LIBRARY OF THE FUTURE (R) First Edition Ver. 4.02 
 Critique of Pure Reason                                          Kant Immanuel         

                                                                            
                                                                            
                                                                            
                                                                            
                                      1781                                  
                                                                            
                          THE CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON                       
                                                                            
                                by Immanuel Kant                            
                                                                            
                       translated by J. M. D. Meiklejohn                    
                                                                            
                                                                            
                                                                            
                                                                            
                                                                            
                                                                            
                                                                            
                                                                            
 Electronically Enhanced Text (c) Copyright 1991, World Library, Inc.       
                                                                            
PREFACE_FIRST_EDITION                                                       
            PREFACE TO THE FIRST EDITION, 1781                              
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  Human reason, in one sphere of its cognition, is called upon to           
consider questions, which it cannot decline, as they are presented          
by its own nature, but which it cannot answer, as they transcend every      
faculty of the mind.                                                        
  It falls into this difficulty without any fault of its own. It            
begins with principles, which cannot be dispensed with in the field of      
experience, and the truth and sufficiency of which are, at the same         
time, insured by experience. With these principles it rises, in             
obedience to the laws of its own nature, to ever higher and more            
remote conditions. But it quickly discovers that, in this way, its          
labours must remain ever incomplete, because new questions never cease      
to present themselves; and thus it finds itself compelled to have           
recourse to principles which transcend the region of experience, while      
they are regarded by common sense without distrust. It thus falls into      
confusion and contradictions, from which it conjectures the presence        
of latent errors, which, however, it is unable to discover, because         
the principles it employs, transcending the limits of experience,           
cannot be tested by that criterion. The arena of these endless              
contests is called Metaphysic.                                              
  Time was, when she was the queen of all the sciences; and, if we          
take the will for the deed, she certainly deserves, so far as               
regards the high importance of her object-matter, this title of             
honour. Now, it is the fashion of the time to heap contempt and             
scorn upon her; and the matron mourns, forlorn and forsaken, like           
Hecuba:                                                                     
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                  Modo maxima rerum,                                        
                                        {PREFACE_FIRST_EDITION ^paragraph 5}
                Tot generis, natisque potens...                             
                Nunc trahor exul, inops.*                                   
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  *Ovid, Metamorphoses. [xiii, "But late on the pinnacle of fame,           
strong in my many sons. now exiled, penniless."]                            
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                                       {PREFACE_FIRST_EDITION ^paragraph 10}
  At first, her government, under the administration of the                 
dogmatists, was an absolute despotism. But, as the legislative              
continued to show traces of the ancient barbaric rule, her empire           
gradually broke up, and intestine wars introduced the reign of              
anarchy; while the sceptics, like nomadic tribes, who hate a permanent      
habitation and settled mode of living, attacked from time to time           
those who had organized themselves into civil communities. But their        
number was, very happily, small; and thus they could not entirely           
put a stop to the exertions of those who persisted in raising new           
edifices, although on no settled or uniform plan. In recent times           
the hope dawned upon us of seeing those disputes settled, and the           
legitimacy of her claims established by a kind of physiology of the         
human understanding- that of the celebrated Locke. But it was found         
that- although it was affirmed that this so-called queen could not          
refer her descent to any higher source than that of common experience,      
a circumstance which necessarily brought suspicion on her claims- as        
this genealogy was incorrect, she persisted in the advancement of           
her claims to sovereignty. Thus metaphysics necessarily fell back into      
the antiquated and rotten constitution of dogmatism, and again              
became obnoxious to the contempt from which efforts had been made to        
save it. At present, as all methods, according to the general               
persuasion, have been tried in vain, there reigns nought but weariness      
and complete indifferentism- the mother of chaos and night in the           
scientific world, but at the same time the source of, or at least           
the prelude to, the re-creation and reinstallation of a science,            
when it has fallen into confusion, obscurity, and disuse from ill           
directed effort.                                                            
  For it is in reality vain to profess indifference in regard to            
such inquiries, the object of which cannot be indifferent to humanity.      
Besides, these pretended indifferentists, however much they may try to      
disguise themselves by the assumption of a popular style and by             
changes on the language of the schools, unavoidably fall into               
metaphysical declarations and propositions, which they profess to           
regard with so much contempt. At the same time, this indifference,          
which has arisen in the world of science, and which relates to that         
kind of knowledge which we should wish to see destroyed the last, is a      
phenomenon that well deserves our attention and reflection. It is           
plainly not the effect of the levity, but of the matured judgement* of      
the age, which refuses to be any longer entertained with illusory           
knowledge, It is, in fact, a call to reason, again to undertake the         
most laborious of all tasks- that of self-examination- and to               
establish a tribunal, which may secure it in its well-grounded claims,      
while it pronounces against all baseless assumptions and                    
pretensions, not in an arbitrary manner, but according to its own           
eternal and unchangeable laws. This tribunal is nothing less than           
the critical investigation of pure reason.                                  
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  *We very often hear complaints of the shallowness of the present          
age, and of the decay of profound science. But I do not think that          
those which rest upon a secure foundation, such as mathematics,             
physical science, etc., in the least deserve this reproach, but that        
they rather maintain their ancient fame, and in the latter case,            
indeed, far surpass it. The same would be the case with the other           
kinds of cognition, if their principles were but firmly established.        
In the absence of this security, indifference, doubt, and finally,          
severe criticism are rather signs of a profound habit of thought.           
Our age is the age of criticism, to which everything must be                
subjected. The sacredness of religion, and the authority of                 
legislation, are by many regarded as grounds of exemption from the          
examination of this tribunal. But, if they on they are exempted,            
they become the subjects of just suspicion, and cannot lay claim to         
sincere respect, which reason accords only to that which has stood the      
test of a free and public examination.                                      
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                                       {PREFACE_FIRST_EDITION ^paragraph 15}
  I do not mean by this a criticism of books and systems, but a             
critical inquiry into the faculty of reason, with reference to the          
cognitions to which it strives to attain without the aid of                 
experience; in other words, the solution of the question regarding the      
possibility or impossibility of metaphysics, and the determination          
of the origin, as well as of the extent and limits of this science.         
All this must be done on the basis of principles.                           
  This path- the only one now remaining- has been entered upon by           
me; and I flatter myself that I have, in this way, discovered the           
cause of- and consequently the mode of removing- all the errors             
which have hitherto set reason at variance with itself, in the              
sphere of non-empirical thought. I have not returned an evasive answer      
to the questions of reason, by alleging the inability and limitation        
of the faculties of the mind; I have, on the contrary, examined them        
completely in the light of principles, and, after having discovered         
the cause of the doubts and contradictions into which reason fell,          
have solved them to its perfect satisfaction. It is true, these             
questions have not been solved as dogmatism, in its vain fancies and        
desires, had expected; for it can only be satisfied by the exercise of      
magical arts, and of these I have no knowledge. But neither do these        
come within the compass of our mental powers; and it was the duty of        
philosophy to destroy the illusions which had their origin in               
misconceptions, whatever darling hopes and valued expectations may          
be ruined by its explanations. My chief aim in this work has been           
thoroughness; and I make bold to say that there is not a single             
metaphysical problem that does not find its solution, or at least           
the key to its solution, here. Pure reason is a perfect unity; and          
therefore, if the if the principle presented by it prove to be              
insufficient for the solution of even a single one of those                 
questions to which the very nature of reason gives birth, we must           
reject it, as we could not be perfectly certain of its sufficiency          
in the case of the others.                                                  
  While I say this, I think I see upon the countenance of the reader        
signs of dissatisfaction mingled with contempt, when he hears               
declarations which sound so boastful and extravagant; and yet they are      
beyond comparison more moderate than those advanced by the commonest        
author of the commonest philosophical programme, in which the               
dogmatist professes to demonstrate the simple nature of the soul, or        
the necessity of a primal being. Such a dogmatist promises to extend        
human knowledge beyond the limits of possible experience; while I           
humbly confess that this is completely beyond my power. Instead of any      
such attempt, I confine myself to the examination of reason alone           
and its pure thought; and I do not need to seek far for the                 
sum-total of its cognition, because it has its seat in my own mind.         
Besides, common logic presents me with a complete and systematic            
catalogue of all the simple operations of reason; and it is my task to      
answer the question how far reason can go, without the material             
presented and the aid furnished by experience.                              
  So much for the completeness and thoroughness necessary in the            
execution of the present task. The aims set before us are not               
arbitrarily proposed, but are imposed upon us by the nature of              
cognition itself.                                                           
  The above remarks relate to the matter of our critical inquiry. As        
regards the form, there are two indispensable conditions, which any         
one who undertakes so difficult a task as that of a critique of pure        
reason, is bound to fulfil. These conditions are certitude and              
clearness.                                                                  
                                       {PREFACE_FIRST_EDITION ^paragraph 20}
  As regards certitude, I have fully convinced myself that, in this         
sphere of thought, opinion is perfectly inadmissible, and that              
everything which bears the least semblance of an hypothesis must be         
excluded, as of no value in such discussions. For it is a necessary         
condition of every cognition that is to be established upon a priori        
grounds that it shall be held to be absolutely necessary; much more is      
this the case with an attempt to determine all pure a priori                
cognition, and to furnish the standard- and consequently an example-        
of all apodeictic (philosophical) certitude. Whether I have                 
succeeded in what I professed to do, it is for the reader to                
determine; it is the author's business merely to adduce grounds and         
reasons, without determining what influence these ought to have on the      
mind of his judges. But, lest anything he may have said may become the      
innocent cause of doubt in their minds, or tend to weaken the effect        
which his arguments might otherwise produce- he may be allowed to           
point out those passages which may occasion mistrust or difficulty,         
although these do not concern the main purpose of the present work. He      
does this solely with the view of removing from the mind of the reader      
any doubts which might affect his judgement of the work as a whole,         
and in regard to its ultimate aim.                                          
  I know no investigations more necessary for a full insight into           
the nature of the faculty which we call understanding, and at the same      
time for the determination of the rules and limits of its use, than         
those undertaken in the second chapter of the "Transcendental               
Analytic," under the title of "Deduction of the Pure Conceptions of         
the Understanding"; and they have also cost me by far the greatest          
labour- labour which, I hope, will not remain uncompensated. The            
view there taken, which goes somewhat deeply into the subject, has two      
sides, The one relates to the objects of the pure understanding, and        
is intended to demonstrate and to render comprehensible the                 
objective validity of its a priori conceptions; and it forms for            
this reason an essential part of the Critique. The other considers the      
pure understanding itself, its possibility and its powers of                
cognition- that is, from a subjective point of view; and, although          
this exposition is of great importance, it does not belong essentially      
to the main purpose of the work, because the grand question is what         
and how much can reason and understanding, apart from experience,           
cognize, and not, how is the faculty of thought itself possible? As         
the latter is an, inquiry into the cause of a given effect, and has         
thus in it some semblance of an hypothesis (although, as I shall            
show on another occasion, this is really not the fact), it would            
seem that, in the present instance, I had allowed myself to enounce         
a mere opinion, and that the reader must therefore be at liberty to         
hold a different opinion. But I beg to remind him that, if my               
subjective deduction does not produce in his mind the conviction of         
its certitude at which I aimed, the objective deduction, with which         
alone the present work is properly concerned, is in every respect           
satisfactory.                                                               
  As regards clearness, the reader has a right to demand, in the first      
place, discursive or logical clearness, that is, on the basis of            
conceptions, and, secondly, intuitive or aesthetic clearness, by means      
of intuitions, that is, by examples or other modes of illustration          
in concreto. I have done what I could for the first kind of                 
intelligibility. This was essential to my purpose; and it thus              
became the accidental cause of my inability to do complete justice          
to the second requirement. I have been almost always at a loss, during      
the progress of this work, how to settle this question. Examples and        
illustrations always appeared to me necessary, and, in the first            
sketch of the Critique, naturally fell into their proper places. But I      
very soon became aware of the magnitude of my task, and the numerous        
problems with which I should be engaged; and, as I perceived that this      
critical investigation would, even if delivered in the driest               
scholastic manner, be far from being brief, I found it unadvisable          
to enlarge it still more with examples and explanations, which are          
necessary only from a popular point of view. I was induced to take          
this course from the consideration also that the present work is not        
intended for popular use, that those devoted to science do not require      
such helps, although they are always acceptable, and that they would        
have materially interfered with my present purpose. Abbe Terrasson          
remarks with great justice that, if we estimate the size of a work,         
not from the number of its pages, but from the time which we require        
to make ourselves master of it, it may be said of many a book that          
it would be much shorter, if it were not so short. On the other             
hand, as regards the comprehensibility of a system of speculative           
cognition, connected under a single principle, we may say with equal        
justice: many a book would have been much clearer, if it had not            
been intended to be so very clear. For explanations and examples,           
and other helps to intelligibility, aid us in the comprehension of          
parts, but they distract the attention, dissipate the mental power          
of the reader, and stand in the way of his forming a clear                  
conception of the whole; as he cannot attain soon enough to a survey        
of the system, and the colouring and embellishments bestowed upon it        
prevent his observing its articulation or organization- which is the        
most important consideration with him, when he comes to judge of its        
unity and stability.                                                        
  The reader must naturally have a strong inducement to co-operate          
with the present author, if he has formed the intention of erecting         
a complete and solid edifice of metaphysical science, according to the      
plan now laid before him. Metaphysics, as here represented, is the          
only science which admits of completion- and with little labour, if it      
is united, in a short time; so that nothing will be left to future          
generations except the task of illustrating and applying it                 
didactically. For this science is nothing more than the inventory of        
all that is given us by pure reason, systematically arranged.               
Nothing can escape our notice; for what reason produces from itself         
cannot lie concealed, but must be brought to the light by reason            
itself, so soon as we have discovered the common principle of the           
ideas we seek. The perfect unity of this kind of cognitions, which are      
based upon pure conceptions, and uninfluenced by any empirical              
element, or any peculiar intuition leading to determinate                   
experience, renders this completeness not only practicable, but also        
necessary.                                                                  
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                                       {PREFACE_FIRST_EDITION ^paragraph 25}
     Tecum habita, et noris quam sit tibi curta supellex.*                  
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  *Persius. [Satirae iv. 52. "Dwell with yourself, and you will know        
how short your household stuff is."                                         
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  Such a system of pure speculative reason I hope to be able to             
publish under the title of Metaphysic of Nature. The content of this        
work (which will not be half so long) will be very much richer than         
that of the present Critique, which has to discover the sources of          
this cognition and expose the conditions of its possibility, and at         
the same time to clear and level a fit foundation for the scientific        
edifice. In the present work, I look for the patient hearing and the        
impartiality of a judge; in the other, for the good-will and                
assistance of a co-labourer. For, however complete the list of              
principles for this system may be in the Critique, the correctness          
of the system requires that no deduced conceptions should be absent.        
These cannot be presented a priori, but must be gradually                   
discovered; and, while the synthesis of conceptions has been fully          
exhausted in the Critique, it is necessary that, in the proposed work,      
the same should be the case with their analysis. But this will be           
rather an amusement than a labour.                                          
                                                                            
PREFACE_SECOND_EDITION                                                      
             PREFACE TO THE SECOND EDITION, 1787                            
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  Whether the treatment of that portion of our knowledge which lies         
within the province of pure reason advances with that undeviating           
certainty which characterizes the progress of science, we shall be          
at no loss to determine. If we find those who are engaged in                
metaphysical pursuits, unable to come to an understanding as to the         
method which they ought to follow; if we find them, after the most          
elaborate preparations, invariably brought to a stand before the            
goal is reached, and compelled to retrace their steps and strike            
into fresh paths, we may then feel quite sure that they are far from        
having attained to the certainty of scientific progress and may rather      
be said to be merely groping about in the dark. In these circumstances      
we shall render an important service to reason if we succeed in simply      
indicating the path along which it must travel, in order to arrive          
at any results- even if it should be found necessary to abandon many        
of those aims which, without reflection, have been proposed for its         
attainment.                                                                 
  That logic has advanced in this sure course, even from the                
earliest times, is apparent from the fact that, since Aristotle, it         
has been unable to advance a step and, thus, to all appearance has          
reached its completion. For, if some of the moderns have thought to         
enlarge its domain by introducing psychological discussions on the          
mental faculties, such as imagination and wit, metaphysical,                
discussions on the origin of knowledge and the different kinds of           
certitude, according to the difference of the objects (idealism,            
scepticism, and so on), or anthropological discussions on                   
prejudices, their causes and remedies: this attempt, on the part of         
these authors, only shows their ignorance of the peculiar nature of         
logical science. We do not enlarge but disfigure the sciences when          
we lose sight of their respective limits and allow them to run into         
one another. Now logic is enclosed within limits which admit of             
perfectly clear definition; it is a science which has for its object        
nothing but the exposition and proof of the formal laws of all              
thought, whether it be a priori or empirical, whatever be its origin        
or its object, and whatever the difficulties- natural or accidental-        
which it encounters in the human mind.                                      
  The early success of logic must be attributed exclusively to the          
narrowness of its field, in which abstraction may, or rather must,          
be made of all the objects of cognition with their characteristic           
distinctions, and in which the understanding has only to deal with          
itself and with its own forms. It is, obviously, a much more difficult      
task for reason to strike into the sure path of science, where it           
has to deal not simply with itself, but with objects external to            
itself. Hence, logic is properly only a propaedeutic- forms, as it          
were, the vestibule of the sciences; and while it is necessary to           
enable us to form a correct judgement with regard to the various            
branches of knowledge, still the acquisition of real, substantive           
knowledge is to be sought only in the sciences properly so called,          
that is, in the objective sciences.                                         
  Now these sciences, if they can be termed rational at all, must           
contain elements of a priori cognition, and this cognition may stand        
in a twofold relation to its object. Either it may have to determine        
the conception of the object- which must be supplied extraneously,          
or it may have to establish its reality. The former is theoretical,         
the latter practical, rational cognition. In both, the pure or a            
priori element must be treated first, and must be carefully                 
distinguished from that which is supplied from other sources. Any           
other method can only lead to irremediable confusion.                       
  Mathematics and physics are the two theoretical sciences which            
have to determine their objects a priori. The former is purely a            
priori, the latter is partially so, but is also dependent on other          
sources of cognition.                                                       
                                       {PREFACE_SECOND_EDITION ^paragraph 5}
  In the earliest times of which history affords us any record,             
mathematics had already entered on the sure course of science, among        
that wonderful nation, the Greeks. Still it is not to be supposed that      
it was as easy for this science to strike into, or rather to construct      
for itself, that royal road, as it was for logic, in which reason           
has only to deal with itself. On the contrary, I believe that it            
must have remained long- chiefly among the Egyptians- in the stage          
of blind groping after its true aims and destination, and that it           
was revolutionized by the happy idea of one man, who struck out and         
determined for all time the path which this science must follow, and        
which admits of an indefinite advancement. The history of this              
intellectual revolution- much more important in its results than the        
discovery of the passage round the celebrated Cape of Good Hope- and        
of its author, has not been preserved. But Diogenes Laertius, in            
naming the supposed discoverer of some of the simplest elements of          
geometrical demonstration- elements which, according to the ordinary        
opinion, do not even require to be proved- makes it apparent that           
the change introduced by the first indication of this new path, must        
have seemed of the utmost importance to the mathematicians of that          
age, and it has thus been secured against the chance of oblivion. A         
new light must have flashed on the mind of the first man (Thales, or        
whatever may have been his name) who demonstrated the properties of         
the isosceles triangle. For he found that it was not sufficient to          
meditate on the figure, as it lay before his eyes, or the conception        
of it, as it existed in his mind, and thus endeavour to get at the          
knowledge of its properties, but that it was necessary to produce           
these properties, as it were, by a positive a priori construction; and      
that, in order to arrive with certainty at a priori cognition, he must      
not attribute to the object any other properties than those which           
necessarily followed from that which he had himself, in accordance          
with his conception, placed in the object.                                  
  A much longer period elapsed before physics entered on the highway        
of science. For it is only about a century and a half since the wise        
Bacon gave a new direction to physical studies, or rather- as others        
were already on the right track- imparted fresh vigour to the               
pursuit of this new direction. Here, too, as in the case of                 
mathematics, we find evidence of a rapid intellectual revolution. In        
the remarks which follow I shall confine myself to the empirical            
side of natural science.                                                    
  When Galilei experimented with balls of a definite weight on the          
inclined plane, when Torricelli caused the air to sustain a weight          
which he had calculated beforehand to be equal to that of a definite        
column of water, or when Stahl, at a later period, converted metals         
into lime, and reconverted lime into metal, by the addition and             
subtraction of certain elements;* a light broke upon all natural            
philosophers. They learned that reason only perceives that which it         
produces after its own design; that it must not be content to               
follow, as it were, in the leading-strings of nature, but must proceed      
in advance with principles of judgement according to unvarying laws,        
and compel nature to reply its questions. For accidental observations,      
made according to no preconceived plan, cannot be united under a            
necessary law. But it is this that reason seeks for and requires. It        
is only the principles of reason which can give to concordant               
phenomena the validity of laws, and it is only when experiment is           
directed by these rational principles that it can have any real             
utility. Reason must approach nature with the view, indeed, of              
receiving information from it, not, however, in the character of a          
pupil, who listens to all that his master chooses to tell him, but          
in that of a judge, who compels the witnesses to reply to those             
questions which he himself thinks fit to propose. To this single            
idea must the revolution be ascribed, by which, after groping in the        
dark for so many centuries, natural science was at length conducted         
into the path of certain progress.                                          
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  *I do not here follow with exactness the history of the experimental      
method, of which, indeed, the first steps are involved in some              
obscurity.                                                                  
                                      {PREFACE_SECOND_EDITION ^paragraph 10}
-                                                                           
  We come now to metaphysics, a purely speculative science, which           
occupies a completely isolated position and is entirely independent of      
the teachings of experience. It deals with mere conceptions- not, like      
mathematics, with conceptions applied to intuition- and in it,              
reason is the pupil of itself alone. It is the oldest of the sciences,      
and would still survive, even if all the rest were swallowed up in the      
abyss of an all-destroying barbarism. But it has not yet had the            
good fortune to attain to the sure scientific method. This will be          
apparent; if we apply the tests which we proposed at the outset. We         
find that reason perpetually comes to a stand, when it attempts to          
gain a priori the perception even of those laws which the most              
common experience confirms. We find it compelled to retrace its             
steps in innumerable instances, and to abandon the path on which it         
had entered, because this does not lead to the desired result. We           
find, too, that those who are engaged in metaphysical pursuits are far      
from being able to agree among themselves, but that, on the                 
contrary, this science appears to furnish an arena specially adapted        
for the display of skill or the exercise of strength in mock-contests-      
a field in which no combatant ever yet succeeded in gaining an inch of      
ground, in which, at least, no victory was ever yet crowned with            
permanent possession.                                                       
  This leads us to inquire why it is that, in metaphysics, the sure         
path of science has not hitherto been found. Shall we suppose that          
it is impossible to discover it? Why then should nature have visited        
our reason with restless aspirations after it, as if it were one of         
our weightiest concerns? Nay, more, how little cause should we have to      
place confidence in our reason, if it abandons us in a matter about         
which, most of all, we desire to know the truth- and not only so,           
but even allures us to the pursuit of vain phantoms, only to betray us      
in the end? Or, if the path has only hitherto been missed, what             
indications do we possess to guide us in a renewed investigation,           
and to enable us to hope for greater success than has fallen to the         
lot of our predecessors?                                                    
  It appears to me that the examples of mathematics and natural             
philosophy, which, as we have seen, were brought into their present         
condition by a sudden revolution, are sufficiently remarkable to fix        
our attention on the essential circumstances of the change which has        
proved so advantageous to them, and to induce us to make the                
experiment of imitating them, so far as the analogy which, as rational      
sciences, they bear to metaphysics may permit. It has hitherto been         
assumed that our cognition must conform to the objects; but all             
attempts to ascertain anything about these objects a priori, by             
means of conceptions, and thus to extend the range of our knowledge,        
have been rendered abortive by this assumption. Let us then make the        
experiment whether we may not be more successful in metaphysics, if we      
assume that the objects must conform to our cognition. This appears,        
at all events, to accord better with the possibility of our gaining         
the end we have in view, that is to say, of arriving at the                 
cognition of objects a priori, of determining something with respect        
to these objects, before they are given to us. We here propose to do        
just what Copernicus did in attempting to explain the celestial             
movements. When he found that he could make no progress by assuming         
that all the heavenly bodies revolved round the spectator, he reversed      
the process, and tried the experiment of assuming that the spectator        
revolved, while the stars remained at rest. We may make the same            
experiment with regard to the intuition of objects. If the intuition        
must conform to the nature of the objects, I do not see how we can          
know anything of them a priori. If, on the other hand, the object           
conforms to the nature of our faculty of intuition, I can then              
easily conceive the possibility of such an a priori knowledge. Now          
as I cannot rest in the mere intuitions, but- if they are to become         
cognitions- must refer them, as representations, to something, as           
object, and must determine the latter by means of the former, here          
again there are two courses open to me. Either, first, I may assume         
that the conceptions, by which I effect this determination, conform to      
the object- and in this case I am reduced to the same perplexity as         
before; or secondly, I may assume that the objects, or, which is the        
same thing, that experience, in which alone as given objects they           
are cognized, conform to my conceptions- and then I am at no loss           
how to proceed. For experience itself is a mode of cognition which          
requires understanding. Before objects, are given to me, that is, a         
priori, I must presuppose in myself laws of the understanding which         
are expressed in conceptions a priori. To these conceptions, then, all      
the objects of experience must necessarily conform. Now there are           
objects which reason thinks, and that necessarily, but which cannot be      
given in experience, or, at least, cannot be given so as reason thinks      
them. The attempt to think these objects will hereafter furnish an          
excellent test of the new method of thought which we have adopted, and      
which is based on the principle that we only cognize in things a            
priori that which we ourselves place in them.*                              
-                                                                           
                                      {PREFACE_SECOND_EDITION ^paragraph 15}
  *This method, accordingly, which we have borrowed from the natural        
philosopher, consists in seeking for the elements of pure reason in         
that which admits of confirmation or refutation by experiment. Now the      
propositions of pure reason, especially when they transcend the limits      
of possible experience, do not admit of our making any experiment with      
their objects, as in natural science. Hence, with regard to those           
conceptions and principles which we assume a priori, our only course        
ill be to view them from two different sides. We must regard one and        
the same conception, on the one hand, in relation to experience as          
an object of the senses and of the understanding, on the other hand,        
in relation to reason, isolated and transcending the limits of              
experience, as an object of mere thought. Now if we find that, when we      
regard things from this double point of view, the result is in harmony      
with the principle of pure reason, but that, when we regard them            
from a single point of view, reason is involved in self-contradiction,      
then the experiment will establish the correctness of this                  
distinction.                                                                
-                                                                           
  This attempt succeeds as well as we could desire, and promises to         
metaphysics, in its first part- that is, where it is occupied with          
conceptions a priori, of which the corresponding objects may be             
given in experience- the certain course of science. For by this new         
method we are enabled perfectly to explain the possibility of a priori      
cognition, and, what is more, to demonstrate satisfactorily the laws        
which lie a priori at the foundation of nature, as the sum of the           
objects of experience- neither of which was possible according to           
the procedure hitherto followed. But from this deduction of the             
faculty of a priori cognition in the first part of metaphysics, we          
derive a surprising result, and one which, to all appearance,               
militates against the great end of metaphysics, as treated in the           
second part. For we come to the conclusion that our faculty of              
cognition is unable to transcend the limits of possible experience;         
and yet this is precisely the most essential object of this science.        
The estimate of our rational cognition a priori at which we arrive          
is that it has only to do with phenomena, and that things in                
themselves, while possessing a real existence, lie beyond its               
sphere. Here we are enabled to put the justice of this estimate to the      
test. For that which of necessity impels us to transcend the limits of      
experience and of all phenomena is the unconditioned, which reason          
absolutely requires in things as they are in themselves, in order to        
complete the series of conditions. Now, if it appears that when, on         
the one hand, we assume that our cognition conforms to its objects          
as things in themselves, the unconditioned cannot be thought without        
contradiction, and that when, on the other hand, we assume that our         
representation of things as they are given to us, does not conform          
to these things as they are in themselves, but that these objects,          
as phenomena, conform to our mode of representation, the contradiction      
disappears: we shall then be convinced of the truth of that which we        
began by assuming for the sake of experiment; we may look upon it as        
established that the unconditioned does not lie in things as we know        
them, or as they are given to us, but in things as they are in              
themselves, beyond the range of our cognition.*                             
-                                                                           
  *This experiment of pure reason has a great similarity to that of         
the chemists, which they term the experiment of reduction, or, more         
usually, the synthetic process. The analysis of the metaphysician           
separates pure cognition a priori into two heterogeneous elements,          
viz., the cognition of things as phenomena, and of things in                
themselves. Dialectic combines these again into harmony with the            
necessary rational idea of the unconditioned, and finds that this           
harmony never results except through the above distinction, which           
is, therefore, concluded to be just.                                        
                                      {PREFACE_SECOND_EDITION ^paragraph 20}
-                                                                           
  But, after we have thus denied the power of speculative reason to         
make any progress in the sphere of the supersensible, it still remains      
for our consideration whether data do not exist in practical cognition      
which may enable us to determine the transcendent conception of the         
unconditioned, to rise beyond the limits of all possible experience         
from a practical point of view, and thus to satisfy the great ends          
of metaphysics. Speculative reason has thus, at least, made room for        
such an extension of our knowledge: and, if it must leave this space        
vacant, still it does not rob us of the liberty to fill it up, if we        
can, by means of practical data- nay, it even challenges us to make         
the attempt.*                                                               
-                                                                           
  *So the central laws of the movements of the heavenly bodies              
established the truth of that which Copernicus, first, assumed only as      
a hypothesis, and, at the same time, brought to light that invisible        
force (Newtonian attraction) which holds the universe together. The         
latter would have remained forever undiscovered, if Copernicus had not      
ventured on the experiment- contrary to the senses but still just-          
of looking for the observed movements not in the heavenly bodies,           
but in the spectator. In this Preface I treat the new metaphysical          
method as a hypothesis with the view of rendering apparent the first        
attempts at such a change of method, which are always hypothetical.         
But in the Critique itself it will be demonstrated, not                     
hypothetically, but apodeictically, from the nature of our                  
representations of space and time. and from the elementary conceptions      
of the understanding.                                                       
-                                                                           
                                      {PREFACE_SECOND_EDITION ^paragraph 25}
  This attempt to introduce a complete revolution in the procedure          
of metaphysics, after the example of the geometricians and natural          
philosophers, constitutes the aim of the Critique of Pure                   
Speculative Reason. It is a treatise on the method to be followed, not      
a system of the science itself. But, at the same time, it marks out         
and defines both the external boundaries and the internal structure of      
this science. For pure speculative reason has this peculiarity,             
that, in choosing the various objects of thought, it is able to define      
the limits of its own faculties, and even to give a complete                
enumeration of the possible modes of proposing problems to itself, and      
thus to sketch out the entire system of metaphysics. For, on the one        
hand, in cognition a priori, nothing must be attributed to the objects      
but what the thinking subject derives from itself; and, on the other        
hand, reason is, in regard to the principles of cognition, a perfectly      
distinct, independent unity, in which, as in an organized body,             
every member exists for the sake of the others, and all for the sake        
of each, so that no principle can be viewed, with safety, in one            
relationship, unless it is, at the same time, viewed in relation to         
the total use of pure reason. Hence, too, metaphysics has this              
singular advantage- an advantage which falls to the lot of no other         
science which has to do with objects- that, if once it is conducted         
into the sure path of science, by means of this criticism, it can then      
take in the whole sphere of its cognitions, and can thus complete           
its work, and leave it for the use of posterity, as a capital which         
can never receive fresh accessions. For metaphysics has to deal only        
with principles and with the limitations of its own employment as           
determined by these principles. To this perfection it is, therefore,        
bound, as the fundamental science, to attain, and to it the maxim           
may justly be applied:                                                      
-                                                                           
    Nil actum reputans, si quid superesset agendum.*                        
-                                                                           
  *"He considered nothing done, so long as anything remained to be          
done."                                                                      
                                      {PREFACE_SECOND_EDITION ^paragraph 30}
-                                                                           
  But, it will be asked, what kind of a treasure is this that we            
propose to bequeath to posterity? What is the real value of this            
system of metaphysics, purified by criticism, and thereby reduced to a      
permanent condition? A cursory view of the present work will lead to        
the supposition that its use is merely negative, that it only serves        
to warn us against venturing, with speculative reason, beyond the           
limits of experience. This is, in fact, its primary use. But this,          
at once, assumes a positive value, when we observe that the principles      
with which speculative reason endeavours to transcend its limits            
lead inevitably, not to the extension, but to the contraction of the        
use of reason, inasmuch as they threaten to extend the limits of            
sensibility, which is their proper sphere, over the entire realm of         
thought and, thus, to supplant the pure (practical) use of reason.          
So far, then, as this criticism is occupied in confining speculative        
reason within its proper bounds, it is only negative; but, inasmuch as      
it thereby, at the same time, removes an obstacle which impedes and         
even threatens to destroy the use of practical reason, it possesses         
a positive and very important value. In order to admit this, we have        
only to be convinced that there is an absolutely necessary use of pure      
reason- the moral use- in which it inevitably transcends the limits of      
sensibility, without the aid of speculation, requiring only to be           
insured against the effects of a speculation which would involve it in      
contradiction with itself. To deny the positive advantage of the            
service which this criticism renders us would be as absurd as. to           
maintain that the system of police is productive of no positive             
benefit, since its main business is to prevent the violence which           
citizen has to apprehend from citizen, that so each may pursue his          
vocation in peace and security. That space and time are only forms          
of sensible intuition, and hence are only conditions of the                 
existence of things as phenomena; that, moreover, we have no                
conceptions of the understanding, and, consequently, no elements for        
the cognition of things, except in so far as a corresponding intuition      
can be given to these conceptions; that, accordingly, we can have no        
cognition of an object, as a thing in itself, but only as an object of      
sensible intuition, that is, as phenomenon- all this is proved in           
the analytical part of the Critique; and from this the limitation of        
all possible speculative cognition to the mere objects of                   
experience, follows as a necessary result. At the same time, it must        
be carefully borne in mind that, while we surrender the power of            
cognizing, we still reserve the power of thinking objects, as things        
in themselves.* For, otherwise, we should require to affirm the             
existence of an appearance, without something that appears- which           
would be absurd. Now let us suppose, for a moment, that we had not          
undertaken this criticism and, accordingly, had not drawn the               
necessary distinction between things as objects of experience and           
things as they are in themselves. The principle of causality, and,          
by consequence, the mechanism of nature as determined by causality,         
would then have absolute validity in relation to all things as              
efficient causes. I should then be unable to assert, with regard to         
one and the same being, e.g., the human soul, that its will is free,        
and yet, at the same time, subject to natural necessity, that is,           
not free, without falling into a palpable contradiction, for in both        
propositions I should take the soul in the same signification, as a         
thing in general, as a thing in itself- as, without previous                
criticism, I could not but take it. Suppose now, on the other hand,         
that we have undertaken this criticism, and have learnt that an object      
may be taken in two senses, first, as a phenomenon, secondly, as a          
thing in itself; and that, according to the deduction of the                
conceptions of the understanding, the principle of causality has            
reference only to things in the first sense. We then see how it does        
not involve any contradiction to assert, on the one hand, that the          
will, in the phenomenal sphere- in visible action- is necessarily           
obedient to the law of nature, and, in so far, not free; and, on the        
other hand, that, as belonging to a thing in itself, it is not subject      
to that law, and, accordingly, is free. Now, it is true that I cannot,      
by means of speculative reason, and still less by empirical                 
observation, cognize my soul as a thing in itself and consequently,         
cannot cognize liberty as the property of a being to which I ascribe        
effects in the world of sense. For, to do so, I must cognize this           
being as existing, and yet not in time, which- since I cannot               
support my conception by any intuition- is impossible. At the same          
time, while I cannot cognize, I can quite well think freedom, that          
is to say, my representation of it involves at least no contradiction,      
if we bear in mind the critical distinction of the two modes of             
representation (the sensible and the intellectual) and the                  
consequent limitation of the conceptions of the pure understanding and      
of the principles which flow from them. Suppose now that morality           
necessarily presupposed liberty, in the strictest sense, as a property      
of our will; suppose that reason contained certain practical, original      
principles a priori, which were absolutely impossible without this          
presupposition; and suppose, at the same time, that speculative reason      
had proved that liberty was incapable of being thought at all. It           
would then follow that the moral presupposition must give way to the        
speculative affirmation, the opposite of which involves an obvious          
contradiction, and that liberty and, with it, morality must yield to        
the mechanism of nature; for the negation of morality involves no           
contradiction, except on the presupposition of liberty. Now morality        
does not require the speculative cognition of liberty; it is enough         
that I can think it, that its conception involves no contradiction,         
that it does not interfere with the mechanism of nature. But even this      
requirement we could not satisfy, if we had not learnt the twofold          
sense in which things may be taken; and it is only in this way that         
the doctrine of morality and the doctrine of nature are confined            
within their proper limits. For this result, then, we are indebted          
to a criticism which warns us of our unavoidable ignorance with regard      
to things in themselves, and establishes the necessary limitation of        
our theoretical cognition to mere phenomena.                                
-                                                                           
  *In order to cognize an object, I must be able to prove its               
possibility, either from its reality as attested by experience, or a        
priori, by means of reason. But I can think what I please, provided         
only I do not contradict myself; that is, provided my conception is         
a possible thought, though I may be unable to answer for the existence      
of a corresponding object in the sum of possibilities. But something        
more is required before I can attribute to such a conception objective      
validity, that is real possibility- the other possibility being merely      
logical. We are not, however, confined to theoretical sources of            
cognition for the means of satisfying this additional requirement, but      
may derive them from practical sources.                                     
-                                                                           
                                      {PREFACE_SECOND_EDITION ^paragraph 35}
  The positive value of the critical principles of pure reason in           
relation to the conception of God and of the simple nature of the           
soul, admits of a similar exemplification; but on this point I shall        
not dwell. I cannot even make the assumption- as the practical              
interests of morality require- of God, freedom, and immortality, if         
I do not deprive speculative reason of its pretensions to transcendent      
insight. For to arrive at these, it must make use of principles which,      
in fact, extend only to the objects of possible experience, and             
which cannot be applied to objects beyond this sphere without               
converting them into phenomena, and thus rendering the practical            
extension of pure reason impossible. I must, therefore, abolish             
knowledge, to make room for belief. The dogmatism of metaphysics, that      
is, the presumption that it is possible to advance in metaphysics           
without previous criticism, is the true source of the unbelief (always      
dogmatic) which militates against morality.                                 
  Thus, while it may be no very difficult task to bequeath a legacy to      
posterity, in the shape of a system of metaphysics constructed in           
accordance with the Critique of Pure Reason, still the value of such a      
bequest is not to be depreciated. It will render an important               
service to reason, by substituting the certainty of scientific              
method for that random groping after results without the guidance of        
principles, which has hitherto characterized the pursuit of                 
metaphysical studies. It will render an important service to the            
inquiring mind of youth, by leading the student to apply his powers to      
the cultivation of. genuine science, instead of wasting them, as at         
present, on speculations which can never lead to any result, or on the      
idle attempt to invent new ideas and opinions. But, above all, it will      
confer an inestimable benefit on morality and religion, by showing          
that all the objections urged against them may be silenced for ever by      
the Socratic method, that is to say, by proving the ignorance of the        
objector. For, as the world has never been, and, no doubt, never            
will be without a system of metaphysics of one kind or another, it          
is the highest and weightiest concern of philosophy to render it            
powerless for harm, by closing up the sources of error.                     
  This important change in the field of the sciences, this loss of its      
fancied possessions, to which speculative reason must submit, does not      
prove in any way detrimental to the general interests of humanity. The      
advantages which the world has derived from the teachings of pure           
reason are not at all impaired. The loss falls, in its whole extent,        
on the monopoly of the schools, but does not in the slightest degree        
touch the interests of mankind. I appeal to the most obstinate              
dogmatist, whether the proof of the continued existence of the soul         
after death, derived from the simplicity of its substance; of the           
freedom of the will in opposition to the general mechanism of               
nature, drawn from the subtle but impotent distinction of subjective        
and objective practical necessity; or of the existence of God, deduced      
from the conception of an ens realissimum- the contingency of the           
changeable, and the necessity of a prime mover, has ever been able          
to pass beyond the limits of the schools, to penetrate the public           
mind, or to exercise the slightest influence on its convictions. It         
must be admitted that this has not been the case and that, owing to         
the unfitness of the common understanding for such subtle                   
speculations, it can never be expected to take place. On the contrary,      
it is plain that the hope of a future life arises from the feeling,         
which exists in the breast of every man, that the temporal is               
inadequate to meet and satisfy the demands of his nature. In like           
manner, it cannot be doubted that the clear exhibition of duties in         
opposition to all the claims of inclination, gives rise to the              
consciousness of freedom, and that the glorious order, beauty, and          
providential care, everywhere displayed in nature, give rise to the         
belief in a wise and great Author of the Universe. Such is the genesis      
of these general convictions of mankind, so far as they depend on           
rational grounds; and this public property not only remains                 
undisturbed, but is even raised to greater importance, by the doctrine      
that the schools have no right to arrogate to themselves a more             
profound insight into a matter of general human concernment than            
that to which the great mass of men, ever held by us in the highest         
estimation, can without difficulty attain, and that the schools             
should, therefore, confine themselves to the elaboration of these           
universally comprehensible and, from a moral point of view, amply           
satisfactory proofs. The change, therefore, affects only the                
arrogant pretensions of the schools, which would gladly retain, in          
their own exclusive possession, the key to the truths which they            
impart to the public.                                                       
-                                                                           
          Quod mecum nescit, solus vult scire videri.                       
                                      {PREFACE_SECOND_EDITION ^paragraph 40}
-                                                                           
At the same time it does not deprive the speculative philosopher of         
his just title to be the sole depositor of a science which benefits         
the public without its knowledge- I mean, the Critique of Pure Reason.      
This can never become popular and, indeed, has no occasion to be so;        
for finespun arguments in favour of useful truths make just as              
little impression on the public mind as the equally subtle                  
objections brought against these truths. On the other hand, since both      
inevitably force themselves on every man who rises to the height of         
speculation, it becomes the manifest duty of the schools to enter upon      
a thorough investigation of the rights of speculative reason and,           
thus, to prevent the scandal which metaphysical controversies are           
sure, sooner or later, to cause even to the masses. It is only by           
criticism that metaphysicians (and, as such, theologians too) can be        
saved from these controversies and from the consequent perversion of        
their doctrines. Criticism alone can strike a blow at the root of           
materialism, fatalism, atheism, free-thinking, fanaticism, and              
superstition, which are universally injurious- as well as of                
idealism and scepticism, which are dangerous to the schools, but can        
scarcely pass over to the public. If governments think proper to            
interfere with the affairs of the learned, it would be more consistent      
with a wise regard for the interests of science, as well as for             
those of society, to favour a criticism of this kind, by which alone        
the labours of reason can be established on a firm basis, than to           
support the ridiculous despotism of the schools, which raise a loud         
cry of danger to the public over the destruction of cobwebs, of             
which the public has never taken any notice, and the loss of which,         
therefore, it can never feel.                                               
  This critical science is not opposed to the dogmatic procedure of         
reason in pure cognition; for pure cognition must always be                 
dogmatic, that is, must rest on strict demonstration from sure              
principles a priori- but to dogmatism, that is, to the presumption          
that it is possible to make any progress with a pure cognition,             
derived from (philosophical) conceptions, according to the                  
principles which reason has long been in the habit of employing-            
without first inquiring in what way and by what right reason has            
come into the possession of these principles. Dogmatism is thus the         
dogmatic procedure of pure reason without previous criticism of its         
own powers, and in opposing this procedure, we must not be supposed to      
lend any countenance to that loquacious shallowness which arrogates to      
itself the name of popularity, nor yet to scepticism, which makes           
short work with the whole science of metaphysics. On the contrary, our      
criticism is the necessary preparation for a thoroughly scientific          
system of metaphysics which must perform its task entirely a priori,        
to the complete satisfaction of speculative reason, and must,               
therefore, be treated, not popularly, but scholastically. In                
carrying out the plan which the Critique prescribes, that is, in the        
future system of metaphysics, we must have recourse to the strict           
method of the celebrated Wolf, the greatest of all dogmatic                 
philosophers. He was the first to point out the necessity of                
establishing fixed principles, of clearly defining our conceptions,         
and of subjecting our demonstrations to the most severe scrutiny,           
instead of rashly jumping at conclusions. The example which he set          
served to awaken that spirit of profound and thorough investigation         
which is not yet extinct in Germany. He would have been peculiarly          
well fitted to give a truly scientific character to metaphysical            
studies, had it occurred to him to prepare the field by a criticism of      
the organum, that is, of pure reason itself. That be failed to              
perceive the necessity of such a procedure must be ascribed to the          
dogmatic mode of thought which characterized his age, and on this           
point the philosophers of his time, as well as of all previous              
times, have nothing to reproach each other with. Those who reject at        
once the method of Wolf, and of the Critique of Pure Reason, can            
have no other aim but to shake off the fetters of science, to change        
labour into sport, certainty into opinion, and philosophy into              
philodoxy.                                                                  
  In this second edition, I have endeavoured, as far as possible, to        
remove the difficulties and obscurity which, without fault of mine          
perhaps, have given rise to many misconceptions even among acute            
thinkers. In the propositions themselves, and in the demonstrations by      
which they are supported, as well as in the form and the entire plan        
of the work, I have found nothing to alter; which must be attributed        
partly to the long examination to which I had subjected the whole           
before offering it to the public and partly to the nature of the case.      
For pure speculative reason is an organic structure in which there          
is nothing isolated or independent, but every Single part is essential      
to all the rest; and hence, the slightest imperfection, whether defect      
or positive error, could not fail to betray itself in use. I                
venture, further, to hope, that this system will maintain the same          
unalterable character for the future. I am led to entertain this            
confidence, not by vanity, but by the evidence which the equality of        
the result affords, when we proceed, first, from the simplest elements      
up to the complete whole of pure reason and, and then, backwards            
from the whole to each part. We find that the attempt to make the           
slightest alteration, in any part, leads inevitably to contradictions,      
not merely in this system, but in human reason itself. At the same          
time, there is still much room for improvement in the exposition of         
the doctrines contained in this work. In the present edition, I have        
endeavoured to remove misapprehensions of the aesthetical part,             
especially with regard to the conception of time; to clear away the         
obscurity which has been found in the deduction of the conceptions          
of the understanding; to supply the supposed want of sufficient             
evidence in the demonstration of the principles of the pure                 
understanding; and, lastly, to obviate the misunderstanding of the          
paralogisms which immediately precede the rational psychology.              
Beyond this point- the end of the second main division of the               
"Transcendental Dialectic"- I have not extended my alterations,*            
partly from want of time, and partly because I am not aware that any        
portion of the remainder has given rise to misconceptions among             
intelligent and impartial critics, whom I do not here mention with          
that praise which is their due, but who will find that their                
suggestions have been attended to in the work itself.                       
-                                                                           
  *The only addition, properly so called- and that only in the              
method of proof- which I have made in the present edition, consists of      
a new refutation of psychological idealism, and a strict                    
demonstration- the only one possible, as I believe- of the objective        
reality of external intuition. However harmless idealism may be             
considered- although in reality it is not so- in regard to the              
essential ends of metaphysics, it must still remain a scandal to            
philosophy and to the general human reason to be obliged to assume, as      
an article of mere belief, the existence of things external to              
ourselves (from which, yet, we derive the whole material of                 
cognition for the internal sense), and not to be able to oppose a           
satisfactory proof to any one who may call it in question. As there is      
some obscurity of expression in the demonstration as it stands in           
the text, I propose to alter the passage in question as follows:            
"But this permanent cannot be an intuition in me. For all the               
determining grounds of my existence which can be found in me are            
representations and, as such, do themselves require a permanent,            
distinct from them, which may determine my existence in relation to         
their changes, that is, my existence in time, wherein they change." It      
may, probably, be urged in opposition to this proof that, after all, I      
am only conscious immediately of that which is in me, that is, of my        
representation of external things, and that, consequently, it must          
always remain uncertain whether anything corresponding to this              
representation does or does not exist externally to me. But I am            
conscious, through internal experience, of my existence in time             
(consequently, also, of the determinability of the former in the            
latter), and that is more than the simple consciousness of my               
representation. It is, in fact, the same as the empirical                   
consciousness of my existence, which can only be determined in              
relation to something, which, while connected with my existence, is         
external to me. This consciousness of my existence in time is,              
therefore, identical with the consciousness of a relation to something      
external to me, and it is, therefore, experience, not fiction,              
sense, not imagination, which inseparably connects the external with        
my internal sense. For the external sense is, in itself, the                
relation of intuition to something real, external to me; and the            
reality of this something, as opposed to the mere imagination of it,        
rests solely on its inseparable connection with internal experience as      
the condition of its possibility. If with the intellectual                  
consciousness of my existence, in the representation: I am, which           
accompanies all my judgements, and all the operations of my                 
understanding, I could, at the same time, connect a determination of        
my existence by intellectual intuition, then the consciousness of a         
relation to something external to me would not be necessary. But the        
internal intuition in which alone my existence can be determined,           
though preceded by that purely intellectual consciousness, is itself        
sensible and attached to the condition of time. Hence this                  
determination of my existence, and consequently my internal experience      
itself, must depend on something permanent which is not in me, which        
can be, therefore, only in something external to me, to which I must        
look upon myself as being related. Thus the reality of the external         
sense is necessarily connected with that of the internal, in order          
to the possibility of experience in general; that is, I am just as          
certainly conscious that there are things external to me related to my      
sense as I am that I myself exist as determined in time. But in             
order to ascertain to what given intuitions objects, external me,           
really correspond, in other words, what intuitions belong to the            
external sense and not to imagination, I must have recourse, in             
every particular case, to those rules according to which experience in      
general (even internal experience) is distinguished from                    
imagination, and which are always based on the proposition that             
there really is an external experience. We may add the remark that the      
representation of something permanent in existence, is not the same         
thing as the permanent representation; for a representation may be          
very variable and changing- as all our representations, even that of        
matter, are- and yet refer to something permanent, which must,              
therefore, be distinct from all my representations and external to me,      
the existence of which is necessarily included in the determination of      
my own existence, and with it constitutes one experience- an                
experience which would not even be possible internally, if it were not      
also at the same time, in part, external. To the question How? we           
are no more able to reply, than we are, in general, to think the            
stationary in time, the coexistence of which with the variable,             
produces the conception of change.                                          
                                      {PREFACE_SECOND_EDITION ^paragraph 45}
-                                                                           
  In attempting to render the exposition of my views as intelligible        
as possible, I have been compelled to leave out or abridge various          
passages which were not essential to the completeness of the work, but      
which many readers might consider useful in other respects, and             
might be unwilling to miss. This trifling loss, which could not be          
avoided without swelling the book beyond due limits, may be                 
supplied, at the pleasure of the reader, by a comparison with the           
first edition, and will, I hope, be more than compensated for by the        
greater clearness of the exposition as it now stands.                       
  I have observed, with pleasure and thankfulness, in the pages of          
various reviews and treatises, that the spirit of profound and              
thorough investigation is not extinct in Germany, though it may have        
been overborne and silenced for a time by the fashionable tone of a         
licence in thinking, which gives itself the airs of genius, and that        
the difficulties which beset the paths of criticism have not prevented      
energetic and acute thinkers from making themselves masters of the          
science of pure reason to which these paths conduct- a science which        
is not popular, but scholastic in its character, and which alone can        
hope for a lasting existence or possess an abiding value. To these          
deserving men, who so happily combine profundity of view with a talent      
for lucid exposition- a talent which I myself am not conscious of           
possessing- I leave the task of removing any obscurity which may still      
adhere to the statement of my doctrines. For, in this case, the danger      
is not that of being refuted, but of being misunderstood. For my own        
part, I must henceforward abstain from controversy, although I shall        
carefully attend to all suggestions, whether from friends or                
adversaries, which may be of use in the future elaboration of the           
system of this propaedeutic. As, during these labours, I have advanced      
pretty far in years this month I reach my sixty-fourth year- it will        
be necessary for me to economize time, if I am to carry out my plan of      
elaborating the metaphysics of nature as well as of morals, in              
confirmation of the correctness of the principles established in            
this Critique of Pure Reason, both speculative and practical; and I         
must, therefore, leave the task of clearing up the obscurities of           
the present work- inevitable, perhaps, at the outset- as well as,           
the defence of the whole, to those deserving men, who have made my          
system their own. A philosophical system cannot come forward armed          
at all points like a mathematical treatise, and hence it may be             
quite possible to take objection to particular passages, while the          
organic structure of the system, considered as a unity, has no              
danger to apprehend. But few possess the ability, and still fewer           
the inclination, to take a comprehensive view of a new system. By           
confining the view to particular passages, taking these out of their        
connection and comparing them with one another, it is easy to pick out      
apparent contradictions, especially in a work written with any freedom      
of style. These contradictions place the work in an unfavourable light      
in the eyes of those who rely on the judgement of others, but are           
easily reconciled by those who have mastered the idea of the whole. If      
a theory possesses stability in itself, the action and reaction             
which seemed at first to threaten its existence serve only, in the          
course of time, to smooth down any superficial roughness or                 
inequality, and- if men of insight, impartiality, and truly popular         
gifts, turn their attention to it- to secure to it, in a short time,        
the requisite elegance also.                                                
-                                                                           
  Konigsberg, April 1787.                                                   
                                                                            
INTRODUCTION                                                                
                     INTRODUCTION.                                          
-                                                                           
  I. Of the difference between Pure and Empirical Knowledge                 
-                                                                           
  That all our knowledge begins with experience there can be no doubt.      
For how is it possible that the faculty of cognition should be              
awakened into exercise otherwise than by means of objects which affect      
our senses, and partly of themselves produce representations, partly        
rouse our powers of understanding into activity, to compare to              
connect, or to separate these, and so to convert the raw material of        
our sensuous impressions into a knowledge of objects, which is              
called experience? In respect of time, therefore, no knowledge of ours      
is antecedent to experience, but begins with it.                            
  But, though all our knowledge begins with experience, it by no means      
follows that all arises out of experience. For, on the contrary, it is      
quite possible that our empirical knowledge is a compound of that           
which we receive through impressions, and that which the faculty of         
cognition supplies from itself (sensuous impressions giving merely the      
occasion), an addition which we cannot distinguish from the original        
element given by sense, till long practice has made us attentive to,        
and skilful in separating it. It is, therefore, a question which            
requires close investigation, and not to be answered at first sight,        
whether there exists a knowledge altogether independent of experience,      
and even of all sensuous impressions? Knowledge of this kind is called      
a priori, in contradistinction to empirical knowledge, which has its        
sources a posteriori, that is, in experience.                               
  But the expression, "a priori," is not as yet definite enough             
adequately to indicate the whole meaning of the question above              
started. For, in speaking of knowledge which has its sources in             
experience, we are wont to say, that this or that may be known a            
priori, because we do not derive this knowledge immediately from            
experience, but from a general rule, which, however, we have itself         
borrowed from experience. Thus, if a man undermined his house, we say,      
"he might know a priori that it would have fallen;" that is, he needed      
not to have waited for the experience that it did actually fall. But        
still, a priori, he could not know even this much. For, that bodies         
are heavy, and, consequently, that they fall when their supports are        
taken away, must have been known to him previously, by means of             
experience.                                                                 
                                                 {INTRODUCTION ^paragraph 5}
  By the term "knowledge a priori," therefore, we shall in the              
sequel understand, not such as is independent of this or that kind          
of experience, but such as is absolutely so of all experience. Opposed      
to this is empirical knowledge, or that which is possible only a            
posteriori, that is, through experience. Knowledge a priori is              
either pure or impure. Pure knowledge a priori is that with which no        
empirical element is mixed up. For example, the proposition, "Every         
change has a cause," is a proposition a priori, but impure, because         
change is a conception which can only be derived from experience.           
-                                                                           
  II. The Human Intellect, even in an Unphilosophical State,                
      is in Possession of Certain Cognitions "a priori".                    
-                                                                           
                                                {INTRODUCTION ^paragraph 10}
  The question now is as to a criterion, by which we may securely           
distinguish a pure from an empirical cognition. Experience no doubt         
teaches us that this or that object is constituted in such and such         
a manner, but not that it could not possibly exist otherwise. Now,          
in the first place, if we have a proposition which contains the idea        
of necessity in its very conception, it is a if, moreover, it is not        
derived from any other proposition, unless from one equally                 
involving the idea of necessity, it is absolutely priori. Secondly, an      
empirical judgement never exhibits strict and absolute, but only            
assumed and comparative universality (by induction); therefore, the         
most we can say is- so far as we have hitherto observed, there is no        
exception to this or that rule. If, on the other hand, a judgement          
carries with it strict and absolute universality, that is, admits of        
no possible exception, it is not derived from experience, but is valid      
absolutely a priori.                                                        
  Empirical universality is, therefore, only an arbitrary extension of      
validity, from that which may be predicated of a proposition valid          
in most cases, to that which is asserted of a proposition which             
holds good in all; as, for example, in the affirmation, "All bodies         
are heavy." When, on the contrary, strict universality characterizes a      
judgement, it necessarily indicates another peculiar source of              
knowledge, namely, a faculty of cognition a priori. Necessity and           
strict universality, therefore, are infallible tests for                    
distinguishing pure from empirical knowledge, and are inseparably           
connected with each other. But as in the use of these criteria the          
empirical limitation is sometimes more easily detected than the             
contingency of the judgement, or the unlimited universality which we        
attach to a judgement is often a more convincing proof than its             
necessity, it may be advisable to use the criteria separately, each         
being by itself infallible.                                                 
  Now, that in the sphere of human cognition we have judgements             
which are necessary, and in the strictest sense universal,                  
consequently pure a priori, it will be an easy matter to show. If we        
desire an example from the sciences, we need only take any proposition      
in mathematics. If we cast our eyes upon the commonest operations of        
the understanding, the proposition, "Every change must have a               
cause," will amply serve our purpose. In the latter case, indeed,           
the conception of a cause so plainly involves the conception of a           
necessity of connection with an effect, and of a strict universality        
of the law, that the very notion of a cause would entirely                  
disappear, were we to derive it, like Hume, from a frequent                 
association of what happens with that which precedes; and the habit         
thence originating of connecting representations- the necessity             
inherent in the judgement being therefore merely subjective.                
Besides, without seeking for such examples of principles existing a         
priori in cognition, we might easily show that such principles are the      
indispensable basis of the possibility of experience itself, and            
consequently prove their existence a priori. For whence could our           
experience itself acquire certainty, if all the rules on which it           
depends were themselves empirical, and consequently fortuitous? No          
one, therefore, can admit the validity of the use of such rules as          
first principles. But, for the present, we may content ourselves            
with having established the fact, that we do possess and exercise a         
faculty of pure a priori cognition; and, secondly, with having pointed      
out the proper tests of such cognition, namely, universality and            
necessity.                                                                  
  Not only in judgements, however, but even in conceptions, is an a         
priori origin manifest. For example, if we take away by degrees from        
our conceptions of a body all that can be referred to mere sensuous         
experience- colour, hardness or softness, weight, even                      
impenetrability- the body will then vanish; but the space which it          
occupied still remains, and this it is utterly impossible to                
annihilate in thought. Again, if we take away, in like manner, from         
our empirical conception of any object, corporeal or incorporeal,           
all properties which mere experience has taught us to connect with it,      
still we cannot think away those through which we cogitate it as            
substance, or adhering to substance, although our conception of             
substance is more determined than that of an object. Compelled,             
therefore, by that necessity with which the conception of substance         
forces itself upon us, we must confess that it has its seat in our          
faculty of cognition a priori.                                              
-                                                                           
                                                {INTRODUCTION ^paragraph 15}
  III. Philosophy stands in need of a Science which shall                   
       Determine the Possibility, Principles, and Extent of                 
       Human Knowledge "a priori"                                           
-                                                                           
  Of far more importance than all that has been above said, is the          
consideration that certain of our cognitions rise completely above the      
sphere of all possible experience, and by means of conceptions, to          
which there exists in the whole extent of experience no                     
corresponding object, seem to extend the range of our judgements            
beyond its bounds. And just in this transcendental or supersensible         
sphere, where experience affords us neither instruction nor                 
guidance, lie the investigations of reason, which, on account of their      
importance, we consider far preferable to, and as having a far more         
elevated aim than, all that the understanding can achieve within the        
sphere of sensuous phenomena. So high a value do we set upon these          
investigations, that even at the risk of error, we persist in               
following them out, and permit neither doubt nor disregard nor              
indifference to restrain us from the pursuit. These unavoidable             
problems of mere pure reason are God, freedom (of will), and                
immortality. The science which, with all its preliminaries, has for         
its especial object the solution of these problems is named                 
metaphysics- a science which is at the very outset dogmatical, that         
is, it confidently takes upon itself the execution of this task             
without any previous investigation of the ability or inability of           
reason for such an undertaking.                                             
                                                {INTRODUCTION ^paragraph 20}
  Now the safe ground of experience being thus abandoned, it seems          
nevertheless natural that we should hesitate to erect a building            
with the cognitions we possess, without knowing whence they come,           
and on the strength of principles, the origin of which is                   
undiscovered. Instead of thus trying to build without a foundation, it      
is rather to be expected that we should long ago have put the               
question, how the understanding can arrive at these a priori                
cognitions, and what is the extent, validity, and worth which they may      
possess? We say, "This is natural enough," meaning by the word              
natural, that which is consistent with a just and reasonable way of         
thinking; but if we understand by the term, that. which usually             
happens, nothing indeed could be more natural and more                      
comprehensible than that this investigation should be left long             
unattempted. For one part of our pure knowledge, the science of             
mathematics, has been long firmly established, and thus leads us to         
form flattering expectations with regard to others, though these may        
be of quite a different nature. Besides, when we get beyond the bounds      
of experience, we are of course safe from opposition in that                
quarter; and the charm of widening the range of our knowledge is so         
great that, unless we are brought to a standstill by some evident           
contradiction, we hurry on undoubtingly in our course. This,                
however, may be avoided, if we are sufficiently cautious in the             
construction of our fictions, which are not the less fictions on            
that account.                                                               
  Mathematical science affords us a brilliant example, how far,             
independently of all experience, we may carry our a priori                  
knowledge. It is true that the mathematician occupies himself with          
objects and cognitions only in so far as they can be represented by         
means of intuition. But this circumstance is easily overlooked,             
because the said intuition can itself be given a priori, and therefore      
is hardly to be distinguished from a mere pure conception. Deceived by      
such a proof of the power of reason, we can perceive no limits to           
the extension of our knowledge. The light dove cleaving in free flight      
the thin air, whose resistance it feels, might imagine that her             
movements would be far more free and rapid in airless space. just in        
the same way did Plato, abandoning the world of sense because of the        
narrow limits it sets to the understanding, venture upon the wings          
of ideas beyond it, into the void space of pure intellect. He did           
not reflect that he made no real progress by all his efforts; for he        
met with no resistance which might serve him for a support, as it           
were, whereon to rest, and on which he might apply his powers, in           
order to let the intellect acquire momentum for its progress. It is,        
indeed, the common fate of human reason in speculation, to finish           
the imposing edifice of thought as rapidly as possible, and then for        
the first time to begin to examine whether the foundation is a solid        
one or no. Arrived at this point, all sorts of excuses are sought           
after, in order to console us for its want of stability, or rather,         
indeed, to enable Us to dispense altogether with so late and dangerous      
an investigation. But what frees us during the process of building          
from all apprehension or suspicion, and flatters us into the belief of      
its solidity, is this. A great part, perhaps the greatest part, of the      
business of our reason consists in the analysation of the                   
conceptions which we already possess of objects. By this means we gain      
a multitude of cognitions, which although really nothing more than          
elucidations or explanations of that which (though in a confused            
manner) was already thought in our conceptions, are, at least in            
respect of their form, prized as new introspections; whilst, so far as      
regards their matter or content, we have really made no addition to         
our conceptions, but only disinvolved them. But as this process does        
furnish a real priori knowledge, which has a sure progress and              
useful results, reason, deceived by this, slips in, without being           
itself aware of it, assertions of a quite different kind; in which, to      
given conceptions it adds others, a priori indeed, but entirely             
foreign to them, without our knowing how it arrives at these, and,          
indeed, without such a question ever suggesting itself. I shall             
therefore at once proceed to examine the difference between these           
two modes of knowledge.                                                     
-                                                                           
  IV. Of the Difference Between Analytical and Synthetical Judgements.      
-                                                                           
                                                {INTRODUCTION ^paragraph 25}
  In all judgements wherein the relation of a subject to the predicate      
is cogitated (I mention affirmative judgements only here; the               
application to negative will be very easy), this relation is                
possible in two different ways. Either the predicate B belongs to           
the subject A, as somewhat which is contained (though covertly) in the      
conception A; or the predicate B lies completely out of the conception      
A, although it stands in connection with it. In the first instance,         
I term the judgement analytical, in the second, synthetical.                
Analytical judgements (affirmative) are therefore those in which the        
connection of the predicate with the subject is cogitated through           
identity; those in which this connection is cogitated without               
identity, are called synthetical judgements. The former may be              
called explicative, the latter augmentative judgements; because the         
former add in the predicate nothing to the conception of the                
subject, but only analyse it into its constituent conceptions, which        
were thought already in the subject, although in a confused manner;         
the latter add to our conceptions of the subject a predicate which was      
not contained in it, and which no analysis could ever have                  
discovered therein. For example, when I say, "All bodies are                
extended," this is an analytical judgement. For I need not go beyond        
the conception of body in order to find extension connected with it,        
but merely analyse the conception, that is, become conscious of the         
manifold properties which I think in that conception, in order to           
discover this predicate in it: it is therefore an analytical                
judgement. On the other hand, when I say, "All bodies are heavy,"           
the predicate is something totally different from that which I think        
in the mere conception of a body. By the addition of such a predicate,      
therefore, it becomes a synthetical judgement.                              
  Judgements of experience, as such, are always synthetical. For it         
would be absurd to think of grounding an analytical judgement on            
experience, because in forming such a judgement I need not go out of        
the sphere of my conceptions, and therefore recourse to the                 
testimony of experience is quite unnecessary. That "bodies are              
extended" is not an empirical judgement, but a proposition which            
stands firm a priori. For before addressing myself to experience, I         
already have in my conception all the requisite conditions for the          
judgement, and I have only to extract the predicate from the                
conception, according to the principle of contradiction, and thereby        
at the same time become conscious of the necessity of the judgement, a      
necessity which I could never learn from experience. On the other           
hand, though at first I do not at all include the predicate of              
weight in my conception of body in general, that conception still           
indicates an object of experience, a part of the totality of                
experience, to which I can still add other parts; and this I do when I      
recognize by observation that bodies are heavy. I can cognize               
beforehand by analysis the conception of body through the                   
characteristics of extension, impenetrability, shape, etc., all             
which are cogitated in this conception. But now I extend my knowledge,      
and looking back on experience from which I had derived this                
conception of body, I find weight at all times connected with the           
above characteristics, and therefore I synthetically add to my              
conceptions this as a predicate, and say, "All bodies are heavy." Thus      
it is experience upon which rests the possibility of the synthesis          
of the predicate of weight with the conception of body, because both        
conceptions, although the one is not contained in the other, still          
belong to one another (only contingently, however), as parts of a           
whole, namely, of experience, which is itself a synthesis of                
intuitions.                                                                 
  But to synthetical judgements a priori, such aid is entirely              
wanting. If I go out of and beyond the conception A, in order to            
recognize another B as connected with it, what foundation have I to         
rest on, whereby to render the synthesis possible? I have here no           
longer the advantage of looking out in the sphere of experience for         
what I want. Let us take, for example, the proposition, "Everything         
that happens has a cause." In the conception of "something that             
happens," I indeed think an existence which a certain time                  
antecedes, and from this I can derive analytical judgements. But the        
conception of a cause lies quite out of the above conception, and           
indicates something entirely different from "that which happens,"           
and is consequently not contained in that conception. How then am I         
able to assert concerning the general conception- "that which               
happens"- something entirely different from that conception, and to         
recognize the conception of cause although not contained in it, yet as      
belonging to it, and even necessarily? what is here the unknown = X,        
upon which the understanding rests when it believes it has found,           
out of the conception A a foreign predicate B, which it nevertheless        
considers to be connected with it? It cannot be experience, because         
the principle adduced annexes the two representations, cause and            
effect, to the representation existence, not only with universality,        
which experience cannot give, but also with the expression of               
necessity, therefore completely a priori and from pure conceptions.         
Upon such synthetical, that is augmentative propositions, depends           
the whole aim of our speculative knowledge a priori; for although           
analytical judgements are indeed highly important and necessary,            
they are so, only to arrive at that clearness of conceptions which          
is requisite for a sure and extended synthesis, and this alone is a         
real acquisition.                                                           
-                                                                           
  V. In all Theoretical Sciences of Reason, Synthetical Judgements          
                                                {INTRODUCTION ^paragraph 30}
     "a priori" are contained as Principles.                                
-                                                                           
  1. Mathematical judgements are always synthetical. Hitherto this          
fact, though incontestably true and very important in its                   
consequences, seems to have escaped the analysts of the human mind,         
nay, to be in complete opposition to all their conjectures. For as          
it was found that mathematical conclusions all proceed according to         
the principle of contradiction (which the nature of every apodeictic        
certainty requires), people became persuaded that the fundamental           
principles of the science also were recognized and admitted in the          
same way. But the notion is fallacious; for although a synthetical          
proposition can certainly be discerned by means of the principle of         
contradiction, this is possible only when another synthetical               
proposition precedes, from which the latter is deduced, but never of        
itself which                                                                
  Before all, be it observed, that proper mathematical propositions         
are always judgements a priori, and not empirical, because they             
carry along with them the conception of necessity, which cannot be          
given by experience. If this be demurred to, it matters not; I will         
then limit my assertion to pure mathematics, the very conception of         
which implies that it consists of knowledge altogether non-empirical        
and a priori.                                                               
  We might, indeed at first suppose that the proposition 7 + 5 = 12 is      
a merely analytical proposition, following (according to the principle      
of contradiction) from the conception of a sum of seven and five.           
But if we regard it more narrowly, we find that our conception of           
the sum of seven and five contains nothing more than the uniting of         
both sums into one, whereby it cannot at all be cogitated what this         
single number is which embraces both. The conception of twelve is by        
no means obtained by merely cogitating the union of seven and five;         
and we may analyse our conception of such a possible sum as long as we      
will, still we shall never discover in it the notion of twelve. We          
must go beyond these conceptions, and have recourse to an intuition         
which corresponds to one of the two- our five fingers, for example, or      
like Segner in his Arithmetic five points, and so by degrees, add           
the units contained in the five given in the intuition, to the              
conception of seven. For I first take the number 7, and, for the            
conception of 5 calling in the aid of the fingers of my hand as             
objects of intuition, I add the units, which I before took together to      
make up the number 5, gradually now by means of the material image          
my hand, to the number 7, and by this process, I at length see the          
number 12 arise. That 7 should be added to 5, I have certainly              
cogitated in my conception of a sum = 7 + 5, but not that this sum was      
equal to 12. Arithmetical propositions are therefore always                 
synthetical, of which we may become more clearly convinced by trying        
large numbers. For it will thus become quite evident that, turn and         
twist our conceptions as we may, it is impossible, without having           
recourse to intuition, to arrive at the sum total or product by             
means of the mere analysis of our conceptions. just as little is any        
principle of pure geometry analytical. "A straight line between two         
points is the shortest," is a synthetical proposition. For my               
conception of straight contains no notion of quantity, but is merely        
qualitative. The conception of the shortest is therefore fore wholly        
an addition, and by no analysis can it be extracted from our                
conception of a straight line. Intuition must therefore here lend           
its aid, by means of which, and thus only, our synthesis is possible.       
                                                {INTRODUCTION ^paragraph 35}
  Some few principles preposited by geometricians are, indeed,              
really analytical, and depend on the principle of contradiction.            
They serve, however, like identical propositions, as links in the           
chain of method, not as principles- for example, a = a, the whole is        
equal to itself, or (a+b) > a, the whole is greater than its part. And      
yet even these principles themselves, though they derive their              
validity from pure conceptions, are only admitted in mathematics            
because they can be presented in intuition. What causes us here             
commonly to believe that the predicate of such apodeictic judgements        
is already contained in our conception, and that the judgement is           
therefore analytical, is merely the equivocal nature of the                 
expression. We must join in thought a certain predicate to a given          
conception, and this necessity cleaves already to the conception.           
But the question is, not what we must join in thought to the given          
conception, but what we really think therein, though only obscurely,        
and then it becomes manifest that the predicate pertains to these           
conceptions, necessarily indeed, yet not as thought in the                  
conception itself, but by virtue of an intuition, which must be             
added to the conception.                                                    
  2. The science of natural philosophy (physics) contains in itself         
synthetical judgements a priori, as principles. I shall adduce two          
propositions. For instance, the proposition, "In all changes of the         
material world, the quantity of matter remains unchanged"; or, that,        
"In all communication of motion, action and reaction must always be         
equal." In both of these, not only is the necessity, and therefore          
their origin a priori clear, but also that they are synthetical             
propositions. For in the conception of matter, I do not cogitate its        
permanency, but merely its presence in space, which it fills. I             
therefore really go out of and beyond the conception of matter, in          
order to think on to it something a priori, which I did not think in        
it. The proposition is therefore not analytical, but synthetical,           
and nevertheless conceived a priori; and so it is with regard to the        
other propositions of the pure part of natural philosophy.                  
  3. As to metaphysics, even if we look upon it merely as an attempted      
science, yet, from the nature of human reason, an indispensable one,        
we find that it must contain synthetical propositions a priori. It          
is not merely the duty of metaphysics to dissect, and thereby               
analytically to illustrate the conceptions which we form a priori of        
things; but we seek to widen the range of our a priori knowledge.           
For this purpose, we must avail ourselves of such principles as add         
something to the original conception- something not identical with,         
nor contained in it, and by means of synthetical judgements a               
priori, leave far behind us the limits of experience; for example,          
in the proposition, "the world must have a beginning," and such             
like. Thus metaphysics, according to the proper aim of the science,         
consists merely of synthetical propositions a priori.                       
-                                                                           
  VI. The Universal Problem of Pure Reason.                                 
                                                {INTRODUCTION ^paragraph 40}
-                                                                           
  It is extremely advantageous to be able to bring a number of              
investigations under the formula of a single problem. For in this           
manner, we not only facilitate our own labour, inasmuch as we define        
it clearly to ourselves, but also render it more easy for others to         
decide whether we have done justice to our undertaking. The proper          
problem of pure reason, then, is contained in the question: "How are        
synthetical judgements a priori possible?"                                  
  That metaphysical science has hitherto remained in so vacillating         
a state of uncertainty and contradiction, is only to be attributed          
to the fact that this great problem, and perhaps even the difference        
between analytical and synthetical judgements, did not sooner               
suggest itself to philosophers. Upon the solution of this problem,          
or upon sufficient proof of the impossibility of synthetical knowledge      
a priori, depends the existence or downfall of the science of               
metaphysics. Among philosophers, David Hume came the nearest of all to      
this problem; yet it never acquired in his mind sufficient                  
precision, nor did he regard the question in its universality. On           
the contrary, he stopped short at the synthetical proposition of the        
connection of an effect with its cause (principium causalitatis),           
insisting that such proposition a priori was impossible. According          
to his conclusions, then, all that we term metaphysical science is a        
mere delusion, arising from the fancied insight of reason into that         
which is in truth borrowed from experience, and to which habit has          
given the appearance of necessity. Against this assertion, destructive      
to all pure philosophy, he would have been guarded, had he had our          
problem before his eyes in its universality. For he would then have         
perceived that, according to his own argument, there likewise could         
not be any pure mathematical science, which assuredly cannot exist          
without synthetical propositions a priori- an absurdity from which his      
good understanding must have saved him.                                     
  In the solution of the above problem is at the same time                  
comprehended the possibility of the use of pure reason in the               
foundation and construction of all sciences which contain                   
theoretical knowledge a priori of objects, that is to say, the              
answer to the following questions:                                          
  How is pure mathematical science possible?                                
                                                {INTRODUCTION ^paragraph 45}
  How is pure natural science possible?                                     
  Respecting these sciences, as they do certainly exist, it may with        
propriety be asked, how they are possible?- for that they must be           
possible is shown by the fact of their really existing.* But as to          
metaphysics, the miserable progress it has hitherto made, and the fact      
that of no one system yet brought forward, far as regards its true          
aim, can it be said that this science really exists, leaves any one at      
liberty to doubt with reason the very possibility of its existence.         
-                                                                           
  *As to the existence of pure natural science, or physics, perhaps         
many may still express doubts. But we have only to look at the              
different propositions which are commonly treated of at the                 
commencement of proper (empirical) physical science- those, for             
example, relating to the permanence of the same quantity of matter,         
the vis inertiae, the equality of action and reaction, etc.- to be          
soon convinced that they form a science of pure physics (physica pura,      
or rationalis), which well deserves to be separately exposed as a           
special science, in its whole extent, whether that be great or              
confined.                                                                   
-                                                                           
                                                {INTRODUCTION ^paragraph 50}
  Yet, in a certain sense, this kind of knowledge must                      
unquestionably be looked upon as given; in other words, metaphysics         
must be considered as really existing, if not as a science,                 
nevertheless as a natural disposition of the human mind (metaphysica        
naturalis). For human reason, without any instigations imputable to         
the mere vanity of great knowledge, unceasingly progresses, urged on        
by its own feeling of need, towards such questions as cannot be             
answered by any empirical application of reason, or principles derived      
therefrom; and so there has ever really existed in every man some           
system of metaphysics. It will always exist, so soon as reason              
awakes to the exercise of its power of speculation. And now the             
question arises: "How is metaphysics, as a natural disposition,             
possible?" In other words, how, from the nature of universal human          
reason, do those questions arise which pure reason proposes to itself,      
and which it is impelled by its own feeling of need to answer as            
well as it can?                                                             
  But as in all the attempts hitherto made to answer the questions          
which reason is prompted by its very nature to propose to itself,           
for example, whether the world had a beginning, or has existed from         
eternity, it has always met with unavoidable contradictions, we must        
not rest satisfied with the mere natural disposition of the mind to         
metaphysics, that is, with the existence of the faculty of pure             
reason, whence, indeed, some sort of metaphysical system always             
arises; but it must be possible to arrive at certainty in regard to         
the question whether we know or do not know the things of which             
metaphysics treats. We must be able to arrive at a decision on the          
subjects of its questions, or on the ability or inability of reason to      
form any judgement respecting them; and therefore either to extend          
with confidence the bounds of our pure reason, or to set strictly           
defined and safe limits to its action. This last question, which            
arises out of the above universal problem, would properly run thus:         
"How is metaphysics possible as a science?"                                 
  Thus, the critique of reason leads at last, naturally and                 
necessarily, to science; and, on the other hand, the dogmatical use of      
reason without criticism leads to groundless assertions, against which      
others equally specious can always be set, thus ending unavoidably          
in scepticism.                                                              
  Besides, this science cannot be of great and formidable prolixity,        
because it has not to do with objects of reason, the variety of             
which is inexhaustible, but merely with Reason herself and her              
problems; problems which arise out of her own bosom, and are not            
proposed to her by the nature of outward things, but by her own             
nature. And when once Reason has previously become able completely          
to understand her own power in regard to objects which she meets            
with in experience, it will be easy to determine securely the extent        
and limits of her attempted application to objects beyond the confines      
of experience.                                                              
  We may and must, therefore, regard the attempts hitherto made to          
establish metaphysical science dogmatically as non-existent. For            
what of analysis, that is, mere dissection of conceptions, is               
contained in one or other, is not the aim of, but only a preparation        
for metaphysics proper, which has for its object the extension, by          
means of synthesis, of our a priori knowledge. And for this purpose,        
mere analysis is of course useless, because it only shows what is           
contained in these conceptions, but not how we arrive, a priori, at         
them; and this it is her duty to show, in order to be able                  
afterwards to determine their valid use in regard to all objects of         
experience, to all knowledge in general. But little self-denial,            
indeed, is needed to give up these pretensions, seeing the undeniable,      
and in the dogmatic mode of procedure, inevitable contradictions of         
Reason with herself, have long since ruined the reputation of every         
system of metaphysics that has appeared up to this time. It will            
require more firmness to remain undeterred by difficulty from               
within, and opposition from without, from endeavouring, by a method         
quite opposed to all those hitherto followed, to further the growth         
and fruitfulness of a science indispensable to human reason- a science      
from which every branch it has borne may be cut away, but whose             
roots remain indestructible.                                                
                                                {INTRODUCTION ^paragraph 55}
-                                                                           
  VII. Idea and Division of a Particular Science, under the                 
       Name of a Critique of Pure Reason.                                   
-                                                                           
  From all that has been said, there results the idea of a                  
particular science, which may be called the Critique of Pure Reason.        
For reason is the faculty which furnishes us with the principles of         
knowledge a priori. Hence, pure reason is the faculty which contains        
the principles of cognizing anything absolutely a priori. An organon        
of pure reason would be a compendium of those principles according          
to which alone all pure cognitions a priori can be obtained. The            
completely extended application of such an organon would afford us a        
system of pure reason. As this, however, is demanding a great deal,         
and it is yet doubtful whether any extension of our knowledge be            
here possible, or, if so, in what cases; we can regard a science of         
the mere criticism of pure reason, its sources and limits, as the           
propaedeutic to a system of pure reason. Such a science must not be         
called a doctrine, but only a critique of pure reason; and its use, in      
regard to speculation, would be only negative, not to enlarge the           
bounds of, but to purify, our reason, and to shield it against              
error- which alone is no little gain. I apply the term                      
transcendental to all knowledge which is not so much occupied with          
objects as with the mode of our cognition of these objects, so far          
as this mode of cognition is possible a priori. A system of such            
conceptions would be called transcendental philosophy. But this,            
again, is still beyond the bounds of our present essay. For as such         
a science must contain a complete exposition not only of our                
synthetical a priori, but of our analytical a priori knowledge, it          
is of too wide a range for our present purpose, because we do not           
require to carry our analysis any farther than is necessary to              
understand, in their full extent, the principles of synthesis a             
priori, with which alone we have to do. This investigation, which we        
cannot properly call a doctrine, but only a transcendental critique,        
because it aims not at the enlargement, but at the correction and           
guidance, of our knowledge, and is to serve as a touchstone of the          
worth or worthlessness of all knowledge a priori, is the sole object        
of our present essay. Such a critique is consequently, as far as            
possible, a preparation for an organon; and if this new organon should      
be found to fail, at least for a canon of pure reason, according to         
which the complete system of the philosophy of pure reason, whether it      
extend or limit the bounds of that reason, might one day be set             
forth both analytically and synthetically. For that this is                 
possible, nay, that such a system is not of so great extent as to           
preclude the hope of its ever being completed, is evident. For we have      
not here to do with the nature of outward objects, which is                 
infinite, but solely with the mind, which judges of the nature of           
objects, and, again, with the mind only in respect of its cognition         
a priori. And the object of our investigations, as it is not to be          
sought without, but, altogether within, ourselves, cannot remain            
concealed, and in all probability is limited enough to be completely        
surveyed and fairly estimated, according to its worth or                    
worthlessness. Still less let the reader here expect a critique of          
books and systems of pure reason; our present object is exclusively         
a critique of the faculty of pure reason itself. Only when we make          
this critique our foundation, do we possess a pure touchstone for           
estimating the philosophical value of ancient and modern writings on        
this subject; and without this criterion, the incompetent historian or      
judge decides upon and corrects the groundless assertions of others         
with his own, which have themselves just as little foundation.              
                                                {INTRODUCTION ^paragraph 60}
  Transcendental philosophy is the idea of a science, for which the         
Critique of Pure Reason must sketch the whole plan                          
architectonically, that is, from principles, with a full guarantee for      
the validity and stability of all the parts which enter into the            
building. It is the system of all the principles of pure reason. If         
this Critique itself does not assume the title of transcendental            
philosophy, it is only because, to be a complete system, it ought to        
contain a full analysis of all human knowledge a priori. Our                
critique must, indeed, lay before us a complete enumeration of all the      
radical conceptions which constitute the said pure knowledge. But from      
the complete analysis of these conceptions themselves, as also from         
a complete investigation of those derived from them, it abstains            
with reason; partly because it would be deviating from the end in view      
to occupy itself with this analysis, since this process is not              
attended with the difficulty and insecurity to be found in the              
synthesis, to which our critique is entirely devoted, and partly            
because it would be inconsistent with the unity of our plan to              
burden this essay with the vindication of the completeness of such          
an analysis and deduction, with which, after all, we have at present        
nothing to do. This completeness of the analysis of these radical           
conceptions, as well as of the deduction from the conceptions a priori      
which may be given by the analysis, we can, however, easily attain,         
provided only that we are in possession of all these radical                
conceptions, which are to serve as principles of the synthesis, and         
that in respect of this main purpose nothing is wanting.                    
  To the Critique of Pure Reason, therefore, belongs all that               
constitutes transcendental philosophy; and it is the complete idea          
of transcendental philosophy, but still not the science itself;             
because it only proceeds so far with the analysis as is necessary to        
the power of judging completely of our synthetical knowledge a priori.      
  The principal thing we must attend to, in the division of the             
parts of a science like this, is that no conceptions must enter it          
which contain aught empirical; in other words, that the knowledge a         
priori must be completely pure. Hence, although the highest principles      
and fundamental conceptions of morality are certainly cognitions a          
priori, yet they do not belong to transcendental philosophy;                
because, though they certainly do not lay the conceptions of pain,          
pleasure, desires, inclinations, etc. (which are all of empirical           
origin), at the foundation of its precepts, yet still into the              
conception of duty- as an obstacle to be overcome, or as an incitement      
which should not be made into a motive- these empirical conceptions         
must necessarily enter, in the construction of a system of pure             
morality. Transcendental philosophy is consequently a philosophy of         
the pure and merely speculative reason. For all that is practical,          
so far as it contains motives, relates to feelings, and these belong        
to empirical sources of cognition.                                          
  If we wish to divide this science from the universal point of view        
of a science in general, it ought to comprehend, first, a Doctrine          
of the Elements, and, secondly, a Doctrine of the Method of pure            
reason. Each of these main divisions will have its subdivisions, the        
separate reasons for which we cannot here particularize. Only so            
much seems necessary, by way of introduction of premonition, that           
there are two sources of human knowledge (which probably spring from a      
common, but to us unknown root), namely, sense and understanding. By        
the former, objects are given to us; by the latter, thought. So far as      
the faculty of sense may contain representations a priori, which            
form the conditions under which objects are given, in so far it             
belongs to transcendental philosophy. The transcendental doctrine of        
sense must form the first part of our science of elements, because the      
conditions under which alone the objects of human knowledge are             
given must precede those under which they are thought.                      
                                                                            
