Date:       Fri, 29 Sep 95 13:32:30 EST
Errors-To:  Comp-privacy Error Handler <owner-comp-privacy@uwm.edu>
From:       Computer Privacy Digest Moderator  <comp-privacy@uwm.edu>
To:         Comp-privacy@uwm.edu
Subject:    Computer Privacy Digest V7#027

Computer Privacy Digest Fri, 29 Sep 95              Volume 7 : Issue: 027

Today's Topics:			       Moderator: Leonard P. Levine

                     Re: Knowing Where you Browse?
                     Re: Knowing Where you Browse?
                        Snooping via Web Servers
                 Re: Local Surveillance and Web Servers
                  Re: Grocery Purchases and my Privacy
                  Re: Grocery Purchases and my Privacy
         Re: White House Plans to Consolidate fed Data Centers
                       Re: Caller ID Experiences
                       Re: Caller ID Experiences
                Re: Signature Data Collection at Kinkos
                   New Home Page for Computer Ethics
                  Re: Junk Faxes & e-mail are Illegal
                     Science and Engineering Ethics
                 Info on CPD [unchanged since 08/01/95]

----------------------------------------------------------------------

From: Jeff Gruszynski <jeffg@hptmvd2.sc.hp.com>
Date: 24 Sep 1995 18:14:47 -0700
Subject: Re: Knowing Where you Browse?

    Your note is the first I have heard about this.  I am aware that my
    browser does keep a history list, but know only that the remote
    site gets a report from the system about my site, not my personal
    account.

I don't believe any browser is capable of dumping a *complete history*
to remote servers.  Many browsers do pass a "Referer" field which
gives, under certain conditions, the *one* preceding URL if that
preceding URL has *a link to* (by an HREF, etc) the requested page on
the current server.

This means that if you go to a page on server A, and that server has a
link to my server B, then server B will be passed the URL of the page
on server A when you follow that link, which I can log.  This goes back
only one server page deep.

The exceptions to this are:  if you are sitting on a page on server A,
and *type in* the URL on server B, the referer field generally should
not contain the URL on A.  Similarly, if you hotlist/bookmark a link,
the referer won't be passed.  However, if you create a local
"file://..."  home page and create an HTML link to server B, the
"file://..."  will be passed.

The one notable exception to the exception is Netscape 1.0 browsers
(and possibly earlier versions) which pass *every URL*, where ever the
request comes from.  This is a bug and an excellent reason to make sure
you're using 1.1 or later if you're concerned about this.

Early versions also passed the "From" field (i.e. the email address you
enter in the preferences.)  This doesn't appear to be passed in 1.1.

Most servers didn't even log referer until the NCSA 1.4, Apache and
Netscape servers came out.

--
=============================================================================
Jeff Gruszynski                          Any Standard Disclaimers Apply
Test & Measurement Webmaster
Hewlett-Packard Company
=============================================================================
jeffg@ptp.hp.com                         http://www.tmo.hp.com/
=============================================================================


------------------------------

From: shields@tembel.org (Michael Shields)
Date: 27 Sep 1995 04:00:42 -0000
Subject: Re: Knowing Where you Browse?
Organization: Tembel's Hedonic Commune

    M. Hedlund <hedlund@best.com> wrote (about Netscape cookies): If
    you are concerned about this issue, take a look at the definition
    of realm -- basically, they try to prevent you from making the
    realm anything other than the whole or a part of your own domain.
    For example, I would be able to issue cookies for any request to
    *.best.com, but not for any request to *.com.

Netscape, according to that page, allows anything with at least two
periods.  Thus, while you couldn't specify *.com, you could specify
*.co.uk.  Without knowledge of the internal structure of each top-level
domain, the browser cannot flag this.

While cookies are convenient for CGIs that need to maintain state, the
information can already be encoded into the URL, which is a universally
supported technique.  The only new functionality cookies provide is the
ability to create detailed clicktrails without being prominent.

-- 
Shields.


------------------------------

From: rj.mills@pti-us.com (Dick Mills)
Date: 27 Sep 1995 07:48:31 -0400
Subject: Snooping via Web Servers

There's been a number of recent CPD articles about web browsers being
used to snoop on the client.

