Date: Sun, 07 Jul 96 09:59:00 EST
Errors-To: Comp-privacy Error Handler <owner-comp-privacy@uwm.edu>
From: Computer Privacy Digest Moderator <comp-privacy@uwm.edu>
To: Comp-privacy@uwm.edu
Subject: Computer Privacy Digest V9#002
Computer Privacy Digest Sun, 07 Jul 96 Volume 9 : Issue: 002
Today's Topics: Moderator: Leonard P. Levine
Re: Cookies
Re: Cookies
AOL Now Polices Private Rooms
Re: Privacy while Downloading from Newsgroup
How an Innocent Download Can Lead to Prosecution
DENVER POST: Student Database Called Orwellian
Automation of Contagion Vigilance - Draft ready
Vein Pattern Checking -- Anti-Fraud or Anti-Freedom?
Info on CPD [unchanged since 11/22/95]
----------------------------------------------------------------------
From: wrfuse@mab.ecse.rpi.edu (Wm. Randolph U Franklin)
Date: 04 Jul 1996 00:32:08 GMT
Subject: Re: Cookies
Organization: ECSE Dept, Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute, Troy, NY, 12180 USA
References: <comp-privacy8.39.5@cs.uwm.edu> <comp-privacy8.51.2@cs.uwm.edu> <comp-privacy9.1.7@cs.uwm.edu>
Here's an analogy that might help us explain to nontechnical people why
we don't like some of cookies' uses.
Remember the survey forms that you get in the mail to fill out and
return? Altho nothing is promised, you can see that your response is
anonymous; neither your name nor any identification info is to be seen
on the form that you return.
Well... it seems that some of these forms have your identification on
them in invisible ink. I believe that the Scientific American did this
once (and was roundly slammed and promised to stop).
Cookies are like this. They secretly link in info about previous
places that you visited, which they don't tell you that they're doing,
and which you would have no reason to suspect that they're doing.
--
wrfuse@mab.ecse.rpi.edu (Wm. Randolph U Franklin)
------------------------------
From: "Prof. L. P. Levine" <levine@blatz.cs.uwm.edu>
Date: 05 Jul 1996 15:03:57 -0500 (CDT)
Subject: Re: Cookies
Organization: University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee
Discussion of "They Know Who you Are" By Hiawatha Bray of The Boston
Globe
In a copyrighted article for the New York Times News Service Hoawatha
Bray shows a feature of many of our browsers. In the article he
states:
For a stark and surprising illustration of the problem, point your
Internet browser at this address:
http://www.13x.com/cgi-bin/cdt/snoop.pl.
Here you'll find a Web page operated by the Center for Democracy
and Technology, an Internet civil liberties group that has come up
with a disturbing lesson in the power of technology.
Here you'll get a report on the type of browsing software you're
using, the resolution settings of your computer's monitor, the
Internet access service you're using, the general part of the
country you're located -- perhaps even a little map of the state.
If your software allows it, the CDT Web page can even tell you the
address of the last Web page you visited. You've revealed all of
this, just by visiting the page.
It gets better -- or worse, depending on how much you value your
privacy. Once you're done, check your electronic mail box. There
may be a message waiting for you there, sent from the folks at
CDT. Certain browsers, like Netscape 2.0, will reveal the user's
e-mail address to any Web site designer who bothers to ask. And the
site operator can share your address with anyone he or she
chooses.
Hiawatha Bray is a member of the Globe staff. You can contact him by
electronic mail at bray@globe.com.
When I viewed the site above I saw text like the following:
Your computer is a PC running Windows 95.
Your Internet browser is Netscape.
You are coming from blatz.cs.uwm.edu.
Another web site that does innocently playes similar games is:
http://www.illuminatus.com/cookie
who give you a cookie and tells you how many times you have visited the
site. These are innocent examples of what is being done now by
browsers.
--
Leonard P. Levine e-mail levine@cs.uwm.edu
Professor, Computer Science Office 1-414-229-5170
University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee Fax 1-414-229-2769
Box 784, Milwaukee, WI 53201
PGP Public Key: finger llevine@blatz.cs.uwm.edu
------------------------------
From: "Prof. L. P. Levine" <levine@blatz.cs.uwm.edu>
Date: 06 Jul 1996 11:30:37 -0500 (CDT)
Subject: AOL Now Polices Private Rooms
Organization: University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee
Taken from fight-censorship-digest Friday, 5 July 1996 01:161
This was reported as coming from an alt. newsgroup. Note that it
requires that if a person visits (by accident or otherwise) a chat room
where illegal activity (such as distribution of illegal software) goes
on the person will lose their AOL account. The email letter indicates
quite strongly that if you have entered such a room you better inform
the Community Action Team immediately with the 'or else' indicated by
implication.