1ST_PT_AESTHETIC                                                            
                               I.                                           
-                                                                           
              TRANSCENDENTAL DOCTRINE OF ELEMENTS.                          
-                                                                           
              FIRST PART. TRANSCENDENTAL AESTHETIC.                         
-                                                                           
                    SS I. Introductory.                                     
                                             {1ST_PT_AESTHETIC ^paragraph 5}
-                                                                           
  In whatsoever mode, or by whatsoever means, our knowledge may relate      
to objects, it is at least quite clear that the only manner in which        
it immediately relates to them is by means of an intuition. To this as      
the indispensable groundwork, all thought points. But an intuition can      
take place only in so far as the object is given to us. This, again,        
is only possible, to man at least, on condition that the object affect      
the mind in a certain manner. The capacity for receiving                    
representations (receptivity) through the mode in which we are              
affected by objects, objects, is called sensibility. By means of            
sensibility, therefore, objects are given to us, and it alone               
furnishes us with intuitions; by the understanding they are thought,        
and from it arise conceptions. But an thought must directly, or             
indirectly, by means of certain signs, relate ultimately to                 
intuitions; consequently, with us, to sensibility, because in no other      
way can an object be given to us.                                           
  The effect of an object upon the faculty of representation, so far        
as we are affected by the said object, is sensation. That sort of           
intuition which relates to an object by means of sensation is called        
an empirical intuition. The undetermined object of an empirical             
intuition is called phenomenon. That which in the phenomenon                
corresponds to the sensation, I term its matter; but that which             
effects that the content of the phenomenon can be arranged under            
certain relations, I call its form. But that in which our sensations        
are merely arranged, and by which they are susceptible of assuming a        
certain form, cannot be itself sensation. It is, then, the matter of        
all phenomena that is given to us a posteriori; the form must lie           
ready a priori for them in the mind, and consequently can be                
regarded separately from all sensation.                                     
  I call all representations pure, in the transcendental meaning of         
the word, wherein nothing is met with that belongs to sensation. And        
accordingly we find existing in the mind a priori, the pure form of         
sensuous intuitions in general, in which all the manifold content of        
the phenomenal world is arranged and viewed under certain relations.        
This pure form of sensibility I shall call pure intuition. Thus, if         
I take away from our representation of a body all that the                  
understanding thinks as belonging to it, as substance, force,               
divisibility, etc., and also whatever belongs to sensation, as              
impenetrability, hardness, colour, etc.; yet there is still                 
something left us from this empirical intuition, namely, extension and      
shape. These belong to pure intuition, which exists a priori in the         
mind, as a mere form of sensibility, and without any real object of         
the senses or any sensation.                                                
  The science of all the principles of sensibility a priori, I call         
transcendental aesthetic.* There must, then, be such a science forming      
the first part of the transcendental doctrine of elements, in               
contradistinction to that part which contains the principles of pure        
thought, and which is called transcendental logic.                          
                                            {1ST_PT_AESTHETIC ^paragraph 10}
-                                                                           
  *The Germans are the only people who at present use this word to          
indicate what others call the critique of taste. At the foundation          
of this term lies the disappointed hope, which the eminent analyst,         
Baumgarten, conceived, of subjecting the criticism of the beautiful to      
principles of reason, and so of elevating its rules into a science.         
But his endeavours were vain. For the said rules or criteria are, in        
respect to their chief sources, merely empirical, consequently never        
can serve as determinate laws a priori, by which our judgement in           
matters of taste is to be directed. It is rather our judgement which        
forms the proper test as to the correctness of the principles. On this      
account it is advisable to give up the use of the term as                   
designating the critique of taste, and to apply it solely to that           
doctrine, which is true science- the science of the laws of                 
sensibility- and thus come nearer to the language and the sense of the      
ancients in their well-known division of the objects of cognition into      
aiotheta kai noeta, or to share it with speculative philosophy, and         
employ it partly in a transcendental, partly in a psychological             
signification.                                                              
-                                                                           
  In the science of transcendental aesthetic accordingly, we shall          
first isolate sensibility or the sensuous faculty, by separating            
from it all that is annexed to its perceptions by the conceptions of        
understanding, so that nothing be left but empirical intuition. In the      
next place we shall take away from this intuition all that belongs          
to sensation, so that nothing may remain but pure intuition, and the        
mere form of phenomena, which is all that the sensibility can afford a      
priori. From this investigation it will be found that there are two         
pure forms of sensuous intuition, as principles of knowledge a priori,      
namely, space and time. To the consideration of these we shall now          
proceed.                                                                    
-                                                                           
                                            {1ST_PT_AESTHETIC ^paragraph 15}
                   SECTION I. Of Space.                                     
-                                                                           
     SS 2. Metaphysical Exposition of this Conception.                      
-                                                                           
  By means of the external sense (a property of the mind), we               
represent to ourselves objects as without us, and these all in              
space. Herein alone are their shape, dimensions, and relations to each      
other determined or determinable. The internal sense, by means of           
which the mind contemplates itself or its internal state, gives,            
indeed, no intuition of the soul as an object; yet there is                 
nevertheless a determinate form, under which alone the contemplation        
of our internal state is possible, so that all which relates to the         
inward determinations of the mind is represented in relations of time.      
Of time we cannot have any external intuition, any more than we can         
have an internal intuition of space. What then are time and space? Are      
they real existences? Or, are they merely relations or                      
determinations of things, such, however, as would equally belong to         
these things in themselves, though they should never become objects of      
intuition; or, are they such as belong only to the form of                  
intuition, and consequently to the subjective constitution of the           
mind, without which these predicates of time and space could not be         
attached to any object? In order to become informed on these points,        
we shall first give an exposition of the conception of space. By            
exposition, I mean the clear, though not detailed, representation of        
that which belongs to a conception; and an exposition is                    
metaphysical when it contains that which represents the conception          
as given a priori.                                                          
                                            {1ST_PT_AESTHETIC ^paragraph 20}
  1. Space is not a conception which has been derived from outward          
experiences. For, in order that certain sensations may relate to            
something without me (that is, to something which occupies a different      
part of space from that in which I am); in like manner, in order            
that I may represent them not merely as without, of, and near to            
each other, but also in separate places, the representation of space        
must already exist as a foundation. Consequently, the representation        
of space cannot be borrowed from the relations of external phenomena        
through experience; but, on the contrary, this external experience          
is itself only possible through the said antecedent representation.         
  2. Space then is a necessary representation a priori, which serves        
for the foundation of all external intuitions. We never can imagine or      
make a representation to ourselves of the non-existence of space,           
though we may easily enough think that no objects are found in it.          
It must, therefore, be considered as the condition of the                   
possibility of phenomena, and by no means as a determination dependent      
on them, and is a representation a priori, which necessarily                
supplies the basis for external phenomena.                                  
  3. Space is no discursive, or as we say, general conception of the        
relations of things, but a pure intuition. For, in the first place, we      
can only represent to ourselves one space, and, when we talk of divers      
spaces, we mean only parts of one and the same space. Moreover,             
these parts cannot antecede this one all-embracing space, as the            
component parts from which the aggregate can be made up, but can be         
cogitated only as existing in it. Space is essentially one, and             
multiplicity in it, consequently the general notion of spaces, of this      
or that space, depends solely upon limitations. Hence it follows            
that an a priori intuition (which is not empirical) lies at the root        
of all our conceptions of space. Thus, moreover, the principles of          
geometry- for example, that "in a triangle, two sides together are          
greater than the third," are never deduced from general conceptions of      
line and triangle, but from intuition, and this a priori, with              
apodeictic certainty.                                                       
  4. Space is represented as an infinite given quantity. Now every          
conception must indeed be considered as a representation which is           
contained in an infinite multitude of different possible                    
representations, which, therefore, comprises these under itself; but        
no conception, as such, can be so conceived, as if it contained within      
itself an infinite multitude of representations. Nevertheless, space        
is so conceived of, for all parts of space are equally capable of           
being produced to infinity. Consequently, the original                      
representation of space is an intuition a priori, and not a                 
conception.                                                                 
-                                                                           
                                            {1ST_PT_AESTHETIC ^paragraph 25}
  SS 3. Transcendental Exposition of the Conception of Space.               
-                                                                           
  By a transcendental exposition, I mean the explanation of a               
conception, as a principle, whence can be discerned the possibility of      
other synthetical a priori cognitions. For this purpose, it is              
requisite, firstly, that such cognitions do really flow from the given      
conception; and, secondly, that the said cognitions are only                
possible under the presupposition of a given mode of explaining this        
conception.                                                                 
  Geometry is a science which determines the properties of space            
synthetically, and yet a priori. What, then, must be our                    
representation of space, in order that such a cognition of it may be        
possible? It must be originally intuition, for from a mere conception,      
no propositions can be deduced which go out beyond the conception, and      
yet this happens in geometry. (Introd. V.) But this intuition must          
be found in the mind a priori, that is, before any perception of            
objects, consequently must be pure, not empirical, intuition. For           
geometrical principles are always apodeictic, that is, united with the      
consciousness of their necessity, as: "Space has only three                 
dimensions." But propositions of this kind cannot be empirical              
judgements, nor conclusions from them. (Introd. II.) Now, how can an        
external intuition anterior to objects themselves, and in which our         
conception of objects can be determined a priori, exist in the human        
mind? Obviously not otherwise than in so far as it has its seat in the      
subject only, as the formal capacity of the subject's being affected        
by objects, and thereby of obtaining immediate representation, that         
is, intuition; consequently, only as the form of the external sense in      
general.                                                                    
  Thus it is only by means of our explanation that the possibility          
of geometry, as a synthetical science a priori, becomes                     
comprehensible. Every mode of explanation which does not show us            
this possibility, although in appearance it may be similar to ours,         
can with the utmost certainty be distinguished from it by these marks.      
                                            {1ST_PT_AESTHETIC ^paragraph 30}
-                                                                           
      SS 4. Conclusions from the foregoing Conceptions.                     
-                                                                           
  (a) Space does Space does not represent any property of objects as        
things in themselves, nor does it represent them in their relations to      
each other; in other words, space does not represent to us any              
determination of objects such as attaches to the objects themselves,        
and would remain, even though all subjective conditions of the              
intuition were abstracted. For neither absolute nor relative                
determinations of objects can be intuited prior to the existence of         
the things to which they belong, and therefore not a priori.                
  (b) Space is nothing else than the form of all phenomena of the           
external sense, that is, the subjective condition of the                    
sensibility, under which alone external intuition is possible. Now,         
because the receptivity or capacity of the subject to be affected by        
objects necessarily antecedes all intuitions of these objects, it is        
easily understood how the form of all phenomena can be given in the         
mind previous to all actual perceptions, therefore a priori, and how        
it, as a pure intuition, in which all objects must be determined,           
can contain principles of the relations of these objects prior to           
all experience.                                                             
                                            {1ST_PT_AESTHETIC ^paragraph 35}
  It is therefore from the human point of view only that we can             
speak of space, extended objects, etc. If we depart from the                
subjective condition, under which alone we can obtain external              
intuition, or, in other words, by means of which we are affected by         
objects, the representation of space has no meaning whatsoever. This        
predicate is only applicable to things in so far as they appear to us,      
that is, are objects of sensibility. The constant form of this              
receptivity, which we call sensibility, is a necessary condition of         
all relations in which objects can be intuited as existing without us,      
and when abstraction of these objects is made, is a pure intuition, to      
which we give the name of space. It is clear that we cannot make the        
special conditions of sensibility into conditions of the possibility        
of things, but only of the possibility of their existence as far as         
they are phenomena. And so we may correctly say that space contains         
all which can appear to us externally, but not all things considered        
as things in themselves, be they intuited or not, or by whatsoever          
subject one will. As to the intuitions of other thinking beings, we         
cannot judge whether they are or are not bound by the same                  
conditions which limit our own intuition, and which for us are              
universally valid. If we join the limitation of a judgement to the          
conception of the subject, then the judgement will possess                  
unconditioned validity. For example, the proposition, "All objects are      
beside each other in space," is valid only under the limitation that        
these things are taken as objects of our sensuous intuition. But if         
I join the condition to the conception and say, "All things, as             
external phenomena, are beside each other in space," then the rule          
is valid universally, and without any limitation. Our expositions,          
consequently, teach the reality (i.e., the objective validity) of           
space in regard of all which can be presented to us externally as           
object, and at the same time also the ideality of space in regard to        
objects when they are considered by means of reason as things in            
themselves, that is, without reference to the constitution of our           
sensibility. We maintain, therefore, the empirical reality of space in      
regard to all possible external experience, although we must admit its      
transcendental ideality; in other words, that it is nothing, so soon        
as we withdraw the condition upon which the possibility of all              
experience depends and look upon space as something that belongs to         
things in themselves.                                                       
  But, with the exception of space, there is no representation,             
subjective and ref erring to something external to us, which could          
be called objective a priori. For there are no other subjective             
representations from which we can deduce synthetical propositions a         
priori, as we can from the intuition of space. (See SS 3.)                  
Therefore, to speak accurately, no ideality whatever belongs to these,      
although they agree in this respect with the representation of              
space, that they belong merely to the subjective nature of the mode of      
sensuous perception; such a mode, for example, as that of sight, of         
hearing, and of feeling, by means of the sensations of colour,              
sound, and heat, but which, because they are only sensations and not        
intuitions, do not of themselves give us the cognition of any               
object, least of all, an a priori cognition. My purpose, in the             
above remark, is merely this: to guard any one against illustrating         
the asserted ideality of space by examples quite insufficient, for          
example, by colour, taste, etc.; for these must be contemplated not as      
properties of things, but only as changes in the subject, changes           
which may be different in different men. For, in such a case, that          
which is originally a mere phenomenon, a rose, for example, is taken        
by the empirical understanding for a thing in itself, though to             
every different eye, in respect of its colour, it may appear                
different. On the contrary, the transcendental conception of phenomena      
in space is a critical admonition, that, in general, nothing which          
is intuited in space is a thing in itself, and that space is not a          
form which belongs as a property to things; but that objects are quite      
unknown to us in themselves, and what we call outward objects, are          
nothing else but mere representations of our sensibility, whose form        
is space, but whose real correlate, the thing in itself, is not             
known by means of these representations, nor ever can be, but               
respecting which, in experience, no inquiry is ever made.                   
-                                                                           
                  SECTION II. Of Time.                                      
-                                                                           
                                            {1ST_PT_AESTHETIC ^paragraph 40}
     SS 5 Metaphysical Exposition of this Conception.                       
-                                                                           
  1. Time is not an empirical conception. For neither coexistence           
nor succession would be perceived by us, if the representation of time      
did not exist as a foundation a priori. Without this presupposition we      
could not represent to ourselves that things exist together at one and      
the same time, or at different times, that is, contemporaneously, or        
in succession.                                                              
  2. Time is a necessary representation, lying at the foundation of         
all our intuitions. With regard to phenomena in general, we cannot          
think away time from them, and represent them to ourselves as out of        
and unconnected with time, but we can quite well represent to               
ourselves time void of phenomena. Time is therefore given a priori. In      
it alone is all reality of phenomena possible. These may all be             
annihilated in thought, but time itself, as the universal condition of      
their possibility, cannot be so annulled.                                   
  3. On this necessity a priori is also founded the possibility of          
apodeictic principles of the relations of time, or axioms of time in        
general, such as: "Time has only one dimension," "Different times           
are not coexistent but successive" (as different spaces are not             
successive but coexistent). These principles cannot be derived from         
experience, for it would give neither strict universality, nor              
apodeictic certainty. We should only be able to say, "so common             
experience teaches us," but not "it must be so." They are valid as          
rules, through which, in general, experience is possible; and they          
instruct us respecting experience, and not by means of it.                  
                                            {1ST_PT_AESTHETIC ^paragraph 45}
  4. Time is not a discursive, or as it is called, general conception,      
but a pure form of the sensuous intuition. Different times are              
merely parts of one and the same time. But the representation which         
can only be given by a single object is an intuition. Besides, the          
proposition that different times cannot be coexistent could not be          
derived from a general conception. For this proposition is                  
synthetical, and therefore cannot spring out of conceptions alone.          
It is therefore contained immediately in the intuition and                  
representation of time.                                                     
  5. The infinity of time signifies nothing more than that every            
determined quantity of time is possible only through limitations of         
one time lying at the foundation. Consequently, the original                
representation, time, must be given as unlimited. But as the                
determinate representation of the parts of time and of every                
quantity of an object can only be obtained by limitation, the complete      
representation of time must not be furnished by means of                    
conceptions, for these contain only partial representations.                
Conceptions, on the contrary, must have immediate intuition for             
their basis.                                                                
-                                                                           
   SS 6 Transcendental Exposition of the Conception of Time.                
-                                                                           
                                            {1ST_PT_AESTHETIC ^paragraph 50}
  I may here refer to what is said above (SS 5, 3), where, for or sake      
of brevity, I have placed under the head of metaphysical exposition,        
that which is properly transcendental. Here I shall add that the            
conception of change, and with it the conception of motion, as              
change of place, is possible only through and in the representation of      
time; that if this representation were not an intuition (internal) a        
priori, no conception, of whatever kind, could render comprehensible        
the possibility of change, in other words, of a conjunction of              
contradictorily opposed predicates in one and the same object, for          
example, the presence of a thing in a place and the non-presence of         
the same thing in the same place. It is only in time that it is             
possible to meet with two contradictorily opposed determinations in         
one thing, that is, after each other. thus our conception of time           
explains the possibility of so much synthetical knowledge a priori, as      
is exhibited in the general doctrine of motion, which is not a              
little fruitful.                                                            
-                                                                           
         SS 7 Conclusions from the above Conceptions.                       
-                                                                           
  (a) Time is not something which subsists of itself, or which inheres      
in things as an objective determination, and therefore remains, when        
abstraction is made of the subjective conditions of the intuition of        
things. For in the former case, it would be something real, yet             
without presenting to any power of perception any real object. In           
the latter case, as an order or determination inherent in things            
themselves, it could not be antecedent to things, as their                  
condition, nor discerned or intuited by means of synthetical                
propositions a priori. But all this is quite possible when we regard        
time as merely the subjective condition under which all our intuitions      
take place. For in that case, this form of the inward intuition can be      
represented prior to the objects, and consequently a priori.                
                                            {1ST_PT_AESTHETIC ^paragraph 55}
  (b) Time is nothing else than the form of the internal sense, that        
is, of the intuitions of self and of our internal state. For time           
cannot be any determination of outward phenomena. It has to do neither      
with shape nor position; on the contrary, it determines the relation        
of representations in our internal state. And precisely because this        
internal intuition presents to us no shape or form, we endeavour to         
supply this want by analogies, and represent the course of time by a        
line progressing to infinity, the content of which constitutes a            
series which is only of one dimension; and we conclude from the             
properties of this line as to all the properties of time, with this         
single exception, that the parts of the line are coexistent, whilst         
those of time are successive. From this it is clear also that the           
representation of time is itself an intuition, because all its              
relations can be expressed in an external intuition.                        
  (c) Time is the formal condition a priori of all phenomena                
whatsoever. Space, as the pure form of external intuition, is               
limited as a condition a priori to external phenomena alone. On the         
other hand, because all representations, whether they have or have not      
external things for their objects, still in themselves, as                  
determinations of the mind, belong to our internal state; and               
because this internal state is subject to the formal condition of           
the internal intuition, that is, to time- time is a condition a priori      
of all phenomena whatsoever- the immediate condition of all                 
internal, and thereby the mediate condition of all external phenomena.      
If I can say a priori, "All outward phenomena are in space, and             
determined a priori according to the relations of space," I can             
also, from the principle of the internal sense, affirm universally,         
"All phenomena in general, that is, all objects of the senses, are          
in time and stand necessarily in relations of time."                        
  If we abstract our internal intuition of ourselves and all                
external intuitions, possible only by virtue of this internal               
intuition and presented to us by our faculty of representation, and         
consequently take objects as they are in themselves, then time is           
nothing. It is only of objective validity in regard to phenomena,           
because these are things which we regard as objects of our senses.          
It no longer objective we, make abstraction of the sensuousness of our      
intuition, in other words, of that mode of representation which is          
peculiar to us, and speak of things in general. Time is therefore           
merely a subjective condition of our (human) intuition (which is            
always sensuous, that is, so far as we are affected by objects), and        
in itself, independently of the mind or subject, is nothing.                
Nevertheless, in respect of all phenomena, consequently of all              
things which come within the sphere of our experience, it is                
necessarily objective. We cannot say, "All things are in time,"             
because in this conception of things in general, we abstract and            
make no mention of any sort of intuition of things. But this is the         
proper condition under which time belongs to our representation of          
objects. If we add the condition to the conception, and say, "All           
things, as phenomena, that is, objects of sensuous intuition, are in        
time," then the proposition has its sound objective validity and            
universality a priori.                                                      
  What we have now set forth teaches, therefore, the empirical reality      
of time; that is, its objective validity in reference to all objects        
which can ever be presented to our senses. And as our intuition is          
always sensuous, no object ever can be presented to us in                   
experience, which does not come under the conditions of time. On the        
other hand, we deny to time all claim to absolute reality; that is, we      
deny that it, without having regard to the form of our sensuous             
intuition, absolutely inheres in things as a condition or property.         
Such properties as belong to objects as things in themselves never can      
be presented to us through the medium of the senses. Herein                 
consists, therefore, the transcendental ideality of time, according to      
which, if we abstract the subjective conditions of sensuous intuition,      
it is nothing, and cannot be reckoned as subsisting or inhering in          
objects as things in themselves, independently of its relation to           
our intuition. this ideality, like that of space, is not to be              
proved or illustrated by fallacious analogies with sensations, for          
this reason- that in such arguments or illustrations, we make the           
presupposition that the phenomenon, in which such and such                  
predicates inhere, has objective reality, while in this case we can         
only find such an objective reality as is itself empirical, that is,        
regards the object as a mere phenomenon. In reference to this subject,      
see the remark in Section I (SS 4)                                          
-                                                                           
                                            {1ST_PT_AESTHETIC ^paragraph 60}
                    SS 8 Elucidation.                                       
-                                                                           
  Against this theory, which grants empirical reality to time, but          
denies to it absolute and transcendental reality, I have heard from         
intelligent men an objection so unanimously urged that I conclude that      
it must naturally present itself to every reader to whom these              
considerations are novel. It runs thus: "Changes are real" (this the        
continual change in our own representations demonstrates, even              
though the existence of all external phenomena, together with their         
changes, is denied). Now, changes are only possible in time, and            
therefore time must be something real. But there is no difficulty in        
answering this. I grant the whole argument. Time, no doubt, is              
something real, that is, it is the real form of our internal                
intuition. It therefore has subjective reality, in reference to our         
internal experience, that is, I have really the representation of time      
and of my determinations therein. Time, therefore, is not to be             
regarded as an object, but as the mode of representation of myself          
as an object. But if I could intuite myself, or be intuited by another      
being, without this condition of sensibility, then those very               
determinations which we now represent to ourselves as changes, would        
present to us a knowledge in which the representation of time, and          
consequently of change, would not appear. The empirical reality of          
time, therefore, remains, as the condition of all our experience.           
But absolute reality, according to what has been said above, cannot be      
granted it. Time is nothing but the form of our internal intuition.*        
If we take away from it the special condition of our sensibility,           
the conception of time also vanishes; and it inheres not in the             
objects themselves, but solely in the subject (or mind) which intuites      
them.                                                                       
-                                                                           
  *I can indeed say "my representations follow one another, or are          
successive"; but this means only that we are conscious of them as in a      
succession, that is, according to the form of the internal sense.           
Time, therefore, is not a thing in itself, nor is it any objective          
determination pertaining to, or inherent in things.                         
                                            {1ST_PT_AESTHETIC ^paragraph 65}
-                                                                           
  But the reason why this objection is so unanimously brought               
against our doctrine of time, and that too by disputants who cannot         
start any intelligible arguments against the doctrine of the                
ideality of space, is this- they have no hope of demonstrating              
apodeictically the absolute reality of space, because the doctrine          
of idealism is against them, according to which the reality of              
external objects is not capable of any strict proof. On the other           
hand, the reality of the object of our internal sense (that is, myself      
and my internal state) is clear immediately through consciousness. The      
former- external objects in space- might be a mere delusion, but the        
latter- the object of my internal perception- is undeniably real. They      
do not, however, reflect that both, without question of their               
reality as representations, belong only to the genus phenomenon, which      
has always two aspects, the one, the object considered as a thing in        
itself, without regard to the mode of intuiting it, and the nature          
of which remains for this very reason problematical, the other, the         
form of our intuition of the object, which must be sought not in the        
object as a thing in itself, but in the subject to which it appears-        
which form of intuition nevertheless belongs really and necessarily to      
the phenomenal object.                                                      
  Time and space are, therefore, two sources of knowledge, from which,      
a priori, various synthetical cognitions can be drawn. Of this we find      
a striking example in the cognitions of space and its relations, which      
form the foundation of pure mathematics. They are the two pure forms        
of all intuitions, and thereby make synthetical propositions a              
priori possible. But these sources of knowledge being merely                
conditions of our sensibility, do therefore, and as such, strictly          
determine their own range and purpose, in that they do not and              
cannot present objects as things in themselves, but are applicable          
to them solely in so far as they are considered as sensuous phenomena.      
The sphere of phenomena is the only sphere of their validity, and if        
we venture out of this, no further objective use can be made of             
them. For the rest, this formal reality of time and space leaves the        
validity of our empirical knowledge unshaken; for our certainty in          
that respect is equally firm, whether these forms necessarily inhere        
in the things themselves, or only in our intuitions of them. On the         
other hand, those who maintain the absolute reality of time and space,      
whether as essentially subsisting, or only inhering, as modifications,      
in things, must find themselves at utter variance with the                  
principles of experience itself. For, if they decide for the first          
view, and make space and time into substances, this being the side          
taken by mathematical natural philosophers, they must admit two             
self-subsisting nonentities, infinite and eternal, which exist (yet         
without there being anything real) for the purpose of containing in         
themselves everything that is real. If they adopt the second view of        
inherence, which is preferred by some metaphysical natural                  
philosophers, and regard space and time as relations (contiguity in         
space or succession in time), abstracted from experience, though            
represented confusedly in this state of separation, they find               
themselves in that case necessitated to deny the validity of                
mathematical doctrines a priori in reference to real things (for            
example, in space)- at all events their apodeictic certainty. For such      
certainty cannot be found in an a posteriori proposition; and the           
conceptions a priori of space and time are, according to this opinion,      
mere creations of the imagination, having their source really in            
experience, inasmuch as, out of relations abstracted from                   
experience, imagination has made up something which contains,               
indeed, general statements of these relations, yet of which no              
application can be made without the restrictions attached thereto by        
nature. The former of these parties gains this advantage, that they         
keep the sphere of phenomena free for mathematical science. On the          
other hand, these very conditions (space and time) embarrass them           
greatly, when the understanding endeavours to pass the limits of            
that sphere. The latter has, indeed, this advantage, that the               
representations of space and time do not come in their way when they        
wish to judge of objects, not as phenomena, but merely in their             
relation to the understanding. Devoid, however, of a true and               
objectively valid a priori intuition, they can neither furnish any          
basis for the possibility of mathematical cognitions a priori, nor          
bring the propositions of experience into necessary accordance with         
those of mathematics. In our theory of the true nature of these two         
original forms of the sensibility, both difficulties are surmounted.        
  In conclusion, that transcendental aesthetic cannot contain any more      
than these two elements- space and time, is sufficiently obvious            
from the fact that all other conceptions appertaining to                    
sensibility, even that of motion, which unites in itself both               
elements, presuppose something empirical. Motion, for example,              
presupposes the perception of something movable. But space                  
considered in itself contains nothing movable, consequently motion          
must be something which is found in space only through experience-          
in other words, an empirical datum. In like manner, transcendental          
aesthetic cannot number the conception of change among its data a           
priori; for time itself does not change, but only something which is        
in time. To acquire the conception of change, therefore, the                
perception of some existing object and of the succession of its             
determinations, in one word, experience, is necessary.                      
-                                                                           
                                            {1ST_PT_AESTHETIC ^paragraph 70}
      SS 9 General Remarks on Transcendental Aesthetic.                     
-                                                                           
  I. In order to prevent any misunderstanding, it will be requisite,        
in the first place, to recapitulate, as clearly as possible, what           
our opinion is with respect to the fundamental nature of our                
sensuous cognition in general. We have intended, then, to say that all      
our intuition is nothing but the representation of phenomena; that the      
things which we intuite, are not in themselves the same as our              
representations of them in intuition, nor are their relations in            
themselves so constituted as they appear to us; and that if we take         
away the subject, or even only the subjective constitution of our           
senses in general, then not only the nature and relations of objects        
in space and time, but even space and time themselves disappear; and        
that these, as phenomena, cannot exist in themselves, but only in           
us. What may be the nature of objects considered as things in               
themselves and without reference to the receptivity of our sensibility      
is quite unknown to us. We know nothing more than our mode of               
perceiving them, which is peculiar to us, and which, though not of          
necessity pertaining to every animated being, is so to the whole human      
race. With this alone we have to do. Space and time are the pure forms      
thereof; sensation the matter. The former alone can we cognize a            
priori, that is, antecedent to all actual perception; and for this          
reason such cognition is called pure intuition. The latter is that          
in our cognition which is called cognition a posteriori, that is,           
empirical intuition. The former appertain absolutely and necessarily        
to our sensibility, of whatsoever kind our sensations may be; the           
latter may be of very diversified character. Supposing that we              
should carry our empirical intuition even to the very highest degree        
of clearness, we should not thereby advance one step nearer to a            
knowledge of the constitution of objects as things in themselves.           
For we could only, at best, arrive at a complete cognition of our           
own mode of intuition, that is of our sensibility, and this always          
under the conditions originally attaching to the subject, namely,           
the conditions of space and time; while the question: "What are             
objects considered as things in themselves?" remains unanswerable even      
after the most thorough examination of the phenomenal world.                
  To say, then, that all our sensibility is nothing but the confused        
representation of things containing exclusively that which belongs          
to them as things in themselves, and this under an accumulation of          
characteristic marks and partial representations which we cannot            
distinguish in consciousness, is a falsification of the conception          
of sensibility and phenomenization, which renders our whole doctrine        
thereof empty and useless. The difference between a confused and a          
clear representation is merely logical and has nothing to do with           
content. No doubt the conception of right, as employed by a sound           
understanding, contains all that the most subtle investigation could        
unfold from it, although, in the ordinary practical use of the word,        
we are not conscious of the manifold representations comprised in           
the conception. But we cannot for this reason assert that the ordinary      
conception is a sensuous one, containing a mere phenomenon, for             
right cannot appear as a phenomenon; but the conception of it lies          
in the understanding, and represents a property (the moral property)        
of actions, which belongs to them in themselves. On the other hand,         
the representation in intuition of a body contains nothing which could      
belong to an object considered as a thing in itself, but merely the         
phenomenon or appearance of something, and the mode in which we are         
affected by that appearance; and this receptivity of our faculty of         
cognition is called sensibility, and remains toto caelo different from      
the cognition of an object in itself, even though we should examine         
the content of the phenomenon to the very bottom.                           
  It must be admitted that the Leibnitz-Wolfian philosophy has              
assigned an entirely erroneous point of view to all investigations          
into the nature and origin of our cognitions, inasmuch as it regards        
the distinction between the sensuous and the intellectual as merely         
logical, whereas it is plainly transcendental, and concerns not merely      
the clearness or obscurity, but the content and origin of both. For         
the faculty of sensibility not only does not present us with an             
indistinct and confused cognition of objects as things in                   
themselves, but, in fact, gives us no knowledge of these at all. On         
the contrary, so soon as we abstract in thought our own subjective          
nature, the object represented, with the properties ascribed to it          
by sensuous intuition, entirely disappears, because it was only this        
subjective nature that determined the form of the object as a               
phenomenon.                                                                 
                                            {1ST_PT_AESTHETIC ^paragraph 75}
  In phenomena, we commonly, indeed, distinguish that which                 
essentially belongs to the intuition of them, and is valid for the          
sensuous faculty of every human being, from that which belongs to           
the same intuition accidentally, as valid not for the sensuous faculty      
in general, but for a particular state or organization of this or that      
sense. Accordingly, we are accustomed to say that the former is a           
cognition which represents the object itself, whilst the latter             
presents only a particular appearance or phenomenon thereof. This           
distinction, however, is only empirical. If we stop here (as is             
usual), and do not regard the empirical intuition as itself a mere          
phenomenon (as we ought to do), in which nothing that can appertain to      
a thing in itself is to be found, our transcendental distinction is         
lost, and we believe that we cognize objects as things in                   
themselves, although in the whole range of the sensuous world,              
investigate the nature of its objects as profoundly as we may, we have      
to do with nothing but phenomena. Thus, we call the rainbow a mere          
appearance of phenomenon in a sunny shower, and the rain, the               
reality or thing in itself; and this is right enough, if we understand      
the latter conception in a merely physical sense, that is, as that          
which in universal experience, and under whatever conditions of             
sensuous perception, is known in intuition to be so and so determined,      
and not otherwise. But if we consider this empirical datum                  
generally, and inquire, without reference to its accordance with all        
our senses, whether there can be discovered in it aught which               
represents an object as a thing in itself (the raindrops of course are      
not such, for they are, as phenomena, empirical objects), the question      
of the relation of the representation to the object is transcendental;      
and not only are the raindrops mere phenomena, but even their circular      
form, nay, the space itself through which they fall, is nothing in          
itself, but both are mere modifications or fundamental dispositions of      
our sensuous intuition, whilst the transcendental object remains for        
us utterly unknown.                                                         
  The second important concern of our aesthetic is that it does not         
obtain favour merely as a plausible hypothesis, but possess as              
undoubted a character of certainty as can be demanded of any theory         
which is to serve for an organon. In order fully to convince the            
reader of this certainty, we shall select a case which will serve to        
make its validity apparent, and also to illustrate what has been            
said in SS 3.                                                               
  Suppose, then, that space and time are in themselves objective,           
and conditions of the- possibility of objects as things in themselves.      
In the first place, it is evident that both present us, with very many      
apodeictic and synthetic propositions a priori, but especially              
space- and for this reason we shall prefer it for investigation at          
present. As the propositions of geometry are cognized synthetically         
a priori, and with apodeictic certainty, I inquire: Whence do you           
obtain propositions of this kind, and on what basis does the                
understanding rest, in order to arrive at such absolutely necessary         
and universally valid truths?                                               
  There is no other way than through intuitions or conceptions, as          
such; and these are given either a priori or a posteriori. The latter,      
namely, empirical conceptions, together with the empirical intuition        
on which they are founded, cannot afford any synthetical                    
proposition, except such as is itself also empirical, that is, a            
proposition of experience. But an empirical proposition cannot possess      
the qualities of necessity and absolute universality, which,                
nevertheless, are the characteristics of all geometrical propositions.      
As to the first and only means to arrive at such cognitions, namely,        
through mere conceptions or intuitions a priori, it is quite clear          
that from mere conceptions no synthetical cognitions, but only              
analytical ones, can be obtained. Take, for example, the                    
proposition: "Two straight lines cannot enclose a space, and with           
these alone no figure is possible," and try to deduce it from the           
conception of a straight line and the number two; or take the               
proposition: "It is possible to construct a figure with three straight      
lines," and endeavour, in like manner, to deduce it from the mere           
conception of a straight line and the number three. All your                
endeavours are in vain, and you find yourself forced to have                
recourse to intuition, as, in fact, geometry always does. You               
therefore give yourself an object in intuition. But of what kind is         
this intuition? Is it a pure a priori, or is it an empirical                
intuition? If the latter, then neither an universally valid, much less      
an apodeictic proposition can arise from it, for experience never           
can give us any such proposition. You must, therefore, give yourself        
an object a priori in intuition, and upon that ground your synthetical      
proposition. Now if there did not exist within you a faculty of             
intuition a priori; if this subjective condition were not in respect        
to its form also the universal condition a priori under which alone         
the object of this external intuition is itself possible; if the            
object (that is, the triangle) were something in itself, without            
relation to you the subject; how could you affirm that that which lies      
necessarily in your subjective conditions in order to construct a           
triangle, must also necessarily belong to the triangle in itself?           
For to your conceptions of three lines, you could not add anything new      
(that is, the figure); which, therefore, must necessarily be found          
in the object, because the object is given before your cognition,           
and not by means of it. If, therefore, space (and time also) were           
not a mere form of your intuition, which contains conditions a priori,      
under which alone things can become external objects for you, and           
without which subjective conditions the objects are in themselves           
nothing, you could not construct any synthetical proposition                
whatsoever regarding external objects. It is therefore not merely           
possible or probable, but indubitably certain, that space and time, as      
the necessary conditions of all our external and internal                   
experience, are merely subjective conditions of all our intuitions, in      
relation to which all objects are therefore mere phenomena, and not         
things in themselves, presented to us in this particular manner. And        
for this reason, in respect to the form of phenomena, much may be said      
a priori, whilst of the thing in itself, which may lie at the               
foundation of these phenomena, it is impossible to say anything.            
  II. In confirmation of this theory of the ideality of the external        
as well as internal sense, consequently of all objects of sense, as         
mere phenomena, we may especially remark that all in our cognition          
that belongs to intuition contains nothing more than mere relations.        
(The feelings of pain and pleasure, and the will, which are not             
cognitions, are excepted.) The relations, to wit, of place in an            
intuition (extension), change of place (motion), and laws according to      
which this change is determined (moving forces). That, however,             
which is present in this or that place, or any operation going on,          
or result taking place in the things themselves, with the exception of      
change of place, is not given to us by intuition. Now by means of mere      
relations, a thing cannot be known in itself; and it may therefore          
be fairly concluded, that, as through the external sense nothing but        
mere representations of relations are given us, the said external           
sense in its representation can contain only the relation of the            
object to the subject, but not the essential nature of the object as a      
thing in itself.                                                            
                                            {1ST_PT_AESTHETIC ^paragraph 80}
  The same is the case with the internal intuition, not only                
because, in the internal intuition, the representation of the external      
senses constitutes the material with which the mind is occupied; but        
because time, in which we place, and which itself antecedes the             
consciousness of, these representations in experience, and which, as        
the formal condition of the mode according to which objects are placed      
in the mind, lies at the foundation of them, contains relations of the      
successive, the coexistent, and of that which always must be                
coexistent with succession, the permanent. Now that which, as               
representation, can antecede every exercise of thought (of an object),      
is intuition; and when it contains nothing but relations, it is the         
form of the intuition, which, as it presents us with no                     
representation, except in so far as something is placed in the mind,        
can be nothing else than the mode in which the mind is affected by its      
own activity, to wit- its presenting to itself representations,             
consequently the mode in which the mind is affected by itself; that         
is, it can be nothing but an internal sense in respect to its form.         
Everything that is represented through the medium of sense is so far        
phenomenal; consequently, we must either refuse altogether to admit an      
internal sense, or the subject, which is the object of that sense,          
could only be represented by it as phenomenon, and not as it would          
judge of itself, if its intuition were pure spontaneous activity, that      
is, were intellectual. The difficulty here lies wholly in the               
question: How can the subject have an internal intuition of itself?         
But this difficulty is common to every theory. The consciousness of         
self (apperception) is the simple representation of the "ego"; and          
if by means of that representation alone, all the manifold                  
representations in the subject were spontaneously given, then our           
internal intuition would be intellectual. This consciousness in man         
requires an internal perception of the manifold representations             
which are previously given in the subject; and the manner in which          
these representations are given in the mind without spontaneity, must,      
on account of this difference (the want of spontaneity), be called          
sensibility. If the faculty of self-consciousness is to apprehend what      
lies in the mind, it must all act that and can in this way alone            
produce an intuition of self. But the form of this intuition, which         
lies in the original constitution of the mind, determines, in the           
representation of time, the manner in which the manifold                    
representations are to combine themselves in the mind; since the            
subject intuites itself, not as it would represent itself                   
immediately and spontaneously, but according to the manner in which         
the mind is internally affected, consequently, as it appears, and           
not as it is.                                                               
  III. When we say that the intuition of external objects, and also         
the self-intuition of the subject, represent both, objects and              
subject, in space and time, as they affect our senses, that is, as          
they appear- this is by no means equivalent to asserting that these         
objects are mere illusory appearances. For when we speak of things          
as phenomena, the objects, nay, even the properties which we ascribe        
to them, are looked upon as really given; only that, in so far as this      
or that property depends upon the mode of intuition of the subject, in      
the relation of the given object to the subject, the object as              
phenomenon is to be distinguished from the object as a thing in             
itself. Thus I do not say that bodies seem or appear to be external to      
me, or that my soul seems merely to be given in my self-consciousness,      
although I maintain that the properties of space and time, in               
conformity to which I set both, as the condition of their existence,        
abide in my mode of intuition, and not in the objects in themselves.        
It would be my own fault, if out of that which I should reckon as           
phenomenon, I made mere illusory appearance.* But this will not             
happen, because of our principle of the ideality of all sensuous            
intuitions. On the contrary, if we ascribe objective reality to             
these forms of representation, it becomes impossible to avoid changing      
everything into mere appearance. For if we regard space and time as         
properties, which must be found in objects as things in themselves, as      
sine quibus non of the possibility of their existence, and reflect          
on the absurdities in which we then find ourselves involved,                
inasmuch as we are compelled to admit the existence of two infinite         
things, which are nevertheless not substances, nor anything really          
inhering in substances, nay, to admit that they are the necessary           
conditions of the existence of all things, and moreover, that they          
must continue to exist, although all existing things were annihilated-      
we cannot blame the good Berkeley for degrading bodies to mere              
illusory appearances. Nay, even our own existence, which would in this      
case depend upon the self-existent reality of such a mere nonentity as      
time, would necessarily be changed with it into mere appearance- an         
absurdity which no one has as yet been guilty of.                           
-                                                                           
  *The predicates of the phenomenon can be affixed to the object            
itself in relation to our sensuous faculty; for example, the red            
colour or the perfume to the rose. But (illusory) appearance never can      
be attributed as a predicate to an object, for this very reason,            
that it attributes to this object in itself that which belongs to it        
only in relation to our sensuous faculty, or to the subject in              
general, e.g., the two handles which were formerly ascribed to Saturn.      
That which is never to be found in the object itself, but always in         
the relation of the object to the subject, and which moreover is            
inseparable from our representation of the object, we denominate            
phenomenon. Thus the predicates of space and time are rightly               
attributed to objects of the senses as such, and in this there is no        
illusion. On the contrary, if I ascribe redness of the rose as a thing      
in itself, or to Saturn his handles, or extension to all external           
objects, considered as things in themselves, without regarding the          
determinate relation of these objects to the subject, and without           
limiting my judgement to that relation- then, and then only, arises         
illusion.                                                                   
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                                            {1ST_PT_AESTHETIC ^paragraph 85}
  IV. In natural theology, where we think of an object- God- which          
never can be an object of intuition to us, and even to himself can          
never be an object of sensuous intuition, we carefully avoid                
attributing to his intuition the conditions of space and time- and          
intuition all his cognition must be, and not thought, which always          
includes limitation. But with what right can we do this if we make          
them forms of objects as things in themselves, and such, moreover,          
as would continue to exist as a priori conditions of the existence          
of things, even though the things themselves were annihilated? For          
as conditions of all existence in general, space and time must be           
conditions of the existence of the Supreme Being also. But if we do         
not thus make them objective forms of all things, there is no other         
way left than to make them subjective forms of our mode of                  
intuition- external and internal; which is called sensuous, because it      
is not primitive, that is, is not such as gives in itself the               
existence of the object of the intuition (a mode of intuition which,        
so far as we can judge, can belong only to the Creator), but is             
dependent on the existence of the object, is possible, therefore, only      
on condition that the representative faculty of the subject is              
affected by the object.                                                     
  It is, moreover, not necessary that we should limit the mode of           
intuition in space and time to the sensuous faculty of man. It may          
well be that all finite thinking beings must necessarily in this            
respect agree with man (though as to this we cannot decide), but            
sensibility does not on account of this universality cease to be            
sensibility, for this very reason, that it is a deduced (intuitus           
derivativus), and not an original (intuitus originarius), consequently      
not an intellectual intuition, and this intuition, as such, for             
reasons above mentioned, seems to belong solely to the Supreme              
Being, but never to a being dependent, quoad its existence, as well as      
its intuition (which its existence determines and limits relatively to      
given objects). This latter remark, however, must be taken only as          
an illustration, and not as any proof of the truth of our                   
aesthetical theory.                                                         
-                                                                           
    SS 10 Conclusion of the Transcendental Aesthetic.                       
-                                                                           
                                            {1ST_PT_AESTHETIC ^paragraph 90}
  We have now completely before us one part of the solution of the          
grand general problem of transcendental philosophy, namely, the             
question: "How are synthetical propositions a priori possible?" That        
is to say, we have shown that we are in possession of pure a priori         
intuitions, namely, space and time, in which we find, when in a             
judgement a priori we pass out beyond the given conception,                 
something which is not discoverable in that conception, but is              
certainly found a priori in the intuition which corresponds to the          
conception, and can be united synthetically with it. But the                
judgements which these pure intuitions enable us to make, never             
reach farther than to objects of the senses, and are valid only for         
objects of possible experience.                                             
                                                                            
INTRO                                                                       
            SECOND PART. TRANSCENDENTAL LOGIC.                              
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       INTRODUCTION. Idea of a Transcendental Logic.                        
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                 I. Of Logic in General.                                    
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  Our knowledge springs from two main sources in the mind, first of         
which is the faculty or power of receiving representations                  
(receptivity for impressions); the second is the power of cognizing by      
means of these representations (spontaneity in the production of            
conceptions). Through the first an object is given to us; through           
the second, it is, in relation to the representation (which is a            
mere determination of the mind), thought. Intuition and conceptions         
constitute, therefore, the elements of all our knowledge, so that           
neither conceptions without an intuition in some way corresponding          
to them, nor intuition without conceptions, can afford us a cognition.      
Both are either pure or empirical. They are. empirical, when sensation      
(which presupposes the actual presence of the object) is contained          
in them; and pure, when no sensation is mixed with the representation.      
Sensations we may call the matter of sensuous cognition. Pure               
intuition consequently contains merely the form under which                 
something is intuited, and pure conception only the form of the             
thought of an object. Only pure intuitions and pure conceptions are         
possible a priori; the empirical only a posteriori.                         
                                                        {INTRO ^paragraph 5}
  We apply the term sensibility to the receptivity of the mind for          
impressions, in so far as it is in some way affected; and, on the           
other hand, we call the faculty of spontaneously producing                  
representations, or the spontaneity of cognition, understanding. Our        
nature is so constituted that intuition with us never can be other          
than sensuous, that is, it contains only the mode in which we are           
affected by objects. On the other hand, the faculty of thinking the         
object of sensuous intuition is the understanding. Neither of these         
faculties has a preference over the other. Without the sensuous             
faculty no object would be given to us, and without the                     
understanding no object would be thought. Thoughts without content are      
void; intuitions without conceptions, blind. Hence it is as                 
necessary for the mind to make its conceptions sensuous (that is, to        
join to them the object in intuition), as to make its intuitions            
intelligible (that is, to bring them under conceptions). Neither of         
these faculties can exchange its proper function. Understanding cannot      
intuite, and the sensuous faculty cannot think. in no other way than        
from the united operation of both, can knowledge arise. But no one          
ought, on this account, to overlook the difference of the elements          
contributed by each; we have rather great reason carefully to separate      
and distinguish them. We therefore distinguish the science of the laws      
of sensibility, that is, aesthetic, from the science of the laws of         
the understanding, that is, logic.                                          
  Now, logic in its turn may be considered as twofold- namely, as           
logic of the general, or of the particular use of the understanding.        
The first contains the absolutely necessary laws of thought, without        
which no use whatsoever of the understanding is possible, and gives         
laws therefore to the understanding, without regard to the                  
difference of objects on which it may be employed. The logic of the         
particular use of the understanding contains the laws of correct            
thinking upon a particular class of objects. The former may be              
called elemental logic- the latter, the organon of this or that             
particular science. The latter is for the most part employed in the         
schools, as a propaedeutic to the sciences, although, indeed,               
according to the course of human reason, it is the last thing we            
arrive at, when the science has been already matured, and needs only        
the finishing touches towards its correction and completion; for our        
knowledge of the objects of our attempted science must be tolerably         
extensive and complete before we can indicate the laws by which a           
science of these objects can be established.                                
  General logic is again either pure or applied. In the former, we          
abstract all the empirical conditions under which the understanding is      
exercised; for example, the influence of the senses, the play of the        
fantasy or imagination, the laws of the memory, the force of habit, of      
inclination, etc., consequently also, the sources of prejudice- in a        
word, we abstract all causes from which particular cognitions arise,        
because these causes regard the understanding under certain                 
circumstances of its application, and, to the knowledge of them             
experience is required. Pure general logic has to do, therefore,            
merely with pure a priori principles, and is a canon of                     
understanding and reason, but only in respect of the formal part of         
their use, be the content what it may, empirical or transcendental.         
General logic is called applied, when it is directed to the laws of         
the use of the understanding, under the subjective empirical                
conditions which psychology teaches us. It has therefore empirical          
principles, although, at the same time, it is in so far general,            
that it applies to the exercise of the understanding, without regard        
to the difference of objects. On this account, moreover, it is neither      
a canon of the understanding in general, nor an organon of a                
particular science, but merely a cathartic of the human understanding.      
  In general logic, therefore, that part which constitutes pure             
logic must be carefully distinguished from that which constitutes           
applied (though still general) logic. The former alone is properly          
science, although short and dry, as the methodical exposition of an         
elemental doctrine of the understanding ought to be. In this,               
therefore, logicians must always bear in mind two rules:                    
  1. As general logic, it makes abstraction of all content of the           
cognition of the understanding, and of the difference of objects,           
and has to do with nothing but the mere form of thought.                    
                                                       {INTRO ^paragraph 10}
  2. As pure logic, it has no empirical principles, and consequently        
draws nothing (contrary to the common persuasion) from psychology,          
which therefore has no influence on the canon of the understanding. It      
is a demonstrated doctrine, and everything in it must be certain            
completely a priori.                                                        
  What I called applied logic (contrary to the common acceptation of        
this term, according to which it should contain certain exercises           
for the scholar, for which pure logic gives the rules), is a                
representation of the understanding, and of the rules of its necessary      
employment in concreto, that is to say, under the accidental                
conditions of the subject, which may either hinder or promote this          
employment, and which are all given only empirically. Thus applied          
logic treats of attention, its impediments and consequences, of the         
origin of error, of the state of doubt, hesitation, conviction,             
etc., and to it is related pure general logic in the same way that          
pure morality, which contains only the necessary moral laws of a            
free will, is related to practical ethics, which considers these            
laws under all the impediments of feelings, inclinations, and passions      
to which men are more or less subjected, and which never can furnish        
us with a true and demonstrated science, because it, as well as             
applied logic, requires empirical and psychological principles.             
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               II. Of Transcendental Logic.                                 
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                                                       {INTRO ^paragraph 15}
  General logic, as we have seen, makes abstraction of all content          
of cognition, that is, of all relation of cognition to its object, and      
regards only the logical form in the relation of cognitions to each         
other, that is, the form of thought in general. But as we have both         
pure and empirical intuitions (as transcendental aesthetic proves), in      
like manner a distinction might be drawn between pure and empirical         
thought (of objects). In this case, there would exist a kind of logic,      
in which we should not make abstraction of all content of cognition;        
for or logic which should comprise merely the laws of pure thought (of      
an object), would of course exclude all those cognitions which were of      
empirical content. This kind of logic would also examine the origin of      
our cognitions of objects, so far as that origin cannot be ascribed to      
the objects themselves; while, on the contrary, general logic has           
nothing to do with the origin of our cognitions, but contemplates           
our representations, be they given primitively a priori in                  
ourselves, or be they only of empirical origin, solely according to         
the laws which the understanding observes in employing them in the          
process of thought, in relation to each other. Consequently, general        
logic treats of the form of the understanding only, which can be            
applied to representations, from whatever source they may have arisen.      
  And here I shall make a remark, which the reader must bear well in        
mind in the course of the following considerations, to wit, that not        
every cognition a priori, but only those through which we cognize that      
and how certain representations (intuitions or conceptions) are             
applied or are possible only a priori; that is to say, the a priori         
possibility of cognition and the a priori use of it are                     
transcendental. Therefore neither is space, nor any a priori                
geometrical determination of space, a transcendental Representation,        
but only the knowledge that such a representation is not of                 
empirical origin, and the possibility of its relating to objects of         
experience, although itself a priori, can be called transcendental. So      
also, the application of space to objects in general would be               
transcendental; but if it be limited to objects of sense it is              
empirical. Thus, the distinction of the transcendental and empirical        
belongs only to the critique of cognitions, and does not concern the        
relation of these to their object.                                          
  Accordingly, in the expectation that there may perhaps be                 
conceptions which relate a priori to objects, not as pure or                
sensuous intuitions, but merely as acts of pure thought (which are          
therefore conceptions, but neither of empirical nor aesthetical             
origin)- in this expectation, I say, we form to ourselves, by               
anticipation, the idea of a science of pure understanding and rational      
cognition, by means of which we may cogitate objects entirely a             
priori. A science of this kind, which should determine the origin, the      
extent, and the objective validity of such cognitions, must be              
called transcendental logic, because it has not, like general logic,        
to do with the laws of understanding and reason in relation to              
empirical as well as pure rational cognitions without distinction, but      
concerns itself with these only in an a priori relation to objects.         
-                                                                           
  III. Of the Division of General Logic into Analytic and Dialectic.        
                                                       {INTRO ^paragraph 20}
-                                                                           
  The old question with which people sought to push logicians into a        
corner, so that they must either have recourse to pitiful sophisms          
or confess their ignorance, and consequently the vanity of their whole      
art, is this: "What is truth?" The definition of the word truth, to         
wit, "the accordance of the cognition with its object," is presupposed      
in the question; but we desire to be told, in the answer to it, what        
is the universal and secure criterion of the truth of every cognition.      
  To know what questions we may reasonably propose is in itself a           
strong evidence of sagacity and intelligence. For if a question be          
in itself absurd and unsusceptible of a rational answer, it is              
attended with the danger- not to mention the shame that falls upon the      
person who proposes it- of seducing the unguarded listener into making      
absurd answers, and we are presented with the ridiculous spectacle          
of one (as the ancients said) "milking the he-goat, and the other           
holding a sieve."                                                           
  If truth consists in the accordance of a cognition with its               
object, this object must be, ipso facto, distinguished from all             
others; for a cognition is false if it does not accord with the object      
to which it relates, although it contains something which may be            
affirmed of other objects. Now an universal criterion of truth would        
be that which is valid for all cognitions, without distinction of           
their objects. But it is evident that since, in the case of such a          
criterion, we make abstraction of all the content of a cognition (that      
is, of all relation to its object), and truth relates precisely to          
this content, it must be utterly absurd to ask for a mark of the truth      
of this content of cognition; and that, accordingly, a sufficient, and      
at the same time universal, test of truth cannot possibly be found. As      
we have already termed the content of a cognition its matter, we shall      
say: "Of the truth of our cognitions in respect of their matter, no         
universal test can be demanded, because such a demand is                    
self-contradictory."                                                        
  On the other hand, with regard to our cognition in respect of its         
mere form (excluding all content), it is equally manifest that              
logic, in so far as it exhibits the universal and necessary laws of         
the understanding, must in these very laws present us with criteria of      
truth. Whatever contradicts these rules is false, because thereby           
the understanding is made to contradict its own universal laws of           
thought; that is, to contradict itself. These criteria, however, apply      
solely to the form of truth, that is, of thought in general, and in so      
far they are perfectly accurate, yet not sufficient. For although a         
cognition may be perfectly accurate as to logical form, that is, not        
self-contradictory, it is notwithstanding quite possible that it may        
not stand in agreement with its object. Consequently, the merely            
logical criterion of truth, namely, the accordance of a cognition with      
the universal and formal laws of understanding and reason, is               
nothing more than the conditio sine qua non, or negative condition          
of all truth. Farther than this logic cannot go, and the error which        
depends not on the form, but on the content of the cognition, it has        
no test to discover.                                                        
                                                       {INTRO ^paragraph 25}
  General logic, then, resolves the whole formal business of                
understanding and reason into its elements, and exhibits them as            
principles of all logical judging of our cognitions. This part of           
logic may, therefore, be called analytic, and is at least the negative      
test of truth, because all cognitions must first of an be estimated         
and tried according to these laws before we proceed to investigate          
them in respect of their content, in order to discover whether they         
contain positive truth in regard to their object. Because, however,         
the mere form of a cognition, accurately as it may accord with logical      
laws, is insufficient to supply us with material (objective) truth, no      
one, by means of logic alone, can venture to predicate anything of          
or decide concerning objects, unless he has obtained, independently of      
logic, well-grounded information about them, in order afterwards to         
examine, according to logical laws, into the use and connection, in         
a cohering whole, of that information, or, what is still better,            
merely to test it by them. Notwithstanding, there lies so seductive         
a charm in the possession of a specious art like this- an art which         
gives to all our cognitions the form of the understanding, although         
with respect to the content thereof we may be sadly deficient- that         
general logic, which is merely a canon of judgement, has been employed      
as an organon for the actual production, or rather for the semblance        
of production, of objective assertions, and has thus been grossly           
misapplied. Now general logic, in its assumed character of organon, is      
called dialectic.                                                           
  Different as are the significations in which the ancients used            
this term for a science or an art, we may safely infer, from their          
actual employment of it, that with them it was nothing else than a          
logic of illusion- a sophistical art for giving ignorance, nay, even        
intentional sophistries, the colouring of truth, in which the               
thoroughness of procedure which logic requires was imitated, and their      
topic employed to cloak the empty pretensions. Now it may be taken          
as a safe and useful warning, that general logic, considered as an          
organon, must always be a logic of illusion, that is, be                    
dialectical, for, as it teaches us nothing whatever respecting the          
content of our cognitions, but merely the formal conditions of their        
accordance with the understanding, which do not relate to and are           
quite indifferent in respect of objects, any attempt to employ it as        
an instrument (organon) in order to extend and enlarge the range of         
our knowledge must end in mere prating; any one being able to maintain      
or oppose, with some appearance of truth, any single assertion              
whatever.                                                                   
  Such instruction is quite unbecoming the dignity of philosophy.           
For these reasons we have chosen to denominate this part of logic           
dialectic, in the sense of a critique of dialectical illusion, and          
we wish the term to be so understood in this place.                         
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  IV. Of the Division of Transcendental Logic into Transcendental           
                                                       {INTRO ^paragraph 30}
      Analytic and Dialectic.                                               
-                                                                           
  In transcendental logic we isolate the understanding (as in               
transcendental aesthetic the sensibility) and select from our               
cognition merely that part of thought which has its origin in the           
understanding alone. The exercise of this pure cognition, however,          
depends upon this as its condition, that objects to which it may be         
applied be given to us in intuition, for without intuition the whole        
of our cognition is without objects, and is therefore quite void. That      
part of transcendental logic, then, which treats of the elements of         
pure cognition of the understanding, and of the principles without          
which no object at all can be thought, is transcendental analytic, and      
at the same time a logic of truth. For no cognition can contradict it,      
without losing at the same time all content, that is, losing all            
reference to an object, and therefore all truth. But because we are         
very easily seduced into employing these pure cognitions and                
principles of the understanding by themselves, and that even beyond         
the boundaries of experience, which yet is the only source whence we        
can obtain matter (objects) on which those pure conceptions may be          
employed- understanding runs the risk of making, by means of empty          
sophisms, a material and objective use of the mere formal principles        
of the pure understanding, and of passing judgements on objects             
without distinction- objects which are not given to us, nay, perhaps        
cannot be given to us in any way. Now, as it ought properly to be only      
a canon for judging of the empirical use of the understanding, this         
kind of logic is misused when we seek to employ it as an organon of         
the universal and unlimited exercise of the understanding, and attempt      
with the pure understanding alone to judge synthetically, affirm,           
and determine respecting objects in general. In this case the exercise      
of the pure understanding becomes dialectical. The second part of           
our transcendental logic must therefore be a critique of dialectical        
illusion, and this critique we shall term transcendental dialectic-         
not meaning it as an art of producing dogmatically such illusion (an        
art which is unfortunately too current among the practitioners of           
metaphysical juggling), but as a critique of understanding and              
reason in regard to their hyperphysical use. This critique will expose      
the groundless nature of the pretensions of these two faculties, and        
invalidate their claims to the discovery and enlargement of our             
cognitions merely by means of transcendental principles, and show that      
the proper employment of these faculties is to test the judgements          
made by the pure understanding, and to guard it from sophistical            
delusion.                                                                   
                                                                            
1ST_DIV_ANAL                                                                
             Transcendental Logic. FIRST DIVISION.                          
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                  TRANSCENDENTAL ANALYTIC.                                  
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                            SS I.                                           
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  Transcendental analytic is the dissection of the whole of our a           
priori knowledge into the elements of the pure cognition of the             
understanding. In order to effect our purpose, it is necessary: (1)         
That the conceptions be pure and not empirical; (2) That they belong        
not to intuition and sensibility, but to thought and understanding;         
(3) That they be elementary conceptions, and as such, quite                 
different from deduced or compound conceptions; (4) That our table          
of these elementary conceptions be complete, and fill up the whole          
sphere of the pure understanding. Now this completeness of a science        
cannot be accepted with confidence on the guarantee of a mere estimate      
of its existence in an aggregate formed only by means of repeated           
experiments and attempts. The completeness which we require is              
possible only by means of an idea of the totality of the a priori           
cognition of the understanding, and through the thereby determined          
division of the conceptions which form the said whole; consequently,        
only by means of their connection in a system. Pure understanding           
distinguishes itself not merely from everything empirical, but also         
completely from all sensibility. It is a unity self-subsistent,             
self-sufficient, and not to be enlarged by any additions from without.      
Hence the sum of its cognition constitutes a system to be determined        
by and comprised under an idea; and the completeness and                    
articulation of this system can at the same time serve as a test of         
the correctness and genuineness of all the parts of cognition that          
belong to it. The whole of this part of transcendental logic                
consists of two books, of which the one contains the conceptions,           
and the other the principles of pure understanding.                         
                                                                            
BK_1                                                                        
                          BOOK I.                                           
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                  Analytic of Conceptions. SS 2                             
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  By the term Analytic of Conceptions, I do not understand the              
analysis of these, or the usual process in philosophical                    
investigations of dissecting the conceptions which present themselves,      
according to their content, and so making them clear; but I mean the        
hitherto little attempted dissection of the faculty of understanding        
itself, in order to investigate the possibility of conceptions a            
priori, by looking for them in the understanding alone, as their            
birthplace, and analysing the pure use of this faculty. For this is         
the proper duty of a transcendental philosophy; what remains is the         
logical treatment of the conceptions in philosophy in general. We           
shall therefore follow up the pure conceptions even to their germs and      
beginnings in the human understanding, in which they lie, until they        
are developed on occasions presented by experience, and, freed by           
the same understanding from the empirical conditions attaching to           
them, are set forth in their unalloyed purity.                              
                                                                            