Does anyone know about the next wave of Java enabled browsers?  It
sounds to me like the Java programs in pages we download might be able
to do unlimited snooping or damage on your computer and your network.

The Java language includes protection from the java program getting
contaminated or picking up a virus, but I don't see what it can do
about a deliberately malicious Java program.

This particular risk has been discussed on the net for some years,
particularly with respect to Postscript, MS Word macros, or any other
interpreted language.

Java just seems to increase the degree of risk because of the
likelihood of having a Java interpreter on the client which will
execute without the user noticing anything; namely the web browser
itself.  It could wisk away a copy of my bookmark file in the blink of
an eye and I'd never notice.  Word, on the other hand, takes forever to
load on my system so I would surely notice if something tried to lanuch
it surreptitiously.

--
Dick Mills                               +1(518)395-5154
            http://www.albany.net/~dmills 


------------------------------

From: geoff@ficus.cs.ucla.edu (Geoff Kuenning)
Date: 26 Sep 1995 21:21:32 GMT
Subject: Re: Local Surveillance and Web Servers
Organization: Ficus Research Project, UCLA Computer Science Department

    Jesse Mundis writes: This brings up an interesting question.  If we
    grant that one has the right to video tape passer-bys on the
    street, how far does that right extend?

This issue is well-established in law, in particular the laws regarding
candid photography.  If you subscribe to Popular Photography or a
similar magazine for a few years, you'll probably see an article on the
subject.

To oversimplify a memory from when I read about this 20 years ago, you
have a near-absolute right to capture images, but you are restricted in
what you do with them, in particular with respect to display or
publication.  Also, the rights of the photographed person vary
depending on whether they are a "public figure" or not.  Basically, if
your photograph isn't embarrassing, it's probably OK to publish it, but
you're better off to get a release from the subject.  If the person
isn't recognizable in the photograph, it's usually OK to publish.  If
the person is a public figure, it's usually OK even if it's
embarrassing (this is why the tabloids can get away with all those
shots of Princess Di).

    Now, what if our B.S.  is in his own house, across the street from
    you, with his window open.  Do you have the right to tape then?

My understanding is that this falls under the "Peeping Tom" laws.  You
not only can't tape, you can't legally even look.

    What is all this leading to?  Following the above reasoning, what
    about encryption on email?  Obviously the person doing the
    encryption wants privacy, but is encrypting like pulling the
    blinds, or like having your window face in a direction such that
    only people who climb a mountain and use a telescope can see you
    scratching your butt?

Pulling the blinds and having a window facing a mountain both create a
reasonable expectation of privacy.  If you climb the mountain expressly
to see the B.S., you're invading privacy.  If you climb the mountain to
look at the view, bring a telescope for birdwatching, and happen to see
the B.S., that's a different matter.  (Yes, I realize that this brings
up the issue of intent.  I'm pretty sure the law makes a distinction.)

    If your encrypted message (signal) passes through my machine (my
    space) en route to somewhere else, and I am nosey and have some
    large computing resources to break your encryption, am I snooping
    (pushing aside the blind) or just looking through an awkwardly
    positioned (encrypted) yet still open, window with my telescope?

You are clearly pushing aside the blinds.  This is not random looking
through a telescope, it is a deliberate exertion of effort designed to
circumvent another person's attempt to ensure privacy.

-- 
Geoff Kuenning	g.kuenning@ieee.org	geoff@ITcorp.com
http://www.cs.ucla.edu/ficus-members/geoff/


------------------------------

From: an274807@anon.penet.fi (Fig)
Date: 27 Sep 1995 01:15:14 -0800
Subject: Re: Grocery Purchases and my Privacy
Organization: Me?

    <JEPSTEIN@SMTPGATE.cordant.com> wrote: In at least some
    communities, there's an easy way you can subvert the supermarket's
    information gathering while doing a good deed.  Some churches,
    synagogues, schools, and other non-profit organizations sell
    "scrip."  It works at the grocery store like cash, and no ID is
    required to use it.  The charitable organization buys it at a 5%
    discount, and sells it at face price.  So you're giving 5% of your
    grocery bill to your favorite charity, and the store isn't
    collecting demographic information since they don't know who you
    are.

