Date: Thu, 16 May 96 08:49:18 EST
Errors-To: Comp-privacy Error Handler <owner-comp-privacy@uwm.edu>
From: Computer Privacy Digest Moderator <comp-privacy@uwm.edu>
To: Comp-privacy@uwm.edu
Subject: Computer Privacy Digest V8#039
Computer Privacy Digest Thu, 16 May 96 Volume 8 : Issue: 039
Today's Topics: Moderator: Leonard P. Levine
FDA Approves At-Home HIV Test
Re: Automated Toll Collection
Re: Automated Toll Collection
Re: Automated Toll Collection
Cookies
Re: Privacy Phone Guard
Re: Privacy Phone Guard
BC Pharmacists defy Minister's Order
Looking for Privacy Watch
Re: Underpinnings of Web Attacked
An Ethical Dilema
Re: Medical Privacy on Nightline
InfoSec Update '96
Chicago Daily Law Bulletin Technology Law Column
Surveillance Technologies Conference
Info on CPD [unchanged since 11/22/95]
----------------------------------------------------------------------
From: privacy@interramp.com (Privacy Newsletter)
Date: 14 May 1996 17:24:01 GMT
Subject: FDA Approves At-Home HIV Test
Organization: Privacy Newsletter
May 14, 1996 -- The FDA just announced that it has approved the first
at-home HIV test, manufactured by Direct Access Diagnostics, a
Bridgewater, New Jersey-based division of Johnson and Johnson. The test
allows for the collection of blood specimens in the home. The blood
samples must then be mailed to a lab for analysis. Results are
available within weeks, and the tests are allegedly anonymous, though,
at this point, it is not clear how so.
--
John Featherman
Privacy Newsletter
PO Box 8206
Philadelphia PA 19101-8206
Phone: 215-533-7373
E-mail: privacy@interramp.com
------------------------------
From: "L. Jean Camp" <lc2m+@andrew.cmu.edu>
Date: 14 May 1996 14:18:26 -0400 (EDT)
Subject: Re: Automated Toll Collection
References: <199605141803.NAA14424@blatz.cs.uwm.edu>
If i understand the purpose of this thing correctly, it is supposed
to help commuters save time by not needing to wait in line behind
people paying the toll - your supposed to just drive on thru. Is
it more conveinant to save the time than protect privacy on your
driving habits?
This is a false and unnecessary choice. You are blaming captive
consumers for the production of a flawed product. The State is saving
money thorugh automation, the consumer is assisting them in using this
service. There is no reason for the State to additionally create a
valuable database about your movements.
Here the State has _all_ the power in terms of designing the system,
and the consumer has all the risks of privacy or fraud. (Gee, like
Microsoft in electronic commerce.)
--
Jean
------------------------------
From: dan@dvl.co.nz (Dan Langille)
Date: 14 May 1996 21:03:52 GMT
Subject: Re: Automated Toll Collection
Organization: DVL Software Limited
References: <comp-privacy8.37.2@cs.uwm.edu> <comp-privacy8.38.6@cs.uwm.edu>
The State of Virginia is encouraging drivers on the Dulles Tollway
to sign up for a program that automates toll collection. A sensor
[...]
That is not all,though. If you choose to enroll on-line, you must
supply a credit card number and other information. It does not
appear that any encryption is used to protect anyone who registers
from their home page.
I do not feel worried about passing my credit card details over the
internet. Is there any [documented] case of credit card details being
stolen whilst in transmission? Such transmissions must happen
thousands of times daily. Surely, if it was a reasonablely easy way to
capture data, it would be done. But it isn't easy. Sure it's
possible, but it's not probable. For that matter, encryption won't
stop. It will still be possible but a little less probable.
--
Dan Langille
DVL Software Limited - Wellington, New Zealand
------------------------------
From: Rick Carlson <lnustoc.bzfhbg@eds.com>
Date: 14 May 1996 14:26:14 -0700
Subject: Re: Automated Toll Collection
Organization: Manufacturing Service Center
References: <comp-privacy8.37.2@cs.uwm.edu> <comp-privacy8.38.5@cs.uwm.edu>
The State of Virginia is encouraging drivers on the Dulles Tollway
to sign up for a program that automates toll collection. A sensor
[...]
Dan Langille wrote: As the program is voluntary, I don't see this
as an invasion of privacy. If it was compulsory, that would be
quite different. But I don't think any such program could be made
compulsory as it would prevent non-locals from using the Tollway.
