Date: Fri, 08 Mar 96 09:50:35 EST
Errors-To: Comp-privacy Error Handler <owner-comp-privacy@uwm.edu>
From: Computer Privacy Digest Moderator <comp-privacy@uwm.edu>
To: Comp-privacy@uwm.edu
Subject: Computer Privacy Digest V8#022
Computer Privacy Digest Fri, 08 Mar 96 Volume 8 : Issue: 022
Today's Topics: Moderator: Leonard P. Levine
Police (ab?)use of SSN's
CIA & NSA Run Anonymous Remailers
Re: US Right to Anonymous Publication
Re: A Far-Reaching Privacy Bill
Re: A Far-Reaching Privacy Bill
Re: A Far-Reaching Privacy Bill
Re: 800 ANI
Cordless Phone Security
Re: BC NDP Membership Leaked Via Internet
Re: Powerful Engines that Search Usenet
EFF Statement on Leahy/Burns/Murray Crypto Bill
Info on CPD [unchanged since 11/22/95]
----------------------------------------------------------------------
From: Aaron Zaugg <relief@indirect.com>
Date: 05 Mar 1996 13:55:42 -0700 (MST)
Subject: Police (ab?)use of SSN's
I recently bought myself a scanner to eavesdrop on just what sort of
tasks the police in my area keep themselves busy with. I've become
quite alarmed however at the amount of personal information that is
broadcasted over their frequencies. Most alarming is the constant
barrage of social security numbers that I pick up. In most cases,
officers at a traffic stop or investigation will use driver's license
number to do their NCIC and PACE searches. In some cases that number
is identical to their SSN (DL numbers that are not SSN's begin with a
letter). However anyone here in Phoenix who does not have a driver's
license or some other State ID card is in for a little treat. The SSN
number they give the police will be sent over the airwaves. Usually
the dispatcher will respond back in a few seconds with that person's
address, want's and warrants, DMV restrictions/suspensions as well as a
physical description on some occasions.
In our world where its common knowledge that people can use a SSN,
name, and address to take over another person's identity, I find it
hard to believe the police would be so careless. Some might say that
no one would want to use a criminal's identity as their own, but the
fact is that many of these people who have their information broadcast
have done nothing wrong now or in the past. They merely forgot to
bring their papers.
Another worrying factor regarding the police's use of SSN's is the
possibility of mistakes in reports. For example, just today I heard an
officer give a name and date of birth for someone he was
investigating. The dispatcher matched the date of birth with a
driver's license (I can't remember if it was local or not) and
warrant. She read the physical description to the officer. The
officer proceeded to say he wasn't sure that was the right
information. All the dispatcher did in response to this was to tell
the officer that the record she was looking at had several other
aliases and "did he want the soc. for him". The officer took the SSN
(as well as myself) and proceeded with his investigation.
For a number that is not to be used to identify a person it certainly
seems that the Phoenix Police Department (and I assume all others) have
a different opinion of what that means. Does anyone know if this kind
of usage is legal, and does the fact that it is being broadcasted
(instead of sent directly to the officer's data terminal in the car)
make the situation any different?
Sheeple Sheeple everywhere.
------------------------------
From: David M Kennedy <David_M_Kennedy@smtp.ord.usace.army.mil>
Date: 05 Mar 1996 17:05:51 -0500
Subject: CIA & NSA Run Anonymous Remailers
[DMK: I don't know what an spj-l is; I'm crossposting from a military list.
I'm a fed of sorts and don't have a problem with the contents below, but
neither do I believe them. It should stir the pot up in CPD though.]
From: owner-spj-l
To: Multiple recipients of list SPJ-L
Subject: CIA & NSA run remailers (fwd)
Date: Monday, March 04, 1996 3:32PM
I attended last weeks "Information, National Policies, and
International Infrastructure" Symposium at Harvard Law School,
organized by the Global Information Infrastructure Commission, the
Kennedy School and the Institute for Information Technology Law &
Policy of Harvard Law School.
During the presentation by Paul Strassmann, National Defense University
and William Marlow, Science Applications International Corporation,
entitled "Anonymous Remailers as Risk-Free International
Infoterrorists" the questions was raised from audience (Professor
Chaarles Nesson, Harvard LAw School) - in a rather extended debate -
whether the CIA and similar government agencies are involved in running
anonymous remailers as this would be a perfect target to scan possibly
illegal messages.