Is the 'script' serialized (it would make sense to help prevent fraud
and to do accounting)?  ...

If so, is your church gathering demographics on you?  Or maybe the
store gives the church an extra 2% if they share the data.

There are churches I trust less than the government, but not
many.

paranoid? whateverfor?

-- 
  And other grandfolks could be heard arguing the perennial question
  of whether the United States still lingered in a prefascist twilight,
  or whether that darkness had fallen long stupefied years ago, and
  the light they thought they saw was coming only from millions of
  Tubes all showing the same bright-colored shadows.
      Vineland, p. 371, Thomas Pynchon


------------------------------

From: mjh9@lehigh.edu
Date: 28 Sep 1995 13:19:10 -0400
Subject: Re: Grocery Purchases and my Privacy

    Mary Jo Bruce writes: My bank, a small one, just installed the
    phone in system, and I used it a few times.  Last night I pushed
    the wrong button, and I was led into a "check verification" area,
    where anybody can call to see if my check is good.  What I want to
    know is this:  do all/most phone in systems have this check
    verification feature?

My bank does have a telephone system, however, in order for me to
access any information about my account, I must enter my personally
choosen PIN.  While I can find out my balance, and what checks have
cleared, no one else can see if my check is good, at least as far as I
know.

Mario Hendricks

      o o o o o o o ...    ____________________  __                     __
    o      _____           ||      Mario      |  || mjh9@Lehigh.edu     ||
  .][__n_n_|DD[  ====___   ||    Hendricks    |  ||   Lehigh University ||
 >(________|  |_[__#97__]  ||_________________|  ||_____________________||
 _/oo OOO   oo  ooo   ooo   'o^o           o^o`  'o^o^o             o^o^o`
 --------------------------------------------------------------------------
+ + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +


------------------------------

From: WELKER@a1.vsdec.nl.nuwc.navy.mil
Date: 27 Sep 1995 09:24:28 -0400 (EDT)
Subject: Re: White House Plans to Consolidate fed Data Centers

    It further concerns me that the original NPR report on
    consolidation was labelled "Official Government Use - Not for
    Public Release" on every page when it was issued in February 1995.
    (This document is currently accessible from a government Internet
    server). Why should such planning be kept secret from the public?

Because if the public heard every wacky idea that comes up in the
course of formulating policies and plans, people would go off
half-cocked and scream about things that would never have made it into
the results anyway.  The civil service rumor mills are quite bad enough
without subjecting every meeting to direct public scrutiny (not that
there aren't a few that would benefit from same).

As for consolidation of data centers, I suspect that at least a 20
percent or more cost savings in data center operations (not the federal
budget, mind you) is not unreasonable, by eliminating the redundant
overheads of the various data centers, which pay for themselves by
"taxing" their end users.  Example:

(assume 5% standard overhead)

                Gross Funding   Operations Cost
Data Center 1            $100                $5
Data Center 2             100                 5
Data Center 3             100                 5

Combine these into one data center with overhead of $7.50.  You save
$7.50, which is 50% of your former operations cost, because you no
longer have three different accounting, purchasing, security,
personnel, and administrative departments, which you only needed
because these activities were being conducted as three distinct
agencies.  Beats the heck out of financing them with your
grandchildren's taxes.


------------------------------

From: Lynne Gregg <lynne.gregg@attws.com>
Date: 26 Sep 95 15:21:00 PDT
Subject: Re: Caller ID Experiences

Responding to Beth Givens (prc@acusd.edu) questions on Caller ID in the
U.S.

Caller ID penetration among residential consumers varies from 6 to over
10% throughout the U.S.   Penetration among residential subs in Canada
is approx. 15% and exceeds that figure in some Euro countries.
Penetration rates among small businesses in the U.S. range from 25 to
40% nationally.

Consumers are generally notified by telcos of service and blocking
options by way of a bill stuffer or bill letter.   These methods are
generally accepted and in some cases required  (by some states and the
impending FCC Order).