BK_1|CH_1                                                                   
  CHAPTER I. Of the Transcendental Clue to the Discovery of all Pure        
             Conceptions of the Understanding.                              
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                    Introductory. SS 3                                      
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  When we call into play a faculty of cognition, different conceptions      
manifest themselves according to the different circumstances, and make      
known this faculty, and assemble themselves into a more or less             
extensive collection, according to the time or penetration that has         
been applied to the consideration of them. Where this process,              
conducted as it is mechanically, so to speak, will end, cannot be           
determined with certainty. Besides, the conceptions which we                
discover in this haphazard manner present themselves by no means in         
order and systematic unity, but are at last coupled together only           
according to resemblances to each other, and arranged in series,            
according to the quantity of their content, from the simpler to the         
more complex- series which are anything but systematic, though not          
altogether without a certain kind of method in their construction.          
  Transcendental philosophy has the advantage, and moreover the             
duty, of searching for its conceptions according to a principle;            
because these conceptions spring pure and unmixed out of the                
understanding as an absolute unity, and therefore must be connected         
with each other according to one conception or idea. A connection of        
this kind, however, furnishes us with a ready prepared rule, by             
which its proper place may be assigned to every pure conception of the      
understanding, and the completeness of the system of all be determined      
a priori- both which would otherwise have been dependent on mere            
choice or chance.                                                           
                                                    {BK_1|CH_1 ^paragraph 5}
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  SECTION 1. Of defined above Use of understanding in General. SS 4         
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  The understanding was defined above only negatively, as a                 
non-sensuous faculty of cognition. Now, independently of                    
sensibility, we cannot possibly have any intuition; consequently,           
the understanding is no faculty of intuition. But besides intuition         
there is no other mode of cognition, except through conceptions;            
consequently, the cognition of every, at least of every human,              
understanding is a cognition through conceptions- not intuitive, but        
discursive. All intuitions, as sensuous, depend on affections;              
conceptions, therefore, upon functions. By the word function I              
understand the unity of the act of arranging diverse representations        
under one common representation. Conceptions, then, are based on the        
spontaneity of thought, as sensuous intuitions are on the                   
receptivity of impressions. Now, the understanding cannot make any          
other use of these conceptions than to judge by means of them. As no        
representation, except an intuition, relates immediately to its             
object, a conception never relates immediately to an object, but            
only to some other representation thereof, be that an intuition or          
itself a conception. A judgement, therefore, is the mediate                 
cognition of an object, consequently the representation of a                
representation of it. In every judgement there is a conception which        
applies to, and is valid for many other conceptions, and which among        
these comprehends also a given representation, this last being              
immediately connected with an object. For example, in the judgement-        
"All bodies are divisible," our conception of divisible applies to          
various other conceptions; among these, however, it is here                 
particularly applied to the conception of body, and this conception of      
body relates to certain phenomena which occur to us. These objects,         
therefore, are mediately represented by the conception of                   
divisibility. All judgements, accordingly, are functions of unity in        
our representations, inasmuch as, instead of an immediate, a higher         
representation, which comprises this and various others, is used for        
our cognition of the object, and thereby many possible cognitions           
are collected into one. But we can reduce all acts of the                   
understanding to judgements, so that understanding may be                   
represented as the faculty of judging. For it is, according to what         
has been said above, a faculty of thought. Now thought is cognition by      
means of conceptions. But conceptions, as predicates of possible            
judgements, relate to some representation of a yet undetermined             
object. Thus the conception of body indicates something- for                
example, metal- which can be cognized by means of that conception.          
It is therefore a conception, for the reason alone that other               
representations are contained under it, by means of which it can            
relate to objects. It is therefore the predicate to a possible              
judgement; for example: "Every metal is a body." All the functions          
of the understanding therefore can be discovered, when we can               
completely exhibit the functions of unity in judgements. And that this      
may be effected very easily, the following section will show.               
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                                                   {BK_1|CH_1 ^paragraph 10}
  SECTION II. Of the Logical Function of the Understanding in               
              Judgements. SS 5                                              
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  If we abstract all the content of a judgement, and consider only the      
intellectual form thereof, we find that the function of thought in a        
judgement can be brought under four heads, of which each contains           
three momenta. These may be conveniently represented in the                 
following table:                                                            
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                                                   {BK_1|CH_1 ^paragraph 15}
                                    1                                       
                         Quantity of judgements                             
                                Universal                                   
                                Particular                                  
                                Singular                                    
                                                   {BK_1|CH_1 ^paragraph 20}
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                      2                           3                         
                    Quality                   Relation                      
                  Affirmative                Categorical                    
                  Negative                   Hypothetical                   
                                                   {BK_1|CH_1 ^paragraph 25}
                  Infinite                   Disjunctive                    
-                                                                           
                                    4                                       
                                 Modality                                   
                               Problematical                                
                                                   {BK_1|CH_1 ^paragraph 30}
                               Assertorical                                 
                               Apodeictical                                 
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  As this division appears to differ in some, though not essential          
points, from the usual technique of logicians, the following                
observations, for the prevention of otherwise possible                      
misunderstanding, will not be without their use.                            
  1. Logicians say, with justice, that in the use of judgements in          
syllogisms, singular judgements may be treated like universal ones.         
For, precisely because a singular judgement has no extent at all,           
its predicate cannot refer to a part of that which is contained in the      
conception of the subject and be excluded from the rest. The predicate      
is valid for the whole conception just as if it were a general              
conception, and had extent, to the whole of which the predicate             
applied. On the other hand, let us compare a singular with a general        
judgement, merely as a cognition, in regard to quantity. The                
singular judgement relates to the general one, as unity to infinity,        
and is therefore in itself essentially different. Thus, if we estimate      
a singular judgement (judicium singulare) not merely according to           
its intrinsic validity as a judgement, but also as a cognition              
generally, according to its quantity in comparison with that of             
other cognitions, it is then entirely different from a general              
judgement (judicium commune), and in a complete table of the momenta        
of thought deserves a separate place- though, indeed, this would not        
be necessary in a logic limited merely to the consideration of the use      
of judgements in reference to each other.                                   
                                                   {BK_1|CH_1 ^paragraph 35}
  2. In like manner, in transcendental logic, infinite must be              
distinguished from affirmative judgements, although in general logic        
they are rightly enough classed under affirmative. General logic            
abstracts all content of the predicate (though it be negative), and         
only considers whether the said predicate be affirmed or denied of the      
subject. But transcendental logic considers also the worth or               
content of this logical affirmation- an affirmation by means of a           
merely negative predicate, and inquires how much the sum total of           
our cognition gains by this affirmation. For example, if I say of           
the soul, "It is not mortal"- by this negative judgement I should at        
least ward off error. Now, by the proposition, "The soul is not             
mortal," I have, in respect of the logical form, really affirmed,           
inasmuch as I thereby place the soul in the unlimited sphere of             
immortal beings. Now, because of the whole sphere of possible               
existences, the mortal occupies one part, and the immortal the              
other, neither more nor less is affirmed by the proposition than            
that the soul is one among the infinite multitude of things which           
remain over, when I take away the whole mortal part. But by this            
proceeding we accomplish only this much, that the infinite sphere of        
all possible existences is in so far limited that the mortal is             
excluded from it, and the soul is placed in the remaining part of           
the extent of this sphere. But this part remains, notwithstanding this      
exception, infinite, and more and more parts may be taken away from         
the whole sphere, without in the slightest degree thereby augmenting        
or affirmatively determining our conception of the soul. These              
judgements, therefore, infinite in respect of their logical extent,         
are, in respect of the content of their cognition, merely                   
limitative; and are consequently entitled to a place in our                 
transcendental table of all the momenta of thought in judgements,           
because the function of the understanding exercised by them may             
perhaps be of importance in the field of its pure a priori cognition.       
  3. All relations of thought in judgements are those (a) of the            
predicate to the subject; (b) of the principle to its consequence; (c)      
of the divided cognition and all the members of the division to each        
other. In the first of these three classes, we consider only two            
conceptions; in the second, two judgements; in the third, several           
judgements in relation to each other. The hypothetical proposition,         
"If perfect justice exists, the obstinately wicked are punished,"           
contains properly the relation to each other of two propositions,           
namely, "Perfect justice exists," and "The obstinately wicked are           
punished." Whether these propositions are in themselves true is a           
question not here decided. Nothing is cogitated by means of this            
judgement except a certain consequence. Finally, the disjunctive            
judgement contains a relation of two or more propositions to each           
other- a relation not of consequence, but of logical opposition, in so      
far as the sphere of the one proposition excludes that of the other.        
But it contains at the same time a relation of community, in so far as      
all the propositions taken together fill up the sphere of the               
cognition. The disjunctive judgement contains, therefore, the relation      
of the parts of the whole sphere of a cognition, since the sphere of        
each part is a complemental part of the sphere of the other, each           
contributing to form the sum total of the divided cognition. Take, for      
example, the proposition, "The world exists either through blind            
chance, or through internal necessity, or through an external               
cause." Each of these propositions embraces a part of the sphere of         
our possible cognition as to the existence of a world; all of them          
taken together, the whole sphere. To take the cognition out of one          
of these spheres, is equivalent to placing it in one of the others;         
and, on the other hand, to place it in one sphere is equivalent to          
taking it out of the rest. There is, therefore, in a disjunctive            
judgement a certain community of cognitions, which consists in this,        
that they mutually exclude each other, yet thereby determine, as a          
whole, the true cognition, inasmuch as, taken together, they make up        
the complete content of a particular given cognition. And this is           
all that I find necessary, for the sake of what follows, to remark          
in this place.                                                              
  4. The modality of judgements is a quite peculiar function, with          
this distinguishing characteristic, that it contributes nothing to the      
content of a judgement (for besides quantity, quality, and relation,        
there is nothing more that constitutes the content of a judgement),         
but concerns itself only with the value of the copula in relation to        
thought in general. Problematical judgements are those in which the         
affirmation or negation is accepted as merely possible (ad libitum).        
In the assertorical, we regard the proposition as real (true); in           
the apodeictical, we look on it as necessary.* Thus the two judgements      
(antecedens et consequens), the relation of which constitutes a             
hypothetical judgement, likewise those (the members of the division)        
in whose reciprocity the disjunctive consists, are only problematical.      
In the example above given the proposition, "There exists perfect           
justice," is not stated assertorically, but as an ad libitum                
judgement, which someone may choose to adopt, and the consequence           
alone is assertorical. Hence such judgements may be obviously false,        
and yet, taken problematically, be conditions of our cognition of           
the truth. Thus the proposition, "The world exists only by blind            
chance," is in the disjunctive judgement of problematical import only:      
that is to say, one may accept it for the moment, and it helps us           
(like the indication of the wrong road among all the roads that one         
can take) to find out the true proposition. The problematical               
proposition is, therefore, that which expresses only logical                
possibility (which is not objective); that is, it expresses a free          
choice to admit the validity of such a proposition- a merely arbitrary      
reception of it into the understanding. The assertorical speaks of          
logical reality or truth; as, for example, in a hypothetical                
syllogism, the antecedens presents itself in a problematical form in        
the major, in an assertorical form in the minor, and it shows that the      
proposition is in harmony with the laws of the understanding. The           
apodeictical proposition cogitates the assertorical as determined by        
these very laws of the understanding, consequently as affirming a           
priori, and in this manner it expresses logical necessity. Now because      
all is here gradually incorporated with the understanding- inasmuch as      
in the first place we judge problematically; then accept                    
assertorically our judgement as true; lastly, affirm it as inseparably      
united with the understanding, that is, as necessary and apodeictical-      
we may safely reckon these three functions of modality as so many           
momenta of thought.                                                         
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  *Just as if thought were in the first instance a function of the          
understanding; in the second, of judgement; in the third, of reason. A      
remark which will be explained in the sequel.                               
                                                   {BK_1|CH_1 ^paragraph 40}
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  SECTION III. Of the Pure Conceptions of the Understanding, or             
               Categories. SS 6                                             
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  General logic, as has been repeatedly said, makes abstraction of all      
content of cognition, and expects to receive representations from some      
other quarter, in order, by means of analysis, to convert them into         
conceptions. On the contrary, transcendental logic has lying before it      
the manifold content of a priori sensibility, which transcendental          
aesthetic presents to it in order to give matter to the pure                
conceptions of the understanding, without which transcendental logic        
would have no content, and be therefore utterly void. Now space and         
time contain an infinite diversity of determinations of pure a              
priori intuition, but are nevertheless the condition of the mind's          
receptivity, under which alone it can obtain representations of             
objects, and which, consequently, must always affect the conception of      
these objects. But the spontaneity of thought requires that this            
diversity be examined after a certain manner, received into the             
mind, and connected, in order afterwards to form a cognition out of         
it. This Process I call synthesis.                                          
                                                   {BK_1|CH_1 ^paragraph 45}
  By the word synthesis, in its most general signification, I               
understand the process of joining different representations to each         
other and of comprehending their diversity in one cognition. This           
synthesis is pure when the diversity is not given empirically but a         
priori (as that in space and time). Our representations must be             
given previously to any analysis of them; and no conceptions can            
arise, quoad their content, analytically. But the synthesis of a            
diversity (be it given a priori or empirically) is the first requisite      
for the production of a cognition, which in its beginning, indeed, may      
be crude and confused, and therefore in need of analysis- still,            
synthesis is that by which alone the elements of our cognitions are         
collected and united into a certain content, consequently it is the         
first thing on which we must fix our attention, if we wish to               
investigate the origin of our knowledge.                                    
  Synthesis, generally speaking, is, as we shall afterwards see, the        
mere operation of the imagination- a blind but indispensable                
function of the soul, without which we should have no cognition             
whatever, but of the working of which we are seldom even conscious.         
But to reduce this synthesis to conceptions is a function of the            
understanding, by means of which we attain to cognition, in the proper      
meaning of the term.                                                        
  Pure synthesis, represented generally, gives us the pure                  
conception of the understanding. But by this pure synthesis, I mean         
that which rests upon a basis of a priori synthetical unity. Thus, our      
numeration (and this is more observable in large numbers) is a              
synthesis according to conceptions, because it takes place according        
to a common basis of unity (for example, the decade). By means of this      
conception, therefore, the unity in the synthesis of the manifold           
becomes necessary.                                                          
  By means of analysis different representations are brought under one      
conception- an operation of which general logic treats. On the other        
hand, the duty of transcendental logic is to reduce to conceptions,         
not representations, but the pure synthesis of representations. The         
first thing which must be given to us for the sake of the a priori          
cognition of all objects, is the diversity of the pure intuition;           
the synthesis of this diversity by means of the imagination is the          
second; but this gives, as yet, no cognition. The conceptions which         
give unity to this pure synthesis, and which consist solely in the          
representation of this necessary synthetical unity, furnish the             
third requisite for the cognition of an object, and these                   
conceptions are given by the understanding.                                 
  The same function which gives unity to the different                      
representation in a judgement, gives also unity to the mere                 
synthesis of different representations in an intuition; and this unity      
we call the pure conception of the understanding. Thus, the same            
understanding, and by the same operations, whereby in conceptions,          
by means of analytical unity, it produced the logical form of a             
judgement, introduces, by means of the synthetical unity of the             
manifold in intuition, a transcendental content into its                    
representations, on which account they are called pure conceptions          
of the understanding, and they apply a priori to objects, a result not      
within the power of general logic.                                          
                                                   {BK_1|CH_1 ^paragraph 50}
  In this manner, there arise exactly so many pure conceptions of           
the understanding, applying a priori to objects of intuition in             
general, as there are logical functions in all possible judgements.         
For there is no other function or faculty existing in the                   
understanding besides those enumerated in that table. These                 
conceptions we shall, with Aristotle, call categories, our purpose          
being originally identical with his, notwithstanding the great              
difference in the execution.                                                
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                     TABLE OF THE CATEGORIES                                
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                    1                         2                             
                                                   {BK_1|CH_1 ^paragraph 55}
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              Of Quantity                Of Quality                         
              Unity                      Reality                            
              Plurality                  Negation                           
              Totality                   Limitation                         
                                                   {BK_1|CH_1 ^paragraph 60}
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                           3                                                
                      Of Relation                                           
   Of Inherence and Subsistence (substantia et accidens)                    
   Of Causality and Dependence (cause and effect)                           
                                                   {BK_1|CH_1 ^paragraph 65}
   Of Community (reciprocity between the agent and patient)                 
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                           4                                                
                     Of Modality                                            
              Possibility - Impossibility                                   
                                                   {BK_1|CH_1 ^paragraph 70}
              Existence - Non-existence                                     
              Necessity - Contingence                                       
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  This, then, is a catalogue of all the originally pure conceptions of      
the synthesis which the understanding contains a priori, and these          
conceptions alone entitle it to be called a pure understanding;             
inasmuch as only by them it can render the manifold of intuition            
conceivable, in other words, think an object of intuition. This             
division is made systematically from a common principle, namely the         
faculty of judgement (which is just the same as the power of thought),      
and has not arisen rhapsodically from a search at haphazard after pure      
conceptions, respecting the full number of which we never could be          
certain, inasmuch as we employ induction alone in our search,               
without considering that in this way we can never understand wherefore      
precisely these conceptions, and none others, abide in the pure             
understanding. It was a design worthy of an acute thinker like              
Aristotle, to search for these fundamental conceptions. Destitute,          
however, of any guiding principle, he picked them up just as they           
occurred to him, and at first hunted out ten, which he called               
categories (predicaments). Afterwards be believed that he had               
discovered five others, which were added under the name of post             
predicaments. But his catalogue still remained defective. Besides,          
there are to be found among them some of the modes of pure sensibility      
(quando, ubi, situs, also prius, simul), and likewise an empirical          
conception (motus)- which can by no means belong to this                    
genealogical register of the pure understanding. Moreover, there are        
deduced conceptions (actio, passio) enumerated among the original           
conceptions, and, of the latter, some are entirely wanting.                 
  With regard to these, it is to be remarked, that the categories,          
as the true primitive conceptions of the pure understanding, have also      
their pure deduced conceptions, which, in a complete system of              
transcendental philosophy, must by no means be passed over; though          
in a merely critical essay we must be contented with the simple             
mention of the fact.                                                        
                                                   {BK_1|CH_1 ^paragraph 75}
  Let it be allowed me to call these pure, but deduced conceptions          
of the understanding, the predicables of the pure understanding, in         
contradistinction to predicaments. If we are in possession of the           
original and primitive, the deduced and subsidiary conceptions can          
easily be added, and the genealogical tree of the understanding             
completely delineated. As my present aim is not to set forth a              
complete system, but merely the principles of one, I reserve this task      
for another time. It may be easily executed by any one who will             
refer to the ontological manuals, and subordinate to the category of        
causality, for example, the predicables of force, action, passion;          
to that of community, those of presence and resistance; to the              
categories of modality, those of origination, extinction, change;           
and so with the rest. The categories combined with the modes of pure        
sensibility, or with one another, afford a great number of deduced a        
priori conceptions; a complete enumeration of which would be a              
useful and not unpleasant, but in this place a perfectly                    
dispensable, occupation.                                                    
  I purposely omit the definitions of the categories in this treatise.      
I shall analyse these conceptions only so far as is necessary for           
the doctrine of method, which is to form a part of this critique. In a      
system of pure reason, definitions of them would be with justice            
demanded of me, but to give them here would only bide from our view         
the main aim of our investigation, at the same time raising doubts and      
objections, the consideration of which, without injustice to our            
main purpose, may be very well postponed till another opportunity.          
Meanwhile, it ought to be sufficiently clear, from the little we            
have already said on this subject, that the formation of a complete         
vocabulary of pure conceptions, accompanied by all the requisite            
explanations, is not only a possible, but an easy undertaking. The          
compartments already exist; it is only necessary to fill them up;           
and a systematic topic like the present, indicates with perfect             
precision the proper place to which each conception belongs, while          
it readily points out any that have not yet been filled up.                 
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                           SS 7                                             
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                                                   {BK_1|CH_1 ^paragraph 80}
  Our table of the categories suggests considerations of some               
importance, which may perhaps have significant results in regard to         
the scientific form of all rational cognitions. For, that this table        
is useful in the theoretical part of philosophy, nay, indispensable         
for the sketching of the complete plan of a science, so far as that         
science rests upon conceptions a priori, and for dividing it                
mathematically, according to fixed principles, is most manifest from        
the fact that it contains all the elementary conceptions of the             
understanding, nay, even the form of a system of these in the               
understanding itself, and consequently indicates all the momenta,           
and also the internal arrangement of a projected speculative                
science, as I have elsewhere shown.* Here follow some of these              
observations.                                                               
-                                                                           
  *In the Metaphysical Principles of Natural Science.                       
-                                                                           
  I. This table, which contains four classes of conceptions of the          
understanding, may, in the first instance, be divided into two              
classes, the first of which relates to objects of intuition- pure as        
well as empirical; the second, to the existence of these objects,           
either in relation to one another, or to the understanding.                 
                                                   {BK_1|CH_1 ^paragraph 85}
  The former of these classes of categories I would entitle the             
mathematical, and the latter the dynamical categories. The former,          
as we see, has no correlates; these are only to be found in the second      
class. This difference must have a ground in the nature of the human        
understanding.                                                              
  II. The number of the categories in each class is always the same,        
namely, three- a fact which also demands some consideration, because        
in all other cases division a priori through conceptions is                 
necessarily dichotomy. It is to be added, that the third category in        
each triad always arises from the combination of the second with the        
first.                                                                      
  Thus totality is nothing else but plurality contemplated as unity;        
limitation is merely reality conjoined with negation; community is the      
causality of a substance, reciprocally determining, and determined          
by other substances; and finally, necessity is nothing but                  
existence, which is given through the possibility itself. Let it not        
be supposed, however, that the third category is merely a deduced, and      
not a primitive conception of the pure understanding. For the               
conjunction of the first and second, in order to produce the third          
conception, requires a particular function of the understanding, which      
is by no means identical with those which are exercised in the first        
and second. Thus, the conception of a number (which belongs to the          
category of totality) is not always possible, where the conceptions of      
multitude and unity exist (for example, in the representation of the        
infinite). Or, if I conjoin the conception of a cause with that of a        
substance, it does not follow that the conception of influence, that        
is, how one substance can be the cause of something in another              
substance, will be understood from that. Thus it is evident that a          
particular act of the understanding is here necessary; and so in the        
other instances.                                                            
  III. With respect to one category, namely, that of community,             
which is found in the third class, it is not so easy as with the            
others to detect its accordance with the form of the disjunctive            
judgement which corresponds to it in the table of the logical               
functions.                                                                  
  In order to assure ourselves of this accordance, we must observe          
that in every disjunctive judgement, the sphere of the judgement (that      
is, the complex of all that is contained in it) is represented as a         
whole divided into parts; and, since one part cannot be contained in        
the other, they are cogitated as co-ordinated with, not subordinated        
to each other, so that they do not determine each other                     
unilaterally, as in a linear series, but reciprocally, as in an             
aggregate- (if one member of the division is posited, all the rest are      
excluded; and conversely).                                                  
                                                   {BK_1|CH_1 ^paragraph 90}
  Now a like connection is cogitated in a whole of things; for one          
thing is not subordinated, as effect, to another as cause of its            
existence, but, on the contrary, is co-ordinated contemporaneously and      
reciprocally, as a cause in relation to the determination of the            
others (for example, in a body- the parts of which mutually attract         
and repel each other). And this is an entirely different kind of            
connection from that which we find in the mere relation of the cause        
to the effect (the principle to the consequence), for in such a             
connection the consequence does not in its turn determine the               
principle, and therefore does not constitute, with the latter, a            
whole- just as the Creator does not with the world make up a whole.         
The process of understanding by which it represents to itself the           
sphere of a divided conception, is employed also when we think of a         
thing as divisible; and in the same manner as the members of the            
division in the former exclude one another, and yet are connected in        
one sphere, so the understanding represents to itself the parts of the      
latter, as having- each of them- an existence (as substances),              
independently of the others, and yet as united in one whole.                
-                                                                           
                          SS 8                                              
-                                                                           
  In the transcendental philosophy of the ancients there exists one         
more leading division, which contains pure conceptions of the               
understanding, and which, although not numbered among the                   
categories, ought, according to them, as conceptions a priori, to be        
valid of objects. But in this case they would augment the number of         
the categories; which cannot be. These are set forth in the                 
proposition, so renowned among the schoolmen- "Quodlibet ens est UNUM,      
VERUM, BONUM." Now, though the inferences from this principle were          
mere tautological propositions, and though it is allowed only by            
courtesy to retain a place in modern metaphysics, yet a thought             
which maintained itself for such a length of time, however empty it         
seems to be, deserves an investigation of its origin, and justifies         
the conjecture that it must be grounded in some law of the                  
understanding, which, as is often the case, has only been                   
erroneously interpreted. These pretended transcendental predicates          
are, in fact, nothing but logical requisites and criteria of all            
cognition of objects, and they employ, as the basis for this                
cognition, the categories of quantity, namely, unity, plurality, and        
totality. But these, which must be taken as material conditions,            
that is, as belonging to the possibility of things themselves, they         
employed merely in a formal signification, as belonging to the logical      
requisites of all cognition, and yet most unguardedly changed these         
criteria of thought into properties of objects, as things in                
themselves. Now, in every cognition of an object, there is unity of         
conception, which may be called qualitative unity, so far as by this        
term we understand only the unity in our connection of the manifold;        
for example, unity of the theme in a play, an oration, or a story.          
Secondly, there is truth in respect of the deductions from it. The          
more true deductions we have from a given conception, the more              
criteria of its objective reality. This we might call the                   
qualitative plurality of characteristic marks, which belong to a            
conception as to a common foundation, but are not cogitated as a            
quantity in it. Thirdly, there is perfection- which consists in             
this, that the plurality falls back upon the unity of the                   
conception, and accords completely with that conception and with no         
other. This we may denominate qualitative completeness. Hence it is         
evident that these logical criteria of the possibility of cognition         
are merely the three categories of quantity modified and transformed        
to suit an unauthorized manner of applying them. That is to say, the        
three categories, in which the unity in the production of the               
quantum must be homogeneous throughout, are transformed solely with         
a view to the connection of heterogeneous parts of cognition in one         
act of consciousness, by means of the quality of the cognition,             
which is the principle of that connection. Thus the criterion of the        
possibility of a conception (not of its object) is the definition of        
it, in which the unity of the conception, the truth of all that may be      
immediately deduced from it, and finally, the completeness of what has      
been thus deduced, constitute the requisites for the reproduction of        
the whole conception. Thus also, the criterion or test of an                
hypothesis is the intelligibility of the received principle of              
explanation, or its unity (without help from any subsidiary                 
hypothesis)- the truth of our deductions from it (consistency with          
each other and with experience)- and lastly, the completeness of the        
principle of the explanation of these deductions, which refer to            
neither more nor less than what was admitted in the hypothesis,             
restoring analytically and a posteriori, what was cogitated                 
synthetically and a priori. By the conceptions, therefore, of unity,        
truth, and perfection, we have made no addition to the                      
transcendental table of the categories, which is complete without           
them. We have, on the contrary, merely employed the three categories        
of quantity, setting aside their application to objects of experience,      
as general logical laws of the consistency of cognition with itself.        
                                                                            
BK_1|CH_2                                                                   
   CHAPTER II Of the Deduction of the Pure Conceptions of the               
                      Understanding.                                        
-                                                                           
   SECTION I Of the Principles of a Transcendental Deduction                
                     in general. SS 9                                       
-                                                                           
  Teachers of jurisprudence, when speaking of rights and claims,            
distinguish in a cause the question of right (quid juris) from the          
question of fact (quid facti), and while they demand proof of both,         
they give to the proof of the former, which goes to establish right or      
claim in law, the name of deduction. Now we make use of a great number      
of empirical conceptions, without opposition from any one; and              
consider ourselves, even without any attempt at deduction, justified        
in attaching to them a sense, and a supposititious signification,           
because we have always experience at hand to demonstrate their              
objective reality. There exist also, however, usurped conceptions,          
such as fortune, fate, which circulate with almost universal                
indulgence, and yet are occasionally challenged by the question, "quid      
juris?" In such cases, we have great difficulty in discovering any          
deduction for these terms, inasmuch as we cannot produce any                
manifest ground of right, either from experience or from reason, on         
which the claim to employ them can be founded.                              
                                                    {BK_1|CH_2 ^paragraph 5}
  Among the many conceptions, which make up the very variegated web of      
human cognition, some are destined for pure use a priori,                   
independent of all experience; and their title to be so employed            
always requires a deduction, inasmuch as, to justify such use of them,      
proofs from experience are not sufficient; but it is necessary to know      
how these conceptions can apply to objects without being derived            
from experience. I term, therefore, an examination of the manner in         
which conceptions can apply a priori to objects, the transcendental         
deduction of conceptions, and I distinguish it from the empirical           
deduction, which indicates the mode in which conception is obtained         
through experience and reflection thereon; consequently, does not           
concern itself with the right, but only with the fact of our obtaining      
conceptions in such and such a manner. We have already seen that we         
are in possession of two perfectly different kinds of conceptions,          
which nevertheless agree with each other in this, that they both apply      
to objects completely a priori. These are the conceptions of space and      
time as forms of sensibility, and the categories as pure conceptions        
of the understanding. To attempt an empirical deduction of either of        
these classes would be labour in vain, because the distinguishing           
characteristic of their nature consists in this, that they apply to         
their objects, without having borrowed anything from experience             
towards the representation of them. Consequently, if a deduction of         
these conceptions is necessary, it must always be transcendental.           
  Meanwhile, with respect to these conceptions, as with respect to all      
our cognition, we certainly may discover in experience, if not the          
principle of their possibility, yet the occasioning causes of their         
production. It will be found that the impressions of sense give the         
first occasion for bringing into action the whole faculty of                
cognition, and for the production of experience, which contains two         
very dissimilar elements, namely, a matter for cognition, given by the      
senses, and a certain form for the arrangement of this matter, arising      
out of the inner fountain of pure intuition and thought; and these, on      
occasion given by sensuous impressions, are called into exercise and        
produce conceptions. Such an investigation into the first efforts of        
our faculty of cognition to mount from particular perceptions to            
general conceptions is undoubtedly of great utility; and we have to         
thank the celebrated Locke for having first opened the way for this         
inquiry. But a deduction of the pure a priori conceptions of course         
never can be made in this way, seeing that, in regard to their              
future employment, which must be entirely independent of experience,        
they must have a far different certificate of birth to show from            
that of a descent from experience. This attempted physiological             
derivation, which cannot properly be called deduction, because it           
relates merely to a quaestio facti, I shall entitle an explanation          
of the possession of a pure cognition. It is therefore manifest that        
there can only be a transcendental deduction of these conceptions           
and by no means an empirical one; also, that all attempts at an             
empirical deduction, in regard to pure a priori conceptions, are vain,      
and can only be made by one who does not understand the altogether          
peculiar nature of these cognitions.                                        
  But although it is admitted that the only possible deduction of pure      
a priori cognition is a transcendental deduction, it is not, for            
that reason, perfectly manifest that such a deduction is absolutely         
necessary. We have already traced to their sources the conceptions          
of space and time, by means of a transcendental deduction, and we have      
explained and determined their objective validity a priori.                 
Geometry, nevertheless, advances steadily and securely in the province      
of pure a priori cognitions, without needing to ask from philosophy         
any certificate as to the pure and legitimate origin of its                 
fundamental conception of space. But the use of the conception in this      
science extends only to the external world of sense, the pure form          
of the intuition of which is space; and in this world, therefore,           
all geometrical cognition, because it is founded upon a priori              
intuition, possesses immediate evidence, and the objects of this            
cognition are given a priori (as regards their form) in intuition by        
and through the cognition itself. With the pure conceptions of              
understanding, on the contrary, commences the absolute necessity of         
seeking a transcendental deduction, not only of these conceptions           
themselves, but likewise of space, because, inasmuch as they make           
affirmations concerning objects not by means of the predicates of           
intuition and sensibility, but of pure thought a priori, they apply to      
objects without any of the conditions of sensibility. Besides, not          
being founded on experience, they are not presented with any object in      
a priori intuition upon which, antecedently to experience, they             
might base their synthesis. Hence results, not only doubt as to the         
objective validity and proper limits of their use, but that even our        
conception of space is rendered equivocal; inasmuch as we are very          
ready with the aid of the categories, to carry the use of this              
conception beyond the conditions of sensuous intuition- and, for            
this reason, we have already found a transcendental deduction of it         
needful. The reader, then, must be quite convinced of the absolute          
necessity of a transcendental deduction, before taking a single step        
in the field of pure reason; because otherwise he goes to work              
blindly, and after he has wondered about in all directions, returns to      
the state of utter ignorance from which he started. He ought,               
moreover, clearly to recognize beforehand the unavoidable difficulties      
in his undertaking, so that he may not afterwards complain of the           
obscurity in which the subject itself is deeply involved, or become         
too soon impatient of the obstacles in his path; because we have a          
choice of only two things- either at once to give up all pretensions        
to knowledge beyond the limits of possible experience, or to bring          
this critical investigation to completion.                                  
  We have been able, with very little trouble, to make it                   
comprehensible how the conceptions of space and time, although a            
priori cognitions, must necessarily apply to external objects, and          
render a synthetical cognition of these possible, independently of all      
experience. For inasmuch as only by means of such pure form of              
sensibility an object can appear to us, that is, be an object of            
empirical intuition, space and time are pure intuitions, which contain      
a priori the condition of the possibility of objects as phenomena, and      
an a priori synthesis in these intuitions possesses objective               
validity.                                                                   
  On the other hand, the categories of the understanding do not             
represent the conditions under which objects are given to us in             
intuition; objects can consequently appear to us without necessarily        
connecting themselves with these, and consequently without any              
necessity binding on the understanding to contain a priori the              
conditions of these objects. Thus we find ourselves involved in a           
difficulty which did not present itself in the sphere of                    
sensibility, that is to say, we cannot discover how the subjective          
conditions of thought can have objective validity, in other words, can      
become conditions of the possibility of all cognition of objects;           
for phenomena may certainly be given to us in intuition without any         
help from the functions of the understanding. Let us take, for              
example, the conception of cause, which indicates a peculiar kind of        
synthesis, namely, that with something, A, something entirely               
different, B, is connected according to a law. It is not a priori           
manifest why phenomena should contain anything of this kind (we are of      
course debarred from appealing for proof to experience, for the             
objective validity of this conception must be demonstrated a                
priori), and it hence remains doubtful a priori, whether such a             
conception be not quite void and without any corresponding object           
among phenomena. For that objects of sensuous intuition must                
correspond to the formal conditions of sensibility existing a priori        
in the mind is quite evident, from the fact that without these they         
could not be objects for us; but that they must also correspond to the      
conditions which understanding requires for the synthetical unity of        
thought is an assertion, the grounds for which are not so easily to be      
discovered. For phenomena might be so constituted as not to correspond      
to the conditions of the unity of thought; and all things might lie in      
such confusion that, for example, nothing could be met with in the          
sphere of phenomena to suggest a law of synthesis, and so correspond        
to the conception of cause and effect; so that this conception would        
be quite void, null, and without significance. Phenomena would              
nevertheless continue to present objects to our intuition; for mere         
intuition  does not in any respect stand in need of the functions of        
thought.                                                                    
                                                   {BK_1|CH_2 ^paragraph 10}
  If we thought to free ourselves from the labour of these                  
investigations by saying: "Experience is constantly offering us             
examples of the relation of cause and effect in phenomena, and              
presents us with abundant opportunity of abstracting the conception of      
cause, and so at the same time of corroborating the objective validity      
of this conception"; we should in this case be overlooking the fact,        
that the conception of cause cannot arise in this way at all; that, on      
the contrary, it must either have an a priori basis in the,                 
understanding, or be rejected as a mere chimera. For this conception        
demands that something, A, should be of such a nature that something        
else, B, should follow from it necessarily, and according to an             
absolutely universal law. We may certainly collect from phenomena a         
law, according to which this or that usually happens, but the               
element of necessity is not to be found in it. Hence it is evident          
that to the synthesis of cause and effect belongs a dignity, which          
is utterly wanting in any empirical synthesis; for it is no mere            
mechanical synthesis, by means of addition, but a dynamical one;            
that is to say, the effect is not to be cogitated as merely annexed to      
the cause, but as posited by and through the cause, and resulting from      
it. The strict universality of this law never can be a                      
characteristic of empirical laws, which obtain through induction            
only a comparative universality, that is, an extended range of              
practical application. But the pure conceptions of the understanding        
would entirely lose all their peculiar character, if we treated them        
merely as the productions of experience.                                    
-                                                                           
     Transition to the Transcendental Deduction of the                      
                    Categories. SS 10                                       
-                                                                           
                                                   {BK_1|CH_2 ^paragraph 15}
  There are only two possible ways in which synthetical representation      
and its objects can coincide with and relate necessarily to each            
other, and, as it were, meet together. Either the object alone makes        
the representation possible, or the representation alone makes the          
object possible. In the former case, the relation between them is only      
empirical, and an a priori representation is impossible. And this is        
the case with phenomena, as regards that in them which is referable to      
mere sensation. In the latter case- although representation alone (for      
of its causality, by means of the will, we do not here speak) does not      
produce the object as to its existence, it must nevertheless be a           
priori determinative in regard to the object, if it is only by means        
of the representation that we can cognize anything as an object. Now        
there are only two conditions of the possibility of a cognition of          
objects; firstly, intuition, by means of which the object, though only      
as phenomenon, is given; secondly, conception, by means of which the        
object which corresponds to this intuition is thought. But it is            
evident from what has been said on aesthetic that the first condition,      
under which alone objects can be intuited, must in fact exist, as a         
formal basis for them, a priori in the mind. With this formal               
condition of sensibility, therefore, all phenomena necessarily              
correspond, because it is only through it that they can be phenomena        
at all; that is, can be empirically intuited and given. Now the             
question is whether there do not exist, a priori in the mind,               
conceptions of understanding also, as conditions under which alone          
something, if not intuited, is yet thought as object. If this question      
be answered in the affirmative, it follows that all empirical               
cognition of objects is necessarily conformable to such conceptions,        
since, if they are not presupposed, it is impossible that anything can      
be an object of experience. Now all experience contains, besides the        
intuition of the senses through which an object is given, a conception      
also of an object that is given in intuition. Accordingly, conceptions      
of objects in general must lie as a priori conditions at the                
foundation of all empirical cognition; and consequently, the objective      
validity of the categories, as a priori conceptions, will rest upon         
this, that experience (as far as regards the form of thought) is            
possible only by their means. For in that case they apply                   
necessarily and a priori to objects of experience, because only             
through them can an object of experience be thought.                        
  The whole aim of the transcendental deduction of all a priori             
conceptions is to show that these conceptions are a priori                  
conditions of the possibility of all experience. Conceptions which          
afford us the objective foundation of the possibility of experience         
are for that very reason necessary. But the analysis of the                 
experiences in which they are met with is not deduction, but only an        
illustration of them, because from experience they could never              
derive the attribute of necessity. Without their original                   
applicability and relation to all possible experience, in which all         
objects of cognition present themselves, the relation of the                
categories to objects, of whatever nature, would be quite                   
incomprehensible.                                                           
  The celebrated Locke, for want of due reflection on these points,         
and because he met with pure conceptions of the understanding in            
experience, sought also to deduce them from experience, and yet             
proceeded so inconsequently as to attempt, with their aid, to arrive        
it cognitions which lie far beyond the limits of all experience. David      
Hume perceived that, to render this possible, it was necessary that         
the conceptions should have an a priori origin. But as he could not         
explain how it was possible that conceptions which are not connected        
with each other in the understanding must nevertheless be thought as        
necessarily connected in the object- and it never occurred to him that      
the understanding itself might, perhaps, by means of these                  
conceptions, be the author of the experience in which its objects were      
presented to it- he was forced to drive these conceptions from              
experience, that is, from a subjective necessity arising from repeated      
association of experiences erroneously considered to be objective-          
in one word, from habit. But he proceeded with perfect consequence and      
declared it to be impossible, with such conceptions and the principles      
arising from them, to overstep the limits of experience. The empirical      
derivation, however, which both of these philosophers attributed to         
these conceptions, cannot possibly be reconciled with the fact that we      
do possess scientific a priori cognitions, namely, those of pure            
mathematics and general physics.                                            
  The former of these two celebrated men opened a wide door to              
extravagance- (for if reason has once undoubted right on its side,          
it will not allow itself to be confined to set limits, by vague             
recommendations of moderation); the latter gave himself up entirely to      
scepticism- a natural consequence, after having discovered, as he           
thought, that the faculty of cognition was not trustworthy. We now          
intend to make a trial whether it be not possible safely to conduct         
reason between these two rocks, to assign her determinate limits,           
and yet leave open for her the entire sphere of her legitimate              
activity.                                                                   
  I shall merely premise an explanation of what the categories are.         
They are conceptions of an object in general, by means of which its         
intuition is contemplated as determined in relation to one of the           
logical functions of judgement. The following will make this plain.         
The function of the categorical judgement is that of the relation of        
subject to predicate; for example, in the proposition: "All bodies are      
divisible." But in regard to the merely logical use of the                  
understanding, it still remains undetermined to which Of these two          
conceptions belongs the function Of subject and to which that of            
predicate. For we could also say: "Some divisible is a body." But           
the category of substance, when the conception of a body is brought         
under it, determines that; and its empirical intuition in experience        
must be contemplated always as subject and never as mere predicate.         
And so with all the other categories.                                       
                                                   {BK_1|CH_2 ^paragraph 20}
-                                                                           
  SECTION II Transcendental Deduction of the pure Conceptions of            
                   the Understanding. SS 11                                 
-                                                                           
  Of the Possibility of a Conjunction of the manifold representations       
                                                   {BK_1|CH_2 ^paragraph 25}
                       given by Sense.                                      
-                                                                           
  The manifold content in our representations can be given in an            
intuition which is merely sensuous- in other words, is nothing but          
susceptibility; and the form of this intuition can exist a priori in        
our faculty of representation, without being anything else but the          
mode in which the subject is affected. But the conjunction                  
(conjunctio) of a manifold in intuition never can be given us by the        
senses; it cannot therefore be contained in the pure form of                
sensuous intuition, for it is a spontaneous act of the faculty of           
representation. And as we must, to distinguish it from sensibility,         
entitle this faculty understanding; so all conjunction whether              
conscious or unconscious, be it of the manifold in intuition, sensuous      
or non-sensuous, or of several conceptions- is an act of the                
understanding. To this act we shall give the general appellation of         
synthesis, thereby to indicate, at the same time, that we cannot            
represent anything as conjoined in the object without having                
previously conjoined it ourselves. Of all mental notions, that of           
conjunction is the only one which cannot be given through objects, but      
can be originated only by the subject itself, because it is an act          
of its purely spontaneous activity. The reader will easily enough           
perceive that the possibility of conjunction must be grounded in the        
very nature of this act, and that it must be equally valid for all          
conjunction, and that analysis, which appears to be its contrary,           
must, nevertheless, always presuppose it; for where the                     
understanding has not previously conjoined, it cannot dissect or            
analyse, because only as conjoined by it, must that which is to be          
analysed have been given to our faculty of representation.                  
  But the conception of conjunction includes, besides the conception        
of the manifold and of the synthesis of it, that of the unity of it         
also. Conjunction is the representation of the synthetical unity of         
the manifold.* This idea of unity, therefore, cannot arise out of that      
of conjunction; much rather does that idea, by combining itself with        
the representation of the manifold, render the conception of                
conjunction possible. This unity, which a priori precedes all               
conceptions of conjunction, is not the category of unity (SS 6); for        
all the categories are based upon logical functions of judgement,           
and in these functions we already have conjunction, and consequently        
unity of given conceptions. It is therefore evident that the                
category of unity presupposes conjunction. We must therefore look           
still higher for this unity (as qualitative, SS 8), in that, namely,        
which contains the ground of the unity of diverse conceptions in            
judgements, the ground, consequently, of the possibility of the             
existence of the understanding, even in regard to its logical use.          
-                                                                           
                                                   {BK_1|CH_2 ^paragraph 30}
  *Whether the representations are in themselves identical, and             
consequently whether one can be thought analytically by means of and        
through the other, is a question which we need not at present               
consider. Our Consciousness of the one, when we speak of the manifold,      
is always distinguishable from our consciousness of the other; and          
it is only respecting the synthesis of this (possible) consciousness        
that we here treat.                                                         
-                                                                           
    Of the Originally Synthetical Unity of Apperception. SS 12              
-                                                                           
  The "I think" must accompany all my representations, for otherwise        
something would be represented in me which could not be thought; in         
other words, the representation would either be impossible, or at           
least be, in relation to me, nothing. That representation which can be      
given previously to all thought is called intuition. All the diversity      
or manifold content of intuition, has, therefore, a necessary relation      
to the 'I think," in the subject in which this diversity is found. But      
this representation, "I think," is an act of spontaneity; that is to        
say, it cannot be regarded as belonging to mere sensibility. I call it      
pure apperception, in order to distinguish it from empirical; or            
primitive apperception, because it is self-consciousness which, whilst      
it gives birth to the representation" I think," must necessarily be         
capable of accompanying all our representations. It is in all acts          
of consciousness one and the same, and unaccompanied by it, no              
representation can exist for me. The unity of this apperception I call      
the transcendental unity of self-consciousness, in order to indicate        
the possibility of a priori cognition arising from it. For the              
manifold representations which are given in an intuition would not all      
of them be my representations, if they did not all belong to one            
self-consciousness, that is, as my representations (even although I am      
not conscious of them as such), they must conform to the condition          
under which alone they can exist together in a common                       
self-consciousness, because otherwise they would not all without            
exception belong to me. From this primitive conjunction follow many         
important results.                                                          
                                                   {BK_1|CH_2 ^paragraph 35}
  For example, this universal identity of the apperception of the           
manifold given in intuition contains a synthesis of representations         
and is possible only by means of the consciousness of this                  
synthesis. For the empirical consciousness which accompanies different      
representations is in itself fragmentary and disunited, and without         
relation to the identity of the subject. This relation, then, does not      
exist because I accompany every representation with consciousness, but      
because I join one representation to another, and am conscious of           
the synthesis of them. Consequently, only because I can connect a           
variety of given representations in one consciousness, is it                
possible that I can represent to myself the identity of                     
consciousness in these representations; in other words, the analytical      
unity of apperception is possible only under the presupposition of a        
synthetical unity.* The thought, "These representations given in            
intuition belong all of them to me," is accordingly just the same           
as, "I unite them in one self-consciousness, or can at least so             
unite them"; and although this thought is not itself the consciousness      
of the synthesis of representations, it presupposes the possibility of      
it; that is to say, for the reason alone that I can comprehend the          
variety of my representations in one consciousness, do I call them          
my representations, for otherwise I must have as many-coloured and          
various a self as are the representations of which I am conscious.          
Synthetical unity of the manifold in intuitions, as given a priori, is      
therefore the foundation of the identity of apperception itself, which      
antecedes a priori all determinate thought. But the conjunction of          
representations into a conception is not to be found in objects             
themselves, nor can it be, as it were, borrowed from them and taken up      
into the understanding by perception, but it is on the contrary an          
operation of the understanding itself, which is nothing more than           
the faculty of conjoining a priori and of bringing the variety of           
given representations under the unity of apperception. This                 
principle is the highest in all human cognition.                            
-                                                                           
  *All general conceptions- as such- depend, for their existence, on        
the analytical unity of consciousness. For example, when I think of         
red in general, I thereby think to myself a property which (as a            
characteristic mark) can be discovered somewhere, or can be united          
with other representations; consequently, it is only by means of a          
forethought possible synthetical unity that I can think to myself           
the analytical. A representation which is cogitated as common to            
different representations, is regarded as belonging to such as,             
besides this common representation, contain something different;            
consequently it must be previously thought in synthetical unity with        
other although only possible representations, before I can think in it      
the analytical unity of consciousness which makes it a conceptas            
communis. And thus the synthetical unity of apperception is the             
highest point with which we must connect every operation of the             
understanding, even the whole of logic, and after it our                    
transcendental philosophy; indeed, this faculty is the understanding        
itself.                                                                     
-                                                                           
  This fundamental principle of the necessary unity of apperception is      
indeed an identical, and therefore analytical, proposition; but it          
nevertheless explains the necessity for a synthesis of the manifold         
given in an intuition, without which the identity of                        
self-consciousness would be incogitable. For the ego, as a simple           
representation, presents us with no manifold content; only in               
intuition, which is quite different from the representation ego, can        
it be given us, and by means of conjunction it is cogitated in one          
self-consciousness. An understanding, in which all the manifold should      
be given by means of consciousness itself, would be intuitive; our          
understanding can only think and must look for its intuition to sense.      
I am, therefore, conscious of my identical self, in relation to all         
the variety of representations given to me in an intuition, because         
I call all of them my representations. In other words, I am                 
conscious myself of a necessary a priori synthesis of my                    
representations, which is called the original synthetical unity of          
apperception, under which rank all the representations presented to         
me, but that only by means of a synthesis.                                  
                                                   {BK_1|CH_2 ^paragraph 40}
-                                                                           
    The Principle of the Synthetical Unity of Apperception                  
         is the highest Principle of all exercise of                        
                  the Understanding. SS 13                                  
-                                                                           
                                                   {BK_1|CH_2 ^paragraph 45}
  The supreme principle of the possibility of all intuition in              
relation to sensibility was, according to our transcendental                
aesthetic, that all the manifold in intuition be subject to the formal      
conditions of space and time. The supreme principle of the possibility      
of it in relation to the understanding is that all the manifold in          
it be subject to conditions of the originally synthetical unity or          
apperception.* To the former of these two principles are subject all        
the various representations of intuition, in so far as they are             
given to us; to the latter, in so far as they must be capable of            
conjunction in one consciousness; for without this nothing can be           
thought or cognized, because the given representations would not            
have in common the act Of the apperception "I think" and therefore          
could not be connected in one self-consciousness.                           
-                                                                           
  *Space and time, and all portions thereof, are intuitions;                
consequently are, with a manifold for their content, single                 
representations. (See the Transcendental Aesthetic.) Consequently,          
they are not pure conceptions, by means of which the same                   
consciousness is found in a great number of representations; but, on        
the contrary, they are many representations contained in one, the           
consciousness of which is, so to speak, compounded. The unity of            
consciousness is nevertheless synthetical and, therefore, primitive.        
From this peculiar character of consciousness follow many important         
consequences. (See SS 21.)                                                  
-                                                                           
  Understanding is, to speak generally, the faculty Of cognitions.          
These consist in the determined relation of given representation to an      
object. But an object is that, in the conception of which the manifold      
in a given intuition is united. Now all union of representations            
requires unity of consciousness in the synthesis of them.                   
Consequently, it is the unity of consciousness alone that                   
constitutes the possibility of representations relating to an               
object, and therefore of their objective validity, and of their             
becoming cognitions, and consequently, the possibility of the               
existence of the understanding itself.                                      
                                                   {BK_1|CH_2 ^paragraph 50}
  The first pure cognition of understanding, then, upon which is            
founded all its other exercise, and which is at the same time               
perfectly independent of all conditions of mere sensuous intuition, is      
the principle of the original synthetical unity of apperception.            
Thus the mere form of external sensuous intuition, namely, space,           
affords us, per se, no cognition; it merely contributes the manifold        
in a priori intuition to a possible cognition. But, in order to             
cognize something in space (for example, a line), I must draw it,           
and thus produce synthetically a determined conjunction of the given        
manifold, so that the unity of this act is at the same time the             
unity of consciousness (in the conception of a line), and by this           
means alone is an object (a determinate space) cognized. The                
synthetical unity of consciousness is, therefore, an objective              
condition of all cognition, which I do not merely require in order          
to cognize an object, but to which every intuition must necessarily be      
subject, in order to become an object for me; because in any other          
way, and without this synthesis, the manifold in intuition could not        
be united in one consciousness.                                             
  This proposition is, as already said, itself analytical, although it      
constitutes the synthetical unity, the condition of all thought; for        
it states nothing more than that all my representations in any given        
intuition must be subject to the condition which alone enables me to        
connect them, as my representation with the identical self, and so          
to unite them synthetically in one apperception, by means of the            
general expression, "I think."                                              
  But this principle is not to be regarded as a principle for every         
possible understanding, but only for the understanding by means of          
whose pure apperception in the thought I am, no manifold content is         
given. The understanding or mind which contained the manifold in            
intuition, in and through the act itself of its own                         
self-consciousness, in other words, an understanding by and in the          
representation of which the objects of the representation should at         
the same time exist, would not require a special act of synthesis of        
the manifold as the condition of the unity of its consciousness, an         
act of which the human understanding, which thinks only and cannot          
intuite, has absolute need. But this principle is the first                 
principle of all the operations of our understanding, so that we            
cannot form the least conception of any other possible                      
understanding, either of one such as should be itself intuition, or         
possess a sensuous intuition, but with forms different from those of        
space and time.                                                             
-                                                                           
      What Objective Unity of Self-consciousness is. SS 14                  
                                                   {BK_1|CH_2 ^paragraph 55}
-                                                                           
  It is by means of the transcendental unity of apperception that           
all the manifold, given in an intuition is united into a conception of      
the object. On this account it is called objective, and must be             
distinguished from the subjective unity of consciousness, which is a        
determination of the internal sense, by means of which the said             
manifold in intuition is given empirically to be so united. Whether         
I can be empirically conscious of the manifold as coexistent or as          
successive, depends upon circumstances, or empirical conditions. Hence      
the empirical unity of consciousness by means of association of             
representations, itself relates to a phenomenal world and is wholly         
contingent. On the contrary, the pure form of intuition in time,            
merely as an intuition, which contains a given manifold, is subject to      
the original unity of consciousness, and that solely by means of the        
necessary relation of the manifold in intuition to the "I think,"           
consequently by means of the pure synthesis of the understanding,           
which lies a priori at the foundation of all empirical synthesis.           
The transcendental unity of apperception is alone objectively valid;        
the empirical which we do not consider in this essay, and which is          
merely a unity deduced from the former under given conditions in            
concreto, possesses only subjective validity. One person connects           
the notion conveyed in a word with one thing, another with another          
thing; and the unity of consciousness in that which is empirical,           
is, in relation to that which is given by experience, not                   
necessarily and universally valid.                                          
-                                                                           
     The Logical Form of all Judgements consists in the Objective           
            Unity of Apperception of the Conceptions                        
                                                   {BK_1|CH_2 ^paragraph 60}
                     contained therein. SS 15                               
-                                                                           
  I could never satisfy myself with the definition which logicians          
give of a judgement. It is, according to them, the representation of a      
relation between two conceptions. I shall not dwell here on the             
faultiness of this definition, in that it suits only for categorical        
and not for hypothetical or disjunctive judgements, these latter            
containing a relation not of conceptions but of judgements themselves-      
a blunder from which many evil results have followed.* It is more           
important for our present purpose to observe, that this definition          
does not determine in what the said relation consists.                      
-                                                                           
  *The tedious doctrine of the four syllogistic figures concerns            
only categorical syllogisms; and although it is nothing more than an        
artifice by surreptitiously introducing immediate conclusions               
(consequentiae immediatae) among the premises of a pure syllogism,          
to give ism' give rise to an appearance of more modes of drawing a          
conclusion than that in the first figure, the artifice would not            
have had much success, had not its authors succeeded in bringing            
categorical judgements into exclusive respect, as those to which all        
others must be referred- a doctrine, however, which, according to SS        
5, is utterly false.                                                        
                                                   {BK_1|CH_2 ^paragraph 65}
-                                                                           
  But if I investigate more closely the relation of given cognitions        
in every judgement, and distinguish it, as belonging to the                 
understanding, from the relation which is produced according to laws        
of the reproductive imagination (which has only subjective                  
validity), I find that judgement is nothing but the mode of bringing        
given cognitions under the objective unit of apperception. This is          
plain from our use of the term of relation is in judgements, in             
order to distinguish the objective unity of given representations from      
the subjective unity. For this term indicates the relation of these         
representations to the original apperception, and also their necessary      
unity, even although the judgement is empirical, therefore contingent,      
as in the judgement: "All bodies are heavy." I do not mean by this,         
that these representations do necessarily belong to each other in           
empirical intuition, but that by means of the necessary unity of            
appreciation they belong to each other in the synthesis of intuitions,      
that is to say, they belong to each other according to principles of        
the objective determination of all our representations, in so far as        
cognition can arise from them, these principles being all deduced from      
the main principle of the transcendental unity of apperception. In          
this way alone can there arise from this relation a judgement, that         
is, a relation which has objective validity, and is perfectly distinct      
from that relation of the very same representations which has only          
subjective validity- a relation, to wit, which is produced according        
to laws of association. According to these laws, I could only say:          
"When I hold in my hand or carry a body, I feel an impression of            
weight"; but I could not say: "It, the body, is heavy"; for this is         
tantamount to saying both these representations are conjoined in the        
object, that is, without distinction as to the condition of the             
subject, and do not merely stand together in my perception, however         
frequently the perceptive act may be repeated.                              
-                                                                           
    All Sensuous Intuitions are subject to the Categories, as               
      Conditions under which alone the manifold Content of                  
                                                   {BK_1|CH_2 ^paragraph 70}
        them can be united in one Consciousness. SS 16                      
-                                                                           
  The manifold content given in a sensuous intuition comes necessarily      
under the original synthetical unity of apperception, because               
thereby alone is the unity of intuition possible (SS 13). But that act      
of the understanding, by which the manifold content of given                
representations (whether intuitions or conceptions) is brought under        
one apperception, is the logical function of judgements (SS 15). All        
the manifold, therefore, in so far as it is given in one empirical          
intuition, is determined in relation to one of the logical functions        
of judgement, by means of which it is brought into union in one             
consciousness. Now the categories are nothing else than these               
functions of judgement so far as the manifold in a given intuition          
is determined in relation to them (SS 9). Consequently, the manifold        
in a given intuition is necessarily subject to the categories of the        
understanding.                                                              
-                                                                           
                    Observation. SS 17                                      
                                                   {BK_1|CH_2 ^paragraph 75}
-                                                                           
  The manifold in an intuition, which I call mine, is represented by        
means of the synthesis of the understanding, as belonging to the            
necessary unity of self-consciousness, and this takes place by means        
of the category.* The category indicates accordingly that the               
empirical consciousness of a given manifold in an intuition is subject      
to a pure self-consciousness a priori, in the same manner as an             
empirical intuition is subject to a pure sensuous intuition, which          
is also a priori. In the above proposition, then, lies the beginning        
of a deduction of the pure conceptions of the understanding. Now, as        
the categories have their origin in the understanding alone,                
independently of sensibility, I must in my deduction make                   
abstraction of the mode in which the manifold of an empirical               
intuition is given, in order to fix my attention exclusively on the         
unity which is brought by the understanding into the intuition by           
means of the category. In what follows (SS 22), it will be shown, from      
the mode in which the empirical intuition is given in the faculty of        
sensibility, that the unity which belongs to it is no other than            
that which the category (according to SS 16) imposes on the manifold        
in a given intuition, and thus, its a priori validity in regard to all      
objects of sense being established, the purpose of our deduction            
will be fully attained.                                                     
-                                                                           
  *The proof of this rests on the represented unity of intuition, by        
means of which an object is given, and which always includes in itself      
a synthesis of the manifold to be intuited, and also the relation of        
this latter to unity of apperception.                                       
-                                                                           
                                                   {BK_1|CH_2 ^paragraph 80}
  But there is one thing in the above demonstration of which I could        
not make abstraction, namely, that the manifold to be intuited must be      
given previously to the synthesis of the understanding, and                 
independently of it. How this takes place remains here undetermined.        
For if I cogitate an understanding which was itself intuitive (as, for      
example, a divine understanding which should not represent given            
objects, but by whose representation the objects themselves should          
be given or produced), the categories would possess no significance in      
relation to such a faculty of cognition. They are merely rules for          
an understanding, whose whole power consists in thought, that is, in        
the act of submitting the synthesis of the manifold which is presented      
to it in intuition from a very different quarter, to the unity of           
apperception; a faculty, therefore, which cognizes nothing per se, but      
only connects and arranges the material of cognition, the intuition,        
namely, which must be presented to it by means of the object. But to        
show reasons for this peculiar character of our understandings, that        
it produces unity of apperception a priori only by means of                 
categories, and a certain kind and number thereof, is as impossible as      
to explain why we are endowed with precisely so many functions of           
judgement and no more, or why time and space are the only forms of our      
intuition.                                                                  
-                                                                           
    In Cognition, its Application to Objects of Experience is               
    the only legitimate use of the Category. SS 18                          
-                                                                           
                                                   {BK_1|CH_2 ^paragraph 85}
  To think an object and to cognize an object are by no means the same      
thing. In cognition there are two elements: firstly, the conception,        
whereby an object is cogitated (the category); and, secondly, the           
intuition, whereby the object is given. For supposing that to the           
conception a corresponding intuition could not be given, it would           
still be a thought as regards its form, but without any object, and no      
cognition of anything would be possible by means of it, inasmuch as,        
so far as I knew, there existed and could exist nothing to which my         
thought could be applied. Now all intuition possible to us is               
sensuous; consequently, our thought of an object by means of a pure         
conception of the understanding, can become cognition for us only in        
so far as this conception is applied to objects of the senses.              
Sensuous intuition is either pure intuition (space and time) or             
empirical intuition- of that which is immediately represented in space      
and time by means of sensation as real. Through the determination of        
pure intuition we obtain a priori cognitions of objects, as in              
mathematics, but only as regards their form as phenomena; whether           
there can exist things which must be intuited in this form is not           
thereby established. All mathematical conceptions, therefore, are           
not per se cognition, except in so far as we presuppose that there          
exist things which can only be represented conformably to the form          
of our pure sensuous intuition. But things in space and time are given      
only in so far as they are perceptions (representations accompanied         
with sensation), therefore only by empirical representation.                
Consequently the pure conceptions of the understanding, even when they      
are applied to intuitions a priori (as in mathematics), produce             
cognition only in so far as these (and therefore the conceptions of         
the understanding by means of them) can be applied to empirical             
intuitions. Consequently the categories do not, even by means of            
pure intuition afford us any cognition of things; they can only do          
so in so far as they can be applied to empirical intuition. That is to      
say, the, categories serve only to render empirical cognition               
possible. But this is what we call experience. Consequently, in             
cognition, their application to objects of experience is the only           
legitimate use of the categories.                                           
-                                                                           
                           SS 19                                            
-                                                                           
  The foregoing proposition is of the utmost importance, for it             
determines the limits of the exercise of the pure conceptions of the        
understanding in regard to objects, just as transcendental aesthetic        
determined the limits of the exercise of the pure form of our sensuous      
intuition. Space and time, as conditions of the possibility of the          
presentation of objects to us, are valid no further than for objects        
of sense, consequently, only for experience. Beyond these limits            
they represent to us nothing, for they belong only to sense, and            
have no reality apart from it. The pure conceptions of the                  
understanding are free from this limitation, and extend to objects          
of intuition in general, be the intuition like or unlike to ours,           
provided only it be sensuous, and not intellectual. But this extension      
of conceptions beyond the range of our intuition is of no advantage;        
for they are then mere empty conceptions of objects, as to the              
possibility or impossibility of the existence of which they furnish us      
with no means of discovery. They are mere forms of thought, without         
objective reality, because we have no intuition to which the                
synthetical unity of apperception, which alone the categories contain,      
could be applied, for the purpose of determining an object. Our             
sensuous and empirical intuition can alone give them significance           
and meaning.                                                                
                                                   {BK_1|CH_2 ^paragraph 90}
  If, then, we suppose an object of a non-sensuous intuition to be          
given we can in that case represent it by all those predicates which        
are implied in the presupposition that nothing appertaining to              
sensuous intuition belongs to it; for example, that it is not               
extended, or in space; that its duration is not time; that in it no         
change (the effect of the determinations in time) is to be met with,        
and so on. But it is no proper knowledge if I merely indicate what the      
intuition of the object is not, without being able to say what is           
contained in it, for I have not shown the possibility of an object          
to which my pure conception of understanding could be applicable,           
because I have not been able to furnish any intuition corresponding to      
it, but am only able to say that our intuition is not valid for it.         
But the most important point is this, that to a something of this kind      
not one category can be found applicable. Take, for example, the            
conception of substance, that is, something that can exist as subject,      
but never as mere predicate; in regard to this conception I am quite        
ignorant whether there can really be anything to correspond to such         
a determination of thought, if empirical intuition did not afford me        
the occasion for its application. But of this more in the sequel.           
-                                                                           
     Of the Application of the Categories to Objects of the                 
                  Senses in general. SS 20                                  
-                                                                           
                                                   {BK_1|CH_2 ^paragraph 95}
  The pure conceptions of the understanding apply to objects of             
intuition in general, through the understanding alone, whether the          
intuition be our own or some other, provided only it be sensuous,           
but are, for this very reason, mere forms of thought, by means of           
which alone no determined object can be cognized. The synthesis or          
conjunction of the manifold in these conceptions relates, we have           
said, only to the unity of apperception, and is for this reason the         
ground of the possibility of a priori cognition, in so far as this          
cognition is dependent on the understanding. This synthesis is,             
therefore, not merely transcendental, but also purely intellectual.         
But because a certain form of sensuous intuition exists in the mind         
a priori which rests on the receptivity of the representative               
faculty (sensibility), the understanding, as a spontaneity, is able to      
determine the internal sense by means of the diversity of given             
representations, conformably to the synthetical unity of apperception,      
and thus to cogitate the synthetical unity of the apperception of           
the manifold of sensuous intuition a priori, as the condition to which      
must necessarily be submitted all objects of human intuition. And in        
this manner the categories as mere forms of thought receive                 
objective reality, that is, application to objects which are given          
to us in intuition, but that only as phenomena, for it is only of           
phenomena that we are capable of a priori intuition.                        
  This synthesis of the manifold of sensuous intuition, which is            
possible and necessary a priori, may be called figurative (synthesis        
speciosa), in contradistinction to that which is cogitated in the mere      
category in regard to the manifold of an intuition in general, and          
is called connection or conjunction of the understanding (synthesis         
intellectualis). Both are transcendental, not merely because they           
themselves precede a priori all experience, but also because they form      
the basis for the possibility of other cognition a priori.                  
  But the figurative synthesis, when it has relation only to the            
originally synthetical unity of apperception, that is to the                
transcendental unity cogitated in the categories, must, to be               
distinguished from the purely intellectual conjunction, be entitled         
the transcendental synthesis of imagination. Imagination is the             
faculty of representing an object even without its presence in              
intuition. Now, as all our intuition is sensuous, imagination, by           
reason of the subjective condition under which alone it can give a          
corresponding intuition to the conceptions of the understanding,            
belongs to sensibility. But in so far as the synthesis of the               
imagination is an act of spontaneity, which is determinative, and not,      
like sense, merely determinable, and which is consequently able to          
determine sense a priori, according to its form, conformably to the         
unity of apperception, in so far is the imagination a faculty of            
determining sensibility a priori, and its synthesis of intuitions           
according to the categories must be the transcendental synthesis of         
the imagination. It is an operation of the understanding on                 
sensibility, and the first application of the understanding to objects      
of possible intuition, and at the same time the basis for the exercise      
of the other functions of that faculty. As figurative, it is                
distinguished from the merely intellectual synthesis, which is              
produced by the understanding alone, without the aid of imagination.        
Now, in so far as imagination is spontaneity, I sometimes call it also      
the productive imagination, and distinguish it from the                     
reproductive, the synthesis of which is subject entirely to                 
empirical laws, those of association, namely, and which, therefore,         
contributes nothing to the explanation of the possibility of a              
priori cognition, and for this reason belongs not to transcendental         
philosophy, but to psychology.                                              
-                                                                           
  We have now arrived at the proper place for explaining the paradox        
which must have struck every one in our exposition of the internal          
sense (SS 6), namely- how this sense represents us to our own               
consciousness, only as we appear to ourselves, not as we are in             
ourselves, because, to wit, we intuite ourselves only as we are             
inwardly affected. Now this appears to be contradictory, inasmuch as        
we thus stand in a passive relation to ourselves; and therefore in the      
systems of psychology, the internal sense is commonly held to be one        
with the faculty of apperception, while we, on the contrary, carefully      
distinguish them.                                                           
                                                  {BK_1|CH_2 ^paragraph 100}
  That which determines the internal sense is the understanding, and        
its original power of conjoining the manifold of intuition, that is,        
of bringing this under an apperception (upon which rests the                
possibility of the understanding itself). Now, as the human                 
understanding is not in itself a faculty of intuition, and is unable        
to exercise such a power, in order to conjoin, as it were, the              
manifold of its own intuition, the synthesis of understanding is,           
considered per se, nothing but the unity of action, of which, as such,      
it is self-conscious, even apart from sensibility, by which, moreover,      
it is able to determine our internal sense in respect of the                
manifold which may be presented to it according to the form of              
sensuous intuition. Thus, under the name of a transcendental synthesis      
of imagination, the understanding exercises an activity upon the            
passive subject, whose faculty it is; and so we are right in saying         
that the internal sense is affected thereby. Apperception and its           
synthetical unity are by no means one and the same with the internal        
sense. The former, as the source of all our synthetical conjunction,        
applies, under the name of the categories, to the manifold of               
intuition in general, prior to all sensuous intuition of objects.           
The internal sense, on the contrary, contains merely the form of            
intuition, but without any synthetical conjunction of the manifold          
therein, and consequently does not contain any determined intuition,        
which is possible only through consciousness of the determination of        
the manifold by the transcendental act of the imagination (synthetical      
influence of the understanding on the internal sense), which I have         
named figurative synthesis.                                                 
  This we can indeed always perceive in ourselves. We cannot                
cogitate a geometrical line without drawing it in thought, nor a            
circle without describing it, nor represent the three dimensions of         
space without drawing three lines from the same point perpendicular to      
one another. We cannot even cogitate time, unless, in drawing a             
straight line (which is to serve as the external figurative                 
representation of time), we fix our attention on the act of the             
synthesis of the manifold, whereby we determine successively the            
internal sense, and thus attend also to the succession of this              
determination. Motion as an act of the subject (not as a determination      
of an object),* consequently the synthesis of the manifold in space,        
if we make abstraction of space and attend merely to the act by             
which we determine the internal sense according to its form, is that        
which produces the conception of succession. The understanding,             
therefore, does by no means find in the internal sense any such             
synthesis of the manifold, but produces it, in that it affects this         
sense. At the same time, how "I who think" is distinct from the "I"         
which intuites itself (other modes of intuition being cogitable as          
at least possible), and yet one and the same with this latter as the        
same subject; how, therefore, I am able to say: "I, as an intelligence      
and thinking subject, cognize myself as an object thought, so far as I      
am, moreover, given to myself in intuition- only, like other                
phenomena, not as I am in myself, and as considered by the                  
understanding, but merely as I appear"- is a question that has in it        
neither more nor less difficulty than the question- "How can I be an        
object to myself?" or this- "How I can be an object of my own               
intuition and internal perceptions?" But that such must be the fact,        
if we admit that space is merely a pure form of the phenomena of            
external sense, can be clearly proved by the consideration that we          
cannot represent time, which is not an object of external intuition,        
in any other way than under the image of a line, which we draw in           
thought, a mode of representation without which we could not cognize        
the unity of its dimension, and also that we are necessitated to            
take our determination of periods of time, or of points of time, for        
all our internal perceptions from the changes which we perceive in          
outward things. It follows that we must arrange the determinations          
of the internal sense, as phenomena in time, exactly in the same            
manner as we arrange those of the external senses in space. And             
consequently, if we grant, respecting this latter, that by means of         
them we know objects only in so far as we are affected externally,          
we must also confess, with regard to the internal sense, that by means      
of it we intuite ourselves only as we are internally affected by            
ourselves; in other words, as regards internal intuition, we cognize        
our own subject only as phenomenon, and not as it is in itself.*[2]         
-                                                                           
  *Motion of an object in space does not belong to a pure science,          
consequently not to geometry; because, that a thing is movable              
cannot be known a priori, but only from experience. But motion,             
considered as the description of a space, is a pure act of the              
successive synthesis of the manifold in external intuition by means of      
productive imagination, and belongs not only to geometry, but even          
to transcendental philosophy.                                               
  *[2] I do not see why so much difficulty should be found in               
admitting that our internal sense is affected by ourselves. Every           
act of attention exemplifies it. In such an act the understanding           
determines the internal sense by the synthetical conjunction which          
it cogitates, conformably to the internal intuition which                   
corresponds to the manifold in the synthesis of the understanding. How      
much the mind is usually affected thereby every one will be able to         
perceive in himself.                                                        
                                                  {BK_1|CH_2 ^paragraph 105}
-                                                                           
                          SS 21                                             
-                                                                           
  On the other hand, in the transcendental synthesis of the manifold        
content of representations, consequently in the synthetical unity of        
apperception, I am conscious of myself, not as I appear to myself, nor      
as I am in myself, but only that "I am." This representation is a           
thought, not an intuition. Now, as in order to cognize ourselves, in        
addition to the act of thinking, which subjects the manifold of             
every possible intuition to the unity of apperception, there is             
necessary a determinate mode of intuition, whereby this manifold is         
given; although my own existence is certainly not mere phenomenon           
(much less mere illusion), the determination of my existence* Can only      
take place conformably to the form of the internal sense, according to      
the particular mode in which the manifold which I conjoin is given          
in internal intuition, and I have therefore no knowledge of myself          
as I am, but merely as I appear to myself. The consciousness of self        
is thus very far from a knowledge of self, in which I do not use the        
categories, whereby I cogitate an object, by means of the                   
conjunction of the manifold in one apperception. In the same way as         
I require, for the sake of the cognition of an object distinct from         
myself, not only the thought of an object in general (in the                
category), but also an intuition by which to determine that general         
conception, in the same way do I require, in order to the cognition of      
myself, not only the consciousness of myself or the thought that I          
think myself, but in addition an intuition of the manifold in               
myself, by which to determine this thought. It is true that I exist as      
an intelligence which is conscious only of its faculty of                   
conjunction or synthesis, but subjected in relation to the manifold         
which this intelligence has to conjoin to a limitative conjunction          
called the internal sense. My intelligence (that is, I) can render          
that conjunction or synthesis perceptible only according to the             
relations of time, which are quite beyond the proper sphere of the          
conceptions of the understanding and consequently cognize itself in         
respect to an intuition (which cannot possibly be intellectual, nor         
given by the understanding), only as it appears to itself, and not          
as it would cognize itself, if its intuition were intellectual.             
-                                                                           
                                                  {BK_1|CH_2 ^paragraph 110}
  *The "I think" expresses the act of determining my own existence. My      
existence is thus already given by the act of consciousness; but the        
mode in which I must determine my existence, that is, the mode in           
which I must place the manifold belonging to my existence, is not           
thereby given. For this purpose intuition of self is required, and          
this intuition possesses a form given a priori, namely, time, which is      
sensuous, and belongs to our receptivity of the determinable. Now,          
as I do not possess another intuition of self which gives the               
determining in me (of the spontaneity of which I am conscious),             
prior to the act of determination, in the same manner as time gives         
the determinable, it is clear that I am unable to determine my own          
existence as that of a spontaneous being, but I am only able to             
represent to myself the spontaneity of my thought, that is, of my           
determination, and my existence remains ever determinable in a              
purely sensuous manner, that is to say, like the existence of a             
phenomenon. But it is because of this spontaneity that I call myself        
an intelligence.                                                            
-                                                                           
      Transcendental Deduction of the universally possible                  
        employment in experience of the Pure Conceptions                    
                of the Understanding. SS 22                                 
                                                  {BK_1|CH_2 ^paragraph 115}
-                                                                           
  In the metaphysical deduction, the a priori origin of categories was      
proved by their complete accordance with the general logical of             
thought; in the transcendental deduction was exhibited the possibility      
of the categories as a priori cognitions of objects of an intuition in      
general (SS 16 and 17).At present we are about to explain the               
possibility of cognizing, a priori, by means of the categories, all         
objects which can possibly be presented to our senses, not, indeed,         
according to the form of their intuition, but according to the laws of      
their conjunction or synthesis, and thus, as it were, of prescribing        
laws to nature and even of rendering nature possible. For if the            
categories were inadequate to this task, it would not be evident to us      
why everything that is presented to our senses must be subject to           
those laws which have an a priori origin in the understanding itself.       
  I premise that by the term synthesis of apprehension I understand         
the combination of the manifold in an empirical intuition, whereby          
perception, that is, empirical consciousness of the intuition (as           
phenomenon), is possible.                                                   
  We have a priori forms of the external and internal sensuous              
intuition in the representations of space and time, and to these            
must the synthesis of apprehension of the manifold in a phenomenon          
be always comformable, because the synthesis itself can only take           
place according to these forms. But space and time are not merely           
forms of sensuous intuition, but intuitions themselves (which               
contain a manifold), and therefore contain a priori the                     
determination of the unity of this manifold.* (See the Transcendent         
Aesthetic.) Therefore is unity of the synthesis of the manifold             
without or within us, consequently also a conjunction to which all          
that is to be represented as determined in space or time must               
correspond, given a priori along with (not in) these intuitions, as         
the condition of the synthesis of all apprehension of them. But this        
synthetical unity can be no other than that of the conjunction of           
the manifold of a given intuition in general, in a primitive act of         
consciousness, according to the categories, but applied to our              
sensuous intuition. Consequently all synthesis, whereby alone is            
even perception possible, is subject to the categories. And, as             
experience is cognition by means of conjoined perceptions, the              
categories are conditions of the possibility of experience and are          
therefore valid a priori for all objects of experience.                     
-                                                                           
                                                  {BK_1|CH_2 ^paragraph 120}
  *Space represented as an object (as geometry really requires it to        
be) contains more than the mere form of the intuition; namely, a            
combination of the manifold given according to the form of sensibility      
into a representation that can be intuited; so that the form of the         
intuition gives us merely the manifold, but the formal intuition gives      
unity of representation. In the aesthetic, I regarded this unity as         
belonging entirely to sensibility, for the purpose of indicating            
that it antecedes all conceptions, although it presupposes a synthesis      
which does not belong to sense, through which alone, however, all           
our conceptions of space and time are possible. For as by means of          
this unity alone (the understanding determining the sensibility) space      
and time are given as intuitions, it follows that the unity of this         
intuition a priori belongs to space and time, and not to the                
conception of the understanding (SS 20).                                    
-                                                                           
  When, then, for example, I make the empirical intuition of a house        
by apprehension of the manifold contained therein into a perception,        
the necessary unity of space and of my external sensuous intuition          
lies at the foundation of this act, and I, as it were, draw the form        
of the house conformably to this synthetical unity of the manifold          
in space. But this very synthetical unity remains, even when I              
abstract the form of space, and has its seat in the understanding, and      
is in fact the category of the synthesis of the homogeneous in an           
intuition; that is to say, the category of quantity, to which the           
aforesaid synthesis of apprehension, that is, the perception, must          
be completely conformable.*                                                 
-                                                                           
  *In this manner it is proved, that the synthesis of apprehension,         
which is empirical, must necessarily be conformable to the synthesis        
of apperception, which is intellectual, and contained a priori in           
the category. It is one and the same spontaneity which at one time,         
under the name of imagination, at another under that of understanding,      
produces conjunction in the manifold of intuition.                          
                                                  {BK_1|CH_2 ^paragraph 125}
-                                                                           
  To take another example, when I perceive the freezing of water, I         
apprehend two states (fluidity and solidity), which, as such, stand         
toward each other mutually in a relation of time. But in the time,          
which I place as an internal intuition, at the foundation of this           
phenomenon, I represent to myself synthetical unity of the manifold,        
without which the aforesaid relation could not be given in an               
intuition as determined (in regard to the succession of time). Now          
this synthetical unity, as the a priori condition under which I             
conjoin the manifold of an intuition, is, if I make abstraction of the      
permanent form of my internal intuition (that is to say, of time), the      
category of cause, by means of which, when applied to my                    
sensibility, I determine everything that occurs according to relations      
of time. Consequently apprehension in such an event, and the event          
itself, as far as regards the possibility of its perception, stands         
under the conception of the relation of cause and effect: and so in         
all other cases.                                                            
-                                                                           
  Categories are conceptions which prescribe laws a priori to               
phenomena, consequently to nature as the complex of all phenomena           
(natura materialiter spectata). And now the question arises-                
inasmuch as these categories are not derived from nature, and do not        
regulate themselves according to her as their model (for in that            
case they would be empirical)- how it is conceivable that nature            
must regulate herself according to them, in other words, how the            
categories can determine a priori the synthesis of the manifold of          
nature, and yet not derive their origin from her. The following is the      
solution of this enigma.                                                    
  It is not in the least more difficult to conceive how the laws of         
the phenomena of nature must harmonize with the understanding and with      
its a priori form- that is, its faculty of conjoining the manifold-         
than it is to understand how the phenomena themselves must                  
correspond with the a priori form of our sensuous intuition. For            
laws do not exist in the phenomena any more than the phenomena exist        
as things in themselves. Laws do not exist except by relation to the        
subject in which the phenomena inhere, in so far as it possesses            
understanding, just as phenomena have no existence except by                
relation to the same existing subject in so far as it has senses. To        
things as things in themselves, conformability to law must necessarily      
belong independently of an understanding to cognize them. But               
phenomena are only representations of things which are utterly unknown      
in respect to what they are in themselves. But as mere                      
representations, they stand under no law of conjunction except that         
which the conjoining faculty prescribes. Now that which conjoins the        
manifold of sensuous intuition is imagination, a mental act to which        
understanding contributes unity of intellectual synthesis, and              
sensibility, manifoldness of apprehension. Now as all possible              
perception depends on the synthesis of apprehension, and this               
empirical synthesis itself on the transcendental, consequently on           
the categories, it is evident that all possible perceptions, and            
therefore everything that can attain to empirical consciousness,            
that is, all phenomena of nature, must, as regards their                    
conjunction, be subject to the categories. And nature (considered           
merely as nature in general) is dependent on them. as the original          
ground of her necessary conformability to law (as natura formaliter         
spectata). But the pure faculty (of the understanding) of                   
prescribing laws a priori to phenomena by means of mere categories, is      
not competent to enounce other or more laws than those on which a           
nature in general, as a conformability to law of phenomena of space         
and time, depends. Particular laws, inasmuch as they concern                
empirically determined phenomena, cannot be entirely deduced from pure      
laws, although they all stand under them. Experience must be                
superadded in order to know these particular laws; but in regard to         
experience in general, and everything that can be cognized as an            
object thereof, these a priori laws are our only rule and guide.            
                                                  {BK_1|CH_2 ^paragraph 130}
-                                                                           
       Result of this Deduction of the Conceptions of the                   
                   Understanding. SS 23                                     
-                                                                           
  We cannot think any object except by means of the categories; we          
cannot cognize any thought except by means of intuitions corresponding      
to these conceptions. Now all our intuitions are sensuous, and our          
cognition, in so far as the object of it is given, is empirical. But        
empirical cognition is experience; consequently no a priori                 
cognition is possible for us, except of objects of possible                 
experience.*                                                                
                                                  {BK_1|CH_2 ^paragraph 135}
-                                                                           
  *Lest my readers should stumble at this assertion, and the                
conclusions that may be too rashly drawn from it, I must remind them        
that the categories in the act of thought are by no means limited by        
the conditions of our sensuous intuition, but have an unbounded sphere      
of action. It is only the cognition of the object of thought, the           
determining of the object, which requires intuition. In the absence of      
intuition, our thought of an object may still have true and useful          
consequences in regard to the exercise of reason by the subject. But        
as this exercise of reason is not always directed on the determination      
of the object, in other words, on cognition thereof, but also on the        
determination of the subject and its volition, I do not intend to           
treat of it in this place.                                                  
-                                                                           
  But this cognition, which is limited to objects of experience, is         
not for that reason derived entirely, from, experience, but- and            
this is asserted of the pure intuitions and the pure conceptions of         
the understanding- there are, unquestionably, elements of cognition,        
which exist in the mind a priori. Now there are only two ways in which      
a necessary harmony of experience with the conceptions of its               
objects can be cogitated. Either experience makes these conceptions         
possible, or the conceptions make experience possible. The former of        
these statements will not bold good with respect to the categories          
(nor in regard to pure sensuous intuition), for they are a priori           
conceptions, and therefore independent of experience. The assertion of      
an empirical origin would attribute to them a sort of generatio             
aequivoca. Consequently, nothing remains but to adopt the second            
alternative (which presents us with a system, as it were, of the            
epigenesis of pure reason), namely, that on the part of the                 
understanding the categories do contain the grounds of the possibility      
of all experience. But with respect to the questions how they make          
experience possible, and what are the principles of the possibility         
thereof with which they present us in their application to                  
phenomena, the following section on the transcendental exercise of the      
faculty of judgement will inform the reader.                                
  It is quite possible that someone may propose a species of                
preformation-system of pure reason- a middle way between the two- to        
wit, that the categories are neither innate and first a priori              
principles of cognition, nor derived from experience, but are merely        
subjective aptitudes for thought implanted in us contemporaneously          
with our existence, which were so ordered and disposed by our Creator,      
that their exercise perfectly harmonizes with the laws of nature which      
regulate experience. Now, not to mention that with such an                  
hypothesis it is impossible to say at what point we must stop in the        
employment of predetermined aptitudes, the fact that the categories         
would in this case entirely lose that character of necessity which          
is essentially involved in the very conception of them, is a                
conclusive objection to it. The conception of cause, for example,           
which expresses the necessity of an effect under a presupposed              
condition, would be false, if it rested only upon such an arbitrary         
subjective necessity of uniting certain empirical representations           
according to such a rule of relation. I could not then say- "The            
effect is connected with its cause in the object (that is,                  
necessarily)," but only, "I am so constituted that I can think this         
representation as so connected, and not otherwise." Now this is just        
what the sceptic wants. For in this case, all our knowledge, depending      
on the supposed objective validity of our judgement, is nothing but         
mere illusion; nor would there be wanting people who would deny any         
such subjective necessity in respect to themselves, though they must        
feel it. At all events, we could not dispute with any one on that           
which merely depends on the manner in which his subject is organized.       
                                                  {BK_1|CH_2 ^paragraph 140}
-                                                                           
             Short view of the above Deduction.                             
-                                                                           
  The foregoing deduction is an exposition of the pure conceptions          
of the understanding (and with them of all theoretical a priori             
cognition), as principles of the possibility of experience, but of          
experience as the determination of all phenomena in space and time          
in general- of experience, finally, from the principle of the original      
synthetical unity of apperception, as the form of the understanding in      
relation to time and space as original forms of sensibility.                
-                                                                           
                                                  {BK_1|CH_2 ^paragraph 145}
  I consider the division by paragraphs to be necessary only up to          
this point, because we had to treat of the elementary conceptions.          
As we now proceed to the exposition of the employment of these, I           
shall not designate the chapters in this manner any further.                
                                                                            
BK_2                                                                        
                         BOOK II.                                           
-                                                                           
                 Analytic of Principles.                                    
-                                                                           
  General logic is constructed upon a plan which coincides exactly          
with the division of the higher faculties of cognition. These are,          
understanding, judgement, and reason. This science, accordingly,            
treats in its analytic of conceptions, judgements, and conclusions          
in exact correspondence with the functions and order of those mental        
powers which we include generally under the generic denomination of         
understanding.                                                              
  As this merely formal logic makes abstraction of all content of           
cognition, whether pure or empirical, and occupies itself with the          
mere form of thought (discursive cognition), it must contain in its         
analytic a canon for reason. For the form of reason has its law,            
which, without taking into consideration the particular nature of           
the cognition about which it is employed, can be discovered a               
priori, by the simple analysis of the action of reason into its             
momenta.                                                                    
  Transcendental logic, limited as it is to a determinate content,          
that of pure a priori cognitions, to wit, cannot imitate general logic      
in this division. For it is evident that the transcendental employment      
of reason is not objectively valid, and therefore does not belong to        
the logic of truth (that is, to analytic), but as a logic of illusion,      
occupies a particular department in the scholastic system under the         
name of transcendental dialectic.                                           
                                                         {BK_2 ^paragraph 5}
  Understanding and judgement accordingly possess in transcendental         
logic a canon of objectively valid, and therefore true exercise, and        
are comprehended in the analytical department of that logic. But            
reason, in her endeavours to arrive by a priori means at some true          
statement concerning objects and to extend cognition beyond the bounds      
of possible experience, is altogether dialectic, and her illusory           
assertions cannot be constructed into a canon such as an analytic           
ought to contain.                                                           
  Accordingly, the analytic of principles will be merely a canon for        
the faculty of judgement, for the instruction of this faculty in its        
application to phenomena of the pure conceptions of the understanding,      
which contain the necessary condition for the establishment of a            
priori laws. On this account, although the subject of the following         
chapters is the especial principles of understanding, I shall make use      
of the term Doctrine of the faculty of judgement, in order to define        
more particularly my present purpose.                                       
-                                                                           
  INTRODUCTION. Of the Transcendental Faculty of judgement in General.      
-                                                                           
                                                        {BK_2 ^paragraph 10}
  If understanding in general be defined as the faculty of laws or          
rules, the faculty of judgement may be termed the faculty of                
subsumption under these rules; that is, of distinguishing whether this      
or that does or does not stand under a given rule (casus datae legis).      
General logic contains no directions or precepts for the faculty of         
judgement, nor can it contain any such. For as it makes abstraction of      
all content of cognition, no duty is left for it, except that of            
exposing analytically the mere form of cognition in conceptions,            
judgements, and conclusions, and of thereby establishing formal             
rules for all exercise of the understanding. Now if this logic              
wished to give some general direction how we should subsume under           
these rules, that is, how we should distinguish whether this or that        
did or did not stand under them, this again could not be done               
otherwise than by means of a rule. But this rule, precisely because it      
is a rule, requires for itself direction from the faculty of                
judgement. Thus, it is evident that the understanding is capable of         
being instructed by rules, but that the judgement is a peculiar             
talent, which does not, and cannot require tuition, but only exercise.      
This faculty is therefore the specific quality of the so-called mother      
wit, the want of which no scholastic discipline can compensate.             
  For although education may furnish, and, as it were, engraft upon         
a limited understanding rules borrowed from other minds, yet the power      
of employing these rules correctly must belong to the pupil himself;        
and no rule which we can prescribe to him with this purpose is, in the      
absence or deficiency of this gift of nature, secure from misuse.* A        
physician therefore, a judge or a statesman, may have in his head many      
admirable pathological, juridical, or political rules, in a degree          
that may enable him to be a profound teacher in his particular              
science, and yet in the application of these rules he may very              
possibly blunder- either because he is wanting in natural judgement         
(though not in understanding) and, whilst he can comprehend the             
general in abstracto, cannot distinguish whether a particular case          
in concreto ought to rank under the former; or because his faculty          
of judgement bas not been sufficiently exercised by examples and            
real practice. Indeed, the grand and only use of examples, is to            
sharpen the judgement. For as regards the correctness and precision of      
the insight of the understanding, examples are commonly injurious           
rather than otherwise, because, as casus in terminis they seldom            
adequately fulfil the conditions of the rule. Besides, they often           
weaken the power of our understanding to apprehend rules or laws in         
their universality, independently of particular circumstances of            
experience; and hence, accustom us to employ them more as formulae          
than as principles. Examples are thus the go-cart of the judgement,         
which he who is naturally deficient in that faculty cannot afford to        
dispense with.                                                              
-                                                                           
  *Deficiency in judgement is properly that which is called stupidity;      
and for such a failing we know no remedy. A dull or narrow-minded           
person, to whom nothing is wanting but a proper degree of                   
understanding, may be improved by tuition, even so far as to deserve        
the epithet of learned. But as such persons frequently labour under         
a deficiency in the faculty of judgement, it is not uncommon to find        
men extremely learned who in the application of their science betray a      
lamentable degree this irremediable want.                                   
-                                                                           
                                                        {BK_2 ^paragraph 15}
  But although general logic cannot give directions to the faculty          
of judgement, the case is very different as regards transcendental          
logic, insomuch that it appears to be the especial duty of the              
latter to secure and direct, by means of determinate rules, the             
faculty of judgement in the employment of the pure understanding. For,      
as a doctrine, that is, as an endeavour to enlarge the sphere of the        
understanding in regard to pure a priori cognitions, philosophy is          
worse than useless, since from all the attempts hitherto made,              
little or no ground has been gained. But, as a critique, in order to        
guard against the mistakes of the faculty of judgement (lapsus              
judicii) in the employment of the few pure conceptions of the               
understanding which we possess, although its use is in this case            
purely negative, philosophy is called upon to apply all its                 
acuteness and penetration.                                                  
  But transcendental philosophy has this peculiarity, that besides          
indicating the rule, or rather the general condition for rules,             
which is given in the pure conception of the understanding, it can, at      
the same time, indicate a priori the case to which the rule must be         
applied. The cause of the superiority which, in this respect,               
transcendental philosophy possesses above all other sciences except         
mathematics, lies in this: it treats of conceptions which must              
relate a priori to their objects, whose objective validity                  
consequently cannot be demonstrated a posteriori, and is, at the            
same time, under the obligation of presenting in general but                
sufficient tests, the conditions under which objects can be given in        
harmony with those conceptions; otherwise they would be mere logical        
forms, without content, and not pure conceptions of the understanding.      
  Our transcendental doctrine of the faculty of judgement will contain      
two chapters. The first will treat of the sensuous condition under          
which alone pure conceptions of the understanding can be employed-          
that is, of the schematism of the pure understanding. The second            
will treat of those synthetical judgements which are derived a              
priori from pure conceptions of the understanding under those               
conditions, and which lie a priori at the foundation of all other           
cognitions, that is to say, it will treat of the principles of the          
pure understanding.                                                         
                                                                            