Both presenters explicitly acknowledged that a number of anonymous
remnailers in the US are run by government agencies scanning traffic.
Marlow said that the government runs at least a dozen remailers and
that the most popular remailers in France and Germany are run by the
respective government agencies in these countries. In addition they
mentioned that the NSA has successfully developed systems to break
encrypted messages below 1000 bit of key length and strongly suggested
to use at least 1024 bit keys. They said that they semselves use 1024
bit keys.
I ask Marlos afterwards if these comments were off or on record, he
paused then said that he can be quoted.
So I thought I pass that on. It seems interesting enough, don't you
think?
--
Viktor Mayer-Schoenberger
Information Law Project
Austrian Institute for Legal Policy
------------------------------
From: glr@ripco.com (Glen L. Roberts)
Date: 06 Mar 1996 21:24:50 GMT
Subject: Re: US Right to Anonymous Publication
Organization: Full Disclosure
References: <comp-privacy8.20.7@cs.uwm.edu>
bo774@freenet.carleton.ca (Kelly Bert Manning) wrote: While
anonymous remailers, usenet and e-mail provide a computer context
to this particular discussion the root issues go back centuries, if
not millenia, and a wide body of literature exists about them.
Discussion of Privacy issues might be improved by building on the
work of the many people who have spent a lot of time and energy
considering them already.
The dabate rages on about anonymousness on the net...
But, no one questions the (in many cases forced) anonymousness of talk
radio. Call Rush Limbaugh and you can reach a tremendous audience
compared to posting on the net... and it is esentially anonymous!
Nobody questions that!
Why do people argue against anonymous postings/email/....
------
Links, Downloadable Programs, Catalog, Real Audio & More on Web
Full Disclosure [Live] -- Privacy, Surveillance, Technology!
(Over 150 weeks on the Air!)
The Net Connection -- Listen in Real Audio on the Web!
http://pages.ripco.com:8080/~glr/glr.html
------
------------------------------
From: glr@ripco.com (Glen L. Roberts)
Date: 06 Mar 1996 21:25:16 GMT
Subject: Re: A Far-Reaching Privacy Bill
Organization: Full Disclosure
References: <comp-privacy8.20.9@cs.uwm.edu>
Beth Givens <bgivens@pwa.acusd.edu> wrote: California state senator
Steve Peace has introduced a bill, which if it passes, will give
consumers a great deal of control over their personal information.
The bill reads in part: "No person or corporation may use or
distribute for profit any personal information concerning a person
without that person's written consent. Such information includes,
but is not limited to, an individual's credit history, finances,
medical history, purchases, and travel patterns."
Is a newspaper that writes an article about someone distributing
information about that person for a profit?
------
Links, Downloadable Programs, Catalog, Real Audio & More on Web
Full Disclosure [Live] -- Privacy, Surveillance, Technology!
(Over 150 weeks on the Air!)
The Net Connection -- Listen in Real Audio on the Web!
http://pages.ripco.com:8080/~glr/glr.html
------
------------------------------
From: Chris Kocur <ckocur@jcpenney.com>
Date: 06 Mar 1996 00:47:22 GMT
Subject: Re: A Far-Reaching Privacy Bill
Organization: JCPenney
References: <comp-privacy8.21.3@cs.uwm.edu>
Beth Givens <bgivens@pwa.acusd.edu> Writes, "No person or
corporation may use or distribute for profit any personal
information concerning a person without that person's written
consent. Such information includes, but is not limited to, an
individual's credit history, finances, medical history, purchases,
and travel patterns."
Glenn Foote <glnfoote@freenet.columbus.oh.us> wrote: With all due
respect, I fail to see how this bill will do very much to protect
privacy. In fact, it may do the opposite. Consider; any business
has only to place a few sentences in _every_ contract, charge card
slip, bank notice, loan or insurance application, etal ... which
might read something like:
(you) agrees that all information contained herein and/or
resulting from any process and procedure hereto, shall become
the exclusive property of the provider(me) and hereby provides
consent for the use of that information by the provider(me) as
they see fit. (you) further hereby provide consent for (me) to
access all available commercial information and investigate as
may deemed necessary."