The blocking options ordered by the FCC (*67 to block on a per call
basis; *82 to unblock on a per call basis when a Line Block is in
effect) are generally thought to be acceptable.   Many telephone
companies offer Per Line Blocking for those consumers who wish to block
display of their numbers on a permanent basis (especially useful to the
consumer who PAYS for an unlisted number or PAYS for inbound calls when
the phone in question is a cellular one).

Sure,  Caller ID may  been used by marketers and other entities to
gather phone numbers.    However,  most folks don't realize that many
marketing companies have been doing this for years with ANI.  ANI is
always present on calls to 800 numbers and CTI systems can read and
process ANI (i.e., your phone number) at the time you complete your
call.    The advantage to the consumer with Caller ID is that they can
control the display of their Calling Party Number.  They cannot do this
with  ANI.  It's always a part of the call and it can't be blocked.

Yes, Caller ID is  effective at thwarting harassing callers.
Consumers who buy Caller ID indicate that they want to know WHO'S
CALLING - especially  when they're wrapped up with dinner or other
activities and  would naturally prefer to defer phone calls.

The  "horror" story on Caller ID is that with today's technological
capabilities, some consumers are deprived of the a basic right to know
WHO'S CALLING them.  For example, when someone rings my doorbell, I can
look through the window to see who's there and choose to answer or
not.  Caller ID offers  consumers  convenience and privacy (as in the
ability to protect theirs from invasion by the caller).

With blocking options generally available (and clearly specified in the
FCC Order) consumers with unpublished numbers can prevent their numbers
from being disclosed.  In almost every state, Per Line Blocking is
readily available  (free) to shelters and similar agencies.

I have seen Caller ID marketing materials from most RBOC and several
independent telcos.  I do not  see anything that is intentionally
misleading or manipulative in the materials I've seen.    However,
there are a few things that consumers who buy Caller ID should know.
Caller ID is not always displayed.  And, depending on who calls you and
how many calls you receive, you  may not even see a majority of Caller
ID numbers appear on the equipment.  Service satisfaction is generally
tied to who calls you and how often you receive calls.      The FCC
Order on Calling Number Services (effective 12/95) also orders
telephone companies to freely exchange Calling Party Number, so
frequency of number display should also improve.     Also it should be
noted that most PBX's (today) don't send  true Calling Party Number on
outbound calls (usually generating  a non-dialable trunk or some
unintelligible number on the Caller ID display).

Caller ID, by the way, is particularly beneficial to consumers of
cellular service here in the U.S.  Since cellular users incur charges
for inbound calls, Caller ID enables them to preview the Calling Party
Number and either accept the call (and pay)  or let it roll to
VoiceMail (and not incur a charge).   AT&T Wireless Services offers
Caller ID to its digital service subscribers in some markets and is
expanding service coverage throughout the U.S.

Regards,
Lynne
 - - - -
Lynne Gregg
Product Manager, Personal Services
AT&T Wireless Services, Inc.
Headquarters
5000 Carillon Point, Kirkland WA  98033
email:  lynne.gregg@attws.com


------------------------------

From: Jay Harrell <jay@mindspring.com>
Date: 27 Sep 1995 22:00:26 GMT
Subject: Re: Caller ID Experiences
Organization: Riverside Consulting Group

    Privacy Rights Clearinghouse <prc@pwa.acusd.edu> wrote: To help us
    prepare this publication, we would like to hear from people in
    states *with* caller ID (currently 48, we're told)

I live in Atlanta GA.  We've had caller ID for several years now and
Caller ID with names for a few years less.  I've been a subscriber to
caller ID for a long time.  I found the number-only caller ID next to
useless because I don't have a good memory for numbers, but I love the
caller ID with name.  Just as most people would not answer the door
without looking to see who is knocking, I seldom answer the phone
unless I know who is calling.  I almost never answer "blocked" calls.
The only missing link is long distance calls which only show "out of
area" - and a large percentage of telemarketing calls are long
distance.  My opinion regarding caller ID is this: the privacy argument
misses the point.  The rights in question are those of the person
receiving the call.  Someone initiating a call has no right to and
should not have an expectation of anonymity.  Phone calls have been
anonymous for so long simply because the technology wasn't there to
make them otherwise.  (And we've had many problems as a result. )
That's my opinion, and I respect others whose opinions differ.  With
all that said- my answers to the questions which were posed.