Len Levine; UWM EE&CS Department
Newsgroups: alt.aol-sucks
Subject: AOL Now Polices Private Rooms
from: never@dave-world.net (BANE)
Organization: Your Organization
Date: 03 Jul 96 04:06:21 GMT
After being kicked out of the private room warez2 by an aol staffer
here is the letter they sent me.
Subj: TOS Violation Report
Date: 96-07-02 00:45:49 EDT
From: CATWatch05
To: Han1234567
Dear Member,
This e-mail has been sent to all of your screen names. If you have
already read it under another screen name, please disregard this
copy.
A screen name associated with your master account recently entered
the chat room warez2 This chat room is reportedly being used to
illegally trade software in violation of U.S. law and AOL=EDs Terms
of Service. In accordance with our Terms of Service, AOL reserves
the right to treat as public any private chat room whose directory
or room name is published or becomes generally known or available.
Please be advised that members found in these rooms may lose their
AOL membership without further warning.
If you entered this room in response to offers of "free online
time", "upgrades of AOL" or the like, you should be aware that
these offers are fraudulent. AOL does not issue credit through
private rooms, and upgrades of our software are only available in
designated free areas of AOL. If you come across any of these
false offers, we would appreciate it if you would report them to
the Community Action Team (keyword:TOS). If you believe you have
entered such a room by accident, please contact the Community
Action Team as soon as possible (keyword:TOS).
We remind you that the AOL community depends on our members abiding
by our community rules. If you are unfamiliar with these rules,
please take the time to read AOL=EDs Terms of Service, which is
always available free online by going to keyword "TOS".
If you have any questions or comments regarding this situation,
please feel free to contact us at the screen name TOSEMAIL1.
Regards,
The Community Action Team
America Online, Inc.
--
Leonard P. Levine e-mail levine@cs.uwm.edu
Professor, Computer Science Office 1-414-229-5170
University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee Fax 1-414-229-2769
Box 784, Milwaukee, WI 53201
PGP Public Key: finger llevine@blatz.cs.uwm.edu
------------------------------
From: Dick Mills <dmills@albany.net>
Date: 04 Jul 1996 09:40:40 -0400
Subject: Re: Privacy while Downloading from Newsgroup
Steve Hunter wrote O.K. so, let's say I've downloaded the plans for
a nuclear device from my PC based system. (PC at home directly my
server account. I don't know if that's IP, TCP, ISP, BBC or B.B.
King) No shell, no employer, just me and my faithful PC. Can I
expect the FBI at my door tomorrow morning asking to see my A-Bomb,
please?"
The previous poster acar@vcn.bc.ca (Al Acar) described three ways your
privacy can be compromised and said that he was sure there are more.
Indeed there are.
There are so many ways to be tripped up and have the computer betray
your privacy we can't imagine them all. Here's a few more.
a)A man in Syracuse NY sent his broken PC out for repair. The
repairman found kiddie porn on his hard disk and called the FBI. The
man was convicted.
b)I asked my own attorney what he did about repairmen and his office
computers containing my files. He replied, "I never thought about
that."
c)A few years ago there were rumors (I don't know if they were true)
that Sun workstations were shipped with the microphone enabled by
default. Savy hackers around the world could eavesdrop on
conversations in the rooms with these workstations.
d)Shimomura, the "foremost security expert" who tracked down and caught
Kevin Mitnick was looking because Mitnick had compromised Shimomura's
security.
Eventually, via encryption technologies, computers will become our
number one tool for protecting our privacy. For now though, computers,
especially in connection with the Internet, are your biggest threat.
Here' my advice.
If you want to engage in anything illegal, immoral or fattening, or
just private, don't do it on, with, or even in the same room as any
computer. For heavan's sake, don't do it on the Internet.
Unfortunately that may include discussions with your banker, your
lawyer, and your doctor. I sincerely hope that technolgy in
combination with some carefully chosen legislation may someday improve
this intolerable situation, but for today, that's the way it is.
For now, consider everything you do on the Internet completely public.
Your illusion of privacy surfing the net from your your own bedroom
late at night with the door closed is just an illusion. The FTI might
not be there tomorrow, but your risk of exposure lasts for years and
years.