With that one small change to any document (and you _MUST_ sign, or
go elsewhere, and there is _unlikely_ to be an "elsewhere"), they
would now have full authority to gather, compile, use, share, AND
sell every piece of data about you they could get their hands on.
I really hope that someone can tell me that I am wrong. I'm NOT a
lawyer, and it only took 60 seconds to come up with the above. I
suspect someone who was really devious could much more damage to
privacy rights.
I wish I could tell you you were wrong, but you nailed it. Actually you
came pretty close in the verbage, but some I've had to sign seemed
worse. I pretty much gave away the farm when I signed up for health
care insurance. As you indicated, not signing wasn't a good option as
there weren't any other choices that didn't require a similar release
and going without isn't a good option either.
What they need to add to the bill is that no entity may require consent
in order to transact business with them (with possibly some _well
defined_ exceptions). IMO the bill should also require that the consent
form be a seperate document and cannot be included as part of any other
agreement the person may sign.
--
Regards, Chris
#include <std/disclaimer.h>
I can do it quick; I can do it well; I can do it cheap -- pick any two.
-- Red Adair
ckocur@jcpenney.com (work), ckocur@plano.net (home)
------------------------------
From: bo774@freenet.carleton.ca
Date: 06 Mar 1996 09:13:15 -0600 (CST)
Subject: Re: A Far-Reaching Privacy Bill
Organization: University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee
John R Levine (johnl@iecc.com) writes: It seems to me that a
somewhat more effective approach would be to require that requests
for data be accompanied by the specific purpose for which it is to
be used, and that other uses require prior written permission. The
trick is to make "specific" work, so they can't just use value
blanket descriptions again.
Quebec deals with this by making personal data non-mandatory. That, in
combination with the Canada Currency Act(cash is all you ever have to
provide when purchasing something, in the absence of any statutory
obligation to register the sale) deals with this.
Aren't there laws that override "shrink wrap" clauses?
--
notice: by sending advertising/solicitations to this account you will be
indicating your consent to paying me $70/hour for a minimum of 2 hours for
my time spent dealing with it
------------------------------
From: johnl@iecc.com (John R Levine)
Date: 05 Mar 96 21:08 EST
Subject: Re: 800 ANI
Organization: I.E.C.C., Trumansburg, N.Y.
References: <comp-privacy8.17.11@cs.uwm.edu> <comp-privacy8.18.10@cs.uwm.edu>
I had a debate about all this with someone on comp.dcom.telecom a
couple years ago, and the debate ended with him saying that he
knows more about telecom than I do, and it's just not technically
feasible to implement these features in the telephone network
(i.e., ANI blocking option for the caller, and call rejection
option for the 800 number owner). All I can say is that, if that's
the case, then the telecom industry ought to hire better design
engineers.
Well, if we were designing the world's telephone system de novo,
there's a lot we might do differently. That's why CLID, which is new,
has blocking options while ANI, which is much older, doesn't.
The problem with suppressing ANI is that the ANI collected on 800 calls
is the same ANI collected on normal toll calls that lets telcos compute
the phone bills. The same applies for 800 calls -- on my 800 lines,
calls from the U.S. are billed at one rate, while calls from Canada are
billed at a different rate. Without ANI, the telco can't generate the
bill.
Do keep in mind that ANI data, unlike CLID, has specific restrictions
put on its use, so that the only legal things to do with it are to
check the phone bill and look up callers' accounts. You can't do with
ANI what CLID is designed for, collecting prospect lists for junk phone
calls.
I suppose that there might be a billing option that blocks out the last
four digits of the phone number or something like that, but with the
existing legal rules in place, abuse of ANI data is already
considerably less of a problem than abuse of CLID.
--
John R. Levine, IECC, POB 640 Trumansburg NY 14886 +1 607 387 6869
johnl@iecc.com "Space aliens are stealing American jobs." - Stanford econ prof
------------------------------
From: cburriss@aol.com (CBurriss)
Date: 07 Mar 1996 02:30:26 -0500
Subject: Cordless Phone Security
Organization: America Online, Inc. (1-800-827-6364)
I realize that cordless phones are not secure in general, but have a
question about two different technologies. Panasonic advertises a
'scramble' feature on some of their cordless phones. Does this acutally
defeat anyone but the most casual eavesdropper? More importantly, is
900 Mhz acually secure, as some advertisements claim?
Just trying to keep my conversations private...