    - Is Caller ID widely used in your state? Or has it been a
    marketplace flop?

I don't know.

    - About what percent of phone customers subscribe to it? Are these
    primarily businesses -- or residential customers?

It is marketed at residential customers.  I don't know of any
businesses using it.

    - Have consumers been adequately notified of their blocking
    options?

_NO_   (I'm not sure that we even have per-call blocking.  I know we
had per-line blocking.)

    - Have the blocking options available in your state been effective
    in allowing consumers to control the dissemination of their phone
    numbers?

Probably not.

    - Has Caller ID been used by marketers and other entities to gather
    phone numbers?

Not that I have noticed.  They have better ways to get your phone
number than waiting for you to call them.

    - Has it been effective at thwarting harassing callers, or is that
    argument over-sold?

Yes, it is _very_ effective for this use.

    - Do you have any "horror" stories to relate about Caller ID being
    used to invade privacy? For example, are there documented cases of
    it being used by stalkers and other types of harassers to learn the
    unpublished numbers of their victims?

No personal horror stories.  I've had a few people, who must have been
using caller ID, call me at home when they should have called my "work"
number.  I often use my home line to make outgoing work related calls.

    - Have domestic violence shelters and various "help" hotlines (such
    as AIDS and suicide prevention hotlines) noticed a "chilling
    effect" on the uses made of their services because of Caller ID?

I do not know.

    - Have your phone company's efforts at marketing Caller ID been
    above-board, or have they been misleading and manipulative?

Misleading only in that they don't mention that you are left in the
dark with long distance callers.

    - Has the introduction of Caller ID resulted in anything which was
    unexpected and which surprised you -- either good or bad?

I no longer always answer the phone everytime it rings.  Basically, I
control my phone instead of it controlling me.  I don't talk to nearly
as many telemarketers as I used to.  Oh yes, and because my unit stores
the last 100 callers, when I need to return a call, I don't look up the
number in my address book, I use the caller ID  instead.

--
Jay Harrell
Jay@Mindspring.com


------------------------------

From: "Shauna Baldwin Associates" <Shauna.Baldwin@mixcom.com>
Date: 27 Sep 1995 22:25:47 -0500 (CDT)
Subject: Re: Signature Data Collection at Kinkos

At my local Kinkos, and I am told, at every Kinko's location since
around mid-August or early September 1995, there is a new device by the
cash register. It is a signature verification data collection device.
When you have an account, as many businesses do, and charge your
purchases, you are now required to sign on the signature verification
device. The clerks are not trained to inform customers using it for the
first time that this is a new system and it is being used to
authenticate their signature. Instead, it is presented as a
convenience, a support on which to rest the invoice as you sign! As a
result, I felt absolutely trapped into their digital data collection.
They had, in effect, scanned my signature, without my permission. To
the credit of the local manager, my complaint (loud, I may add) led to
a simple workaround. I am now singled out for special service:  the
staff are trained to mark all my invoices "Delivery" so I don't have to
use the darn thing.

But my questions are:

Is there a law against this? (I live in Wisconsin.)

Is signature authentication technology proven as accurate?

What does it prove if the first signature collected is by an imposter
and all subsequent signatures are by the same imposter posing as a
company employee?


------------------------------

From: Centre for Computing and Social Responsibility <ccsr@dmu.ac.uk>
Date: 28 Sep 1995 15:39:57 +0100 (BST)
Subject: New Home Page for Computer Ethics

Launch of the new CCSR Home Page
 --------------------------------

As Director of the Centre for Computing and Social Responsibility, I am
pleased to announce the launch of CCSR's new Home Page at:

		   http://www.cms.dmu.ac.uk/CCSR

Our aim is to establish this as a major reference site for both
academics and practitioners concerned with the sensitive application of
the information technologies. New information and new links to other
sites will be added regularly, these being highlighted for ease of
use.  We will email contacts of any major additions. If you do not wish
to remain on this mailing list or you know of others who would like to
be included please let us know.

