Date: Sun, 05 Nov 95 08:19:34 EST
Errors-To: Comp-privacy Error Handler <owner-comp-privacy@uwm.edu>
From: Computer Privacy Digest Moderator <comp-privacy@uwm.edu>
To: Comp-privacy@uwm.edu
Subject: Computer Privacy Digest V7#038
Computer Privacy Digest Sun, 05 Nov 95 Volume 7 : Issue: 038
Today's Topics: Moderator: Leonard P. Levine
Who reads your email?
FBI on wiretap capacity
Uncolicited email Advertising
Re: Copying Driver's Licenses
Re: Copying Driver's Licenses
Re: The Information Rights Act of 1996
Phone Number Privacy
Re: Telephone Odds and Ends
Deirdre Mulligan's defense of Bennett Medical Records Bill
FBI Wiretap Demand is Massive
Info on CPD [unchanged since 08/18/95]
----------------------------------------------------------------------
From: "anonymous" <levine@blatz.cs.uwm.edu>
Date: 02 Nov 1995 08:46:56 -0400 (EDT)
Subject: Who reads your email?
[moderator: The author requested anonymous posting, this is posted
from my mailbox.]
I have little doubt that somewhere in the NSA, or elsewhere in the
US gov't, there's a quiet little office with a nice big budget,
unobtrusively vacuuming up email and news postings and applying
AI-based analysis to it. All for national security, dont'cha
know.
My personal understanding is that NSA is charged with gathering signals
intelligence throughout the world, including and signals which cross
the borders of the United States. This means that anything you
transmit that exits the U.S. is fair game, so usenet posts would
obviously qualify. Whether or not your personal email is subject to
surveillance by this mechanism would depend on who you sent it to and
whether the intervening network (for whatever reason) routed it across
an international boundary (I assume this would include satellites in
geosync orbit even for "domestic" traffic). I personally do not know
this to be true, but it is consistent with what I've read in public
sources. This is not a sinister mechanism, it is often the only
mechanism for keeping track of what foriegn governments are
doing/saying.
I was very surprised a couple of weeks ago to hear press reports of
this surveillance being applied to a Japanese trade delegation being
broadcast as if the information were news! My activity was recently
briefed on industrial and financial espionage as part of our routine
training -- you can obtain pamphlets on the subject from your local
FBI office, but suffice it to say that NSA's activities are mild in
comparison with those of foreign countries. I'm afraid I didn't have
the opportunity to ask the agents giving the brief how they were able
to reconcile industrial espionage concerns with DoJ's desire to set
aside phone lines for surveillance and various agencies' opposition to
commercial crypto -- sorry.
------------------------------
From: gmcgath@condes.MV.COM (Gary McGath)
Date: 04 Nov 1995 19:08:48 GMT
Subject: FBI on wiretap capacity
Organization: Conceptual Design
A Washington Post article published in my local paper regarding the FBI
wiretap proposal included the following:
James Kallstrom, assistant FBI director in charge of the New York
field division, argues that the proposal would in fact reduce the
FBI's surveillance authority.
"Today, we have 100 percent capacity," he said, referring to older,
pre-digital technology. "We could tap all the phones in the United
States." Under the plan, the FBI's surveillance ability would
shrink to a maximum of 1 percent of simultaneous telephone calls
from any one telephone switch, he said.
Under the FBI plan, Kallstrom said, a typical central switching
office in New York that serves 50,000 telephone lines has a
capacity to carry only 5,000 calls simultaneously. It is the latter
number, not the former, he said, on which the FBI bases its
calculations. So the highest level of simultaneous surveilance in
that area, he said, would be 50 lines.
It's a worthwhile exercise, one that could have gone into "How to Lie
with Statistics," to dissect Kallstrom's falsehoods.
First, his claim that the FBI has 100% wiretapping capacity, sounds
highly dubious. That would imply that the FBI has a stockpile of
wiretapping equipment which is millions of times as much as it needs to
carry out the current level of wiretapping, which the Post article
cited as less than 900 a year. If it's true, it's an outrage; if it's
false, Kallstrom has made an outrageous lie. The capacity which the FBI
has requested suggests that it wants to massively increase the amount
of wiretapping it does.