--
Dick Mills O- http://www.albany.net/~dmills
dmills@albany.net AKA rj.mills@pti-us.com
------------------------------
From: dwwrmk@teleport.com (dww)
Date: 05 Jul 1996 19:46:15 -0700
Subject: How an Innocent Download Can Lead to Prosecution
Organization: Teleport - Portland's Public Access (503) 220-1016
<URL:http://www.teleport.com/~dwwrmk/index1.html>
This website discusses what happened when a disgruntled 'friend' convinced
the Washington State Police to investigate a college teacher for felonious
possession of images downloaded from newsgroups. It includes a description
of what happened, some newspaper articles about the case, how people can
help, the latest update on the case, a pointer to other news of a similar
case, and a pointer to a general news page.
--
dwwrmk@teleport.com
------------------------------
From: Peter Marshall <rocque@eskimo.com>
Date: 04 Jul 1996 11:24:04 -0700 (PDT)
Subject: DENVER POST: Student Database Called Orwellian
distributed with permission of THE DENVER POST.
URL: "www.denverpost.com".
---------- Begin Forwarded message ----------
Student database called Orwellian
Colo. plan a threat to privacy, critics say
Janet Bingham Denver Post Education Writer
06/30/96 Denver Post A-01 (Copyright 1996)
Imagine a researcher punching a button on a computer and pulling up
most of your child's school history without your consent - schools
attended, disciplinary records, physical or emotional disabilities and
more.
It could happen under proposals before the Colorado Board of Education
that for the first time would centralize certain information about
Colorado's 656,000 public school students.
Districts would furnish the information via the Internet to the
education department, accompanied by student name and Social Security
or other identifying number.
[....]
Colorado is among a growing number of states that are creating
electronic networks for student records. Both critics and advocates
foresee the evolution of a national network that would allow electronic
exchange of records among schools, social services, health and law
enforcement agencies, colleges, the military and even employers.
But some fear that even the embryonic system being proposed in Colorado
could threaten privacy; they say legal loopholes open the possibility
that personal information could be collected and shared without the
consent of students and their parents.
"Brick by innocent brick, the edifice of lifelong electronic student
dossiers is being constructed without any recognition by the general
public of what is being done," wrote Gordon Cook, a New Jersey-based
privacy advocate, in a recent report. Cook publishes a newsletter and
reports on privacy issues on the Internet.
"Privacy issues are debated politely from the sidelines," Cook wrote,
"while the technology juggernaut moves inexorably forward as children
entering kindergarten are asked for their Social Security numbers."
[....]
Others remain wary: "I'm an advocate of data banks and using the power
of technology to work through a lot of the paper shuffling we used to
do," said Dick Weber, head of the Colorado Association of School
Executives. "But there's a limit here. When it moves to
individualizing and centralizing personal data by name and Social
Security number, I have a problem with that," he said. "When you start
tracking people from district to district or place to place, you have a
point of intrusion into people's lives that I would have difficulty
with. ... It starts to smack of Orwell a little too much."
[....]
Information would include emotional, physical or mental disorders that
result in a child's placement in special education programs;
participation in gifted and talented or remedial programs; expulsion
and suspension history; type of school attended; transfer to or from a
private school or home school; residence in mental health, correctional
or detention facilities; or other factors indicating whether a student
attends his normal district school.
The names and identification numbers would allow a central computer to
track individual students from year to year, from school to school and
from district to district.
[....]
State board of education member Patti Johnson doesn't oppose letting
districts send statistical summaries electronically to the department.
But she said that can be done without including student
identification.
She would let schools send student records electronically to other
schools - but only with family consent. "Individual data should not be
released outside the building unless the student or parent requests
it," said Johnson, who is a parent.
[....]
Individual student records are protected under federal privacy laws and
cannot be made available to the public without parental consent.
But a student's disciplinary records may now be shared with officials
in other educational institutions without parental notification.
And critics noted that privacy laws already permit other exceptions:
School records can be disclosed without parental consent to school
accrediting agencies and organizations "conducting studies on behalf of
education agencies or institutions.
The records can also be released without consent to another school,
school district or postsecondary institution where th student was
enrolled or intends to enroll; agencies in the state's juvenile justice
system; "authorized representatives" of the U.S. comptroller general,
the U.S. secretary of education and the state department of education;
and state education officials "with a legitimate educational interest
in the records." Critics say that list can be broadly interpreted. But
the state board could adopt its own, more restrictive policy, Johnson
said.
nformation has historically been difficult to collect because it was
scattered and reports weren't standardized, so large-scale breaches of
privacy were rare.
"The more people who have access to such information, the more chances
for breaches of confidentiality," Johnson said.
Even the consulting firm that recommended a centralized data system for
Colorado and several other states acknowledges that the growing
practice of using Social Security numbers to identify students poses a
danger.
