Date: Tue, 30 Jan 96 18:39:18 EST
Errors-To: Comp-privacy Error Handler <owner-comp-privacy@uwm.edu>
From: Computer Privacy Digest Moderator <comp-privacy@uwm.edu>
To: Comp-privacy@uwm.edu
Subject: Computer Privacy Digest V8#010
Computer Privacy Digest Tue, 30 Jan 96 Volume 8 : Issue: 010
Today's Topics: Moderator: Leonard P. Levine
Re: One Person's War on Junk Mail
Re: One Person's War on Junk Mail
Re: One Person's War on Junk Mail
Re: One Person's War on Junk Mail
Re: Medical Records Privacy
Re: Voyeur's delight
Re: Some Thoughts on Privacy in General
Re: Some Thoughts on Privacy in General
Re: AOL search warrants and email retention
The Internet is Insecure
Big Brother is Closing In
Warning on Thefts of Laptops
Info on CPD [unchanged since 11/22/95]
----------------------------------------------------------------------
From: ajkovar@ix.netcom.com (Adrienne J. Kovar )
Date: 28 Jan 1996 08:11:48 GMT
Subject: Re: One Person's War on Junk Mail
Organization: Netcom
David & Kirsten Lichty <miracles@znet.com> wrote: My favorite
response is to stuff their postage paid envelope full (really,
really full) of all of the stuff they sent me at a postage rate I
subsidised.
Been there, done that <G>. Now any known junk mail just goes straight
from mailbox to circular file. For me, it's no longer worth the time
or the aggravation that comes from acknowledging junk mail.
Not that I don't value my privacy. FWIW, I have an unlisted phone, and
I use checks without my address. I don't tell people things I don't
feel they need to know. But it would take a lot to change the way
society operates as a whole, and I'm not up to it. I'll leave it to
you nice people. :-)
--
AJ 8-)
------------------------------
From: "Dennis G. Rears" <drears@Pica.Army.Mil>
Date: Mon, 29 Jan 96 11:53:36 EST
Subject: Re: One Person's War on Junk Mail
David & Kirsten Lichty <miracles@znet.com> writes: My favorite
response is to stuff their postage paid envelope full (really,
really full) of all of the stuff they sent me at a postage rate I
subsidised.
You have it wrong, the junk mailer subsidizes our first class rates.
Junk mail is extremely profitable for the USPS. If junk mail were to
disappear completely rates would at least double if not triple.
Another trick, I use different middle initials or invent a "dept.
no." for various responses. With a little record keeping, I can
tell who is selling my name. And with a mini-contract as you
described this could become interesting.
I use different initials on my magazines subscriptions. I started it
in college Other that I just toss out most of the stuff. Since have I
both a residential and P.O. Box it get a double dose of junk mail. My
credit card bills go to my residential my magazines go to PO box. I
get more junk mail at the PO Box.
As far as shipping it back in the reply envelopes or suing in small
claims court; I am astonished that people have the time to spend doing
this. The (supposed) cure is worse than the disease but if it makes
people feel better.
--
dennis
------------------------------
From: Chris Kocur <ckocur@jcpenney.com>
Date: 29 Jan 1996 20:35:05 GMT
Subject: Re: One Person's War on Junk Mail
Organization: JCPenney
References: <comp-privacy8.9.4@cs.uwm.edu>
fyoung@oxford.net (F Young) wrote: I've never been through a time
when I got so upset about junk mail that I would go through the
trouble of writing a "contract" such as that of Mr. Beken, or suit
the marketer in court. Personally, I'm more upset on fax
advertising or the long and windy unsolicited e-mail as it cost me
money to receive them. Long e-mails could also potentially fill up
my mailbox and cause important messages to get bounced.
It all depends on your situation. My email doesn't cost extra and I
don't leave my fax online, so those don't bother me as much. But I have
had important and wanted mail (bills, magazines, letters) returned as
undeliverable because junk mail had filled up my mail box.