Second, Kallstrom equivocates on simultaneous calls and maximum
simultaneous calling capacity. Switching systems are normally used at
less than capacity. If, during an off-peak hour, the hypothetical New
York system were carrying only 500 calls, the FBI would still be able
to tap 50 calls.
If we assume that the average tap is 5 minutes long, then the FBI would
be able to tap 14,400 calls in one day at just that one switching
system. Last year, all federal, state, and local agencies made less
than 900 wiretaps (leaving mountains of equipment idle, if Kallstrom is
telling the truth). We must wonder what the FBI is planning to do with
all of this surveillance capacity.
--
Gary McGath
gmcgath@condes.mv.com
http://www.mv.com/users/gmcgath
------------------------------
From: clouds@rainbow.rmii.com (Philip Duclos)
Date: 02 Nov 1995 07:57:19 -0700
Subject: Uncolicited email Advertising
Organization: Rocky Mountain Internet, Inc
Yesterday I received the first piece of unsolicited email addressed to
me. It was an advertisement for a Web site. I have no idea how the
sender discovered my email address, though I'm sure it isn't hard. I
have no idea why I was picked as a recepient.
Question: How big a stretch is it to claim your computer is a FAX
machine under the Federal laws governing unsolicited FAXs? If it fits,
how does one file charges under that statute?
Question: What other methods have been effective is stopping or
preventing unsolicited email?
Perhaps I'm overreacting, but I would like to prevent this from
happenning again. I find it extremely annoying. Since I'm paying for my
net connection, junk email costs me money and I don't particularly like
that.
--
Phil Duclos
pjd@clouds.com
------------------------------
From: Maryjo Bruce <sunshine@netcom.com>
Date: 02 Nov 1995 08:33:34 -0800 (PST)
Subject: Re: Copying Driver's Licenses
I will broaden my remarks about my experience when I withdrew over 10K
in cash from savings. My cpa made an awful error, and I had to pay 13K
in back taxes. I was pretty much in shock while at the bank. I took my
cards out and was looking through the pile, laying them down on the
bank counter while I searched for my new DL which they demanded.
Without my seeing him, the teller reached out and scooped up what he
wanted, including an old DL, my SAM's card-which has a picture of me on
it. I did not know he had taken the items until another teller
returned them.
As part of the paperwork the bank filled out because of my withdrawal,
I was asked my for my employer's name. I said I am
unemployed...because I AM unemployed.
While this transaction was taking place...it took an hour to get the
money....one of the tellers proudly informed me that it was his job to
judge the intention of his customers. If someone came into the bank
and withdrew LESS then 10K and there was no need to fill out the
paperwork for the government, he sometimes did it anyway because he
had been entrusted with the task of observing their patterns of
behavior and banking and interpreting their motives.
Two days later there was an emergency call from the bank. I was
informed that being unemployed was unacceptable. I HAD to list an
employer. I asked how I could do that when I have no employer. I was
passed around to several people, each of whom insisted that the
paperwork would be returned from the bank's internal affairs division
as incomplete if they did not get the name of an employer on that
form...so I HAD to provide one. I was then encouraged to say
something, anything.....give the name of a former employer. I said I
would call my lawyer and my cpa.
--
Mary Jo Bruce, M.S., M.L.S.
Sunshine@netcom.com
------------------------------
From: kayedemby@aol.com (KayeDemby)
Date: 03 Nov 1995 04:34:31 -0500
Subject: Re: Copying Driver's Licenses
Organization: America Online, Inc. (1-800-827-6364)
I have concerns about what the wrong people can do if they have your
driver's license? I'm being asked for that kind of personal
information more and more and not just from banks.
------------------------------
From: bcn@world.std.com (Barry C Nelson)
Date: 03 Nov 1995 05:38:57 GMT
Subject: Re: The Information Rights Act of 1996
Organization: The World Public Access UNIX, Brookline, MA
Please try to focus on a plane higher than just credit cards, phone
numbers, and TV cameras. These things are important, but too
transient to put into civil rights law. Technology changes awfully
fast.
Oh, right.
I would point out that the Civil Rts Act of 1964 wasn't eviscerated by
the Supreme Court until 1979. Steel Workers v. Weber, 99 S.Ct. 2721
(reverse discrimination is not illegal "racial" discrimination).