It's really no different to a VISA bill; they know where you have
been. But so what?
Just as there have been problems with the computerization and sales of
credit card information, expect that there will be privacy problems
with the automation of toll collection. I would not dismiss the privacy
problems with credit card information. Credit Bureaus and credit card
companies have a history of intruding on people's privacy and assisting
directly and indirectly - through sales - in questionable marketing
activities.
There is nothing to prevent the State of VI to sell the data that they
collect through the automated toll booths. It would seem imprudent to
expect that would not eventually try to get some money into the state
treasury for this "state resource".
--
Rick Carlson
------------------------------
From: lihou@ms2.hinet.net
Date: 14 May 1996 18:08:17 GMT
Subject: Cookies
Organization: SEEDNET InterNetNews News System
Browsing recent uplodads to www.shareware.com, I found this
Files from the winsite-win95 archive
(since May 10,1996)
sm186.zip
desktop/
sm186.zip
Fortune program with over 66000 cookies Size 3006 K
It seems to me that these cookies are cookies files from people using
Netscape Navigator and MSIE. If so, how we can prevent others from
getting our 'cookies'? I mean, any other way except manually deleting
them every time we use a browser. Is 'history' file also dowloadable
from unsuspicious user's PC?
--
Sean
Taipei
------------------------------
From: bo774@FreeNet.Carleton.CA (Kelly Bert Manning)
Date: 14 May 1996 19:37:00 GMT
Subject: Re: Privacy Phone Guard
Organization: National Capital Freenet, Ottawa, Canada
chazl (chazl@leonardo.lmt.com) writes: Do you worry that your phone
number is very likely available to anyone who knows your name and
has access to a phone book, regardless of whether or not you EVER
CALL THEM? I really do not understand all the hullabaloo about how
CallerID allegedly violates one's privacy. Here's the way I view
it:
What statistics are you basing this estimate of proabiliity on?
"Privacy Journal" published some %non-published number stats for
different USA cities/regions a few years back.
I don't have a copy in front of me but my recollection is that having
an unlisted number was the norm, by a factor of 2:1(over 60%) in Los
Angeles, the only US city with 2 area codes.
Even in areas such as the Pacific Northwest about 1 number in 3 is
non-published.
On the face of it this seems to demonstrate a clear and widespread
interest in keeping home phone numbers private. Disclosure of
non-published numbers would seem to directly attack a privacy interest
in which individuals invest hundreds of millions of dollars, if not
millions(non-published fee * 12 months/year * millions of non-published
numbers).
If you have figures that show that the actual % of non-published
numbers is a tiny minority please share them with us. Can you assure us
that the majority of LA home numbers are actually published, contrary
to the "Privacy Journal" report? -- notice: by sending advertising or
solicitations to this account you will be indicating your consent to
paying me $70/hour for a minimum of 2 hours for my time spent dealing
with it
------------------------------
From: bob.landry@u.cc.utah.edu (Bob Landry)
Date: 16 May 1996 09:23:07 GMT
Subject: Re: Privacy Phone Guard
Organization: Your Organization
References: <comp-privacy8.37.1@cs.uwm.edu> <comp-privacy8.38.3@cs.uwm.edu>
PatrickK@Mail.Reinhardt.Edu says... Do you worry that your phone
number is available to anyone whom you call with a caller id box?
Or, you can simply tell your phone co. to permanently block caller ID
on your line. Then you dial *81 (I think) if someone insists on seeing
your number. Personally, I rarely call strangers, and if a business
(one actually did this) wants to see my phone # before they'll talk to
me, then they obviously have to much business to handle already.
Since I went to the trouble of requesting a non-listed, non-published
number on my modem line, I see ne reason to let people have it whenever
I happen to also use the phone on that line. And before you ask, No, I
don't take incoming calls thru the modem.
--
Bob Landry
------------------------------
From: bo774@FreeNet.Carleton.CA (Kelly Bert Manning)
Date: 14 May 1996 19:49:55 GMT
Subject: BC Pharmacists defy Minister's Order
Organization: National Capital Freenet, Ottawa, Canada
Last month the BC Minister of Health ordered Pharacists to stop
peddling prescribing profile information to IMS Canada Ltd. which uses
it to target doctors in an attempt to increase sales of particular
drugs.