------------------------------
From: bo774@freenet.carleton.ca
Date: 06 Mar 1996 09:14:18 -0600 (CST)
Subject: Re: BC NDP Membership Leaked Via Internet
Organization: University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee
The purported membership list of the BC NDP party, currently the
governing party in BC, has been released by a disgruntled wannabe
leadership candidate.
He recieved the document, with names, addresses, and phone numbers, via
the internet.
The opposition Liberal party, which is expected to win an election
later this year, plans to compare the list of members with the names of
civil servants hired under the NDP, in addition to reviewing
appointments to government bodies.
One of the news stories raised the issue of whether something
purportedly recieved over the internet from an unnamed source, should
be regarded as accurate. There has also been a few news stories lately
about parties padding their member lists with names and phone numbers
of people who have only spoken to a junk phone caller briefly and who
haven't paid a membership fee, signed a membership application, or ever
had the intent to become a party member.
Brian Gardiner, NDP Provincial Secretary, said that he has "full
confidence that our E-mail system hasn't been breached". Well then, why
wouldn't access to such a sensitive party asset be audited. Why don't
they have a traffic log of this chunk of data being mailed?
--
notice: by sending advertising/solicitations to this account you will be
indicating your consent to paying me $70/hour for a minimum of 2 hours for
my time spent dealing with it
------------------------------
From: Richard Thieme <rthieme@lifeworks.com>
Date: 07 Mar 1996 18:57:53 -0800
Subject: Re: Powerful Engines that Search Usenet
Organization: Richard Thieme LifeWorks
References: <comp-privacy8.21.5@cs.uwm.edu>
Al Magary wrote: The Wall St. Journal today (3/4/96, p.B1) has an
article, "World-Wide Fame Is at Your Fingertips," about the
adventure of powerful search engines that search both the Web and
Usenet, principally Alta Vista and Open Text: It may be quite a
party stunt in Silicon Valley to rate people's social status by how
many hits they get in an Alta Vista search (Bill Gates, 60,000;
you, zero?), but for those, like myself, who conduct all Internet
business under their own name, Alta Vista's archiving of old
correspondence is chilling.
Al, I did the search and was also taken aback, even though it was a
small thing. Things I've written (as in Wired) showed up and that's
fine. But I had communicated what I thought was semi-privately within a
moderated group and found every post to that group archived and
available. I was introducing myself as a speaker and consultant to
someone looking for one and spoke highly of my reputation. I was
selling, after all. But it took me aback to see what I thought was a
communication, say, in a single room to twenty people recorded on a
hidden cassette recorder (as it were) and broadcast over world wide
radio.
Different kinds of speech carry with them implicit assumptions about
speaker and listener, norms that felt violated in this case.
I queried the group leader to ask why I had not been asked for
permission and it had never occurred to him.
Live and learn.
------------------------------
From: Stanton McCandlish <mech@eff.org>
Date: 05 Mar 1996 13:00:49 -0800 (PST)
Subject: EFF Statement on Leahy/Burns/Murray Crypto Bill
New "Encrypted Communications Privacy Act" - Enabling Electronic Envelopes
==========================================================================
FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUNDATION
+1 415 436 9333
ask@eff.org
March 5, 1996 http://www.eff.org
The Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF) is encouraged to see
Congressional support for lifting restrictions on encryption and
affirming privacy rights for U.S. citizens. The bill introduced today
by Senators Pat Leahy (D-VT), Patricia Murray (D-WA) and Conrad Burns
(R-MT) is an important step in reclaiming privacy and encryption rights
for society and business. The bill would legalize wide use of
"electronic envelopes" to protect private information. Today this
information travels on "electronic postcards" which can easily be
altered or intercepted. However, the bill also includes key escrow and
obstruction of justice provisions which would cause problems if
enacted.
"The bill provides a new opportunity to bring reason into the crypto
policy debate," said EFF co-founder John Gilmore. "We support the
Senators for bringing their energy into the process. The bill is a
good start, and with healthy debate and modification, it could become
acceptable legislation."