In order to properly frame legislation, it is often useful to first try
to formulate a concise definition of the harm which is meant to be
eliminated and why existing law fails to do so.
--
BCNelson (not a lawyer)
------------------------------
From: bcn@world.std.com (Barry C Nelson)
Date: 03 Nov 1995 06:29:43 GMT
Subject: Phone Number Privacy
Organization: The World Public Access UNIX, Brookline, MA
On a recent NYNEX commercial advertising *69 to call back the last
person who called you (as when you can't get to the phone in time to
answer), there was a statement at the bottom of the screen: "Your phone
number may appear on the bill of anyone who calls you using this
service."
This would appear to mean that anyone having call blocking and unlisted
phone numbers are still at risk of letting anyone they call know their
number. It would also mean that anyone who picks up your phone can
call the last person who called you just by pressing *69, which may be
an amusing pastime for snoops.
--
BCNelson (not a lawyer)
[moderator: Ameritech announced just yesterday in a TV advertizement
that *69 is now available without ordering anything special for a cost
of $0.75/request. There was no mention on the TV ad (that I could
see) that your number appeared anywhere.]
------------------------------
From: peter@nmti.com (Peter da Silva)
Date: 03 Nov 1995 19:08:11 GMT
Subject: Re: Telephone Odds and Ends
Organization: Network/development platform support, NMTI
Robert Ellis Smith <0005101719@mcimail.com> wrote: I'm curious why
people would want a service that automatically blocks out any
incoming call that has Call Blocking.
Because most of the people with ID-blocking seem to be telemarketers.
Aren't there going to be occasions when family members and others
call - perhaps in urgent situations - from phones with Call
Blocking?
There's always *67.
And isn't CALL TRACE a much more effective way to handle harassing
calls than Caller ID?
CALL TRACE has not proven to be an effective deterrent to the people
who were harassing us when we were running a BBS. CALL RETURN worked on
a few of these munchkins...
"Hello? Oh, did you just call us? Your son maybe? Oh yes, he
has a computer?... ah, you might let him know it's not nice to
harass people over the telephone. Thanks so very much..."
Since CALLER ID was popularized we haven't even had to deal with these
minor creepazoids.
The problem with CALL TRACE is, you have to be willing to involve the
law. Involving parents is a much less stressful solution.
--
Peter da Silva (NIC: PJD2) `-_-' 1601 Industrial Boulevard
Bailey Network Management 'U` Sugar Land, TX 77487-5013
+1 713 274 5180 "Har du kramat din varg idag?" USA
Bailey pays for my technical expertise. My opinions probably scare them
------------------------------
From: James Love <love@essential.org>
Date: 01 Nov 1995 16:12:53 -0500
Subject: Deirdre Mulligan's defense of Bennett Medical Records Bill
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TAP-INFO - An Internet newsletter available from listproc@tap.org
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TAXPAYER ASSETS PROJECT - INFORMATION POLICY NOTE
November 1, 1995
---------- Forwarded message ----------
Date: 01 Nov 1995 15:08:41 -0400
From: Deirdre Mulligan <deirdre@cdt.org>
Jamie-
In the interest of free and fair discussion I ask that you post this to
the tap-info list. Thanks, Deirdre
The Center for Democracy and Technology, AIDS Action Council,
The Legal Action Center, The New York Public Interest Research Group,
the American Association of Retired Persons, plus a number of other
groups, have all registered their strong support for the Bennett-Leahy
bill (S. 1360), "The Medical Records Confidentiality Act." The
groups represent privacy concerns, consumers concerns, the concerns of
those living with HIV, alcohol, and drug dependency, and the concerns
of the elderly. In addition, the sponsors of the bill include a number
of Senators who have a good record on privacy, such as Leahy, Kohl,
Kennedy and Daschle, to name a few. No bill is ever perfect, and many
of these organizations, including CDT, would like to see certain
sections of this bill improved. CDT is working to strengthen the
standard for law enforcement access, the limit the breadth of the
oversight exception, and require consent for researchers' to personally
identifiable data.