BK_2|CH_1                                                                   
       TRANSCENDENTAL DOCTRINE OF THE FACULTY OF JUDGEMENT                  
                   OR, ANALYTIC OF PRINCIPLES.                              
-                                                                           
    CHAPTER I. Of the Schematism at of the Pure Conceptions                 
                    of the Understanding.                                   
-                                                                           
  In all subsumptions of an object under a conception, the                  
representation of the object must be homogeneous with the                   
conception; in other words, the conception must contain that which          
is represented in the object to be subsumed under it. For this is           
the meaning of the expression: "An object is contained under a              
conception." Thus the empirical conception of a plate is homogeneous        
with the pure geometrical conception of a circle, inasmuch as the           
roundness which is cogitated in the former is intuited in the latter.       
                                                    {BK_2|CH_1 ^paragraph 5}
  But pure conceptions of the understanding, when compared with             
empirical intuitions, or even with sensuous intuitions in general, are      
quite heterogeneous, and never can be discovered in any intuition. How      
then is the subsumption of the latter under the former, and                 
consequently the application of the categories to phenomena,                
possible?- For it is impossible to say, for example: "Causality can be      
intuited through the senses and is contained in the phenomenon."- This      
natural and important question forms the real cause of the necessity        
of a transcendental doctrine of the faculty of judgement, with the          
purpose, to wit, of showing how pure conceptions of the                     
understanding can be applied to phenomena. In all other sciences,           
where the conceptions by which the object is thought in the general         
are not so different and heterogeneous from those which represent           
the object in concreto- as it is given, it is quite unnecessary to          
institute any special inquiries concerning the application of the           
former to the latter.                                                       
  Now it is quite clear that there must be some third thing, which          
on the one side is homogeneous with the category, and with the              
phenomenon on the other, and so makes the application of the former to      
the latter possible. This mediating representation must be pure             
(without any empirical content), and yet must on the one side be            
intellectual, on the other sensuous. Such a representation is the           
transcendental schema.                                                      
  The conception of the understanding contains pure synthetical             
unity of the manifold in general. Time, as the formal condition of the      
manifold of the internal sense, consequently of the conjunction of all      
representations, contains a priori a manifold in the pure intuition.        
Now a transcendental determination of time is so far homogeneous            
with the category, which constitutes the unity thereof, that it is          
universal and rests upon a rule a priori. On the other hand, it is          
so far homogeneous with the phenomenon, inasmuch as time is                 
contained in every empirical representation of the manifold. Thus an        
application of the category to phenomena becomes possible, by means of      
the transcendental determination of time, which, as the schema of           
the conceptions of the understanding, mediates the subsumption of           
the latter under the former.                                                
  After what has been proved in our deduction of the categories, no         
one, it is to be hoped, can hesitate as to the proper decision of           
the question, whether the employment of these pure conceptions of           
the understanding ought to be merely empirical or also transcendental;      
in other words, whether the categories, as conditions of a possible         
experience, relate a priori solely to phenomena, or whether, as             
conditions of the possibility of things in general, their                   
application can be extended to objects as things in themselves. For we      
have there seen that conceptions are quite impossible, and utterly          
without signification, unless either to them, or at least to the            
elements of which they consist, an object be given; and that,               
consequently, they cannot possibly apply to objects as things in            
themselves without regard to the question whether and how these may be      
given to us; and, further, that the only manner in which objects can        
be given to us is by means of the modification of our sensibility;          
and, finally, that pure a priori conceptions, in addition to the            
function of the understanding in the category, must contain a priori        
formal conditions of sensibility (of the internal sense, namely),           
which again contain the general condition under which alone the             
category can be applied to any object. This formal and pure                 
condition of sensibility, to which the conception of the understanding      
is restricted in its employment, we shall name the schema of the            
conception of the understanding, and the procedure of the                   
understanding with these schemata we shall call the schematism of           
the pure understanding.                                                     
  The schema is, in itself, always a mere product of the                    
imagination. But, as the synthesis of imagination has for its aim no        
single intuition, but merely unity in the determination of                  
sensibility, the schema is clearly distinguishable from the image.          
Thus, if I place five points one after another.... this is an image of      
the number five. On the other hand, if I only think a number in             
general, which may be either five or a hundred, this thought is rather      
the representation of a method of representing in an image a sum            
(e.g., a thousand) in conformity with a conception, than the image          
itself, an image which I should find some little difficulty in              
reviewing, and comparing with the conception. Now this                      
representation of a general procedure of the imagination to present         
its image to a conception, I call the schema of this conception.            
                                                   {BK_2|CH_1 ^paragraph 10}
  In truth, it is not images of objects, but schemata, which lie at         
the foundation of our pure sensuous conceptions. No image could ever        
be adequate to our conception of a triangle in general. For the             
generalness of the conception it never could attain to, as this             
includes under itself all triangles, whether right-angled,                  
acute-angled, etc., whilst the image would always be limited to a           
single part of this sphere. The schema of the triangle can exist            
nowhere else than in thought, and it indicates a rule of the synthesis      
of the imagination in regard to pure figures in space. Still less is        
an object of experience, or an image of the object, ever to the             
empirical conception. On the contrary, the conception always relates        
immediately to the schema of the imagination, as a rule for the             
determination of our intuition, in conformity with a certain general        
conception. The conception of a dog indicates a rule, according to          
which my imagination can delineate the figure of a four-footed              
animal in general, without being limited to any particular                  
individual form which experience presents to me, or indeed to any           
possible image that I can represent to myself in concreto. This             
schematism of our understanding in regard to phenomena and their            
mere form, is an art, hidden in the depths of the human soul, whose         
true modes of action we shall only with difficulty discover and             
unveil. Thus much only can we say: "The image is a product of the           
empirical faculty of the productive imagination- the schema of              
sensuous conceptions (of figures in space, for example) is a                
product, and, as it were, a monogram of the pure imagination a priori,      
whereby and according to which images first become possible, which,         
however, can be connected with the conception only mediately by             
means of the schema which they indicate, and are in themselves never        
fully adequate to it." On the other hand, the schema of a pure              
conception of the understanding is something that cannot be reduced         
into any image- it is nothing else than the pure synthesis expressed        
by the category, conformably, to a rule of unity according to               
conceptions. It is a transcendental product of the imagination, a           
product which concerns the determination of the internal sense,             
according to conditions of its form (time) in respect to all                
representations, in so far as these representations must be                 
conjoined a priori in one conception, conformably to the unity of           
apperception.                                                               
  Without entering upon a dry and tedious analysis of the essential         
requisites of transcendental schemata of the pure conceptions of the        
understanding, we shall rather proceed at once to give an                   
explanation of them according to the order of the categories, and in        
connection therewith.                                                       
  For the external sense the pure image of all quantities                   
(quantorum) is space; the pure image of all objects of sense in             
general, is time. But the pure schema of quantity (quantitatis) as a        
conception of the understanding, is number, a representation which          
comprehends the successive addition of one to one (homogeneous              
quantities). Thus, number is nothing else than the unity of the             
synthesis of the manifold in a homogeneous intuition, by means of my        
generating time itself in my apprehension of the intuition.                 
  Reality, in the pure conception of the understanding, is that             
which corresponds to a sensation in general; that, consequently, the        
conception of which indicates a being (in time). Negation is that           
the conception of which represents a not-being (in time). The               
opposition of these two consists therefore in the difference of one         
and the same time, as a time filled or a time empty. Now as time is         
only the form of intuition, consequently of objects as phenomena, that      
which in objects corresponds to sensation is the transcendental matter      
of all objects as things in themselves (Sachheit, reality). Now             
every sensation has a degree or quantity by which it can fill time,         
that is to say, the internal sense in respect of the representation of      
an object, more or less, until it vanishes into nothing (= 0 =              
negatio). Thus there is a relation and connection between reality           
and negation, or rather a transition from the former to the latter,         
which makes every reality representable to us as a quantum; and the         
schema of a reality as the quantity of something in so far as it fills      
time, is exactly this continuous and uniform generation of the reality      
in time, as we descend in time from the sensation which has a               
certain degree, down to the vanishing thereof, or gradually ascend          
from negation to the quantity thereof.                                      
  The schema of substance is the permanence of the real in time;            
that is, the representation of it as a substratum of the empirical          
determination of time; a substratum which therefore remains, whilst         
all else changes. (Time passes not, but in it passes the existence          
of the changeable. To time, therefore, which is itself unchangeable         
and permanent, corresponds that which in the phenomenon is                  
unchangeable in existence, that is, substance, and it is only by it         
that the succession and coexistence of phenomena can be determined          
in regard to time.)                                                         
                                                   {BK_2|CH_1 ^paragraph 15}
  The schema of cause and of the causality of a thing is the real           
which, when posited, is always followed by something else. It               
consists, therefore, in the succession of the manifold, in so far as        
that succession is subjected to a rule.                                     
  The schema of community (reciprocity of action and reaction), or the      
reciprocal causality of substances in respect of their accidents, is        
the coexistence of the determinations of the one with those of the          
other, according to a general rule.                                         
  The schema of possibility is the accordance of the synthesis of           
different representations with the conditions of time in general            
(as, for example, opposites cannot exist together at the same time          
in the same thing, but only after each other), and is therefore the         
determination of the representation of a thing at any time.                 
  The schema of reality is existence in a determined time.                  
  The schema of necessity is the existence of an object in all time.        
                                                   {BK_2|CH_1 ^paragraph 20}
  It is clear, from all this, that the schema of the category of            
quantity contains and represents the generation (synthesis) of time         
itself, in the successive apprehension of an object; the schema of          
quality the synthesis of sensation with the representation of time, or      
the filling up of time; the schema of relation the relation of              
perceptions to each other in all time (that is, according to a rule of      
the determination of time): and finally, the schema of modality and         
its categories, time itself, as the correlative of the determination        
of an object- whether it does belong to time, and how. The schemata,        
therefore, are nothing but a priori determinations of time according        
to rules, and these, in regard to all possible objects, following           
the arrangement of the categories, relate to the series in time, the        
content in time, the order in time, and finally, to the complex or          
totality in time.                                                           
  Hence it is apparent that the schematism of the understanding, by         
means of the transcendental synthesis of the imagination, amounts to        
nothing else than the unity of the manifold of intuition in the             
internal sense, and thus indirectly to the unity of apperception, as a      
function corresponding to the internal sense (a receptivity). Thus,         
the schemata of the pure conceptions of the understanding are the true      
and only conditions whereby our understanding receives an                   
application to objects, and consequently significance. Finally,             
therefore, the categories are only capable of empirical use,                
inasmuch as they serve merely to subject phenomena to the universal         
rules of synthesis, by means of an a priori necessary unity (on             
account of the necessary union of all consciousness in one original         
apperception); and so to render them susceptible of a complete              
connection in one experience. But within this whole of possible             
experience lie all our cognitions, and in the universal relation to         
this experience consists transcendental truth, which antecedes all          
empirical truth, and renders the latter possible.                           
  It is, however, evident at first sight, that although the schemata        
of sensibility are the sole agents in realizing the categories, they        
do, nevertheless, also restrict them, that is, they limit the               
categories by conditions which lie beyond the sphere of understanding-      
namely, in sensibility. Hence the schema is properly only the               
phenomenon, or the sensuous conception of an object in harmony with         
the category. (Numerus est quantitas phaenomenon- sensatio realitas         
phaenomenon; constans et perdurabile rerum substantia phaenomenon-          
aeternitas, necessitas, phaenomena, etc.) Now, if we remove a               
restrictive condition, we thereby amplify, it appears, the formerly         
limited conception. In this way, the categories in their pure               
signification, free from all conditions of sensibility, ought to be         
valid of things as they are, and not, as the schemata represent             
them, merely as they appear; and consequently the categories must have      
a significance far more extended, and wholly independent of all             
schemata. In truth, there does always remain to the pure conceptions        
of the understanding, after abstracting every sensuous condition, a         
value and significance, which is, however, merely logical. But in this      
case, no object is given them, and therefore they have no meaning           
sufficient to afford us a conception of an object. The notion of            
substance, for example, if we leave out the sensuous determination          
of permanence, would mean nothing more than a something which can be        
cogitated as subject, without the possibility of becoming a                 
predicate to anything else. Of this representation I can make nothing,      
inasmuch as it does not indicate to me what determinations the thing        
possesses which must thus be valid as premier subject. Consequently,        
the categories, without schemata are merely functions of the                
understanding for the production of conceptions, but do not                 
represent any object. This significance they derive from                    
sensibility, which at the same time realizes the understanding and          
restricts it.                                                               
                                                                            
BK_2|CH_2                                                                   
   CHAPTER II. System of all Principles of the Pure Understanding.          
-                                                                           
  In the foregoing chapter we have merely considered the general            
conditions under which alone the transcendental faculty of judgement        
is justified in using the pure conceptions of the understanding for         
synthetical judgements. Our duty at present is to exhibit in                
systematic connection those judgements which the understanding              
really produces a priori. For this purpose, our table of the                
categories will certainly afford us the natural and safe guidance. For      
it is precisely the categories whose application to possible                
experience must constitute all pure a priori cognition of the               
understanding; and the relation of which to sensibility will, on            
that very account, present us with a complete and systematic catalogue      
of all the transcendental principles of the use of the understanding.       
  Principles a priori are so called, not merely because they contain        
in themselves the grounds of other judgements, but also because they        
themselves are not grounded in higher and more general cognitions.          
This peculiarity, however, does not raise them altogether above the         
need of a proof. For although there could be found no higher                
cognition, and therefore no objective proof, and although such a            
principle rather serves as the foundation for all cognition of the          
object, this by no means hinders us from drawing a proof from the           
subjective sources of the possibility of the cognition of an object.        
Such a proof is necessary, moreover, because without it the                 
principle might be liable to the imputation of being a mere gratuitous      
assertion.                                                                  
  In the second place, we shall limit our investigations to those           
principles which relate to the categories. For as to the principles of      
transcendental aesthetic, according to which space and time are the         
conditions of the possibility of things as phenomena, as also the           
restriction of these principles, namely, that they cannot be applied        
to objects as things in themselves- these, of course, do not fall           
within the scope of our present inquiry. In like manner, the                
principles of mathematical science form no part of this system,             
because they are all drawn from intuition, and not from the pure            
conception of the understanding. The possibility of these                   
principles, however, will necessarily be considered here, inasmuch          
as they are synthetical judgements a priori, not indeed for the             
purpose of proving their accuracy and apodeictic certainty, which is        
unnecessary, but merely to render conceivable and deduce the                
possibility of such evident a priori cognitions.                            
  But we shall have also to speak of the principle of analytical            
judgements, in opposition to synthetical judgements, which is the           
proper subject of our inquiries, because this very opposition will          
free the theory of the latter from all ambiguity, and place it clearly      
before our eyes in its true nature.                                         
-                                                                           
                                                    {BK_2|CH_2 ^paragraph 5}
        SYSTEM OF THE PRINCIPLES OF THE PURE UNDERSTANDING.                 
-                                                                           
  SECTION I. Of the Supreme Principle of all Analytical Judgements.         
-                                                                           
  Whatever may be the content of our cognition, and in whatever manner      
our cognition may be related to its object, the universal, although         
only negative conditions of all our judgements is that they do not          
contradict themselves; otherwise these judgements are in themselves         
(even without respect to the object) nothing. But although there may        
exist no contradiction in our judgement, it may nevertheless connect        
conceptions in such a manner that they do not correspond to the             
object, or without any grounds either a priori or a posteriori for          
arriving at such a judgement, and thus, without being                       
self-contradictory, a judgement may nevertheless be either false or         
groundless.                                                                 
                                                   {BK_2|CH_2 ^paragraph 10}
  Now, the proposition: "No subject can have a predicate that               
contradicts it," is called the principle of contradiction, and is a         
universal but purely negative criterion of all truth. But it belongs        
to logic alone, because it is valid of cognitions, merely as                
cognitions and without respect to their content, and declares that the      
contradiction entirely nullifies them. We can also, however, make a         
positive use of this principle, that is, not merely to banish               
falsehood and error (in so far as it rests upon contradiction), but         
also for the cognition of truth. For if the judgement is analytical,        
be it affirmative or negative, its truth must always be recognizable        
by means of the principle of contradiction. For the contrary of that        
which lies and is cogitated as conception in the cognition of the           
object will be always properly negatived, but the conception itself         
must always be affirmed of the object, inasmuch as the contrary             
thereof would be in contradiction to the object.                            
  We must therefore hold the principle of contradiction to be the           
universal and fully sufficient Principle of all analytical                  
cognition. But as a sufficient criterion of truth, it has no further        
utility or authority. For the fact that no cognition can be at              
variance with this principle without nullifying itself, constitutes         
this principle the sine qua non, but not the determining ground of the      
truth of our cognition. As our business at present is properly with         
the synthetical part of our knowledge only, we shall always be on           
our guard not to transgress this inviolable principle; but at the same      
time not to expect from it any direct assistance in the                     
establishment of the truth of any synthetical proposition.                  
  There exists, however, a formula of this celebrated principle- a          
principle merely formal and entirely without content- which contains a      
synthesis that has been inadvertently and quite unnecessarily mixed up      
with it. It is this: "It is impossible for a thing to be and not to be      
at the same time." Not to mention the superfluousness of the                
addition of the word impossible to indicate the apodeictic                  
certainty, which ought to be self-evident from the proposition itself,      
the proposition is affected by the condition of time, and as it were        
says: "A thing = A, which is something = B, cannot at the same time be      
non-B." But both, B as well as non-B, may quite well exist in               
succession. For example, a man who is young cannot at the same time be      
old; but the same man can very well be at one time young, and at            
another not young, that is, old. Now the principle of contradiction as      
a merely logical proposition must not by any means limit its                
application merely to relations of time, and consequently a formula         
like the preceding is quite foreign to its true purpose. The                
misunderstanding arises in this way. We first of all separate a             
predicate of a thing from the conception of the thing, and                  
afterwards connect with this predicate its opposite, and hence do           
not establish any contradiction with the subject, but only with its         
predicate, which has been conjoined with the subject synthetically-         
a contradiction, moreover, which obtains only when the first and            
second predicate are affirmed in the same time. If I say: "A man who        
is ignorant is not learned," the condition "at the same time" must          
be added, for he who is at one time ignorant, may at another be             
learned. But if I say: "No ignorant man is a learned man," the              
proposition is analytical, because the characteristic ignorance is now      
a constituent part of the conception of the subject; and in this            
case the negative proposition is evident immediately from the               
proposition of contradiction, without the necessity of adding the           
condition "the same time." This is the reason why I have altered the        
formula of this principle- an alteration which shows very clearly           
the nature of an analytical proposition.                                    
-                                                                           
  SECTION II. Of the Supreme Principle of all Synthetical Judgements.       
                                                   {BK_2|CH_2 ^paragraph 15}
-                                                                           
  The explanation of the possibility of synthetical judgements is a         
task with which general logic has nothing to do; indeed she needs           
not even be acquainted with its name. But in transcendental logic it        
is the most important matter to be dealt with- indeed the only one, if      
the question is of the possibility of synthetical judgements a priori,      
the conditions and extent of their validity. For when this question is      
fully decided, it can reach its aim with perfect ease, the                  
determination, to wit, of the extent and limits of the pure                 
understanding.                                                              
  In an analytical judgement I do not go beyond the given                   
conception, in order to arrive at some decision respecting it. If           
the judgement is affirmative, I predicate of the conception only            
that which was already cogitated in it; if negative, I merely               
exclude from the conception its contrary. But in synthetical                
judgements, I must go beyond the given conception, in order to              
cogitate, in relation with it, something quite different from that          
which was cogitated in it, a relation which is consequently never           
one either of identity or contradiction, and by means of which the          
truth or error of the judgement cannot be discerned merely from the         
judgement itself.                                                           
  Granted, then, that we must go out beyond a given conception, in          
order to compare it synthetically with another, a third thing is            
necessary, in which alone the synthesis of two conceptions can              
originate. Now what is this tertium quid that is to be the medium of        
all synthetical judgements? It is only a complex in which all our           
representations are contained, the internal sense to wit, and its form      
a priori, time.                                                             
  The synthesis of our representations rests upon the imagination;          
their synthetical unity (which is requisite to a judgement), upon           
the unity of apperception. In this, therefore, is to be sought the          
possibility of synthetical judgements, and as all three contain the         
sources of a priori representations, the possibility of pure                
synthetical judgements also; nay, they are necessary upon these             
grounds, if we are to possess a knowledge of objects, which rests           
solely upon the synthesis of representations.                               
                                                   {BK_2|CH_2 ^paragraph 20}
  If a cognition is to have objective reality, that is, to relate to        
an object, and possess sense and meaning in respect to it, it is            
necessary that the object be given in some way or another. Without          
this, our conceptions are empty, and we may indeed have thought by          
means of them, but by such thinking we have not, in fact, cognized          
anything, we have merely played with representation. To give an             
object, if this expression be understood in the sense of "to                
present" the object, not mediately but immediately in intuition, means      
nothing else than to apply the representation of it to experience,          
be that experience real or only possible. Space and time themselves,        
pure as these conceptions are from all that is empirical, and               
certain as it is that they are represented fully a priori in the mind,      
would be completely without objective validity, and without sense           
and significance, if their necessary use in the objects of                  
experience were not shown. Nay, the representation of them is a mere        
schema, that always relates to the reproductive imagination, which          
calls up the objects of experience, without which they have no              
meaning. And so it is with all conceptions without distinction.             
  The possibility of experience is, then, that which gives objective        
reality to all our a priori cognitions. Now experience depends upon         
the synthetical unity of phenomena, that is, upon a synthesis               
according to conceptions of the object of phenomena in general, a           
synthesis without which experience never could become knowledge, but        
would be merely a rhapsody of perceptions, never fitting together into      
any connected text, according to rules of a thoroughly united               
(possible) consciousness, and therefore never subjected to the              
transcendental and necessary unity of apperception. Experience has          
therefore for a foundation, a priori principles of its form, that is        
to say, general rules of unity in the synthesis of phenomena, the           
objective reality of which rules, as necessary conditions even of           
the possibility of experience can which rules, as necessary                 
conditions- even of the possibility of experience- can always be shown      
in experience. But apart from this relation, a priori synthetical           
propositions are absolutely impossible, because they have no third          
term, that is, no pure object, in which the synthetical unity can           
exhibit the objective reality of its conceptions.                           
  Although, then, respecting space, or the forms which productive           
imagination describes therein, we do cognize much a priori in               
synthetical judgements, and are really in no need of experience for         
this purpose, such knowledge would nevertheless amount to nothing           
but a busy trifling with a mere chimera, were not space to be               
considered as the condition of the phenomena which constitute the           
material of external experience. Hence those pure synthetical               
judgements do relate, though but mediately, to possible experience, or      
rather to the possibility of experience, and upon that alone is             
founded the objective validity of their synthesis.                          
  While then, on the one hand, experience, as empirical synthesis,          
is the only possible mode of cognition which gives reality to all           
other synthesis; on the other hand, this latter synthesis, as               
cognition a priori, possesses truth, that is, accordance with its           
object, only in so far as it contains nothing more than what is             
necessary to the synthetical unity of experience.                           
  Accordingly, the supreme principle of all synthetical judgements is:      
"Every object is subject to the necessary conditions of the                 
synthetical unity of the manifold of intuition in a possible                
experience."                                                                
                                                   {BK_2|CH_2 ^paragraph 25}
  A priori synthetical judgements are possible when we apply the            
formal conditions of the a priori intuition, the synthesis of the           
imagination, and the necessary unity of that synthesis in a                 
transcendental apperception, to a possible cognition of experience,         
and say: "The conditions of the possibility of experience in general        
are at the same time conditions of the possibility of the objects of        
experience, and have, for that reason, objective validity in an a           
priori synthetical judgement."                                              
-                                                                           
     SECTION III. Systematic Representation of all Synthetical              
             Principles of the Pure Understanding.                          
-                                                                           
                                                   {BK_2|CH_2 ^paragraph 30}
  That principles exist at all is to be ascribed solely to the pure         
understanding, which is not only the faculty of rules in regard to          
that which happens, but is even the source of principles according          
to which everything that can be presented to us as an object is             
necessarily subject to rules, because without such rules we never           
could attain to cognition of an object. Even the laws of nature, if         
they are contemplated as principles of the empirical use of the             
understanding, possess also a characteristic of necessity, and we           
may therefore at least expect them to be determined upon grounds which      
are valid a priori and antecedent to all experience. But all laws of        
nature, without distinction, are subject to higher principles of the        
understanding, inasmuch as the former are merely applications of the        
latter to particular cases of experience. These higher principles           
alone therefore give the conception, which contains the necessary           
condition, and, as it were, the exponent of a rule; experience, on the      
other hand, gives the case which comes under the rule.                      
  There is no danger of our mistaking merely empirical principles           
for principles of the pure understanding, or conversely; for the            
character of necessity, according to conceptions which distinguish the      
latter, and the absence of this in every empirical proposition, how         
extensively valid soever it may be, is a perfect safeguard against          
confounding them. There are, however, pure principles a priori,             
which nevertheless I should not ascribe to the pure understanding- for      
this reason, that they are not derived from pure conceptions, but           
(although by the mediation of the understanding) from pure intuitions.      
But understanding is the faculty of conceptions. Such principles            
mathematical science possesses, but their application to experience,        
consequently their objective validity, nay the possibility of such a        
priori synthetical cognitions (the deduction thereof) rests entirely        
upon the pure understanding.                                                
  On this account, I shall not reckon among my principles those of          
mathematics; though I shall include those upon the possibility and          
objective validity a priori, of principles of the mathematical              
science, which, consequently, are to be looked upon as the principle        
of these, and which proceed from conceptions to intuition, and not          
from intuition to conceptions.                                              
  In the application of the pure conceptions of the understanding to        
possible experience, the employment of their synthesis is either            
mathematical or dynamical, for it is directed partly on the                 
intuition alone, partly on the existence of a phenomenon. But the a         
priori conditions of intuition are in relation to a possible                
experience absolutely necessary, those of the existence of objects          
of a possible empirical intuition are in themselves contingent.             
Hence the principles of the mathematical use of the categories will         
possess a character of absolute necessity, that is, will be                 
apodeictic; those, on the other hand, of the dynamical use, the             
character of an a priori necessity indeed, but only under the               
condition of empirical thought in an experience, therefore only             
mediately and indirectly. Consequently they will not possess that           
immediate evidence which is peculiar to the former, although their          
application to experience does not, for that reason, lose its truth         
and certitude. But of this point we shall be better able to judge at        
the conclusion of this system of principles.                                
  The table of the categories is naturally our guide to the table of        
principles, because these are nothing else than rules for the               
objective employment of the former. Accordingly, all principles of the      
pure understanding are:                                                     
                                                   {BK_2|CH_2 ^paragraph 35}
-                                                                           
                                1                                           
                              Axioms                                        
                           of Intuition                                     
-                                                                           
                                                   {BK_2|CH_2 ^paragraph 40}
               2                                    3                       
          Anticipations                          Analogies                  
          of Perception                        of Experience                
                                                                            
                                4                                           
                          Postulates of                                     
                                                   {BK_2|CH_2 ^paragraph 45}
                        Empirical Thought                                   
                           in general                                       
-                                                                           
  These appellations I have chosen advisedly, in order that we might        
not lose sight of the distinctions in respect of the evidence and           
the employment of these principles. It will, however, soon appear           
that- a fact which concerns both the evidence of these principles, and      
the a priori determination of phenomena- according to the categories        
of quantity and quality (if we attend merely to the form of these),         
the principles of these categories are distinguishable from those of        
the two others, in as much as the former are possessed of an                
intuitive, but the latter of a merely discursive, though in both            
instances a complete, certitude. I shall therefore call the former          
mathematical, and the latter dynamical principles.* It must be              
observed, however, that by these terms I mean just as little in the         
one case the principles of mathematics as those of general                  
(physical) dynamics in the other. I have here in view merely the            
principles of the pure understanding, in their application to the           
internal sense (without distinction of the representations given            
therein), by means of which the sciences of mathematics and dynamics        
become possible. Accordingly, I have named these principles rather          
with reference to their application than their content; and I shall         
now proceed to consider them in the order in which they stand in the        
table.                                                                      
-                                                                           
                                                   {BK_2|CH_2 ^paragraph 50}
  *All combination (conjunctio) is either composition (compositio)          
or connection (nexus). The former is the synthesis of a manifold,           
the parts of which do not necessarily belong to each other. For             
example, the two triangles into which a square is divided by a              
diagonal, do not necessarily belong to each other, and of this kind is      
the synthesis of the homogeneous in everything that can be                  
mathematically considered. This synthesis can be divided into those of      
aggregation and coalition, the former of which is applied to                
extensive, the latter to intensive quantities. The second sort of           
combination (nexus) is the synthesis of a manifold, in so far as its        
parts do belong necessarily to each other; for example, the accident        
to a substance, or the effect to the cause. Consequently it is a            
synthesis of that which though heterogeneous, is represented as             
connected a priori. This combination- not an arbitrary one- I               
entitle dynamical because it concerns the connection of the                 
existence of the manifold. This, again, may be divided into the             
physical synthesis, of the phenomena divided among each other, and the      
metaphysical synthesis, or the connection of phenomena a priori in the      
faculty of cognition.                                                       
-                                                                           
                 1. AXIOMS OF INTUITION.                                    
     The principle of these is: All Intuitions are Extensive                
                      Quantities.                                           
                                                   {BK_2|CH_2 ^paragraph 55}
-                                                                           
                         PROOF.                                             
-                                                                           
  All phenomena contain, as regards their form, an intuition in             
space and time, which lies a priori at the foundation of all without        
exception. Phenomena, therefore, cannot be apprehended, that is,            
received into empirical consciousness otherwise than through the            
synthesis of a manifold, through which the representations of a             
determinate space or time are generated; that is to say, through the        
composition of the homogeneous and the consciousness of the                 
synthetical unity of this manifold (homogeneous). Now the                   
consciousness of a homogeneous manifold in intuition, in so far as          
thereby the representation of an object is rendered possible, is the        
conception of a quantity (quanti). Consequently, even the perception        
of an object as phenomenon is possible only through the same                
synthetical unity of the manifold of the given sensuous intuition,          
through which the unity of the composition of the homogeneous manifold      
in the conception of a quantity is cogitated; that is to say, all           
phenomena are quantities, and extensive quantities, because as              
intuitions in space or time they must be represented by means of the        
same synthesis through which space and time themselves are determined.      
  An extensive quantity I call that wherein the representation of           
the parts renders possible (and therefore necessarily antecedes) the        
representation of the whole. I cannot represent to myself any line,         
however small, without drawing it in thought, that is, without              
generating from a point all its parts one after another, and in this        
way alone producing this intuition. Precisely the same is the case          
with every, even the smallest, portion of time. I cogitate therein          
only the successive progress from one moment to another, and hence, by      
means of the different portions of time and the addition of them, a         
determinate quantity of time is produced. As the pure intuition in all      
phenomena is either time or space, so is every phenomenon in its            
character of intuition an extensive quantity, inasmuch as it can            
only be cognized in our apprehension by successive synthesis (from          
part to part). All phenomena are, accordingly, to be considered as          
aggregates, that is, as a collection of previously given parts;             
which is not the case with every sort of quantities, but only with          
those which are represented and apprehended by us as extensive.             
                                                   {BK_2|CH_2 ^paragraph 60}
  On this successive synthesis of the productive imagination, in the        
generation of figures, is founded the mathematics of extension, or          
geometry, with its axioms, which express the conditions of sensuous         
intuition a priori, under which alone the schema of a pure                  
conception of external intuition can exist; for example, "be tween two      
points only one straight line is possible," "two straight lines cannot      
enclose a space," etc. These are the axioms which properly relate only      
to quantities (quanta) as such.                                             
  But, as regards the quantity of a thing (quantitas), that is to say,      
the answer to the question: "How large is this or that object?"             
although, in respect to this question, we have various propositions         
synthetical and immediately certain (indemonstrabilia); we have, in         
the proper sense of the term, no axioms. For example, the                   
propositions: "If equals be added to equals, the wholes are equal";         
"If equals be taken from equals, the remainders are equal"; are             
analytical, because I am immediately conscious of the identity of           
the production of the one quantity with the production of the other;        
whereas axioms must be a priori synthetical propositions. On the other      
hand, the self-evident propositions as to the relation of numbers, are      
certainly synthetical but not universal, like those of geometry, and        
for this reason cannot be called axioms, but numerical formulae.            
That 7 + 5 = 12 is not an analytical proposition. For neither in the        
representation of seven, nor of five, nor of the composition of the         
two numbers, do I cogitate the number twelve. (Whether I cogitate           
the number in the addition of both, is not at present the question;         
for in the case of an analytical proposition, the only point is             
whether I really cogitate the predicate in the representation of the        
subject.) But although the proposition is synthetical, it is                
nevertheless only a singular proposition. In so far as regard is            
here had merely to the synthesis of the homogeneous (the units), it         
cannot take place except in one manner, although our use of these           
numbers is afterwards general. If I say: "A triangle can be                 
constructed with three lines, any two of which taken together are           
greater than the third," I exercise merely the pure function of the         
productive imagination, which may draw the lines longer or shorter and      
construct the angles at its pleasure. On the contrary, the number           
seven is possible only in one manner, and so is likewise the number         
twelve, which results from the synthesis of seven and five. Such            
propositions, then, cannot be termed axioms (for in that case we            
should have an infinity of these), but numerical formulae.                  
  This transcendental principle of the mathematics of phenomena             
greatly enlarges our a priori cognition. For it is by this principle        
alone that pure mathematics is rendered applicable in all its               
precision to objects of experience, and without it the validity of          
this application would not be so self-evident; on the contrary,             
contradictions and confusions have often arisen on this very point.         
Phenomena are not things in themselves. Empirical intuition is              
possible only through pure intuition (of space and time);                   
consequently, what geometry affirms of the latter, is indisputably          
valid of the former. All evasions, such as the statement that               
objects of sense do not conform to the rules of construction in             
space (for example, to the rule of the infinite divisibility of             
lines or angles), must fall to the ground. For, if these objections         
hold good, we deny to space, and with it to all mathematics, objective      
validity, and no longer know wherefore, and how far, mathematics can        
be applied to phenomena. The synthesis of spaces and times as the           
essential form of all intuition, is that which renders possible the         
apprehension of a phenomenon, and therefore every external experience,      
consequently all cognition of the objects of experience; and                
whatever mathematics in its pure use proves of the former, must             
necessarily hold good of the latter. All objections are but the             
chicaneries of an ill-instructed reason, which erroneously thinks to        
liberate the objects of sense from the formal conditions of our             
sensibility, and represents these, although mere phenomena, as              
things in themselves, presented as such to our understanding. But in        
this case, no a priori synthetical cognition of them could be               
possible, consequently not through pure conceptions of space and the        
science which determines these conceptions, that is to say,                 
geometry, would itself be impossible.                                       
-                                                                           
                2. ANTICIPATIONS OF PERCEPTION.                             
                                                   {BK_2|CH_2 ^paragraph 65}
-                                                                           
    The principle of these is: In all phenomena the Real, that              
      which is an object of sensation, has Intensive Quantity,              
                  that is, has a Degree.                                    
-                                                                           
                                                   {BK_2|CH_2 ^paragraph 70}
                         PROOF.                                             
-                                                                           
  Perception is empirical consciousness, that is to say, a                  
consciousness which contains an element of sensation. Phenomena as          
objects of perception are not pure, that is, merely formal intuitions,      
like space and time, for they cannot be perceived in themselves.            
They contain, then, over and above the intuition, the materials for an      
object (through which is represented something existing in space or         
time), that is to say, they contain the real of sensation, as a             
representation merely subjective, which gives us merely the                 
consciousness that the subject is affected, and which we refer to some      
external object. Now, a gradual transition from empirical                   
consciousness to pure consciousness is possible, inasmuch as the            
real in this consciousness entirely vanishes, and there remains a           
merely formal consciousness (a priori) of the manifold in time and          
space; consequently there is possible a synthesis also of the               
production of the quantity of a sensation from its commencement,            
that is, from the pure intuition = 0 onwards up to a certain                
quantity of the sensation. Now as sensation in itself is not an             
objective representation, and in it is to be found neither the              
intuition of space nor of time, it cannot possess any extensive             
quantity, and yet there does belong to it a quantity (and that by           
means of its apprehension, in which empirical consciousness can within      
a certain time rise from nothing = 0 up to its given amount),               
consequently an intensive quantity. And thus we must ascribe intensive      
quantity, that is, a degree of influence on sense to all objects of         
perception, in so far as this perception contains sensation.                
  All cognition, by means of which I am enabled to cognize and              
determine a priori what belongs to empirical cognition, may be              
called an anticipation; and without doubt this is the sense in which        
Epicurus employed his expression prholepsis. But as there is in             
phenomena something which is never cognized a priori, which on this         
account constitutes the proper difference between pure and empirical        
cognition, that is to say, sensation (as the matter of perception), it      
follows, that sensation is just that element in cognition which cannot      
be at all anticipated. On the other hand, we might very well term           
the pure determinations in space and time, as well in regard to figure      
as to quantity, anticipations of phenomena, because they represent a        
priori that which may always be given a posteriori in experience.           
But suppose that in every sensation, as sensation in general,               
without any particular sensation being thought of, there existed            
something which could be cognized a priori, this would deserve to be        
called anticipation in a special sense- special, because it may seem        
surprising to forestall experience, in that which concerns the              
matter of experience, and which we can only derive from itself. Yet         
such really is the case here.                                               
  Apprehension, by means of sensation alone, fills only one moment,         
that is, if I do not take into consideration a succession of many           
sensations. As that in the phenomenon, the apprehension of which is         
not a successive synthesis advancing from parts to an entire                
representation, sensation has therefore no extensive quantity; the          
want of sensation in a moment of time would represent it as empty,          
consequently = O. That which in the empirical intuition corresponds to      
sensation is reality (realitas phaenomenon); that which corresponds to      
the absence of it, negation = O. Now every sensation is capable of a        
diminution, so that it can decrease, and thus gradually disappear.          
Therefore, between reality in a phenomenon and negation, there              
exists a continuous concatenation of many possible intermediate             
sensations, the difference of which from each other is always               
smaller than that between the given sensation and zero, or complete         
negation. That is to say, the real in a phenomenon has always a             
quantity, which however is not discoverable in apprehension,                
inasmuch as apprehension take place by means of mere sensation in           
one instant, and not by the successive synthesis of many sensations,        
and therefore does not progress from parts to the whole. Consequently,      
it has a quantity, but not an extensive quantity.                           
                                                   {BK_2|CH_2 ^paragraph 75}
  Now that quantity which is apprehended only as unity, and in which        
plurality can be represented only by approximation to negation = O,         
I term intensive quantity. Consequently, reality in a phenomenon has        
intensive quantity, that is, a degree. if we consider this reality          
as cause (be it of sensation or of another reality in the                   
phenomenon, for example, a change), we call the degree of reality in        
its character of cause a momentum, for example, the momentum of             
weight; and for this reason, that the degree only indicates that            
quantity the apprehension of which is not successive, but                   
instantaneous. This, however, I touch upon only in passing, for with        
causality I have at present nothing to do.                                  
  Accordingly, every sensation, consequently every reality in               
phenomena, however small it may be, has a degree, that is, an               
intensive quantity, which may always be lessened, and between               
reality and negation there exists a continuous connection of                
possible realities, and possible smaller perceptions. Every colour-         
for example, red- has a degree, which, be it ever so small, is never        
the smallest, and so is it always with heat, the momentum of weight,        
etc.                                                                        
  This property of quantities, according to which no part of them is        
the smallest possible (no part simple), is called their continuity.         
Space and time are quanta continua, because no part of them can be          
given, without enclosing it within boundaries (points and moments),         
consequently, this given part is itself a space or a time. Space,           
therefore, consists only of spaces, and time of times. Points and           
moments are only boundaries, that is, the mere places or positions          
of their limitation. But places always presuppose intuitions which are      
to limit or determine them; and we cannot conceive either space or          
time composed of constituent parts which are given before space or          
time. Such quantities may also be called flowing, because synthesis         
(of the productive imagination) in the production of these                  
quantities is a progression in time, the continuity of which we are         
accustomed to indicate by the expression flowing.                           
  All phenomena, then, are continuous quantities, in respect both to        
intuition and mere perception (sensation, and with it reality). In the      
former case they are extensive quantities; in the latter, intensive.        
When the synthesis of the manifold of a phenomenon is interrupted,          
there results merely an aggregate of several phenomena, and not             
properly a phenomenon as a quantity, which is not produced by the mere      
continuation of the productive synthesis of a certain kind, but by the      
repetition of a synthesis always ceasing. For example, if I call            
thirteen dollars a sum or quantity of money, I employ the term quite        
correctly, inasmuch as I understand by thirteen dollars the value of a      
mark in standard silver, which is, to be sure, a continuous                 
quantity, in which no part is the smallest, but every part might            
constitute a piece of money, which would contain material for still         
smaller pieces. If, however, by the words thirteen dollars I                
understand so many coins (be their value in silver what it may), it         
would be quite erroneous to use the expression a quantity of                
dollars; on the contrary, I must call them aggregate, that is, a            
number of coins. And as in every number we must have unity as the           
foundation, so a phenomenon taken as unity is a quantity, and as            
such always a continuous quantity (quantum continuum).                      
  Now, seeing all phenomena, whether considered as extensive or             
intensive, are continuous quantities, the proposition: "All change          
(transition of a thing from one state into another) is continuous,"         
might be proved here easily, and with mathematical evidence, were it        
not that the causality of a change lies, entirely beyond the bounds of      
a transcendental philosophy, and presupposes empirical principles. For      
of the possibility of a cause which changes the condition of things,        
that is, which determines them to the contrary to a certain given           
state, the understanding gives us a priori no knowledge; not merely         
because it has no insight into the possibility of it (for such insight      
is absent in several a priori cognitions), but because the notion of        
change concerns only certain determinations of phenomena, which             
experience alone can acquaint us with, while their cause lies in the        
unchangeable. But seeing that we have nothing which we could here           
employ but the pure fundamental conceptions of all possible                 
experience, among which of course nothing empirical can be admitted,        
we dare not, without injuring the unity of our system, anticipate           
general physical science, which is built upon certain fundamental           
experiences.                                                                
                                                   {BK_2|CH_2 ^paragraph 80}
  Nevertheless, we are in no want of proofs of the great influence          
which the principle above developed exercises in the anticipation of        
perceptions, and even in supplying the want of them, so far as to           
shield us against the false conclusions which otherwise we might            
rashly draw.                                                                
  If all reality in perception has a degree, between which and              
negation there is an endless sequence of ever smaller degrees, and if,      
nevertheless, every sense must have a determinate degree of                 
receptivity for sensations; no perception, and consequently no              
experience is possible, which can prove, either immediately or              
mediately, an entire absence of all reality in a phenomenon; in             
other words, it is impossible ever to draw from experience a proof          
of the existence of empty space or of empty time. For in the first          
place, an entire absence of reality in a sensuous intuition cannot          
of course be an object of perception; secondly, such absence cannot be      
deduced from the contemplation of any single phenomenon, and the            
difference of the degrees in its reality; nor ought it ever to be           
admitted in explanation of any phenomenon. For if even the complete         
intuition of a determinate space or time is thoroughly real, that           
is, if no part thereof is empty, yet because every reality has its          
degree, which, with the extensive quantity of the phenomenon                
unchanged, can diminish through endless gradations down to nothing          
(the void), there must be infinitely graduated degrees, with which          
space or time is filled, and the intensive quantity in different            
phenomena may be smaller or greater, although the extensive quantity        
of the intuition remains equal and unaltered.                               
  We shall give an example of this. Almost all natural philosophers,        
remarking a great difference in the quantity of the matter of               
different kinds in bodies with the same volume (partly on account of        
the momentum of gravity or weight, partly on account of the momentum        
of resistance to other bodies in motion), conclude unanimously that         
this volume (extensive quantity of the phenomenon) must be void in all      
bodies, although in different proportion. But who would suspect that        
these for the most part mathematical and mechanical inquirers into          
nature should ground this conclusion solely on a metaphysical               
hypothesis- a sort of hypothesis which they profess to disparage and        
avoid? Yet this they do, in assuming that the real in space (I must         
not here call it impenetrability or weight, because these are               
empirical conceptions) is always identical, and can only be                 
distinguished according to its extensive quantity, that is,                 
multiplicity. Now to this presupposition, for which they can have no        
ground in experience, and which consequently is merely metaphysical, I      
oppose a transcendental demonstration, which it is true will not            
explain the difference in the filling up of spaces, but which               
nevertheless completely does away with the supposed necessity of the        
above-mentioned presupposition that we cannot explain the said              
difference otherwise than by the hypothesis of empty spaces. This           
demonstration, moreover, has the merit of setting the understanding at      
liberty to conceive this distinction in a different manner, if the          
explanation of the fact requires any such hypothesis. For we                
perceive that although two equal spaces may be completely filled by         
matters altogether different, so that in neither of them is there left      
a single point wherein matter is not present, nevertheless, every           
reality has its degree (of resistance or of weight), which, without         
diminution of the extensive quantity, can become less and less ad           
infinitum, before it passes into nothingness and disappears. Thus an        
expansion which fills a space- for example, caloric, or any other           
reality in the phenomenal world- can decrease in its degrees to             
infinity, yet without leaving the smallest part of the space empty; on      
the contrary, filling it with those lesser degrees as completely as         
another phenomenon could with greater. My intention here is by no           
means to maintain that this is really the case with the difference          
of matters, in regard to their specific gravity; I wish only to prove,      
from a principle of the pure understanding, that the nature of our          
perceptions makes such a mode of explanation possible, and that it          
is erroneous to regard the real in a phenomenon as equal quoad its          
degree, and different only quoad its aggregation and extensive              
quantity, and this, too, on the pretended authority of an a priori          
principle of the understanding.                                             
  Nevertheless, this principle of the anticipation of perception            
must somewhat startle an inquirer whom initiation into                      
transcendental philosophy has rendered cautious. We must naturally          
entertain some doubt whether or not the understanding can enounce           
any such synthetical proposition as that respecting the degree of           
all reality in phenomena, and consequently the possibility of the           
internal difference of sensation itself- abstraction being made of its      
empirical quality. Thus it is a question not unworthy of solution:          
"How the understanding can pronounce synthetically and a priori             
respecting phenomena, and thus anticipate these, even in that which is      
peculiarly and merely empirical, that, namely, which concerns               
sensation itself?"                                                          
  The quality of sensation is in all cases merely empirical, and            
cannot be represented a priori (for example, colours, taste, etc.).         
But the real- that which corresponds to sensation- in opposition to         
negation = O, only represents something the conception of which in          
itself contains a being (ein seyn), and signifies nothing but the           
synthesis in an empirical consciousness. That is to say, the empirical      
consciousness in the internal sense can be raised from 0 to every           
higher degree, so that the very same extensive quantity of                  
intuition, an illuminated surface, for example, excites as great a          
sensation as an aggregate of many other surfaces less illuminated.          
We can therefore make complete abstraction of the extensive quantity        
of a phenomenon, and represent to ourselves in the mere sensation in a      
certain momentum, a synthesis of homogeneous ascension from 0 up to         
the given empirical consciousness, All sensations therefore as such         
are given only a posteriori, but this property thereof, namely, that        
they have a degree, can be known a priori. It is worthy of remark,          
that in respect to quantities in general, we can cognize a priori only      
a single quality, namely, continuity; but in respect to all quality         
(the real in phenomena), we cannot cognize a priori anything more than      
the intensive quantity thereof, namely, that they have a degree. All        
else is left to experience.                                                 
                                                   {BK_2|CH_2 ^paragraph 85}
-                                                                           
                  3. ANALOGIES OF EXPERIENCE.                               
-                                                                           
    The principle of these is: Experience is possible only                  
     through the representation of a necessary connection                   
                                                   {BK_2|CH_2 ^paragraph 90}
                      of Perceptions.                                       
-                                                                           
                           PROOF.                                           
-                                                                           
  Experience is an empirical cognition; that is to say, a cognition         
which determines an object by means of perceptions. It is therefore         
a synthesis of perceptions, a synthesis which is not itself                 
contained in perception, but which contains the synthetical unity of        
the manifold of perception in a consciousness; and this unity               
constitutes the essential of our cognition of objects of the senses,        
that is, of experience (not merely of intuition or sensation). Now          
in experience our perceptions come together contingently, so that no        
character of necessity in their connection appears, or can appear from      
the perceptions themselves, because apprehension is only a placing          
together of the manifold of empirical intuition, and no representation      
of a necessity in the connected existence of the phenomena which            
apprehension brings together, is to be discovered therein. But as           
experience is a cognition of objects by means of perceptions, it            
follows that the relation of the existence of the existence of the          
manifold must be represented in experience not as it is put together        
in time, but as it is objectively in time. And as time itself cannot        
be perceived, the determination of the existence of objects in time         
can only take place by means of their connection in time in general,        
consequently only by means of a priori connecting conceptions. Now          
as these conceptions always possess the character of necessity,             
experience is possible only by means of a representation of the             
necessary connection of perception.                                         
                                                   {BK_2|CH_2 ^paragraph 95}
  The three modi of time are permanence, succession, and                    
coexistence. Accordingly, there are three rules of all relations of         
time in phenomena, according to which the existence of every                
phenomenon is determined in respect of the unity of all time, and           
these antecede all experience and render it possible.                       
  The general principle of all three analogies rests on the                 
necessary unity of apperception in relation to all possible                 
empirical consciousness (perception) at every time, consequently, as        
this unity lies a priori at the foundation of all mental operations,        
the principle rests on the synthetical unity of all phenomena               
according to their relation in time. For the original apperception          
relates to our internal sense (the complex of all representations),         
and indeed relates a priori to its form, that is to say, the                
relation of the manifold empirical consciousness in time. Now this          
manifold must be combined in original apperception according to             
relations of time- a necessity imposed by the a priori                      
transcendental unity of apperception, to which is subjected all that        
can belong to my (i.e., my own) cognition, and therefore all that           
can become an object for me. This synthetical and a priori                  
determined unity in relation of perceptions in time is therefore the        
rule: "All empirical determinations of time must be subject to rules        
of the general determination of time"; and the analogies of                 
experience, of which we are now about to treat, must be rules of            
this nature.                                                                
  These principles have this peculiarity, that they do not concern          
phenomena, and the synthesis of the empirical intuition thereof, but        
merely the existence of phenomena and their relation to each other          
in regard to this existence. Now the mode in which we apprehend a           
thing in a phenomenon can be determined a priori in such a manner that      
the rule of its synthesis can give, that is to say, can produce this a      
priori intuition in every empirical example. But the existence of           
phenomena cannot be known a priori, and although we could arrive by         
this path at a conclusion of the fact of some existence, we could           
not cognize that existence determinately, that is to say, we should be      
incapable of anticipating in what respect the empirical intuition of        
it would be distinguishable from that of others.                            
  The two principles above mentioned, which I called mathematical,          
in consideration of the fact of their authorizing the application of        
mathematic phenomena, relate to these phenomena only in regard to           
their possibility, and instruct us how phenomena, as far as regards         
their intuition or the real in their perception, can be generated           
according to the rules of a mathematical synthesis. Consequently,           
numerical quantities, and with them the determination of a                  
phenomenon as a quantity, can be employed in the one case as well as        
in the other. Thus, for example, out of 200,000 illuminations by the        
moon, I might compose and give a priori, that is construct, the degree      
of our sensations of the sunlight. We may therefore entitle these           
two principles constitutive.                                                
  The case is very different with those principles whose province it        
is to subject the existence of phenomena to rules a priori. For as          
existence does not admit of being constructed, it is clear that they        
must only concern the relations of existence and be merely                  
regulative principles. In this case, therefore, neither axioms nor          
anticipations are to be thought of. Thus, if a perception is given us,      
in a certain relation of time to other (although undetermined)              
perceptions, we cannot then say a priori, what and how great (in            
quantity) the other perception necessarily connected with the former        
is, but only how it is connected, quoad its existence, in this given        
modus of time. Analogies in philosophy mean something very different        
from that which they represent in mathematics. In the latter they           
are formulae, which enounce the equality of two relations of quantity,      
and are always constitutive, so that if two terms of the proportion         
are given, the third is also given, that is, can be constructed by the      
aid of these formulae. But in philosophy, analogy is not the                
equality of two quantitative but of two qualitative relations. In this      
case, from three given terms, I can give a priori and cognize the           
relation to a fourth member, but not this fourth term itself, although      
I certainly possess a rule to guide me in the search for this fourth        
term in experience, and a mark to assist me in discovering it. An           
analogy of experience is therefore only a rule according to which           
unity of experience must arise out of perceptions in respect to             
objects (phenomena) not as a constitutive, but merely as a                  
regulative principle. The same holds good also of the postulates of         
empirical thought in general, which relate to the synthesis of mere         
intuition (which concerns the form of phenomena), the synthesis of          
perception (which concerns the matter of phenomena), and the synthesis      
of experience (which concerns the relation of these perceptions).           
For they are only regulative principles, and clearly distinguishable        
from the mathematical, which are constitutive, not indeed in regard to      
the certainty which both possess a priori, but in the mode of evidence      
thereof, consequently also in the manner of demonstration.                  
                                                  {BK_2|CH_2 ^paragraph 100}
  But what has been observed of all synthetical propositions, and must      
be particularly remarked in this place, is this, that these                 
analogies possess significance and validity, not as principles of           
the transcendental, but only as principles of the empirical use of the      
understanding, and their truth can therefore be proved only as such,        
and that consequently the phenomena must not be subjoined directly          
under the categories, but only under their schemata. For if the             
objects to which those principles must be applied were things in            
themselves, it would be quite impossible to cognize aught concerning        
them synthetically a priori. But they are nothing but phenomena; a          
complete knowledge of which- a knowledge to which all principles a          
priori must at last relate- is the only possible experience. It             
follows that these principles can have nothing else for their aim than      
the conditions of the empirical cognition in the unity of synthesis of      
phenomena. But this synthesis is cogitated only in the schema of the        
pure conception of the understanding, of whose unity, as that of a          
synthesis in general, the category contains the function                    
unrestricted by any sensuous condition. These principles will               
therefore authorize us to connect phenomena according to an analogy,        
with the logical and universal unity of conceptions, and                    
consequently to employ the categories in the principles themselves;         
but in the application of them to experience, we shall use only             
their schemata, as the key to their proper application, instead of the      
categories, or rather the latter as restricting conditions, under           
the title of "formulae" of the former.                                      
-                                                                           
                     A. FIRST ANALOGY.                                      
-                                                                           
           Principle of the Permanence of Substance.                        
                                                  {BK_2|CH_2 ^paragraph 105}
-                                                                           
   In all changes of phenomena, substance is permanent, and the             
   quantum thereof in nature is neither increased nor diminished.           
-                                                                           
                          PROOF.                                            
                                                  {BK_2|CH_2 ^paragraph 110}
-                                                                           
  All phenomena exist in time, wherein alone as substratum, that is,        
as the permanent form of the internal intuition, coexistence and            
succession can be represented. Consequently time, in which all changes      
of phenomena must be cogitated, remains and changes not, because it is      
that in which succession and coexistence can be represented only as         
determinations thereof. Now, time in itself cannot be an object of          
perception. It follows that in objects of perception, that is, in           
phenomena, there must be found a substratum which represents time in        
general, and in which all change or coexistence can be perceived by         
means of the relation of phenomena to it. But the substratum of all         
reality, that is, of all that pertains to the existence of things,          
is substance; all that pertains to existence can be cogitated only          
as a determination of substance. Consequently, the permanent, in            
relation to which alone can all relations of time in phenomena be           
determined, is substance in the world of phenomena, that is, the            
real in phenomena, that which, as the substratum of all change,             
remains ever the same. Accordingly, as this cannot change in                
existence, its quantity in nature can neither be increased nor              
diminished.                                                                 
  Our apprehension of the manifold in a phenomenon is always                
successive, is Consequently always changing. By it alone we could,          
therefore, never determine whether this manifold, as an object of           
experience, is coexistent or successive, unless it had for a                
foundation something fixed and permanent, of the existence of which         
all succession and coexistence are nothing but so many modes (modi          
of time). Only in the permanent, then, are relations of time                
possible (for simultaneity and succession are the only relations in         
time); that is to say, the permanent is the substratum of our               
empirical representation of time itself, in which alone all                 
determination of time is possible. Permanence is, in fact, just             
another expression for time, as the abiding correlate of all existence      
of phenomena, and of all change, and of all coexistence. For change         
does not affect time itself, but only the phenomena in time (just as        
coexistence cannot be regarded as a modus of time itself, seeing            
that in time no parts are coexistent, but all successive). If we            
were to attribute succession to time itself, we should be obliged to        
cogitate another time, in which this succession would be possible.          
It is only by means of the permanent that existence in different parts      
of the successive series of time receives a quantity, which we entitle      
duration. For in mere succession, existence is perpetually vanishing        
and recommencing, and therefore never has even the least quantity.          
Without the permanent, then, no relation in time is possible. Now,          
time in itself is not an object of perception; consequently the             
permanent in phenomena must be regarded as the substratum of all            
determination of time, and consequently also as the condition of the        
possibility of all synthetical unity of perceptions, that is, of            
experience; and all existence and all change in time can only be            
regarded as a mode in the existence of that which abides unchangeably.      
Therefore, in all phenomena, the permanent is the object in itself,         
that is, the substance (phenomenon); but all that changes or can            
change belongs only to the mode of the existence of this substance          
or substances, consequently to its determinations.                          
  I find that in all ages not only the philosopher, but even the            
common understanding, has preposited this permanence as a substratum        
of all change in phenomena; indeed, I am compelled to believe that          
they will always accept this as an indubitable fact. Only the               
philosopher expresses himself in a more precise and definite manner,        
when he says: "In all changes in the world, the substance remains, and      
the accidents alone are changeable." But of this decidedly synthetical      
proposition, I nowhere meet with even an attempt at proof; nay, it          
very rarely has the good fortune to stand, as it deserves to do, at         
the head of the pure and entirely a priori laws of nature. In truth,        
the statement that substance is permanent, is tautological. For this        
very permanence is the ground on which we apply the category of             
substance to the phenomenon; and we should have been obliged to             
prove that in all phenomena there is something permanent, of the            
existence of which the changeable is nothing but a determination.           
But because a proof of this nature cannot be dogmatical, that is,           
cannot be drawn from conceptions, inasmuch as it concerns a                 
synthetical proposition a priori, and as philosophers never                 
reflected that such propositions are valid only in relation to              
possible experience, and therefore cannot be proved except by means of      
a deduction of the possibility of experience, it is no wonder that          
while it has served as the foundation of all experience (for we feel        
the need of it in empirical cognition), it has never been supported by      
proof.                                                                      
  A philosopher was asked: "What is the weight of smoke?" He answered:      
"Subtract from the weight of the burnt wood the weight of the               
remaining ashes, and you will have the weight of the smoke." Thus he        
presumed it to be incontrovertible that even in fire the matter             
(substance) does not perish, but that only the form of it undergoes         
a change. In like manner was the saying: "From nothing comes nothing,"      
only another inference from the principle or permanence, or rather          
of the ever-abiding existence of the true subject in phenomena. For if      
that in the phenomenon which we call substance is to be the proper          
substratum of all determination of time, it follows that all existence      
in past as well as in future time, must be determinable by means of it      
alone. Hence we are entitled to apply the term substance to a               
phenomenon, only because we suppose its existence in all time, a            
notion which the word permanence does not fully express, as it seems        
rather to be referable to future time. However, the internal necessity      
perpetually to be, is inseparably connected with the necessity              
always to have been, and so the expression may stand as it is.              
"Gigni de nihilo nihil; in nihilum nil posse reverti,"* are two             
propositions which the ancients never parted, and which people              
nowadays sometimes mistakenly disjoin, because they imagine that the        
propositions apply to objects as things in themselves, and that the         
former might be inimical to the dependence (even in respect of its          
substance also) of the world upon a supreme cause. But this                 
apprehension is entirely needless, for the question in this case is         
only of phenomena in the sphere of experience, the unity of which           
never could be possible, if we admitted the possibility that new            
things (in respect of their substance) should arise. For in that case,      
we should lose altogether that which alone can represent the unity          
of time, to wit, the identity of the substratum, as that through which      
alone all change possesses complete and thorough unity. This                
permanence is, however, nothing but the manner in which we represent        
to ourselves the existence of things in the phenomenal world.               
                                                  {BK_2|CH_2 ^paragraph 115}
-                                                                           
  *[Persius, Satirae, iii.83-84. "Nothing can be produced from              
nothing; nothing can be returned into nothing."]                            
-                                                                           
  The determinations of a substance, which are only particular modes        
of its existence, are called accidents. They are always real,               
because they concern the existence of substance (negations are only         
determinations, which express the non-existence of something in the         
substance). Now, if to this real in the substance we ascribe a              
particular existence (for example, to motion as an accident of              
matter), this existence is called inherence, in contradistinction to        
the existence of substance, which we call subsistence. But hence arise      
many misconceptions, and it would be a more accurate and just mode          
of expression to designate the accident only as the mode in which           
the existence of a substance is positively determined. Meanwhile, by        
reason of the conditions of the logical exercise of our understanding,      
it is impossible to avoid separating, as it were, that which in the         
existence of a substance is subject to change, whilst the substance         
remains, and regarding it in relation to that which is properly             
permanent and radical. On this account, this category of substance          
stands under the title of relation, rather because it is the condition      
thereof than because it contains in itself any relation.                    
  Now, upon this notion of permanence rests the proper notion of the        
conception change. Origin and extinction are not changes of that which      
originates or becomes extinct. Change is but a mode of existence,           
which follows on another mode of existence of the same object; hence        
all that changes is permanent, and only the condition thereof changes.      
Now since this mutation affects only determinations, which can have         
a beginning or an end, we may say, employing an expression which seems      
somewhat paradoxical: "Only the permanent (substance) is subject to         
change; the mutable suffers no change, but rather alternation, that         
is, when certain determinations cease, others begin."                       
                                                  {BK_2|CH_2 ^paragraph 120}
  Change, when, cannot be perceived by us except in substances, and         
origin or extinction in an absolute sense, that does not concern            
merely a determination of the permanent, cannot be a possible               
perception, for it is this very notion of the permanent which               
renders possible the representation of a transition from one state          
into another, and from non-being to being, which, consequently, can be      
empirically cognized only as alternating determinations of that             
which is permanent. Grant that a thing absolutely begins to be; we          
must then have a point of time in which it was not. But how and by          
what can we fix and determine this point of time, unless by that which      
already exists? For a void time- preceding- is not an object of             
perception; but if we connect this beginning with objects which             
existed previously, and which continue to exist till the object in          
question in question begins to be, then the latter can only be a            
determination of the former as the permanent. The same holds good of        
the notion of extinction, for this presupposes the empirical                
representation of a time, in which a phenomenon no longer exists.           
  Substances (in the world of phenomena) are the substratum of all          
determinations of time. The beginning of some, and the ceasing to be        
of other substances, would utterly do away with the only condition          
of the empirical unity of time; and in that case phenomena would            
relate to two different times, in which, side by side, existence would      
pass; which is absurd. For there is only one time in which all              
different times must be placed, not as coexistent, but as successive.       
  Accordingly, permanence is a necessary condition under which alone        
phenomena, as things or objects, are determinable in a possible             
experience. But as regards the empirical criterion of this necessary        
permanence, and with it of the substantiality of phenomena, we shall        
find sufficient opportunity to speak in the sequel.                         
-                                                                           
                   B. SECOND ANALOGY.                                       
                                                  {BK_2|CH_2 ^paragraph 125}
-                                                                           
      Principle of the Succession of Time According                         
                to the Law of Causality.                                    
-                                                                           
     All changes take place according to the law of the                     
                                                  {BK_2|CH_2 ^paragraph 130}
              connection of Cause and Effect.                               
-                                                                           
                         PROOF.                                             
-                                                                           
  (That all phenomena in the succession of time are only changes, that      
is, a successive being and non-being of the determinations of               
substance, which is permanent; consequently that a being of                 
substance itself which follows on the non-being thereof, or a               
non-being of substance which follows on the being thereof, in other         
words, that the origin or extinction of substance itself, is                
impossible- all this has been fully established in treating of the          
foregoing principle. This principle might have been expressed as            
follows: "All alteration (succession) of phenomena is merely                
change"; for the changes of substance are not origin or extinction,         
because the conception of change presupposes the same subject as            
existing with two opposite determinations, and consequently as              
permanent. After this premonition, we shall proceed to the proof.)          
                                                  {BK_2|CH_2 ^paragraph 135}
  I perceive that phenomena succeed one another, that is to say, a          
state of things exists at one time, the opposite of which existed in a      
former state. In this case, then, I really connect together two             
perceptions in time. Now connection is not an operation of mere             
sense and intuition, but is the product of a synthetical faculty of         
imagination, which determines the internal sense in respect of a            
relation of time. But imagination can connect these two states in           
two ways, so that either the one or the other may antecede in time;         
for time in itself cannot be an object of perception, and what in an        
object precedes and what follows cannot be empirically determined in        
relation to it. I am only conscious, then, that my imagination              
places one state before and the other after; not that the one state         
antecedes the other in the object. In other words, the objective            
relation of the successive phenomena remains quite undetermined by          
means of mere perception. Now in order that this relation may be            
cognized as determined, the relation between the two states must be so      
cogitated that it is thereby determined as necessary, which of them         
must be placed before and which after, and not conversely. But the          
conception which carries with it a necessity of synthetical unity, can      
be none other than a pure conception of the understanding which does        
not lie in mere perception; and in this case it is the conception of        
"the relation of cause and effect," the former of which determines the      
latter in time, as its necessary consequence, and not as something          
which might possibly antecede (or which might in some cases not be          
perceived to follow). It follows that it is only because we subject         
the sequence of phenomena, and consequently all change, to the law          
of causality, that experience itself, that is, empirical cognition          
of phenomena, becomes possible; and consequently, that phenomena            
themselves, as objects of experience, are possible only by virtue of        
this law.                                                                   
  Our apprehension of the manifold of phenomena is always                   
successive. The representations of parts succeed one another.               
Whether they succeed one another in the object also, is a second point      
for reflection, which was not contained in the former. Now we may           
certainly give the name of object to everything, even to every              
representation, so far as we are conscious thereof; but what this word      
may mean in the case of phenomena, not merely in so far as they (as         
representations) are objects, but only in so far as they indicate an        
object, is a question requiring deeper consideration. In so far as          
they, regarded merely as representations, are at the same time objects      
of consciousness, they are not to be distinguished from                     
apprehension, that is, reception into the synthesis of imagination,         
and we must therefore say: "The manifold of phenomena is always             
produced successively in the mind." If phenomena were things in             
themselves, no man would be able to conjecture from the succession          
of our representations how this manifold is connected in the object;        
for we have to do only with our representations. How things may be          
in themselves, without regard to the representations through which          
they affect us, is utterly beyond the sphere of our cognition. Now          
although phenomena are not things in themselves, and are                    
nevertheless the only thing given to us to be cognized, it is my            
duty to show what sort of connection in time belongs to the manifold        
in phenomena themselves, while the representation of this manifold          
in apprehension is always successive. For example, the apprehension of      
the manifold in the phenomenon of a house which stands before me, is        
successive. Now comes the question whether the manifold of this             
house is in itself successive- which no one will be at all willing          
to grant. But, so soon as I raise my conception of an object to the         
transcendental signification thereof, I find that the house is not a        
thing in itself, but only a phenomenon, that is, a representation, the      
transcendental object of which remains utterly unknown. What then am I      
to understand by the question: "How can the manifold be connected in        
the phenomenon itself- not considered as a thing in itself, but merely      
as a phenomenon?" Here that which lies in my successive apprehension        
is regarded as representation, whilst the phenomenon which is given         
me, notwithstanding that it is nothing more than a complex of these         
representations, is regarded as the object thereof, with which my           
conception, drawn from the representations of apprehension, must            
harmonize. It is very soon seen that, as accordance of the cognition        
with its object constitutes truth, the question now before us can only      
relate to the formal conditions of empirical truth; and that the            
phenomenon, in opposition to the representations of apprehension,           
can only be distinguished therefrom as the object of them, if it is         
subject to a rule which distinguishes it from every other                   
apprehension, and which renders necessary a mode of connection of           
the manifold. That in the phenomenon which contains the condition of        
this necessary rule of apprehension, is the object.                         
  Let us now proceed to our task. That something happens, that is to        
say, that something or some state exists which before was not,              
cannot be empirically perceived, unless a phenomenon precedes, which        
does not contain in itself this state. For a reality which should           
follow upon a void time, in other words, a beginning, which no state        
of things precedes, can just as little be apprehended as the void time      
itself. Every apprehension of an event is therefore a perception which      
follows upon another perception. But as this is the case with all           
synthesis of apprehension, as I have shown above in the example of a        
house, my apprehension of an event is not yet sufficiently                  
distinguished from other apprehensions. But I remark also that if in a      
phenomenon which contains an occurrence, I call the antecedent state        
of my perception, A, and the following state, B, the perception B           
can only follow A in apprehension, and the perception A cannot              
follow B, but only precede it. For example, I see a ship float down         
the stream of a river. My perception of its place lower down follows        
upon my perception of its place higher up the course of the river, and      
it is impossible that, in the apprehension of this phenomenon, the          
vessel should be perceived first below and afterwards higher up the         
stream. Here, therefore, the order in the sequence of perceptions in        
apprehension is determined; and by this order apprehension is               
regulated. In the former example, my perceptions in the apprehension        
of a house might begin at the roof and end at the foundation, or            
vice versa; or I might apprehend the manifold in this empirical             
intuition, by going from left to right, and from right to left.             
Accordingly, in the series of these perceptions, there was no               
determined order, which necessitated my beginning at a certain              
point, in order empirically to connect the manifold. But this rule          
is always to be met with in the perception of that which happens,           
and it makes the order of the successive perceptions in the                 
apprehension of such a phenomenon necessary.                                
  I must, therefore, in the present case, deduce the subjective             
sequence of apprehension from the objective sequence of phenomena, for      
otherwise the former is quite undetermined, and one phenomenon is           
not distinguishable from another. The former alone proves nothing as        
to the connection of the manifold in an object, for it is quite             
arbitrary. The latter must consist in the order of the manifold in a        
phenomenon, according to which order the apprehension of one thing          
(that which happens) follows that of another thing (which precedes),        
in conformity with a rule. In this way alone can I be authorized to         
say of the phenomenon itself, and not merely of my own apprehension,        
that a certain order or sequence is to be found therein. That is, in        
other words, I cannot arrange my apprehension otherwise than in this        
order.                                                                      
  In conformity with this rule, then, it is necessary that in that          
which antecedes an event there be found the condition of a rule,            
according to which in this event follows always and necessarily; but I      
cannot reverse this and go back from the event, and determine (by           
apprehension) that which antecedes it. For no phenomenon goes back          
from the succeeding point of time to the preceding point, although          
it does certainly relate to a preceding point of time; from a given         
time, on the other hand, there is always a necessary progression to         
the determined succeeding time. Therefore, because there certainly          
is something that follows, I must of necessity connect it with              
something else, which antecedes, and upon which it follows, in              
conformity with a rule, that is necessarily, so that the event, as          
conditioned, affords certain indication of a condition, and this            
condition determines the event.                                             
                                                  {BK_2|CH_2 ^paragraph 140}
  Let us suppose that nothing precedes an event, upon which this event      
must follow in conformity with a rule. All sequence of perception           
would then exist only in apprehension, that is to say, would be merely      
subjective, and it could not thereby be objectively determined what         
thing ought to precede, and what ought to follow in perception. In          
such a case, we should have nothing but a play of representations,          
which would possess no application to any object. That is to say, it        
would not be possible through perception to distinguish one phenomenon      
from another, as regards relations of time; because the succession          
in the act of apprehension would always be of the same sort, and            
therefore there would be nothing in the phenomenon to determine the         
succession, and to render a certain sequence objectively necessary.         
And, in this case, I cannot say that two states in a phenomenon follow      
one upon the other, but only that one apprehension follows upon             
another. But this is merely subjective, and does not determine an           
object, and consequently cannot be held to be cognition of an               
object- not even in the phenomenal world.                                   
  Accordingly, when we know in experience that something happens, we        
always presuppose that something precedes, whereupon it follows in          
conformity with a rule. For otherwise I could not say of the object         
that it follows; because the mere succession in my apprehension, if it      
be not determined by a rule in relation to something preceding, does        
not authorize succession in the object. Only, therefore, in                 
reference to a rule, according to which phenomena are determined in         
their sequence, that is, as they happen, by the preceding state, can I      
make my subjective synthesis (of apprehension) objective, and it is         
only under this presupposition that even the experience of an event is      
possible.                                                                   
  No doubt it appears as if this were in thorough contradiction to all      
the notions which people have hitherto entertained in regard to the         
procedure of the human understanding. According to these opinions,          
it is by means of the perception and comparison of similar                  
consequences following upon certain antecedent phenomena that the           
understanding is led to the discovery of a rule, according to which         
certain events always follow certain phenomena, and it is only by this      
process that we attain to the conception of cause. Upon such a              
basis, it is clear that this conception must be merely empirical,           
and the rule which it furnishes us with- "Everything that happens must      
have a cause"- would be just as contingent as experience itself. The        
universality and necessity of the rule or law would be perfectly            
spurious attributes of it. Indeed, it could not possess universal           
validity, inasmuch as it would not in this case be a priori, but            
founded on deduction. But the same is the case with this law as with        
other pure a priori representations (e.g., space and time), which we        
can draw in perfect clearness and completeness from experience, only        
because we had already placed them therein, and by that means, and          
by that alone, had rendered experience possible. Indeed, the logical        
clearness of this representation of a rule, determining the series          
of events, is possible only when we have made use thereof in                
experience. Nevertheless, the recognition of this rule, as a condition      
of the synthetical unity of phenomena in time, was the ground of            
experience itself and consequently preceded it a priori.                    
  It is now our duty to show by an example that we never, even in           
experience, attribute to an object the notion of succession or              
effect (of an event- that is, the happening of something that did           
not exist before), and distinguish it from the subjective succession        
of apprehension, unless when a rule lies at the foundation, which           
compels us to observe this order of perception in preference to any         
other, and that, indeed, it is this necessity which first renders           
possible the representation of a succession in the object.                  
  We have representations within us, of which also we can be                
conscious. But, however widely extended, however accurate and               
thoroughgoing this consciousness may be, these representations are          
still nothing more than representations, that is, internal                  
determinations of the mind in this or that relation of time. Now how        
happens it that to these representations we should set an object, or        
that, in addition to their subjective reality, as modifications, we         
should still further attribute to them a certain unknown objective          
reality? It is clear that objective significancy cannot consist in a        
relation to another representation (of that which we desire to term         
object), for in that case the question again arises: "How does this         
other representation go out of itself, and obtain objective                 
significancy over and above the subjective, which is proper to it,          
as a determination of a state of mind?" If we try to discover what          
sort of new property the relation to an object gives to our subjective      
representations, and what new importance they thereby receive, we           
shall find that this relation has no other effect than that of              
rendering necessary the connection of our representations in a certain      
manner, and of subjecting them to a rule; and that conversely, it is        
only because a certain order is necessary in the relations of time          
of our representations, that objective significancy is ascribed to          
them.                                                                       
                                                  {BK_2|CH_2 ^paragraph 145}
  In the synthesis of phenomena, the manifold of our representations        
is always successive. Now hereby is not represented an object, for          
by means of this succession, which is common to all apprehension, no        
one thing is distinguished from another. But so soon as I perceive          
or assume that in this succession there is a relation to a state            
antecedent, from which the representation follows in accordance with a      
rule, so soon do I represent something as an event, or as a thing that      
happens; in other words, I cognize an object to which I must assign         
a certain determinate position in time, which cannot be altered,            
because of the preceding state in the object. When, therefore, I            
perceive that something happens, there is contained in this                 
representation, in the first place, the fact, that something                
antecedes; because, it. is only in relation to this that the                
phenomenon obtains its proper relation of time, in other words, exists      
after an antecedent time, in which it did not exist. But it can             
receive its determined place in time only by the presupposition that        
something existed in the foregoing state, upon which it follows             
inevitably and always, that is, in conformity with a rule. From all         
this it is evident that, in the first place, I cannot reverse the           
order of succession, and make that which happens precede that upon          
which it follows; and that, in the second place, if the antecedent          
state be posited, a certain determinate event inevitably and                
necessarily follows. Hence it follows that there exists a certain           
order in our representations, whereby the present gives a sure              
indication of some previously existing state, as a correlate, though        
still undetermined, of the existing event which is given- a                 
correlate which itself relates to the event as its consequence,             
conditions it, and connects it necessarily with itself in the series        
of time.                                                                    
  If then it be admitted as a necessary law of sensibility, and             
consequently a formal condition of all perception, that the                 
preceding necessarily determines the succeeding time (inasmuch as I         
cannot arrive at the succeeding except through the preceding), it must      
likewise be an indispensable law of empirical representation of the         
series of time that the phenomena of the past determine all                 
phenomena in the succeeding time, and that the latter, as events,           
cannot take place, except in so far as the former determine their           
existence in time, that is to say, establish it according to a rule.        
For it is of course only in phenomena that we can empirically               
cognize this continuity in the connection of times.                         
  For all experience and for the possibility of experience,                 
understanding is indispensable, and the first step which it takes in        
this sphere is not to render the representation of objects clear,           
but to render the representation of an object in general, possible. It      
does this by applying the order of time to phenomena, and their             
existence. In other words, it assigns to each phenomenon, as a              
consequence, a place in relation to preceding phenomena, determined         
a priori in time, without which it could not harmonize with time            
itself, which determines a place a priori to all its parts. This            
determination of place cannot be derived from the relation of               
phenomena to absolute time (for it is not an object of perception);         
but, on the contrary, phenomena must reciprocally determine the places      
in time of one another, and render these necessary in the order of          
time. In other words, whatever follows or happens, must follow in           
conformity with a universal rule upon that which was contained in           
the foregoing state. Hence arises a series of phenomena, which, by          
means of the understanding, produces and renders necessary exactly the      
same order and continuous connection in the series of our possible          
perceptions, as is found a priori in the form of internal intuition         
(time), in which all our perceptions must have place.                       
  That something happens, then, is a perception which belongs to a          
possible experience, which becomes real only because I look upon the        
phenomenon as determined in regard to its place in time,                    
consequently as an object, which can always be found by means of a          
rule in the connected series of my perceptions. But this rule of the        
determination of a thing according to succession in time is as              
follows: "In what precedes may be found the condition, under which          
an event always (that is, necessarily) follows." From all this it is        
obvious that the principle of cause and effect is the principle of          
possible experience, that is, of objective cognition of phenomena,          
in regard to their relations in the succession of time.                     
  The proof of this fundamental proposition rests entirely on the           
following momenta of argument. To all empirical cognition belongs           
the synthesis of the manifold by the imagination, a synthesis which is      
always successive, that is, in which the representations therein            
always follow one another. But the order of succession in                   
imagination is not determined, and the series of successive                 
representations may be taken retrogressively as well as progressively.      
But if this synthesis is a synthesis of apprehension (of the                
manifold of a given phenomenon),then the order is determined in the         
object, or to speak more accurately, there is therein an order of           
successive synthesis which determines an object, and according to           
which something necessarily precedes, and when this is posited,             
something else necessarily follows. If, then, my perception is to           
contain the cognition of an event, that is, of something which              
really happens, it must be an empirical judgement, wherein we think         
that the succession is determined; that is, it presupposes another          
phenomenon, upon which this event follows necessarily, or in                
conformity with a rule. If, on the contrary, when I posited the             
antecedent, the event did not necessarily follow, I should be               
obliged to consider it merely as a subjective play of my                    
imagination, and if in this I represented to myself anything as             
objective, I must look upon it as a mere dream. Thus, the relation          
of phenomena (as possible perceptions), according to which that             
which happens is, as to its existence, necessarily determined in            
time by something which antecedes, in conformity with a rule- in other      
words, the relation of cause and effect- is the condition of the            
objective validity of our empirical judgements in regard to the             
sequence of perceptions, consequently of their empirical truth, and         
therefore of experience. The principle of the relation of causality in      
the succession of phenomena is therefore valid for all objects of           
experience, because it is itself the ground of the possibility of           
experience.                                                                 
                                                  {BK_2|CH_2 ^paragraph 150}
  Here, however, a difficulty arises, which must be resolved. The           
principle of the connection of causality among phenomena is limited in      
our formula to the succession thereof, although in practice we find         
that the principle applies also when the phenomena exist together in        
the same time, and that cause and effect may be simultaneous. For           
example, there is heat in a room, which does not exist in the open          
air. I look about for the cause, and find it to be the fire, Now the        
fire as the cause is simultaneous with its effect, the heat of the          
room. In this case, then, there is no succession as regards time,           
between cause and effect, but they are simultaneous; and still the law      
holds good. The greater part of operating causes in nature are              
simultaneous with their effects, and the succession in time of the          
latter is produced only because the cause cannot achieve the total          
of its effect in one moment. But at the moment when the effect first        
arises, it is always simultaneous with the causality of its cause,          
because, if the cause had but a moment before ceased to be, the effect      
could not have arisen. Here it must be specially remembered that we         
must consider the order of time and not the lapse thereof. The              
relation remains, even though no time has elapsed. The time between         
the causality of the cause and its immediate effect may entirely            
vanish, and the cause and effect be thus simultaneous, but the              
relation of the one to the other remains always determinable according      
to time. If, for example, I consider a leaden ball, which lies upon         
a cushion and makes a hollow in it, as a cause, then it is                  
simultaneous with the effect. But I distinguish the two through the         
relation of time of the dynamical connection of both. For if I lay the      
ball upon the cushion, then the hollow follows upon the before              
smooth surface; but supposing the cushion has, from some cause or           
another, a hollow, there does not thereupon follow a leaden ball.           
  Thus, the law of succession of time is in all instances the only          
empirical criterion of effect in relation to the causality of the           
antecedent cause. The glass is the cause of the rising of the water         
above its horizontal surface, although the two phenomena are                
contemporaneous. For, as soon as I draw some water with the glass from      
a larger vessel, an effect follows thereupon, namely, the change of         
the horizontal state which the water had in the large vessel into a         
concave, which it assumes in the glass.                                     
  This conception of causality leads us to the conception of action;        
that of action, to the conception of force; and through it, to the          
conception of substance. As I do not wish this critical essay, the          
sole purpose of which is to treat of the sources of our synthetical         
cognition a priori, to be crowded with analyses which merely                
explain, but do not enlarge the sphere of our conceptions, I reserve        
the detailed explanation of the above conceptions for a future              
system of pure reason. Such an analysis, indeed, executed with great        
particularity, may already be found in well-known works on this             
subject. But I cannot at present refrain from making a few remarks          
on the empirical criterion of a substance, in so far as it seems to be      
more evident and more easily recognized through the conception of           
action than through that of the permanence of a phenomenon.                 
  Where action (consequently activity and force) exists, substance          
also must exist, and in it alone must be sought the seat of that            
fruitful source of phenomena. Very well. But if we are called upon          
to explain what we mean by substance, and wish to avoid the vice of         
reasoning in a circle, the answer is by no means so easy. How shall we      
conclude immediately from the action to the permanence of that which        
acts, this being nevertheless an essential and peculiar criterion of        
substance (phenomenon)? But after what has been said above, the             
solution of this question becomes easy enough, although by the              
common mode of procedure- merely analysing our conceptions- it would        
be quite impossible. The conception of action indicates the relation        
of the subject of causality to the effect. Now because all effect           
consists in that which happens, therefore in the changeable, the            
last subject thereof is the permanent, as the substratum of all that        
changes, that is, substance. For according to the principle of              
causality, actions are always the first ground of all change in             
phenomena and, consequently, cannot be a property of a subject which        
itself changes, because if this were the case, other actions and            
another subject would be necessary to determine this change. From           
all this it results that action alone, as an empirical criterion, is a      
sufficient proof of the presence of substantiality, without any             
necessity on my part of endeavouring to discover the permanence of          
substance by a comparison. Besides, by this mode of induction we could      
not attain to the completeness which the magnitude and strict               
universality of the conception requires. For that the primary               
subject of the causality of all arising and passing away, all origin        
and extinction, cannot itself (in the sphere of phenomena) arise and        
pass away, is a sound and safe conclusion, a conclusion which leads us      
to the conception of empirical necessity and permanence in                  
existence, and consequently to the conception of a substance as             
phenomenon.                                                                 
  When something happens, the mere fact of the occurrence, without          
regard to that which occurs, is an object requiring investigation. The      
transition from the non-being of a state into the existence of it,          
supposing that this state contains no quality which previously existed      
in the phenomenon, is a fact of itself demanding inquiry. Such an           
event, as has been shown in No. A, does not concern substance (for          
substance does not thus originate), but its condition or state. It          
is therefore only change, and not origin from nothing. If this              
origin be regarded as the effect of a foreign cause, it is termed           
creation, which cannot be admitted as an event among phenomena,             
because the very possibility of it would annihilate the unity of            
experience. If, however, I regard all things not as phenomena, but          
as things in themselves and objects of understanding alone, they,           
although substances, may be considered as dependent, in respect of          
their existence, on a foreign cause. But this would require a very          
different meaning in the words, a meaning which could not apply to          
phenomena as objects of possible experience.                                
                                                  {BK_2|CH_2 ^paragraph 155}
  How a thing can be changed, how it is possible that upon one state        
existing in one point of time, an opposite state should follow in           
another point of time- of this we have not the smallest conception a        
priori. There is requisite for this the knowledge of real powers,           
which can only be given empirically; for example, knowledge of              
moving forces, or, in other words, of certain successive phenomena (as      
movements) which indicate the presence of such forces. But the form of      
every change, the condition under which alone it can take place as the      
coming into existence of another state (be the content of the               
change, that is, the state which is changed, what it may), and              
consequently the succession of the states themselves can very well          
be considered a priori, in relation to the law of causality and the         
conditions of time.*                                                        
-                                                                           
  *It must be remarked that I do not speak of the change of certain         
relations, but of the change of the state. Thus, when a body moves          
in a uniform manner, it does not change its state (of motion); but          
only when all motion increases or decreases.                                
-                                                                           
  When a substance passes from one state, a, into another state, b,         
the point of time in which the latter exists is different from, and         
subsequent to that in which the former existed. In like manner, the         
second state, as reality (in the phenomenon), differs from the              
first, in which the reality of the second did not exist, as b from          
zero. That is to say, if the state, b, differs from the state, a, only      
in respect to quantity, the change is a coming into existence of b -        
a, which in the former state did not exist, and in relation to which        
that state is = O.                                                          
                                                  {BK_2|CH_2 ^paragraph 160}
  Now the question arises how a thing passes from one state = a,            
into another state = b. Between two moments there is always a               
certain time, and between two states existing in these moments there        
is always a difference having a certain quantity (for all parts of          
phenomena are in their turn quantities). Consequently, every                
transition from one state into another is always effected in a time         
contained between two moments, of which the first determines the state      
which leaves, and the second determines the state into the thing            
passes. the thing leaves, and the second determines the state into          
which the thing Both moments, then, are limitations of the time of a        
change, consequently of the intermediate state between both, and as         
such they belong to the total of the change. Now every change has a         
cause, which evidences its causality in the whole time during which         
the charge takes place. The cause, therefore, does not produce the          
change all at once or in one moment, but in a time, so that, as the         
time gradually increases from the commencing instant, a, to its             
completion at b, in like manner also, the quantity of the reality           
(b - a) is generated through the lesser degrees which are contained         
between the first and last. All change is therefore possible only           
through a continuous action of the causality, which, in so far as it        
is uniform, we call a momentum. The change does not consist of these        
momenta, but is generated or produced by them as their effect.              
  Such is the law of the continuity of all change, the ground of which      
is that neither time itself nor any phenomenon in time consists of          
parts which are the smallest possible, but that, notwithstanding,           
the state of a thing passes in the process of a change through all          
these parts, as elements, to its second state. There is no smallest         
degree of reality in a phenomenon, just as there is no smallest degree      
in the quantity of time; and so the new state of reality grows up           
out of the former state, through all the infinite degrees thereof, the      
differences of which one from another, taken all together, are less         
than the difference between o and a.                                        
  It is not our business to inquire here into the utility of this           
principle in the investigation of nature. But how such a                    
proposition, which appears so greatly to extend our knowledge of            
nature, is possible completely a priori, is indeed a question which         
deserves investigation, although the first view seems to demonstrate        
the truth and reality of the principle, and the question, how it is         
possible, may be considered superfluous. For there are so many              
groundless pretensions to the enlargement of our knowledge by pure          
reason that we must take it as a general rule to be mistrustful of all      
such, and without a thoroughgoing and radical deduction, to believe         
nothing of the sort even on the clearest dogmatical evidence.               
  Every addition to our empirical knowledge, and every advance made in      
the exercise of our perception, is nothing more than an extension of        
the determination of the internal sense, that is to say, a progression      
in time, be objects themselves what they may, phenomena, or pure            
intuitions. This progression in time determines everything, and is          
itself determined by nothing else. That is to say, the parts of the         
progression exist only in time, and by means of the synthesis thereof,      
and are not given antecedently to it. For this reason, every                
transition in perception to anything which follows upon another in          
time, is a determination of time by means of the production of this         
perception. And as this determination of time is, always and in all         
its parts, a quantity, the perception produced is to be considered          
as a quantity which proceeds through all its degrees- no one of             
which is the smallest possible- from zero up to its determined degree.      
From this we perceive the possibility of cognizing a priori a law of        
changes- a law, however, which concerns their form merely. We merely        
anticipate our own apprehension, the formal condition of which,             
inasmuch as it is itself to be found in the mind antecedently to all        
given phenomena, must certainly be capable of being cognized a priori.      
  Thus, as time contains the sensuous condition a priori of the             
possibility of a continuous progression of that which exists to that        
which follows it, the understanding, by virtue of the unity of              
apperception, contains the condition a priori of the possibility of         
a continuous determination of the position in time of all phenomena,        
and this by means of the series of causes and effects, the former of        
which necessitate the sequence of the latter, and thereby render            
universally and for all time, and by consequence, objectively, valid        
the empirical cognition of the relations of time.                           
                                                  {BK_2|CH_2 ^paragraph 165}
-                                                                           
                   C. THIRD ANALOGY.                                        
-                                                                           
      Principle of Coexistence, According to the Law                        
               of Reciprocity or Community.                                 
                                                  {BK_2|CH_2 ^paragraph 170}
-                                                                           
   All substances, in so far as they can be perceived in space              
    at the same time, exist in a state of complete reciprocity              
                     of action.                                             
-                                                                           
                                                  {BK_2|CH_2 ^paragraph 175}
                        PROOF.                                              
-                                                                           
  Things are coexistent, when in empirical intuition the perception of      
the one can follow upon the perception of the other, and vice versa-        
which cannot occur in the succession of phenomena, as we have shown in      
the explanation of the second principle. Thus I can perceive the            
moon and then the earth, or conversely, first the earth and then the        
moon; and for the reason that my perceptions of these objects can           
reciprocally follow each other, I say, they exist contemporaneously.        
Now coexistence is the existence of the manifold in the same time. But      
time itself is not an object of perception; and therefore we cannot         
conclude from the fact that things are placed in the same time, the         
other fact, that the perception of these things can follow each             
other reciprocally. The synthesis of the imagination in apprehension        
would only present to us each of these perceptions as present in the        
subject when the other is not present, and contrariwise; but would not      
show that the objects are coexistent, that is to say, that, if the one      
exists, the other also exists in the same time, and that this is            
necessarily so, in order that the perceptions may be capable of             
following each other reciprocally. It follows that a conception of the      
understanding or category of the reciprocal sequence of the                 
determinations of phenomena (existing, as they do, apart from each          
other, and yet contemporaneously), is requisite to justify us in            
saying that the reciprocal succession of perceptions has its                
foundation in the object, and to enable us to represent coexistence as      
objective. But that relation of substances in which the one contains        
determinations the ground of which is in the other substance, is the        
relation of influence. And, when this influence is reciprocal, it is        
the relation of community or reciprocity. Consequently the coexistence      
of substances in space cannot be cognized in experience otherwise than      
under the precondition of their reciprocal action. This is therefore        
the condition of the possibility of things themselves as objects of         
experience.                                                                 
  Things are coexistent, in so far as they exist in one and the same        
time. But how can we know that they exist in one and the same time?         
Only by observing that the order in the synthesis of apprehension of        
the manifold is arbitrary and a matter of indifference, that is to          
say, that it can proceed from A, through B, C, D, to E, or                  
contrariwise from E to A. For if they were successive in time (and          
in the order, let us suppose, which begins with A), it is quite             
impossible for the apprehension in perception to begin with E and go        
backwards to A, inasmuch as A belongs to past time and, therefore,          
cannot be an object of apprehension.                                        
  Let us assume that in a number of substances considered as phenomena      
each is completely isolated, that is, that no one acts upon another.        
Then I say that the coexistence of these cannot be an object of             
possible perception and that the existence of one cannot, by any            
mode of empirical synthesis, lead us to the existence of another.           
For we imagine them in this case to be separated by a completely            
void space, and thus perception, which proceeds from the one to the         
other in time, would indeed determine their existence by means of a         
following perception, but would be quite unable to distinguish whether      
the one phenomenon follows objectively upon the first, or is                
coexistent with it.                                                         
                                                  {BK_2|CH_2 ^paragraph 180}
  Besides the mere fact of existence, then, there must be something by      
means of which A determines the position of B in time and, conversely,      
B the position of A; because only under this condition can                  
substances be empirically represented as existing contemporaneously.        
Now that alone determines the position of another thing in time             
which is the cause of it or of its determinations. Consequently             
every substance (inasmuch as it can have succession predicated of it        
only in respect of its determinations) must contain the causality of        
certain determinations in another substance, and at the same time           
the effects of the causality of the other in itself. That is to say,        
substances must stand (mediately or immediately) in dynamical               
community with each other, if coexistence is to be cognized in any          
possible experience. But, in regard to objects of experience, that          
is absolutely necessary without which the experience of these               
objects would itself be impossible. Consequently it is absolutely           
necessary that all substances in the world of phenomena, in so far          
as they are coexistent, stand in a relation of complete community of        
reciprocal action to each other.                                            
  The word community has in our language* two meanings, and contains        
the two notions conveyed in the Latin communio and commercium. We           
employ it in this place in the latter sense- that of a dynamical            
community, without which even the community of place (communio spatii)      
could not be empirically cognized. In our experiences it is easy to         
observe that it is only the continuous influences in all parts of           
space that can conduct our senses from one object to another; that the      
light which plays between our eyes and the heavenly bodies produces         
a mediating community between them and us, and thereby evidences their      
coexistence with us; that we cannot empirically change our position         
(perceive this change), unless the existence of matter throughout           
the whole of space rendered possible the perception of the positions        
we occupy; and that this perception can prove the contemporaneous           
existence of these places only through their reciprocal influence, and      
thereby also the coexistence of even the most remote objects- although      
in this case the proof is only mediate. Without community, every            
perception (of a phenomenon in space) is separated from every other         
and isolated, and the chain of empirical representations, that is,          
of experience, must, with the appearance of a new object, begin             
entirely de novo, without the least connection with preceding               
representations, and without standing towards these even in the             
relation of time. My intention here is by no means to combat the            
notion of empty space; for it may exist where our perceptions cannot        
exist, inasmuch as they cannot reach thereto, and where, therefore, no      
empirical perception of coexistence takes place. But in this case it        
is not an object of possible experience.                                    
-                                                                           
  *German.                                                                  
-                                                                           
                                                  {BK_2|CH_2 ^paragraph 185}
  The following remarks may be useful in the way of explanation. In         
the mind, all phenomena, as contents of a possible experience, must         
exist in community (communio) of apperception or consciousness, and in      
so far as it is requisite that objects be represented as coexistent         
and connected, in so far must they reciprocally determine the position      
in time of each other and thereby constitute a whole. If this               
subjective community is to rest upon an objective basis, or to be           
applied to substances as phenomena, the perception of one substance         
must render possible the perception of another, and conversely. For         
otherwise succession, which is always found in perceptions as               
apprehensions, would be predicated of external objects, and their           
representation of their coexistence be thus impossible. But this is         
a reciprocal influence, that is to say, a real community                    
(commercium) of substances, without which therefore the empirical           
relation of coexistence would be a notion beyond the reach of our           
minds. By virtue of this commercium, phenomena, in so far as they           
are apart from, and nevertheless in connection with each other,             
constitute a compositum reale. Such composita are possible in many          
different ways. The three dynamical relations then, from which all          
others spring, are those of inherence, consequence, and composition.        
-                                                                           
  These, then, are the three analogies of experience. They are nothing      
more than principles of the determination of the existence of               
phenomena in time, according to the three modi of this                      
determination; to wit, the relation to time itself as a quantity            
(the quantity of existence, that is, duration), the relation in time        
as a series or succession, finally, the relation in time as the             
complex of all existence (simultaneity). This unity of determination        
in regard to time is thoroughly dynamical; that is to say, time is not      
considered as that in which experience determines immediately to every      
existence its position; for this is impossible, inasmuch as absolute        
time is not an object of perception, by means of which phenomena can        
be connected with each other. On the contrary, the rule of the              
understanding, through which alone the existence of phenomena can           
receive synthetical unity as regards relations of time, determines for      
every phenomenon its position in time, and consequently a priori,           
and with validity for all and every time.                                   
  By nature, in the empirical sense of the word, we understand the          
totality of phenomena connected, in respect of their existence,             
according to necessary rules, that is, laws. There are therefore            
certain laws (which are moreover a priori) which make nature possible;      
and all empirical laws can exist only by means of experience, and by        
virtue of those primitive laws through which experience itself becomes      
possible. The purpose of the analogies is therefore to represent to us      
the unity of nature in the connection of all phenomena under certain        
exponents, the only business of which is to express the relation of         
time (in so far as it contains all existence in itself) to the unity        
of apperception, which can exist in synthesis only according to rules.      
The combined expression of all is this: "All phenomena exist in one         
nature, and must so exist, inasmuch as without this a priori unity, no      
unity of experience, and consequently no determination of objects in        
experience, is possible."                                                   
  As regards the mode of proof which we have employed in treating of        
these transcendental laws of nature, and the peculiar character of          
we must make one remark, which will at the same time be important as a      
guide in every other attempt to demonstrate the truth of                    
intellectual and likewise synthetical propositions a priori. Had we         
endeavoured to prove these analogies dogmatically, that is, from            
conceptions; that is to say, had we employed this method in attempting      
to show that everything which exists, exists only in that which is          
permanent- that every thing or event presupposes the existence of           
something in a preceding state, upon which it follows in conformity         
with a rule- lastly, that in the manifold, which is coexistent, the         
states coexist in connection with each other according to a rule-           
all our labour would have been utterly in vain. For more conceptions        
of things, analyse them as we may, cannot enable us to conclude from        
the existence of one object to the existence of another. What other         
course was left for us to pursue? This only, to demonstrate the             
possibility of experience as a cognition in which at last all               
objects must be capable of being presented to us, if the                    
representation of them is to possess any objective reality. Now in          
this third, this mediating term, the essential form of which                
consists in the synthetical unity of the apperception of all                
phenomena, we found a priori conditions of the universal and necessary      
determination as to time of all existences in the world of                  
phenomena, without which the empirical determination thereof as to          
time would itself be impossible, and we also discovered rules of            
synthetical unity a priori, by means of which we could anticipate           
experience. For want of this method, and from the fancy that it was         
possible to discover a dogmatical proof of the synthetical                  
propositions which are requisite in the empirical employment of the         
understanding, has it happened that a proof of the principle of             
sufficient reason has been so often attempted, and always in vain. The      
other two analogies nobody has ever thought of, although they have          
always been silently employed by the mind,* because the guiding thread      
furnished by the categories was wanting, the guide which alone can          
enable us to discover every hiatus, both in the system of                   
conceptions and of principles.                                              
                                                  {BK_2|CH_2 ^paragraph 190}
-                                                                           
  *The unity of the universe, in which all phenomena to be                  
connected, is evidently a mere consequence of the admitted principle        
of the community of all substances which are coexistent. For were           
substances isolated, they could not as parts constitute a whole, and        
were their connection (reciprocal action of the manifold) not               
necessary from the very fact of coexistence, we could not conclude          
from the fact of the latter as a merely ideal relation to the former        
as a real one. We have, however, shown in its place that community          
is the proper ground of the possibility of an empirical cognition of        
coexistence, and that we may therefore properly reason from the latter      
to the former as its condition.                                             
-                                                                           
           4. THE POSTULATES OF EMPIRICAL THOUGHT.                          
-                                                                           
                                                  {BK_2|CH_2 ^paragraph 195}
  1. That which agrees with the formal conditions (intuition and            
conception) of experience, is possible.                                     
  2. That which coheres with the material conditions of experience          
(sensation), is real.                                                       
  3. That whose coherence with the real is determined according to          
universal conditions of experience is (exists) necessary.                   
-                                                                           
                       Explanation.                                         
                                                  {BK_2|CH_2 ^paragraph 200}
-                                                                           
  The categories of modality possess this peculiarity, that they do         
not in the least determine the object, or enlarge the conception to         
which they are annexed as predicates, but only express its relation to      
the faculty of cognition. Though my conception of a thing is in itself      
complete, I am still entitled to ask whether the object of it is            
merely possible, or whether it is also real, or, if the latter,             
whether it is also necessary. But hereby the object itself is not more      
definitely determined in thought, but the question is only in what          
relation it, including all its determinations, stands to the                
understanding and its employment in experience, to the empirical            
faculty of judgement, and to the reason of its application to               
experience.                                                                 
  For this very reason, too, the categories of modality are nothing         
more than explanations of the conceptions of possibility, reality, and      
necessity, as employed in experience, and at the same time,                 
restrictions of all the categories to empirical use alone, not              
authorizing the transcendental employment of them. For if they are          
to have something more than a merely logical significance, and to be        
something more than a mere analytical expression of the form of             
thought, and to have a relation to things and their possibility,            
reality, or necessity, they must concern possible experience and its        
synthetical unity, in which alone objects of cognition can be given.        
  The postulate of the possibility of things requires also, that the        
conception of the things agree with the formal conditions of our            
experience in general. But this, that is to say, the objective form of      
experience, contains all the kinds of synthesis which are requisite         
for the cognition of objects. A conception which contains a                 
synthesis must be regarded as empty and, without reference to an            
object, if its synthesis does not belong to experience- either as           
borrowed from it, and in this case it is called an empirical                
conception, or such as is the ground and a priori condition of              
experience (its form), and in this case it is a pure conception, a          
conception which nevertheless belongs to experience, inasmuch as its        
object can be found in this alone. For where shall we find the              
criterion or character of the possibility of an object which is             
cogitated by means of an a priori synthetical conception, if not in         
the synthesis which constitutes the form of empirical cognition of          
objects? That in such a conception no contradiction exists is indeed a      
necessary logical condition, but very far from being sufficient to          
establish the objective reality of the conception, that is, the             
possibility of such an object as is thought in the conception. Thus,        
in the conception of a figure which is contained within two straight        
lines, there is no contradiction, for the conceptions of two                
straight lines and of their junction contain no negation of a               
figure. The impossibility in such a case does not rest upon the             
conception in itself, but upon the construction of it in space, that        
is to say, upon the conditions of space and its determinations. But         
these have themselves objective reality, that is, they apply to             
possible things, because they contain a priori the form of                  
experience in general.                                                      
  And now we shall proceed to point out the extensive utility and           
influence of this postulate of possibility. When I represent to myself      
a thing that is permanent, so that everything in it which changes           
belongs merely to its state or condition, from such a conception alone      
I never can cognize that such a thing is possible. Or, if I                 
represent to myself something which is so constituted that, when it is      
posited, something else follows always and infallibly, my thought           
contains no self-contradiction; but whether such a property as              
causality is to be found in any possible thing, my thought alone            
affords no means of judging. Finally, I can represent to myself             
different things (substances) which are so constituted that the             
state or condition of one causes a change in the state of the other,        
and reciprocally; but whether such a relation is a property of              
things cannot be perceived from these conceptions, which contain a          
merely arbitrary synthesis. Only from the fact, therefore, that             
these conceptions express a priori the relations of perceptions in          
every experience, do we know that they possess objective reality, that      
is, transcendental truth; and that independent of experience, though        
not independent of all relation to form of an experience in general         
and its synthetical unity, in which alone objects can be empirically        
cognized.                                                                   
                                                  {BK_2|CH_2 ^paragraph 205}
  But when we fashion to ourselves new conceptions of substances,           
forces, action, and reaction, from the material presented to us by          
perception, without following the example of experience in their            
connection, we create mere chimeras, of the possibility of which we         
cannot discover any criterion, because we have not taken experience         
for our instructress, though we have borrowed the conceptions from          
her. Such fictitious conceptions derive their character of possibility      
not, like the categories, a priori, as conceptions on which all             
experience depends, but only, a posteriori, as conceptions given by         
means of experience itself, and their possibility must either be            
cognized a posteriori and empirically, or it cannot be cognized at          
all. A substance which is permanently present in space, yet without         
filling it (like that tertium quid between matter and the thinking          
subject which some have tried to introduce into metaphysics), or a          
peculiar fundamental power of the mind of intuiting the future by           
anticipation (instead of merely inferring from past and present             
events), or, finally, a power of the mind to place itself in community      
of thought with other men, however distant they may be- these are           
conceptions the possibility of which has no ground to rest upon. For        
they are not based upon experience and its known laws; and, without         
experience, they are a merely arbitrary conjunction of thoughts,            
which, though containing no internal contradiction, has no claim to         
objective reality, neither, consequently, to the possibility of such        
an object as is thought in these conceptions. As far as concerns            
reality, it is self-evident that we cannot cogitate such a possibility      
in concreto without the aid of experience; because reality is               
concerned only with sensation, as the matter of experience, and not         
with the form of thought, with which we can no doubt indulge in             
shaping fancies.                                                            
  But I pass by everything which derives its possibility from               
reality in experience, and I purpose treating here merely of the            
possibility of things by means of a priori conceptions. I maintain,         
then, that the possibility of things is not derived from such               
conceptions per se, but only when considered as formal and objective        
conditions of an experience in general.                                     
  It seems, indeed, as if the possibility of a triangle could be            
cognized from the conception of it alone (which is certainly                
independent of experience); for we can certainly give to the                
conception a corresponding object completely a priori, that is to say,      
we can construct it. But as a triangle is only the form of an               
object, it must remain a mere product of the imagination, and the           
possibility of the existence of an object corresponding to it must          
remain doubtful, unless we can discover some other ground, unless we        
know that the figure can be cogitated under the conditions upon             
which all objects of experience rest. Now, the facts that space is a        
formal condition a priori of external experience, that the formative        
synthesis, by which we construct a triangle in imagination, is the          
very same as that we employ in the apprehension of a phenomenon for         
the purpose of making an empirical conception of it, are what alone         
connect the notion of the possibility of such a thing, with the             
conception of it. In the same manner, the possibility of continuous         
quantities, indeed of quantities in general, for the conceptions of         
them are without exception synthetical, is never evident from the           
conceptions in themselves, but only when they are considered as the         
formal conditions of the determination of objects in experience. And        
where, indeed, should we look for objects to correspond to our              
conceptions, if not in experience, by which alone objects are               
presented to us? It is, however, true that without antecedent               
experience we can cognize and characterize the possibility of               
things, relatively to the formal conditions, under which something          
is determined in experience as an object, consequently, completely a        
priori. But still this is possible only in relation to experience           
and within its limits.                                                      
  The postulate concerning the cognition of the reality of things           
requires perception, consequently conscious sensation, not indeed           
immediately, that is, of the object itself, whose existence is to be        
cognized, but still that the object have some connection with a real        
perception, in accordance with the analogies of experience, which           
exhibit all kinds of real connection in experience.                         
  From the mere conception of a thing it is impossible to conclude its      
existence. For, let the conception be ever so complete, and containing      
a statement of all the determinations of the thing, the existence of        
it has nothing to do with all this, but only with thew question             
whether such a thing is given, so that the perception of it can in          
every case precede the conception. For the fact that the conception of      
it precedes the perception, merely indicates the possibility of its         
existence; it is perception which presents matter to the conception,        
that is the sole criterion of reality. Prior to the perception of           
the thing, however, and therefore comparatively a priori, we are            
able to cognize its existence, provided it stands in connection with        
some perceptions according to the principles of the empirical               
conjunction of these, that is, in conformity with the analogies of          
perception. For, in this case, the existence of the supposed thing          
is connected with our perception in a possible experience, and we           
are able, with the guidance of these analogies, to reason in the            
series of possible perceptions from a thing which we do really              
perceive to the thing we do not perceive. Thus, we cognize the              
existence of a magnetic matter penetrating all bodies from the              
perception of the attraction of the steel-filings by the magnet,            
although the constitution of our organs renders an immediate                
perception of this matter impossible for us. For, according to the          
laws of sensibility and the connected context of our perceptions, we        
should in an experience come also on an immediate empirical                 
intuition of this matter, if our senses were more acute- but this           
obtuseness has no influence upon and cannot alter the form of possible      
experience in general. Our knowledge of the existence of things             
reaches as far as our perceptions, and what may be inferred from            
them according to empirical laws, extend. If we do not set out from         
experience, or do not proceed according to the laws of the empirical        
connection of phenomena, our pretensions to discover the existence          
of a thing which we do not immediately perceive are vain. Idealism,         
however, brings forward powerful objections to these rules for proving      
existence mediately. This is, therefore, the proper place for its           
refutation.                                                                 
                                                  {BK_2|CH_2 ^paragraph 210}
-                                                                           
                 REFUTATION OF IDEALISM.                                    
-                                                                           
  Idealism- I mean material idealism- is the theory which declares the      
existence of objects in space without us to be either () doubtful           
and indemonstrable, or (2) false and impossible. The first is the           
problematical idealism of Descartes, who admits the undoubted               
certainty of only one empirical assertion (assertio), to wit, "I            
am." The second is the dogmatical idealism of Berkeley, who                 
maintains that space, together with all the objects of which it is the      
inseparable condition, is a thing which is in itself impossible, and        
that consequently the objects in space are mere products of the             
imagination. The dogmatical theory of idealism is unavoidable, if we        
regard space as a property of things in themselves; for in that case        
it is, with all to which it serves as condition, a nonentity. But           
the foundation for this kind of idealism we have already destroyed          
in the transcendental aesthetic. Problematical idealism, which makes        
no such assertion, but only alleges our incapacity to prove the             
existence of anything besides ourselves by means of immediate               
experience, is a theory rational and evidencing a thorough and              
philosophical mode of thinking, for it observes the rule not to form a      
decisive judgement before sufficient proof be shown. The desired proof      
must therefore demonstrate that we have experience of external things,      
and not mere fancies. For this purpose, we must prove, that our             
internal and, to Descartes, indubitable experience is itself                
possible only under the previous assumption of external experience.         
-                                                                           
                                                  {BK_2|CH_2 ^paragraph 215}
                        THEOREM.                                            
-                                                                           
    The simple but empirically determined consciousness of                  
       my own existence proves the existence of external                    
       objects in space.                                                    
                                                  {BK_2|CH_2 ^paragraph 220}
-                                                                           
                         PROOF                                              
-                                                                           
  I am conscious of my own existence as determined in time. All             
determination in regard to time presupposes the existence of something      
permanent in perception. But this permanent something cannot be             
something in me, for the very reason that my existence in time is           
itself determined by this permanent something. It follows that the          
perception of this permanent existence is possible only through a           
thing without me and not through the mere representation of a thing         
without me. Consequently, the determination of my existence in time is      
possible only through the existence of real things external to me.          
Now, consciousness in time is necessarily connected with the                
consciousness of the possibility of this determination in time.             
Hence it follows that consciousness in time is necessarily connected        
also with the existence of things without me, inasmuch as the               
existence of these things is the condition of determination in time.        
That is to say, the consciousness of my own existence is at the same        
time an immediate consciousness of the existence of other things            
without me.                                                                 
  Remark I. The reader will observe, that in the foregoing proof the        
game which idealism plays is retorted upon itself, and with more            
justice. It assumed that the only immediate experience is internal and      
that from this we can only infer the existence of external things.          
But, as always happens, when we reason from given effects to                
determined causes, idealism bas reasoned with too much haste and            
uncertainty, for it is quite possible that the cause of our                 
representations may lie in ourselves, and that we ascribe it falsely        
to external things. But our proof shows that external experience is         
properly immediate,* that only by virtue of it- not, indeed, the            
consciousness of our own existence, but certainly the determination of      
our existence in time, that is, internal experience- is possible. It        
is true, that the representation "I am," which is the expression of         
the consciousness which can accompany all my thoughts, is that which        
immediately includes the existence of a subject. But in this                
representation we cannot find any knowledge of the subject, and             
therefore also no empirical knowledge, that is, experience. For             
experience contains, in addition to the thought of something existing,      
intuition, and in this case it must be internal intuition, that is,         
time, in relation to which the subject must be determined. But the          
existence of external things is absolutely requisite for this purpose,      
so that it follows that internal experience is itself possible only         
mediately and through external experience.                                  
                                                  {BK_2|CH_2 ^paragraph 225}
-                                                                           
  *The immediate consciousness of the existence of external things is,      
in the preceding theorem, not presupposed, but proved, by the               
possibility of this consciousness understood by us or not. The              
question as to the possibility of it would stand thus: "Have we an          
internal sense, but no external sense, and is our belief in external        
perception a mere delusion?" But it is evident that, in order merely        
to fancy to ourselves anything as external, that is, to present it          
to the sense in intuition we must already possess an external sense,        
and must thereby distinguish immediately the mere receptivity of an         
external intuition from the spontaneity which characterizes every           
act of imagination. For merely to imagine also an external sense,           
would annihilate the faculty of intuition itself which is to be             
determined by the imagination.                                              
-                                                                           
  Remark II. Now with this view all empirical use of our faculty of         
cognition in the determination of time is in perfect accordance. Its        
truth is supported by the fact that it is possible to perceive a            
determination of time only by means of a change in external                 
relations (motion) to the permanent in space (for example, we become        
aware of the sun's motion by observing the changes of his relation          
to the objects of this earth). But this is not all. We find that we         
possess nothing permanent that can correspond and be submitted to           
the conception of a substance as intuition, except matter. This idea        
of permanence is not itself derived from external experience, but is        
an a priori necessary condition of all determination of time,               
consequently also of the internal sense in reference to our own             
existence, and that through the existence of external things. In the        
representation "I," the consciousness of myself is not an intuition,        
but a merely intellectual representation produced by the spontaneous        
activity of a thinking subject. It follows, that this "I" has not           
any predicate of intuition, which, in its character of permanence,          
could serve as correlate to the determination of time in the                
internal sense- in the same way as impenetrability is the correlate of      
matter as an empirical intuition.                                           
  Remark III. From the fact that the existence of external things is a      
necessary condition of the possibility of a determined consciousness        
of ourselves, it does not follow that every intuitive representation        
of external things involves the existence of these things, for their        
representations may very well be the mere products of the                   
imagination (in dreams as well as in madness); though, indeed, these        
are themselves created by the reproduction of previous external             
perceptions, which, as has been shown, are possible only through the        
reality of external objects. The sole aim of our remarks has, however,      
been to prove that internal experience in general is possible only          
through external experience in general. Whether this or that                
supposed experience be purely imaginary must be discovered from its         
particular determinations and by comparing these with the criteria          
of all real experience.                                                     
                                                  {BK_2|CH_2 ^paragraph 230}
-                                                                           
  Finally, as regards the third postulate, it applies to material           
necessity in existence, and not to merely formal and logical necessity      
in the connection of conceptions. Now as we cannot cognize                  
completely a priori the existence of any object of sense, though we         
can do so comparatively a priori, that is, relatively to some other         
previously given existence- a cognition, however, which can only be of      
such an existence as must be contained in the complex of experience,        
of which the previously given perception is a part- the necessity of        
existence can never be cognized from conceptions, but always, on the        
contrary, from its connection with that which is an object of               
perception. But the only existence cognized, under the condition of         
other given phenomena, as necessary, is the existence of effects            
from given causes in conformity with the laws of causality. It is           
consequently not the necessity of the existence of things (as               
substances), but the necessity of the state of things that we cognize,      
and that not immediately, but by means of the existence of other            
states given in perception, according to empirical laws of                  
causality. Hence it follows that the criterion of necessity is to be        
found only in the law of possible experience- that everything which         
happens is determined a priori in the phenomenon by its cause. Thus we      
cognize only the necessity of effects in nature, the causes of which        
are given us. Moreover, the criterion of necessity in existence             
possesses no application beyond the field of possible experience,           
and even in this it is not valid of the existence of things as              
substances, because these can never be considered as empirical              
effects, or as something that happens and has a beginning.                  
Necessity, therefore, regards only the relations of phenomena               
according to the dynamical law of causality, and the possibility            
grounded thereon, of reasoning from some given existence (of a              
cause) a priori to another existence (of an effect). "Everything            
that happens is hypothetically necessary," is a principle which             
subjects the changes that take place in the world to a law, that is,        
to a rule of necessary existence, without which nature herself could        
not possibly exist. Hence the proposition, "Nothing happens by blind        
chance (in mundo non datur casus)," is an a priori law of nature.           
The case is the same with the proposition, "Necessity in nature is not      
blind," that is, it is conditioned, consequently intelligible               
necessity (non datur fatum). Both laws subject the play of change to        
"a nature of things (as phenomena)," or, which is the same thing, to        
the unity of the understanding, and through the understanding alone         
can changes belong to an experience, as the synthetical unity of            
phenomena. Both belong to the class of dynamical principles. The            
former is properly a consequence of the principle of causality- one of      
the analogies of experience. The latter belongs to the principles of        
modality, which to the determination of causality adds the                  
conception of necessity, which is itself, however, subject to a rule        
of the understanding. The principle of continuity forbids any leap          
in the series of phenomena regarded as changes (in mundo non datur          
saltus); and likewise, in the complex of all empirical intuitions in        
space, any break or hiatus between two phenomena (non datur hiatus)-        
for we can so express the principle, that experience can admit nothing      
which proves the existence of a vacuum, or which even admits it as a        
part of an empirical synthesis. For, as regards a vacuum or void,           
which we may cogitate as out and beyond the field of possible               
experience (the world), such a question cannot come before the              
tribunal of mere understanding, which decides only upon questions that      
concern the employment of given phenomena for the construction of           
empirical cognition. It is rather a problem for ideal reason, which         
passes beyond the sphere of a possible experience and aims at               
forming a judgement of that which surrounds and circumscribes it,           
and the proper place for the consideration of it is the transcendental      
dialectic. These four propositions, "In mundo non datur hiatus, non         
datur saltus, non datur casus, non datur fatum," as well as all             
principles of transcendental origin, we could very easily exhibit in        
their proper order, that is, in conformity with the order of the            
categories, and assign to each its proper place. But the already            
practised reader will do this for himself, or discover the clue to          
such an arrangement. But the combined result of all is simply this, to      
admit into the empirical synthesis nothing which might cause a break        
in or be foreign to the understanding and the continuous connection of      
all phenomena, that is, the unity of the conceptions of the                 
understanding. For in the understanding alone is the unity of               
experience, in which all perceptions must have their assigned place,        
possible.                                                                   
  Whether the field of possibility be greater than that of reality,         
and whether the field of the latter be itself greater than that of          
necessity, are interesting enough questions, and quite capable of           
synthetic solution, questions, however, which come under the                
jurisdiction of reason alone. For they are tantamount to asking             
whether all things as phenomena do without exception belong to the          
complex and connected whole of a single experience, of which every          
given perception is a part which therefore cannot be conjoined with         
any other phenomena- or, whether my perceptions can belong to more          
than one possible experience? The understanding gives to experience,        
according to the subjective and formal conditions, of sensibility as        
well as of apperception, the rules which alone make this experience         
possible. Other forms of intuition besides those of space and time,         
other forms of understanding besides the discursive forms of                
thought, or of cognition by means of conceptions, we can neither            
imagine nor make intelligible to ourselves; and even if we could, they      
would still not belong to experience, which is the only mode of             
cognition by which objects are presented to us. Whether other               
perceptions besides those which belong to the total of our possible         
experience, and consequently whether some other sphere of matter            
exists, the understanding has no power to decide, its proper                
occupation being with the synthesis of that which is given.                 
Moreover, the poverty of the usual arguments which go to prove the          
existence of a vast sphere of possibility, of which all that is real        
(every object of experience) is but a small part, is very                   
remarkable. "All real is possible"; from this follows naturally,            
according to the logical laws of conversion, the particular                 
proposition: "Some possible is real." Now this seems to be                  
equivalent to: "Much is possible that is not real." No doubt it does        
seem as if we ought to consider the sum of the possible to be               
greater than that of the real, from the fact that something must be         
added to the former to constitute the latter. But this notion of            
adding to the possible is absurd. For that which is not in the sum          
of the possible, and consequently requires to be added to it, is            
manifestly impossible. In addition to accordance with the formal            
conditions of experience, the understanding requires a connection with      
some perception; but that which is connected with this perception is        
real, even although it is not immediately perceived. But that               
another series of phenomena, in complete coherence with that which          
is given in perception, consequently more than one all-embracing            
experience is possible, is an inference which cannot be concluded from      
the data given us by experience, and still less without any data at         
all. That which is possible only under conditions which are themselves      
merely possible, is not possible in any respect. And yet we can find        
no more certain ground on which to base the discussion of the question      
whether the sphere of possibility is wider than that of experience.         
  I have merely mentioned these questions, that in treating of the          
conception of the understanding, there might be no omission of              
anything that, in the common opinion, belongs to them. In reality,          
however, the notion of absolute possibility (possibility which is           
valid in every respect) is not a mere conception of the understanding,      
which can be employed empirically, but belongs to reason alone,             
which passes the bounds of all empirical use of the understanding.          
We have, therefore, contented ourselves with a merely critical remark,      
leaving the subject to be explained in the sequel.                          
  Before concluding this fourth section, and at the same time the           
system of all principles of the pure understanding, it seems proper to      
mention the reasons which induced me to term the principles of              
modality postulates. This expression I do not here use in the sense         
which some more recent philosophers, contrary to its meaning with           
mathematicians, to whom the word properly belongs, attach to it-            
that of a proposition, namely, immediately certain, requiring               
neither deduction nor proof. For if, in the case of synthetical             
propositions, however evident they may be, we accord to them without        
deduction, and merely on the strength of their own pretensions,             
unqualified belief, all critique of the understanding is entirely           
lost; and, as there is no want of bold pretensions, which the common        
belief (though for the philosopher this is no credential) does not          
reject, the understanding lies exposed to every delusion and                
conceit, without the power of refusing its assent to those assertions,      
which, though illegitimate, demand acceptance as veritable axioms.          
When, therefore, to the conception of a thing an a priori                   
determination is synthetically added, such a proposition must               
obtain, if not a proof, at least a deduction of the legitimacy of           
its assertion.                                                              
                                                  {BK_2|CH_2 ^paragraph 235}
  The principles of modality are, however, not objectively                  
synthetical, for the predicates of possibility, reality, and necessity      
do not in the least augment the conception of that of which they are        
affirmed, inasmuch as they contribute nothing to the representation of      
the object. But as they are, nevertheless, always synthetical, they         
are so merely subjectively. That is to say, they have a reflective          
power, and apply to the conception of a thing, of which, in other           
respects, they affirm nothing, the faculty of cognition in which the        
conception originates and has its seat. So that if the conception           
merely agree with the formal conditions of experience, its object is        
called possible; if it is in connection with perception, and                
determined thereby, the object is real; if it is determined                 
according to conceptions by means of the connection of perceptions,         
the object is called necessary. The principles of modality therefore        
predicate of a conception nothing more than the procedure of the            
faculty of cognition which generated it. Now a postulate in                 
mathematics is a practical proposition which contains nothing but           
the synthesis by which we present an object to ourselves, and               
produce the conception of it, for example- "With a given line, to           
describe a circle upon a plane, from a given point"; and such a             
proposition does not admit of proof, because the procedure, which it        
requires, is exactly that by which alone it is possible to generate         
the conception of such a figure. With the same right, accordingly, can      
we postulate the principles of modality, because they do not                
augment* the conception of a thing but merely indicate the manner in        
which it is connected with the faculty of cognition.                        
-                                                                           
  *When I think the reality of a thing, I do really think more than         
the possibility, but not in the thing; for that can never contain more      
in reality than was contained in its complete possibility. But while        
the notion of possibility is merely the notion of a position of             
thing in relation to the understanding (its empirical use), reality is      
the conjunction of the thing with perception.                               
-                                                                           
           GENERAL REMARK ON THE SYSTEM OF PRINCIPLES.                      
                                                  {BK_2|CH_2 ^paragraph 240}
-                                                                           
  It is very remarkable that we cannot perceive the possibility of a        
thing from the category alone, but must always have an intuition, by        
which to make evident the objective reality of the pure conception          
of the understanding. Take, for example, the categories of relation.        
How (1) a thing can exist only as a subject, and not as a mere              
determination of other things, that is, can be substance; or how            
(2), because something exists, some other thing must exist,                 
consequently how a thing can be a cause; or how (3), when several           
things exist, from the fact that one of these things exists, some           
consequence to the others follows, and reciprocally, and in this way a      
community of substances can be possible- are questions whose                
solution cannot be obtained from mere conceptions. The very same is         
the case with the other categories; for example, how a thing can be of      
the same sort with many others, that is, can be a quantity, and so on.      
So long as we have not intuition we cannot know whether we do really        
think an object by the categories, and where an object can anywhere be      
found to cohere with them, and thus the truth is established, that the      
categories are not in themselves cognitions, but mere forms of thought      
for the construction of cognitions from given intuitions. For the same      
reason is it true that from categories alone no synthetical                 
proposition can be made. For example: "In every existence there is          
substance," that is, something that can exist only as a subject and         
not as mere predicate; or, "Everything is a quantity"- to construct         
propositions such as these, we require something to enable us to go         
out beyond the given conception and connect another with it. For the        
same reason the attempt to prove a synthetical proposition by means of      
mere conceptions, for example: "Everything that exists contingently         
has a cause," has never succeeded. We could never get further than          
proving that, without this relation to conceptions, we could not            
conceive the existence of the contingent, that is, could not a              
priori through the understanding cognize the existence of such a            
thing; but it does not hence follow that this is also the condition of      
the possibility of the thing itself that is said to be contingent. If,      
accordingly; we look back to our proof of the principle of                  
causality, we shall find that we were able to prove it as valid only        
of objects of possible experience, and, indeed, only as itself the          
principle of the possibility of experience, Consequently of the             
cognition of an object given in empirical intuition, and not from mere      
conceptions. That, however, the proposition: "Everything that is            
contingent must have a cause," is evident to every one merely from          
conceptions, is not to be denied. But in this case the conception of        
the contingent is cogitated as involving not the category of                
modality (as that the non-existence of which can be conceive but            
that of relation (as that which can exist only as the consequence of        
something else), and so it is really an identical proposition: "That        
which can exist only as a consequence, has a cause." In fact, when          
we have to give examples of contingent existence, we always refer to        
changes, and not merely to the possibility of conceiving the                
opposite.* But change is an event, which, as such, is possible only         
through a cause, and considered per se its non-existence is                 
therefore possible, and we become cognizant of its contingency from         
the fact that it can exist only as the effect of a cause. Hence, if         
a thing is assumed to be contingent, it is an analytical proposition        
to say, it has a cause.                                                     
-                                                                           
  *We can easily conceive the non-existence of matter; but the              
ancients did not thence infer its contingency. But even the                 
alternation of the existence and non-existence of a given state in a        
thing, in which all change consists, by no means proves the                 
contingency of that state- the ground of proof being the reality of         
its opposite. For example, a body is in a state of rest after               
motion, but we cannot infer the contingency of the motion from the          
fact that the former is the opposite of the latter. For this                
opposite is merely a logical and not a real opposite to the other.          
If we wish to demonstrate the contingency of the motion, what we ought      
to prove is that, instead of the motion which took place in the             
preceding point of time, it was possible for the body to have been          
then in rest, not, that it is afterwards in rest; for in this case,         
both opposites are perfectly consistent with each other.                    
-                                                                           
                                                  {BK_2|CH_2 ^paragraph 245}
  But it is still more remarkable that, to understand the                   
possibility of things according to the categories and thus to               
demonstrate the objective reality of the latter, we require not merely      
intuitions, but external intuitions. If, for example, we take the pure      
conceptions of relation, we find that (1) for the purpose of                
presenting to the conception of substance something permanent in            
intuition corresponding thereto and thus of demonstrating the               
objective reality of this conception, we require an intuition (of           
matter) in space, because space alone is permanent and determines           
things as such, while time, and with it all that is in the internal         
sense, is in a state of continual flow; (2) in order to represent           
change as the intuition corresponding to the conception of                  
causality, we require the representation of motion as change in space;      
in fact, it is through it alone that changes, the possibility of which      
no pure understanding can perceive, are capable of being intuited.          
Change is the connection of determinations contradictorily opposed          
to each other in the existence of one and the same thing. Now, how          
it is possible that out of a given state one quite opposite to it in        
the same thing should follow, reason without an example can not only        
not conceive, but cannot even make intelligible without intuition; and      
this intuition is the motion of a point in space; the existence of          
which in different spaces (as a consequence of opposite                     
determinations) alone makes the intuition of change possible. For,          
in order to make even internal change cognitable, we require to             
represent time, as the form of the internal sense, figuratively by a        
line, and the internal change by the drawing of that line (motion),         
and consequently are obliged to employ external intuition to be able        
to represent the successive existence of ourselves in different             
states. The proper ground of this fact is that all change to be             
perceived as change presupposes something permanent in intuition,           
while in the internal sense no permanent intuition is to be found.          
Lastly, the objective possibility of the category of community              
cannot be conceived by mere reason, and consequently its objective          
reality cannot be demonstrated without an intuition, and that external      
in space. For how can we conceive the possibility of community, that        
is, when several substances exist, that some effect on the existence        
of the one follows from the existence of the other, and                     
reciprocally, and therefore that, because something exists in the           
latter, something else must exist in the former, which could not be         
understood from its own existence alone? For this is the very               
essence of community- which is inconceivable as a property of things        
which are perfectly isolated. Hence, Leibnitz, in attributing to the        
substances of the world- as cogitated by the understanding alone- a         
community, required the mediating aid of a divinity; for, from their        
existence, such a property seemed to him with justice inconceivable.        
But we can very easily conceive the possibility of community (of            
substances as phenomena) if we represent them to ourselves as in            
space, consequently in external intuition. For external intuition           
contains in itself a priori formal external relations, as the               
conditions of the possibility of the real relations of action and           
reaction, and therefore of the possibility of community. With the same      
ease can it be demonstrated, that the possibility of things as              
quantities, and consequently the objective reality of the category          
of quantity, can be grounded only in external intuition, and that by        
its means alone is the notion of quantity appropriated by the internal      
sense. But I must avoid prolixity, and leave the task of                    
illustrating this by examples to the reader's own reflection.               
  The above remarks are of the greatest importance, not only for the        
confirmation of our previous confutation of idealism, but still more        
when the subject of self-cognition by mere internal consciousness           
and the determination of our own nature without the aid of external         
empirical intuitions is under discussion, for the indication of the         
grounds of the possibility of such a cognition.                             
  The result of the whole of this part of the analytic of principles        
is, therefore: "All principles of the pure understanding are nothing        
more than a priori principles of the possibility of experience, and to      
experience alone do all a priori synthetical propositions apply and         
relate"; indeed, their possibility itself rests entirely on this            
relation.                                                                   
                                                                            