Electronic privacy and encryption policy is extremely complex because
it intertwines our constitutional rights of free speech, publication,
association, and protection from self-incrimination and unreasonable
search, with issues of wiretapping, spying, military security, personal
privacy, and computer security. This bill would pick a new balance
among these competing interests, with long-term impacts on our society
and economy. EFF is committed to working with government, industry and
public interest organizations to raise the level of understanding and
debate in resolving these complex issues.
Export Control Liberalization
-----------------------------
The Encrypted Communications Privacy bill would make long-overdue
changes to the export restrictions currently hampering the deployment
of privacy and security "envelopes" for Windows, Unix, the Mac, and the
Internet.
The bill:
* Moves export control of all non-military information security
products, incuding encryption, to the Commerce Dept., whose rules
protect constitutional rights and reflect market realities.
* Requires that no license be required to export generally available
mass-market software, public domain software, and computers that
include such software.
* Requires that export be authorized for non-military encryption
software to any country where similar software is exportable from
the U.S. to foreign financial institutions.
* Requires that export be authorized for encryption hardware if a
comparable product is available overseas.
The above changes would significantly improve the nation's crypto
policy. But they make detailed changes in a very complex section of
the law and regulations. There is a significant risk that they will be
implemented by the Administration in a different fashion than Congress
intended. This happened in 1987, for example, when Congress tried to
eliminate NSA meddling with civilian computers by passing the Computer
Security Act. It was subverted by a series of Presidential directives
and agreements among Executive Branch departments. The result today is
that NSA is still in control of domestic security and privacy policy.
We would encourage futher deregulation as a simpler, more effective,
and far more reliable solution. The bill should simply eliminate all
export controls on non-military encryption.
Criminalization of Encryption and Encouragement of Key Escrow
-------------------------------------------------------------
The following provisions raise serious concerns about the imbalance
between the rights of the people and the desires of the goverment. EFF
feels that the impact of these provisions must be closely considered,
and will work to modify or remove them to better serve the public
interest. The bill:
* Makes it a new crime to "use encryption to obstruct justice", with
5-10 year sentences, plus fines. In plain language, this is a
extra criminal charge that can be applied when police are
frustrated in an investigation but happen to catch someone
breaking the law in some other way. It's like Adding an extra
ten-year jail term if you close your curtains while committing a
crime. Americans have the right to protect their own privacy by
any nonviolent means, and we expect that encryption will soon be
built into all computers, phones, and networks.
* Provides a legal infrastructure for key escrow, a system in which
all users' keys are copied to permit government access. The
Clinton Administration has been pushing key escrow to replace its
failed "Clipper chip", out of fear that if Americans have real
privacy they will abuse it. These provisions in the bill would
encourage people to use the flawed key-copying system.
Clarification and Refinement
----------------------------
The are a number of areas of the bill that would benefit from
additional debate and clarification. Specifically, where the bill:
* Explicitly does not mandate key escrow, but fails to prohibit
the Administration from attempting to impose it with regulations.
* Outlaws disclosure of others' keys except to the government, with
1-2 year sentences, plus fines, but includes a broad "good faith"
exemption for when the government does something illegal or
unconstitutional.
* Requires disclosure of other peoples' keys to the government,
under the same procedures currently used for wiretaps, searches of
online records and backup tapes, and fishing expeditions in
billing records. The provision does not always require adversary
legal process, in which citizens can argue for their privacy
before a judge, but instead relies solely on the integrity of
prosecutors.
* Legalizes the use any encryption "except as provided in this
Act...or in any other law".
EFF's Proposed Crypto-Privacy Principles
----------------------------------------
EFF's Cryptography and Privacy Policy Principles, which were originally
written during the Clipper Chip debate, are the touchstone by which we
measure privacy legislation and policy issues:
* Private-sector access to encryption technology must not be
hindered, either by regulation of what crypto may be used
domestically, or by restriction on what may be exported.
* Government policy on encryption usage and standards must be set in
open forums with proper attention paid to public input. Secret
hearings and classified algorithms have no part to play in a
democratic process.
* Encryption must become part of the "information infrastructure" to
protect personal, commercial and governmental privacy and
security. Cryptographic tools must not be crippled or weakened for
the convenience of government agents, and users must be free to
choose what encryption they prefer and whether and to whom they
will reveal encryption keys. Law enforcement must obtain court
orders, not simply administrative subpoenas to seize keys or
decrypt and search encrypted information.
