about taking
these steps, or not know how to go about taking them. What struck me,
though, was that when I received my package of credit bureau info, it
came in a large envelope that said something like, "Here's the private
information you requested" in large print on the outside of the
envelope. It seemed to me that raising an obvious red flag like this
(as opposed to sending it in a plain brown envelope) was just asking
for trouble from some unscrupulous individual who might see the
envelope in a mailbox and be tempted to steal it.
It seems that marketing needs have gotten the best of privacy concerns
in this case.
------------------------------
From: daf1@cec.wustl.edu (Danyel A Fisher)
Date: 13 Sep 1995 21:47:00 -0500
Subject: Re: Privacy Guard
Organization: Washington University, St. Louis MO
Regarding that letter from Hampshire college, regarding a service a guy
was offered to "search down medical and official records to verify
there are no errors on them."
So, let me double check this: You _pay_them_ for the privelege of you
signing away your rights to privacy on your medical records, Social
Security records, credit reports, bank statements and whathaveyou.
In exchange, they tell you that your name is spelled right on each
form.
STOP! DO NOT FILL ANYTHING OUT.
It sounds like their membership is a genuine real thing service. They
will, in fact, check that your name is spelled right (or whathaveyou)
on each of these forms. They charge a fee to make it look like a
service. On the other hand, they seem to be simply collecting large
quantities of private data by asking consumers to sign away their right
of privacy.
Somehow, it seems like a scam. In fact, I can see _no_ merit
whatsoever to this service as described; I can see a lot of danger to
it. It is impressive that the "service" is so open about
themselves....
I guess the obvious warnings are that
- they send you the forms to fill out. What is to stop you from
filling them out yourself, requesting your own records, and getting
your own social security records, etc?
- why does their service have "terms"? This should be a one-time
check, from the way you described it. The auto-resubscribe seems like
nothing more than a way to drain a few extra bucks off their gullible
members.
And remember, folks.... privacy remains the one right you can
all-too-easily sign away....
--
Sometimes, you meet a person.| Danyel Fisher |To a pessimist, the world
I am one of those people. | daf1@cec.wustl.edu |is full of happy surprises
------------------------------
From: RSA Secure Team <rsasecure@rsa.com>
Date: 09 Sep 1995 00:27:53 GMT
Subject: RSA Crypto Software on Web for Download and Evaluation
Organization: RSA Data Security, Inc.
RSA Data Security, Inc. announces the availability of a free evaluation
version of its new file protection software, RSA Secure(tm) for
Windows. It can be downloaded from their World Wide Web site
(http://www.rsa.com) or retrieved via anonymous FTP to ftp.rsa.com
(/pub/crypto/eval/rsa_eval.exe). RSA Secure was named "Best Encryption
Product" in the June 1995 InfoSecurity News Readers Trust Awards.
Key features of RSA Secure include: (1) Full integration with the
Windows File Manager; (2) Automatic encryption and/or decryption via
the RSA AutoCrypt(tm) List; (3) Emergency Access(tm) to encrypted
files; (4) Multiple trustees for Emergency Access.
This version is designed for Windows 3.1 and Windows for Workgroups
3.1x. An evaluation version for Windows 95 is scheduled for release in
early 1996, and a version for the Macintosh is scheduled for release in
Q4'95. For further information, either visit the Web site or send
email to rsasecure@rsa.com.
------------------------------
From: rseoeg@site33.ping.at (Moss-Jusefowytsch OEG)
Date: 15 Sep 1995 22:47:00 +0100
Subject: AOL and the FBI
Apparently America Online monitors private e-mail and passes
information on to the FBI. This is a copy of
telecom15.383.1@eecs.nwu.edu, written by the moderator of
comp.dcom.telecom
Chris Mathews
The FBI made dozens of arrests and searched 120 homes and personal
computers on Wednesday as part of an investigation into child
pornography on America OnLine.
Management of America OnLine has, over a two year period, supplied the
FBI with the names and addresses of users 'suspected' of 'being
involved in' child pornography and/or arranging sex with children. The
raids on Wednesday marked the first time federal agents were called
upon by an online service to investigate the behavior of their
subscribers in private chat rooms.
Attorney General Janet Reno spoke in support of the actions of America
OnLine and FBI agents, noting, "We are not going to permit exciting new
technology to be misused to exploit and injure children."