BK_2|CH_3                                                                   
    CHAPTER III Of the Ground of the Division of all Objects                
                 into Phenomena and Noumena.                                
-                                                                           
  We have now not only traversed the region of the pure                     
understanding and carefully surveyed every part of it, but we have          
also measured it, and assigned to everything therein its proper place.      
But this land is an island, and enclosed by nature herself within           
unchangeable limits. It is the land of truth (an attractive word),          
surrounded by a wide and stormy ocean, the region of illusion, where        
many a fog-bank, many an iceberg, seems to the mariner, on his              
voyage of discovery, a new country, and, while constantly deluding him      
with vain hopes, engages him in dangerous adventures, from which he         
never can desist, and which yet he never can bring to a termination.        
But before venturing upon this sea, in order to explore it in its           
whole extent, and to arrive at a certainty whether anything is to be        
discovered there, it will not be without advantage if we cast our eyes      
upon the chart of the land that we are about to leave, and to ask           
ourselves, firstly, whether we cannot rest perfectly contented with         
what it contains, or whether we must not of necessity be contented          
with it, if we can find nowhere else a solid foundation to build upon;      
and, secondly, by what title we possess this land itself, and how we        
hold it secure against all hostile claims? Although, in the course          
of our analytic, we have already given sufficient answers to these          
questions, yet a summary recapitulation of these solutions may be           
useful in strengthening our conviction, by uniting in one point the         
momenta of the arguments.                                                   
  We have seen that everything which the understanding draws from           
itself, without borrowing from experience, it nevertheless possesses        
only for the behoof and use of experience. The principles of the            
pure understanding, whether constitutive a priori (as the mathematical      
principles), or merely regulative (as the dynamical), contain               
nothing but the pure schema, as it were, of possible experience. For        
experience possesses its unity from the synthetical unity which the         
understanding, originally and from itself, imparts to the synthesis of      
the imagination in relation to apperception, and in a priori                
relation to and agreement with which phenomena, as data for a possible      
cognition, must stand. But although these rules of the understanding        
are not only a priori true, but the very source of all truth, that is,      
of the accordance of our cognition with objects, and on this ground,        
that they contain the basis of the possibility of experience, as the        
ensemble of all cognition, it seems to us not enough to propound            
what is true- we desire also to be told what we want to know. If,           
then, we learn nothing more by this critical examination than what          
we should have practised in the merely empirical use of the                 
understanding, without any such subtle inquiry, the presumption is          
that the advantage we reap from it is not worth the labour bestowed         
upon it. It may certainly be answered that no rash curiosity is more        
prejudicial to the enlargement of our knowledge than that which must        
know beforehand the utility of this or that piece of information which      
we seek, before we have entered on the needful investigations, and          
before one could form the least conception of its utility, even though      
it were placed before our eyes. But there is one advantage in such          
transcendental inquiries which can be made comprehensible to the            
dullest and most reluctant learner- this, namely, that the                  
understanding which is occupied merely with empirical exercise, and         
does not reflect on the sources of its own cognition, may exercise its      
functions very well and very successfully, but is quite unable to do        
one thing, and that of very great importance, to determine, namely,         
the bounds that limit its employment, and to know what lies within          
or without its own sphere. This purpose can be obtained only by such        
profound investigations as we have instituted. But if it cannot             
distinguish whether certain questions lie within its horizon or not,        
it can never be sure either as to its claims or possessions, but            
must lay its account with many humiliating corrections, when it             
transgresses, as it unavoidably will, the limits of its own territory,      
and loses itself in fanciful opinions and blinding illusions.               
  That the understanding, therefore, cannot make of its a priori            
principles, or even of its conceptions, other than an empirical use,        
is a proposition which leads to the most important results. A               
transcendental use is made of a conception in a fundamental                 
proposition or principle, when it is referred to things in general and      
considered as things in themselves; an empirical use, when it is            
referred merely to phenomena, that is, to objects of a possible             
experience. That the latter use of a conception is the only admissible      
one is evident from the reasons following. For every conception are         
requisite, firstly, the logical form of a conception (of thought)           
general; and, secondly, the possibility of presenting to this an            
object to which it may apply. Failing this latter, it has no sense,         
and utterly void of content, although it may contain the logical            
function for constructing a conception from certain data. Now,              
object cannot be given to a conception otherwise than by intuition,         
and, even if a pure intuition antecedent to the object is a priori          
possible, this pure intuition can itself obtain objective validity          
only from empirical intuition, of which it is itself but the form. All      
conceptions, therefore, and with them all principles, however high the      
degree of their a priori possibility, relate to empirical                   
intuitions, that is, to data towards a possible experience. Without         
this they possess no objective validity, but are mere play of               
imagination or of understanding with images or notions. Let us take,        
for example, the conceptions of mathematics, and first in its pure          
intuitions. "Space has three dimensions"- "Between two points there         
can be only one straight line," etc. Although all these principles,         
and the representation of the object with which this science                
occupies itself, are generated in the mind entirely a priori, they          
would nevertheless have no significance if we were not always able          
to exhibit their significance in and by means of phenomena                  
(empirical objects). Hence it is requisite that an abstract conception      
be made sensuous, that is, that an object corresponding to it in            
intuition be forthcoming, otherwise the conception remains, as we say,      
without sense, that is, without meaning. Mathematics fulfils this           
requirement by the construction of the figure, which is a phenomenon        
evident to the senses. The same science finds support and significance      
in number; this in its turn finds it in the fingers, or in counters,        
or in lines and points. The conception itself is always produced a          
priori, together with the synthetical principles or formulas from such      
conceptions; but the proper employment of them, and their                   
application to objects, can exist nowhere but in experience, the            
possibility of which, as regards its form, they contain a priori.           
  That this is also the case with all of the categories and the             
principles based upon them is evident from the fact that we cannot          
render intelligible the possibility of an object corresponding to them      
without having recourse to the conditions of sensibility,                   
consequently, to the form of phenomena, to which, as their only proper      
objects, their use must therefore be confined, inasmuch as, if this         
condition is removed, all significance, that is, all relation to an         
object, disappears, and no example can be found to make it                  
comprehensible what sort of things we ought to think under such             
conceptions.                                                                
                                                    {BK_2|CH_3 ^paragraph 5}
  The conception of quantity cannot be explained except by saying that      
it is the determination of a thing whereby it can be cogitated how          
many times one is placed in it. But this "how many times" is based          
upon successive repetition, consequently upon time and the synthesis        
of the homogeneous therein. Reality, in contradistinction to negation,      
can be explained only by cogitating a time which is either filled           
therewith or is void. If I leave out the notion of permanence (which        
is existence in all time), there remains in the conception of               
substance nothing but the logical notion of subject, a notion of which      
I endeavour to realize by representing to myself something that can         
exist only as a subject. But not only am I perfectly ignorant of any        
conditions under which this logical prerogative can belong to a thing,      
I can make nothing out of the notion, and draw no inference from it,        
because no object to which to apply the conception is determined,           
and we consequently do not know whether it has any meaning at all.          
In like manner, if I leave out the notion of time, in which                 
something follows upon some other thing in conformity with a rule, I        
can find nothing in the pure category, except that there is a               
something of such a sort that from it a conclusion may be drawn as          
to the existence of some other thing. But in this case it would not         
only be impossible to distinguish between a cause and an effect,            
but, as this power to draw conclusions requires conditions of which         
I am quite ignorant, the conception is not determined as to the mode        
in which it ought to apply to an object. The so-called principle:           
"Everything that is contingent has a cause," comes with a gravity           
and self-assumed authority that seems to require no support from            
without. But, I ask, what is meant by contingent? The answer is that        
the non-existence of which is possible. But I should like very well to      
know by what means this possibility of non-existence is to be               
cognized, if we do not represent to ourselves a succession in the           
series of phenomena, and in this succession an existence which follows      
a non-existence, or conversely, consequently, change. For to say, that      
the non-existence of a thing is not self-contradictory is a lame            
appeal to a logical condition, which is no doubt a necessary condition      
of the existence of the conception, but is far from being sufficient        
for the real objective possibility of non-existence. I can                  
annihilate in thought every existing substance without                      
self-contradiction, but I cannot infer from this their objective            
contingency in existence, that is to say, the possibility of their          
non-existence in itself. As regards the category of community, it           
may easily be inferred that, as the pure categories of substance and        
causality are incapable of a definition and explanation sufficient          
to determine their object without the aid of intuition, the category        
of reciprocal causality in the relation of substances to each other         
(commercium) is just as little susceptible thereof. Possibility,            
existence, and necessity nobody has ever yet been able to explain           
without being guilty of manifest tautology, when the definition has         
been drawn entirely from the pure understanding. For the                    
substitution of the logical possibility of the conception- the              
condition of which is that it be not self-contradictory, for the            
transcendental possibility of things- the condition of which is that        
there be an object corresponding to the conception, is a trick which        
can only deceive the inexperienced.*                                        
-                                                                           
  *In one word, to none of these conceptions belongs a corresponding        
object, and consequently their real possibility cannot be                   
demonstrated, if we take away sensuous intuition- the only intuition        
which we possess- and there then remains nothing but the logical            
possibility, that is, the fact that the conception or thought is            
possible- which, however, is not the question; what we want to know         
being, whether it relates to an object and thus possesses any meaning.      
-                                                                           
  It follows incontestably, that the pure conceptions of the                
understanding are incapable of transcendental, and must always be of        
empirical use alone, and that the principles of the pure understanding      
relate only to the general conditions of a possible experience, to          
objects of the senses, and never to things in general, apart from           
the mode in which we intuite them.                                          
                                                   {BK_2|CH_3 ^paragraph 10}
  Transcendental analytic has accordingly this important result, to         
wit, that the understanding is competent' effect nothing a priori,          
except the anticipation of the form of a possible experience in             
general, and that, as that which is not phenomenon cannot be an object      
of experience, it can never overstep the limits of sensibility, within      
which alone objects are presented to us. Its principles are merely          
principles of the exposition of phenomena, and the proud name of an         
ontology, which professes to present synthetical cognitions a priori        
of things in general in a systematic doctrine, must give place to           
the modest title of analytic of the pure understanding.                     
  Thought is the act of referring a given intuition to an object. If        
the mode of this intuition is unknown to us, the object is merely           
transcendental, and the conception of the understanding is employed         
only transcendentally, that is, to produce unity in the thought of a        
manifold in general. Now a pure category, in which all conditions of        
sensuous intuition- as the only intuition we possess- are                   
abstracted, does not determine an object, but merely expresses the          
thought of an object in general, according to different modes. Now, to      
employ a conception, the function of judgement is required, by which        
an object is subsumed under the conception, consequently the at             
least formal condition, under which something can be given in               
intuition. Failing this condition of judgement (schema), subsumption        
is impossible; for there is in such a case nothing given, which may be      
subsumed under the conception. The merely transcendental use of the         
categories is therefore, in fact, no use at all and has no determined,      
or even, as regards its form, determinable object. Hence it follows         
that the pure category is incompetent to establish a synthetical a          
priori principle, and that the principles of the pure understanding         
are only of empirical and never of transcendental use, and that beyond      
the sphere of possible experience no synthetical a priori principles        
are possible.                                                               
  It may be advisable, therefore, to express ourselves thus. The            
pure categories, apart from the formal conditions of sensibility, have      
a merely transcendental meaning, but are nevertheless not of                
transcendental use, because this is in itself impossible, inasmuch          
as all the conditions of any employment or use of them (in judgements)      
are absent, to wit, the formal conditions of the subsumption of an          
object under these conceptions. As, therefore, in the character of          
pure categories, they must be employed empirically, and cannot be           
employed transcendentally, they are of no use at all, when separated        
from sensibility, that is, they cannot be applied to an object. They        
are merely the pure form of the employment of the understanding in          
respect of objects in general and of thought, without its being at the      
same time possible to think or to determine any object by their means.      
  But there lurks at the foundation of this subject an illusion             
which it is very difficult to avoid. The categories are not based,          
as regards their origin, upon sensibility, like the forms of                
intuition, space, and time; they seem, therefore, to be capable of          
an application beyond the sphere of sensuous objects. But this is           
not the case. They are nothing but mere forms of thought, which             
contain only the logical faculty of uniting a priori in                     
consciousness the manifold given in intuition. Apart, then, from the        
only intuition possible for us, they have still less meaning than           
the pure sensuous forms, space and time, for through them an object is      
at least given, while a mode of connection of the manifold, when the        
intuition which alone gives the manifold is wanting, has no meaning at      
all. At the same time, when we designate certain objects as                 
phenomena or sensuous existences, thus distinguishing our mode of           
intuiting them from their own nature as things in themselves, it is         
evident that by this very distinction we as it were place the               
latter, considered in this their own nature, although we do not so          
intuite them, in opposition to the former, or, on the other hand, we        
do so place other possible things, which are not objects of our             
senses, but are cogitated by the understanding alone, and call them         
intelligible existences (noumena). Now the question arises whether the      
pure conceptions of our understanding do possess significance in            
respect of these latter, and may possibly be a mode of cognizing them.      
  But we are met at the very commencement with an ambiguity, which may      
easily occasion great misapprehension. The understanding, when it           
terms an object in a certain relation phenomenon, at the same time          
forms out of this relation a representation or notion of an object          
in itself, and hence believes that it can form also conceptions of          
such objects. Now as the understanding possesses no other                   
fundamental conceptions besides the categories, it takes for granted        
that an object considered as a thing in itself must be capable of           
being thought by means of these pure conceptions, and is thereby led        
to hold the perfectly undetermined conception of an intelligible            
existence, a something out of the sphere of our sensibility, for a          
determinate conception of an existence which we can cognize in some         
way or other by means of the understanding.                                 
                                                   {BK_2|CH_3 ^paragraph 15}
  If, by the term noumenon, we understand a thing so far as it is           
not an object of our sensuous intuition, thus making abstraction of         
our mode of intuiting it, this is a noumenon in the negative sense          
of the word. But if we understand by it an object of a non-sensuous         
intuition, we in this case assume a peculiar mode of intuition, an          
intellectual intuition, to wit, which does not, however, belong to us,      
of the very possibility of which we have no notion- and this is a           
noumenon in the positive sense.                                             
  The doctrine of sensibility is also the doctrine of noumena in the        
negative sense, that is, of things which the understanding is               
obliged to cogitate apart from any relation to our mode of                  
intuition, consequently not as mere phenomena, but as things in             
themselves. But the understanding at the same time comprehends that it      
cannot employ its categories for the consideration of things in             
themselves, because these possess significance only in relation to the      
unity of intuitions in space and time, and that they are competent          
to determine this unity by means of general a priori connecting             
conceptions only on account of the pure ideality of space and time.         
Where this unity of time is not to be met with, as is the case with         
noumena, the whole use, indeed the whole meaning of the categories          
is entirely lost, for even the possibility of things to correspond          
to the categories is in this case incomprehensible. On this point, I        
need only refer the reader to what I have said at the commencement          
of the General Remark appended to the foregoing chapter. Now, the           
possibility of a thing can never be proved from the fact that the           
conception of it is not self-contradictory, but only by means of an         
intuition corresponding to the conception. If, therefore, we wish to        
apply the categories to objects which cannot be regarded as phenomena,      
we must have an intuition different from the sensuous, and in this          
case the objects would be a noumena in the positive sense of the word.      
Now, as such an intuition, that is, an intellectual intuition, is no        
part of our faculty of cognition, it is absolutely impossible for           
the categories to possess any application beyond the limits of              
experience. It may be true that there are intelligible existences to        
which our faculty of sensuous intuition has no relation, and cannot be      
applied, but our conceptions of the understanding, as mere forms of         
thought for our sensuous intuition, do not extend to these. What,           
therefore, we call noumenon must be understood by us as such in a           
negative sense.                                                             
  If I take away from an empirial intuition all thought (by means of        
the categories), there remains no cognition of any object; for by           
means of mere intuition nothing is cogitated, and, from the                 
existence of such or such an affection of sensibility in me, it does        
not follow that this affection or representation has any relation to        
an object without me. But if I take away all intuition, there still         
remains the form of thought, that is, the mode of determining an            
object for the manifold of a possible intuition. Thus the categories        
do in some measure really extend further than sensuous intuition,           
inasmuch as they think objects in general, without regard to the            
mode (of sensibility) in which these objects are given. But they do         
not for this reason apply to and determine a wider sphere of                
objects, because we cannot assume that such can be given, without           
presupposing the possibility of another than the sensuous mode of           
intuition, a supposition we are not justified in making.                    
  I call a conception problematical which contains in itself no             
contradiction, and which is connected with other cognitions as a            
limitation of given conceptions, but whose objective reality cannot be      
cognized in any manner. The conception of a noumenon, that is, of a         
thing which must be cogitated not as an object of sense, but as a           
thing in itself (solely through the pure understanding), is not             
self-contradictory, for we are not entitled to maintain that                
sensibility is the only possible mode of intuition. Nay, further, this      
conception is necessary to restrain sensuous intuition within the           
bounds of phenomena, and thus to limit the objective validity of            
sensuous cognition; for things in themselves, which lie beyond its          
province, are called noumena for the very purpose of indicating that        
this cognition does not extend its application to all that the              
understanding thinks. But, after all, the possibility of such               
noumena is quite incomprehensible, and beyond the sphere of phenomena,      
all is for us a mere void; that is to say, we possess an understanding      
whose province does problematically extend beyond this sphere, but          
we do not possess an intuition, indeed, not even the conception of a        
possible intuition, by means of which objects beyond the region of          
sensibility could be given us, and in reference to which the                
understanding might be employed assertorically. The conception of a         
noumenon is therefore merely a limitative conception and therefore          
only of negative use. But it is not an arbitrary or fictitious notion,      
but is connected with the limitation of sensibility, without, however,      
being capable of presenting us with any positive datum beyond this          
sphere.                                                                     
  The division of objects into phenomena and noumena, and of the world      
into a mundus sensibilis and intelligibilis is therefore quite              
inadmissible in a positive sense, although conceptions do certainly         
admit of such a division; for the class of noumena have no determinate      
object corresponding to them, and cannot therefore possess objective        
validity. If we abandon the senses, how can it be made conceivable          
that the categories (which are the only conceptions that could serve        
as conceptions for noumena) have any sense or meaning at all, inasmuch      
as something more than the mere unity of thought, namely, a possible        
intuition, is requisite for their application to an object? The             
conception of a noumenon, considered as merely problematical, is,           
however, not only admissible, but, as a limitative conception of            
sensibility, absolutely necessary. But, in this case, a noumenon is         
not a particular intelligible object for our understanding; on the          
contrary, the kind of understanding to which it could belong is itself      
a problem, for we cannot form the most distant conception of the            
possibility of an understanding which should cognize an object, not         
discursively by means of categories, but intuitively in a non-sensuous      
intuition. Our understanding attains in this way a sort of negative         
extension. That is to say, it is not limited by, but rather limits,         
sensibility, by giving the name of noumena to things, not considered        
as phenomena, but as things in themselves. But it at the same time          
prescribes limits to itself, for it confesses itself unable to cognize      
these by means of the categories, and hence is compelled to cogitate        
them merely as an unknown something.                                        
                                                   {BK_2|CH_3 ^paragraph 20}
  I find, however, in the writings of modern authors, an entirely           
different use of the expressions, mundus sensibilis and                     
intelligibilis, which quite departs from the meaning of the                 
ancients- an acceptation in which, indeed, there is to be found no          
difficulty, but which at the same time depends on mere verbal               
quibbling. According to this meaning, some have chosen to call the          
complex of phenomena, in so far as it is intuited, mundus                   
sensibilis, but in so far as the connection thereof is cogitated            
according to general laws of thought, mundus intelligibilis.                
Astronomy, in so far as we mean by the word the mere observation of         
the starry heaven, may represent the former; a system of astronomy,         
such as the Copernican or Newtonian, the latter. But such twisting          
of words is a mere sophistical subterfuge, to avoid a difficult             
question, by modifying its meaning to suit our own convenience. To          
be sure, understanding and reason are employed in the cognition of          
phenomena; but the question is, whether these can be applied when           
the object is not a phenomenon and in this sense we regard it if it is      
cogitated as given to the understanding alone, and not to the               
senses. The question therefore is whether, over and above the               
empirical use of the understanding, a transcendental use is                 
possible, which applies to the noumenon as an object. This question we      
have answered in the negative.                                              
  When therefore we say, the senses represent objects as they               
appear, the understanding as they are, the latter statement must not        
be understood in a transcendental, but only in an empirical                 
signification, that is, as they must be represented in the complete         
connection of phenomena, and not according to what they may be,             
apart from their relation to possible experience, consequently not          
as objects of the pure understanding. For this must ever remain             
unknown to us. Nay, it is also quite unknown to us whether any such         
transcendental or extraordinary cognition is possible under any             
circumstances, at least, whether it is possible by means of our             
categories. Understanding and sensibility, with us, can determine           
objects only in conjunction. If we separate them, we have intuitions        
without conceptions, or conceptions without intuitions; in both cases,      
representations, which we cannot apply to any determinate object.           
  If, after all our inquiries and explanations, any one still               
hesitates to abandon the mere transcendental use of the categories,         
let him attempt to construct with them a synthetical proposition. It        
would, of course, be unnecessary for this purpose to construct an           
analytical proposition, for that does not extend the sphere of the          
understanding, but, being concerned only about what is cogitated in         
the conception itself, it leaves it quite undecided whether the             
conception has any relation to objects, or merely indicates the             
unity of thought- complete abstraction being made of the modi in which      
an object may be given: in such a proposition, it is sufficient for         
the understanding to know what lies in the conception- to what it           
applies is to it indifferent. The attempt must therefore be made            
with a synthetical and so-called transcendental principle, for              
example: "Everything that exists, exists as substance," or,                 
"Everything that is contingent exists as an effect of some other            
thing, viz., of its cause." Now I ask, whence can the understanding         
draw these synthetical propositions, when the conceptions contained         
therein do not relate to possible experience but to things in               
themselves (noumena)? Where is to be found the third term, which is         
always requisite PURE site in a synthetical proposition, which may          
connect in the same proposition conceptions which have no logical           
(analytical) connection with each other? The proposition never will be      
demonstrated, nay, more, the possibility of any such pure assertion         
never can be shown, without making reference to the empirical use of        
the understanding, and thus, ipso facto, completely renouncing pure         
and non-sensuous judgement. Thus the conception of pure and merely          
intelligible objects is completely void of all principles of its            
application, because we cannot imagine any mode in which they might be      
given, and the problematical thought which leaves a place open for          
them serves only, like a void space, to limit the use of empirical          
principles, without containing at the same time any other object of         
cognition beyond their sphere.                                              
                                                                            