There is "the potential for developing a database that contains massive
amounts of information, making individuals subject to computerized
matches and searches without their awareness or consent," said the
report from CTMG Inc.
A parent cannot legally be required to give a student's Social Security
number; the state would have to come up with an alternate
identification number for those who decline.
[....]
But Weber warns of letting students "be dogged by an electronic pit
bull" - a record that follows them forever and may limit their ability
to start over in a new environment.
In Seattle, privacy advocate Janeane Dubuar worries about where student
information ends up. In that state, she said, high school graduates
from 36 school districts are being tracked into college, the military
and the workplace - without their consent - using Social Security
numbers.
Dubuar, a member of the Seattle Chapter of Computer Professionals for
Social Responsibility, also points to an incident in Kennewick, Wash.
Behavioral information on 4,000 children was sent, with names, to a
psychiatric care center that contracted with the district to screen for
"at-risk" students who might benefit from its programs. The data, she
said, was sent without parents' knowledge.
Colorado board member Johnson wants to make sure similar things can't
happen here. "If Colorado is to be in the forefront of computerized
data exchange in order to streamline the process of budgeting and
reporting, it must also be in the forefront of concerns about our right
to privacy."
---------- End Forwarded message ----------
------------------------------
From: DavidS@dk-online.dk (David Stodolsky)
Date: 04 Jul 1996 23:27:18 +0200
Subject: Automation of Contagion Vigilance - Draft ready
I now have ready a prepublication draft of "Automation of Contagion
Vigilance", which will appear in Methods of Information in Medicine.
The paper is directed toward the AIDS problem, but the approach is also
applicable to computer viruses and other contagion type processes.
Requests for the lastest version go to: DavidS@dk-online.dk
--
Automation of Contagion Vigilance
David Stodolsky
DavidS@dk-online.dk
Abstract
The very long latency between HIV infection and the appearance of AIDS
imposes extensive information processing requirements on partner
notification efforts. The apparently contradictory needs of maintaining
the right to privacy of infected persons, while simultaneously
providing information to persons at risk of infection, impose severe
security requirements. These requirements can be satisfied by a
Contagion Management System based upon networked personal computers of
a kind now becoming available. Security of information is based upon
cryptographic protocols that implement anonymous partner notification
(contact tracing) and privacy preserving negotiation. The proposed
scheme has the following properties: (a) Contact tracing is automated,
(b) contacts remain anonymous, (c) sensitive information is kept
private, and (d) risk-conscious users act as if sensitive information
was public. Optimal health protection can thus be obtained while
securing informational rights.
Here are main and sub headings for the files
with page numbers (double spaced lines):
1) Automation of Contagion Vigilance
Document Structure 4
Definitions 5
Individual Rights and Public Health 8
Partner Notification using Distributed Databases 10
Classes of Transmissible Agents 11
Informational agents demanding attention 11
Informational agents processible by machine 12
Communicating Diagnostic Information 13
Anonymous partner notification 13
Secure partner notification 17
Secure and anonymous partner notification 19
Possible Application Development 23
Rationale and Summary 25
2) Appendix: Privacy Preserving Negotiation.
Conditional Privacy 1
Single Stage Models 2
An ideal physical model 3
Asymptotically secure models 3
Amount of information released 4
Protocol implementation. 5
A Multistage Model 6
Risk of Compromise 10
------------------------------
From: taxhaven@ix.netcom.com (Adam Starchild )
Date: 05 Jul 1996 11:45:59 GMT
Subject: Vein Pattern Checking -- Anti-Fraud or Anti-Freedom?
Organization: Netcom
Vein Pattern Checking -- Anti-Fraud or Anti-Freedom?
We continue our look at the growing field of Biometry, the statistical
analysis of biological data.
The cashpoint machine (ATM) is rapidly turning into Big Brother's
testing ground for all manner of intrusive surveillance and detection
devices. The latest biometric project on the drawing board is
vein-pattern checking. Once again masquerading as an anti-fraud
precaution, this pointless device will scan a persons' hand as they
insert their card into the machine. By checking for unique patterns of
veins buried just beneath the skin's surface, the machine will be able
to tell if the card is being used by its true owner.
The Mouse does not have at its disposal, statistics showing exactly how
ATM machines are used fraudulently. However, common sense begs the
question, what is the point in all this? The vast majority of
non-violent ATM fraud must occur when people are foolish enough to
leave their PIN in their wallet or, worse still, written on their
card! These people don't deserve to be 'nannied' by the system.