* Government policy regarding emerging technologies like encryption
must not erode Constitutional protections. In particular, any such
policies must be compatible with the rights to freedom of speech,
press and association, freedom from coerced self-incrimination, and
freedom from unreasonable search and seizure.
* Encryption will be built into all next-generation Internet,
communications and computer technology. There must be no government
policy equating use of encryption with evidence of criminal
behavior, nor the creation of any new crime category that holds
encryption users liable for making criminal investigation more
difficult.
* Government at all levels should explore cryptography's potential to
replace identity-based or dossier-based systems - such as driver's
licenses, credit cards, social security numbers, and passports -
with less invasive technology.
The Encrypted Communications Privacy bill at this time passes some of
these tests, and we are committed to working with industry, government,
and public interest organiations to address the remaining issues.
Background: EFF and Crypto-Privacy Policy
-----------------------------------------
The Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF) is a nonprofit public interest
organization devoted to the protection of online privacy and free
expression. EFF was founded in 1990, and is based in San Francisco,
California.
The International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITARs), administered by
the State Department, and in the background by the National Security
Agency, unreasonably treat encryption software and hardware as if they
were weapons of war, like rockets and bombs. It has proven very
difficult to deploy U.S.-made encryption products in an increasingly
important global market due to these regulations, at a time when the
need for online security systems for personal and commercial use has
never been more keenly felt.
EFF has for several years led efforts to fend off governmental attempts
to restrict the development and public availability of secure privacy
technology. In 1993-4, EFF and other civil liberties organizations
successfully opposed implementation of the U.S. Administration's
"Clipper" or "Skipjack" system - hardware encryption for voice and data
communications in which all encryption keys are held by government for
the convenience of law enforcement and intelligence agencies. In 1994,
we helped ensure that crypto export became a major legislative topic,
laying the groundwork for eventual liberalization of the ITARs. In 1994
and 1995 EFF opposed implementation of and helped defeat funding for
the FBI's "Digital Telephony" scheme, in which up to one person on
every city block could be simultaneously wiretapped. In 1995, we filed
an ongoing federal lawsuit with mathematician Daniel Bernstein,
challenging the constitutionality of the export control laws.
Online Resources for More Information
-------------------------------------
Please see EFF's Internet archives for more details on this and other
issues.
EFF Privacy & Encryption Archive: http://www.eff.org/pub/Privacy/ EFF
Legal Issues & Policy Archive: http://www.eff.org/pub/Legal/
Action Alerts: http://www.eff.org/pub/Alerts/
Topical Index of the EFF Archive: http://www.eff.org/links.html
Contact Information
-------------------
The Electronic Frontier Foundation
1550 Bryant St., Suite 725
San Francisco CA 94103 USA
+1 415 436 9333 (voice)
+1 415 436 9993 (fax)
Internet: ask@eff.org
John Gilmore, Co-founder and Member of the Board
gnu@eff.org +1 415 221 6524
------------------------------
From: "Prof. L. P. Levine" <levine@blatz.cs.uwm.edu>
Date: 02 Mar 1996 10:34:30 -0600 (CST)
Subject: Info on CPD [unchanged since 11/22/95]
Organization: University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee
The Computer Privacy Digest is a forum for discussion on the effect of
technology on privacy or vice versa. The digest is moderated and
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Submissions should be sent to comp-privacy@uwm.edu and administrative
requests to comp-privacy-request@uwm.edu.
This digest is a forum with information contributed via Internet
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If you read this from the comp.society.privacy newsgroup and wish to
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---------------------------------+-----------------------------------------
Leonard P. Levine | Moderator of: Computer Privacy Digest
Professor of Computer Science | and comp.society.privacy
University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee | Post: comp-privacy@uwm.edu
Box 784, Milwaukee WI 53201 | Information: comp-privacy-request@uwm.edu
| Gopher: gopher.cs.uwm.edu
levine@cs.uwm.edu | Web: gopher://gopher.cs.uwm.edu
---------------------------------+-----------------------------------------
------------------------------
End of Computer Privacy Digest V8 #022
******************************
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