The raids were conducted throughout the day Wednesday in 57 of the 94
FBI districts in the United States. They were mostly concentrated on
the east coast, however arrests and confiscation of computer equipment
took place all over the country in such diverse cities as Miami, New
York, Dallas and Trenton, NJ. Carlos Fernandez, an FBI spokesperson in
Washington, DC said that 'quite a few more arrests are expected in the
next several days' and that the Bureau would wait until those arrests
had been effected before discussing the case in detail.
Pam McGraw, a spokesperson for America OnLine, based in Viennna, VA
admitted that the company monitored email and private conversations
seeking out persons who use their network to transmit pornographic
material. She said they always provide the FBI with the names of users
suspected of involvement in child pornography.
Ms. McGraw also discussed an online 'neighborhood watch' program in
effect on AOL where users are encouraged to oberve each other's
activities and report on them to management of the online service.
Although child pornography certainly is not allowed in public areas of
AOL, according to Ms. McGraw it 'usually is transmitted in email
between users, or in private chat rooms'. She did not indicate how
AOL's interception of email for the purpose of examining it for
'pornography' or their monitoring of private conversations between
subscribers could be reconciled with various privacy laws, apparently
because it can't be.
FBI spokesperson Fernandez said the federal investigation of AOL users
showed that child pornographers are turning to online networks 'more
and more' to lure curious children. He said, "the utilization of online
services and bulletin board systems is rapidly becoming one of most
prevalent tech- niques for individuals to create and share pornogrpahic
pictures of children as well as to identify and recruit children into
sexually illicit relation- ships."
Raids and arrests of other AOL subscribers 'suspected of being involved
in child pornography' will continue over the next few days until all
the user-suspects have been located.
I don't know about you, but I'm going to purge all the AOL sofware from
my computer today. Child porn does not interest me in the least, but
having AOL scanning my mail and checking up on my in private
conversations with other users there is of great concern. It is hard
for me to imagine how any online service could violate the trust of
their users in this way, by getting into their email and personal
files, regardless of the intentions.
We have known for some time that AOL was 'cooperating' with federal
agents in their investigation of child pornography, but until the
massive raids and arrests commenced on Wednesday followed by AOL's
admission that the 'evidence' was found in email and private chat, we
did not know the extent to which AOL was abusing their subscribers in
the process of cooperating.
PAT
------------------------------
From: sales@sug.org (Charles Sumner)
Date: 12 Sep 1995 22:15:03 GMT
Subject: Computers and the Law Conference
Organization: Sun User Group
Contact: Charles Sumner Sun User Group (617) 232-0514
SUN USER GROUP CONFERENCE HELPS DEFINE CYBERCRIME
Speakers from the FBI and the Electronic Frontier Foundation
will be featured at the second annual "Computers & The Law"
Conference, November 12-15, Tampa, Florida.
This November 12 through 15, the Sun User Group will sponsor the second
annual "Computers & The Law" symposium in Tampa, Florida. As computers
and the Internet invade more and more corners of everyday life, the
once distinct areas of technology, security, legislation, and law
enforcement begin to collide -- often with disastrous results. In an
effort to help members of these professions deal with a rapidly
changing world, the Sun User Group founded the "Computers & The Law"
conference.
This year's conference is a unique forum in which members of these once
diverse fields can meet to share experiences and ideas, and address the
growing connections between their professions. Last year's symposium
was critically acclaimed and this year's, with featured speakers from
the FBI's Economic Espionage Unit and the Electronic Frontier
Foundation, is expected to be even more successful.
[... shortened by moderator ...]
To register, or for more information on the conference or the Sun User
Group, contact the Sun User Group via email at conference@sug.org, on
the World Wide Web Page at http://sug.org, or by calling 617/232-0514.
------------------------------
From: "Prof. L. P. Levine" <levine@blatz.cs.uwm.edu>
Date: 13 Sep 1995 08:01:58 -0500 (CDT)
Subject: Open Letter to Geoff Greiveldinger
Organization: University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee
Taken from RISKS-LIST: Risks-Forum Digest Tues 12 September 1995
Volume 17 : Issue 34 FORUM ON RISKS TO THE PUBLIC IN COMPUTERS AND
RELATED SYSTEMS (comp.risks) ACM Committee on Computers and Public
Policy, Peter G. Neumann, moderator
Date: 08 Sep 1995 22:11:13 -0700
From: Carl Ellison <cme@clark.net>
Subject: Open letter to Geoff Greiveldinger,
DoJ [key escrowed, export]
NIST (the National Institute of Standards and Technology) held a
two-day public meeting on 6-7 September, 1995 to discuss Software Key
Escrow as a possible means of achieving export of cryptography.