Nevertheless, there is no doubt that the Bennett-Leahy bill
fills a gaping hole in current privacy protection. Even acknowledging
that it should be strengthened, the bill for the first time establishes
a federal warrant requirement for access and a host of other privacy
protections.
Critics of the bill seem to believe that its greatest flaw is
that it does not prohibit health information from being computerized.
This criticism lacks any connection to reality. The bill attempts to
address reality. Automation is here and expanding. Equifax, TRW and
the many smaller companies involved in the information industry have
been, and will continue to enter the health information field with or
without legislation. Today, 90% of all the information needed to
process insurance claims containing diagnosis and test results move
electronically. Currently these companies/information systems operate
without any legal limits on their actions. The only rules governing
their behavior are a result of contracts with hospitals.
The Bennett- Leahy bill will regulate their actions to protect
privacy. It will prohibit information systems providers with whom
hospitals contract -- to complete billing and claims transactions for
example -- from capturing and using information for any other purpose
without the consent of the patient.
We don't need protection from computers. We need privacy
protection. Ensuring privacy protection is fundamental regardless of
whether personal health information systems are automated or
paper-based. The classic example of technology being branded as evil,
when the true culprit is a lack of comprehensive privacy policy is
offered by the Harvard Community Health Plan fiasco. Everyone started
screaming about mental health treatment notes being automated. The
real story wasn't whether they were online. The real problem was that
every provider in the HMO had access to the records. The Bennett-Leahy
bill deals with this issue. The general rules regarding use and
disclosure of information contain a "minimization" rule. Trustees can
disclose only the minimum amount of information necessary. Moreover,
CDT and a number of other organizations are not luddites. We are
attempting to reap the privacy potential that is in new technologies if
they are designed to respect privacy at the frontend. Audit trails,
encryption technologies, digital signatures, masking and other
technological tools offer methods to secure information, track access
to records, and enforce privacy policy that are non-existent in a paper
based system.
The creation and use of health information systems poses
substantial risks to individual privacy. So does the current lack of
federal legislation. The Bennett-Leahy bill acknowledges both the
existing threat and the increasing threat that automation without
regulation poses to people's privacy. The bill protects information
whether in paper or electronic form. It limits disclosure, requires
consent, establishes a warrant requirement, and calls for security
standards. Most importantly it establishes a private right of action
for violation of the act, imposes hefty civil fines -- including
expulsion from all federally funded programs such as Medicaid and
Medicare -- and criminal sanctions ranging from $50,000 to $, 250,000,
exclusion from federally funded programs, and substantial prison
terms.
I invite anyone who is interested or has further questions or
comments on the bill to contact us. A section by section analysis and
frequently asked questions document are available at our web site.
Deirdre Mulligan
Staff Counsel
Center for Democracy and Technology
1001 G Street NW
Suite 500 East
Washington, DC 20001
USA
(202)637-9800
(202)637-0968 fax
http://www.cdt.org/
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------------------------------
From: jwarren@well.com (Jim Warren)
Date: 04 Nov 1995 18:31:11 -0800
Subject: FBI Wiretap Demand is Massive
The FBI has finally published the details of their half-BILLION-dollar
NATIONAL WIRETAP SYSTEM -- a gargantuan threat to the freedom, privacy
and civil liberties of every citizen in this nation.
Once deployed, what politician would dare oppose or impeach an
unscrupulous administration in control of such convenient, undetectable
wiretapping -- that can listen FROM anywhere, TO anywhere, at a
keystroke (e.g. Nixon/Watergate)?
Once operational, what federal, state or local elected representative
would dare question or oppose law enforcers (e.g., for the decades that
J. Edgar Hoover ran massive wiretaps on politicians up to and including
sitting Presidents and his own Attorney General, he got almost
everything he asked for from Congress -- and from his Presidents -- and
that was when wiretapping was *hard* to do).
Once federal, state and local enforcers have everso-convenient
wiretaps -- what Hollywood or television producer will dare create
shows critical of law enforcement, much less documentaries of
enforcement abuses (e.g., for the decades that J. Edgar Hoover
wiretapped everyone from Desi Arnez to Elvis Presley, there were
essentially NO shows or movies criticial of the FBI!)