--
Regards, Chris
------------------------------
From: glr@ripco.com (Glen L. Roberts)
Date: 30 Jan 1996 20:57:47 GMT
Subject: Re: One Person's War on Junk Mail
Organization: Full Disclosure
References: <comp-privacy8.8.1@cs.uwm.edu> <comp-privacy8.9.7@cs.uwm.edu>
Beth Givens wrote: Is this a significant victory? I think so. A
court has agreed that a consumer has a right to say "no" to junk
mail and to have the request honored. Perhaps this case, along with
the Avrahami case, will serve as wake up calls to the direct
marketing industry. Consumers want and deserve to be able to
control what enters their mailboxes. Your thoughts??
Dan Langille <dan@dvl.co.nz> wrote: I think not. I always
understood it to be the case that asking not to receive unsolicited
material meant the sender must cease. If I am mistaken, the I
would agree with you that the case is significant. Otherwise, it's
just an example where someone really mucked up and Mr Beken was
smart enough to know how to take advantage of what he thought was
going to happen.
Sexually explicit material aside... one does not have to abide by ANY
request to stop sending mail to them. (It might be common sense to
stop... but...)
What Robert Beken did was get Computer City to enter into a CONTRACT
with him not to send him any junk mail. The CONTRACT further specified
the damages and Computer City agreed. It made it a simple contract
dispute in court.
If you send a letter telling one not to mail you and you want $1000.00
if they do... good luck!
------
Links, Downloadable Programs, Catalog, Real Audio & More on Web
Full Disclosure [Live] -- Privacy, Surveillance, Technology!
(Over 140 weeks on the Air!)
The Net Connection -- Listen in Real Audio on the Web!
http://pages.ripco.com:8080/~glr/glr.html
------
------------------------------
From: prvtctzn@aol.com (Prvt Ctzn)
Date: 27 Jan 1996 20:25:17 -0500
Subject: Re: Medical Records Privacy
Organization: America Online, Inc. (1-800-827-6364)
References: <comp-privacy8.9.16@cs.uwm.edu>
If you like, I can tell you were to get a list citizens with the
following ailments:
Allergies
Alzheimers
Angina
Arthritis
Bladder Control
Gingivitis
Blindness
Diabetes
Emphasema
Epilepsy
Heart Desease
Baldness
Yeast Infections...
and more
Privacy in the area of our medical contions? It just does not exist
thatnks to the power of the direct marketing industry.
--
Robert Bulmash
Private Citizen, Inc. 1/800-CUT-JUNK
------------------------------
From: rj.mills@pti-us.com (Dick Mills)
Date: 28 Jan 1996 18:04:32 -0500
Subject: Re: Voyeur's delight
How refreshing. In CPD 09:26 <WELKER@a1.VsDeC.nL.nuwc.navy.mil> raised
a point in the encryption debate I never heard before.
While the debate over who should hold the escrowed keys is a
legitimate one, I must point out that some form of key escrow is
essential as a practical matter in order for electronic documents
to be legally binding. I think this more than anything else is why
PGP is not much appreciated by the business community. We cannot
permit electronic commerce wherein someone can claim "oops, I lost
the key...sorry about your $1M".
I can see the cause for concern if this is a real hole, but I can't see
the hole. Can you elaborate? How can someone perpetrate a fraud by
losing a key?
Further, persons who really wish to protect their data can layer a
better encryption scheme on top of Lotus'.
Like the gun lobby, we privacy paranoids don't want to let them get a
toe in the door. We believe that the government intends to move to
prohibit private encryption as soon as they have Clipper in place.
I don't see how there can be any kind of realistic electronic
commerce at the international level without the cryptosystem being
in the public domain (or at least dirt cheap).
I agree about the public part, but you seem to be defending the Clipper
proposal in your article. The Clipper algorithm is not public. Cheap
is not an issue.
Secure encryption is not dependent on secrecy. Public algorithms can be
examined to verify that they do not, contain holes back doors such as a
secret master key. The government's refusal to make Clipper public
raises the suspicion that they have done exactly that, and that the
escrow issue is merely a smoke screen.
I can't say for sure, but I think this makes it logistically
challenging for any government to try to scan all encrypted email
traffic with a keyword search, for example.