Having their money fraudulently withdrawn serves as a valuable lesson
not to be so careless in future. The victims of violent ATM fraud are
usually frog- marched at knifepoint to the ATM, where they will use
their own hand to insert their own card - how does vein-pattern
checking solve this one? Then there's the other type of victim who is
forced to reveal their PIN under duress before the crook runs off with
their cashcard. The recent case in Britain of the London
police-mechanic, Alan Holmes, demonstrates the lengths that crooks will
go to for minuscule sums of money. The victim was tied to his own bed
and forced to reveal his PIN numbers to his attackers. The thieves
fled with his cards and withdrew 1200 pounds from the man's credit and
current accounts. The crooks did not bother to inform anyone that Mr
Holmes was tied to his bed. He died of dehydration after laying
undiscovered for 10 days. If criminals are prepared to kill for a few
hundred pounds, surely they won't be adverse to cutting off a person's
hand and taking it to the cashpoint?
This plot is thinly veiled. By installing biometric devices at such
vital points as ATMs, which practically everyone uses, you develop a
database of biometric information. Such information could never be
gleaned by telling the truth. "We want to form a police-state where we
can keep tabs on everyone and everything. In order to do this we need
to be able to identify everyone at the push of a button. Please supply
us with your fingerprints, retinal scans and a vein-pattern. Thank
you." Not likely is it? Though they still mange to get the sheep to
hand over such information by disguising it as anti-fraud measures.
Reprinted with permission from The Mouse Monitor, May, 1996, a magazine
for the customers of Scope International, whose website is at
http://www.britnet.co.uk/scope
Posted by Adam Starchild
The Offshore Entrepreneur at http://www.au.com/offshore
------------------------------
From: "Prof. L. P. Levine" <levine@blatz.cs.uwm.edu>
Date: 07 Jul 1996 09:19:56 -0500 (CDT)
Subject: Info on CPD [unchanged since 11/22/95]
Organization: University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee
The Computer Privacy Digest is a forum for discussion on the effect of
technology on privacy or vice versa. The digest is moderated and
gatewayed into the USENET newsgroup comp.society.privacy (Moderated).
Submissions should be sent to comp-privacy@uwm.edu and administrative
requests to comp-privacy-request@uwm.edu.
This digest is a forum with information contributed via Internet
eMail. Those who understand the technology also understand the ease of
forgery in this very free medium. Statements, therefore, should be
taken with a grain of salt and it should be clear that the actual
contributor might not be the person whose email address is posted at
the top. Any user who openly wishes to post anonymously should inform
the moderator at the beginning of the posting. He will comply.
If you read this from the comp.society.privacy newsgroup and wish to
contribute a message, you should simply post your contribution. As a
moderated newsgroup, attempts to post to the group are normally turned
into eMail to the submission address below.
On the other hand, if you read the digest eMailed to you, you generally
need only use the Reply feature of your mailer to contribute. If you
do so, it is best to modify the "Subject:" line of your mailing.
Contributions to CPD should be submitted, with appropriate, substantive
SUBJECT: line, otherwise they may be ignored. They must be relevant,
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nonrepetitious. Diversity is welcome, but not personal attacks. Do
not include entire previous messages in responses to them. Include
your name & legitimate Internet FROM: address, especially from
.UUCP and .BITNET folks. Anonymized mail is not accepted. All
contributions considered as personal comments; usual disclaimers
apply. All reuses of CPD material should respect stated copyright
notices, and should cite the sources explicitly; as a courtesy;
publications using CPD material should obtain permission from the
contributors.
Contributions generally are acknowledged within 24 hours of
submission. If selected, they are printed within two or three days.
The moderator reserves the right to delete extraneous quoted material.
He may change the Subject: line of an article in order to make it
easier for the reader to follow a discussion. He will not, however,
alter or edit the text except for purely technical reasons.
A library of back issues is available on ftp.cs.uwm.edu [129.89.9.18].
Login as "ftp" with password identifying yourid@yoursite. The archives
are in the directory "pub/comp-privacy".
People with gopher capability can most easily access the library at
gopher.cs.uwm.edu.
Web browsers will find it at gopher://gopher.cs.uwm.edu.
---------------------------------+-----------------------------------------
Leonard P. Levine | Moderator of: Computer Privacy Digest
Professor of Computer Science | and comp.society.privacy
University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee | Post: comp-privacy@uwm.edu
Box 784, Milwaukee WI 53201 | Information: comp-privacy-request@uwm.edu
| Gopher: gopher.cs.uwm.edu
levine@cs.uwm.edu | Web: gopher://gopher.cs.uwm.edu
---------------------------------+-----------------------------------------
------------------------------
End of Computer Privacy Digest V9 #002
******************************
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