And just think of how entertaining and useful this system will be for
every phone phreak, computer cracker, industrial espionage agent and
foreign spy -- as each one of them learn how to crack the system,
implemented by the nation's notioriously insecure telecommunications
companies (if we are to believe the FBI's cracker horror stories and
claims of billions of dollars of phone fraud).
And finally, once this system is operational, what government
whistle-blower would dare talk to a reporter?
If there was ever a need for outraged, massive howls of opposition to
"our" elected federal representatives -- and their replacement at the
polls in 1996, if they fail to rescend this Orwellian mandate, much
less if they fund it -- the TIME IS NOW!
(Note: It is the Republicans who have been holding up this
appropriation -- while FBI Director Louie Freeh has been pleading for
it since early this year. Wonder who would support it and who would
oppose it, if a Republican was in the White House? :-)
&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&
We Knew It Was Going to be Bad -- But We Didn't Realize How Bad
The FBI is demanding facilities to simultaneously wiretap 1 call in 100
in many urban areas; and a maximum no less than 1 in 400 for the entire
nation!
Even if they are following the time-honored bureaucratic practice of
requesitioning 3-5 times what they actually want, this is MASSIVE!
According to the FBI's notice to the nation and to our
telecommunidations services providers, published in the Federal
Register:
"... The capacity figures in this notice reflect the combined number of
simultaneous pen register, trap and trace, and communication
interceptions that law enforcement may conduct by October 25, 1998.
...
"Category I (the highest category) and Category II (the intermediate
category) represent those geographic areas where the majority of
electronic surveillance activity occurs. ... Other densely populated
areas and some suburban areas, with moderate electronic surveillance
activity, are grouped into Category II. ...
"Category III (the lowest category) represents law enforcement's
minimum acceptable capacity requirements for electronic surveillance
activity. This category covers all other geographic areas. ...
"The actual and maximum capacity requirements are presented as a
percentage of the engineered capacity of the equipment, facilities, and
services that provide a customer or subscriber with the ability to
originate, terminate, or direct communications. ..."
URBAN AREA WIRETAP REQUIREMENTS: MAXIMUM OF 1 CALL in 100; 1 in 200,
*ACTUAL*
"Category I
"Actual Capacity - Each telecommunications carrier must provide the
ability to meet ... a number of simultaneous ... interceptions equal to
0.5% [1 call in 200] of the engineered capacity of the equipment,
facilities, or services that provide a customer or subscriber with the
ability to originate, terminate, or direct communications. ...
"Maximum Capacity - Each telecommunications carrier must ensure ...
communication interceptions equal to 1% [1 call in 100] of the
engineered capacity ..."
URBAN & SUBURBAN AREAS: 1 in 200 CALLS WIRETAPPED, MAXIMUM; 1 in 400,
*ACTUAL*
"Category II ... Actual Capacity ... communication interceptions equal
to 0.25% [1 call in 400] of the engineered capacity ...
"Maximum Capacity ... 0.5% of the engineered capacity of the equipment,
facilities, or services that provide a customer or subscriber with the
ability to originate, terminate, or direct communications.
MINIMUM FOR THE NATION: CAPABILITY TO SIMULTANEOUSLY WIRETAP 1 CALL in
400
"Category III ... Actual Capacity ... interceptions equal to 0.05% ...
"Maximum Capacity ... number of simultaneous ... interceptions equal to
0.25% [1 call in 400] ...
&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&
Up-to-Date Electronic Addresses for Congress Members & Congressional
Committees
Though the prodigious efforts of librarian Grace York
(graceyor@umich.edu), there is a comprehensive list of congressional
email addresses available on the University of Michigan Library
Gopher. Gopher to the University of Michigan Library Gopher or telnet
to una.hh.lib.umich.edu Login as gopher. Path: Social
Sciences/Government/U.S. Government: Legislative Branch/E-Mail
Addresses.
Access is also provided through the Documents Center's web site:
http://www.lib.umich.edu/libhome/Documents.center/federal.html and the
ULIBRARY Gopher's web interface: gopher://una.hh.lib.
umich.edu:70/00/socsci/poliscilaw/uslegi/conemail
&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&
Clinton Admin & FBI Imply This Will Be Used Only Under Court Order -
NOT SO!