The 1996/May/13 edition of the Victoria Times-Colonist had an editorial
which begins:
"Information: Access vs Abuse
Aside from the obvious protection of your personal privacy, should
there be any other restrictions on the computer data about your
prescription drug usage?"
The editorial goes on to describe how the College of Pharmacists has
taken advantage of the current election to ignore the minister's
order. The legislature is not sitting and there is no enforcement
statute.
The editorial concludes "The B.C.College of Pharmacists is supposed to
uphold the ethics of its profession. It's fallen far short here." --
notice: by sending advertising/solicitations to this account you will
be indicating your consent to paying me $70/hour for a minimum of 2
hours for my time spent dealing with it
------------------------------
From: Robert Grosshandler <rob@intercast.com>
Date: 14 May 1996 17:30:27 -0400
Subject: Looking for Privacy Watch
Organization: Intercast, LLC
I am trying to track down a service or company called Privacy Watch.
Any info or pointers would be much appreciated.
Thanks in advance.
--
Robert.
------------------------------
From: dan@dvl.co.nz (Dan Langille)
Date: 15 May 1996 08:44:14 GMT
Subject: Re: Underpinnings of Web Attacked
Organization: DVL Software Limited
References: <comp-privacy8.37.3@cs.uwm.edu>
glr@ripco.com (Glen L. Roberts) wrote: Underpinnings of Web
Attacked "Banyan Revival Bets Heavily on the Web" reads a headline
in the 3/96 issue of Web Week. Banyan Systems International is
apparently looking for corporate success through the Internet and
it's world wide web. Now, however, they appear to be attacking the
entire structure of the web. [SNIP]
How inappropriate of Banyan. How do they define "misappropriation of
Switchboard"? Are the guidelines for appropriation defined &
published?
As I've said before, all that this site does is automate a manual
process. If one wants privacy, one will not be in the phone book.
--
Dan Langille
DVL Software Limited - Wellington, New Zealand
------------------------------
From: Simon Rogerson <srog@dmu.ac.uk>
Date: 15 May 1996 10:53:31 +0100 (BST)
Subject: An Ethical Dilema
Problems associated with the uniqueness of IT abound. Consider
these three statements:
* Hacking is wrong
* Counselling support for the suicidal is right
* Anonymity between the counsellor and the counselled is a
right
And here is the dilemma:
* Is it right to employ hackers to develop an anonymous
Internet counselling service for the suicidal?
What do you think?
--
Simon Rogerson
Director, Centre for Computing & Social Responsibility
School of Computing Sciences
De Montfort University TEL: +44 116 257 7475
The Gateway, Leicester FAX: +44 116 254 1891
LE1 9BH, UK EMAIL: srog@dmu.ac.uk
visit our home page at http://www.cms.dmu.ac.uk/CCSR
------------------------------
From: madnix.uucp!zaphod@nicmad.nicolet.com (Ron Bean)
Date: 15 May 96 18:54 CDT
Subject: Re: Medical Privacy on Nightline
bgold@platinum.com (Barry Gold) writes: This is one of those
problem areas with no easy answers. The proposed legislation would
create the opposite problem: adverse selection. If it is possible
to know whether you have a condition _and_ to conceal that
information from an insurer, then you don't buy the insurance
unless/until you have the condition.
I thought the bill currently in congress had a "grandfather clause" in
it, so they couldn't deny coverage if you currently had insurance with
another company, but they *could* if you didn't. And anything you can
test for, they can test for.
The purpose of this is to allow you to transfer your coverage to a
different company, which is important if you're in a local HMO and need
to relocate. Something like 4 million of us are ready to change jobs
the minute the bill gets signed...
If you are young, you have relatively little need of medical
insurance -- your odds of getting sick are very small. At most,
you need insurance against accidental injury.
Well, having survived cancer at age 24 (nine years ago), I beg to
differ. Insurance works *because* the odds are low. And young males
probably need more insurance for accidental injury than the general
population (that's why your car insurance rates drop in half when you
turn 25).
Universal insurance solves the adverse selection problem, but then
you don't get any choice. You can have any color of model T you
want, as long as you want black.
There is another possibility-- you pick the coverage, but you can't
upgrade later (or at least not easily).
I've heard that Germany has a universal system that allows rich people
to opt out, but they can't get back in.
also because people who have good health insurance through their
jobs (like me) didn't want to be forced into some sort of HMO. I
voted for Clinton, but I wasn't having any, thank you very much.