We are in the process of building a multilingual bibliography for
computer ethics which will be made available in the future. If you have
any items that you would like to include in this bibliography please
email the details. Such contributions will be acknowledged.

If you know of other relevant home pages that would be worth linking to
please let us have the details.

In conjunction with the Research Center on Computing & Society at
Southern Connecticut State University, we are establishing a global
consortium of centres to promote the work of computer ethics on an
international basis.  If you are interested in being involved in this
work please contact us.

I hope you enjoy visiting our Home Page and please let us have your
suggestions as to how we can make it even better!

Simon Rogerson


------------------------------

From: "Dennis G. Rears" <drears@Pica.Army.Mil>
Date: 28 Sep 95 11:06:00 EDT
Subject: Re: Junk Faxes & e-mail are Illegal

    prvtctzn@aol.com (Prvt Ctzn) writes: Unsolicited advertisements
    that are sent to you by e-mail, or to your fax machine are illegal,
    ... and you can sue the sender for $500 in your states small claims
    court pursuant to 47 USC 227 (b)(1)(C).  [aka the TCPA]

I'm assuming you are complaining about email that aol sent to your aol
account.  If so two suggestions: get a life and get a clue!  If you
don't want aol to send you email;  Get off their system.  Your analogy
about a computer-modem-printer system being a fax system is false.  It
fails because the printing requires operator intervention, that is the
user must specifically toggle the printer on.  If you do sue I hope
that in addition to tossing your case out of court the judge fines you
for a frivilous court action.

    Unsolicited advertisements that are sent to you by e-mail, or to
    your fax machine are illegal,

unsolicited email advertisements are not illegal.  

--
dennis


------------------------------

From: Centre for Computing and Social Responsibility <ccsr@dmu.ac.uk>
Date: 28 Sep 1995 15:48:57 +0100 (BST)
Subject: Science and Engineering Ethics

Introducing a new quarterly journal:

SCIENCE AND ENGINEERING ETHICS

Editors: 
Stephanie J. Bird, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, USA
Raymond E. Spier, University of Surrey, UK 

Published quarterly by Opragen Publications, PO Box 54, Guildford, GU1
2YF, UK

Science and Engineering Ethics is a multi-disciplinary quarterly
journal launched in January 1995 which is dedicated to exploring
ethical issues of direct concern to scientists and engineers covering
professional education, research and practice as well as the effects of
innovations on the wider society. An international editorial board has
been appointed which represents a broad range of expertise. The journal
will publish original research papers, reviews, comment pieces,
letters, editorials, book reviews and conference reports. It will also
publish special issues devoted to single topics of importance; these
include Trustworthy Research (in 1995), Computer Ethics (in 1996) and
Peer Review (in 1997).

In this new journal both science and engineering are defined broadly
and include all aspects of human endeavour that seek to increase the
range and quality of our knowledge and the application of this
knowledge to the generation of goods and services that benefit us as
individuals and as members of societies.

Although the focus of this publication is primarily directed towards
practitioners of science and engineering,  contributions from a broad
range of disciplines will be included.  The journal presents an
opportunity for the discussion of ethical values and professional
standards as well as exploring the expectations and concerns of
professionals in science. In addition, Science and  Engineering Ethics
will provide material which will be useful for the education and
training of scientists and engineers in the ethical issues that they
will encounter in their workplaces - a matter receiving increasing
attention.

The journal will also provide a forum for the exchange of views on the
many issues that are presented to society by innovations in science and
engineering. These include new products that have arisen from genetic
engineering, informatics, nucleonics, robotics and our abilities to
manipulate the fertilization process. Other concerns emerge from our
use of animals in research, our approach to healthcare, the
persuasiveness of the media, the sustainability of a high quality
environment and the way in which we build and use our towns and
cities.

Science and Engineering Ethics welcomes manuscripts from those who wish
to make contributions to progress in this field. Papers containing
original research will be double-blind refereed.