All of the law-n-order hype about this to congress-critters and the
press has *implied* that it would only be used under court order.
BULL SHIT!
Let's ignore the *fact* that it *will* be abused by those in power who
make unauthorized used of their authorized access to the system -- if
history is any implication.
The actual language of the 1994 authorizing legislation (titled, in
true Orwellian double-speak, the "Communications Assistance for Law
Enforcement Act," the CALEA) requires that:
"[Every] telecommunications carrier shall ensure that its equipment,
facilities, or services that provide a customer or subscriber with the
ability to originate, terminate, or direct communications are capable
of -- "(1) expeditiously isolating and enabling the government,
pursuant to a court order or other lawful authorization, to intercept,
to the exclusion of any other communications, all wire and electronic
communications carried by the carrier within a service area to or from
equipment, facilities, or services of a subscriber of such carrier
concurrently with their transmission to or from the subscriber's
equipment, facility, or service, or at such later time as may be
acceptable to the government; ..." [there's *lots* more!]
Notice the part: "pursuant to a court order OR OTHER LAWFUL
AUTHORIZATION."
*Which*, "other lawful authorizations?"
Us peons -- who *Shall* Be Subservient to Big Brother -- don't know.
Probably most members of Congress who so casually demanded that the
nation's telecomm carriers inflict this on us, and authorized half a
billion dollars to pay for it, don't know.
Some "lawful authorizations" to wiretap are certainly classified --
and, of course, we victims can't be told about those secret
authorizations. After all, then they wouldn't be secret.
And I won't even get into what authorizations the President may have
under all of the secret war powers that Congress has given to him over
the decades, that have never rescinded. (Note that various Presidents
have formally declared numerous wars -- "War on Drugs," "War on
Poverty," "War on Crime," etc. -- and those declarations have never
been withdrawn.)
&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&
FBI Says This Is Just to Keep Level Playing Field - But It's MASSIVE
Change!
The FBI first attempted to weasel this into law in 1991, hidden in the
post-Gulf-War Omnibus Anti-Terrorism Bill. It took them until 1994 to
finally ram it through Congress, fast-tracked with no substantive
hearings, no roll-call vote in the [Democrat-controlled] House, and
unanimous consent vote in the [Democrat-controlled] Senate -- literally
only hours before it adjourned so incumbants could rush home to
campaign for re-election. It was quickly, and every-so-quietly, signed
into law by ex-antiwar-activist Clinton ... who shoulda known better.
(Wonder what the FBI has on Clinton in their files?)
Throughout this, the FBI (as front-man for the numerous federal, state
and local government snoop-n-peep agencies) whined that they needed
this half-gigabuck any-place, any-time wiretap system, "just to keep
the wiretap capabilities that law enforcement had 'always' had" (i.e.,
since the early 1900s).
BULL SHIT!
Government has never before had the ability to wiretap with so little
effort.
Government has never before had the capability to wiretap FROM
anyplace.
Government has never before had the capability to wiretap AT A
KEYSTROKE.
For the most part, Government has never before the ability to tap
UNDETECTABLY.
&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&
Local and State Incumbents & Enforcers Can Play Peeping Tom, Too
The statute includes this definition:
"The term "government" means the government of the United States and
any agency or instrumentality thereof, the District of Columbia, any
commonwealth, territory, or possession of the United States, and any
State or political subdivision thereof authorized by law to conduct
electronic surveillance."
Note that this means it allows ALL federal, state, county, city and
other "authorized" agents and agencies to use this pervasive peeping
tool.
And just think about how much fun they will have on slow nights in the
office, once we have widespread use of videophones.
&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&
Watergate, Joe McCarthy, HUAC, Cointelpro, FBI Library "Awareness"
Program, J. Edgar Hoover, FBI Dirty Tricks, Lyndon Johnson
If this system were installed in the 1950s, imagine what the
red-baiting Joe McCarthy (and Senatorial side-kick Richard Nixon) could
have done through a friendly law enforcer?
Remember how many lives and careers were demolished by the House
Un-American Activities Committee (HUAC)?
Or the joy of the FBI's dirty-tricks program that successfully
demolished various law-abiding anti-war organizations.