I hope you have good job security.
Whatever we do, we really must get rid of employer-paid insurance.
There is no way to level the playing field as long it exists.
--
madnix!zaphod@nicmad.nicolet.com (Ron Bean)
------------------------------
From: Mich Kabay <75300.3232@CompuServe.COM>
Date: 16 May 96 08:13:53 EDT
Subject: InfoSec Update '96
Information Technology Security Update '96
Wednesday and Thursday, June 12-13, 1996
Hull, QC (National Capital Region of Canada)
sponsored by
The Institute for Government Informatics Professionals (Hull, QC)
and The National Computer Security Association (Carlisle, PA)
Program
Two-Day InfoSec Update Sponsored by IGIP and NCSA
DAY1 TOPIC
Information Warfare: Concepts and Implications
InfoWar Concepts and Case Studies
News from the 4th Intl Conference on IW (Brussels, May 1996)
Discussion of InfoWar
Computer Crime Update
Recent International Case Studies
News from the 6th Intl Conf on Virus Prevention (Washington, April 1996)
Computer Crime and Fraud in Canada
IS/RECON: Tracking Potential Crime
DAY2 TOPIC
Internet Security
Commerce on the Internet: Benefits and Risks
Cryptography Report: Algorithms, Attacks and Laws
Recent CERT/CIAC Alerts
Firewall Certification Program
Security Management
Psycho-social Factors for Successful Security Policies
Security Certification: The (ISC)^2 and the CISSP
For more information or to register call NCSA HQ: 717-258-1816 x.226
or send any e-mail message to the NCSA Infobot (info@ncsa.com) or point
Web browser to http://www.ncsa.com/update96.html
Registration Deadline: 7 June 1996
--
Michel E. Kabay, Ph.D. (Kirkland, QC)
Director of Education, National Computer Security Association (Carlisle, PA)
------------------------------
From: David@Loundy.com (David J. Loundy)
Date: 14 May 1996 15:49:58 -0500
Subject: Chicago Daily Law Bulletin Technology Law Column
Published in the Chicago Daily Law Bulletin, May 9, 1996, at page 6.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
Two rulings on encryption speak different language.
Copyright 1996 by David Loundy
Reprinted with permission
This and past articles archived at http://www.Loundy.com/
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
Two district courts were recently presented with the issue of whether
the Department of State can constitutionally restrict certain forms of
encryption or whether the materials at issue constitute "speech"
protected by the First Amendment.
The first case, Karn v. U.S. Department of State, No. 95-1812 (CRR)
(D. D.C. Mar. 22, 1996) concerned whether a computer disk containing
encryption code is a defense article under the Arms Export Control Act
(AECA), 22 U.S.C. Sections 2751-2796d, and the International Traffic
in Arms Regulations (ITAR), 22 C.F.R. Sections 120-130, and is thus
subject to a licensing requirement in order to export the disk.
In the Karn case, the plaintiff filed a "commodity jurisdiction
request" to export the book "Applied Cryptography" by Bruce Schneier.
The book explains different aspects of cryptography-- history,
politics, different encryption algorithms, and techniques to implement
cryptographic algorithms. One part of the book contains computer source
code for a number of cryptographic algorithms. Stuck in the back of the
book was also a computer disk containing the same source code found
printed in the book. The Department of State's Office of Defense Trade
Controls declared that it did not have jurisdiction under the ITAR as
to the book, but explicitly did not extend this determination to the
disks.
Karn then filed a commodity jurisdiction request for the computer
disks. The Office of Defense Trade Controls responded that it did have
jurisdiction over the disk, and the disk constituted a restricted
defense article. This decision was then appealed twice, and the appeal
was denied twice-- resulting in the current case.
The U.S. District Court for the D.C Circuit held that the AECA
specifically bars judicial review of the President's (or the
President's designee-- the Department of State) designation of items as
defense articles. The court then held that a challenge based on the
Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. Section 706(2)(a), constituted
an attempted end-run around the non-reviewability provision of the
AECA, and thus also failed.
Most importantly though, the court addressed a constitutional challenge
to the regulations. The court held that the regulations are
content-neutral, regardless of whether they are, as the Plaintiff
contended, nonsensical because they allow export of the computer code
printed on paper, but not the same code "printed" on a floppy disk.