APPENDIX                                                                    
                         APPENDIX.                                          
-                                                                           
   Of the Equivocal Nature or Amphiboly of the Conceptions of               
     Reflection from the Confusion of the Transcendental with               
     the Empirical use of the Understanding.                                
-                                                                           
  Reflection (reflexio) is not occupied about objects themselves,           
for the purpose of directly obtaining conceptions of them, but is that      
state of the mind in which we set ourselves to discover the subjective      
conditions under which we obtain conceptions. It is the                     
consciousness of the relation of given representations to the               
different sources or faculties of cognition, by which alone their           
relation to each other can be rightly determined. The first question        
which occurs in considering our representations is to what faculty          
of cognition do they belong? To the understanding or to the senses?         
Many judgements are admitted to be true from mere habit or                  
inclination; but, because reflection neither precedes nor follows,          
it is held to be a judgement that has its origin in the understanding.      
All judgements do not require examination, that is, investigation into      
the grounds of their truth. For, when they are immediately certain          
(for example: "Between two points there can be only one straight            
line"), no better or less mediate test of their truth can be found          
than that which they themselves contain and express. But all                
judgement, nay, all comparisons require reflection, that is, a              
distinction of the faculty of cognition to which the given conceptions      
belong. The act whereby I compare my representations with the               
faculty of cognition which originates them, and whereby I                   
distinguish whether they are compared with each other as belonging          
to the pure understanding or to sensuous intuition, I term                  
transcendental reflection. Now, the relations in which conceptions can      
stand to each other are those of identity and difference, agreement         
and opposition, of the internal and external, finally, of the               
determinable and the determining (matter and form). The proper              
determination of these relations rests on the question, to what             
faculty of cognition they subjectively belong, whether to                   
sensibility or understanding? For, on the manner in which we solve          
this question depends the manner in which we must cogitate these            
relations.                                                                  
                                                     {APPENDIX ^paragraph 5}
  Before constructing any objective judgement, we compare the               
conceptions that are to be placed in the judgement, and observe             
whether there exists identity (of many representations in one               
conception), if a general judgement is to be constructed, or                
difference, if a particular; whether there is agreement when                
affirmative; and opposition when negative judgements are to be              
constructed, and so on. For this reason we ought to call these              
conceptions, conceptions of comparison (conceptus comparationis).           
But as, when the question is not as to the logical form, but as to the      
content of conceptions, that is to say, whether the things                  
themselves are identical or different, in agreement or opposition, and      
so on, the things can have a twofold relation to our faculty of             
cognition, to wit, a relation either to sensibility or to the               
understanding, and as on this relation depends their relation to            
each other, transcendental reflection, that is, the relation of             
given representations to one or the other faculty of cognition, can         
alone determine this latter relation. Thus we shall not be able to          
discover whether the things are identical or different, in agreement        
or opposition, etc., from the mere conception of the things by means        
of comparison (comparatio), but only by distinguishing the mode of          
cognition to which they belong, in other words, by means of                 
transcendental reflection. We may, therefore, with justice say, that        
logical reflection is mere comparison, for in it no account is taken        
of the faculty of cognition to which the given conceptions belong, and      
they are consequently, as far as regards their origin, to be treated        
as homogeneous; while transcendental reflection (which applies to           
the objects themselves) contains the ground of the possibility of           
objective comparison of representations with each other, and is             
therefore very different from the former, because the faculties of          
cognition to which they belong are not even the same. Transcendental        
reflection is a duty which no one can neglect who wishes to                 
establish an a priori judgement upon things. We shall now proceed to        
fulfil this duty, and thereby throw not a little light on the question      
as to the determination of the proper business of the understanding.        
  1. Identity and Difference. When an object is presented to us             
several times, but always with the same internal determinations             
(qualitas et quantitas), it, if an object of pure understanding, is         
always the same, not several things, but only one thing (numerica           
identitas); but if a phenomenon, we do not concern ourselves with           
comparing the conception of the thing with the conception of some           
other, but, although they may be in this respect perfectly the same,        
the difference of place at the same time is a sufficient ground for         
asserting the numerical difference of these objects (of sense).             
Thus, in the case of two drops of water, we may make complete               
abstraction of all internal difference (quality and quantity), and,         
the fact that they are intuited at the same time in different               
places, is sufficient to justify us in holding them to be                   
numerically different. Leibnitz regarded phenomena as things in             
themselves, consequently as intelligibilia, that is, objects of pure        
understanding (although, on account of the confused nature of their         
representations, he gave them the name of phenomena), and in this case      
his principle of the indiscernible (principium identatis                    
indiscernibilium) is not to be impugned. But, as phenomena are objects      
of sensibility, and, as the understanding, in respect of them, must be      
employed empirically and not purely or transcendentally, plurality and      
numerical difference are given by space itself as the condition of          
external phenomena. For one part of space, although it may be               
perfectly similar and equal to another part, is still without it,           
and for this reason alone is different from the latter, which is added      
to it in order to make up a greater space. It follows that this must        
hold good of all things that are in the different parts of space at         
the same time, however similar and equal one may be to another.             
  2. Agreement and Opposition. When reality is represented by the pure      
understanding (realitas noumenon), opposition between realities is          
incogitable- such a relation, that is, that when these realities are        
connected in one subject, they annihilate the effects of each other         
and may be represented in the formula 3 - 3 = 0. On the other hand,         
the real in a phenomenon (realitas phaenomenon) may very well be in         
mutual opposition, and, when united in the same subject, the one may        
completely or in part annihilate the effect or consequence of the           
other; as in the case of two moving forces in the same straight line        
drawing or impelling a point in opposite directions, or in the case of      
a pleasure counterbalancing a certain amount of pain.                       
  3. The Internal and External. In an object of the pure                    
understanding, only that is internal which has no relation (as regards      
its existence) to anything different from itself. On the other hand,        
the internal determinations of a substantia phaenomenon in space are        
nothing but relations, and it is itself nothing more than a complex of      
mere relations. Substance in space we are cognizant of only through         
forces operative in it, either drawing others towards itself                
(attraction), or preventing others from forcing into itself (repulsion      
and impenetrability). We know no other properties that make up the          
conception of substance phenomenal in space, and which we term matter.      
On the other hand, as an object of the pure understanding, every            
substance must have internal determination and forces. But what             
other internal attributes of such an object can I think than those          
which my internal sense presents to me? That, to wit, which in              
either itself thought, or something analogous to it. Hence Leibnitz,        
who looked upon things as noumena, after denying them everything            
like external relation, and therefore also composition or combination,      
declared that all substances, even the component parts of matter, were      
simple substances with powers of representation, in one word, monads.       
  4. Matter and Form. These two conceptions lie at the foundation of        
all other reflection, so inseparably are they connected with every          
mode of exercising the understanding. The former denotes the                
determinable in general, the second its determination, both in a            
transcendental sense, abstraction being made of every difference in         
that which is given, and of the mode in which it is determined.             
Logicians formerly termed the universal, matter, the specific               
difference of this or that part of the universal, form. In a judgement      
one may call the given conceptions logical matter (for the judgement),      
the relation of these to each other (by means of the copula), the form      
of the judgement. In an object, the composite parts thereof                 
(essentialia) are the matter; the mode in which they are connected          
in the object, the form. In respect to things in general, unlimited         
reality was regarded as the matter of all possibility, the                  
limitation thereof (negation) as the form, by which one thing is            
distinguished from another according to transcendental conceptions.         
The understanding demands that something be given (at least in the          
conception), in order to be able to determine it in a certain               
manner. Hence, in a conception of the pure understanding, the matter        
precedes the form, and for this reason Leibnitz first assumed the           
existence of things (monads) and of an internal power of                    
representation in them, in order to found upon this their external          
relation and the community their state (that is, of their                   
representations). Hence, with him, space and time were possible- the        
former through the relation of substances, the latter through the           
connection of their determinations with each other, as causes and           
effects. And so would it really be, if the pure understanding were          
capable of an immediate application to objects, and if space and            
time were determinations of things in themselves. But being merely          
sensuous intuitions, in which we determine all objects solely as            
phenomena, the form of intuition (as a subjective property of               
sensibility) must antecede all matter (sensations), consequently space      
and time must antecede all phenomena and all data of experience, and        
rather make experience itself possible. But the intellectual                
philosopher could not endure that the form should precede the things        
themselves and determine their possibility; an objection perfectly          
correct, if we assume that we intuite things as they are, although          
with confused representation. But as sensuous intuition is a                
peculiar subjective condition, which is a priori at the foundation          
of all perception, and the form of which is primitive, the form must        
be given per se, and so far from matter (or the things themselves           
which appear) lying at the foundation of experience (as we must             
conclude, if we judge by mere conceptions), the very possibility of         
itself presupposes, on the contrary, a given formal intuition (space        
and time).                                                                  
                                                    {APPENDIX ^paragraph 10}
-                                                                           
    REMARK ON THE AMPHIBOLY OF THE CONCEPTIONS OF REFLECTION.               
-                                                                           
  Let me be allowed to term the position which we assign to a               
conception either in the sensibility or in the pure understanding, the      
transcendental place. In this manner, the appointment of the                
position which must be taken by each conception according to the            
difference in its use, and the directions for determining this place        
to all conceptions according to rules, would be a transcendental            
topic, a doctrine which would thoroughly shield us from the                 
surreptitious devices of the pure understanding and the delusions           
which thence arise, as it would always distinguish to what faculty          
of cognition each conception properly belonged. Every conception,           
every title, under which many cognitions rank together, may be              
called a logical place. Upon this is based the logical topic of             
Aristotle, of which teachers and rhetoricians could avail                   
themselves, in order, under certain titles of thought, to observe what      
would best suit the matter they had to treat, and thus enable               
themselves to quibble and talk with fluency and an appearance of            
profundity.                                                                 
  Transcendental topic, on the contrary, contains nothing more than         
the above-mentioned four titles of all comparison and distinction,          
which differ from categories in this respect, that they do not              
represent the object according to that which constitutes its                
conception (quantity, reality), but set forth merely the comparison of      
representations, which precedes our conceptions of things. But this         
comparison requires a previous reflection, that is, a determination of      
the place to which the representations of the things which are              
compared belong, whether, to wit, they are cogitated by the pure            
understanding, or given by sensibility.                                     
                                                    {APPENDIX ^paragraph 15}
  Conceptions may be logically compared without the trouble of              
inquiring to what faculty their objects belong, whether as noumena, to      
the understanding, or as phenomena, to sensibility. If, however, we         
wish to employ these conceptions in respect of objects, previous            
transcendental reflection is necessary. Without this reflection I           
should make a very unsafe use of these conceptions, and construct           
pretended synthetical propositions which critical reason cannot             
acknowledge and which are based solely upon a transcendental                
amphiboly, that is, upon a substitution of an object of pure                
understanding for a phenomenon.                                             
  For want of this doctrine of transcendental topic, and                    
consequently deceived by the amphiboly of the conceptions of                
reflection, the celebrated Leibnitz constructed an intellectual system      
of the world, or rather, believed himself competent to cognize the          
internal nature of things, by comparing all objects merely with the         
understanding and the abstract formal conceptions of thought. Our           
table of the conceptions of reflection gives us the unexpected              
advantage of being able to exhibit the distinctive peculiarities of         
his system in all its parts, and at the same time of exposing the           
fundamental principle of this peculiar mode of thought, which rested        
upon naught but a misconception. He compared all things with each           
other merely by means of conceptions, and naturally found no other          
differences than those by which the understanding distinguishes its         
pure conceptions one from another. The conditions of sensuous               
intuition, which contain in themselves their own means of distinction,      
he did not look upon as primitive, because sensibility was to him           
but a confused mode of representation and not any particular source of      
representations. A phenomenon was for him the representation of the         
thing in itself, although distinguished from cognition by the               
understanding only in respect of the logical form- the former with its      
usual want of analysis containing, according to him, a certain mixture      
of collateral representations in its conception of a thing, which it        
is the duty of the understanding to separate and distinguish. In one        
word, Leibnitz intellectualized phenomena, just as Locke, in his            
system of noogony (if I may be allowed to make use of such                  
expressions), sensualized the conceptions of the understanding, that        
is to say, declared them to be nothing more than empirical or abstract      
conceptions of reflection. Instead of seeking in the understanding and      
sensibility two different sources of representations, which,                
however, can present us with objective judgements of things only in         
conjunction, each of these great men recognized but one of these            
faculties, which, in their opinion, applied immediately to things in        
themselves, the other having no duty but that of confusing or               
arranging the representations of the former.                                
  Accordingly, the objects of sense were compared by Leibnitz as            
things in general merely in the understanding.                              
  1st. He compares them in regard to their identity or difference-          
as judged by the understanding. As, therefore, he considered merely         
the conceptions of objects, and not their position in intuition, in         
which alone objects can be given, and left quite out of sight the           
transcendental locale of these conceptions- whether, that is, their         
object ought to be classed among phenomena, or among things in              
themselves, it was to be expected that he should extend the                 
application of the principle of indiscernibles, which is valid              
solely of conceptions of things in general, to objects of sense             
(mundus phaenomenon), and that he should believe that he had thereby        
contributed in no small degree to extend our knowledge of nature. In        
truth, if I cognize in all its inner determinations a drop of water as      
a thing in itself, I cannot look upon one drop as different from            
another, if the conception of the one is completely identical with          
that of the other. But if it is a phenomenon in space, it has a             
place not merely in the understanding (among conceptions), but also in      
sensuous external intuition (in space), and in this case, the physical      
locale is a matter of indifference in regard to the internal                
determinations of things, and one place, B, may contain a thing             
which is perfectly similar and equal to another in a place, A, just as      
well as if the two things were in every respect different from each         
other. Difference of place without any other conditions, makes the          
plurality and distinction of objects as phenomena, not only possible        
in itself, but even necessary. Consequently, the above so-called law        
is not a law of nature. It is merely an analytical rule for the             
comparison of things by means of mere conceptions.                          
  2nd. The principle: "Realities (as simple affirmations) never             
logically contradict each other," is a proposition perfectly true           
respecting the relation of conceptions, but, whether as regards             
nature, or things in themselves (of which we have not the slightest         
conception), is without any the least meaning. For real opposition, in      
which A - B is = 0, exists everywhere, an opposition, that is, in           
which one reality united with another in the same subject                   
annihilates the effects of the other- a fact which is constantly            
brought before our eyes by the different antagonistic actions and           
operations in nature, which, nevertheless, as depending on real             
forces, must be called realitates phaenomena. General mechanics can         
even present us with the empirical condition of this opposition in          
an a priori rule, as it directs its attention to the opposition in the      
direction of forces- a condition of which the transcendental                
conception of reality can tell us nothing. Although M. Leibnitz did         
not announce this proposition with precisely the pomp of a new              
principle, he yet employed it for the establishment of new                  
propositions, and his followers introduced it into their                    
Leibnitzio-Wolfian system of philosophy. According to this                  
principle, for example, all evils are but consequences of the               
limited nature of created beings, that is, negations, because these         
are the only opposite of reality. (In the mere conception of a thing        
in general this is really the case, but not in things as phenomena.)        
In like manner, the upholders of this system deem it not only               
possible, but natural also, to connect and unite all reality in one         
being, because they acknowledge no other sort of opposition than            
that of contradiction (by which the conception itself of a thing is         
annihilated), and find themselves unable to conceive an opposition          
of reciprocal destruction, so to speak, in which one real cause             
destroys the effect of another, and the conditions of whose                 
representation we meet with only in sensibility.                            
                                                    {APPENDIX ^paragraph 20}
  3rd. The Leibnitzian monadology has really no better foundation than      
on this philosopher's mode of falsely representing the difference of        
the internal and external solely in relation to the understanding.          
Substances, in general, must have something inward, which is therefore      
free from external relations, consequently from that of composition         
also. The simple- that which can be represented by a unit- is               
therefore the foundation of that which is internal in things in             
themselves. The internal state of substances cannot therefore               
consist in place, shape, contact, or motion, determinations which           
are all external relations, and we can ascribe to them no other than        
that whereby we internally determine our faculty of sense itself, that      
is to say, the state of representation. Thus, then, were constructed        
the monads, which were to form the elements of the universe, the            
active force of which consists in representation, the effects of            
this force being thus entirely confined to themselves.                      
  For the same reason, his view of the possible community of                
substances could not represent it but as a predetermined harmony,           
and by no means as a physical influence. For inasmuch as everything is      
occupied only internally, that is, with its own representations, the        
state of the representations of one substance could not stand in            
active and living connection with that of another, but some third           
cause operating on all without exception was necessary to make the          
different states correspond with one another. And this did not              
happen by means of assistance applied in each particular case (systema      
assistentiae), but through the unity of the idea of a cause occupied        
and connected with all substances, in which they necessarily                
receive, according to the Leibnitzian school, their existence and           
permanence, consequently also reciprocal correspondence, according          
to universal laws.                                                          
  4th. This philosopher's celebrated doctrine of space and time, in         
which he intellectualized these forms of sensibility, originated in         
the same delusion of transcendental reflection. If I attempt to             
represent by the mere understanding, the external relations of things,      
I can do so only by employing the conception of their reciprocal            
action, and if I wish to connect one state of the same thing with           
another state, I must avail myself of the notion of the order of cause      
and effect. And thus Leibnitz regarded space as a certain order in the      
community of substances, and time as the dynamical sequence of their        
states. That which space and time possess proper to themselves and          
independent of things, he ascribed to a necessary confusion in our          
conceptions of them, whereby that which is a mere form of dynamical         
relations is held to be a self-existent intuition, antecedent even          
to things themselves. Thus space and time were the intelligible form        
of the connection of things (substances and their states) in                
themselves. But things were intelligible substances (substantiae            
noumena). At the same time, he made these conceptions valid of              
phenomena, because he did not allow to sensibility a peculiar mode          
of intuition, but sought all, even the empirical representation of          
objects, in the understanding, and left to sense naught but the             
despicable task of confusing and disarranging the representations of        
the former.                                                                 
  But even if we could frame any synthetical proposition concerning         
things in themselves by means of the pure understanding (which is           
impossible), it could not apply to phenomena, which do not represent        
things in themselves. In such a case I should be obliged in                 
transcendental reflection to compare my conceptions only under the          
conditions of sensibility, and so space and time would not be               
determinations of things in themselves, but of phenomena. What              
things may be in themselves, I know not and need not know, because a        
thing is never presented to me otherwise than as a phenomenon.              
  I must adopt the same mode of procedure with the other conceptions        
of reflection. Matter is substantia phaenomenon. That in it which is        
internal I seek to discover in all parts of space which it occupies,        
and in all the functions and operations it performs, and which are          
indeed never anything but phenomena of the external sense. I cannot         
therefore find anything that is absolutely, but only what is                
comparatively internal, and which itself consists of external               
relations. The absolutely internal in matter, and as it should be           
according to the pure understanding, is a mere chimera, for matter          
is not an object for the pure understanding. But the transcendental         
object, which is the foundation of the phenomenon which we call             
matter, is a mere nescio quid, the nature of which we could not             
understand, even though someone were found able to tell us. For we can      
understand nothing that does not bring with it something in                 
intuition corresponding to the expressions employed. If, by the             
complaint of being unable to perceive the internal nature of things,        
it is meant that we do not comprehend by the pure understanding what        
the things which appear to us may be in themselves, it is a silly           
and unreasonable complaint; for those who talk thus really desire that      
we should be able to cognize, consequently to intuite, things               
without senses, and therefore wish that we possessed a faculty of           
cognition perfectly different from the human faculty, not merely in         
degree, but even as regards intuition and the mode thereof, so that         
thus we should not be men, but belong to a class of beings, the             
possibility of whose existence, much less their nature and                  
constitution, we have no means of cognizing. By observation and             
analysis of phenomena we penetrate into the interior of nature, and no      
one can say what progress this knowledge may make in time. But those        
transcendental questions which pass beyond the limits of nature, we         
could never answer, even although all nature were laid open to us,          
because we have not the power of observing our own mind with any other      
intuition than that of our internal sense. For herein lies the mystery      
of the origin and source of our faculty of sensibility. Its                 
application to an object, and the transcendental ground of this             
unity of subjective and objective, lie too deeply concealed for us,         
who cognize ourselves only through the internal sense, consequently as      
phenomena, to be able to discover in our existence anything but             
phenomena, the non-sensuous cause of which we at the same time              
earnestly desire to penetrate to.                                           
                                                    {APPENDIX ^paragraph 25}
  The great utility of this critique of conclusions arrived at by           
the processes of mere reflection consists in its clear demonstration        
of the nullity of all conclusions respecting objects which are              
compared with each other in the understanding alone, while it at the        
same time confirms what we particularly insisted on, namely, that,          
although phenomena are not included as things in themselves among           
the objects of the pure understanding, they are nevertheless the            
only things by which our cognition can possess objective reality, that      
is to say, which give us intuitions to correspond with our                  
conceptions.                                                                
  When we reflect in a purely logical manner, we do nothing more            
than compare conceptions in our understanding, to discover whether          
both have the same content, whether they are self-contradictory or          
not, whether anything is contained in either conception, which of           
the two is given, and which is merely a mode of thinking that given.        
But if I apply these conceptions to an object in general (in the            
transcendental sense), without first determining whether it is an           
object of sensuous or intellectual intuition, certain limitations           
present themselves, which forbid us to pass beyond the conceptions and      
render all empirical use of them impossible. And thus these                 
limitations prove that the representation of an object as a thing in        
general is not only insufficient, but, without sensuous                     
determination and independently of empirical conditions,                    
self-contradictory; that we must therefore make abstraction of all          
objects, as in logic, or, admitting them, must think them under             
conditions of sensuous intuition; that, consequently, the intelligible      
requires an altogether peculiar intuition, which we do not possess,         
and in the absence of which it is for us nothing; while, on the             
other hand phenomena cannot be objects in themselves. For, when I           
merely think things in general, the difference in their external            
relations cannot constitute a difference in the things themselves;          
on the contrary, the former presupposes the latter, and if the              
conception of one of two things is not internally different from            
that of the other, I am merely thinking the same thing in different         
relations. Further, by the addition of one affirmation (reality) to         
the other, the positive therein is really augmented, and nothing is         
abstracted or withdrawn from it; hence the real in things cannot be in      
contradiction with or opposition to itself- and so on.                      
-                                                                           
  The true use of the conceptions of reflection in the employment of        
the understanding has, as we have shown, been so misconceived by            
Leibnitz, one of the most acute philosophers of either ancient or           
modern times, that he has been misled into the construction of a            
baseless system of intellectual cognition, which professes to               
determine its objects without the intervention of the senses. For this      
reason, the exposition of the cause of the amphiboly of these               
conceptions, as the origin of these false principles, is of great           
utility in determining with certainty the proper limits of the              
understanding.                                                              
  It is right to say whatever is affirmed or denied of the whole of         
a conception can be affirmed or denied of any part of it (dictum de         
omni et nullo); but it would be absurd so to alter this logical             
proposition as to say whatever is not contained in a general                
conception is likewise not contained in the particular conceptions          
which rank under it; for the latter are particular conceptions, for         
the very reason that their content is greater than that which is            
cogitated in the general conception. And yet the whole intellectual         
system of Leibnitz is based upon this false principle, and with it          
must necessarily fall to the ground, together with all the ambiguous        
principles in reference to the employment of the understanding which        
have thence originated.                                                     
                                                    {APPENDIX ^paragraph 30}
  Leibnitz's principle of the identity of indiscernibles or                 
indistinguishables is really based on the presupposition that, if in        
the conception of a thing a certain distinction is not to be found, it      
is also not to be met with in things themselves; that, consequently,        
all things are completely identical (numero eadem) which are not            
distinguishable from each other (as to quality or quantity) in our          
conceptions of them. But, as in the mere conception of anything             
abstraction has been made of many necessary conditions of intuition,        
that of which abstraction has been made is rashly held to be                
non-existent, and nothing is attributed to the thing but what is            
contained in its conception.                                                
  The conception of a cubic foot of space, however I may think it,          
is in itself completely identical. But two cubic feet in space are          
nevertheless distinct from each other from the sole fact of their           
being in different places (they are numero diversa); and these              
places are conditions of intuition, wherein the object of this              
conception is given, and which do not belong to the conception, but to      
the faculty of sensibility. In like manner, there is in the conception      
of a thing no contradiction when a negative is not connected with an        
affirmative; and merely affirmative conceptions cannot, in                  
conjunction, produce any negation. But in sensuous intuition,               
wherein reality (take for example, motion) is given, we find                
conditions (opposite directions)- of which abstraction has been made        
in the conception of motion in general- which render possible a             
contradiction or opposition (not indeed of a logical kind)- and             
which from pure positives produce zero = 0. We are therefore not            
justified in saying that all reality is in perfect agreement and            
harmony, because no contradiction is discoverable among its                 
conceptions.* According to mere conceptions, that which is internal is      
the substratum of all relations or external determinations. When,           
therefore, I abstract all conditions of intuition, and confine              
myself solely to the conception of a thing in general, I can make           
abstraction of all external relations, and there must nevertheless          
remain a conception of that which indicates no relation, but merely         
internal determinations. Now it seems to follow that in everything          
(substance) there is something which is absolutely internal and             
which antecedes all external determinations, inasmuch as it renders         
them possible; and that therefore this substratum is something which        
does not contain any external relations and is consequently simple          
(for corporeal things are never anything but relations, at least of         
their parts external to each other); and, inasmuch as we know of no         
other absolutely internal determinations than those of the internal         
sense, this substratum is not only simple, but also, analogously            
with our internal sense, determined through representations, that is        
to say, all things are properly monads, or simple beings endowed            
with the power of representation. Now all this would be perfectly           
correct, if the conception of a thing were the only necessary               
condition of the presentation of objects of external intuition. It is,      
on the contrary, manifest that a permanent phenomenon in space              
(impenetrable extension) can contain mere relations, and nothing            
that is absolutely internal, and yet be the primary substratum of           
all external perception. By mere conceptions I cannot think anything        
external, without, at the same time, thinking something internal,           
for the reason that conceptions of relations presuppose given               
things, and without these are impossible. But, as an intuition there        
is something (that is, space, which, with all it contains, consists of      
purely formal, or, indeed, real relations) which is not found in the        
mere conception of a thing in general, and this presents to us the          
substratum which could not be cognized through conceptions alone, I         
cannot say: because a thing cannot be represented by mere                   
conceptions without something absolutely internal, there is also, in        
the things themselves which are contained under these conceptions, and      
in their intuition nothing external to which something absolutely           
internal does not serve as the foundation. For, when we have made           
abstraction of all the conditions of intuition, there certainly             
remains in the mere conception nothing but the internal in general,         
through which alone the external is possible. But this necessity,           
which is grounded upon abstraction alone, does not obtain in the            
case of things themselves, in so far as they are given in intuition         
with such determinations as express mere relations, without having          
anything internal as their foundation; for they are not things of a         
thing of which we can neither for they are not things in themselves,        
but only phenomena. What we cognize in matter is nothing but relations      
(what we call its internal determinations are but comparatively             
internal). But there are some self-subsistent and permanent, through        
which a determined object is given. That I, when abstraction is made        
of these relations, have nothing more to think, does not destroy the        
conception of a thing as phenomenon, nor the conception of an object        
in abstracto, but it does away with the possibility of an object            
that is determinable according to mere conceptions, that is, of a           
noumenon. It is certainly startling to hear that a thing consists           
solely of relations; but this thing is simply a phenomenon, and cannot      
be cogitated by means of the mere categories: it does itself consist        
in the mere relation of something in general to the senses. In the          
same way, we cannot cogitate relations of things in abstracto, if we        
commence with conceptions alone, in any other manner than that one          
is the cause of determinations in the other; for that is itself the         
conception of the understanding or category of relation. But, as in         
this case we make abstraction of all intuition, we lose altogether the      
mode in which the manifold determines to each of its parts its              
place, that is, the form of sensibility (space); and yet this mode          
antecedes all empirical causality.                                          
-                                                                           
  *If any one wishes here to have recourse to the usual subterfuge,         
and to say, that at least realitates noumena cannot be in opposition        
to each other, it will be requisite for him to adduce an example of         
this pure and non-sensuous reality, that it may be understood               
whether the notion represents something or nothing. But an example          
cannot be found except in experience, which never presents to us            
anything more than phenomena; and thus the proposition means nothing        
more than that the conception which contains only affirmatives does         
not contain anything negative- a proposition nobody ever doubted.           
-                                                                           
                                                    {APPENDIX ^paragraph 35}
  If by intelligible objects we understand things which can be thought      
by means of the pure categories, without the need of the schemata of        
sensibility, such objects are impossible. For the condition of the          
objective use of all our conceptions of understanding is the mode of        
our sensuous intuition, whereby objects are given; and, if we make          
abstraction of the latter, the former can have no relation to an            
object. And even if we should suppose a different kind of intuition         
from our own, still our functions of thought would have no use or           
signification in respect thereof. But if we understand by the term,         
objects of a non-sensuous intuition, in respect of which our                
categories are not valid, and of which we can accordingly have no           
knowledge (neither intuition nor conception), in this merely                
negative sense noumena must be admitted. For this is no more than           
saying that our mode of intuition is not applicable to all things, but      
only to objects of our senses, that consequently its objective              
validity is limited, and that room is therefore left for another            
kind of intuition, and thus also for things that may be objects of it.      
But in this sense the conception of a noumenon is problematical,            
that is to say, it is the notion of that it that it is possible, nor        
that it is impossible, inasmuch as we do not know of any mode of            
intuition besides the sensuous, or of any other sort of conceptions         
than the categories- a mode of intuition and a kind of conception           
neither of which is applicable to a non-sensuous object. We are on          
this account incompetent to extend the sphere of our objects of             
thought beyond the conditions of our sensibility, and to assume the         
existence of objects of pure thought, that is, of noumena, inasmuch as      
these have no true positive signification. For it must be confessed of      
the categories that they are not of themselves sufficient for the           
cognition of things in themselves and, without the data of                  
sensibility, are mere subjective forms of the unity of the                  
understanding. Thought is certainly not a product of the senses, and        
in so far is not limited by them, but it does not therefore follow          
that it may be employed purely and without the intervention of              
sensibility, for it would then be without reference to an object.           
And we cannot call a noumenon an object of pure thought; for the            
representation thereof is but the problematical conception of an            
object for a perfectly different intuition and a perfectly different        
understanding from ours, both of which are consequently themselves          
problematical. The conception of a noumenon is therefore not the            
conception of an object, but merely a problematical conception              
inseparably connected with the limitation of our sensibility. That          
is to say, this conception contains the answer to the question: "Are        
there objects quite unconnected with, and independent of, our               
intuition?"- a question to which only an indeterminate answer can be        
given. That answer is: "Inasmuch as sensuous intuition does not             
apply to all things without distinction, there remains room for             
other and different objects." The existence of these problematical          
objects is therefore not absolutely denied, in the absence of a             
determinate conception of them, but, as no category is valid in             
respect of them, neither must they be admitted as objects for our           
understanding.                                                              
  Understanding accordingly limits sensibility, without at the same         
time enlarging its own field. While, moreover, it forbids                   
sensibility to apply its forms and modes to things in themselves and        
restricts it to the sphere of phenomena, it cogitates an object in          
itself, only, however, as a transcendental object, which is the             
cause of a phenomenon (consequently not itself a phenomenon), and           
which cannot be thought either as a quantity or as reality, or as           
substance (because these conceptions always require sensuous forms          
in which to determine an object)- an object, therefore, of which we         
are quite unable to say whether it can be met with in ourselves or out      
of us, whether it would be annihilated together with sensibility,           
or, if this were taken away, would continue to exist. If we wish to         
call this object a noumenon, because the representation of it is            
non-sensuous, we are at liberty to do so. But as we can apply to it         
none of the conceptions of our understanding, the representation is         
for us quite void, and is available only for the indication of the          
limits of our sensuous intuition, thereby leaving at the same time          
an empty space, which we are competent to fill by the aid neither of        
possible experience, nor of the pure understanding.                         
  The critique of the pure understanding, accordingly, does not permit      
us to create for ourselves a new field of objects beyond those which        
are presented to us as phenomena, and to stray into intelligible            
worlds; nay, it does not even allow us to endeavour to form so much as      
a conception of them. The specious error which leads to this- and           
which is a perfectly excusable one- lies in the fact that the               
employment of the understanding, contrary to its proper purpose and         
destination, is made transcendental, and objects, that is, possible         
intuitions, are made to regulate themselves according to                    
conceptions, instead of the conceptions arranging themselves according      
to the intuitions, on which alone their own objective validity              
rests. Now the reason of this again is that apperception, and with          
it thought, antecedes all possible determinate arrangement of               
representations. Accordingly we think something in general and              
determine it on the one hand sensuously, but, on the other,                 
distinguish the general and in abstracto represented object from            
this particular mode of intuiting it. In this case there remains a          
mode of determining the object by mere thought, which is really but         
a logical form without content, which, however, seems to us to be a         
mode of the existence of the object in itself (noumenon), without           
regard to intuition which is limited to our senses.                         
-                                                                           
  Before ending this transcendental analytic, we must make an               
addition, which, although in itself of no particular importance, seems      
to be necessary to the completeness of the system. The highest              
conception, with which a transcendental philosophy commonly begins, is      
the division into possible and impossible. But as all division              
presupposes a divided conception, a still higher one must exist, and        
this is the conception of an object in general- problematically             
understood and without its being decided whether it is something or         
nothing. As the categories are the only conceptions which apply to          
objects in general, the distinguishing of an object, whether it is          
something or nothing, must proceed according to the order and               
direction of the categories.                                                
                                                    {APPENDIX ^paragraph 40}
  1. To the categories of quantity, that is, the conceptions of all,        
many, and one, the conception which annihilates all, that is, the           
conception of none, is opposed. And thus the object of a conception,        
to which no intuition can be found to correspond, is = nothing. That        
is, it is a conception without an object (ens rationis), like noumena,      
which cannot be considered possible in the sphere of reality, though        
they must not therefore be held to be impossible- or like certain           
new fundamental forces in matter, the existence of which is                 
cogitable without contradiction, though, as examples from experience        
are not forthcoming, they must not be regarded as possible.                 
  2. Reality is something; negation is nothing, that is, a                  
conception of the absence of an object, as cold, a shadow (nihil            
privativum).                                                                
  3. The mere form of intuition, without substance, is in itself no         
object, but the merely formal condition of an object (as                    
phenomenon), as pure space and pure time. These are certainly               
something, as forms of intuition, but are not themselves objects which      
are intuited (ens imaginarium).                                             
  4. The object of a conception which is self-contradictory, is             
nothing, because the conception is nothing- is impossible, as a figure      
composed of two straight lines (nihil negativum).                           
  The table of this division of the conception of nothing (the              
corresponding division of the conception of something does not require      
special description) must therefore be arranged as follows:                 
                                                    {APPENDIX ^paragraph 45}
-                                                                           
                      NOTHING                                               
                        AS                                                  
-                                                                           
                        1                                                   
                                                    {APPENDIX ^paragraph 50}
                As Empty Conception                                         
                 without object,                                            
                  ens rationis                                              
           2                               3                                
     Empty object of               Empty intuition                          
                                                    {APPENDIX ^paragraph 55}
      a conception,                without object,                          
     nihil privativum              ens imaginarium                          
                        4                                                   
                   Empty object                                             
                 without conception,                                        
                                                    {APPENDIX ^paragraph 60}
                  nihil negativum                                           
-                                                                           
  We see that the ens rationis is distinguished from the nihil              
negativum or pure nothing by the consideration that the former must         
not be reckoned among possibilities, because it is a mere fiction-          
though not self-contradictory, while the latter is completely               
opposed to all possibility, inasmuch as the conception annihilates          
itself. Both, however, are empty conceptions.  On the other hand,           
the nihil privativum and ens imaginarium are empty data for                 
conceptions. If light be not given to the senses, we cannot                 
represent to ourselves darkness, and if extended objects are not            
perceived, we cannot represent space. Neither the negation, nor the         
mere form of intuition can, without something real, be an object.           
                                                                            
INTRO                                                                       
           TRANSCENDENTAL LOGIC. SECOND DIVISION.                           
-                                                                           
           TRANSCENDENTAL DIALECTIC. INTRODUCTION.                          
-                                                                           
         I. Of Transcendental Illusory Appearance.                          
-                                                                           
  We termed dialectic in general a logic of appearance. This does           
not signify a doctrine of probability; for probability is truth,            
only cognized upon insufficient grounds, and though the information it      
gives us is imperfect, it is not therefore deceitful. Hence it must         
not be separated from the analytical part of logic. Still less must         
phenomenon and appearance be held to be identical. For truth or             
illusory appearance does not reside in the object, in so far as it          
is intuited, but in the judgement upon the object, in so far as it          
is thought. It is, therefore, quite correct to say that the senses          
do not err, not because they always judge correctly, but because            
they do not judge at all. Hence truth and error, consequently also,         
illusory appearance as the cause of error, are only to be found in a        
judgement, that is, in the relation of an object to our understanding.      
In a cognition which completely harmonizes with the laws of the             
understanding, no error can exist. In a representation of the               
senses- as not containing any judgement- there is also no error. But        
no power of nature can of itself deviate from its own laws. Hence           
neither the understanding per se (without the influence of another          
cause), nor the senses per se, would fall into error; the former could      
not, because, if it acts only according to its own laws, the effect         
(the judgement) must necessarily accord with these laws. But in             
accordance with the laws of the understanding consists the formal           
element in all truth. In the senses there is no judgement- neither a        
true nor a false one. But, as we have no source of cognition besides        
these two, it follows that error is caused solely by the unobserved         
influence of the sensibility upon the understanding. And thus it            
happens that the subjective grounds of a judgement and are                  
confounded with the objective, and cause them to deviate from their         
proper determination,* just as a body in motion would always of itself      
proceed in a straight line, but if another impetus gives to it a            
different direction, it will then start off into a curvilinear line of      
motion. To distinguish the peculiar action of the understanding from        
the power which mingles with it, it is necessary to consider an             
erroneous judgement as the diagonal between two forces, that determine      
the judgement in two different directions, which, as it were, form          
an angle, and to resolve this composite operation into the simple ones      
of the understanding and the sensibility. In pure a priori                  
judgements this must be done by means of transcendental reflection,         
whereby, as has been already shown, each representation has its             
place appointed in the corresponding faculty of cognition, and              
consequently the influence of the one faculty upon the other is made        
apparent.                                                                   
                                                        {INTRO ^paragraph 5}
-                                                                           
  *Sensibility, subjected to the understanding, as the object upon          
which the understanding employs its functions, is the source of real        
cognitions. But, in so far as it exercises an influence upon the            
action of the understanding and determines it to judgement,                 
sensibility is itself the cause of error.                                   
-                                                                           
  It is not at present our business to treat of empirical illusory          
appearance (for example, optical illusion), which occurs in the             
empirical application of otherwise correct rules of the understanding,      
and in which the judgement is misled by the influence of                    
imagination. Our purpose is to speak of transcendental illusory             
appearance, which influences principles- that are not even applied          
to experience, for in this case we should possess a sure test of their      
correctness- but which leads us, in disregard of all the warnings of        
criticism, completely beyond the empirical employment of the                
categories and deludes us with the chimera of an extension of the           
sphere of the pure understanding. We shall term those principles the        
application of which is confined entirely within the limits of              
possible experience, immanent; those, on the other hand, which              
transgress these limits, we shall call transcendent principles. But by      
these latter I do not understand principles of the transcendental           
use or misuse of the categories, which is in reality a mere fault of        
the judgement when not under due restraint from criticism, and              
therefore not paying sufficient attention to the limits of the              
sphere in which the pure understanding is allowed to exercise its           
functions; but real principles which exhort us to break down all those      
barriers, and to lay claim to a perfectly new field of cognition,           
which recognizes no line of demarcation. Thus transcendental and            
transcendent are not identical terms. The principles of the pure            
understanding, which we have already propounded, ought to be of             
empirical and not of transcendental use, that is, they are not              
applicable to any object beyond the sphere of experience. A                 
principle which removes these limits, nay, which authorizes us to           
overstep them, is called transcendent. If our criticism can succeed in      
exposing the illusion in these pretended principles, those which are        
limited in their employment to the sphere of experience may be called,      
in opposition to the others, immanent principles of the pure                
understanding.                                                              
  Logical illusion, which consists merely in the imitation of the form      
of reason (the illusion in sophistical syllogisms), arises entirely         
from a want of due attention to logical rules. So soon as the               
attention is awakened to the case before us, this illusion totally          
disappears. Transcendental illusion, on the contrary, does not cease        
to exist, even after it has been exposed, and its nothingness               
clearly perceived by means of transcendental criticism. Take, for           
example, the illusion in the proposition: "The world must have a            
beginning in time." The cause of this is as follows. In our reason,         
subjectively considered as a faculty of human cognition, there exist        
fundamental rules and maxims of its exercise, which have completely         
the appearance of objective principles. Now from this cause it happens      
that the subjective necessity of a certain connection of our                
conceptions, is regarded as an objective necessity of the                   
determination of things in themselves. This illusion it is                  
impossible to avoid, just as we cannot avoid perceiving that the sea        
appears to be higher at a distance than it is near the shore,               
because we see the former by means of higher rays than the latter, or,      
which is a still stronger case, as even the astronomer cannot               
prevent himself from seeing the moon larger at its rising than some         
time afterwards, although he is not deceived by this illusion.              
                                                       {INTRO ^paragraph 10}
  Transcendental dialectic will therefore content itself with exposing      
the illusory appearance in transcendental judgements, and guarding          
us against it; but to make it, as in the case of logical illusion,          
entirely disappear and cease to be illusion is utterly beyond its           
power. For we have here to do with a natural and unavoidable illusion,      
which rests upon subjective principles and imposes these upon us as         
objective, while logical dialectic, in the detection of sophisms,           
has to do merely with an error in the logical consequence of the            
propositions, or with an artificially constructed illusion, in              
imitation of the natural error. There is, therefore, a natural and          
unavoidable dialectic of pure reason- not that in which the bungler,        
from want of the requisite knowledge, involves himself, nor that which      
the sophist devises for the purpose of misleading, but that which is        
an inseparable adjunct of human reason, and which, even after its           
illusions have been exposed, does not cease to deceive, and                 
continually to lead reason into momentary errors, which it becomes          
necessary continually to remove.                                            
-                                                                           
    II. Of Pure Reason as the Seat of Transcendental Illusory               
                        Appearance.                                         
-                                                                           
                                                       {INTRO ^paragraph 15}
                  A. OF REASON IN GENERAL.                                  
-                                                                           
  All our knowledge begins with sense, proceeds thence to                   
understanding, and ends with reason, beyond which nothing higher can        
be discovered in the human mind for elaborating the matter of               
intuition and subjecting it to the highest unity of thought. At this        
stage of our inquiry it is my duty to give an explanation of this, the      
highest faculty of cognition, and I confess I find myself here in some      
difficulty. Of reason, as of the understanding, there is a merely           
formal, that is, logical use, in which it makes abstraction of all          
content of cognition; but there is also a real use, inasmuch as it          
contains in itself the source of certain conceptions and principles,        
which it does not borrow either from the senses or the                      
understanding. The former faculty has been long defined by logicians        
as the faculty of mediate conclusion in contradistinction to immediate      
conclusions (consequentiae immediatae); but the nature of the               
latter, which itself generates conceptions, is not to be understood         
from this definition. Now as a division of reason into a logical and a      
transcendental faculty presents itself here, it becomes necessary to        
seek for a higher conception of this source of cognition which shall        
comprehend both conceptions. In this we may expect, according to the        
analogy of the conceptions of the understanding, that the logical           
conception will give us the key to the transcendental, and that the         
table of the functions of the former will present us with the clue          
to the conceptions of reason.                                               
  In the former part of our transcendental logic, we defined the            
understanding to be the faculty of rules; reason may be                     
distinguished from understanding as the faculty of principles.              
  The term principle is ambiguous, and commonly signifies merely a          
cognition that may be employed as a principle, although it is not in        
itself, and as regards its proper origin, entitled to the distinction.      
Every general proposition, even if derived from experience by the           
process of induction, may serve as the major in a syllogism; but it is      
not for that reason a principle. Mathematical axioms (for example,          
there can be only one straight line between two points) are general         
a priori cognitions, and are therefore rightly denominated principles,      
relatively to the cases which can be subsumed under them. But I cannot      
for this reason say that I cognize this property of a straight line         
from principles- I cognize it only in pure intuition.                       
                                                       {INTRO ^paragraph 20}
  Cognition from principles, then, is that cognition in which I             
cognize the particular in the general by means of conceptions. Thus         
every syllogism is a form of the deduction of a cognition from a            
principle. For the major always gives a conception, through which           
everything that is subsumed under the condition thereof is cognized         
according to a principle. Now as every general cognition may serve          
as the major in a syllogism, and the understanding presents us with         
such general a priori propositions, they may be termed principles,          
in respect of their possible use.                                           
  But if we consider these principles of the pure understanding in          
relation to their origin, we shall find them to be anything rather          
than cognitions from conceptions. For they would not even be                
possible a priori, if we could not rely on the assistance of pure           
intuition (in mathematics), or on that of the conditions of a possible      
experience. That everything that happens has a cause, cannot be             
concluded from the general conception of that which happens; on the         
contrary the principle of causality instructs us as to the mode of          
obtaining from that which happens a determinate empirical conception.       
  Synthetical cognitions from conceptions the understanding cannot          
supply, and they alone are entitled to be called principles. At the         
same time, all general propositions may be termed comparative               
principles.                                                                 
  It has been a long-cherished wish- that (who knows how late), may         
one day, be happily accomplished- that the principles of the endless        
variety of civil laws should be investigated and exposed; for in            
this way alone can we find the secret of simplifying legislation.           
But in this case, laws are nothing more than limitations of our             
freedom upon conditions under which it subsists in perfect harmony          
with itself; they consequently have for their object that which is          
completely our own work, and of which we ourselves may be the cause by      
means of these conceptions. But how objects as things in themselves-        
how the nature of things is subordinated to principles and is to be         
determined. according to conceptions, is a question which it seems          
well nigh impossible to answer. Be this, however, as it may- for on         
this point our investigation is yet to be made- it is at least              
manifest from what we have said that cognition from principles is           
something very different from cognition by means of the understanding,      
which may indeed precede other cognitions in the form of a                  
principle, but in itself- in so far as it is synthetical- is neither        
based upon mere thought, nor contains a general proposition drawn from      
conceptions alone shall comprehend                                          
  The understanding may be a faculty for the production of unity of         
phenomena by virtue of rules; the reason is a faculty for the               
production of unity of rules (of the understanding) under                   
principles. Reason, therefore, never applies directly to experience,        
or to any sensuous object; its object is, on the contrary, the              
understanding, to the manifold cognition of which it gives a unity a        
priori by means of conceptions- a unity which may be called rational        
unity, and which is of a nature very different from that of the             
unity produced by the understanding.                                        
                                                       {INTRO ^paragraph 25}
  The above is the general conception of the faculty of reason, in          
so far as it has been possible to make it comprehensible in the             
absence of examples. These will be given in the sequel.                     
-                                                                           
             B. OF THE LOGICAL USE OF REASON.                               
-                                                                           
  A distinction is commonly made between that which is immediately          
cognized and that which is inferred or concluded. That in a figure          
which is bounded by three straight lines there are three angles, is an      
immediate cognition; but that these angles are together equal to two        
right angles, is an inference or conclusion. Now, as we are constantly      
employing this mode of thought and have thus become quite accustomed        
to it, we no longer remark the above distinction, and, as in the            
case of the so-called deceptions of sense, consider as immediately          
perceived, what has really been inferred. In every reasoning or             
syllogism, there is a fundamental proposition, afterwards a second          
drawn from it, and finally the conclusion, which connects the truth in      
the first with the truth in the second- and that infallibly. If the         
judgement concluded is so contained in the first proposition that it        
can be deduced from it without the meditation of a third notion, the        
conclusion is called immediate (consequentia immediata); I prefer           
the term conclusion of the understanding. But if, in addition to the        
fundamental cognition, a second judgement is necessary for the              
production of the conclusion, it is called a conclusion of the reason.      
In the proposition: All men are mortal, are contained the                   
propositions: Some men are mortal, Nothing that is not mortal is a          
man, and these are therefore immediate conclusions from the first.          
On the other hand, the proposition: all the learned are mortal, is not      
contained in the main proposition (for the conception of a learned man      
does not occur in it), and it can be deduced from the main proposition      
only by means of a mediating judgement.                                     
                                                       {INTRO ^paragraph 30}
  In every syllogism I first cogitate a rule (the major) by means of        
the understanding. In the next place I subsume a cognition under the        
condition of the rule (and this is the minor) by means of the               
judgement. And finally I determine my cognition by means of the             
predicate of the rule (this is the conclusio), consequently, I              
determine it a priori by means of the reason. The relations,                
therefore, which the major proposition, as the rule, represents             
between a cognition and its condition, constitute the different             
kinds of syllogisms. These are just threefold- analogously with all         
judgements, in so far as they differ in the mode of expressing the          
relation of a cognition in the understanding- namely, categorical,          
hypothetical, and disjunctive.                                              
  When as often happens, the conclusion is a judgement which may            
follow from other given judgements, through which a perfectly               
different object is cogitated, I endeavour to discover in the               
understanding whether the assertion in this conclusion does not             
stand under certain conditions according to a general rule. If I            
find such a condition, and if the object mentioned in the conclusion        
can be subsumed under the given condition, then this conclusion             
follows from a rule which is also valid for other objects of                
cognition. From this we see that reason endeavours to subject the           
great variety of the cognitions of the understanding to the smallest        
possible number of principles (general conditions), and thus to             
produce in it the highest unity.                                            
-                                                                           
               C. OF THE PURE USE OF REASON.                                
-                                                                           
                                                       {INTRO ^paragraph 35}
  Can we isolate reason, and, if so, is it in this case a peculiar          
source of conceptions and judgements which spring from it alone, and        
through which it can be applied to objects; or is it merely a               
subordinate faculty, whose duty it is to give a certain form to             
given cognitions- a form which is called logical, and through which         
the cognitions of the understanding are subordinated to each other,         
and lower rules to higher (those, to wit, whose condition comprises in      
its sphere the condition of the others), in so far as this can be done      
by comparison? This is the question which we have at present to             
answer. Manifold variety of rules and unity of principles is a              
requirement of reason, for the purpose of bringing the understanding        
into complete accordance with itself, just as understanding subjects        
the manifold content of intuition to conceptions, and thereby               
introduces connection into it. But this principle prescribes no law to      
objects, and does not contain any ground of the possibility of              
cognizing or of determining them as such, but is merely a subjective        
law for the proper arrangement of the content of the understanding.         
The purpose of this law is, by a comparison of the conceptions of           
the understanding, to reduce them to the smallest possible number,          
although, at the same time, it does not justify us in demanding from        
objects themselves such a uniformity as might contribute to the             
convenience and the enlargement of the sphere of the understanding, or      
in expecting that it will itself thus receive from them objective           
validity. In one word, the question is: "does reason in itself, that        
is, does pure reason contain a priori synthetical principles and            
rules, and what are those principles?"                                      
  The formal and logical procedure of reason in syllogisms gives us         
sufficient information in regard to the ground on which the                 
transcendental principle of reason in its pure synthetical cognition        
will rest.                                                                  
  1. Reason, as observed in the syllogistic process, is not applicable      
to intuitions, for the purpose of subjecting them to rules- for this        
is the province of the understanding with its categories- but to            
conceptions and judgements. If pure reason does apply to objects and        
the intuition of them, it does so not immediately, but mediately-           
through the understanding and its judgements, which have a direct           
relation to the senses and their intuition, for the purpose of              
determining their objects. The unity of reason is therefore not the         
unity of a possible experience, but is essentially different from this      
unity, which is that of the understanding. That everything which            
happens has a cause, is not a principle cognized and prescribed by          
reason. This principle makes the unity of experience possible and           
borrows nothing from reason, which, without a reference to possible         
experience, could never have produced by means of mere conceptions any      
such synthetical unity.                                                     
  2. Reason, in its logical use, endeavours to discover the general         
condition of its judgement (the conclusion), and a syllogism is itself      
nothing but a judgement by means of the subsumption of its condition        
under a general rule (the major). Now as this rule may itself be            
subjected to the same process of reason, and thus the condition of the      
condition be sought (by means of a prosyllogism) as long as the             
process can be continued, it is very manifest that the peculiar             
principle of reason in its logical use is to find for the                   
conditioned cognition of the understanding the unconditioned whereby        
the unity of the former is completed.                                       
  But this logical maxim cannot be a principle of pure reason,              
unless we admit that, if the conditioned is given, the whole series of      
conditions subordinated to one another- a series which is consequently      
itself unconditioned- is also given, that is, contained in the              
object and its connection.                                                  
                                                       {INTRO ^paragraph 40}
  But this principle of pure reason is evidently synthetical; for,          
analytically, the conditioned certainly relates to some condition, but      
not to the unconditioned. From this principle also there must               
originate different synthetical propositions, of which the pure             
understanding is perfectly ignorant, for it has to do only with             
objects of a possible experience, the cognition and synthesis of which      
is always conditioned. The unconditioned, if it does really exist,          
must be especially considered in regard to the determinations which         
distinguish it from whatever is conditioned, and will thus afford us        
material for many a priori synthetical propositions.                        
  The principles resulting from this highest principle of pure              
reason will, however, be transcendent in relation to phenomena, that        
is to say, it will be impossible to make any adequate empirical use of      
this principle. It is therefore completely different from all               
principles of the understanding, the use made of which is entirely          
immanent, their object and purpose being merely the possibility of          
experience. Now our duty in the transcendental dialectic is as              
follows. To discover whether the principle that the series of               
conditions (in the synthesis of phenomena, or of thought in general)        
extends to the unconditioned is objectively true, or not; what              
consequences result therefrom affecting the empirical use of the            
understanding, or rather whether there exists any such objectively          
valid proposition of reason, and whether it is not, on the contrary, a      
merely logical precept which directs us to ascend perpetually to still      
higher conditions, to approach completeness in the series of them, and      
thus to introduce into our cognition the highest possible unity of          
reason. We must ascertain, I say, whether this requirement of reason        
has not been regarded, by a misunderstanding, as a transcendental           
principle of pure reason, which postulates a thorough completeness          
in the series of conditions in objects themselves. We must show,            
moreover, the misconceptions and illusions that intrude into                
syllogisms, the major proposition of which pure reason has supplied- a      
proposition which has perhaps more of the character of a petitio            
than of a postulatum- and that proceed from experience upwards to           
its conditions. The solution of these problems is our task in               
transcendental dialectic, which we are about to expose even at its          
source, that lies deep in human reason. We shall divide it into two         
parts, the first of which will treat of the transcendent conceptions        
of pure reason, the second of transcendent and dialectical syllogisms.      
                                                                            
BK_1                                                                        
                           BOOK I.                                          
-                                                                           
             OF THE CONCEPTIONS OF PURE REASON.                             
-                                                                           
  The conceptions of pure reason- we do not here speak of the               
possibility of them- are not obtained by reflection, but by                 
inference or conclusion. The conceptions of understanding are also          
cogitated a priori antecedently to experience, and render it possible;      
but they contain nothing but the unity of reflection upon phenomena,        
in so far as these must necessarily belong to a possible empirical          
consciousness. Through them alone are cognition and the                     
determination of an object possible. It is from them, accordingly,          
that we receive material for reasoning, and antecedently to them we         
possess no a priori conceptions of objects from which they might be         
deduced, On the other hand, the sole basis of their objective               
reality consists in the necessity imposed on them, as containing the        
intellectual form of all experience, of restricting their                   
application and influence to the sphere of experience.                      
  But the term, conception of reason, or rational conception, itself        
indicates that it does not confine itself within the limits of              
experience, because its object-matter is a cognition, of which every        
empirical cognition is but a part- nay, the whole of possible               
experience may be itself but a part of it- a cognition to which no          
actual experience ever fully attains, although it does always               
pertain to it. The aim of rational conceptions is the comprehension,        
as that of the conceptions of understanding is the understanding of         
perceptions. If they contain the unconditioned, they relate to that to      
which all experience is subordinate, but which is never itself an           
object of experience- that towards which reason tends in all its            
conclusions from experience, and by the standard of which it estimates      
the degree of their empirical use, but which is never itself an             
element in an empirical synthesis. If, notwithstanding, such                
conceptions possess objective validity, they may be called conceptus        
ratiocinati (conceptions legitimately concluded); in cases where            
they do not, they have been admitted on account of having the               
appearance of being correctly concluded, and may be called conceptus        
ratiocinantes (sophistical conceptions). But as this can only be            
sufficiently demonstrated in that part of our treatise which relates        
to the dialectical conclusions of reason, we shall omit any                 
consideration of it in this place. As we called the pure conceptions        
of the understanding categories, we shall also distinguish those of         
pure reason by a new name and call them transcendental ideas. These         
terms, however, we must in the first place explain and justify.             
-                                                                           
                                                         {BK_1 ^paragraph 5}
               SECTION I - Of Ideas in General.                             
-                                                                           
  Despite the great wealth of words which European languages                
possess, the thinker finds himself often at a loss for an expression        
exactly suited to his conception, for want of which he is unable to         
make himself intelligible either to others or to himself. To coin           
new words is a pretension to legislation in language which is seldom        
successful; and, before recourse is taken to so desperate an                
expedient, it is advisable to examine the dead and learned                  
languages, with the hope and the probability that we may there meet         
with some adequate expression of the notion we have in our minds. In        
this case, even if the original meaning of the word has become              
somewhat uncertain, from carelessness or want of caution on the part        
of the authors of it, it is always better to adhere to and confirm its      
proper meaning- even although it may be doubtful whether it was             
formerly used in exactly this sense- than to make our labour vain by        
want of sufficient care to render ourselves intelligible.                   
  For this reason, when it happens that there exists only a single          
word to express a certain conception, and this word, in its usual           
acceptation, is thoroughly adequate to the conception, the accurate         
distinction of which from related conceptions is of great                   
importance, we ought not to employ the expression improvidently, or,        
for the sake of variety and elegance of style, use it as a synonym for      
other cognate words. It is our duty, on the contrary, carefully to          
preserve its peculiar signification, as otherwise it easily happens         
that when the attention of the reader is no longer particularly             
attracted to the expression, and it is lost amid the multitude of           
other words of very different import, the thought which it conveyed,        
and which it alone conveyed, is lost with it.                               
  Plato employed the expression idea in a way that plainly showed he        
meant by it something which is never derived from the senses, but           
which far transcends even the conceptions of the understanding (with        
which Aristotle occupied himself), inasmuch as in experience nothing        
perfectly corresponding to them could be found. Ideas are, according        
to him, archetypes of things themselves, and not merely keys to             
possible experiences, like the categories. In his view they flow            
from the highest reason, by which they have been imparted to human          
reason, which, however, exists no longer in its original state, but is      
obliged with great labour to recall by reminiscence- which is called        
philosophy- the old but now sadly obscured ideas. I will not here           
enter upon any literary investigation of the sense which this               
sublime philosopher attached to this expression. I shall content            
myself with remarking that it is nothing unusual, in common                 
conversation as well as in written works, by comparing the thoughts         
which an author has delivered upon a subject, to understand him better      
than he understood himself inasmuch as he may not have sufficiently         
determined his conception, and thus have sometimes spoken, nay even         
thought, in opposition to his own opinions.                                 
                                                        {BK_1 ^paragraph 10}
  Plato perceived very clearly that our faculty of cognition has the        
feeling of a much higher vocation than that of merely spelling out          
phenomena according to synthetical unity, for the purpose of being          
able to read them as experience, and that our reason naturally              
raises itself to cognitions far too elevated to admit of the                
possibility of an object given by experience corresponding to them-         
cognitions which are nevertheless real, and are not mere phantoms of        
the brain.                                                                  
  This philosopher found his ideas especially in all that is                
practical,* that is, which rests upon freedom, which in its turn ranks      
under cognitions that are the peculiar product of reason. He who would      
derive from experience the conceptions of virtue, who would make (as        
many have really done) that, which at best can but serve as an              
imperfectly illustrative example, a model for or the formation of a         
perfectly adequate idea on the subject, would in fact transform virtue      
into a nonentity changeable according to time and circumstance and          
utterly incapable of being employed as a rule. On the contrary,             
every one is conscious that, when any one is held up to him as a model      
of virtue, he compares this so-called model with the true original          
which he possesses in his own mind and values him according to this         
standard. But this standard is the idea of virtue, in relation to           
which all possible objects of experience are indeed serviceable as          
examples- proofs of the practicability in a certain degree of that          
which the conception of virtue demands- but certainly not as                
archetypes. That the actions of man will never be in perfect                
accordance with all the requirements of the pure ideas of reason, does      
not prove the thought to be chimerical. For only through this idea are      
all judgements as to moral merit or demerit possible; it                    
consequently lies at the foundation of every approach to moral              
perfection, however far removed from it the obstacles in human nature-      
indeterminable as to degree- may keep us.                                   
-                                                                           
  *He certainly extended the application of his conception to               
speculative cognitions also, provided they were given pure and              
completely a priori, nay, even to mathematics, although this science        
cannot possess an object otherwhere than in Possible experience. I          
cannot follow him in this, and as little can I follow him in his            
mystical deduction of these ideas, or in his hypostatization of             
them; although, in truth, the elevated and exaggerated language             
which he employed in describing them is quite capable of an                 
interpretation more subdued and more in accordance with fact and the        
nature of things.                                                           
-                                                                           
                                                        {BK_1 ^paragraph 15}
  The Platonic Republic has become proverbial as an example- and a          
striking one- of imaginary perfection, such as can exist only in the        
brain of the idle thinker; and Brucker ridicules the philosopher for        
maintaining that a prince can never govern well, unless he is               
participant in the ideas. But we should do better to follow up this         
thought and, where this admirable thinker leaves us without                 
assistance, employ new efforts to place it in clearer light, rather         
than carelessly fling it aside as useless, under the very miserable         
and pernicious pretext of impracticability. A constitution of the           
greatest possible human freedom according to laws, by which the             
liberty of every individual can consist with the liberty of every           
other (not of the greatest possible happiness, for this follows             
necessarily from the former), is, to say the least, a necessary             
idea, which must be placed at the foundation not only of the first          
plan of the constitution of a state, but of all its laws. And, in           
this, it not necessary at the outset to take account of the                 
obstacles which lie in our way- obstacles which perhaps do not              
necessarily arise from the character of human nature, but rather            
from the previous neglect of true ideas in legislation. For there is        
nothing more pernicious and more unworthy of a philosopher, than the        
vulgar appeal to a so-called adverse experience, which indeed would         
not have existed, if those institutions had been established at the         
proper time and in accordance with ideas; while, instead of this,           
conceptions, crude for the very reason that they have been drawn            
from experience, have marred and frustrated all our better views and        
intentions. The more legislation and government are in harmony with         
this idea, the more rare do punishments become and thus it is quite         
reasonable to maintain, as Plato did, that in a perfect state no            
punishments at all would be necessary. Now although a perfect state         
may never exist, the idea is not on that account the less just,             
which holds up this maximum as the archetype or standard of a               
constitution, in order to bring legislative government always nearer        
and nearer to the greatest possible perfection. For at what precise         
degree human nature must stop in its progress, and how wide must be         
the chasm which must necessarily exist between the idea and its             
realization, are problems which no one can or ought to determine-           
and for this reason, that it is the destination of freedom to overstep      
all assigned limits between itself and the idea.                            
  But not only in that wherein human reason is a real causal agent and      
where ideas are operative causes (of actions and their objects),            
that is to say, in the region of ethics, but also in regard to              
nature herself, Plato saw clear proofs of an origin from ideas. A           
plant, and animal, the regular order of nature- probably also the           
disposition of the whole universe- give manifest evidence that they         
are possible only by means of and according to ideas; that, indeed, no      
one creature, under the individual conditions of its existence,             
perfectly harmonizes with the idea of the most perfect of its kind-         
just as little as man with the idea of humanity, which nevertheless he      
bears in his soul as the archetypal standard of his actions; that,          
notwithstanding, these ideas are in the highest sense individually,         
unchangeably, and completely determined, and are the original causes        
of things; and that the totality of connected objects in the                
universe is alone fully adequate to that idea. Setting aside the            
exaggerations of expression in the writings of this philosopher, the        
mental power exhibited in this ascent from the ectypal mode of              
regarding the physical world to the architectonic connection thereof        
according to ends, that is, ideas, is an effort which deserves              
imitation and claims respect. But as regards the principles of ethics,      
of legislation, and of religion, spheres in which ideas alone render        
experience possible, although they never attain to full expression          
therein, he has vindicated for himself a position of peculiar merit,        
which is not appreciated only because it is judged by the very              
empirical rules, the validity of which as principles is destroyed by        
ideas. For as regards nature, experience presents us with rules and is      
the source of truth, but in relation to ethical laws experience is the      
parent of illusion, and it is in the highest degree reprehensible to        
limit or to deduce the laws which dictate what I ought to do, from          
what is done.                                                               
  We must, however, omit the consideration of these important               
subjects, the development of which is in reality the peculiar duty and      
dignity of philosophy, and confine ourselves for the present to the         
more humble but not less useful task of preparing a firm foundation         
for those majestic edifices of moral science. For this foundation           
has been hitherto insecure from the many subterranean passages which        
reason in its confident but vain search for treasures has made in           
all directions. Our present duty is to make ourselves perfectly             
acquainted with the transcendental use made of pure reason, its             
principles and ideas, that we may be able properly to determine and         
value its influence and real worth. But before bringing these               
introductory remarks to a close, I beg those who really have                
philosophy at heart- and their number is but small- if they shall find      
themselves convinced by the considerations following as well as by          
those above, to exert themselves to preserve to the expression idea         
its original signification, and to take care that it be not lost among      
those other expressions by which all sorts of representations are           
loosely designated- that the interests of science may not thereby           
suffer. We are in no want of words to denominate adequately every mode      
of representation, without the necessity of encroaching upon terms          
which are proper to others. The following is a graduated list of them.      
The genus is representation in general (representation. Under it            
stands representation with consciousness (perceptio). A perception          
which relates solely to the subject as a modification of its state, is      
a sensation (sensatio), an objective perception is a cognition              
(cognitio). A cognition is either an intuition or a conception              
(intuitus vel conceptus). The former has an immediate relation to           
the object and is singular and individual; the latter has but a             
mediate relation, by means of a characteristic mark which may be            
common to several things. A conception is either empirical or pure.         
A pure conception, in so far as it has its origin in the understanding      
alone, and is not the conception of a pure sensuous image, is called        
notio. A conception formed from notions, which transcends the               
possibility of experience, is an idea, or a conception of reason. To        
one who has accustomed himself to these distinctions, it must be quite      
intolerable to hear the representation of the colour red called an          
idea. It ought not even to be called a notion or conception of              
understanding.                                                              
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             SECTION II. Of Transcendental Ideas.                           
                                                        {BK_1 ^paragraph 20}
-                                                                           
  Transcendental analytic showed us how the mere logical form of our        
cognition can contain the origin of pure conceptions a priori,              
conceptions which represent objects antecedently to all experience, or      
rather, indicate the synthetical unity which alone renders possible an      
empirical cognition of objects. The form of judgements- converted into      
a conception of the synthesis of intuitions- produced the categories        
which direct the employment of the understanding in experience. This        
consideration warrants us to expect that the form of syllogisms,            
when applied to synthetical unity of intuitions, following the rule of      
the categories, will contain the origin of particular a priori              
conceptions, which we may call pure conceptions of reason or                
transcendental ideas, and which will determine the use of the               
understanding in the totality of experience according to principles.        
  The function of reason in arguments consists in the universality          
of a cognition according to conceptions, and the syllogism itself is a      
judgement which is determined a priori in the whole extent of its           
condition. The proposition: "Caius is mortal," is one which may be          
obtained from experience by the aid of the understanding alone; but my      
wish is to find a conception which contains the condition under             
which the predicate of this judgement is given- in this case, the           
conception of man- and after subsuming under this condition, taken          
in its whole extent (all men are mortal), I determine according to          
it the cognition of the object thought, and say: "Caius is mortal."         
  Hence, in the conclusion of a syllogism we restrict a predicate to a      
certain object, after having thought it in the major in its whole           
extent under a certain condition. This complete quantity of the extent      
in relation to such a condition is called universality                      
(universalitas). To this corresponds totality (universitas) of              
conditions in the synthesis of intuitions. The transcendental               
conception of reason is therefore nothing else than the conception          
of the totality of the conditions of a given conditioned. Now as the        
unconditioned alone renders possible totality of conditions, and,           
conversely, the totality of conditions is itself always unconditioned;      
a pure rational conception in general can be defined and explained          
by means of the conception of the unconditioned, in so far as it            
contains a basis for the synthesis of the conditioned.                      
  To the number of modes of relation which the understanding cogitates      
by means of the categories, the number of pure rational conceptions         
will correspond. We must therefore seek for, first, an unconditioned        
of the categorical synthesis in a subject; secondly, of the                 
hypothetical synthesis of the members of a series; thirdly, of the          
disjunctive synthesis of parts in a system.                                 
                                                        {BK_1 ^paragraph 25}
  There are exactly the same number of modes of syllogisms, each of         
which proceeds through prosyllogisms to the unconditioned- one to           
the subject which cannot be employed as predicate, another to the           
presupposition which supposes nothing higher than itself, and the           
third to an aggregate of the members of the complete division of a          
conception. Hence the pure rational conceptions of totality in the          
synthesis of conditions have a necessary foundation in the nature of        
human reason- at least as modes of elevating the unity of the               
understanding to the unconditioned. They may have no valid                  
application, corresponding to their transcendental employment, in           
concreto, and be thus of no greater utility than to direct the              
understanding how, while extending them as widely as possible, to           
maintain its exercise and application in perfect consistence and            
harmony.                                                                    
  But, while speaking here of the totality of conditions and of the         
unconditioned as the common title of all conceptions of reason, we          
again light upon an expression which we find it impossible to dispense      
with, and which nevertheless, owing to the ambiguity attaching to it        
from long abuse, we cannot employ with safety. The word absolute is         
one of the few words which, in its original signification, was              
perfectly adequate to the conception it was intended to convey- a           
conception which no other word in the same language exactly suits, and      
the loss- or, which is the same thing, the incautious and loose             
employment- of which must be followed by the loss of the conception         
itself. And, as it is a conception which occupies much of the               
attention of reason, its loss would be greatly to the detriment of all      
transcendental philosophy. The word absolute is at present                  
frequently used to denote that something can be predicated of a             
thing considered in itself and intrinsically. In this sense absolutely      
possible would signify that which is possible in itself (interne)-          
which is, in fact, the least that one can predicate of an object. On        
the other hand, it is sometimes employed to indicate that a thing is        
valid in all respects- for example, absolute sovereignty. Absolutely        
possible would in this sense signify that which is possible in all          
relations and in every respect; and this is the most that can be            
predicated of the possibility of a thing. Now these significations          
do in truth frequently coincide. Thus, for example, that which is           
intrinsically impossible, is also impossible in all relations, that         
is, absolutely impossible. But in most cases they differ from each          
other toto caelo, and I can by no means conclude that, because a thing      
is in itself possible, it is also possible in all relations, and            
therefore absolutely. Nay, more, I shall in the sequel show that            
absolute necessity does not by any means depend on internal necessity,      
and that, therefore, it must not be considered as synonymous with           
it. Of an opposite which is intrinsically impossible, we may affirm         
that it is in all respects impossible, and that, consequently, the          
thing itself, of which this is the opposite, is absolutely                  
necessary; but I cannot reason conversely and say, the opposite of          
that which is absolutely necessary is intrinsically impossible, that        
is, that the absolute necessity of things is an internal necessity.         
For this internal necessity is in certain cases a mere empty word with      
which the least conception cannot be connected, while the conception        
of the necessity of a thing in all relations possesses very peculiar        
determinations. Now as the loss of a conception of great utility in         
speculative science cannot be a matter of indifference to the               
philosopher, I trust that the proper determination and careful              
preservation of the expression on which the conception depends will         
likewise be not indifferent to him.                                         
  In this enlarged signification, then, shall I employ the word             
absolute, in opposition to that which is valid only in some particular      
respect; for the latter is restricted by conditions, the former is          
valid without any restriction whatever.                                     
  Now the transcendental conception of reason has for its object            
nothing else than absolute totality in the synthesis of conditions and      
does not rest satisfied till it has attained to the absolutely, that        
is, in all respects and relations, unconditioned. For pure reason           
leaves to the understanding everything that immediately relates to the      
object of intuition or rather to their synthesis in imagination. The        
former restricts itself to the absolute totality in the employment          
of the conceptions of the understanding and aims at carrying out the        
synthetical unity which is cogitated in the category, even to the           
unconditioned. This unity may hence be called the rational unity of         
phenomena, as the other, which the category expresses, may be termed        
the unity of the understanding. Reason, therefore, has an immediate         
relation to the use of the understanding, not indeed in so far as           
the latter contains the ground of possible experience (for the              
conception of the absolute totality of conditions is not a                  
conception that can be employed in experience, because no experience        
is unconditioned), but solely for the purpose of directing it to a          
certain unity, of which the understanding has no conception, and the        
aim of which is to collect into an absolute whole all acts of the           
understanding. Hence the objective employment of the pure                   
conceptions of reason is always transcendent, while that of the pure        
conceptions of the understanding must, according to their nature, be        
always immanent, inasmuch as they are limited to possible experience.       
  I understand by idea a necessary conception of reason, to which no        
corresponding object can be discovered in the world of sense.               
Accordingly, the pure conceptions of reason at present under                
consideration are transcendental ideas. They are conceptions of pure        
reason, for they regard all empirical cognition as determined by means      
of an absolute totality of conditions. They are not mere fictions, but      
natural and necessary products of reason, and have hence a necessary        
relation to the whole sphere of the exercise of the understanding.          
And, finally, they are transcendent, and overstep the limits of all         
experiences, in which, consequently, no object can ever be presented        
that would be perfectly adequate to a transcendental idea. When we use      
the word idea, we say, as regards its object (an object of the pure         
understanding), a great deal, but as regards its subject (that is,          
in respect of its reality under conditions of experience), exceedingly      
little, because the idea, as the conception of a maximum, can never be      
completely and adequately presented in concreto. Now, as in the merely      
speculative employment of reason the latter is properly the sole            
aim, and as in this case the approximation to a conception, which is        
never attained in practice, is the same thing as if the conception          
were non-existent- it is commonly said of the conception of this kind,      
"it is only an idea." So we might very well say, "the absolute              
totality of all phenomena is only an idea," for, as we never can            
present an adequate representation of it, it remains for us a               
problem incapable of solution. On the other hand, as in the                 
practical use of the understanding we have only to do with action           
and practice according to rules, an idea of pure reason can always          
be given really in concreto, although only partially, nay, it is the        
indispensable condition of all practical employment of reason. The          
practice or execution of the idea is always limited and defective, but      
nevertheless within indeterminable boundaries, consequently always          
under the influence of the conception of an absolute perfection. And        
thus the practical idea is always in the highest degree fruitful,           
and in relation to real actions indispensably necessary. In the             
idea, pure reason possesses even causality and the power of                 
producing that which its conception contains. Hence we cannot say of        
wisdom, in a disparaging way, "it is only an idea." For, for the            
very reason that it is the idea of the necessary unity of all possible      
aims, it must be for all practical exertions and endeavours the             
primitive condition and rule- a rule which, if not constitutive, is at      
least limitative.                                                           
                                                        {BK_1 ^paragraph 30}
  Now, although we must say of the transcendental conceptions of            
reason, "they are only ideas," we must not, on this account, look upon      
them as superfluous and nugatory. For, although no object can be            
determined by them, they can be of great utility, unobserved and at         
the basis of the edifice of the understanding, as the canon for its         
extended and self-consistent exercise- a canon which, indeed, does not      
enable it to cognize more in an object than it would cognize by the         
help of its own conceptions, but which guides it more securely in           
its cognition. Not to mention that they perhaps render possible a           
transition from our conceptions of nature and the non-ego to the            
practical conceptions, and thus produce for even ethical ideas              
keeping, so to speak, and connection with the speculative cognitions        
of reason. The explication of all this must be looked for in the            
sequel.                                                                     
  But setting aside, in conformity with our original purpose, the           
consideration of the practical ideas, we proceed to contemplate reason      
in its speculative use alone, nay, in a still more restricted               
sphere, to wit, in the transcendental use; and here must strike into        
the same path which we followed in our deduction of the categories.         
That is to say, we shall consider the logical form of the cognition of      
reason, that we may see whether reason may not be thereby a source          
of conceptions which enables us to regard objects in themselves as          
determined synthetically a priori, in relation to one or other of           
the functions of reason.                                                    
  Reason, considered as the faculty of a certain logical form of            
cognition, is the faculty of conclusion, that is, of mediate                
judgement- by means of the subsumption of the condition of a                
possible judgement under the condition of a given judgement. The given      
judgement is the general rule (major). The subsumption of the               
condition of another possible judgement under the condition of the          
rule is the minor. The actual judgement, which enounces the                 
assertion of the rule in the subsumed case, is the conclusion               
(conclusio). The rule predicates something generally under a certain        
condition. The condition of the rule is satisfied in some particular        
case. It follows that what was valid in general under that condition        
must also be considered as valid in the particular case which               
satisfies this condition. It is very plain that reason attains to a         
cognition, by means of acts of the understanding which constitute a         
series of conditions. When I arrive at the proposition, "All bodies         
are changeable," by beginning with the more remote cognition (in which      
the conception of body does not appear, but which nevertheless              
contains the condition of that conception), "All compound is                
changeable," by proceeding from this to a less remote cognition, which      
stands under the condition of the former, "Bodies are compound," and        
hence to a third, which at length connects for me the remote cognition      
(changeable) with the one before me, "Consequently, bodies are              
changeable"- I have arrived at a cognition (conclusion) through a           
series of conditions (premisses). Now every series, whose exponent (of      
the categorical or hypothetical judgement) is given, can be continued;      
consequently the same procedure of reason conducts us to the                
ratiocinatio polysyllogistica, which is a series of syllogisms, that        
can be continued either on the side of the conditions (per                  
prosyllogismos) or of the conditioned (per episyllogismos) to an            
indefinite extent.                                                          
  But we very soon perceive that the chain or series of prosyllogisms,      
that is, of deduced cognitions on the side of the grounds or                
conditions of a given cognition, in other words, the ascending              
series of syllogisms must have a very different relation to the             
faculty of reason from that of the descending series, that is, the          
progressive procedure of reason on the side of the conditioned by           
means of episyllogisms. For, as in the former case the cognition            
(conclusio) is given only as conditioned, reason can attain to this         
cognition only under the presupposition that all the members of the         
series on the side of the conditions are given (totality in the series      
of premisses), because only under this supposition is the judgement we      
may be considering possible a priori; while on the side of the              
conditioned or the inferences, only an incomplete and becoming, and         
not a presupposed or given series, consequently only a potential            
progression, is cogitated. Hence, when a cognition is contemplated          
as conditioned, reason is compelled to consider the series of               
conditions in an ascending line as completed and given in their             
totality. But if the very same condition is considered at the same          
time as the condition of other cognitions, which together constitute a      
series of inferences or consequences in a descending line, reason           
may preserve a perfect indifference, as to how far this progression         
may extend a parte posteriori, and whether the totality of this series      
is possible, because it stands in no need of such a series for the          
purpose of arriving at the conclusion before it, inasmuch as this           
conclusion is sufficiently guaranteed and determined on grounds a           
parte priori. It may be the case, that upon the side of the conditions      
the series of premisses has a first or highest condition, or it may         
not possess this, and so be a parte priori unlimited; but it must,          
nevertheless, contain totality of conditions, even admitting that we        
never could succeed in completely apprehending it; and the whole            
series must be unconditionally true, if the conditioned, which is           
considered as an inference resulting from it, is to be held as true.        
This is a requirement of reason, which announces its cognition as           
determined a priori and as necessary, either in itself- and in this         
case it needs no grounds to rest upon- or, if it is deduced, as a           
member of a series of grounds, which is itself unconditionally true.        
-                                                                           
                                                        {BK_1 ^paragraph 35}
        SECTION III. System of Transcendental Ideas.                        
-                                                                           
  We are not at present engaged with a logical dialectic, which             
makes complete abstraction of the content of cognition and aims only        
at unveiling the illusory appearance in the form of syllogisms. Our         
subject is transcendental dialectic, which must contain, completely         
a priori, the origin of certain cognitions drawn from pure reason, and      
the origin of certain deduced conceptions, the object of which              
cannot be given empirically and which therefore lie beyond the              
sphere of the faculty of understanding. We have observed, from the          
natural relation which the transcendental use of our cognition, in          
syllogisms as well as in judgements, must have to the logical, that         
there are three kinds of dialectical arguments, corresponding to the        
three modes of conclusion, by which reason attains to cognitions on         
principles; and that in all it is the business of reason to ascend          
from the conditioned synthesis, beyond which the understanding never        
proceeds, to the unconditioned which the understanding never can            
reach.                                                                      
  Now the most general relations which can exist in our                     
representations are: 1st, the relation to the subject; 2nd, the             
relation to objects, either as phenomena, or as objects of thought          
in general. If we connect this subdivision with the main division, all      
the relations of our representations, of which we can form either a         
conception or an idea, are threefold: 1. The relation to the                
subject; 2. The relation to the manifold of the object as a                 
phenomenon; 3. The relation to all things in general.                       
  Now all pure conceptions have to do in general with the                   
synthetical unity of representations; conceptions of pure reason            
(transcendental ideas), on the other hand, with the unconditional           
synthetical unity of all conditions. It follows that all                    
transcendental ideas arrange themselves in three classes, the first of      
which contains the absolute (unconditioned) unity of the thinking           
subject, the second the absolute unity of the series of the conditions      
of a phenomenon, the third the absolute unity of the condition of           
all objects of thought in general.                                          
                                                        {BK_1 ^paragraph 40}
  The thinking subject is the object-matter of Psychology; the sum          
total of all phenomena (the world) is the object-matter of                  
Cosmology; and the thing which contains the highest condition of the        
possibility of all that is cogitable (the being of all beings) is           
the object-matter of all Theology. Thus pure reason presents us with        
the idea of a transcendental doctrine of the soul (psychologia              
rationalis), of a transcendental science of the world (cosmologia           
rationalis), and finally of a transcendental doctrine of God                
(theologia transcendentalis). Understanding cannot originate even           
the outline of any of these sciences, even when connected with the          
highest logical use of reason, that is, all cogitable syllogisms-           
for the purpose of proceeding from one object (phenomenon) to all           
others, even to the utmost limits of the empirical synthesis. They          
are, on the contrary, pure and genuine products, or problems, of            
pure reason.                                                                
  What modi of the pure conceptions of reason these transcendental          
ideas are will be fully exposed in the following chapter. They              
follow the guiding thread of the categories. For pure reason never          
relates immediately to objects, but to the conceptions of these             
contained in the understanding. In like manner, it will be made             
manifest in the detailed explanation of these ideas- how reason,            
merely through the synthetical use of the same function which it            
employs in a categorical syllogism, necessarily attains to the              
conception of the absolute unity of the thinking subject- how the           
logical procedure in hypothetical ideas necessarily produces the            
idea of the absolutely unconditioned in a series of given                   
conditions, and finally- how the mere form of the disjunctive               
syllogism involves the highest conception of a being of all beings:         
a thought which at first sight seems in the highest degree                  
paradoxical.                                                                
  An objective deduction, such as we were able to present in the            
case of the categories, is impossible as regards these                      
transcendental ideas. For they have, in truth, no relation to any           
object, in experience, for the very reason that they are only ideas.        
But a subjective deduction of them from the nature of our reason is         
possible, and has been given in the present chapter.                        
  It is easy to perceive that the sole aim of pure reason is the            
absolute totality of the synthesis on the side of the conditions,           
and that it does not concern itself with the absolute completeness          
on the Part of the conditioned. For of the former alone does she stand      
in need, in order to preposit the whole series of conditions, and thus      
present them to the understanding a priori. But if we once have a           
completely (and unconditionally) given condition, there is no               
further necessity, in proceeding with the series, for a conception          
of reason; for the understanding takes of itself every step                 
downward, from the condition to the conditioned. Thus the                   
transcendental ideas are available only for ascending in the series of      
conditions, till we reach the unconditioned, that is, principles. As        
regards descending to the conditioned, on the other hand, we find that      
there is a widely extensive logical use which reason makes of the laws      
of the understanding, but that a transcendental use thereof is              
impossible; and that when we form an idea of the absolute totality          
of such a synthesis, for example, of the whole series of all future         
changes in the world, this idea is a mere ens rationis, an arbitrary        
fiction of thought, and not a necessary presupposition of reason.           
For the possibility of the conditioned presupposes the totality of its      
conditions, but not of its consequences. Consequently, this conception      
is not a transcendental idea- and it is with these alone that we are        
at present occupied.                                                        
  Finally, it is obvious that there exists among the transcendental         
ideas a certain connection and unity, and that pure reason, by means        
of them, collects all its cognitions into one system. From the              
cognition of self to the cognition of the world, and through these          
to the supreme being, the progression is so natural, that it seems          
to resemble the logical march of reason from the premisses to the           
conclusion.* Now whether there lies unobserved at the foundation of         
these ideas an analogy of the same kind as exists between the               
logical and transcendental procedure of reason, is another of those         
questions, the answer to which we must not expect till we arrive at         
a more advanced stage in our inquiries. In this cursory and                 
preliminary view, we have, meanwhile, reached our aim. For we have          
dispelled the ambiguity which attached to the transcendental                
conceptions of reason, from their being commonly mixed up with other        
conceptions in the systems of philosophers, and not properly                
distinguished from the conceptions of the understanding; we have            
exposed their origin and, thereby, at the same time their                   
determinate number, and presented them in a systematic connection, and      
have thus marked out and enclosed a definite sphere for pure reason.        
                                                        {BK_1 ^paragraph 45}
-                                                                           
  *The science of Metaphysics has for the proper object of its              
inquiries only three grand ideas: GOD, FREEDOM, and IMMORTALITY, and        
it aims at showing, that the second conception, conjoined with the          
first, must lead to the third, as a necessary conclusion. All the           
other subjects with which it occupies itself, are merely means for the      
attainment and realization of these ideas. It does not require these        
ideas for the construction of a science of nature, but, on the              
contrary, for the purpose of passing beyond the sphere of nature. A         
complete insight into and comprehension of them would render Theology,      
Ethics, and, through the conjunction of both, Religion, solely              
dependent on the speculative faculty of reason. In a systematic             
representation of these ideas the above-mentioned arrangement- the          
synthetical one- would be the most suitable; but in the                     
investigation which must necessarily precede it, the analytical, which      
reverses this arrangement, would be better adapted to our purpose,          
as in it we should proceed from that which experience immediately           
presents to us- psychology, to cosmology, and thence to theology.           
                                                                            
BK_2                                                                        
                        BOOK II.                                            
-                                                                           
        OF THE DIALECTICAL PROCEDURE OF PURE REASON.                        
-                                                                           
  It may be said that the object of a merely transcendental idea is         
something of which we have no conception, although the idea may be a        
necessary product of reason according to its original laws. For, in         
fact, a conception of an object that is adequate to the idea given          
by reason, is impossible. For such an object must be capable of             
being presented and intuited in a Possible experience. But we should        
express our meaning better, and with less risk of being misunderstood,      
if we said that we can have no knowledge of an object, which perfectly      
corresponds to an idea, although we may possess a problematical             
conception thereof.                                                         
  Now the transcendental (subjective) reality at least of the pure          
conceptions of reason rests upon the fact that we are led to such           
ideas by a necessary procedure of reason. There must therefore be           
syllogisms which contain no empirical premisses, and by means of which      
we conclude from something that we do know, to something of which we        
do not even possess a conception, to which we, nevertheless, by an          
unavoidable illusion, ascribe objective reality. Such arguments are,        
as regards their result, rather to be termed sophisms than syllogisms,      
although indeed, as regards their origin, they are very well                
entitled to the latter name, inasmuch as they are not fictions or           
accidental products of reason, but are necessitated by its very             
nature. They are sophisms, not of men, but of pure reason herself,          
from which the Wisest cannot free himself. After long labour he may be      
able to guard against the error, but he can never be thoroughly rid of      
the illusion which continually mocks and misleads him.                      
  Of these dialectical arguments there are three kinds,                     
corresponding to the number of the ideas which their conclusions            
present. In the argument or syllogism of the first class, I                 
conclude, from the transcendental conception of the subject contains        
no manifold, the absolute unity of the subject itself, of which I           
cannot in this manner attain to a conception. This dialectical              
argument I shall call the transcendental paralogism. The second             
class of sophistical arguments is occupied with the transcendental          
conception of the absolute totality of the series of conditions for         
a given phenomenon, and I conclude, from the fact that I have always a      
self-contradictory conception of the unconditioned synthetical unity        
of the series upon one side, the truth of the opposite unity, of which      
I have nevertheless no conception. The condition of reason in these         
dialectical arguments, I shall term the antinomy of pure reason.            
Finally, according to the third kind of sophistical argument, I             
conclude, from the totality of the conditions of thinking objects in        
general, in so far as they can be given, the absolute synthetical           
unity of all conditions of the possibility of things in general;            
that is, from things which I do not know in their mere                      
transcendental conception, I conclude a being of all beings which I         
know still less by means of a transcendental conception, and of             
whose unconditioned necessity I can form no conception whatever.            
This dialectical argument I shall call the ideal of pure reason.            
                                                                            