Shotgun scanning is not the only risk. Storage is cheap enough to
archive *ALL* the Internet traffic *ALL* the time, in raw unprocessed
form. A terabyte tape reel has already been reported. That's enough
to store 500 million typical email messages on a single reel. It's not
only the government that has the resources to archive the traffic,
private parties do it already. In a decade or two a typical home PC
may have the capacity to archive all the world's UseNet traffic and web
pages. Enemies in hostile countries can also archive our traffic.
The archive holder could then select individuals, either in advance, or
retroactively to have their encryption broken and examined.
Selectivity reduces the cost of surveillance by a factor of 1,000,000
my guess). Retroactivity allows the use of tomorrow's computer power to
break today's messages. Civil libertarians should be alarmed because
the power of surveillance could be used politically and commercially as
well as for law enforcement.
As automated toll collectors and surveillance cameras (including facial
recognition) become on-line "webcams", then video and audio recordings
of all surveiled public areas will become part of the permanent public
archives. Future O.J. trials will never again have to speculate who
was where when.
Last year's furor over the DejaNews service is just a harbinger of
things to come. IBM's contemporary TV ad about "data mining" is
another. The genie is already out of the bottle. Eventual decryption,
indexing and cross referencing of the entire archival record seem a
certainty, not a possibility.Your grandchildren will be able to find
everything you ever said or did on the electronic record ... A
voyeur's delight.
--
Dick Mills +1(518)395-5154
AKA dmills@albany.net http://www.albany.net/~dmills
------------------------------
From: stuart@cosc.canterbury.ac.nz
Date: 30 Jan 1996 02:05:14 GMT
Subject: Re: Some Thoughts on Privacy in General
Organization: University of Waikato
References: <comp-privacy8.9.11@cs.uwm.edu>
ingramm@Cognos.COM (Mark Ingram) writes: I was first going to
attempt to justify this assertion with a vaguely religious
argument, you know, God knows everything about you, so there can't
really be anything wrong with knowing everything about someone else
... but I was led inescapably to the issue of intent -- of course
there's nothing wrong with God knowing everything, because God
won't do anything evil with that knowledge! So it's a specious
argument.
Assuming, of course, a christain-judaic world view, where you have a
single God who defines good and evil. [Or a single government who
defines right and wrong ?]
However, in a truly public (non-private? aprivate? deprived (:-)?)
world, there isn't even a problem with intentions (or so I
assert). Let us take a worst-case example, or at least one that I
know, the stalking issue. Let's say that solely because your
address was known, someone hunted you down and killed you. But in
a world of no privacy, the killer's location and actions are known,
and we can presume that redress will be swift and permanent!
Even if the killer's actions were public, if there was no one present
to observe and record the events, there would be no record for
investigators to trace after the event. If a tree falls in a forest,
and there's no one there to listen, it makes no noise.
There is another problem with a lack of privacy, that of different
standards.
Where I grew up, there was a Sun Club (Nudist Camp) next to the local
primary school. I think most people would agree that a fence (or thick
trees) was necessary between the two fot eh purposes of privacy.
--
``The greatest deception men suffer is from their own opinions.''
stuart@cosc.canterbury.ac.nz
syeates@cs.waikato.ac.nz
------------------------------
From: haz1@kimbark.uchicago.edu (Bill H.)
Date: 30 Jan 1996 12:47:01 GMT
Subject: Re: Some Thoughts on Privacy in General
Organization: the usual place
References: <comp-privacy8.9.11@cs.uwm.edu>
Mark Ingram <ingramm@Cognos.COM> wrote: {snip; stalking example:
person A uses knowledge of person B to murder person B; society
uses knowledge of person A to identify and punish} I submit that
*all* supposed invasions of privacy are similar to this example.
Person A knows something about person B, and performs action C as a
result. If the action is unjustified, person B has redress; and if
it is justified, why should person B complain?