Having determined that the regulations were content-neutral, the court
then applied the test for constitutionality which was developed in U.
S. v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968). The O'Brien test requires that a
regulation be within the constitutional power of the government, that
it further an "important and substantial government interest," and that
the regulation be narrowly tailored to the government interest.
The plaintiff did not contest the first two elements, but rather
claimed that by classifying the disk as a munition, the government
would not satisfy its interest in limiting access to strong
cryptography. The court found that this argument was another veiled
attack on the President's determination that the material at issue
should be on the munitions list-- a determination that the court had
already found unreviewable. Karn is now on appeal.
Unlike Mr. Karn, Daniel Bernstein fared a bit better in his challenge
of the constitutionality of the same regulations. Mr. Bernstein
developed an encryption algorithm called "Snuffle." He wrote an
academic paper discussing his algorithm, he wrote some source code
implementing the algorithm, and he wished to present talks about it at
conferences and on the Internet.
Bernstein also requested a Commodity Jurisdiction determination from
the Office of Defense Trade Controls regarding his paper, and two
portions of his software implementation of the Snuffle algorithm. The
Office of Defense Trade Controls declared that his system is considered
a defense article, and thus is subject to a licensing requirement
before it can be exported. Not knowing which elements this decision
referred to, Bernstein requested a separate determination as to five
distinct elements-- the paper, the two software components, and two
texts on implementation and use of the algorithm. The response to his
request was that all of the elements constitute defense articles. This
determination resulted in Bernstein v. United States Department of
State, No. C-95-0582 (N.D. Cal. April 15, 1996).
After the suit was filed, the Office of Defense Trade Controls wrote to
Bernstein to "clarify" that its determination applied only to the
software elements, and not to the texts.
In the Bernstein case the Department of State made the same arguments
it made in the Karn case. Both cases acknowledged the non-reviewability
provision of the regulations, and both acknowledged that the provision
will not stop a constitutional challenge. This, however, is largely
where the similarity between the two decisions ends.
In addressing the constitutional issues, the court in Bernstein first
looked at whether if the encryption system constitutes "speech" or
whether it is more appropriately labeled "conduct" (and thus is easier
to regulate). The court determined that the encryption system is
speech, albeit "functional" speech. Rather than using the analogy that
the encryption system is "conduct," like burning a flag, the court held
that the computer software is more analogous to speech in a foreign
language. The court reasoned, "[n]or does the particular language one
chooses change the matter for First Amendment purposes. This court can
find no meaningful difference between computer language, particularly
high-level [computer] languages... and German or French. All
participate in a complex system of understood meanings within specific
communities."
The court found further support for the argument that computer
languages constitute speech for constitutional purposes by looking to
the Copyright Act-- which protects computer software as "literary
works" 17 U.S.C. 101, 102(a)-- even purely "functional" speech such as
player-piano rolls.
Next, as did the Karn court, the Bernstein court looked to the
aforementioned O'Brien test. However, the Bernstein court determined
that speech was at issue, and not conduct, and it found the O'Brien
test to be an inappropriate standard. However, because the case was
only a motion for summary judgment, the court applied the standard to
ascertain whether Mr. Bernstein had a colorable claim sufficient to
avoid the defendant's motion for summary judgment.
Again, neither party debated much over the first two prongs of the
O'Brien test-- that the government has the power to regulate in this
area, and that it has an important interest at stake (national
security). However, the Bernstein court, noting the presumption against
prior restraints on speech, found that the Department of State's only
response was that the software is conduct, not speech-- a proposition
that the court had already rejected.
Continuing, the court held that Bernstein had a colorable claim that
the regulations were overbroad, and that the regulations could
compromise protected speech. Furthermore, the court found no difficulty
in holding that the regulations were vague. Although the Department of
State claimed that the definition of cryptographic software and the
exemptions from the definition are clear to a person of ordinary
intelligence, the court pointed out that the Office of Defense Trade
Controls itself mistakenly categorized Bernstein's academic paper as a
defense article. In other words, the court found that Bernstein's
vagueness claims were also colorable enough to survive a motion for
summary judgment.
In discussing these two cases, one commentator speculated that the two
judges must have come from different planets. In the judges' opinions,
the courts are clearly speaking different languages. In the past,
speaking in different languages (specifically, Navajo) was used to
avoid enemy interception of communications during war. According to the
Bernstein court, it should not matter whether someone speaks in
English, Navajo, or PGP-- all speech has some constitutional
protection. On the other hand, I would be interested to see how the
Karn Court would handle the matter if the Department of State declared
a software algorithm that automatically converts English to Navajo a
defense article.