BK_2|CH_1                                                                   
          CHAPTER I. Of the Paralogisms of Pure Reason.                     
-                                                                           
  The logical paralogism consists in the falsity of an argument in          
respect of its form, be the content what it may. But a                      
transcendental paralogism has a transcendental foundation, and              
concludes falsely, while the form is correct and unexceptionable. In        
this manner the paralogism has its foundation in the nature of human        
reason, and is the parent of an unavoidable, though not insoluble,          
mental illusion.                                                            
  We now come to a conception which was not inserted in the general         
list of transcendental conceptions. and yet must be reckoned with           
them, but at the same time without in the least altering, or                
indicating a deficiency in that table. This is the conception, or,          
if the term is preferred, the judgement, "I think." But it is               
readily perceived that this thought is as it were the vehicle of all        
conceptions in general, and consequently of transcendental conceptions      
also, and that it is therefore regarded as a transcendental                 
conception, although it can have no peculiar claim to be so ranked,         
inasmuch as its only use is to indicate that all thought is                 
accompanied by consciousness. At the same time, pure as this                
conception is from empirical content (impressions of the senses), it        
enables us to distinguish two different kinds of objects. "I," as           
thinking, am an object of the internal sense, and am called soul. That      
which is an object of the external senses is called body. Thus the          
expression, "I," as a thinking being, designates the object-matter          
of psychology, which may be called "the rational doctrine of the            
soul," inasmuch as in this science I desire to know nothing of the          
soul but what, independently of all experience (which determines me in      
concreto), may be concluded from this conception "I," in so far as          
it appears in all thought.                                                  
  Now, the rational doctrine of the soul is really an undertaking of        
this kind. For if the smallest empirical element of thought, if any         
particular perception of my internal state, were to be introduced           
among the grounds of cognition of this science, it would not be a           
rational, but an empirical doctrine of the soul. We have thus before        
us a pretended science, raised upon the single proposition, "I think,"      
whose foundation or want of foundation we may very properly, and            
agreeably with the nature of a transcendental philosophy, here              
examine. It ought not to be objected that in this proposition, which        
expresses the perception of one's self, an internal experience is           
asserted, and that consequently the rational doctrine of the soul           
which is founded upon it, is not pure, but partly founded upon an           
empirical principle. For this internal perception is nothing more than      
the mere apperception, "I think," which in fact renders all                 
transcendental conceptions possible, in which we say, "I think              
substance, cause, etc." For internal experience in general and its          
possibility, or perception in general, and its relation to other            
perceptions, unless some particular distinction or determination            
thereof is empirically given, cannot be regarded as empirical               
cognition, but as cognition of the empirical, and belongs to the            
investigation of the possibility of every experience, which is              
certainly transcendental. The smallest object of experience (for            
example, only pleasure or pain), that should be included in the             
general representation of self-consciousness, would immediately change      
the rational into an empirical psychology.                                  
  "I think" is therefore the only text of rational psychology, from         
which it must develop its whole system. It is manifest that this            
thought, when applied to an object (myself), can contain nothing but        
transcendental predicates thereof; because the least empirical              
predicate would destroy the purity of the science and its independence      
of all experience.                                                          
  But we shall have to follow here the guidance of the categories-          
only, as in the present case a thing, "I," as thinking being, is at         
first given, we shall- not indeed change the order of the categories        
as it stands in the table- but begin at the category of substance,          
by which at the a thing a thing is represented and proceeds                 
backwards through the series. The topic of the rational doctrine of         
the soul, from which everything else it may contain must be deduced,        
is accordingly as follows:                                                  
                                                    {BK_2|CH_1 ^paragraph 5}
-                                                                           
            1                          2                                    
  The Soul is SUBSTANCE       As regards its quality                        
                                it is SIMPLE                                
-                                                                           
                                                   {BK_2|CH_1 ^paragraph 10}
                      3                                                     
          As regards the different                                          
          times in which it exists,                                         
          it is numerically identical,                                      
          that is UNITY, not Plurality.                                     
                                                   {BK_2|CH_1 ^paragraph 15}
-                                                                           
                       4                                                    
  It is in relation to possible objects in space*                           
-                                                                           
  *The reader, who may not so easily perceive the psychological             
sense of these expressions, taken here in their transcendental              
abstraction, and cannot guess why the latter attribute of the soul          
belongs to the category of existence, will find the expressions             
sufficiently explained and justified in the sequel. I have,                 
moreover, to apologize for the Latin terms which have been                  
employed,instead of their German synonyms, contrary to the rules of         
correct writing. But I judged it better to sacrifice elegance to            
perspicuity.                                                                
                                                   {BK_2|CH_1 ^paragraph 20}
-                                                                           
  From these elements originate all the conceptions of pure                 
psychology, by combination alone, without the aid of any other              
principle. This substance, merely as an object of the internal              
sense, gives the conception of Immateriality; as simple substance,          
that of Incorruptibility; its identity, as intellectual substance,          
gives the conception of Personality; all these three together,              
Spirituality. Its relation to objects in space gives us the conception      
of connection (commercium) with bodies. Thus it represents thinking         
substance as the principle of life in matter, that is, as a soul            
(anima), and as the ground of Animality; and this, limited and              
determined by the conception of spirituality, gives us that of              
Immortality.                                                                
  Now to these conceptions relate four paralogisms of a transcendental      
psychology, which is falsely held to be a science of pure reason.           
touching the nature of our thinking being. We can, however, lay at the      
foundation of this science nothing but the simple and in itself             
perfectly contentless representation "I which cannot even be called         
a conception, but merely a consciousness which accompanies all              
conceptions. By this "I," or "He," or "It," who or which thinks,            
nothing more is represented than a transcendental subject of thought =      
x, which is cognized only by means of the thoughts that are its             
predicates, and of which, apart from these, we cannot form the least        
conception. Hence in a perpetual circle, inasmuch as we must always         
employ it, in order to frame any judgement respecting it. And this          
inconvenience we find it impossible to rid ourselves of, because            
consciousness in itself is not so much a representation distinguishing      
a particular object, as a form of representation in general, in so far      
as it may be termed cognition; for in and by cognition alone do I           
think anything.                                                             
  It must, however, appear extraordinary at first sight that the            
condition under which I think, and which is consequently a property of      
my subject, should be held to be likewise valid for every existence         
which thinks, and that we can presume to base upon a seemingly              
empirical proposition a judgement which is apodeictic and universal,        
to wit, that everything which thinks is constituted as the voice of my      
consciousness declares it to be, that is, as a self-conscious being.        
The cause of this belief is to be found in the fact that we                 
necessarily attribute to things a priori all the properties which           
constitute conditions under which alone we can cogitate them. Now I         
cannot obtain the least representation of a thinking being by means of      
external experience, but solely through self-consciousness. Such            
objects are consequently nothing more than the transference of this         
consciousness of mine to other things which can only thus be                
represented as thinking beings. The proposition, "I think," is, in the      
present case, understood in a problematical sense, not in so far as it      
contains a perception of an existence (like the Cartesian "Cogito,          
ergo sum"),* but in regard to its mere possibility- for the purpose of      
discovering what properties may be inferred from so simple a                
proposition and predicated of the subject of it.                            
-                                                                           
                                                   {BK_2|CH_1 ^paragraph 25}
  *["I think, therefore I am."]                                             
-                                                                           
  If at the foundation of our pure rational cognition of thinking           
beings there lay more than the mere Cogito- if we could likewise            
call in aid observations on the play of our thoughts, and the thence        
derived natural laws of the thinking self, there would arise an             
empirical psychology which would be a kind of physiology of the             
internal sense and might possibly be capable of explaining the              
phenomena of that sense. But it could never be available for                
discovering those properties which do not belong to possible                
experience (such as the quality of simplicity), nor could it make           
any apodeictic enunciation on the nature of thinking beings: it             
would therefore not be a rational psychology.                               
  Now, as the proposition "I think" (in the problematical sense)            
contains the form of every judgement in general and is the constant         
accompaniment of all the categories, it is manifest that conclusions        
are drawn from it only by a transcendental employment of the                
understanding. This use of the understanding excludes all empirical         
elements; and we cannot, as has been shown above, have any                  
favourable conception beforehand of its procedure. We shall                 
therefore follow with a critical eye this proposition through all           
the predicaments of pure psychology; but we shall, for brevity's sake,      
allow this examination to proceed in an uninterrupted connection.           
  Before entering on this task, however, the following general              
remark may help to quicken our attention to this mode of argument.          
It is not merely through my thinking that I cognize an object, but          
only through my determining a given intuition in relation to the unity      
of consciousness in which all thinking consists. It follows that I          
cognize myself, not through my being conscious of myself as                 
thinking, but only when I am conscious of the intuition of myself as        
determined in relation to the function of thought. All the modi of          
self-consciousness in thought are hence not conceptions of objects          
(conceptions of the understanding- categories); they are mere               
logical functions, which do not present to thought an object to be          
cognized, and cannot therefore present my Self as an object. Not the        
consciousness of the determining, but only that of the determinable         
self, that is, of my internal intuition (in so far as the manifold          
contained in it can be connected conformably with the general               
condition of the unity of apperception in thought), is the object.          
                                                   {BK_2|CH_1 ^paragraph 30}
  1. In all judgements I am the determining subject of that relation        
which constitutes a judgement. But that the I which thinks, must be         
considered as in thought always a subject, and as a thing which cannot      
be a predicate to thought, is an apodeictic and identical proposition.      
But this proposition does not signify that I, as an object, am, for         
myself, a self-subsistent being or substance. This latter statement-        
an ambitious one- requires to be supported by data which are not to be      
discovered in thought; and are perhaps (in so far as I consider the         
thinking self merely as such) not to be discovered in the thinking          
self at all.                                                                
  2. That the I or Ego of apperception, and consequently in all             
thought, is singular or simple, an;3 cannot be resolved into a              
plurality of subjects, and therefore indicates a logically simple           
subject- this is self-evident from the very conception of an Ego,           
and is consequently an analytical proposition. But this is not              
tantamount to declaring that the thinking Ego is a simple substance-        
for this would be a synthetical proposition. The conception of              
substance always relates to intuitions, which with me cannot be             
other than sensuous, and which consequently lie completely out of           
the sphere of the understanding and its thought: but to this sphere         
belongs the affirmation that the Ego is simple in thought. It would         
indeed be surprising, if the conception of "substance," which in other      
cases requires so much labour to distinguish from the other elements        
presented by intuition- so much trouble, too, to discover whether it        
can be simple (as in the case of the parts of matter)- should be            
presented immediately to me, as if by revelation, in the poorest            
mental representation of all.                                               
  3. The proposition of the identity of my Self amidst all the              
manifold representations of which I am conscious, is likewise a             
proposition lying in the conceptions themselves, and is consequently        
analytical. But this identity of the subject, of which I am                 
conscious in all its representations, does not relate to or concern         
the intuition of the subject, by which it is given as an object.            
This proposition cannot therefore enounce the identity of the               
person, by which is understood the consciousness of the identity of         
its own substance as a thinking being in all change and variation of        
circumstances. To prove this, we should require not a mere analysis of      
the proposition, but synthetical judgements based upon a given              
intuition.                                                                  
  4. I distinguish my own existence, as that of a thinking being, from      
that of other things external to me- among which my body also is            
reckoned. This is also an analytical proposition, for other things are      
exactly those which I think as different or distinguished from myself.      
But whether this consciousness of myself is possible without things         
external to me; and whether therefore I can exist merely as a thinking      
being (without being man)- cannot be known or inferred from this            
proposition.                                                                
  Thus we have gained nothing as regards the cognition of myself as         
object, by the analysis of the consciousness of my Self in thought.         
The logical exposition of thought in general is mistaken for a              
metaphysical determination of the object.                                   
                                                   {BK_2|CH_1 ^paragraph 35}
  Our Critique would be an investigation utterly superfluous, if there      
existed a possibility of proving a priori, that all thinking beings         
are in themselves simple substances, as such, therefore, possess the        
inseparable attribute of personality, and are conscious of their            
existence apart from and unconnected with matter. For we should thus        
have taken a step beyond the world of sense, and have penetrated            
into the sphere of noumena; and in this case the right could not be         
denied us of extending our knowledge in this sphere, of establishing        
ourselves, and, under a favouring star, appropriating to ourselves          
possessions in it. For the proposition: "Every thinking being, as           
such, is simple substance," is an a priori synthetical proposition;         
because in the first place it goes beyond the conception which is           
the subject of it, and adds to the mere notion of a thinking being the      
mode of its existence, and in the second place annexes a predicate          
(that of simplicity) to the latter conception- a predicate which it         
could not have discovered in the sphere of experience. It would follow      
that a priori synthetical propositions are possible and legitimate,         
not only, as we have maintained, in relation to objects of possible         
experience, and as principles of the possibility of this experience         
itself, but are applicable to things in themselves- an inference which      
makes an end of the whole of this Critique, and obliges us to fall          
back on the old mode of metaphysical procedure. But indeed the              
danger is not so great, if we look a little closer into the question.       
  There lurks in the procedure of rational Psychology a paralogism,         
which is represented in the following syllogism:                            
  That which cannot be cogitated otherwise than as subject, does not        
exist otherwise than as subject, and is therefore substance.                
  A thinking being, considered merely as such, cannot be cogitated          
otherwise than as subject.                                                  
  Therefore it exists also as such, that is, as substance.                  
                                                   {BK_2|CH_1 ^paragraph 40}
  In the major we speak of a being that can be cogitated generally and      
in every relation, consequently as it may be given in intuition. But        
in the minor we speak of the same being only in so far as it regards        
itself as subject, relatively to thought and the unity of                   
consciousness, but not in relation to intuition, by which it is             
presented as an object to thought. Thus the conclusion is here arrived      
at by a Sophisma figurae dictionis.*                                        
-                                                                           
  *Thought is taken in the two premisses in two totally different           
senses. In the major it is considered as relating and applying to           
objects in general, consequently to objects of intuition also. In           
the minor, we understand it as relating merely to                           
self-consciousness. In this sense, we do not cogitate an object, but        
merely the relation to the self-consciousness of the subject, as the        
form of thought. In the former premiss we speak of things which cannot      
be cogitated otherwise than as subjects. In the second, we do not           
speak of things, but of thought all objects being abstracted), in           
which the Ego is always the subject of consciousness. Hence the             
conclusion cannot be, "I cannot exist otherwise than as subject";           
but only "I can, in cogitating my existence, employ my Ego only as the      
subject of the judgement." But this is an identical proposition, and        
throws no light on the mode of my existence.                                
-                                                                           
  That this famous argument is a mere paralogism, will be plain to any      
one who will consider the general remark which precedes our exposition      
of the principles of the pure understanding, and the section on             
noumena. For it was there proved that the conception of a thing, which      
can exist per se- only as a subject and never as a predicate,               
possesses no objective reality; that is to say, we can never know           
whether there exists any object to correspond to the conception;            
consequently, the conception is nothing more than a conception, and         
from it we derive no proper knowledge. If this conception is to             
indicate by the term substance, an object that can be given, if it          
is to become a cognition, we must have at the foundation of the             
cognition a permanent intuition, as the indispensable condition of its      
objective reality. For through intuition alone can an object be given.      
But in internal intuition there is nothing permanent, for the Ego is        
but the consciousness of my thought. If then, we appeal merely to           
thought, we cannot discover the necessary condition of the application      
of the conception of substance- that is, of a subject existing per se-      
to the subject as a thinking being. And thus the conception of the          
simple nature of substance, which is connected with the objective           
reality of this conception, is shown to be also invalid, and to be, in      
fact, nothing more than the logical qualitative unity of                    
self-consciousness in thought; whilst we remain perfectly ignorant          
whether the subject is composite or not.                                    
                                                   {BK_2|CH_1 ^paragraph 45}
-                                                                           
       Refutation of the Argument of Mendelssohn for the                    
          Substantiality or Permanence of the Soul.                         
-                                                                           
  This acute philosopher easily perceived the insufficiency of the          
common argument which attempts to prove that the soul- it being             
granted that it is a simple being- cannot perish by dissolution or          
decomposition; he saw it is not impossible for it to cease to be by         
extinction, or disappearance. He endeavoured to prove in his Phaedo,        
that the soul cannot be annihilated, by showing that a simple being         
cannot cease to exist. Inasmuch as, be said, a simple existence cannot      
diminish, nor gradually lose portions of its being, and thus be by          
degrees reduced to nothing (for it possesses no parts, and therefore        
no multiplicity), between the moment in which it is, and the moment in      
which it is not, no time can be discovered- which is impossible. But        
this philosopher did not consider that, granting the soul to possess        
this simple nature, which contains no parts external to each other and      
consequently no extensive quantity, we cannot refuse to it any less         
than to any other being, intensive quantity, that is, a degree of           
reality in regard to all its faculties, nay, to all that constitutes        
its existence. But this degree of reality can become less and less          
through an infinite series of smaller degrees. It follows,                  
therefore, that this supposed substance- this thing, the permanence of      
which is not assured in any other way, may, if not by decomposition,        
by gradual loss (remissio) of its powers (consequently by                   
elanguescence, if I may employ this expression), be changed into            
nothing. For consciousness itself has always a degree, which may be         
lessened.* Consequently the faculty of being conscious may be               
diminished; and so with all other faculties. The permanence of the          
soul, therefore, as an object of the internal sense, remains                
undemonstrated, nay, even indemonstrable. Its permanence in life is         
evident, per se, inasmuch as the thinking being (as man) is to itself,      
at the same time, an object of the external senses. But this does           
not authorize the rational psychologist to affirm, from mere                
conceptions, its permanence beyond life.*[2]                                
                                                   {BK_2|CH_1 ^paragraph 50}
-                                                                           
  *Clearness is not, as logicians maintain, the consciousness of a          
representation. For a certain degree of consciousness, which may            
not, however, be sufficient for recollection, is to be met with in          
many dim representations. For without any consciousness at all, we          
should not be able to recognize any difference in the obscure               
representations we connect; as we really can do with many conceptions,      
such as those of right and justice, and those of the musician, who          
strikes at once several notes in improvising a piece of music. But a        
representation is clear, in which our consciousness is sufficient           
for the consciousness of the difference of this representation from         
others. If we are only conscious that there is a difference, but are        
not conscious of the difference- that is, what the difference is-           
the representation must be termed obscure. There is, consequently,          
an infinite series of degrees of consciousness down to its entire           
disappearance.                                                              
  *[2] There are some who think they have done enough to establish a        
new possibility in the mode of the existence of souls, when they            
have shown that there is no contradiction in their hypotheses on            
this subject. Such are those who affirm the possibility of thought- of      
which they have no other knowledge than what they derive from its           
use in connecting empirical intuitions presented in this our human          
life- after this life bas ceased. But it is very easy to embarrass          
them by the introduction of counter-possibilities, which rest upon          
quite as good a foundation. Such, for example, is the possibility of        
the division of a simple substance into several substances; and             
conversely, of the coalition of several into one simple substance.          
For, although divisibility presupposes composition, it does not             
necessarily require a composition of substances, but only of the            
degrees (of the several faculties) of one and the same substance.           
Now we can cogitate all the powers and faculties of the soul- even          
that of consciousness- as diminished by one half, the substance             
still remaining. In the same way we can represent to ourselves without      
contradiction, this obliterated half as preserved, not in the soul,         
but without it; and we can believe that, as in this case every.             
thing that is real in the soul, and has a degree- consequently its          
entire existence- has been halved, a particular substance would             
arise out of the soul. For the multiplicity, which has been divided,        
formerly existed, but not as a multiplicity of substances, but of           
every reality as the quantum of existence in it; and the unity of           
substance was merely a mode of existence, which by this division alone      
has been transformed into a plurality of subsistence. In the same           
manner several simple substances might coalesce into one, without           
anything being lost except the plurality of subsistence, inasmuch as        
the one substance would contain the degree of reality of all the            
former substances. Perhaps, indeed, the simple substances, which            
appear under the form of matter, might (not indeed by a mechanical          
or chemical influence upon each other, but by an unknown influence, of      
which the former would be but the phenomenal appearance), by means          
of such a dynamical division of the parent-souls, as intensive              
quantities, produce other souls, while the former repaired the loss         
thus sustained with new matter of the same sort. I am far from              
allowing any value to such chimeras; and the principles of our              
analytic have clearly proved that no other than an empirical use of         
the categories- that of substance, for example- is possible. But if         
the rationalist is bold enough to construct, on the mere authority          
of the faculty of thought- without any intuition, whereby an object is      
given- a self-subsistent being, merely because the unity of                 
apperception in thought cannot allow him to believe it a composite          
being, instead of declaring, as he ought to do, that he is unable to        
explain the possibility of a thinking nature; what ought to hinder the      
materialist, with as complete an independence of experience, to employ      
the principle of the rationalist in a directly opposite manner-             
still preserving the formal unity required by his opponent?                 
-                                                                           
  If, now, we take the above propositions- as they must be accepted as      
valid for all thinking beings in the system of rational psychology- in      
synthetical connection, and proceed, from the category of relation,         
with the proposition: "All thinking beings are, as such,                    
substances," backwards through the series, till the circle is               
completed; we come at last to their existence, of which, in this            
system of rational psychology, substances are held to be conscious,         
independently of external things; nay, it is asserted that, in              
relation to the permanence which is a necessary characteristic of           
substance, they can of themselves determine external things. It             
follows that idealism- at least problematical idealism, is perfectly        
unavoidable in this rationalistic system. And, if the existence of          
outward things is not held to be requisite to the determination of the      
existence of a substance in time, the existence of these outward            
things at all, is a gratuitous assumption which remains without the         
possibility of a proof.                                                     
                                                   {BK_2|CH_1 ^paragraph 55}
  But if we proceed analytically- the "I think" as a proposition            
containing in itself an existence as given, consequently modality           
being the principle- and dissect this proposition, in order to              
ascertain its content, and discover whether and how this Ego                
determines its existence in time and space without the aid of anything      
external; the propositions of rationalistic psychology would not begin      
with the conception of a thinking being, but with a reality, and the        
properties of a thinking being in general would be deduced from the         
mode in which this reality is cogitated, after everything empirical         
had been abstracted; as is shown in the following table:                    
-                                                                           
                        1                                                   
                      I think,                                              
-                                                                           
                                                   {BK_2|CH_1 ^paragraph 60}
            2                             3                                 
        as Subject,              as simple Subject,                         
-                                                                           
                        4                                                   
               as identical Subject,                                        
                                                   {BK_2|CH_1 ^paragraph 65}
           in every state of my thought.                                    
-                                                                           
  Now, inasmuch as it is not determined in this second proposition,         
whether I can exist and be cogitated only as subject, and not also          
as a predicate of another being, the conception of a subject is here        
taken in a merely logical sense; and it remains undetermined,               
whether substance is to be cogitated under the conception or not.           
But in the third proposition, the absolute unity of apperception-           
the simple Ego in the representation to which all connection and            
separation, which constitute thought, relate, is of itself                  
important; even although it presents us with no information about           
the constitution or subsistence of the subject. Apperception is             
something real, and the simplicity of its nature is given in the            
very fact of its possibility. Now in space there is nothing real            
that is at the same time simple; for points, which are the only simple      
things in space, are merely limits, but not constituent parts of            
space. From this follows the impossibility of a definition on the           
basis of materialism of the constitution of my Ego as a merely              
thinking subject. But, because my existence is considered in the first      
proposition as given, for it does not mean, "Every thinking being           
exists" (for this would be predicating of them absolute necessity),         
but only, "I exist thinking"; the proposition is quite empirical,           
and contains the determinability of my existence merely in relation to      
my representations in time. But as I require for this purpose               
something that is permanent, such as is not given in internal               
intuition; the mode of my existence, whether as substance or as             
accident, cannot be determined by means of this simple                      
self-consciousness. Thus, if materialism is inadequate to explain           
the mode in which I exist, spiritualism is likewise as insufficient;        
and the conclusion is that we are utterly unable to attain to any           
knowledge of the constitution of the soul, in so far as relates to the      
possibility of its existence apart from external objects.                   
  And, indeed, how should it be possible, merely by the aid of the          
unity of consciousness- which we cognize only for the reason that it        
is indispensable to the possibility of experience- to pass the              
bounds of experience (our existence in this life); and to extend our        
cognition to the nature of all thinking beings by means of the              
empirical- but in relation to every sort of intuition, perfectly            
undetermined- proposition, "I think"?                                       
  There does not then exist any rational psychology as a doctrine           
furnishing any addition to our knowledge of ourselves. It is nothing        
more than a discipline, which sets impassable limits to speculative         
reason in this region of thought, to prevent it, on the one hand, from      
throwing itself into the arms of a soulless materialism, and, on the        
other, from losing itself in the mazes of a baseless spiritualism.          
It teaches us to consider this refusal of our reason to give any            
satisfactory answer to questions which reach beyond the limits of this      
our human life, as a hint to abandon fruitless speculation; and to          
direct, to a practical use, our knowledge of ourselves- which,              
although applicable only to objects of experience, receives its             
principles from a higher source, and regulates its procedure as if our      
destiny reached far beyond the boundaries of experience and life.           
                                                   {BK_2|CH_1 ^paragraph 70}
  From all this it is evident that rational psychology has its              
origin in a mere misunderstanding. The unity of consciousness, which        
lies at the basis of the categories, is considered to be an                 
intuition of the subject as an object; and the category of substance        
is applied to the intuition. But this unity is nothing more than the        
unity in thought, by which no object is given; to which therefore           
the category of substance- which always presupposes a given intuition-      
cannot be applied. Consequently, the subject cannot be cognized. The        
subject of the categories cannot, therefore, for the very reason            
that it cogitates these, frame any conception of itself as an object        
of the categories; for, to cogitate these, it must lay at the               
foundation its own pure self-consciousness- the very thing that it          
wishes to explain and describe. In like manner, the subject, in             
which the representation of time has its basis, cannot determine,           
for this very reason, its own existence in time. Now, if the latter is      
impossible, the former, as an attempt to determine itself by means          
of the categories as a thinking being in general, is no less so.*           
-                                                                           
  *The "I think" is, as has been already stated, an empirical               
proposition, and contains the proposition, "I exist." But I cannot          
say, "Everything, which thinks, exists"; for in this case the property      
of thought would constitute all beings possessing it, necessary             
being Hence my existence cannot be considered as an inference from the      
proposition, "I think," as Descartes maintained- because in this            
case the major premiss, "Everything, which thinks, exists," must            
precede- but the two propositions are identical. The proposition, "I        
think," expresses an undetermined empirical intuition, that perception      
(proving consequently that sensation, which must belong to                  
sensibility, lies at the foundation of this proposition); but it            
precedes experience, whose province it is to determine an object of         
perception by means of the categories in relation to time; and              
existence in this proposition is not a category, as it does not             
apply to an undetermined given object, but only to one of which we          
have a conception, and about which we wish to know whether it does          
or does not exist, out of, and apart from this conception. An               
undetermined perception signifies here merely something real that           
has been given, only, however, to thought in general- but not as a          
phenomenon, nor as a thing in itself (noumenon), but only as something      
that really exists, and is designated as such in the proposition, "I        
think." For it must be remarked that, when I call the proposition,          
"I think," an empirical proposition, I do not thereby mean that the         
Ego in the proposition is an empirical representation; on the               
contrary, it is purely intellectual, because it belongs to thought          
in general. But without some empirical representation, which                
presents to the mind material for thought, the mental act, "I               
think," would not take place; and the empirical is only the                 
condition of the application or employment of the pure intellectual         
faculty.                                                                    
-                                                                           
  Thus, then, appears the vanity of the hope of establishing a              
cognition which is to extend its rule beyond the limits of experience-      
a cognition which is one of the highest interests of humanity; and          
thus is proved the futility of the attempt of speculative philosophy        
in this region of thought. But, in this interest of thought, the            
severity of criticism has rendered to reason a not unimportant              
service, by the demonstration of the impossibility of making any            
dogmatical affirmation concerning an object of experience beyond the        
boundaries of experience. She has thus fortified reason against all         
affirmations of the contrary. Now, this can be accomplished in only         
two ways. Either our proposition must be proved apodeictically; or, if      
this is unsuccessful, the sources of this inability must be sought          
for, and, if these are discovered to exist in the natural and               
necessary limitation of our reason, our opponents must submit to the        
same law of renunciation and refrain from advancing claims to dogmatic      
assertion.                                                                  
                                                   {BK_2|CH_1 ^paragraph 75}
  But the right, say rather the necessity to admit a future life, upon      
principles of the practical conjoined with the speculative use of           
reason, has lost nothing by this renunciation; for the merely               
speculative proof has never had any influence upon the common reason        
of men. It stands upon the point of a hair, so that even the schools        
have been able to preserve it from falling only by incessantly              
discussing it and spinning it like a top; and even in their eyes it         
has never been able to present any safe foundation for the erection of      
a theory. The proofs which have been current among men, preserve their      
value undiminished; nay, rather gain in clearness and                       
unsophisticated power, by the rejection of the dogmatical                   
assumptions of speculative reason. For reason is thus confined              
within her own peculiar province- the arrangement of ends or aims,          
which is at the same time the arrangement of nature; and, as a              
practical faculty, without limiting itself to the latter, it is             
justified in extending the former, and with it our own existence,           
beyond the boundaries of experience and life. If we turn our attention      
to the analogy of the nature of living beings in this world, in the         
consideration of which reason is obliged to accept as a principle that      
no organ, no faculty, no appetite is useless, and that nothing is           
superfluous, nothing disproportionate to its use, nothing unsuited          
to its end; but that, on the contrary, everything is perfectly              
conformed to its destination in life- we shall find that man, who           
alone is the final end and aim of this order, is still the only animal      
that seems to be excepted from it. For his natural gifts- not merely        
as regards the talents and motives that may incite him to employ them,      
but especially the moral law in him- stretch so far beyond all mere         
earthly utility and advantage, that he feels himself bound to prize         
the mere consciousness of probity, apart from all advantageous              
consequences- even the shadowy gift of posthumous fame- above               
everything; and he is conscious of an inward call to constitute             
himself, by his conduct in this world- without regard to mere               
sublunary interests- the citizen of a better. This mighty,                  
irresistible proof- accompanied by an ever-increasing knowledge of the      
conformability to a purpose in everything we see around us, by the          
conviction of the boundless immensity of creation, by the                   
consciousness of a certain illimitableness in the possible extension        
of our knowledge, and by a desire commensurate therewith- remains to        
humanity, even after the theoretical cognition of ourselves bas failed      
to establish the necessity of an existence after death.                     
-                                                                           
              Conclusion of the Solution of the                             
                 Psychological Paralogism.                                  
-                                                                           
                                                   {BK_2|CH_1 ^paragraph 80}
  The dialectical illusion in rational psychology arises from our           
confounding an idea of reason (of a pure intelligence) with the             
conception- in every respect undetermined- of a thinking being in           
general. I cogitate myself in behalf of a possible experience, at           
the same time making abstraction of all actual experience; and infer        
therefrom that I can be conscious of myself apart from experience           
and its empirical conditions. I consequently confound the possible          
abstraction of my empirically determined existence with the supposed        
consciousness of a possible separate existence of my thinking self;         
and I believe that I cognize what is substantial in myself as a             
transcendental subject, when I have nothing more in thought than the        
unity of consciousness, which lies at the basis of all determination        
of cognition.                                                               
  The task of explaining the community of the soul with the body            
does not properly belong to the psychology of which we are here             
speaking; because it proposes to prove the personality of the soul          
apart from this communion (after death), and is therefore transcendent      
in the proper sense of the word, although occupying itself with an          
object of experience- only in so far, however, as it ceases to be an        
object of experience. But a sufficient answer may be found to the           
question in our system. The difficulty which lies in the execution          
of this task consists, as is well known, in the presupposed                 
heterogeneity of the object of the internal sense (the soul) and the        
objects of the external senses; inasmuch as the formal condition of         
the intuition of the one is time, and of that of the other space also.      
But if we consider that both kinds of objects do not differ                 
internally, but only in so far as the one appears externally to the         
other- consequently, that what lies at the basis of phenomena, as a         
thing in itself, may not be heterogeneous; this difficulty disappears.      
There then remains no other difficulty than is to be found in the           
question- how a community of substances is possible; a question             
which lies out of the region of psychology, and which the reader,           
after what in our analytic has been said of primitive forces and            
faculties, will easily judge to be also beyond the region of human          
cognition.                                                                  
-                                                                           
                      GENERAL REMARK                                        
-                                                                           
                                                   {BK_2|CH_1 ^paragraph 85}
     On the Transition from Rational Psychology to Cosmology.               
-                                                                           
  The proposition, "I think," or, "I exist thinking," is an                 
empirical proposition. But such a proposition must be based on              
empirical intuition, and the object cogitated as a phenomenon; and          
thus our theory appears to maintain that the soul, even in thought, is      
merely a phenomenon; and in this way our consciousness itself, in           
fact, abuts upon nothing.                                                   
  Thought, per se, is merely the purely spontaneous logical function        
which operates to connect the manifold of a possible intuition; and it      
does not represent the subject of consciousness as a phenomenon- for        
this reason alone, that it pays no attention to the question whether        
the mode of intuiting it is sensuous or intellectual. I therefore do        
not represent myself in thought either as I am, or as I appear to           
myself; I merely cogitate myself as an object in general, of the            
mode of intuiting which I make abstraction. When I represent myself as      
the subject of thought, or as the ground of thought, these modes of         
representation are not related to the categories of substance or of         
cause; for these are functions of thought applicable only to our            
sensuous intuition. The application of these categories to the Ego          
would, however, be necessary, if I wished to make myself an object          
of knowledge. But I wish to be conscious of myself only as thinking;        
in what mode my Self is given in intuition, I do not consider, and          
it may be that I, who think, am a phenomenon- although not in so far        
as I am a thinking being; but in the consciousness of myself in mere        
thought I am a being, though this consciousness does not present to me      
any property of this being as material for thought.                         
  But the proposition, "I think," in so far as it declares, "I exist        
thinking," is not the mere representation of a logical function. It         
determines the subject (which is in this case an object also) in            
relation to existence; and it cannot be given without the aid of the        
internal sense, whose intuition presents to us an object, not as a          
thing in itself, but always as a phenomenon. In this proposition there      
is therefore something more to be found than the mere spontaneity of        
thought; there is also the receptivity of intuition, that is, my            
thought of myself applied to the empirical intuition of myself. Now,        
in this intuition the thinking self must seek the conditions of the         
employment of its logical functions as categories of substance, cause,      
and so forth; not merely for the purpose of distinguishing itself as        
an object in itself by means of the representation "I," but also for        
the purpose of determining the mode of its existence, that is, of           
cognizing itself as noumenon. But this is impossible, for the internal      
empirical intuition is sensuous, and presents us with nothing but           
phenomenal data, which do not assist the object of pure                     
consciousness in its attempt to cognize itself as a separate                
existence, but are useful only as contributions to experience.              
                                                   {BK_2|CH_1 ^paragraph 90}
  But, let it be granted that we could discover, not in experience,         
but in certain firmly-established a priori laws of the use of pure          
reason- laws relating to our existence, authority to consider               
ourselves as legislating a priori in relation to our own existence and      
as determining this existence; we should, on this supposition, find         
ourselves possessed of a spontaneity, by which our actual existence         
would be determinable, without the aid of the conditions of                 
empirical intuition. We should also become aware that in the                
consciousness of our existence there was an a priori content, which         
would serve to determine our own existence- an existence only               
sensuously determinable- relatively, however, to a certain internal         
faculty in relation to an intelligible world.                               
  But this would not give the least help to the attempts of rational        
psychology. For this wonderful faculty, which the consciousness of the      
moral law in me reveals, would present me with a principle of the           
determination of my own existence which is purely intellectual- but by      
what predicates? By none other than those which are given in                
sensuous intuition. Thus I should find myself in the same position          
in rational psychology which I formerly occupied, that is to say, I         
should find myself still in need of sensuous intuitions, in order to        
give significance to my conceptions of substance and cause, by means        
of which alone I can possess a knowledge of myself: but these               
intuitions can never raise me above the sphere of experience. I should      
be justified, however, in applying these conceptions, in regard to          
their practical use, which is always directed to objects of                 
experience- in conformity with their analogical significance when           
employed theoretically- to freedom and its subject. At the same             
time, I should understand by them merely the logical functions of           
subject and predicate, of principle and consequence, in conformity          
with which all actions are so determined, that they are capable of          
being explained along with the laws of nature, conformably to the           
categories of substance and cause, although they originate from a very      
different principle. We have made these observations for the purpose        
of guarding against misunderstanding, to which the doctrine of our          
intuition of self as a phenomenon is exposed. We shall have occasion        
to perceive their utility in the sequel.                                    
                                                                            