Therein lies the true need for privacy:
Person A knows something about person B, and performs action C, which
many people regard as "justified", but person B does not. For example,
not too many years ago, if person A knew that person B was a
homosexual, person A might kill person, and expect the majority of
people to react with tolerance for the murder, if not with outright
support. In a more mundane example from 1950s culture, say that person
B is employed by person A, and on a blind date between person B, and
person A's daughter, they end up sleeping together; person A then fires
person B, which at that time is considered by society to be a perfectly
acceptable reaction.
The purpose of privacy is to protect the few and the powerless against
the prejudice of the many and the powerful. Take away privacy, and
every personal dislike, religious belief, and social prejudice becomes
a ground for action in our everyday affairs. Truth to tell, social
tolerance is based in significant part on the ability of a society as a
whole to ignore the personal lives and choices of its members. Privacy
defines for us what areas of our lives we may judged on, and what areas
of others lives it is acceptable for us to judge them on; thus, we do
not in the normal course of events have to deal with the spectre of
being fired for getting romantically involved with the wrong person, or
being murder on account of sexual orientation, or being treated as a
social pariah because we owned stock in a company that recently went
bankrupt. All of these things can happen, but because the information
which would permit someone to act against us for those reasons is
considered private, and is not generally known by a person unless we
choose to tell him or her about it, such happenings are relatively
rare.
Some prejudices-- ethnic prejudices in particular-- cannot be so easily
discouraged by the protection of privacy, because the information is
difficult or impossible to conceal; even in these cases, however,
privacy can be an important tool against prejudice. How many people do
you know, whose ethnic background might be held against them in some
quarters, who have chosen not to reveal their ethnicity on an
application form? Do you understand why someone might choose to do
that? That, too, is an application of privacy: information which
triggers prejudices, but is not genuinely relevant to the matter at
hand (for example, job competence), is withheld under the aegis of
privacy, unless a legal right to know (or a factual impossibility of
concealment, as in a face-to-face interview) applies.
Oh, the situation of powerful institutions we know nothing about,
knowing a great deal about us, is frightening enough, but let us not be
so quick to deceive ourselves about privacy. The real enemy-- the
power against which we protect ourselves with the cloak of privacy-- is
not powerful corporate interests or governments, but the petty
prejudices of ourselves and our peers. "Big Brother" is a threat
primarily because Big Brother takes his marching orders from We The
People. :-)
--
Bill Hazelrig (haz1@kimbark.uchicago.edu)
------------------------------
From: MDDALLARA@msuvx2.memphis.edu
Date: 29 Jan 1996 14:15:04 -0600 (CST)
Subject: Re: AOL search warrants and email retention
Declan McCullagh writes: I find it disturbing that, according to
the St. Petersburg Times, AOL keeps email for five days before
purging. I read this to mean that contrary to what their customers
may expect, AOL intentionally retains email users have tried to
delete.
Disturbing, yes, but not that recent. I remember reading about AOL's
email retention policy a few months ago, when law enforcement agencies
first ran into the problem of deleted email.
An AOL spokeswoman said that it is the company's policy to comply
with subpoenas, and that although it does not keep records from
chat rooms, it does keep records of e-mail for five days before
they are purged. "We certainly respect and abide by our customers'
right to privacy, [...]
Service decided to make full copies of all mail passing through *their*
system and keep those copies for five days. Every time AOL is in the
news, they just reinforce my conviction that I'd rather be castrated
with a cheese grater than ever use their network.
--
*** FIGHT CENSORSHIP *** BOYCOTT COMPUSERVE ***
Mark Dallara | Grad Student | Biomedical Engineer | Florida Gator
Available for hire soon. Real soon. Any day now. No, really.
Resume, C.V., thesis abstract, and Gator stuff at:
http://www.mecca.org/BME/STUDENTS/mdallara.html
------------------------------
From: "Prof. L. P. Levine" <levine@blatz.cs.uwm.edu>
Date: 30 Jan 1996 13:08:47 -0600 (CST)
Subject: The Internet is Insecure
Organization: University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee
In a copyrighted article in the San Jose Mercury News Simson Garfunkel
reports that a company called First Virtual Holdings has developed a
rogue computer program that steals credit card numbers from
unsuspecting users.