Announcements of meetings and networks relevant to the subject matter
are welcomed and will be published in each issue as a service to
readers.  Information should be sent to Opragen Publications at the
address below.

Notes for authors, subscription information and review copies of the
journal can be obtained from the publishers, Opragen Publications, P.O.
Box 54, Guildford, Surrey GU1 2YF,  United Kingdom, Tel/Fax +44 (0)1483
560074.

Manuscripts can be submitted to one of the editors as follows:

Professor Raymond Spier, School of Biological Sciences, University of Surrey, 
Guildford GU2 5XH, United Kingdom,       Tel/fax +44 1483 259 265
E-Mail:  r.spier@surrey.ac.uk

Dr. Stephanie J. Bird, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Rm. 12-187, 
77 Massachusetts  Ave.,  Cambridge, MA 02139, USA
Tel (617) 253 8024, Fax (617) 253 1986.


------------------------------

From: "Prof. L. P. Levine" <levine@blatz.cs.uwm.edu>
Date: 11 Aug 1995 09:39:43 -0500 (CDT)
Subject: Info on CPD [unchanged since 08/01/95]
Organization: University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee

The Computer Privacy Digest is a forum for discussion on the effect of
technology on privacy or vice versa.  The digest is moderated and
gatewayed into the USENET newsgroup comp.society.privacy (Moderated).
Submissions should be sent to comp-privacy@uwm.edu and administrative
requests to comp-privacy-request@uwm.edu.  

This digest is a forum with information contributed via Internet
eMail.  Those who understand the technology also understand the ease of
forgery in this very free medium.  Statements, therefore, should be
taken with a grain of salt and it should be clear that the actual
contributor might not be the person whose email address is posted at
the top.  Any user who openly wishes to post anonymously should inform
the moderator at the beginning of the posting.  He will comply.

If you read this from the comp.society.privacy newsgroup and wish to
contribute a message, you should simply post your contribution.  As a
moderated newsgroup, attempts to post to the group are normally turned
into eMail to the submission address below.

On the other hand, if you read the digest eMailed to you, you generally
need only use the Reply feature of your mailer to contribute.  If you
do so, it is best to modify the "Subject:" line of your mailing.

Contributions to CPD should be submitted, with appropriate, substantive
SUBJECT: line, otherwise they may be ignored.  They must be relevant,
sound, in good taste, objective, cogent, coherent, concise, and
nonrepetitious.  Diversity is welcome, but not personal attacks.  Do
not include entire previous messages in responses to them.  Include
your name & legitimate Internet FROM: address, especially from
 .UUCP and .BITNET folks.  Anonymized mail is not accepted.  All
contributions considered as personal comments; usual disclaimers
apply.  All reuses of CPD material should respect stated copyright
notices, and should cite the sources explicitly; as a courtesy;
publications using CPD material should obtain permission from the
contributors.  

Contributions generally are acknowledged within 24 hours of
submission.  If selected, they are printed within two or three days.
The moderator reserves the right to delete extraneous quoted material.
He may change the SUBJECT: line of an article in order to make it
easier for the reader to follow a discussion.  He will not, however,
alter or edit or append to the text except for purely technical
reasons.

A library of back issues is available on ftp.cs.uwm.edu [129.89.9.18].
Login as "ftp" with password identifying yourid@yoursite.  The archives
are in the directory "pub/comp-privacy".

People with gopher capability can most easily access the library at
gopher.cs.uwm.edu.

Mosaic users will find it at gopher://gopher.cs.uwm.edu.

 ---------------------------------+-----------------------------------------
Leonard P. Levine                 | Moderator of:     Computer Privacy Digest
Professor of Computer Science     |                  and comp.society.privacy
University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee | Post:                comp-privacy@uwm.edu
Box 784, Milwaukee WI 53201       | Information: comp-privacy-request@uwm.edu
                                  | Gopher:                 gopher.cs.uwm.edu 
levine@cs.uwm.edu                 | Mosaic:        gopher://gopher.cs.uwm.edu
 ---------------------------------+-----------------------------------------


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End of Computer Privacy Digest V7 #027
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