In the morning of 7 Sept, Goeff Greiveldinger of the Department of
Justice gave a description of the kinds of crimes which DoJ wants to
use wiretapping to solve. He closed this litany of lawbreaking with
the assertion that software manufacturers don't want to provide
products which allow such lawbreakers to keep their criminal evidence
hidden from law enforcement.
I'm sorry to disillusion you, Geoff, but I *do* want to make such
systems.
Would you have Ryder stop renting trucks because some terrorist decided
to fill one with explosives and kill many innocent children? Would you
have Americans stop making automobiles because bank robbers have been
known to use cars for getaways? Would you have all new buildings
constructed with FBI microphones in every wall because some criminals
meet in private rooms in order to plan crimes?
When an American company sweeps its conference room for bugs, finds
some and destroys them, it doesn't matter whether those bugs were
planted by industrial spies or the FBI. The company has a right to
eliminate them. When that company ties two such conference rooms
together by video-conference equipment and encrypts the line between
them using strong link encryption, it is performing the same defensive
operation in cyberspace. It is protecting itself from spies and it
doesn't matter that the wiretaps it frustrates might be illegal ones by
industrial spies or legal ones by the FBI. The right to attempt to
achieve privacy is a long-standing one in this country and not one to
allow to be lost.
When I design and build systems for privacy for my customers, I am
providing products for law-abiding, honest people. I am aware of
criminals, of course. Criminals are the threats against whom I protect
my customers. These criminals are usually not in the government but
that doesn't mean that I believe I should offer my honest customers up
for a strip-search in cyberspace. The law enforcement agencies of this
free country have no right to expect blanket access to the ciphertext
of citizens. It will take legislation to get that right and I will do
everything in my power to keep such legislation from passing. Barring
such legislation, I will make sure that honest American citizens have
cryptography with which to attempt to maintain their privacy, even from
the government. We have the right to attempt to keep a secret from
government agencies and continuous demonstration of that right is an
important part of this free country.
On the other hand, I am sympathetic to law-enforcement officers. I
have several friends in that business. I have asked my friends and
acquaintances who do surveillance (2 IRS agents investigating organized
crime for tax evasion; 2 undercover cops in Boston's highest drug
neighborhood; 1 DEA agent in the midwest) if they ever encounter
encrypted communications or files. They don't. Neither does anyone in
their offices. Of course, even if they did it would remain so
important to preserve our right to attempt to keep secrets from the
government that their frustration would just have to be accepted. The
fact that this isn't a real problem makes my decision that much
easier. I am left with no moral qualms at all.
In summary, criminals are so few that I will not design for them. I
will not treat my vast majority of honest users as if they were
criminals just because some criminal might someday use my product and
frustrate you.
ObRisk: We run the risk of losing our fundamental right to attempt to
keep a secret from the government -- a practice we need to preserve in
order to protect ourselves from criminals in cyberspace. There are
powerful forces in the US government attempting to cajole us into
giving up that right.
[see http://www.clark.net/pub/cme/html/nist-ske.html for more on this
subject]
------------------------------
From: "Prof. L. P. Levine" <levine@blatz.cs.uwm.edu>
Date: 11 Aug 1995 09:39:43 -0500 (CDT)
Subject: Info on CPD [unchanged since 08/01/95]
Organization: University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee
The Computer Privacy Digest is a forum for discussion on the effect of
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This digest is a forum with information contributed via Internet
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A library of back issues is available on ftp.cs.uwm.edu [129.89.9.18].
Login as "ftp" with password identifying yourid@yoursite. The archives
are in the directory "pub/comp-privacy".
People with gopher capability can most easily access the library at
gopher.cs.uwm.edu.
Mosaic users will find it at gopher://gopher.cs.uwm.edu.
---------------------------------+-----------------------------------------
Leonard P. Levine | Moderator of: Computer Privacy Digest
Professor of Computer Science | and comp.society.privacy
University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee | Post: comp-privacy@uwm.edu
Box 784, Milwaukee WI 53201 | Information: comp-privacy-request@uwm.edu
| Gopher: gopher.cs.uwm.edu
levine@cs.uwm.edu | Mosaic: gopher://gopher.cs.uwm.edu
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End of Computer Privacy Digest V7 #022
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