According to the program's authors the it demonstrates that using
personal computers to send sensitive financial information over the
Internet with encryption may be flawed because there is no way to
control the computer on which the encryption program itself is
running.
The authors point out that the program was not designed to perpetrate
credit fraud. Instead, it was developed to prove that encryption alone
is not the solution to guaranteeing financial security in the age of
networked computers.
According to the authors today's software systems can't provide overall
protection because they don't start at the keyboard interface.
The First Virtual program poses as a screen saver. It constantly
monitors the keyboard, waiting for the user to type what appears to be
a complete credit card number. When such a number is typed, the
program activates, playing sinister music and displaying a window
showing the credit card number and an icon for the kind of credit card
that is currently being used.
"There is no reason why one could not write a program to monitor
keystrokes, look for numbers which look like credit card numbers, and
send them out over the Internet to some party unknown to the person
(entering) the credit card number", said Matt Bishop, a professor of
computer security at the University of California, Davis.
The First Virtual program differs from an actual program that would be
used to attack consumers in four important ways.
One, it doesn't install itself automatically, Two, it doesn't run in
secret. Three, when it finds things, it doesn't steal them -- that is,
send them out over the Internet. Four, it is easy to uninstall.
But if an attacker was truly interested in capturing large numbers of
credit cards, such a rogue program could be hidden in a popular piece
of shareware and distributed on the Internet. The program could lie
dormant on people's computers for weeks or months. And the credit card
numbers could be transmitted widely on the Internet, further allowing
the attacker to escape detection.
--
Leonard P. Levine e-mail levine@cs.uwm.edu
Professor, Computer Science Office 1-414-229-5170
University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee Fax 1-414-229-6958
Box 784, Milwaukee, WI 53201
PGP Public Key: finger llevine@blatz.cs.uwm.edu
------------------------------
From: "James P. Galasyn" <blackbox@halcyon.com>
Date: 29 Jan 1996 10:41:11 -0800 (PST)
Subject: Big Brother is Closing In
NJ POLICE INTERNET INVESTIGATION OF MURDER THREATENS PRIVACY
Excerpted, Trenton Times, 1/28/96
Police needs vie with privacy
The bizarre E.Windsor killing that led to a gay "chat room" on America
OnLine (AOL) has underscored how on-line computer discussions & e-mail
- thought by many users to be private - are vulnerable to routine
criminal investigations. Fairfax Co. VA police assisting in the local
investigation of the 1/5 murder of Hesse Unger of Hamilton, obtained a
criminal search warrant and descended on America Online's Vienna, Va.,
headquarters Monday to perform the first such search ever of America
Online records. After sifting through electronic information and
e-mail all day, officers confiscated dozens of files and turned them
over to authorities in New Jersey. East Windsor Detective John Funda
said local police received the files Thursday evening, but had not yet
examined them.
The search of the America Online (AOL) computers has sparked fierce
debate on the Internet and given law enforcement agencies food for
thought. Although civil and criminal court subpoenas have been served
on on-line services in recent years, this week's search warrant has
demonstrated law enforcement's ability to reach information some
computer users incorrectly thought was confidential. "IN FIVE YEARS,
we are going to see police pulling someone's America Online records or
Compuserve records" commonly, said David Banisar, an analyst for the
Washington-based Electronic Privacy Information Center, 'a watchdog
group specializing electronic communication issues. "They are going to
have access to very personal, private information," he said. "They
will be able to read your messages, find out who you talk to, even what
your fetishes might be. And right now, very little of that information
is being protected."
But law enforcement sources said that to obtain most computer records,
investigators will have to seek search warrants under the same
standards that now apply to searches of private homes and businesses.
Still, police are enthusiastic about the potentially incriminating
information stored in computers. "It's an 'area in the future that
we'll look at as an avenue to gather information and evidence," said
Fairfax County Police Lt. Judi Lukens Torian. "We don't want to
overstep our bounds, and this would be used only in necessary cases.
But there is a lot of information on those disks that could,be vital to
cases."