Then there was the FBI's massive requests that librarians covertly
monitor all materials being checked-out by various library patrons, and
report it to agents.
And good ol' Lyndon Johnson didn't hesitate to sic the IRS on his
political opponents.
And FBI Director Hoover ... hell, he used his FBI facilities -- that
will now control the National Wiretap System -- to compile so much dirt
on his political opponents that no would question him or his practices
or budget demands, and President JFK and Attorney General Bobby K dared
not remove him, even though they were just short of open warefare with
him.
&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&
Wiretap Action Alert from Electronic Privacy Information Center (EPIC)
Date: 02 Nov 1995 11:21:11 -0500
From: "Marc Rotenberg" <rotenberg@epic.org>
Subject: FBI Unveils National Wiretap
To: "EPIC-News" <epic-news@epic.org>
[Please repost]
The New York Times reports today that the FBI has proposed "a national
wiretapping system of unprecedented size and scope that would give law
enforcement officials the capacity to monitor simultaneously as many as
one out of every 100 phone lines" in some regions of the country. ("FBI
Wants to Vastly Increase Wiretapping," NYT, Nov. 2, 1995, at A1)
The story follows the October publication in the Federal Register of
the FBI plans to implement the Communications Assistance for Law
Enforcement Act, the controversial "digital telephony" bill that was
opposed by many groups last year but supported by an industry
association called the "Digital Privacy and Security Working Group"
after the government put up $500,000,000 to pay for the new
surveillance features. (See EPIC Alert 2.12)
The Times article also notes that there is now some question about
whether the law will ever go into effect. A provision to provide
funding was deleted last week after "several freshman Republicans,
including Representative Bob Barr of Georgia, a former federal
prosecutor, said he objected to the way the money for wiretapping would
be raised and that he had concerns about how the FBI might use such a
sweeping surveillance ability."
The article also says that "The scope of the FBI plan has startled
industry telephone executives, who said it was difficult to estimate
how much it would ultimately cost to carry out the capacity increases."
EPIC is urging the on-line community to object to implementation of the
wiretap plan. More information can be found at our web page:
http://www.epic.org/privacy/wiretap/.
--
Marc Rotenberg
rotenberg@epic.org
&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&
Center for Democracy and Technology (CDT) Offers Comprehensive Wiretap
Analysis
Date: 20 Oct 1995 14:11:30 -0500
To: policy-posts@cdt.org
From: editor@cdt.org (editor@cdt.org)
Subject: CDT Policy Post No.26 -- FBI DigTel Surveillance Capacity Request
Under this header, Washington's CENTER FOR DEMOCRACY AND TECHNOLOGY
circulated an outstanding, 34-kilobyte analysis and detail of the FBI's
plan. Unfortunately, it said, "This document may be re-distributed
freely provided it remains in its entirety." Since I was loathe to
inflict their 34KB plus the other items herein on unsuspecting
GovAccess recipients, I will only provide these pointers to where to
get this *excellent* CDT analysis, and the FBI's Federal Register
notice that it references and includes:
[Federal Register: October 16, 1995 (Volume 60, Number 199)]
[Notices]
[Page 53643-53646]
>From the Federal Register Online via GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov]
HOW TO SUBSCRIBE TO THE CDT POLICY POST LIST
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subscribe policy-posts
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The Center for Democracy and Technology is a non-profit public interest
organization based in Washington, DC. The Center's mission is to
develop and advocate public policies that advance constitutional civil
liberties and democratic values in new computer and communications
technologies.
General information: info@cdt.org
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(v) +1.202.637.9800 * (f) +1.202.637.0968
&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&
Is Someone Already Watching All International Net Traffic?
The following is the transcript of an actual communications trace that
a friend ran, while I was sitting next to him, watching -- reprinted
here with his permission.
He did a "traceroute" of two messages that he sent from his machine in
Switzerland (he'd telneted into it while we were at a computer
conference in California).
Traceroute automatically reports each Internet node through which a
message passes, as it proceeds from origin to destination.
He did two traceroutes. The first was from Switzerland to an addressee
at Netcom in San Jose, California. The second was from Switzerland to
an addressee in Israel.