------------------------------
From: pi@privacy.org (Privacy International Washington Office)
Date: 15 May 1996 15:35:07 -0400
Subject: Surveillance Technologies Conference
Organization: Privacy International
Preliminary Conference Announcement
ADVANCED SURVEILLANCE TECHNOLOGIES II
Sponsored by
Privacy International
Electronic Privacy Information Center
September 16, 1996
Citadel Ottawa Hotel and Convention Centre
Ottawa, Canada
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
The rapid evolution of technology is leading to the creation of a
seamless web of surveillance across much of the world. Powerful
technologies originally developed for the military are being adopted by
law enforcement and civilian agencies, and private companies to monitor
entire populations. This has been further fueled by the end of the
Cold War and increasing demands for greater bureaucratic efficiency.
Existing laws and regulations have failed to keep up with these
developments.
This one day conference will examine a range of advanced surveillance
technologies and their impact on privacy and other civil liberties. It
will explore the process of planning and implementation of the
technologies, their operating conditions, and the people and
organizations responsible for them. The conference will also examine
possible technical, regulatory and legal responses.
The conference will also address in detail the findings of Privacy
International's "Big Brother Incorporated" report which examined the
international trade in surveillance technology and the involvement of
the arms industry.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
PARTIAL LIST OF SPEAKERS
Phil Agre, University of California, San Diego
Dave Banisar, Electronic Privacy Information Center
Colin Bennett, University of Victoria
Simon Davies, London School of Economics & Director, Privacy International
Wayne Madsen, Author, Handbook of Personal Data Protection
Bruce Schneier, Counterpane Systems & Author, Applied Cryptography
CONFERENCE SUBJECTS
* Artificial Intelligence Systems
* Biometric Identification
* Digital Cash
* Information Superhighways
* Information Warfare
* Infrared and Passive Millimeter Wave Detectors
* Intelligent Transportation Systems
* Other New Technologies
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
MORE INFORMATION
More information on the conference will be available at the Privacy
International mailing list at pi-news@privacy.org (subject: subscribe)
or at the PI Home Page at http://www.privacy.org/pi/conference/ottawa/
[additional material removed by moderator CPD]
------------------------------
From: "Prof. L. P. Levine" <levine@blatz.cs.uwm.edu>
Date: 17 Mar 1996 09:14:50 -0600 (CST)
Subject: Info on CPD [unchanged since 11/22/95]
Organization: University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee
The Computer Privacy Digest is a forum for discussion on the effect of
technology on privacy or vice versa. The digest is moderated and
gatewayed into the USENET newsgroup comp.society.privacy (Moderated).
Submissions should be sent to comp-privacy@uwm.edu and administrative
requests to comp-privacy-request@uwm.edu.
This digest is a forum with information contributed via Internet
eMail. Those who understand the technology also understand the ease of
forgery in this very free medium. Statements, therefore, should be
taken with a grain of salt and it should be clear that the actual
contributor might not be the person whose email address is posted at
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the moderator at the beginning of the posting. He will comply.
If you read this from the comp.society.privacy newsgroup and wish to
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On the other hand, if you read the digest eMailed to you, you generally
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Contributions generally are acknowledged within 24 hours of
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The moderator reserves the right to delete extraneous quoted material.
He may change the Subject: line of an article in order to make it
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A library of back issues is available on ftp.cs.uwm.edu [129.89.9.18].
Login as "ftp" with password identifying yourid@yoursite. The archives
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People with gopher capability can most easily access the library at
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Web browsers will find it at gopher://gopher.cs.uwm.edu.
---------------------------------+-----------------------------------------
Leonard P. Levine | Moderator of: Computer Privacy Digest
Professor of Computer Science | and comp.society.privacy
University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee | Post: comp-privacy@uwm.edu
Box 784, Milwaukee WI 53201 | Information: comp-privacy-request@uwm.edu
| Gopher: gopher.cs.uwm.edu
levine@cs.uwm.edu | Web: gopher://gopher.cs.uwm.edu
---------------------------------+-----------------------------------------
------------------------------
End of Computer Privacy Digest V8 #039
******************************
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