The case that led to the search began Jan. 5 in East Windsor when
police found the lime-covered body of Unger, 38, wrapped in a blue
plastic tarpaulin in the basement of George Hemenway's Jeffrey Lano
home. Hemenway, 39, has confessed to shooting and killing Unger while
a 15-year-old Hamilton boy looked on ' prosecutors said. The teenager,
whose name is being withheld due to his age, told The Times that he,
Unger and Hemenway had met through AOL. The boy said the three
computer users often met in an AOL chat room titled "NJ M4M," which is
the shorthand title for "New Jersey Men for Men," a gay-themed chat
room.
CHAT ROOMS allow users with common interests to exchange electronic
messages as they sit before their computers, which are connected to the
service by modems and phone lines.
Two other AOL users - Michelle Benson, 24, of Trenton and Timothy
Brown, 24, of Hightstown - became involved in the East Windsor murder
case when Hemenway asked them to help remove Unger's body from his
basement, prosecutors said. Benson later informed police about the
body, and she and Brown have been charged with tampering with
evidence.
Fairfax County police obtained the AOL search warrant and handed over
their information to local investigators, who already had seized the
computers of Hemenway, Unger and the teenager, said East Windsor
Detective John Funda. A computer expert with the New Jersey State
Police Technical Support Unit has begun examining the files stored on
the hard drives of those computers, Funda said. "One of the computers
we're looking at had a lot of files that were deleted. Someone was
deleting like crazy," said Funda, who added that experts often can
retrieve files that have been deleted from a hard drive.
The combined information from the hard drives and the AOL search may
shed light on the motive and planning of the homicide, Funda said.
It's possible the hard drives will contain much more information than
was turned up with the AOL search, because the on- line provider does
not archive chat room conversations, and e-mail sent between members is
purged from the AOL system five days after it is read, AOL spokeswoman
Pam McGraw said. Unread e-mail is purged from the system after 30
days, the spokeswoman said.
ON THE OTHER HAND, computer users can easily choose to save permanent
copies of their on-line excursions to their hard drives. Several crime
and computer specialists said Thursday that the East Windsor case is
the first time they had heard of a homicide victim meeting his attacker
on-line. And the unusual case has led investigators into controversial
terrain. Appeals courts have not specifically ruled on law enforcement
access to such records, but Congress is considering several bills that
would try to curb some behavior online, including criminalizing
indecentspeech. Banisar, whose group advocates special due process
protections before authorities can search on-line users' data, said
Monday's search illustrates how people other than the targets can be
scrutinized in a cornputer-based criminal probe.
Mary J. Culnan, a Georgetown University associate professor and expert
on computer privacy laws, said many computer users believe what they
write on-line "goes off into the cosmos, never to be seen again. They
don't know there is an archives. "We already grapple with the issue of
police overstepping its bounds," Culnan added. "With technology today,
that becomes even more creepy."
McGraw of AOL said it is the company's policy to comply with subpoenas
and that the service cooperated fully with this investigation.
"We certainly respect and abide by our customers' right to privacy,"
she said. "But we also are going to follow the law. We have 4.5
million customers - that's the size of a city. When we have some
problems, we have to deal with it responsibly."
Posted in pol-abuse@igc.apc.org
To subscribe, send this message: subscribe pol-abuse
To this address: majordomo@igc.apc.org
------------------------------
From: "Prof. L. P. Levine" <levine@blatz.cs.uwm.edu>
Date: 28 Jan 1996 11:23:18 -0600 (CST)
Subject: Warning on Thefts of Laptops
Organization: University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee
Taken from RISKS-LIST: Risks-Forum Digest Thursday 25 January
1996 Volume 17 : Issue 67 FORUM ON RISKS TO THE PUBLIC IN
COMPUTERS AND RELATED SYSTEMS (comp.risks) ACM Committee on
Computers and Public Policy, Peter G. Neumann, moderator
From: "Tom Zmudzinski" <zmudzint@ncr.disa.mil>
Date: 24 Jan 96 11:09:41 EST
Subject: Warning on Thefts of Laptops (fwd from Buddy Guynn)
The following advisory is being provided by Mr. Buddy Guynn, DMC Montgomery
Security Manager. He received the information from the Army Material
Command regarding the security of Laptop Computers during travel.