Date: 21 Apr 95 02:54:58 +0200
From: kelvin@fourmilab.ch (John Walker)
To: jwarren@well.com
Subject: Traceroute
> /usr2/kelvin> traceroute netcom11.netcom.com
traceroute to netcom11.netcom.com (192.100.81.121), 30 hops max, 40 byte packets
1 eunet-router (193.8.230.64) 2 ms 2 ms 2 ms
2 146.228.231.1 (146.228.231.1) 326 ms 345 ms 307 ms
3 Bern5.CH.EU.NET (146.228.14.5) 447 ms 408 ms 364 ms
4 146.228.107.1 (146.228.107.1) 127 ms 37 ms 36 ms
5 Zuerich1.CH.EU.NET (146.228.10.80) 37 ms 38 ms 175 ms
6 (134.222.9.1) 65 ms 109 ms 252 ms
7 lp (134.222.35.2) 196 ms 179 ms 405 ms
8 Vienna1.VA.ALTER.NET (137.39.11.1) 191 ms 179 ms 313 ms
9 fddi.mae-east.netcom.net (192.41.177.210) 336 ms 204 ms 303 ms
10 t3-2.dc-gw4-2.netcom.net (163.179.220.181) 182 ms 251 ms 187 ms
11 t3-2.chw-il-gw1.netcom.net (163.179.220.186) 305 ms 586 ms 518 ms
12 t3-2.scl-gw1.netcom.net (163.179.220.190) 537 ms 693 ms 797 ms
13 t3-1.netcomgw.netcom.net (163.179.220.193) 698 ms 549 ms 754 ms
14 netcom11.netcom.com (192.100.81.121) 890 ms 1922 ms 1696 ms
> /usr2/kelvin> traceroute jerusalem1.datasrv.co.il
traceroute to jerusalem1.datasrv.co.il (192.114.21.101), 30 hops max, 40
byte packets
1 eunet-router (193.8.230.64) 2 ms 3 ms 2 ms
2 146.228.231.1 (146.228.231.1) 933 ms 853 ms 874 ms
3 Bern5.CH.EU.NET (146.228.14.5) 1040 ms 450 ms 525 ms
4 146.228.107.1 (146.228.107.1) 453 ms 424 ms 188 ms
5 Zuerich1.CH.EU.NET (146.228.10.80) 64 ms 61 ms 47 ms
6 (134.222.9.1) 80 ms 312 ms 84 ms
7 lp (134.222.35.2) 270 ms 400 ms 216 ms
8 Vienna2.VA.ALTER.NET (137.39.11.2) 660 ms 1509 ms 886 ms
9 dataserv-gw.ALTER.NET (137.39.155.38) 1829 ms 1094 ms 1306 ms
10 orion.datasrv.co.il (192.114.20.22) 1756 ms 1280 ms 1309 ms
11 ...
Notice that both messages went through an unnamed site -- 134.222.9.1
and then a strangely-named site, "lp (134.222.35.2)" -- then through
the same Vienna, Virginia (USA) site ... and thereafter, on to their
destination. I.e., the second message went through Virginia to get
from Switzerland to Israel.
The whois servers at the InterNIC and at nic.ddn.mil for MILNET
Information report, ``No match for "134.222.9.1". '' and `` No match
for "134.222.35.2".''
Now let me see ... which spy agencies are located in or near Virginia?
--
jim
&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&
[This is where I normally insert quotes or humor. This is not a
quote.]
While on a September lecture trip to Washington, I was invited to
dinner with an "associate" Secretary of Defense [title purposely
disguised] who's responsibilities include surveillance and security
technology, including cryptography and the National Security Agency.
GovAccess readers will be happy to know that the administration's
"Clipper II" key-escrow proposal has little chance of being adopted,
and also -- without exception, the NSA does not spy on nor evesdrop on
U.S. citizens, foreign or domestically. I was assured of this. --jim
warren
------------------------------
From: "Prof. L. P. Levine" <levine@blatz.cs.uwm.edu>
Date: 18 Oct 1995 13:55:25 -0500 (CDT)
Subject: Info on CPD [unchanged since 08/18/95]
Organization: University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee
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------------------------------
End of Computer Privacy Digest V7 #038
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