1. The following information is valid not only for laptops but
also for other items of value such as briefcases while you are
in domestic or international travel status:
"Laptop computers have become a premium target for theft
throughout Europe. Every international traveler who is
anticipating on carrying a laptop computer with them must
remain on constant alert as they traverse through all
airports.
Two methods of theft have already occurred at separate
airports and the techniques that were used to steal the
laptop computers can occur at any airport. Both methods
involved two thieves to carry out the theft.
Recently, Brussels Airport security advised that one method
involved the use of security x-ray machines. The first
thief would precede the traveler through the security check
point and then loiter around the area where the carry-on
luggage had already been examined. When the traveler places
his laptop computer onto the conveyer belt of the x-ray
machine, the second thief would step in front of the
traveler and set off the metal detector. While the traveler
was being delayed, the first thief would remove the
traveler's laptop computer from the conveyer belt just after
it had gone through the x-ray machine and quickly disappear.
The most recent method of theft just occurred at the
Frankfurt International Airport, Germany, while the traveler
was walking around a crowd of people in the airport
terminal. The traveler, who was carrying his laptop
computer on his rollbag, was preceded by the first thief.
Just as the traveler got around the crowd of people, the
first thief stopped abruptly, causing the traveler to stop
abruptly. When they stopped momentarily, a second thief,
who had been following just behind them, quickly removed the
traveler's laptop computer from his rollbag and disappeared
in the crowd."
2. All travelers, both international and domestic, are urged to
be alert to the above methods used in stealing computers and
always be mindful of any abrupt diversions during your travels.
Report any losses immediately to authorities. Keep serial
numbers, make, and model information of your laptop computers, or
of any items of value, separate from the item so you can give
precise information to authorities if the items are stolen.
3. Request widest dissemination of this correspondence.
------------------------------
From: "Prof. L. P. Levine" <levine@blatz.cs.uwm.edu>
Date: 15 Jan 1996 18:40:39 -0600 (CST)
Subject: Info on CPD [unchanged since 11/22/95]
Organization: University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee
The Computer Privacy Digest is a forum for discussion on the effect of
technology on privacy or vice versa. The digest is moderated and
gatewayed into the USENET newsgroup comp.society.privacy (Moderated).
Submissions should be sent to comp-privacy@uwm.edu and administrative
requests to comp-privacy-request@uwm.edu.
This digest is a forum with information contributed via Internet
eMail. Those who understand the technology also understand the ease of
forgery in this very free medium. Statements, therefore, should be
taken with a grain of salt and it should be clear that the actual
contributor might not be the person whose email address is posted at
the top. Any user who openly wishes to post anonymously should inform
the moderator at the beginning of the posting. He will comply.
If you read this from the comp.society.privacy newsgroup and wish to
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On the other hand, if you read the digest eMailed to you, you generally
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Contributions to CPD should be submitted, with appropriate, substantive
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Contributions generally are acknowledged within 24 hours of
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The moderator reserves the right to delete extraneous quoted material.
He may change the Subject: line of an article in order to make it
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A library of back issues is available on ftp.cs.uwm.edu [129.89.9.18].
Login as "ftp" with password identifying yourid@yoursite. The archives
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People with gopher capability can most easily access the library at
gopher.cs.uwm.edu.
Web browsers will find it at gopher://gopher.cs.uwm.edu.
---------------------------------+-----------------------------------------
Leonard P. Levine | Moderator of: Computer Privacy Digest
Professor of Computer Science | and comp.society.privacy
University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee | Post: comp-privacy@uwm.edu
Box 784, Milwaukee WI 53201 | Information: comp-privacy-request@uwm.edu
| Gopher: gopher.cs.uwm.edu
levine@cs.uwm.edu | Web: gopher://gopher.cs.uwm.edu
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End of Computer Privacy Digest V8 #010
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