BK_2|CH_2                                                                   
            CHAPTER II. The Antinomy of Pure Reason.                        
-                                                                           
  We showed in the introduction to this part of our work, that all          
transcendental illusion of pure reason arose from dialectical               
arguments, the schema of which logic gives us in its three formal           
species of syllogisms- just as the categories find their logical            
schema in the four functions of all judgements. The first kind of           
these sophistical arguments related to the unconditioned unity of           
the subjective conditions of all representations in general (of the         
subject or soul), in correspondence with the categorical syllogisms,        
the major of which, as the principle, enounces the relation of a            
predicate to a subject. The second kind of dialectical argument will        
therefore be concerned, following the analogy with hypothetical             
syllogisms, with the unconditioned unity of the objective conditions        
in the phenomenon; and, in this way, the theme of the third kind to be      
treated of in the following chapter will be the unconditioned unity of      
the objective conditions of the possibility of objects in general.          
  But it is worthy of remark that the transcendental paralogism             
produced in the mind only a one-third illusion, in regard to the            
idea of the subject of our thought; and the conceptions of reason gave      
no ground to maintain the contrary proposition. The advantage is            
completely on the side of Pneumatism; although this theory itself           
passes into naught, in the crucible of pure reason.                         
  Very different is the case when we apply reason to the objective          
synthesis of phenomena. Here, certainly, reason establishes, with much      
plausibility, its principle of unconditioned unity; but it very soon        
falls into such contradictions that it is compelled, in relation to         
cosmology, to renounce its pretensions.                                     
  For here a new phenomenon of human reason meets us- a perfectly           
natural antithetic, which does not require to be sought for by              
subtle sophistry, but into which reason of itself unavoidably falls.        
It is thereby preserved, to be sure, from the slumber of a fancied          
conviction- which a merely one-sided illusion produces; but it is at        
the same time compelled, either, on the one hand, to abandon itself to      
a despairing scepticism, or, on the other, to assume a dogmatical           
confidence and obstinate persistence in certain assertions, without         
granting a fair hearing to the other side of the question. Either is        
the death of a sound philosophy, although the former might perhaps          
deserve the title of the euthanasia of pure reason.                         
  Before entering this region of discord and confusion, which the           
conflict of the laws of pure reason (antinomy) produces, we shall           
present the reader with some considerations, in explanation and             
justification of the method we intend to follow in our treatment of         
this subject. I term all transcendental ideas, in so far as they            
relate to the absolute totality in the synthesis of phenomena,              
cosmical conceptions; partly on account of this unconditioned               
totality, on which the conception of the world-whole is based- a            
conception, which is itself an idea- partly because they relate solely      
to the synthesis of phenomena- the empirical synthesis; while, on           
the other hand, the absolute totality in the synthesis of the               
conditions of all possible things gives rise to an ideal of pure            
reason, which is quite distinct from the cosmical conception, although      
it stands in relation with it. Hence, as the paralogisms of pure            
reason laid the foundation for a dialectical psychology, the                
antinomy of pure reason will present us with the transcendental             
principles of a pretended pure (rational) cosmology- not, however,          
to declare it valid and to appropriate it, but- as the very term of         
a conflict of reason sufficiently indicates, to present it as an            
idea which cannot be reconciled with phenomena and experience.              
                                                    {BK_2|CH_2 ^paragraph 5}
-                                                                           
           SECTION I. System of Cosmological Ideas.                         
-                                                                           
  That We may be able to enumerate with systematic precision these          
ideas according to a principle, we must remark, in the first place,         
that it is from the understanding alone that pure and transcendental        
conceptions take their origin; that the reason does not properly            
give birth to any conception, but only frees the conception of the          
understanding from the unavoidable limitation of a possible                 
experience, and thus endeavours to raise it above the empirical,            
though it must still be in connection with it. This happens from the        
fact that, for a given conditioned, reason demands absolute totality        
on the side of the conditions (to which the understanding submits           
all phenomena), and thus makes of the category a transcendental             
idea. This it does that it may be able to give absolute completeness        
to the empirical synthesis, by continuing it to the unconditioned           
(which is not to be found in experience, but only in the idea). Reason      
requires this according to the principle: If the conditioned is             
given the whole of the conditions, and consequently the absolutely          
unconditioned, is also given, whereby alone the former was possible.        
First, then, the transcendental ideas are properly nothing but              
categories elevated to the unconditioned; and they may be arranged          
in a table according to the titles of the latter. But, secondly, all        
the categories are not available for this purpose, but only those in        
which the synthesis constitutes a series- of conditions subordinated        
to, not co-ordinated with, each other. Absolute totality is required        
of reason only in so far as concerns the ascending series of the            
conditions of a conditioned; not, consequently, when the question           
relates to the descending series of consequences, or to the                 
aggregate of the co-ordinated conditions of these consequences. For,        
in relation to a given conditioned, conditions are presupposed and          
considered to be given along with it. On the other hand, as the             
consequences do not render possible their conditions, but rather            
presuppose them- in the consideration of the procession of                  
consequences (or in the descent from the given condition to the             
conditioned), we may be quite unconcerned whether the series ceases or      
not; and their totality is not a necessary demand of reason.                
  Thus we cogitate- and necessarily- a given time completely elapsed        
up to a given moment, although that time is not determinable by us.         
But as regards time future, which is not the condition of arriving          
at the present, in order to conceive it; it is quite indifferent            
whether we consider future time as ceasing at some point, or as             
prolonging itself to infinity. Take, for example, the series m, n,          
o, in which n is given as conditioned in relation to m, but at the          
same time as the condition of o, and let the series proceed upwards         
from the conditioned n to m (l, k, i, etc.), and also downwards from        
the condition n to the conditioned o (p, q, r, etc.)- I must                
presuppose the former series, to be able to consider n as given, and n      
is according to reason (the totality of conditions) possible only by        
means of that series. But its possibility does not rest on the              
following series o, p, q, r, which for this reason cannot be                
regarded as given, but only as capable of being given (dabilis).            
                                                   {BK_2|CH_2 ^paragraph 10}
  I shall term the synthesis of the series on the side of the               
conditions- from that nearest to the given phenomenon up to the more        
remote- regressive; that which proceeds on the side of the                  
conditioned, from the immediate consequence to the more remote, I           
shall call the progressive synthesis. The former proceeds in                
antecedentia, the latter in consequentia. The cosmological ideas are        
therefore occupied with the totality of the regressive synthesis,           
and proceed in antecedentia, not in consequentia. When the latter           
takes place, it is an arbitrary and not a necessary problem of pure         
reason; for we require, for the complete understanding of what is           
given in a phenomenon, not the consequences which succeed, but the          
grounds or principles which precede.                                        
  In order to construct the table of ideas in correspondence with           
the table of categories, we take first the two primitive quanta of all      
our intuitions, time and space. Time is in itself a series (and the         
formal condition of all series), and hence, in relation to a given          
present, we must distinguish a priori in it the antecedentia as             
conditions (time past) from the consequentia (time future).                 
Consequently, the transcendental idea of the absolute totality of           
the series of the conditions of a given conditioned, relates merely to      
all past time. According to the idea of reason, the whole past time,        
as the condition of the given moment, is necessarily cogitated as           
given. But, as regards space, there exists in it no distinction             
between progressus and regressus; for it is an aggregate and not a          
series- its parts existing together at the same time. I can consider a      
given point of time in relation to past time only as conditioned,           
because this given moment comes into existence only through the past        
time rather through the passing of the preceding time. But as the           
parts of space are not subordinated, but co-ordinated to each other,        
one part cannot be the condition of the possibility of the other;           
and space is not in itself, like time, a series. But the synthesis          
of the manifold parts of space- (the syntheses whereby we apprehend         
space)- is nevertheless successive; it takes place, therefore, in           
time, and contains a series. And as in this series of aggregated            
spaces (for example, the feet in a rood), beginning with a given            
portion of space, those which continue to be annexed form the               
condition of the limits of the former- the measurement of a space must      
also be regarded as a synthesis of the series of the conditions of a        
given conditioned. It differs, however, in this respect from that of        
time, that the side of the conditioned is not in itself                     
distinguishable from the side of the condition; and, consequently,          
regressus and progressus in space seem to be identical. But,                
inasmuch as one part of space is not given, but only limited, by and        
through another, we must also consider every limited space as               
conditioned, in so far as it presupposes some other space as the            
condition of its limitation, and so on. As regards limitation,              
therefore, our procedure in space is also a regressus, and the              
transcendental idea of the absolute totality of the synthesis in a          
series of conditions applies to space also; and I am entitled to            
demand the absolute totality of the phenomenal synthesis in space as        
well as in time. Whether my demand can be satisfied is a question to        
be answered in the sequel.                                                  
  Secondly, the real in space- that is, matter- is conditioned. Its         
internal conditions are its parts, and the parts of parts its remote        
conditions; so that in this case we find a regressive synthesis, the        
absolute totality of which is a demand of reason. But this cannot be        
obtained otherwise than by a complete division of parts, whereby the        
real in matter becomes either nothing or that which is not matter,          
that is to say, the simple. Consequently we find here also a series of      
conditions and a progress to the unconditioned.                             
  Thirdly, as regards the categories of a real relation between             
phenomena, the category of substance and its accidents is not suitable      
for the formation of a transcendental idea; that is to say, reason has      
no ground, in regard to it, to proceed regressively with conditions.        
For accidents (in so far as they inhere in a substance) are                 
co-ordinated with each other, and do not constitute a series. And,          
in relation to substance, they are not properly subordinated to it,         
but are the mode of existence of the substance itself. The                  
conception of the substantial might nevertheless seem to be an idea of      
the transcendental reason. But, as this signifies nothing more than         
the conception of an object in general, which subsists in so far as we      
cogitate in it merely a transcendental subject without any predicates;      
and as the question here is of an unconditioned in the series of            
phenomena- it is clear that the substantial can form no member              
thereof. The same holds good of substances in community, which are          
mere aggregates and do not form a series. For they are not                  
subordinated to each other as conditions of the possibility of each         
other; which, however, may be affirmed of spaces, the limits of             
which are never determined in themselves, but always by some other          
space. It is, therefore, only in the category of causality that we can      
find a series of causes to a given effect, and in which we ascend from      
the latter, as the conditioned, to the former as the conditions, and        
thus answer the question of reason.                                         
  Fourthly, the conceptions of the possible, the actual, and the            
necessary do not conduct us to any series- excepting only in so far as      
the contingent in existence must always be regarded as conditioned,         
and as indicating, according to a law of the understanding, a               
condition, under which it is necessary to rise to a higher, till in         
the totality of the series, reason arrives at unconditioned necessity.      
                                                   {BK_2|CH_2 ^paragraph 15}
  There are, accordingly, only four cosmological ideas,                     
corresponding with the four titles of the categories. For we can            
select only such as necessarily furnish us with a series in the             
synthesis of the manifold.                                                  
-                                                                           
                      1                                                     
            The absolute Completeness                                       
                    of the                                                  
                                                   {BK_2|CH_2 ^paragraph 20}
                 COMPOSITION                                                
     of the given totality of all phenomena.                                
-                                                                           
                      2                                                     
            The absolute Completeness                                       
                                                   {BK_2|CH_2 ^paragraph 25}
                    of the                                                  
                   DIVISION                                                 
     of given totality in a phenomenon.                                     
-                                                                           
                       3                                                    
                                                   {BK_2|CH_2 ^paragraph 30}
            The absolute Completeness                                       
                     of the                                                 
                   ORIGINATION                                              
                  of a phenomenon.                                          
-                                                                           
                                                   {BK_2|CH_2 ^paragraph 35}
                       4                                                    
            The absolute Completeness                                       
         of the DEPENDENCE of the EXISTENCE                                 
        of what is changeable in a phenomenon.                              
-                                                                           
                                                   {BK_2|CH_2 ^paragraph 40}
  We must here remark, in the first place, that the idea of absolute        
totality relates to nothing but the exposition of phenomena, and            
therefore not to the pure conception of a totality of things.               
Phenomena are here, therefore, regarded as given, and reason                
requires the absolute completeness of the conditions of their               
possibility, in so far as these conditions constitute a series-             
consequently an absolutely (that is, in every respect) complete             
synthesis, whereby a phenomenon can be explained according to the laws      
of the understanding.                                                       
  Secondly, it is properly the unconditioned alone that reason seeks        
in this serially and regressively conducted synthesis of conditions.        
It wishes, to speak in another way, to attain to completeness in the        
series of premisses, so as to render it unnecessary to presuppose           
others. This unconditioned is always contained in the absolute              
totality of the series, when we endeavour to form a representation          
of it in thought. But this absolutely complete synthesis is itself but      
an idea; for it is impossible, at least before hand, to know whether        
any such synthesis is possible in the case of phenomena. When we            
represent all existence in thought by means of pure conceptions of the      
understanding, without any conditions of sensuous intuition, we may         
say with justice that for a given conditioned the whole series of           
conditions subordinated to each other is also given; for the former is      
only given through the latter. But we find in the case of phenomena         
a particular limitation of the mode in which conditions are given,          
that is, through the successive synthesis of the manifold of                
intuition, which must be complete in the regress. Now whether this          
completeness is sensuously possible, is a problem. But the idea of          
it lies in the reason- be it possible or impossible to connect with         
the idea adequate empirical conceptions. Therefore, as in the absolute      
totality of the regressive synthesis of the manifold in a phenomenon        
(following the guidance of the categories, which represent it as a          
series of conditions to a given conditioned) the unconditioned is           
necessarily contained- it being still left unascertained whether and        
how this totality exists; reason sets out from the idea of totality,        
although its proper and final aim is the unconditioned- of the whole        
series, or of a part thereof.                                               
  This unconditioned may be cogitated- either as existing only in           
the entire series, all the members of which therefore would be without      
exception conditioned and only the totality absolutely                      
unconditioned- and in this case the regressus is called infinite; or        
the absolutely unconditioned is only a part of the series, to which         
the other members are subordinated, but which Is not itself                 
submitted to any other condition.* In the former case the series is         
a parte priori unlimited (without beginning), that is, infinite, and        
nevertheless completely given. But the regress in it is never               
completed, and can only be called potentially infinite. In the              
second case there exists a first in the series. This first is               
called, in relation to past time, the beginning of the world; in            
relation to space, the limit of the world; in relation to the parts of      
a given limited whole, the simple; in relation to causes, absolute          
spontaneity (liberty); and in relation to the existence of                  
changeable things, absolute physical necessity.                             
-                                                                           
  *The absolute totality of the series of conditions to a given             
conditioned is always unconditioned; because beyond it there exist          
no other conditions, on which it might depend. But the absolute             
totality of such a series is only an idea, or rather a problematical        
conception, the possibility of which must be investigated-                  
particularly in relation to the mode in which the unconditioned, as         
the transcendental idea which is the real subject of inquiry, may be        
contained therein.                                                          
                                                   {BK_2|CH_2 ^paragraph 45}
-                                                                           
  We possess two expressions, world and nature, which are generally         
interchanged. The first denotes the mathematical total of all               
phenomena and the totality of their synthesis- in its progress by           
means of composition, as well as by division. And the world is              
termed nature,* when it is regarded as a dynamical whole- when our          
attention is not directed to the aggregation in space and time, for         
the purpose of cogitating it as a quantity, but to the unity in the         
existence of phenomena. In this case the condition of that which            
happens is called a cause; the unconditioned causality of the cause in      
a phenomenon is termed liberty; the conditioned cause is called in a        
more limited sense a natural cause. The conditioned in existence is         
termed contingent, and the unconditioned necessary. The                     
unconditioned necessity of phenomena may be called natural necessity.       
-                                                                           
  *Nature, understood adjective (formaliter), signifies the complex of      
the determinations of a thing, connected according to an internal           
principle of causality. On the other hand, we understand by nature,         
substantive (materialiter), the sum total of phenomena, in so far as        
they, by virtue of an internal principle of causality, are connected        
with each other throughout. In the former sense we speak of the nature      
of liquid matter, of fire, etc., and employ the word only adjective;        
while, if speaking of the objects of nature, we have in our minds           
the idea of a subsisting whole.                                             
-                                                                           
                                                   {BK_2|CH_2 ^paragraph 50}
  The ideas which we are at present engaged in discussing I have            
called cosmological ideas; partly because by the term world is              
understood the entire content of all phenomena, and our ideas are           
directed solely to the unconditioned among phenomena; partly also,          
because world, in the transcendental sense, signifies the absolute          
totality of the content of existing things, and we are directing our        
attention only to the completeness of the synthesis- although,              
properly, only in regression. In regard to the fact that these ideas        
are all transcendent. and, although they do not transcend phenomena as      
regards their mode, but are concerned solely with the world of sense        
(and not with noumena), nevertheless carry their synthesis to a degree      
far above all possible experience- it still seems to me that we can,        
with perfect propriety, designate them cosmical conceptions. As             
regards the distinction between the mathematically and the dynamically      
unconditioned which is the aim of the regression of the synthesis, I        
should call the two former, in a more limited signification,                
cosmical conceptions, the remaining two transcendent physical               
conceptions. This distinction does not at present seem to be of             
particular importance, but we shall afterwards find it to be of some        
value.                                                                      
-                                                                           
-                                                                           
           SECTION II. Antithetic of Pure Reason.                           
-                                                                           
  Thetic is the term applied to every collection of dogmatical              
propositions. By antithetic I do not understand dogmatical                  
assertions of the opposite, but the self-contradiction of seemingly         
dogmatical cognitions (thesis cum antithesis, in none of which we           
can discover any decided superiority. Antithetic is not, therefore,         
occupied with one-sided statements, but is engaged in considering           
the contradictory nature of the general cognitions of reason and its        
causes. Transcendental antithetic is an investigation into the              
antinomy of pure reason, its causes and result. If we employ our            
reason not merely in the application of the principles of the               
understanding to objects of experience, but venture with it beyond          
these boundaries, there arise certain sophistical propositions or           
theorems. These assertions have the following peculiarities: They           
can find neither confirmation nor confutation in experience; and            
each is in itself not only self-consistent, but possesses conditions        
of its necessity in the very nature of reason- only that, unluckily,        
there exist just as valid and necessary grounds for maintaining the         
contrary proposition.                                                       
                                                   {BK_2|CH_2 ^paragraph 55}
  The questions which naturally arise in the consideration of this          
dialectic of pure reason, are therefore: 1st. In what propositions          
is pure reason unavoidably subject to an antinomy? 2nd. What are the        
causes of this antinomy? 3rd. Whether and in what way can reason            
free itself from this self-contradiction?                                   
  A dialectical proposition or theorem of pure reason must,                 
according to what has been said, be distinguishable from all                
sophistical propositions, by the fact that it is not an answer to an        
arbitrary question, which may be raised at the mere pleasure of any         
person, but to one which human reason must necessarily encounter in         
its progress. In the second place, a dialectical proposition, with its      
opposite, does not carry the appearance of a merely artificial              
illusion, which disappears as soon as it is investigated, but a             
natural and unavoidable illusion, which, even when we are no longer         
deceived by it, continues to mock us and, although rendered                 
harmless, can never be completely removed.                                  
  This dialectical doctrine will not relate to the unity of                 
understanding in empirical conceptions, but to the unity of reason          
in pure ideas. The conditions of this doctrine are- inasmuch as it          
must, as a synthesis according to rules, be conformable to the              
understanding, and at the same time as the absolute unity of the            
synthesis, to the reason- that, if it is adequate to the unity of           
reason, it is too great for the understanding, if according with the        
understanding, it is too small for the reason. Hence arises a mutual        
opposition, which cannot be avoided, do what we will.                       
  These sophistical assertions of dialectic open, as it were, a             
battle-field, where that side obtains the victory which has been            
permitted to make the attack, and he is compelled to yield who has          
been unfortunately obliged to stand on the defensive. And hence,            
champions of ability, whether on the right or on the wrong side, are        
certain to carry away the crown of victory, if they only take care          
to have the right to make the last attack, and are not obliged to           
sustain another onset from their opponent. We can easily believe            
that this arena has been often trampled by the feet of combatants,          
that many victories have been obtained on both sides, but that the          
last victory, decisive of the affair between the contending parties,        
was won by him who fought for the right, only if his adversary was          
forbidden to continue the tourney. As impartial umpires, we must lay        
aside entirely the consideration whether the combatants are fighting        
for the right or for the wrong side, for the true or for the false,         
and allow the combat to be first decided. Perhaps, after they have          
wearied more than injured each other, they will discover the                
nothingness of their cause of quarrel and part good friends.                
  This method of watching, or rather of originating, a conflict of          
assertions, not for the purpose of finally deciding in favour of            
either side, but to discover whether the object of the struggle is not      
a mere illusion, which each strives in vain to reach, but which             
would be no gain even when reached- this procedure, I say, may be           
termed the sceptical method. It is thoroughly distinct from                 
scepticism- the principle of a technical and scientific ignorance,          
which undermines the foundations of all knowledge, in order, if             
possible, to destroy our belief and confidence therein. For the             
sceptical method aims at certainty, by endeavouring to discover in a        
conflict of this kind, conducted honestly and intelligently on both         
sides, the point of misunderstanding; just as wise legislators derive,      
from the embarrassment of judges in lawsuits, information in regard to      
the defective and ill-defined parts of their statutes. The antinomy         
which reveals itself in the application of laws, is for our limited         
wisdom the best criterion of legislation. For the attention of reason,      
which in abstract speculation does not easily become conscious of           
its errors, is thus roused to the momenta in the determination of           
its principles.                                                             
                                                   {BK_2|CH_2 ^paragraph 60}
  But this sceptical method is essentially peculiar to                      
transcendental philosophy, and can perhaps be dispensed with in             
every other field of investigation. In mathematics its use would be         
absurd; because in it no false assertions can long remain hidden,           
inasmuch as its demonstrations must always proceed under the                
guidance of pure intuition, and by means of an always evident               
synthesis. In experimental philosophy, doubt and delay may be very          
useful; but no misunderstanding is possible, which cannot be easily         
removed; and in experience means of solving the difficulty and putting      
an end to the dissension must at last be found, whether sooner or           
later. Moral philosophy can always exhibit its principles, with             
their practical consequences, in concreto- at least in possible             
experiences, and thus escape the mistakes and ambiguities of                
abstraction. But transcendental propositions, which lay claim to            
insight beyond the region of possible experience, cannot, on the one        
hand, exhibit their abstract synthesis in any a priori intuition, nor,      
on the other, expose a lurking error by the help of experience.             
Transcendental reason, therefore, presents us with no other                 
criterion than that of an attempt to reconcile such assertions, and         
for this purpose to permit a free and unrestrained conflict between         
them. And this we now proceed to arrange.*                                  
-                                                                           
  *The antinomies stand in the order of the four transcendental             
ideas above detailed.                                                       
-                                                                           
-                                                                           
          FIRST CONFLICT OF THE TRANSCENDENTAL IDEAS.                       
                                                   {BK_2|CH_2 ^paragraph 65}
-                                                                           
                          THESIS.                                           
-                                                                           
     The world has a beginning in time, and is also limited in              
regard to space.                                                            
-                                                                           
                                                   {BK_2|CH_2 ^paragraph 70}
                          PROOF.                                            
-                                                                           
  Granted that the world has no beginning in time; up to every given        
moment of time, an eternity must have elapsed, and therewith passed         
away an infinite series of successive conditions or states of things        
in the world. Now the infinity of a series consists in the fact that        
it never can be completed by means of a successive synthesis. It            
follows that an infinite series already elapsed is impossible and           
that, consequently, a beginning of the world is a necessary                 
condition of its existence. And this was the first thing to be proved.      
  As regards the second, let us take the opposite for granted. In this      
case, the world must be an infinite given total of coexistent               
things. Now we cannot cogitate the dimensions of a quantity, which          
is not given within certain limits of an intuition,* in any other           
way than by means of the synthesis of its parts, and the total of such      
a quantity only by means of a completed synthesis, or the repeated          
addition of unity to itself. Accordingly, to cogitate the world, which      
fills all spaces, as a whole, the successive synthesis of the parts of      
an infinite world must be looked upon as completed, that is to say, an      
infinite time must be regarded as having elapsed in the enumeration of      
all co-existing things; which is impossible. For this reason an             
infinite aggregate of actual things cannot be considered as a given         
whole, consequently, not as a contemporaneously given whole. The world      
is consequently, as regards extension in space, not infinite, but           
enclosed in limits. And this was the second thing to be proved.             
-                                                                           
                                                   {BK_2|CH_2 ^paragraph 75}
  *We may consider an undetermined quantity as a whole, when it is          
enclosed within limits, although we cannot construct or ascertain           
its totality by measurement, that is, by the successive synthesis of        
its parts. For its limits of themselves determine its completeness          
as a whole.                                                                 
-                                                                           
                        ANTITHESIS.                                         
-                                                                           
  The world has no beginning, and no limits in space, but is, in            
relation both to time and space, infinite.                                  
                                                   {BK_2|CH_2 ^paragraph 80}
-                                                                           
                          PROOF.                                            
-                                                                           
  For let it be granted that it has a beginning. A beginning is an          
existence which is preceded by a time in which the thing does not           
exist. On the above supposition, it follows that there must have            
been a time in which the world did not exist, that is, a void time.         
But in a void time the origination of a thing is impossible; because        
no part of any such time contains a distinctive condition of being, in      
preference to that of non-being (whether the supposed thing                 
originate of itself, or by means of some other cause). Consequently,        
many series of things may have a beginning in the world, but the world      
itself cannot have a beginning, and is, therefore, in relation to past      
time, infinite.                                                             
  As regards the second statement, let us first take the opposite           
for granted- that the world is finite and limited in space; it follows      
that it must exist in a void space, which is not limited. We should         
therefore meet not only with a relation of things in space, but also a      
relation of things to space. Now, as the world is an absolute whole,        
out of and beyond which no object of intuition, and consequently no         
correlate to which can be discovered, this relation of the world to         
a void space is merely a relation to no object. But such a relation,        
and consequently the limitation of the world by void space, is              
nothing. Consequently, the world, as regards space, is not limited,         
that is, it is infinite in regard to extension.*                            
                                                   {BK_2|CH_2 ^paragraph 85}
-                                                                           
  *Space is merely the form of external intuition (formal                   
intuition), and not a real object which can be externally perceived.        
Space, prior to all things which determine it (fill or limit it),           
or, rather, which present an empirical intuition conformable to it,         
is, under the title of absolute space, nothing but the mere                 
possibility of external phenomena, in so far as they either exist in        
themselves, or can annex themselves to given intuitions. Empirical          
intuition is therefore not a composition of phenomena and space (of         
perception and empty intuition). The one is not the correlate of the        
other in a synthesis, but they are vitally connected in the same            
empirical intuition, as matter and form. If we wish to set one of           
these two apart from the other- space from phenomena- there arise           
all sorts of empty determinations of external intuition, which are          
very far from being possible perceptions. For example, motion or            
rest of the world in an infinite empty space, or a determination of         
the mutual relation of both, cannot possibly be perceived, and is           
therefore merely the predicate of a notional entity.                        
-                                                                           
-                                                                           
            OBSERVATIONS ON THE FIRST ANTINOMY.                             
-                                                                           
                                                   {BK_2|CH_2 ^paragraph 90}
                     ON THE THESIS.                                         
-                                                                           
  In bringing forward these conflicting arguments, I have not been          
on the search for sophisms, for the purpose of availing myself of           
special pleading, which takes advantage of the carelessness of the          
opposite party, appeals to a misunderstood statute, and erects its          
unrighteous claims upon an unfair interpretation. Both proofs               
originate fairly from the nature of the case, and the advantage             
presented by the mistakes of the dogmatists of both parties has been        
completely set aside.                                                       
  The thesis might also have been unfairly demonstrated, by the             
introduction of an erroneous conception of the infinity of a given          
quantity. A quantity is infinite, if a greater than itself cannot           
possibly exist. The quantity is measured by the number of given units-      
which are taken as a standard- contained in it. Now no number can be        
the greatest, because one or more units can always be added. It             
follows that an infinite given quantity, consequently an infinite           
world (both as regards time and extension) is impossible. It is,            
therefore, limited in both respects. In this manner I might have            
conducted my proof; but the conception given in it does not agree with      
the true conception of an infinite whole. In this there is no               
representation of its quantity, it is not said how large it is;             
consequently its conception is not the conception of a maximum. We          
cogitate in it merely its relation to an arbitrarily assumed unit,          
in relation to which it is greater than any number. Now, just as the        
unit which is taken is greater or smaller, the infinite will be             
greater or smaller; but the infinity, which consists merely in the          
relation to this given unit, must remain always the same, although the      
absolute quantity of the whole is not thereby cognized.                     
  The true (transcendental) conception of infinity is: that the             
successive synthesis of unity in the measurement of a given quantum         
can never be completed.* Hence it follows, without possibility of           
mistake, that an eternity of actual successive states up to a given         
(the present) moment cannot have elapsed, and that the world must           
therefore have a beginning.                                                 
                                                   {BK_2|CH_2 ^paragraph 95}
-                                                                           
  *The quantum in this sense contains a congeries of given units,           
which is greater than any number- and this is the mathematical              
conception of the infinite.                                                 
-                                                                           
  In regard to the second part of the thesis, the difficulty as to          
an infinite and yet elapsed series disappears; for the manifold of a        
world infinite in extension is contemporaneously given. But, in             
order to cogitate the total of this manifold, as we cannot have the         
aid of limits constituting by themselves this total in intuition, we        
are obliged to give some account of our conception, which in this case      
cannot proceed from the whole to the determined quantity of the parts,      
but must demonstrate the possibility of a whole by means of a               
successive synthesis of the parts. But as this synthesis must               
constitute a series that cannot be completed, it is impossible for          
us to cogitate prior to it, and consequently not by means of it, a          
totality. For the conception of totality itself is in the present case      
the representation of a completed synthesis of the parts; and this          
completion, and consequently its conception, is impossible.                 
-                                                                           
                                                  {BK_2|CH_2 ^paragraph 100}
                   ON THE ANTITHESIS.                                       
-                                                                           
  The proof in favour of the infinity of the cosmical succession and        
the cosmical content is based upon the consideration that, in the           
opposite case, a void time and a void space must constitute the limits      
of the world. Now I am not unaware, that there are some ways of             
escaping this conclusion. It may, for example, be alleged, that a           
limit to the world, as regards both space and time, is quite possible,      
without at the same time holding the existence of an absolute time          
before the beginning of the world, or an absolute space extending           
beyond the actual world- which is impossible. I am quite well               
satisfied with the latter part of this opinion of the philosophers          
of the Leibnitzian school. Space is merely the form of external             
intuition, but not a real object which can itself be externally             
intuited; it is not a correlate of phenomena, it is the form of             
phenomena itself. Space, therefore, cannot be regarded as absolutely        
and in itself something determinative of the existence of things,           
because it is not itself an object, but only the form of possible           
objects. Consequently, things, as phenomena, determine space; that          
is to say, they render it possible that, of all the possible                
predicates of space (size and relation), certain may belong to              
reality. But we cannot affirm the converse, that space, as something        
self-subsistent, can determine real things in regard to size or shape,      
for it is in itself not a real thing. Space (filled or void)* may           
therefore be limited by phenomena, but phenomena cannot be limited          
by an empty space without them. This is true of time also. All this         
being granted, it is nevertheless indisputable, that we must assume         
these two nonentities, void space without and void time before the          
world, if we assume the existence of cosmical limits, relatively to         
space or time.                                                              
-                                                                           
  *It is evident that what is meant here is, that empty space, in so        
far as it is limited by phenomena- space, that is, within the world-        
does not at least contradict transcendental principles, and may             
therefore, as regards them, be admitted, although its possibility           
cannot on that account be affirmed.                                         
                                                  {BK_2|CH_2 ^paragraph 105}
-                                                                           
  For, as regards the subterfuge adopted by those who endeavour to          
evade the consequence- that, if the world is limited as to space and        
time, the infinite void must determine the existence of actual              
things in regard to their dimensions- it arises solely from the fact        
that instead of a sensuous world, an intelligible world- of which           
nothing is known- is cogitated; instead of a real beginning (an             
existence, which is preceded by a period in which nothing exists),          
an existence which presupposes no other condition than that of time;        
and, instead of limits of extension, boundaries of the universe. But        
the question relates to the mundus phaenomenon, and its quantity;           
and in this case we cannot make abstraction of the conditions of            
sensibility, without doing away with the essential reality of this          
world itself. The world of sense, if it is limited, must necessarily        
lie in the infinite void. If this, and with it space as the a priori        
condition of the possibility of phenomena, is left out of view, the         
whole world of sense disappears. In our problem is this alone               
considered as given. The mundus intelligibilis is nothing but the           
general conception of a world, in which abstraction has been made of        
all conditions of intuition, and in relation to which no synthetical        
proposition- either affirmative or negative- is possible.                   
-                                                                           
-                                                                           
         SECOND CONFLICT OF TRANSCENDENTAL IDEAS.                           
-                                                                           
                                                  {BK_2|CH_2 ^paragraph 110}
                        THESIS.                                             
-                                                                           
  Every composite substance in the world consists of simple parts; and      
there exists nothing that is not either itself simple, or composed          
of simple parts.                                                            
-                                                                           
                         PROOF.                                             
                                                  {BK_2|CH_2 ^paragraph 115}
-                                                                           
  For, grant that composite substances do not consist of simple parts;      
in this case, if all combination or composition were annihilated in         
thought, no composite part, and (as, by the supposition, there do           
not exist simple parts) no simple part would exist. Consequently, no        
substance; consequently, nothing would exist. Either, then, it is           
impossible to annihilate composition in thought; or, after such             
annihilation, there must remain something that subsists without             
composition, that is, something that is simple. But in the former case      
the composite could not itself consist of substances, because with          
substances composition is merely a contingent relation, apart from          
which they must still exist as self-subsistent beings. Now, as this         
case contradicts the supposition, the second must contain the truth-        
that the substantial composite in the world consists of simple parts.       
  It follows, as an immediate inference, that the things in the             
world are all, without exception, simple beings- that composition is        
merely an external condition pertaining to them- and that, although we      
never can separate and isolate the elementary substances from the           
state of composition, reason must cogitate these as the primary             
subjects of all composition, and consequently, as prior thereto- and        
as simple substances.                                                       
-                                                                           
                      ANTITHESIS.                                           
                                                  {BK_2|CH_2 ^paragraph 120}
-                                                                           
  No composite thing in the world consists of simple parts; and             
there does not exist in the world any simple substance.                     
-                                                                           
                             PROOF.                                         
-                                                                           
                                                  {BK_2|CH_2 ^paragraph 125}
  Let it be supposed that a composite thing (as substance) consists of      
simple parts. Inasmuch as all external relation, consequently all           
composition of substances, is possible only in space; the space,            
occupied by that which is composite, must consist of the same number        
of parts as is contained in the composite. But space does not               
consist of simple parts, but of spaces. Therefore, every part of the        
composite must occupy a space. But the absolutely primary parts of          
what is composite are simple. It follows that what is simple                
occupies a space. Now, as everything real that occupies a space,            
contains a manifold the parts of which are external to each other, and      
is consequently composite- and a real composite, not of accidents (for      
these cannot exist external to each other apart from substance), but        
of substances- it follows that the simple must be a substantial             
composite, which is self-contradictory.                                     
  The second proposition of the antithesis- that there exists in the        
world nothing that is simple- is here equivalent to the following: The      
existence of the absolutely simple cannot be demonstrated from any          
experience or perception either external or internal; and the               
absolutely simple is a mere idea, the objective reality of which            
cannot be demonstrated in any possible experience; it is consequently,      
in the exposition of phenomena, without application and object. For,        
let us take for granted that an object may be found in experience           
for this transcendental idea; the empirical intuition of such an            
object must then be recognized to contain absolutely no manifold            
with its parts external to each other, and connected into unity.            
Now, as we cannot reason from the non-consciousness of such a manifold      
to the impossibility of its existence in the intuition of an object,        
and as the proof of this impossibility is necessary for the                 
establishment and proof of absolute simplicity; it follows that this        
simplicity cannot be inferred from any perception whatever. As,             
therefore, an absolutely simple object cannot be given in any               
experience, and the world of sense must be considered as the sum total      
of all possible experiences: nothing simple exists in the world.            
  This second proposition in the antithesis has a more extended aim         
than the first. The first merely banishes the simple from the               
intuition of the composite; while the second drives it entirely out of      
nature. Hence we were unable to demonstrate it from the conception          
of a given object of external intuition (of the composite), but we          
were obliged to prove it from the relation of a given object to a           
possible experience in general.                                             
-                                                                           
-                                                                           
            OBSERVATIONS ON THE SECOND ANTINOMY.                            
                                                  {BK_2|CH_2 ^paragraph 130}
-                                                                           
                          THESIS.                                           
-                                                                           
  When I speak of a whole, which necessarily consists of simple parts,      
I understand thereby only a substantial whole, as the true                  
composite; that is to say, I understand that contingent unity of the        
manifold which is given as perfectly isolated (at least in thought),        
placed in reciprocal connection, and thus constituted a unity. Space        
ought not to be called a compositum but a totum, for its parts are          
possible in the whole, and not the whole by means of the parts. It          
might perhaps be called a compositum ideale, but not a compositum           
reale. But this is of no importance. As space is not a composite of         
substances (and not even of real accidents), if I abstract all              
composition therein- nothing, not even a point, remains; for a point        
is possible only as the limit of a space- consequently of a composite.      
Space and time, therefore, do not consist of simple parts. That             
which belongs only to the condition or state of a substance, even           
although it possesses a quantity (motion or change, for example),           
likewise does not consist of simple parts. That is to say, a certain        
degree of change does not originate from the addition of many simple        
changes. Our inference of the simple from the composite is valid            
only of self-subsisting things. But the accidents of a state are not        
self-subsistent. The proof, then, for the necessity of the simple,          
as the component part of all that is substantial and composite, may         
prove a failure, and the whole case of this thesis be lost, if we           
carry the proposition too far, and wish to make it valid of everything      
that is composite without distinction- as indeed has really now and         
then happened. Besides, I am here speaking only of the simple, in so        
far as it is necessarily given in the composite- the latter being           
capable of solution into the former as its component parts. The proper      
signification of the word monas (as employed by Leibnitz) ought to          
relate to the simple, given immediately as simple substance (for            
example, in consciousness), and not as an element of the composite. As      
an clement, the term atomus would be more appropriate. And as I wish        
to prove the existence of simple substances, only in relation to,           
and as the elements of, the composite, I might term the antithesis          
of the second Antinomy, transcendental Atomistic. But as this word has      
long been employed to designate a particular theory of corporeal            
phenomena (moleculae), and thus presupposes a basis of empirical            
conceptions, I prefer calling it the dialectical principle of               
Monadology.                                                                 
-                                                                           
                                                  {BK_2|CH_2 ^paragraph 135}
                        ANTITHESIS.                                         
-                                                                           
  Against the assertion of the infinite subdivisibility of matter           
whose ground of proof is purely mathematical, objections have been          
alleged by the Monadists. These objections lay themselves open, at          
first sight, to suspicion, from the fact that they do not recognize         
the clearest mathematical proofs as propositions relating to the            
constitution of space, in so far as it is really the formal                 
condition of the possibility of all matter, but regard them merely          
as inferences from abstract but arbitrary conceptions, which cannot         
have any application to real things. just as if it were possible to         
imagine another mode of intuition than that given in the primitive          
intuition of space; and just as if its a priori determinations did not      
apply to everything, the existence of which is possible, from the fact      
alone of its filling space. If we listen to them, we shall find             
ourselves required to cogitate, in addition to the mathematical point,      
which is simple- not, however, a part, but a mere limit of space-           
physical points, which are indeed likewise simple, but possess the          
peculiar property, as parts of space, of filling it merely by their         
aggregation. I shall not repeat here the common and clear                   
refutations of this absurdity, which are to be found everywhere in          
numbers: every one knows that it is impossible to undermine the             
evidence of mathematics by mere discursive conceptions; I shall only        
remark that, if in this case philosophy endeavours to gain an               
advantage over mathematics by sophistical artifices, it is because          
it forgets that the discussion relates solely to Phenomena and their        
conditions. It is not sufficient to find the conception of the              
simple for the pure conception of the composite, but we must                
discover for the intuition of the composite (matter), the intuition of      
the simple. Now this, according to the laws of sensibility, and             
consequently in the case of objects of sense, is utterly impossible.        
In the case of a whole composed of substances, which is cogitated           
solely by the pure understanding, it may be necessary to be in              
possession of the simple before composition is possible. But this does      
not hold good of the Totum substantiale phaenomenon, which, as an           
empirical intuition in space, possesses the necessary property of           
containing no simple part, for the very reason that no part of space        
is simple. Meanwhile, the Monadists have been subtle enough to              
escape from this difficulty, by presupposing intuition and the              
dynamical relation of substances as the condition of the possibility        
of space, instead of regarding space as the condition of the                
possibility of the objects of external intuition, that is, of               
bodies. Now we have a conception of bodies only as phenomena, and,          
as such, they necessarily presuppose space as the condition of all          
external phenomena. The evasion is therefore in vain; as, indeed, we        
have sufficiently shown in our Aesthetic. If bodies were things in          
themselves, the proof of the Monadists would be unexceptionable.            
  The second dialectical assertion possesses the peculiarity of having      
opposed to it a dogmatical proposition, which, among all such               
sophistical statements, is the only one that undertakes to prove in         
the case of an object of experience, that which is properly a               
transcendental idea- the absolute simplicity of substance. The              
proposition is that the object of the internal sense, the thinking          
Ego, is an absolute simple substance. Without at present entering upon      
this subject- as it has been considered at length in a former chapter-      
I shall merely remark that, if something is cogitated merely as an          
object, without the addition of any synthetical determination of its        
intuition- as happens in the case of the bare representation, I- it is      
certain that no manifold and no composition can be perceived in such a      
representation. As, moreover, the predicates whereby I cogitate this        
object are merely intuitions of the internal sense, there cannot be         
discovered in them anything to prove the existence of a manifold whose      
parts are external to each other, and, consequently, nothing to             
prove the existence of real composition. Consciousness, therefore,          
is so constituted that, inasmuch as the thinking subject is at the          
same time its own object, it cannot divide itself- although it can          
divide its inhering determinations. For every object in relation to         
itself is absolute unity. Nevertheless, if the subject is regarded          
externally, as an object of intuition, it must, in its character of         
phenomenon, possess the property of composition. And it must always be      
regarded in this manner, if we wish to know whether there is or is not      
contained in it a manifold whose parts are external to each other.          
-                                                                           
-                                                                           
                                                  {BK_2|CH_2 ^paragraph 140}
          THIRD CONFLICT OF THE TRANSCENDENTAL IDEAS.                       
-                                                                           
                            THESIS.                                         
-                                                                           
  Causality according to the laws of nature, is not the only causality      
operating to originate the phenomena of the world. A causality of           
freedom is also necessary to account fully for these phenomena.             
                                                  {BK_2|CH_2 ^paragraph 145}
-                                                                           
                             PROOF.                                         
-                                                                           
  Let it be supposed, that there is no other kind of causality than         
that according to the laws of nature. Consequently, everything that         
happens presupposes a previous condition, which it follows with             
absolute certainty, in conformity with a rule. But this previous            
condition must itself be something that has happened (that has              
arisen in time, as it did not exist before), for, if it has always          
been in existence, its consequence or effect would not thus                 
originate for the first time, but would likewise have always                
existed. The causality, therefore, of a cause, whereby something            
happens, is itself a thing that has happened. Now this again                
presupposes, in conformity with the law of nature, a previous               
condition and its causality, and this another anterior to the               
former, and so on. If, then, everything happens solely in accordance        
with the laws of nature, there cannot be any real first beginning of        
things, but only a subaltern or comparative beginning. There cannot,        
therefore, be a completeness of series on the side of the causes which      
originate the one from the other. But the law of nature is that             
nothing can happen without a sufficient a priori determined cause. The      
proposition therefore- if all causality is possible only in accordance      
with the laws of nature- is, when stated in this unlimited and general      
manner, self-contradictory. It follows that this cannot be the only         
kind of causality.                                                          
  From what has been said, it follows that a causality must be              
admitted, by means of which something happens, without its cause being      
determined according to necessary laws by some other cause                  
preceding. That is to say, there must exist an absolute spontaneity of      
cause, which of itself originates a series of phenomena which proceeds      
according to natural laws- consequently transcendental freedom,             
without which even in the course of nature the succession of phenomena      
on the side of causes is never complete.                                    
                                                  {BK_2|CH_2 ^paragraph 150}
-                                                                           
                        ANTITHESIS.                                         
-                                                                           
  There is no such thing as freedom, but everything in the world            
happens solely according to the laws of nature.                             
-                                                                           
                                                  {BK_2|CH_2 ^paragraph 155}
                          PROOF.                                            
-                                                                           
  Granted, that there does exist freedom in the transcendental              
sense, as a peculiar kind of causality, operating to produce events in      
the world- a faculty, that is to say, of originating a state, and           
consequently a series of consequences from that state. In this case,        
not only the series originated by this spontaneity, but the                 
determination of this spontaneity itself to the production of the           
series, that is to say, the causality itself must have an absolute          
commencement, such that nothing can precede to determine this action        
according to unvarying laws. But every beginning of action presupposes      
in the acting cause a state of inaction; and a dynamically primal           
beginning of action presupposes a state, which has no connection- as        
regards causality- with the preceding state of the cause- which does        
not, that is, in any wise result from it. Transcendental freedom is         
therefore opposed to the natural law of cause and effect, and such a        
conjunction of successive states in effective causes is destructive of      
the possibility of unity in experience and for that reason not to be        
found in experience- is consequently a mere fiction of thought.             
  We have, therefore, nothing but nature to which we must look for          
connection and order in cosmical events. Freedom- independence of           
the laws of nature- is certainly a deliverance from restraint, but          
it is also a relinquishing of the guidance of law and rule. For it          
cannot be alleged that, instead of the laws of nature, laws of freedom      
may be introduced into the causality of the course of nature. For,          
if freedom were determined according to laws, it would be no longer         
freedom, but merely nature. Nature, therefore, and transcendental           
freedom are distinguishable as conformity to law and lawlessness.           
The former imposes upon understanding the difficulty of seeking the         
origin of events ever higher and higher in the series of causes,            
inasmuch as causality is always conditioned thereby; while it               
compensates this labour by the guarantee of a unity complete and in         
conformity with law. The latter, on the contrary, holds out to the          
understanding the promise of a point of rest in the chain of causes,        
by conducting it to an unconditioned causality, which professes to          
have the power of spontaneous origination, but which, in its own utter      
blindness, deprives it of the guidance of rules, by which alone a           
completely connected experience is possible.                                
-                                                                           
-                                                                           
                                                  {BK_2|CH_2 ^paragraph 160}
             OBSERVATIONS ON THE THIRD ANTINOMY.                            
-                                                                           
                       ON THE THESIS.                                       
-                                                                           
  The transcendental idea of freedom is far from constituting the           
entire content of the psychological conception so termed, which is for      
the most part empirical. It merely presents us with the conception          
of spontaneity of action, as the proper ground for imputing freedom to      
the cause of a certain class of objects. It is, however, the true           
stumbling-stone to philosophy, which meets with unconquerable               
difficulties in the way of its admitting this kind of unconditioned         
causality. That element in the question of the freedom of the will,         
which bas for so long a time placed speculative reason in such              
perplexity, is properly only transcendental, and concerns the               
question, whether there must be held to exist a faculty of spontaneous      
origination of a series of successive things or states. How such a          
faculty is possible is not a necessary inquiry; for in the case of          
natural causality itself, we are obliged to content ourselves with the      
a priori knowledge that such a causality must be presupposed, although      
we are quite incapable of comprehending how the being of one thing          
is possible through the being of another, but must for this                 
information look entirely to experience. Now we have demonstrated this      
necessity of a free first beginning of a series of phenomena, only          
in so far as it is required for the comprehension of an origin of           
the world, all following states being regarded as a succession              
according to laws of nature alone. But, as there has thus been              
proved the existence of a faculty which can of itself originate a           
series in time- although we are unable to explain how it can exist- we      
feel ourselves authorized to admit, even in the midst of the natural        
course of events, a beginning, as regards causality, of different           
successions of phenomena, and at the same time to attribute to all          
substances a faculty of free action. But we ought in this case not          
to allow ourselves to fall into a common misunderstanding, and to           
suppose that, because a successive series in the world can only have a      
comparatively first beginning- another state or condition of things         
always preceding- an absolutely first beginning of a series in the          
course of nature is impossible. For we are not speaking here of an          
absolutely first beginning in relation to time, but as regards              
causality alone. When, for example, I, completely of my own free will,      
and independently of the necessarily determinative influence of             
natural causes, rise from my chair, there commences with this event,        
including its material consequences in infinitum, an absolutely new         
series; although, in relation to time, this event is merely the             
continuation of a preceding series. For this resolution and act of          
mine do not form part of the succession of effects in nature, and           
are not mere continuations of it; on the contrary, the determining          
causes of nature cease to operate in reference to this event, which         
certainly succeeds the acts of nature, but does not proceed from them.      
For these reasons, the action of a free agent must be termed, in            
regard to causality, if not in relation to time, an absolutely              
primal beginning of a series of phenomena.                                  
                                                  {BK_2|CH_2 ^paragraph 165}
  The justification of this need of reason to rest upon a free act          
as the first beginning of the series of natural causes is evident from      
the fact, that all philosophers of antiquity (with the exception of         
the Epicurean school) felt themselves obliged, when constructing a          
theory of the motions of the universe, to accept a prime mover, that        
is, a freely acting cause, which spontaneously and prior to all             
other causes evolved this series of states. They always felt the            
need of going beyond mere nature, for the purpose of making a first         
beginning comprehensible.                                                   
-                                                                           
                    ON THE ANTITHESIS.                                      
-                                                                           
  The assertor of the all-sufficiency of nature in regard to causality      
(transcendental Physiocracy), in opposition to the doctrine of              
freedom, would defend his view of the question somewhat in the              
following manner. He would say, in answer to the sophistical arguments      
of the opposite party: If you do not accept a mathematical first, in        
relation to time, you have no need to seek a dynamical first, in            
regard to causality. Who compelled you to imagine an absolutely primal      
condition of the world, and therewith an absolute beginning of the          
gradually progressing successions of phenomena- and, as some                
foundation for this fancy of yours, to set bounds to unlimited nature?      
Inasmuch as the substances in the world have always existed- at             
least the unity of experience renders such a supposition quite              
necessary- there is no difficulty in believing also, that the               
changes in the conditions of these substances have always existed;          
and, consequently, that a first beginning, mathematical or                  
dynamical, is by no means required. The possibility of such an              
infinite derivation, without any initial member from which all the          
others result, is certainly quite incomprehensible. But, if you are         
rash enough to deny the enigmatical secrets of nature for this reason,      
you will find yourselves obliged to deny also the existence of many         
fundamental properties of natural objects (such as fundamental              
forces), which you can just as little comprehend; and even the              
possibility of so simple a conception as that of change must present        
to you insuperable difficulties. For if experience did not teach you        
that it was real, you never could conceive a priori the possibility of      
this ceaseless sequence of being and non-being.                             
                                                  {BK_2|CH_2 ^paragraph 170}
  But if the existence of a transcendental faculty of freedom is            
granted- a faculty of originating changes in the world- this faculty        
must at least exist out of and apart from the world; although it is         
certainly a bold assumption, that, over and above the complete content      
of all possible intuitions, there still exists an object which              
cannot be presented in any possible perception. But, to attribute to        
substances in the world itself such a faculty, is quite                     
inadmissible; for, in this case; the connection of phenomena                
reciprocally determining and determined according to general laws,          
which is termed nature, and along with it the criteria of empirical         
truth, which enable us to distinguish experience from mere visionary        
dreaming, would almost entirely disappear. In proximity with such a         
lawless faculty of freedom, a system of nature is hardly cogitable;         
for the laws of the latter would be continually subject to the              
intrusive influences of the former, and the course of phenomena, which      
would otherwise proceed regularly and uniformly, would become               
thereby confused and disconnected.                                          
-                                                                           
-                                                                           
        FOURTH CONFLICT OF THE TRANSCENDENTAL IDEAS.                        
-                                                                           
                         THESIS.                                            
                                                  {BK_2|CH_2 ^paragraph 175}
-                                                                           
  There exists either in, or in connection with the world- either as a      
part of it, or as the cause of it-an absolutely necessary being.            
-                                                                           
                          PROOF.                                            
-                                                                           
                                                  {BK_2|CH_2 ^paragraph 180}
  The world of sense, as the sum total of all phenomena, contains a         
series of changes. For, without such a series, the mental                   
representation of the series of time itself, as the condition of the        
possibility of the sensuous world, could not be presented to us.*           
But every change stands under its condition, which precedes it in time      
and renders it necessary. Now the existence of a given condition            
presupposes a complete series of conditions up to the absolutely            
unconditioned, which alone is absolutely necessary. It follows that         
something that is absolutely necessary must exist, if change exists as      
its consequence. But this necessary thing itself belongs to the             
sensuous world. For suppose it to exist out of and apart from it,           
the series of cosmical changes would receive from it a beginning,           
and yet this necessary cause would not itself belong to the world of        
sense. But this is impossible. For, as the beginning of a series in         
time is determined only by that which precedes it in time, the supreme      
condition of the beginning of a series of changes must exist in the         
time in which this series itself did not exist; for a beginning             
supposes a time preceding, in which the thing that begins to be was         
not in existence. The causality of the necessary cause of changes, and      
consequently the cause itself, must for these reasons belong to             
time- and to phenomena, time being possible only as the form of             
phenomena. Consequently, it cannot be cogitated as separated from           
the world of sense- the sum total of all phenomena. There is,               
therefore, contained in the world, something that is absolutely             
necessary- whether it be the whole cosmical series itself, or only a        
part of it.                                                                 
-                                                                           
  *Objectively, time, as the formal condition of the possibility of         
change, precedes all changes; but subjectively, and in                      
consciousness, the representation of time, like every other, is             
given solely by occasion of perception.                                     
-                                                                           
                         ANTITHESIS.                                        
                                                  {BK_2|CH_2 ^paragraph 185}
-                                                                           
  An absolutely necessary being does not exist, either in the world,        
or out of it- as its cause.                                                 
-                                                                           
                           PROOF.                                           
-                                                                           
                                                  {BK_2|CH_2 ^paragraph 190}
  Grant that either the world itself is necessary, or that there is         
contained in it a necessary existence. Two cases are possible.              
First, there must either be in the series of cosmical changes a             
beginning, which is unconditionally necessary, and therefore uncaused-      
which is at variance with the dynamical law of the determination of         
all phenomena in time; or, secondly, the series itself is without           
beginning, and, although contingent and conditioned in all its              
parts, is nevertheless absolutely necessary and unconditioned as a          
whole- which is self-contradictory. For the existence of an                 
aggregate cannot be necessary, if no single part of it possesses            
necessary existence.                                                        
  Grant, on the other band, that an absolutely necessary cause              
exists out of and apart from the world. This cause, as the highest          
member in the series of the causes of cosmical changes, must originate      
or begin* the existence of the latter and their series. In this case        
it must also begin to act, and its causality would therefore belong to      
time, and consequently to the sum total of phenomena, that is, to           
the world. It follows that the cause cannot be out of the world; which      
is contradictory to the hypothesis. Therefore, neither in the world,        
nor out of it (but in causal connection with it), does there exist any      
absolutely necessary being.                                                 
-                                                                           
  *The word begin is taken in two senses. The first is active- the          
cause being regarded as beginning a series of conditions as its effect      
(infit). The second is passive- the causality in the cause itself           
beginning to operate (fit). I reason here from the first to the             
second.                                                                     
-                                                                           
-                                                                           
                                                  {BK_2|CH_2 ^paragraph 195}
             OBSERVATIONS ON THE FOURTH ANTINOMY.                           
-                                                                           
                      ON THE THESIS.                                        
-                                                                           
  To demonstrate the existence of a necessary being, I cannot be            
permitted in this place to employ any other than the cosmological           
argument, which ascends from the conditioned in phenomena to the            
unconditioned in conception- the unconditioned being considered the         
necessary condition of the absolute totality of the series. The proof,      
from the mere idea of a supreme being, belongs to another principle of      
reason and requires separate discussion.                                    
                                                  {BK_2|CH_2 ^paragraph 200}
  The pure cosmological proof demonstrates the existence of a               
necessary being, but at the same time leaves it quite unsettled,            
whether this being is the world itself, or quite distinct from it.          
To establish the truth of the latter view, principles are requisite,        
which are not cosmological and do not proceed in the series of              
phenomena. We should require to introduce into our proof conceptions        
of contingent beings- regarded merely as objects of the understanding,      
and also a principle which enables us to connect these, by means of         
mere conceptions, with a necessary being. But the proper place for all      
such arguments is a transcendent philosophy, which has unhappily not        
yet been established.                                                       
  But, if we begin our proof cosmologically, by laying at the               
foundation of it the series of phenomena, and the regress in it             
according to empirical laws of causality, we are not at liberty to          
break off from this mode of demonstration and to pass over to               
something which is not itself a member of the series. The condition         
must be taken in exactly the same signification as the relation of the      
conditioned to its condition in the series has been taken, for the          
series must conduct us in an unbroken regress to this supreme               
condition. But if this relation is sensuous, and belongs to the             
possible empirical employment of understanding, the supreme                 
condition or cause must close the regressive series according to the        
laws of sensibility and consequently, must belong to the series of          
time. It follows that this necessary existence must be regarded as the      
highest member of the cosmical series.                                      
  Certain philosophers have, nevertheless, allowed themselves the           
liberty of making such a saltus (metabasis eis allo gonos). From the        
changes in the world they have concluded their empirical                    
contingency, that is, their dependence on empirically-determined            
causes, and they thus admitted an ascending series of empirical             
conditions: and in this they are quite right. But as they could not         
find in this series any primal beginning or any highest member, they        
passed suddenly from the empirical conception of contingency to the         
pure category, which presents us with a series- not sensuous, but           
intellectual- whose completeness does certainly rest upon the               
existence of an absolutely necessary cause. Nay, more, this                 
intellectual series is not tied to any sensuous conditions; and is          
therefore free from the condition of time, which requires it                
spontaneously to begin its causality in time. But such a procedure          
is perfectly inadmissible, as will be made plain from what follows.         
  In the pure sense of the categories, that is contingent the               
contradictory opposite of which is possible. Now we cannot reason from      
empirical contingency to intellectual. The opposite of that which is        
changed- the opposite of its state- is actual at another time, and          
is therefore possible. Consequently, it is not the contradictory            
opposite of the former state. To be that, it is necessary that, in the      
same time in which the preceding state existed, its opposite could          
have existed in its place; but such a cognition is not given us in the      
mere phenomenon of change. A body that was in motion = A, comes into a      
state of rest = non-A. Now it cannot be concluded from the fact that a      
state opposite to the state A follows it, that the contradictory            
opposite of A is possible; and that A is therefore contingent. To           
prove this, we should require to know that the state of rest could          
have existed in the very same time in which the motion took place. Now      
we know nothing more than that the state of rest was actual in the          
time that followed the state of motion; consequently, that it was also      
possible. But motion at one time, and rest at another time, are not         
contradictorily opposed to each other. It follows from what has been        
said that the succession of opposite determinations, that is,               
change, does not demonstrate the fact of contingency as represented in      
the conceptions of the pure understanding; and that it cannot,              
therefore, conduct us to the fact of the existence of a necessary           
being. Change proves merely empirical contingency, that is to say,          
that the new state could not have existed without a cause, which            
belongs to the preceding time. This cause- even although it is              
regarded as absolutely necessary- must be presented to us in time, and      
must belong to the series of phenomena.                                     
-                                                                           
                                                  {BK_2|CH_2 ^paragraph 205}
                       ON THE ANTITHESIS.                                   
-                                                                           
  The difficulties which meet us, in our attempt to rise through the        
series of phenomena to the existence of an absolutely necessary             
supreme cause, must not originate from our inability to establish           
the truth of our mere conceptions of the necessary existence of a           
thing. That is to say, our objections not be ontological, but must          
be directed against the causal connection with a series of phenomena        
of a condition which is itself unconditioned. In one word, they must        
be cosmological and relate to empirical laws. We must show that the         
regress in the series of causes (in the world of sense) cannot              
conclude with an empirically unconditioned condition, and that the          
cosmological argument from the contingency of the cosmical state- a         
contingency alleged to arise from change- does not justify us in            
accepting a first cause, that is, a prime originator of the cosmical        
series.                                                                     
  The reader will observe in this antinomy a very remarkable contrast.      
The very same grounds of proof which established in the thesis the          
existence of a supreme being, demonstrated in the antithesis- and with      
equal strictness- the non-existence of such a being. We found,              
first, that a necessary being exists, because the whole time past           
contains the series of all conditions, and with it, therefore, the          
unconditioned (the necessary); secondly, that there does not exist any      
necessary being, for the same reason, that the whole time past              
contains the series of all conditions- which are themselves,                
therefore, in the aggregate, conditioned. The cause of this seeming         
incongruity is as follows. We attend, in the first argument, solely to      
the absolute totality of the series of conditions, the one of which         
determines the other in time, and thus arrive at a necessary                
unconditioned. In the second, we consider, on the contrary, the             
contingency of everything that is determined in the series of time-         
for every event is preceded by a time, in which the condition itself        
must be determined as conditioned- and thus everything that is              
unconditioned or absolutely necessary disappears. In both, the mode of      
proof is quite in accordance with the common procedure of human             
reason, which often falls into discord with itself, from considering        
an object from two different points of view. Herr von Mairan                
regarded the controversy between two celebrated astronomers, which          
arose from a similar difficulty as to the choice of a proper                
standpoint, as a phenomenon of sufficient importance to warrant a           
separate treatise on the subject. The one concluded: the moon revolves      
on its own axis, because it constantly presents the same side to the        
earth; the other declared that the moon does not revolve on its own         
axis, for the same reason. Both conclusions were perfectly correct,         
according to the point of view from which the motions of the moon were      
considered.                                                                 
-                                                                           
-                                                                           
                                                  {BK_2|CH_2 ^paragraph 210}
        SECTION III. Of the Interest of Reason in these                     
                     Self-contradictions.                                   
-                                                                           
  We have thus completely before us the dialectical procedure of the        
cosmological ideas. No possible experience can present us with an           
object adequate to them in extent. Nay, more, reason itself cannot          
cogitate them as according with the general laws of experience. And         
yet they are not arbitrary fictions of thought. On the contrary,            
reason, in its uninterrupted progress in the empirical synthesis, is        
necessarily conducted to them, when it endeavours to free from all          
conditions and to comprehend in its unconditioned totality that             
which can only be determined conditionally in accordance with the laws      
of experience. These dialectical propositions are so many attempts          
to solve four natural and unavoidable problems of reason. There are         
neither more, nor can there be less, than this number, because there        
are no other series of synthetical hypotheses, limiting a priori the        
empirical synthesis.                                                        
  The brilliant claims of reason striving to extend its dominion            
beyond the limits of experience, have been represented above only in        
dry formulae, which contain merely the grounds of its pretensions.          
They have, besides, in conformity with the character of a                   
transcendental philosophy, been freed from every empirical element;         
although the full splendour of the promises they hold out, and the          
anticipations they excite, manifests itself only when in connection         
with empirical cognitions. In the application of them, however, and in      
the advancing enlargement of the employment of reason, while                
struggling to rise from the region of experience and to soar to             
those sublime ideas, philosophy discovers a value and a dignity,            
which, if it could but make good its assertions, would raise it far         
above all other departments of human knowledge- professing, as it           
does, to present a sure foundation for our highest hopes and the            
ultimate aims of all the exertions of reason. The questions: whether        
the world has a beginning and a limit to its extension in space;            
whether there exists anywhere, or perhaps, in my own thinking Self, an      
indivisible and indestructible unity- or whether nothing but what is        
divisible and transitory exists; whether I am a free agent, or, like        
other beings, am bound in the chains of nature and fate; whether,           
finally, there is a supreme cause of the world, or all our thought and      
speculation must end with nature and the order of external things- are      
questions for the solution of which the mathematician would                 
willingly exchange his whole science; for in it there is no                 
satisfaction for the highest aspirations and most ardent desires of         
humanity. Nay, it may even be said that the true value of mathematics-      
that pride of human reason- consists in this: that she guides reason        
to the knowledge of nature- in her greater as well as in her less           
manifestations- in her beautiful order and regularity- guides her,          
moreover, to an insight into the wonderful unity of the moving              
forces in the operations of nature, far beyond the expectations of a        
philosophy building only on experience; and that she thus encourages        
philosophy to extend the province of reason beyond all experience, and      
at the same time provides it with the most excellent materials for          
supporting its investigations, in so far as their nature admits, by         
adequate and accordant intuitions.                                          
                                                  {BK_2|CH_2 ^paragraph 215}
  Unfortunately for speculation- but perhaps fortunately for the            
practical interests of humanity- reason, in the midst of her highest        
anticipations, finds herself hemmed in by a press of opposite and           
contradictory conclusions, from which neither her honour nor her            
safety will permit her to draw back. Nor can she regard these               
conflicting trains of reasoning with indifference as mere passages          
at arms, still less can she command peace; for in the subject of the        
conflict she has a deep interest. There is no other course left open        
to her than to reflect with herself upon the origin of this disunion        
in reason- whether it may not arise from a mere misunderstanding.           
After such an inquiry, arrogant claims would have to be given up on         
both sides; but the sovereignty of reason over understanding and sense      
would be based upon a sure foundation.                                      
  We shall at present defer this radical inquiry and, in the meantime,      
consider for a little what side in the controversy we should most           
willingly take, if we were obliged to become partisans at all. As,          
in this case, we leave out of sight altogether the logical criterion        
of truth, and merely consult our own interest in reference to the           
question, these considerations, although inadequate to settle the           
question of right in either party, will enable us to comprehend how         
those who have taken part in the struggle, adopt the one view rather        
than the other- no special insight into the subject, however, having        
influenced their choice. They will, at the same time, explain to us         
many other things by the way- for example, the fiery zeal on the one        
side and the cold maintenance of their cause on the other; why the one      
party has met with the warmest approbations, and the other has              
always been repulsed by irreconcilable prejudices.                          
  There is one thing, however, that determines the proper point of          
view, from which alone this preliminary inquiry can be instituted           
and carried on with the proper completeness- and that is the                
comparison of the principles from which both sides, thesis and              
antithesis, proceed. My readers would remark in the propositions of         
the antithesis a complete uniformity in the mode of thought and a           
perfect unity of principle. Its principle was that of pure empiricism,      
not only in the explication of the phenomena in the world, but also in      
the solution of the transcendental ideas, even of that of the universe      
itself. The affirmations of the thesis, on the contrary, were based,        
in addition to the empirical mode of explanation employed in the            
series of phenomena, on intellectual propositions; and its                  
principles were in so far not simple. I shall term the thesis, in view      
of its essential characteristic, the dogmatism of pure reason.              
  On the side of Dogmatism, or of the thesis, therefore, in the             
determination of the cosmological ideas, we find:                           
  1. A practical interest, which must be very dear to every                 
right-thinking man. That the word has a beginning- that the nature          
of my thinking self is simple, and therefore indestructible- that I am      
a free agent, and raised above the compulsion of nature and her             
laws- and, finally, that the entire order of things, which form the         
world, is dependent upon a Supreme Being, from whom the whole receives      
unity and connection- these are so many foundation-stones of                
morality and religion. The antithesis deprives us of all these              
supports- or, at least, seems so to deprive us.                             
                                                  {BK_2|CH_2 ^paragraph 220}
  2. A speculative interest of reason manifests itself on this side.        
For, if we take the transcendental ideas and employ them in the manner      
which the thesis directs, we can exhibit completely a priori the            
entire chain of conditions, and understand the derivation of the            
conditioned- beginning from the unconditioned. This the antithesis          
does not do; and for this reason does not meet with so welcome a            
reception. For it can give no answer to our question respecting the         
conditions of its synthesis- except such as must be supplemented by         
another question, and so on to infinity. According to it, we must rise      
from a given beginning to one still higher; every part conducts us          
to a still smaller one; every event is preceded by another event which      
is its cause; and the conditions of existence rest always upon other        
and still higher conditions, and find neither end nor basis in some         
self-subsistent thing as the primal being.                                  
  3. This side has also the advantage of popularity; and this               
constitutes no small part of its claim to favour. The common                
understanding does not find the least difficulty in the idea of the         
unconditioned beginning of all synthesis- accustomed, as it is, rather      
to follow our consequences than to seek for a proper basis for              
cognition. In the conception of an absolute first, moreover- the            
possibility of which it does not inquire into- it is highly                 
gratified to find a firmly-established point of departure for its           
attempts at theory; while in the restless and continuous ascent from        
the conditioned to the condition, always with one foot in the air,          
it can find no satisfaction.                                                
  On the side of the antithesis, or Empiricism, in the determination        
of the cosmological ideas:                                                  
  1. We cannot discover any such practical interest arising from            
pure principles of reason as morality and religion present. On the          
contrary, pure empiricism seems to empty them of all their power and        
influence. If there does not exist a Supreme Being distinct from the        
world- if the world is without beginning, consequently without a            
Creator- if our wills are not free, and the soul is divisible and           
subject to corruption just like matter- the ideas and principles of         
morality lose all validity and fall with the transcendental ideas           
which constituted their theoretical support.                                
  2. But empiricism, in compensation, holds out to reason, in its           
speculative interests, certain important advantages, far exceeding any      
that the dogmatist can promise us. For, when employed by the                
empiricist, understanding is always upon its proper ground of               
investigation- the field of possible experience, the laws of which          
it can explore, and thus extend its cognition securely and with             
clear intelligence without being stopped by limits in any direction.        
Here can it and ought it to find and present to intuition its proper        
object- not only in itself, but in all its relations; or, if it employ      
conceptions, upon this ground it can always present the                     
corresponding images in clear and unmistakable intuitions. It is quite      
unnecessary for it to renounce the guidance of nature, to attach            
itself to ideas, the objects of which it cannot know; because, as mere      
intellectual entities, they cannot be presented in any intuition. On        
the contrary, it is not even permitted to abandon its proper                
occupation, under the pretence that it has been brought to a                
conclusion (for it never can be), and to pass into the region of            
idealizing reason and transcendent conceptions, which it is not             
required to observe and explore the laws of nature, but merely to           
think and to imagine- secure from being contradicted by facts, because      
they have not been called as witnesses, but passed by, or perhaps           
subordinated to the so-called higher interests and considerations of        
pure reason.                                                                
                                                  {BK_2|CH_2 ^paragraph 225}
  Hence the empiricist will never allow himself to accept any epoch of      
nature for the first- the absolutely primal state; he will not believe      
that there can be limits to his outlook into her wide domains, nor          
pass from the objects of nature, which he can satisfactorily explain        
by means of observation and mathematical thought- which he can              
determine synthetically in intuition, to those which neither sense nor      
imagination can ever present in concreto; he will not concede the           
existence of a faculty in nature, operating independently of the            
laws of nature- a concession which would introduce uncertainty into         
the procedure of the understanding, which is guided by necessary            
laws to the observation of phenomena; nor, finally, will he permit          
himself to seek a cause beyond nature, inasmuch as we know nothing but      
it, and from it alone receive an objective basis for all our                
conceptions and instruction in the unvarying laws of things.                
  In truth, if the empirical philosopher had no other purpose in the        
establishment of his antithesis than to check the presumption of a          
reason which mistakes its true destination, which boasts of its             
insight and its knowledge, just where all insight and knowledge             
cease to exist, and regards that which is valid only in relation to         
a practical interest, as an advancement of the speculative interests        
of the mind (in order, when it is convenient for itself, to break           
the thread of our physical investigations, and, under pretence of           
extending our cognition, connect them with transcendental ideas, by         
means of which we really know only that we know nothing)- if, I say,        
the empiricist rested satisfied with this benefit, the principle            
advanced by him would be a maxim recommending moderation in the             
pretensions of reason and modesty in its affirmations, and at the same      
time would direct us to the right mode of extending the province of         
the understanding, by the help of the only true teacher, experience.        
In obedience to this advice, intellectual hypotheses and faith would        
not be called in aid of our practical interests; nor should we              
introduce them under the pompous titles of science and insight. For         
speculative cognition cannot find an objective basis any other where        
than in experience; and, when we overstep its limits our synthesis,         
which requires ever new cognitions independent of experience, has no        
substratum of intuition upon which to build.                                
  But if- as often happens- empiricism, in relation to ideas,               
becomes itself dogmatic and boldly denies that which is above the           
sphere of its phenomenal cognition, it falls itself into the error          
of intemperance- an error which is here all the more reprehensible, as      
thereby the practical interest of reason receives an irreparable            
injury.                                                                     
  And this constitutes the opposition between Epicureanism* and             
Platonism.                                                                  
-                                                                           
                                                  {BK_2|CH_2 ^paragraph 230}
  *It is, however, still a matter of doubt whether Epicurus ever            
propounded these principles as directions for the objective employment      
of the understanding. If, indeed, they were nothing more than maxims        
for the speculative exercise of reason, he gives evidence therein a         
more genuine philosophic spirit than any of the philosophers of             
antiquity. That, in the explanation of phenomena, we must proceed as        
if the field of inquiry had neither limits in space nor commencement        
in time; that we must be satisfied with the teaching of experience          
in reference to the material of which the world is posed; that we must      
not look for any other mode of the origination of events than that          
which is determined by the unalterable laws of nature; and finally,         
that we not employ the hypothesis of a cause distinct from the world        
to account for a phenomenon or for the world itself- are principles         
for the extension of speculative philosophy, and the discovery of           
the true sources of the principles of morals, which, however little         
conformed to in the present day, are undoubtedly correct. At the            
same time, any one desirous of ignoring, in mere speculation, these         
dogmatical propositions, need not for that reason be accused of             
denying them.                                                               
-                                                                           
  Both Epicurus and Plato assert more in their systems than they know.      
The former encourages and advances science- although to the                 
prejudice of the practical; the latter presents us with excellent           
principles for the investigation of the practical, but, in relation to      
everything regarding which we can attain to speculative cognition,          
permits reason to append idealistic explanations of natural phenomena,      
to the great injury of physical investigation.                              
  3. In regard to the third motive for the preliminary choice of a          
party in this war of assertions, it seems very extraordinary that           
empiricism should be utterly unpopular. We should be inclined to            
believe that the common understanding would receive it with                 
pleasure- promising as it does to satisfy it without passing the            
bounds of experience and its connected order; while transcendental          
dogmatism obliges it to rise to conceptions which far surpass the           
intelligence and ability of the most practised thinkers. But in             
this, in truth, is to be found its real motive. For the common              
understanding thus finds itself in a situation where not even the most      
learned can have the advantage of it. If it understands little or           
nothing about these transcendental conceptions, no one can boast of         
understanding any more; and although it may not express itself in so        
scholastically correct a manner as others, it can busy itself with          
reasoning and arguments without end, wandering among mere ideas, about      
which one can always be very eloquent, because we know nothing about        
them; while, in the observation and investigation of nature, it             
would be forced to remain dumb and to confess its utter ignorance.          
Thus indolence and vanity form of themselves strong recommendations of      
these principles. Besides, although it is a hard thing for a                
philosopher to assume a principle, of which he can give to himself          
no reasonable account, and still more to employ conceptions, the            
objective reality of which cannot be established, nothing is more           
usual with the common understanding. It wants something which will          
allow it to go to work with confidence. The difficulty of even              
comprehending a supposition does not disquiet it, because- not knowing      
what comprehending means- it never even thinks of the supposition it        
may be adopting as a principle; and regards as known that with which        
it has become familiar from constant use. And, at last, all                 
speculative interests disappear before the practical interests which        
it holds dear; and it fancies that it understands and knows what its        
necessities and hopes incite it to assume or to believe. Thus the           
empiricism of transcendentally idealizing reason is robbed of all           
popularity; and, however prejudicial it may be to the highest               
practical principles, there is no fear that it will ever pass the           
limits of the schools, or acquire any favour or influence in society        
or with the multitude a                                                     
  Human reason is by nature architectonic. That is to say, it               
regards all cognitions as parts of a possible system, and hence             
accepts only such principles as at least do not incapacitate a              
cognition to which we may have attained from being placed along with        
others in a general system. But the propositions of the antithesis are      
of a character which renders the completion of an edifice of                
cognitions impossible. According to these, beyond one state or epoch        
of the world there is always to be found one more ancient; in every         
part always other parts themselves divisible; preceding every event         
another, the origin of which must itself be sought still higher; and        
everything in existence is conditioned, and still not dependent on          
an unconditioned and primal existence. As, therefore, the antithesis        
will not concede the existence of a first beginning which might be          
available as a foundation, a complete edifice of cognition, in the          
presence of such hypothesis, is utterly impossible. Thus the                
architectonic interest of reason, which requires a unity- not               
empirical, but a priori and rational- forms a natural recommendation        
for the assertions of the thesis in our antinomy.                           
                                                  {BK_2|CH_2 ^paragraph 235}
  But if any one could free himself entirely from all considerations        
of interest, and weigh without partiality the assertions of reason,         
attending only to their content, irrespective of the consequences           
which follow from them; such a person, on the supposition that he knew      
no other way out of the confusion than to settle the truth of one or        
other of the conflicting doctrines, would live in a state of continual      
hesitation. Today, he would feel convinced that the human will is           
free; to-morrow, considering the indissoluble chain of nature, he           
would look on freedom as a mere illusion and declare nature to be           
all-in-all. But, if he were called to action, the play of the merely        
speculative reason would disappear like the shapes of a dream, and          
practical interest would dictate his choice of principles. But, as          
it well befits a reflective and inquiring being to devote certain           
periods of time to the examination of its own reason- to divest itself      
of all partiality, and frankly to communicate its observations for the      
judgement and opinion of others; so no one can be blamed for, much          
less prevented from, placing both parties on their trial, with              
permission to end themselves, free from intimidation, before                
intimidation, before a sworn jury of equal condition with                   
themselves- the condition of weak and fallible men.                         
-                                                                           
-                                                                           
       SECTION IV. Of the necessity imposed upon Pure Reason                
           of presenting a Solution of its Transcendental                   
                           Problems.                                        
                                                  {BK_2|CH_2 ^paragraph 240}
-                                                                           
  To avow an ability to solve all problems and to answer all questions      
would be a profession certain to convict any philosopher of                 
extravagant boasting and self-conceit, and at once to destroy the           
confidence that might otherwise have been reposed in him. There are,        
however, sciences so constituted that every question arising within         
their sphere must necessarily be capable of receiving an answer from        
the knowledge already possessed, for the answer must be received            
from the same sources whence the question arose. In such sciences it        
is not allowable to excuse ourselves on the plea of necessary and           
unavoidable ignorance; a solution is absolutely requisite. The rule of      
right and wrong must help us to the knowledge of what is right or           
wrong in all possible cases; otherwise, the idea of obligation or duty      
would be utterly null, for we cannot have any obligation to that which      
we cannot know. On the other hand, in our investigations of the             
phenomena of nature, much must remain uncertain, and many questions         
continue insoluble; because what we know of nature is far from being        
sufficient to explain all the phenomena that are presented to our           
observation. Now the question is: "Whether there is in                      
transcendental philosophy any question, relating to an object               
presented to pure reason, which is unanswerable by this reason; and         
whether we must regard the subject of the question as quite uncertain,      
so far as our knowledge extends, and must give it a place among             
those subjects, of which we have just so much conception as is              
sufficient to enable us to raise a question- faculty or materials           
failing us, however, when we attempt an answer. the world                   
  Now I maintain that, among all speculative cognition, the                 
peculiarity of transcendental philosophy is that there is no question,      
relating to an object presented to pure reason, which is insoluble          
by this reason; and that the profession of unavoidable ignorance-           
the problem being alleged to be beyond the reach of our faculties-          
cannot free us from the obligation to present a complete and                
satisfactory answer. For the very conception which enables us to raise      
the question must give us the power of answering it; inasmuch as the        
object, as in the case of right and wrong, is not to be discovered out      
of the conception.                                                          
  But, in transcendental philosophy, it is only the cosmological            
questions to which we can demand a satisfactory answer in relation          
to the constitution of their object; and the philosopher is not             
permitted to avail himself of the pretext of necessary ignorance and        
impenetrable obscurity. These questions relate solely to the                
cosmological ideas. For the object must be given in experience, and         
the question relates to the adequateness of the object to an idea.          
If the object is transcendental and therefore itself unknown; if the        
question, for example, is whether the object- the something, the            
phenomenon of which (internal- in ourselves) is thought- that is to         
say, the soul, is in itself a simple being; or whether there is a           
cause of all things, which is absolutely necessary- in such cases we        
are seeking for our idea an object, of which we may confess that it is      
unknown to us, though we must not on that account assert that it is         
impossible.* The cosmological ideas alone posses the peculiarity            
that we can presuppose the object of them and the empirical                 
synthesis requisite for the conception of that object to be given; and      
the question, which arises from these ideas, relates merely to the          
progress of this synthesis, in so far as it must contain absolute           
totality- which, however, is not empirical, as it cannot be given in        
any experience. Now, as the question here is solely in regard to a          
thing as the object of a possible experience and not as a thing in          
itself, the answer to the transcendental cosmological question need         
not be sought out of the idea, for the question does not regard an          
object in itself. The question in relation to a possible experience is      
not, "What can be given in an experience in concreto" but "what is          
contained in the idea, to which the empirical synthesis must                
approximate." The question must therefore be capable of solution            
from the idea alone. For the idea is a creation of reason itself,           
which therefore cannot disclaim the obligation to answer or refer us        
to the unknown object.                                                      
-                                                                           
                                                  {BK_2|CH_2 ^paragraph 245}
  *The question, "What is the constitution of a transcendental              
object?" is unanswerable- we are unable to say what it is; but we           
can perceive that the question itself is nothing; because it does           
not relate to any object that can be presented to us. For this reason,      
we must consider all the questions raised in transcendental psychology      
as answerable and as really answered; for they relate to the                
transcendental subject of all internal phenomena, which is not              
itself phenomenon and consequently not given as an object, in which,        
moreover, none of the categories- and it is to them that the                
question is properly directed- find any conditions of its application.      
Here, therefore, is a case where no answer is the only proper               
answer. For a question regarding the constitution of a something which      
cannot be cogitated by any determined predicate, being completely           
beyond the sphere of objects and experience, is perfectly null and          
void.                                                                       
-                                                                           
  It is not so extraordinary, as it at first sight appears, that a          
science should demand and expect satisfactory answers to all the            
questions that may arise within its own sphere (questiones                  
domesticae), although, up to a certain time, these answers may not          
have been discovered. There are, in addition to transcendental              
philosophy, only two pure sciences of reason; the one with a                
speculative, the other with a practical content- pure mathematics           
and pure ethics. Has any one ever heard it alleged that, from our           
complete and necessary ignorance of the conditions, it is uncertain         
what exact relation the diameter of a circle bears to the circle in         
rational or irrational numbers? By the former the sum cannot be             
given exactly, by the latter only approximately; and therefore we           
decide that the impossibility of a solution of the question is              
evident. Lambert presented us with a demonstration of this. In the          
general principles of morals there can be nothing uncertain, for the        
propositions are either utterly without meaning, or must originate          
solely in our rational conceptions. On the other hand, there must be        
in physical science an infinite number of conjectures, which can never      
become certainties; because the phenomena of nature are not given as        
objects dependent on our conceptions. The key to the solution of            
such questions cannot, therefore, be found in our conceptions, or in        
pure thought, but must lie without us and for that reason is in many        
cases not to be discovered; and consequently a satisfactory                 
explanation cannot be expected. The questions of transcendental             
analytic, which relate to the deduction of our pure cognition, are not      
to be regarded as of the same kind as those mentioned above; for we         
are not at present treating of the certainty of judgements in relation      
to the origin of our conceptions, but only of that certainty in             
relation to objects.                                                        
  We cannot, therefore, escape the responsibility of at least a             
critical solution of the questions of reason, by complaints of the          
limited nature of our faculties, and the seemingly humble confession        
that it is beyond the power of our reason to decide, whether the world      
has existed from all eternity or had a beginning- whether it is             
infinitely extended, or enclosed within certain limits- whether             
anything in the world is simple, or whether everything must be capable      
of infinite divisibility- whether freedom can originate phenomena,          
or whether everything is absolutely dependent on the laws and order of      
nature- and, finally, whether there exists a being that is                  
completely unconditioned and necessary, or whether the existence of         
everything is conditioned and consequently dependent on something           
external to itself, and therefore in its own nature contingent. For         
all these questions relate to an object, which can be given nowhere         
else than in thought. This object is the absolutely unconditioned           
totality of the synthesis of phenomena. If the conceptions in our           
minds do not assist us to some certain result in regard to these            
problems, we must not defend ourselves on the plea that the object          
itself remains hidden from and unknown to us. For no such thing or          
object can be given- it is not to be found out of the idea in our           
minds. We must seek the cause of our failure in our idea itself, which      
is an insoluble problem and in regard to which we obstinately assume        
that there exists a real object corresponding and adequate to it. A         
clear explanation of the dialectic which lies in our conception,            
will very soon enable us to come to a satisfactory decision in              
regard to such a question.                                                  
  The pretext that we are unable to arrive at certainty in regard to        
these problems may be met with this question, which requires at             
least a plain answer: "From what source do the ideas originate, the         
solution of which involves you in such difficulties? Are you seeking        
for an explanation of certain phenomena; and do you expect these ideas      
to give you the principles or the rules of this explanation?" Let it        
be granted, that all nature was laid open before you; that nothing was      
hid from your senses and your consciousness. Still, you could not           
cognize in concreto the object of your ideas in any experience. For         
what is demanded is not only this full and complete intuition, but          
also a complete synthesis and the consciousness of its absolute             
totality; and this is not possible by means of any empirical                
cognition. It follows that your question- your idea- is by no means         
necessary for the explanation of any phenomenon; and the idea cannot        
have been in any sense given by the object itself. For such an              
object can never be presented to us, because it cannot be given by any      
possible experience. Whatever perceptions you may attain to, you are        
still surrounded by conditions- in space, or in time- and you cannot        
discover anything unconditioned; nor can you decide whether this            
unconditioned is to be placed in an absolute beginning of the               
synthesis, or in an absolute totality of the series without beginning.      
A whole, in the empirical signification of the term, is always              
merely comparative. The absolute whole of quantity (the universe),          
of division, of derivation, of the condition of existence, with the         
question- whether it is to be produced by finite or infinite                
synthesis, no possible experience can instruct us concerning. You will      
not, for example, be able to explain the phenomena of a body in the         
least degree better, whether you believe it to consist of simple, or        
of composite parts; for a simple phenomenon- and just as little an          
infinite series of composition- can never be presented to your              
perception. Phenomena require and admit of explanation, only in so far      
as the conditions of that explanation are given in perception; but the      
sum total of that which is given in phenomena, considered as an             
absolute whole, is itself a perception- and we cannot therefore seek        
for explanations of this whole beyond itself, in other perceptions.         
The explanation of this whole is the proper object of the                   
transcendental problems of pure reason.                                     
                                                  {BK_2|CH_2 ^paragraph 250}
  Although, therefore, the solution of these problems is                    
unattainable through experience, we must not permit ourselves to say        
that it is uncertain how the object of our inquiries is constituted.        
For the object is in our own mind and cannot be discovered in               
experience; and we have only to take care that our thoughts are             
consistent with each other, and to avoid falling into the amphiboly of      
regarding our idea as a representation of an object empirically given,      
and therefore to be cognized according to the laws of experience. A         
dogmatical solution is therefore not only unsatisfactory but                
impossible. The critical solution, which may be a perfectly certain         
one, does not consider the question objectively, but proceeds by            
inquiring into the basis of the cognition upon which the question           
rests.                                                                      
-                                                                           
     SECTION V. Sceptical Exposition of the Cosmological Problems           
           presented in the four Transcendental Ideas.                      
-                                                                           
                                                  {BK_2|CH_2 ^paragraph 255}
  We should be quite willing to desist from the demand of a dogmatical      
answer to our questions, if we understood beforehand that, be the           
answer what it may, it would only serve to increase our ignorance,          
to throw us from one incomprehensibility into another, from one             
obscurity into another still greater, and perhaps lead us into              
irreconcilable contradictions. If a dogmatical affirmative or negative      
answer is demanded, is it at all prudent to set aside the probable          
grounds of a solution which lie before us and to take into                  
consideration what advantage we shall gain, if the answer is to favour      
the one side or the other? If it happens that in both cases the answer      
is mere nonsense, we have in this an irresistible summons to institute      
a critical investigation of the question, for the purpose of                
discovering whether it is based on a groundless presupposition and          
relates to an idea, the falsity of which would be more easily               
exposed in its application and consequences than in the mere                
representation of its content. This is the great utility of the             
sceptical mode of treating the questions addressed by pure reason to        
itself. By this method we easily rid ourselves of the confusions of         
dogmatism, and establish in its place a temperate criticism, which, as      
a genuine cathartic, will successfully remove the presumptuous notions      
of philosophy and their consequence- the vain pretension to                 
universal science.                                                          
  If, then, I could understand the nature of a cosmological idea and        
perceive, before I entered on the discussion of the subject at all,         
that, whatever side of the question regarding the unconditioned of the      
regressive synthesis of phenomena it favoured- it must either be too        
great or too small for every conception of the understanding- I             
would be able to comprehend how the idea, which relates to an object        
of experience- an experience which must be adequate to and in               
accordance with a possible conception of the understanding- must be         
completely void and without significance, inasmuch as its object is         
inadequate, consider it as we may. And this is actually the case            
with all cosmological conceptions, which, for the reason above              
mentioned, involve reason, so long as it remains attached to them,          
in an unavoidable antinomy. For suppose:                                    
  First, that the world has no beginning- in this case it is too large      
for our conception; for this conception, which consists in a                
successive regress, cannot overtake the whole eternity that has             
elapsed. Grant that it has a beginning, it is then too small for the        
conception of the understanding. For, as a beginning presupposes a          
time preceding, it cannot be unconditioned; and the law of the              
empirical employment of the understanding imposes the necessity of          
looking for a higher condition of time; and the world is, therefore,        
evidently too small for this law.                                           
  The same is the case with the double answer to the question               
regarding the extent, in space, of the world. For, if it is infinite        
and unlimited, it must be too large for every possible empirical            
conception. If it is finite and limited, we have a right to ask: "What      
determines these limits?" Void space is not a self-subsistent               
correlate of things, and cannot be a final condition- and still less        
an empirical condition, forming a part of a possible experience. For        
how can we have any experience or perception of an absolute void?           
But the absolute totality of the empirical synthesis requires that the      
unconditioned be an empirical conception. Consequently, a finite world      
is too small for our conception.                                            
  Secondly, if every phenomenon (matter) in space consists of an            
infinite number of parts, the regress of the division is always too         
great for our conception; and if the division of space must cease with      
some member of the division (the simple), it is too small for the idea      
of the unconditioned. For the member at which we have discontinued our      
division still admits a regress to many more parts contained in the         
object.                                                                     
                                                  {BK_2|CH_2 ^paragraph 260}
  Thirdly, suppose that every event in the world happens in accordance      
with the laws of nature; the causality of a cause must itself be an         
event and necessitates a regress to a still higher cause, and               
consequently the unceasing prolongation of the series of conditions         
a parte priori. Operative nature is therefore too large for every           
conception we can form in the synthesis of cosmical events.                 
  If we admit the existence of spontaneously produced events, that is,      
of free agency, we are driven, in our search for sufficient reasons,        
on an unavoidable law of nature and are compelled to appeal to the          
empirical law of causality, and we find that any such totality of           
connection in our synthesis is too small for our necessary empirical        
conception.                                                                 
  Fourthly, if we assume the existence of an absolutely necessary           
being- whether it be the world or something in the world, or the cause      
of the world- we must place it in a time at an infinite distance            
from any given moment; for, otherwise, it must be dependent on some         
other and higher existence. Such an existence is, in this case, too         
large for our empirical conception, and unattainable by the                 
continued regress of any synthesis.                                         
  But if we believe that everything in the world- be it condition or        
conditioned- is contingent; every given existence is too small for our      
conception. For in this case we are compelled to seek for some other        
existence upon which the former depends.                                    
  We have said that in all these cases the cosmological idea is either      
too great or too small for the empirical regress in a synthesis, and        
consequently for every possible conception of the understanding. Why        
did we not express ourselves in a manner exactly the reverse of this        
and, instead of accusing the cosmological idea of over stepping or          
of falling short of its true aim, possible experience, say that, in         
the first case, the empirical conception is always too small for the        
idea, and in the second too great, and thus attach the blame of             
these contradictions to the empirical regress? The reason is this.          
Possible experience can alone give reality to our conceptions; without      
it a conception is merely an idea, without truth or relation to an          
object. Hence a possible empirical conception must be the standard          
by which we are to judge whether an idea is anything more than an idea      
and fiction of thought, or whether it relates to an object in the           
world. If we say of a thing that in relation to some other thing it is      
too large or too small, the former is considered as existing for the        
sake of the latter, and requiring to be adapted to it. Among the            
trivial subjects of discussion in the old schools of dialectics was         
this question: "If a ball cannot pass through a hole, shall we say          
that the ball is too large or the hole too small?" In this case it          
is indifferent what expression we employ; for we do not know which          
exists for the sake of the other. On the other hand, we cannot say:         
"The man is too long for his coat"; but: "The coat is too short for         
the man."                                                                   
                                                  {BK_2|CH_2 ^paragraph 265}
  We are thus led to the well-founded suspicion that the                    
cosmological ideas, and all the conflicting sophistical assertions          
connected with them, are based upon a false and fictitious                  
conception of the mode in which the object of these ideas is presented      
to us; and this suspicion will probably direct us how to expose the         
illusion that has so long led us astray from the truth.                     
-                                                                           
      SECTION VI. Transcendental Idealism as the Key to the                 
            Solution of Pure Cosmological Dialectic.                        
-                                                                           
                                                  {BK_2|CH_2 ^paragraph 270}
  In the transcendental aesthetic we proved that everything intuited        
in space and time, all objects of a possible experience, are nothing        
but phenomena, that is, mere representations; and that these, as            
presented to us- as extended bodies, or as series of changes- have          
no self-subsistent existence apart from human thought. This doctrine I      
call Transcendental Idealism.* The realist in the transcendental sense      
regards these modifications of our sensibility, these mere                  
representations, as things subsisting in themselves.                        
-                                                                           
  *I have elsewhere termed this theory formal idealism, to distinguish      
it from material idealism, which doubts or denies the existence of          
external things. To avoid ambiguity, it seems advisable in many             
cases to employ this term instead of that mentioned in the text.            
-                                                                           
  It would be unjust to accuse us of holding the long-decried theory        
of empirical idealism, which, while admitting the reality of space,         
denies, or at least doubts, the existence of bodies extended in it,         
and thus leaves us without a sufficient criterion of reality and            
illusion. The supporters of this theory find no difficulty in               
admitting the reality of the phenomena of the internal sense in             
time; nay, they go the length of maintaining that this internal             
experience is of itself a sufficient proof of the real existence of         
its object as a thing in itself.                                            
                                                  {BK_2|CH_2 ^paragraph 275}
  Transcendental idealism allows that the objects of external               
intuition- as intuited in space, and all changes in time- as                
represented by the internal sense, are real. For, as space is the form      
of that intuition which we call external, and, without objects in           
space, no empirical representation could be given us, we can and ought      
to regard extended bodies in it as real. The case is the same with          
representations in time. But time and space, with all phenomena             
therein, are not in themselves things. They are nothing but                 
representations and cannot exist out of and apart from the mind.            
Nay, the sensuous internal intuition of the mind (as the object of          
consciousness), the determination of which is represented by the            
succession of different states in time, is not the real, proper             
self, as it exists in itself- not the transcendental subject- but only      
a phenomenon, which is presented to the sensibility of this, to us,         
unknown being. This internal phenomenon cannot be admitted to be a          
self-subsisting thing; for its condition is time, and time cannot be        
the condition of a thing in itself. But the empirical truth of              
phenomena in space and time is guaranteed beyond the possibility of         
doubt, and sufficiently distinguished from the illusion of dreams or        
fancy- although both have a proper and thorough connection in an            
experience according to empirical laws. The objects of experience then      
are not things in themselves, but are given only in experience, and         
have no existence apart from and independently of experience. That          
there may be inhabitants in the moon, although no one has ever              
observed them, must certainly be admitted; but this assertion means         
only, that we may in the possible progress of experience discover them      
at some future time. For that which stands in connection with a             
perception according to the laws of the progress of experience is           
real. They are therefore really existent, if they stand in empirical        
connection with my actual or real consciousness, although they are not      
in themselves real, that is, apart from the progress of experience.         
  There is nothing actually given- we can be conscious of nothing as        
real, except a perception and the empirical progression from it to          
other possible perceptions. For phenomena, as mere representations,         
are real only in perception; and perception is, in fact, nothing but        
the reality of an empirical representation, that is, a phenomenon.          
To call a phenomenon a real thing prior to perception means either          
that we must meet with this phenomenon in the progress of                   
experience, or it means nothing at all. For I can say only of a             
thing in itself that it exists without relation to the senses and           
experience. But we are speaking here merely of phenomena in space           
and time, both of which are determinations of sensibility, and not          
of things in themselves. It follows that phenomena are not things in        
themselves, but are mere representations, which if not given in us- in      
perception- are non-existent.                                               
  The faculty of sensuous intuition is properly a receptivity- a            
capacity of being affected in a certain manner by representations, the      
relation of which to each other is a pure intuition of space and time-      
the pure forms of sensibility. These representations, in so far as          
they are connected and determinable in this relation (in space and          
time) according to laws of the unity of experience, are called              
objects. The non-sensuous cause of these representations is completely      
unknown to us and hence cannot be intuited as an object. For such an        
object could not be represented either in space or in time; and             
without these conditions intuition or representation is impossible. We      
may, at the same time, term the non-sensuous cause of phenomena the         
transcendental object- but merely as a mental correlate to                  
sensibility, considered as a receptivity. To this transcendental            
object we may attribute the whole connection and extent of our              
possible perceptions, and say that it is given and exists in itself         
prior to all experience. But the phenomena, corresponding to it, are        
not given as things in themselves, but in experience alone. For they        
are mere representations, receiving from perceptions alone                  
significance and relation to a real object, under the condition that        
this or that perception- indicating an object- is in complete               
connection with all others in accordance with the rules of the unity        
of experience. Thus we can say: "The things that really existed in          
past time are given in the transcendental object of experience." But        
these are to me real objects, only in so far as I can represent to          
my own mind, that a regressive series of possible perceptions-              
following the indications of history, or the footsteps of cause and         
effect- in accordance with empirical laws- that, in one word, the           
course of the world conducts us to an elapsed series of time as the         
condition of the present time. This series in past time is represented      
as real, not in itself, but only in connection with a possible              
experience. Thus, when I say that certain events occurred in past           
time, I merely assert the possibility of prolonging the chain of            
experience, from the present perception, upwards to the conditions          
that determine it according to time.                                        
  If I represent to myself all objects existing in all space and time,      
I do not thereby place these in space and time prior to all                 
experience; on the contrary, such a representation is nothing more          
than the notion of a possible experience, in its absolute                   
completeness. In experience alone are those objects, which are nothing      
but representations, given. But, when I say they existed prior to my        
experience, this means only that I must begin with the perception           
present to me and follow the track indicated until I discover them          
in some part or region of experience. The cause of the empirical            
condition of this progression- and consequently at what member therein      
I must stop, and at what point in the regress I am to find this             
member- is transcendental, and hence necessarily incognizable. But          
with this we have not to do; our concern is only with the law of            
progression in experience, in which objects, that is, phenomena, are        
given. It is a matter of indifference, whether I say, "I may in the         
progress of experience discover stars, at a hundred times greater           
distance than the most distant of those now visible," or, "Stars at         
this distance may be met in space, although no one has, or ever will        
discover them." For, if they are given as things in themselves,             
without any relation to possible experience, they are for me                
non-existent, consequently, are not objects, for they are not               
contained in the regressive series of experience. But, if these             
phenomena must be employed in the construction or support of the            
cosmological idea of an absolute whole, and when we are discussing a        
question that oversteps the limits of possible experience, the              
proper distinction of the different theories of the reality of              
sensuous objects is of great importance, in order to avoid the              
illusion which must necessarily arise from the misinterpretation of         
our empirical conceptions.                                                  
-                                                                           
                                                  {BK_2|CH_2 ^paragraph 280}
    SECTION VII. Critical Solution of the Cosmological Problem.             
-                                                                           
  The antinomy of pure reason is based upon the following                   
dialectical argument: "If that which is conditioned is given, the           
whole series of its conditions is also given; but sensuous objects are      
given as conditioned; consequently..." This syllogism, the major of         
which seems so natural and evident, introduces as many cosmological         
ideas as there are different kinds of conditions in the synthesis of        
phenomena, in so far as these conditions constitute a series. These         
ideas require absolute totality in the series, and thus place reason        
in inextricable embarrassment. Before proceeding to expose the fallacy      
in this dialectical argument, it will be necessary to have a correct        
understanding of certain conceptions that appear in it.                     
  In the first place, the following proposition is evident, and             
indubitably certain: "If the conditioned is given, a regress in the         
series of all its conditions is thereby imperatively required." For         
the very conception of a conditioned is a conception of something           
related to a condition, and, if this condition is itself                    
conditioned, to another condition- and so on through all the members        
of the series. This proposition is, therefore, analytical and has           
nothing to fear from transcendental criticism. It is a logical              
postulate of reason: to pursue, as far as possible, the connection          
of a conception with its conditions.                                        
  If, in the second place, both the conditioned and the condition           
are things in themselves, and if the former is given, not only is           
the regress to the latter requisite, but the latter is really given         
with the former. Now, as this is true of all the members of the             
series, the entire series of conditions, and with them the                  
unconditioned, is at the same time given in the very fact of the            
conditioned, the existence of which is possible only in and through         
that series, being given. In this case, the synthesis of the                
conditioned with its condition, is a synthesis of the understanding         
merely, which represents things as they are, without regarding whether      
and how we can cognize them. But if I have to do with phenomena,            
which, in their character of mere representations, are not given, if I      
do not attain to a cognition of them (in other words, to themselves,        
for they are nothing more than empirical cognitions), I am not              
entitled to say: "If the conditioned is given, all its conditions           
(as phenomena) are also given." I cannot, therefore, from the fact          
of a conditioned being given, infer the absolute totality of the            
series of its conditions. For phenomena are nothing but an empirical        
synthesis in apprehension or perception, and are therefore given            
only in it. Now, in speaking of phenomena it does not follow that,          
if the conditioned is given, the synthesis which constitutes its            
empirical condition is also thereby given and presupposed; such a           
synthesis can be established only by an actual regress in the series        
of conditions. But we are entitled to say in this case that a               
regress to the conditions of a conditioned, in other words, that a          
continuous empirical synthesis is enjoined; that, if the conditions         
are not given, they are at least required; and that we are certain          
to discover the conditions in this regress.                                 
                                                  {BK_2|CH_2 ^paragraph 285}
  We can now see that the major, in the above cosmological                  
syllogism, takes the conditioned in the transcendental signification        
which it has in the pure category, while the minor speaks of it in the      
empirical signification which it has in the category as applied to          
phenomena. There is, therefore, a dialectical fallacy in the                
syllogism- a sophisma figurae dictionis. But this fallacy is not a          
consciously devised one, but a perfectly natural illusion of the            
common reason of man. For, when a thing is given as conditioned, we         
presuppose in the major its conditions and their series,                    
unperceived, as it were, and unseen; because this is nothing more than      
the logical requirement of complete and satisfactory premisses for a        
given conclusion. In this case, time is altogether left out in the          
connection of the conditioned with the condition; they are supposed to      
be given in themselves, and contemporaneously. It is, moreover, just        
as natural to regard phenomena (in the minor) as things in                  
themselves and as objects presented to the pure understanding, as in        
the major, in which complete abstraction was made of all conditions of      
intuition. But it is under these conditions alone that objects are          
given. Now we overlooked a remarkable distinction between the               
conceptions. The synthesis of the conditioned with its condition,           
and the complete series of the latter (in the major) are not limited        
by time, and do not contain the conception of succession. On the            
contrary, the empirical synthesis and the series of conditions in           
the phenomenal world- subsumed in the minor- are necessarily                
successive and given in time alone. It follows that I cannot                
presuppose in the minor, as I did in the major, the absolute                
totality of the synthesis and of the series therein represented; for        
in the major all the members of the series are given as things in           
themselves- without any limitations or conditions of time, while in         
the minor they are possible only in and through a successive                
regress, which cannot exist, except it be actually carried into             
execution in the world of phenomena.                                        
  After this proof of the viciousness of the argument commonly              
employed in maintaining cosmological assertions, both parties may           
now be justly dismissed, as advancing claims without grounds or title.      
But the process has not been ended by convincing them that one or both      
were in the wrong and had maintained an assertion which was without         
valid grounds of proof. Nothing seems to be clearer than that, if           
one maintains: "The world has a beginning," and another: "The world         
has no beginning," one of the two must be right. But it is likewise         
clear that, if the evidence on both sides is equal, it is impossible        
to discover on what side the truth lies; and the controversy                
continues, although the parties have been recommended to peace              
before the tribunal of reason. There remains, then, no other means          
of settling the question than to convince the parties, who refute each      
other with such conclusiveness and ability, that they are disputing         
about nothing, and that a transcendental illusion has been mocking          
them with visions of reality where there is none. The mode of               
adjusting a dispute which cannot be decided upon its own merits, we         
shall now proceed to lay before our readers.                                
-                                                                           
  Zeno of Elea, a subtle dialectician, was severely reprimanded by          
Plato as a sophist, who, merely from the base motive of exhibiting his      
skill in discussion, maintained and subverted the same proposition          
by arguments as powerful and convincing on the one side as on the           
other. He maintained, for example, that God (who was probably               
nothing more, in his view, than the world) is neither finite nor            
infinite, neither in motion nor in rest, neither similar nor                
dissimilar to any other thing. It seemed to those philosophers who          
criticized his mode of discussion that his purpose was to deny              
completely both of two self-contradictory propositions- which is            
absurd. But I cannot believe that there is any justice in this              
accusation. The first of these propositions I shall presently consider      
in a more detailed manner. With regard to the others, if by the word        
of God he understood merely the Universe, his meaning must have             
been- that it cannot be permanently present in one place- that is,          
at rest- nor be capable of changing its place- that is, of moving-          
because all places are in the universe, and the universe itself is,         
therefore, in no place. Again, if the universe contains in itself           
everything that exists, it cannot be similar or dissimilar to any           
other thing, because there is, in fact, no other thing with which it        
can be compared. If two opposite judgements presuppose a contingent         
impossible, or arbitrary condition, both- in spite of their opposition      
(which is, however, not properly or really a contradiction)- fall           
away; because the condition, which ensured the validity of both, has        
itself disappeared.                                                         
  If we say: "Everybody has either a good or a bad smell," we have          
omitted a third possible judgement- it has no smell at all; and thus        
both conflicting statements may be false. If we say: "It is either          
good-smelling or not good-smelling (vel suaveolens vel                      
non-suaveolens)," both judgements are contradictorily opposed; and the      
contradictory opposite of the former judgement- some bodies are not         
good-smelling- embraces also those bodies which have no smell at            
all. In the preceding pair of opposed judgements (per disparata),           
the contingent condition of the conception of body (smell) attached to      
both conflicting statements, instead of having been omitted in the          
latter, which is consequently not the contradictory opposite of the         
former.                                                                     
                                                  {BK_2|CH_2 ^paragraph 290}
  If, accordingly, we say: "The world is either infinite in extension,      
or it is not infinite (non est infinitus)"; and if the former               
proposition is false, its contradictory opposite- the world is not          
infinite- must be true. And thus I should deny the existence of an          
infinite, without, however affirming the existence of a finite              
world. But if we construct our proposition thus: "The world is              
either infinite or finite (non-infinite)," both statements may be           
false. For, in this case, we consider the world as per se determined        
in regard to quantity, and while, in the one judgement, we deny its         
infinite and consequently, perhaps, its independent existence; in           
the other, we append to the world, regarded as a thing in itself, a         
certain determination- that of finitude; and the latter may be false        
as well as the former, if the world is not given as a thing in itself,      
and thus neither as finite nor as infinite in quantity. This kind of        
opposition I may be allowed to term dialectical; that of                    
contradictories may be called analytical opposition. Thus then, of two      
dialectically opposed judgements both may be false, from the fact,          
that the one is not a mere contradictory of the other, but actually         
enounces more than is requisite for a full and complete contradiction.      
  When we regard the two propositions- "The world is infinite in            
quantity," and, "The world is finite in quantity," as contradictory         
opposites, we are assuming that the world- the complete series of           
phenomena- is a thing in itself. For it remains as a permanent              
quantity, whether I deny the infinite or the finite regress in the          
series of its phenomena. But if we dismiss this assumption- this            
transcendental illusion- and deny that it is a thing in itself, the         
contradictory opposition is metamorphosed into a merely dialectical         
one; and the world, as not existing in itself- independently of the         
regressive series of my representations- exists in like manner neither      
as a whole which is infinite nor as a whole which is finite in itself.      
The universe exists for me only in the empirical regress of the series      
of phenomena and not per se. If, then, it is always conditioned, it is      
never completely or as a whole; and it is, therefore, not an                
unconditioned whole and does not exist as such, either with an              
infinite, or with a finite quantity.                                        
  What we have here said of the first cosmological idea- that of the        
absolute totality of quantity in phenomena- applies also to the             
others. The series of conditions is discoverable only in the                
regressive synthesis itself, and not in the phenomenon considered as a      
thing in itself- given prior to all regress. Hence I am compelled to        
say: "The aggregate of parts in a given phenomenon is in itself             
neither finite nor infinite; and these parts are given only in the          
regressive synthesis of decomposition- a synthesis which is never           
given in absolute completeness, either as finite, or as infinite." The      
same is the case with the series of subordinated causes, or of the          
conditioned up to the unconditioned and necessary existence, which can      
never be regarded as in itself, ind in its totality, either as              
finite or as infinite; because, as a series of subordinate                  
representations, it subsists only in the dynamical regress and              
cannot be regarded as existing previously to this regress, or as a          
self-subsistent series of things.                                           
  Thus the antinomy of pure reason in its cosmological ideas                
disappears. For the above demonstration has established the fact            
that it is merely the product of a dialectical and illusory                 
opposition, which arises from the application of the idea of                
absolute totality- admissible only as a condition of things in              
themselves- to phenomena, which exist only in our representations,          
and- when constituting a series- in a successive regress. This              
antinomy of reason may, however, be really profitable to our                
speculative interests, not in the way of contributing any dogmatical        
addition, but as presenting to us another material support in our           
critical investigations. For it furnishes us with an indirect proof of      
the transcendental ideality of phenomena, if our minds were not             
completely satisfied with the direct proof set forth in the                 
Trancendental Aesthetic. The proof would proceed in the following           
dilemma. If the world is a whole existing in itself, it must be either      
finite or infinite. But it is neither finite nor infinite- as has been      
shown, on the one side, by the thesis, on the other, by the                 
antithesis. Therefore the world- the content of all phenomena- is           
not a whole existing in itself. It follows that phenomena are nothing,      
apart from our representations. And this is what we mean by                 
transcendental ideality.                                                    
  This remark is of some importance. It enables us to see that the          
proofs of the fourfold antinomy are not mere sophistries- are not           
fallacious, but grounded on the nature of reason, and valid- under the      
supposition that phenomena are things in themselves. The opposition of      
the judgements which follow makes it evident that a fallacy lay in the      
initial supposition, and thus helps us to discover the true                 
constitution of objects of sense. This transcendental dialectic does        
not favour scepticism, although it presents us with a triumphant            
demonstration of the advantages of the sceptical method, the great          
utility of which is apparent in the antinomy, where the arguments of        
reason were allowed to confront each other in undiminished force.           
And although the result of these conflicts of reason is not what we         
expected- although we have obtained no positive dogmatical addition to      
metaphysical science- we have still reaped a great advantage in the         
correction of our judgements on these subjects of thought.                  
                                                  {BK_2|CH_2 ^paragraph 295}
-                                                                           
     SECTION VIII. Regulative Principle of Pure Reason in relation          
                   to the Cosmological Ideas.                               
-                                                                           
  The cosmological principle of totality could not give us any certain      
knowledge in regard to the maximum in the series of conditions in           
the world of sense, considered as a thing in itself. The actual             
regress in the series is the only means of approaching this maximum.        
This principle of pure reason, therefore, may still be considered as        
valid- not as an axiom enabling us to cogitate totality in the              
object as actual, but as a problem for the understanding, which             
requires it to institute and to continue, in conformity with the            
idea of totality in the mind, the regress in the series of the              
conditions of a given conditioned. For in the world of sense, that is,      
in space and time, every condition which we discover in our                 
investigation of phenomena is itself conditioned; because sensuous          
objects are not things in themselves (in which case an absolutely           
unconditioned might be reached in the progress of cognition), but           
are merely empirical representations the conditions of which must           
always be found in intuition. The principle of reason is therefore          
properly a mere rule- prescribing a regress in the series of                
conditions for given phenomena, and prohibiting any pause or rest on        
an absolutely unconditioned. It is, therefore, not a principle of           
the possibility of experience or of the empirical cognition of              
sensuous objects- consequently not a principle of the understanding;        
for every experience is confined within certain proper limits               
determined by the given intuition. Still less is it a constitutive          
principle of reason authorizing us to extend our conception of the          
sensuous world beyond all possible experience. It is merely a               
principle for the enlargement and extension of experience as far as is      
possible for human faculties. It forbids us to consider any                 
empirical limits as absolute. It is, hence, a principle of reason,          
which, as a rule, dictates how we ought to proceed in our empirical         
regress, but is unable to anticipate or indicate prior to the               
empirical regress what is given in the object itself. I have termed it      
for this reason a regulative principle of reason; while the                 
principle of the absolute totality of the series of conditions, as          
existing in itself and given in the object, is a constitutive               
cosmological principle. This distinction will at once demonstrate           
the falsehood of the constitutive principle, and prevent us from            
attributing (by a transcendental subreptio) objective reality to an         
idea, which is valid only as a rule.                                        
                                                  {BK_2|CH_2 ^paragraph 300}
  In order to understand the proper meaning of this rule of pure            
reason, we must notice first that it cannot tell us what the object         
is, but only how the empirical regress is to be proceeded with in           
order to attain to the complete conception of the object. If it gave        
us any information in respect to the former statement, it would be a        
constitutive principle- a principle impossible from the nature of pure      
reason. It will not therefore enable us to establish any such               
conclusions as: "The series of conditions for a given conditioned is        
in itself finite." or, "It is infinite." For, in this case, we              
should be cogitating in the mere idea of absolute totality, an              
object which is not and cannot be given in experience; inasmuch as          
we should be attributing a reality objective and independent of the         
empirical synthesis, to a series of phenomena. This idea of reason          
cannot then be regarded as valid- except as a rule for the                  
regressive synthesis in the series of conditions, according to which        
we must proceed from the conditioned, through all intermediate and          
subordinate conditions, up to the unconditioned; although this goal is      
unattained and unattainable. For the absolutely unconditioned cannot        
be discovered in the sphere of experience.                                  
  We now proceed to determine clearly our notion of a synthesis             
which can never be complete. There are two terms commonly employed for      
this purpose. These terms are regarded as expressions of different and      
distinguishable notions, although the ground of the distinction has         
never been clearly exposed. The term employed by the mathematicians is      
progressus in infinitum. The philosophers prefer the expression             
progressus in indefinitum. Without detaining the reader with an             
examination of the reasons for such a distinction, or with remarks          
on the right or wrong use of the terms, I shall endeavour clearly to        
determine these conceptions, so far as is necessary for the purpose in      
this Critique.                                                              
  We may, with propriety, say of a straight line, that it may be            
produced to infinity. In this case the distinction between a                
progressus in infinitum and a progressus in indefinitum is a mere           
piece of subtlety. For, although when we say, "Produce a straight           
line," it is more correct to say in indefinitum than in infinitum;          
because the former means, "Produce it as far as you please," the            
second, "You must not cease to produce it"; the expression in               
infinitum is, when we are speaking of the power to do it, perfectly         
correct, for we can always make it longer if we please- on to               
infinity. And this remark holds good in all cases, when we speak of         
a progressus, that is, an advancement from the condition to the             
conditioned; this possible advancement always proceeds to infinity. We      
may proceed from a given pair in the descending line of generation          
from father to son, and cogitate a never-ending line of descendants         
from it. For in such a case reason does not demand absolute totality        
in the series, because it does not presuppose it as a condition and as      
given (datum), but merely as conditioned, and as capable of being           
given (dabile).                                                             
  Very different is the case with the problem: "How far the regress,        
which ascends from the given conditioned to the conditions, must            
extend"; whether I can say: "It is a regress in infinitum," or only         
"in indefinitum"; and whether, for example, setting out from the human      
beings at present alive in the world, I may ascend in the series of         
their ancestors, in infinitum- mr whether all that can be said is,          
that so far as I have proceeded, I have discovered no empirical ground      
for considering the series limited, so that I am justified, and             
indeed, compelled to search for ancestors still further back, although      
I am not obliged by the idea of reason to presuppose them.                  
  My answer to this question is: "If the series is given in                 
empirical intuition as a whole, the regress in the series of its            
internal conditions proceeds in infinitum; but, if only one member          
of the series is given, from which the regress is to proceed to             
absolute totality, the regress is possible only in indefinitum." For        
example, the division of a portion of matter given within certain           
limits- of a body, that is- proceeds in infinitum. For, as the              
condition of this whole is its part, and the condition of the part a        
part of the part, and so on, and as in this regress of decomposition        
an unconditioned indivisible member of the series of conditions is not      
to be found; there are no reasons or grounds in experience for              
stopping in the division, but, on the contrary, the more remote             
members of the division are actually and empirically given prior to         
this division. That is to say, the division proceeds to infinity. On        
the other hand, the series of ancestors of any given human being is         
not given, in its absolute totality, in any experience, and yet the         
regress proceeds from every genealogical member of this series to           
one still higher, and does not meet with any empirical limit                
presenting an absolutely unconditioned member of the series. But as         
the members of such a series are not contained in the empirical             
intuition of the whole, prior to the regress, this regress does not         
proceed to infinity, but only in indefinitum, that is, we are called        
upon to discover other and higher members, which are themselves always      
conditioned.                                                                
                                                  {BK_2|CH_2 ^paragraph 305}
  In neither case- the regressus in infinitum, nor the regressus in         
indefinitum, is the series of conditions to be considered as                
actually infinite in the object itself. This might be true of things        
in themselves, but it cannot be asserted of phenomena, which, as            
conditions of each other, are only given in the empirical regress           
itself. Hence, the question no longer is, "What is the quantity of          
this series of conditions in itself- is it finite or infinite?" for it      
is nothing in itself; but, "How is the empirical regress to be              
commenced, and how far ought we to proceed with it?" And here a signal      
distinction in the application of this rule becomes apparent. If the        
whole is given empirically, it is possible to recede in the series          
of its internal conditions to infinity. But if the whole is not given,      
and can only be given by and through the empirical regress, I can only      
say: "It is possible to infinity, to proceed to still higher                
conditions in the series." In the first case, I am justified in             
asserting that more members are empirically given in the object than I      
attain to in the regress (of decomposition). In the second case, I          
am justified only in saying, that I can always proceed further in           
the regress, because no member of the series. is given as absolutely        
conditioned, and thus a higher member is possible, and an inquiry with      
regard to it is necessary. In the one case it is necessary to find          
other members of the series, in the other it is necessary to inquire        
for others, inasmuch as experience presents no absolute limitation          
of the regress. For, either you do not possess a perception which           
absolutely limits your empirical regress, and in this case the regress      
cannot be regarded as complete; or, you do possess such a limitative        
perception, in which case it is not a part of your series (for that         
which limits must be distinct from that which is limited by it), and        
it is incumbent you to continue your regress up to this condition, and      
so on.                                                                      
  These remarks will be placed in their proper light by their               
application in the following section.                                       
-                                                                           
    SECTION IX. Of the Empirical Use of the Regulative Principle            
         of Reason with regard to the Cosmological Ideas.                   
                                                  {BK_2|CH_2 ^paragraph 310}
-                                                                           
  We have shown that no transcendental use can be made either of the        
conceptions of reason or of understanding. We have shown, likewise,         
that the demand of absolute totality in the series of conditions in         
the world of sense arises from a transcendental employment of               
reason, resting on the opinion that phenomena are to be regarded as         
things in themselves. It follows that we are not required to answer         
the question respecting the absolute quantity of a series- whether          
it is in itself limited or unlimited. We are only called upon to            
determine how far we must proceed in the empirical regress from             
condition to condition, in order to discover, in conformity with the        
rule of reason, a full and correct answer to the questions proposed by      
reason itself.                                                              
  This principle of reason is hence valid only as a rule for the            
extension of a possible experience- its invalidity as a principle           
constitutive of phenomena in themselves having been sufficiently            
demonstrated. And thus, too, the antinomial conflict of reason with         
itself is completely put an end to; inasmuch as we have not only            
presented a critical solution of the fallacy lurking in the opposite        
statements of reason, but have shown the true meaning of the ideas          
which gave rise to these statements. The dialectical principle of           
reason has, therefore, been changed into a doctrinal principle. But in      
fact, if this principle, in the subjective signification which we have      
shown to be its only true sense, may be guaranteed as a principle of        
the unceasing extension of the employment of our understanding, its         
influence and value are just as great as if it were an axiom for the a      
priori determination of objects. For such an axiom could not exert a        
stronger influence on the extension and rectification of our                
knowledge, otherwise than by procuring for the principles of the            
understanding the most widely expanded employment in the field of           
experience.                                                                 
-                                                                           
  I. Solution of the Cosmological Idea of the Totality of the               
                                                  {BK_2|CH_2 ^paragraph 315}
          Composition of Phenomena in the Universe.                         
-                                                                           
  Here, as well as in the case of the other cosmological problems, the      
ground of the regulative principle of reason is the proposition that        
in our empirical regress no experience of an absolute limit, and            
consequently no experience of a condition, which is itself                  
absolutely unconditioned, is discoverable. And the truth of this            
proposition itself rests upon the consideration that such an                
experience must represent to us phenomena as limited by nothing or the      
mere void, on which our continued regress by means of perception            
must abut- which is impossible.                                             
  Now this proposition, which declares that every condition attained        
in the empirical regress must itself be considered empirically              
conditioned, contains the rule in terminis, which requires me, to           
whatever extent I may have proceeded in the ascending series, always        
to look for some higher member in the series- whether this member is        
to become known to me through experience, or not.                           
  Nothing further is necessary, then, for the solution of the first         
cosmological problem, than to decide, whether, in the regress to the        
unconditioned quantity of the universe (as regards space and time),         
this never limited ascent ought to be called a regressus in                 
infinitum or indefinitum.                                                   
                                                  {BK_2|CH_2 ^paragraph 320}
  The general representation which we form in our minds of the              
series of all past states or conditions of the world, or of all the         
things which at present exist in it, is itself nothing more than a          
possible empirical regress, which is cogitated- although in an              
undetermined manner- in the mind, and which gives rise to the               
conception of a series of conditions for a given object.* Now I have a      
conception of the universe, but not an intuition- that is, not an           
intuition of it as a whole. Thus I cannot infer the magnitude of the        
regress from the quantity or magnitude of the world, and determine the      
former by means of the latter; on the contrary, I must first of all         
form a conception of the quantity or magnitude of the world from the        
magnitude of the empirical regress. But of this regress I know nothing      
more than that I ought to proceed from every given member of the            
series of conditions to one still higher. But the quantity of the           
universe is not thereby determined, and we cannot affirm that this          
regress proceeds in infinitum. Such an affirmation would anticipate         
the members of the series which have not yet been reached, and              
represent the number of them as beyond the grasp of any empirical           
synthesis; it would consequently determine the cosmical quantity prior      
to the regress (although only in a negative manner)- which is               
impossible. For the world is not given in its totality in any               
intuition: consequently, its quantity cannot be given prior to the          
regress. It follows that we are unable to make any declaration              
respecting the cosmical quantity in itself- not even that the               
regress in it is a regress in infinitum; we must only endeavour to          
attain to a conception of the quantity of the universe, in                  
conformity with the rule which determines the empirical regress in it.      
But this rule merely requires us never to admit an absolute limit to        
our series- how far soever we may have proceeded in it, but always, on      
the contrary, to subordinate every phenomenon to some other as its          
condition, and consequently to proceed to this higher phenomenon. Such      
a regress is, therefore, the regressus in indefinitum, which, as not        
determining a quantity in the object, is clearly distinguishable            
from the regressus in infinitum.                                            
-                                                                           
  *The cosmical series can neither be greater nor smaller than the          
possible empirical regress, upon which its conception is based. And as      
this regress cannot be a determinate infinite regress, still less a         
determinate finite (absolutely limited), it is evident that we              
cannot regard the world as either finite or infinite, because the           
regress, which gives us the representation of the world, is neither         
finite nor infinite.                                                        
-                                                                           
  It follows from what we have said that we are not justified in            
declaring the world to be infinite in space, or as regards past             
time. For this conception of an infinite given quantity is                  
empirical; but we cannot apply the conception of an infinite                
quantity to the world as an object of the senses. I cannot say, "The        
regress from a given perception to everything limited either in             
space or time, proceeds in infinitum," for this presupposes an              
infinite cosmical quantity; neither can I say, "It is finite," for          
an absolute limit is likewise impossible in experience. It follows          
that I am not entitled to make any assertion at all respecting the          
whole object of experience- the world of sense; I must limit my             
declarations to the rule according to which experience or empirical         
knowledge is to be attained.                                                
                                                  {BK_2|CH_2 ^paragraph 325}
  To the question, therefore, respecting the cosmical quantity, the         
first and negative answer is: "The world has no beginning in time, and      
no absolute limit in space."                                                
  For, in the contrary case, it would be limited by a void time on the      
one hand, and by a void space on the other. Now, since the world, as a      
phenomenon, cannot be thus limited in itself for a phenomenon is not a      
thing in itself; it must be possible for us to have a perception of         
this limitation by a void time and a void space. But such a                 
perception- such an experience is impossible; because it has no             
content. Consequently, an absolute cosmical limit is empirically,           
and therefore absolutely, impossible.*                                      
-                                                                           
  *The reader will remark that the proof presented above is very            
different from the dogmatical demonstration given in the antithesis of      
the first antinomy. In that demonstration, it was taken for granted         
that the world is a thing in itself- given in its totality prior to         
all regress, and a determined position in space and time was denied to      
it- if it was not considered as occupying all time and all space.           
Hence our conclusion differed from that given above; for we inferred        
in the antithesis the actual infinity of the world.                         
-                                                                           
                                                  {BK_2|CH_2 ^paragraph 330}
  From this follows the affirmative answer: "The regress in the series      
of phenomena- as a determination of the cosmical quantity, proceeds in      
indefinitum." This is equivalent to saying: "The world of sense has no      
absolute quantity, but the empirical regress (through which alone           
the world of sense is presented to us on the side of its conditions)        
rests upon a rule, which requires it to proceed from every member of        
the series, as conditioned, to one still more remote (whether               
through personal experience, or by means of history, or the chain of        
cause and effect), and not to cease at any point in this extension          
of the possible empirical employment of the understanding." And this        
is the proper and only use which reason can make of its principles.         
  The above rule does not prescribe an unceasing regress in one kind        
of phenomena. It does not, for example, forbid us, in our ascent            
from an individual human being through the line of his ancestors, to        
expect that we shall discover at some point of the regress a                
primeval pair, or to admit, in the series of heavenly bodies, a sun at      
the farthest possible distance from some centre. All that it demands        
is a perpetual progress from phenomena to phenomena, even although          
an actual perception is not presented by them (as in the case of our        
perceptions being so weak as that we are unable to become conscious of      
them), since they, nevertheless, belong to possible experience.             
  Every beginning is in time, and all limits to extension are in            
space. But space and time are in the world of sense. Consequently           
phenomena in the world are conditionally limited, but the world itself      
is not limited, either conditionally or unconditionally.                    
  For this reason, and because neither the world nor the cosmical           
series of conditions to a given conditioned can be completely given,        
our conception of the cosmical quantity is given only in and through        
the regress and not prior to it- in a collective intuition. But the         
regress itself is really nothing more than the determining of the           
cosmical quantity, and cannot therefore give us any determined              
conception of it- still less a conception of a quantity which is, in        
relation to a certain standard, infinite. The regress does not,             
therefore, proceed to infinity (an infinity given), but only to an          
indefinite extent, for or the of presenting to us a quantity- realized      
only in and through the regress itself.                                     
-                                                                           
                                                  {BK_2|CH_2 ^paragraph 335}
    II. Solution of the Cosmological Idea of the Totality of                
        the Division of a Whole given in Intuition.                         
-                                                                           
  When I divide a whole which is given in intuition, I proceed from         
a conditioned to its conditions. The division of the parts of the           
whole (subdivisio or decompositio) is a regress in the series of these      
conditions. The absolute totality of this series would be actually          
attained and given to the mind, if the regress could arrive at              
simple parts. But if all the parts in a continuous decomposition are        
themselves divisible, the division, that is to say, the regress,            
proceeds from the conditioned to its conditions in infinitum;               
because the conditions (the parts) are themselves contained in the          
conditioned, and, as the latter is given in a limited intuition, the        
former are all given along with it. This regress cannot, therefore, be      
called a regressus in indefinitum, as happened in the case of the           
preceding cosmological idea, the regress in which proceeded from the        
conditioned to the conditions not given contemporaneously and along         
with it, but discoverable only through the empirical regress. We are        
not, however, entitled to affirm of a whole of this kind, which is          
divisible in infinitum, that it consists of an infinite number of           
parts. For, although all the parts are contained in the intuition of        
the whole, the whole division is not contained therein. The division        
is contained only in the progressing decomposition- in the regress          
itself, which is the condition of the possibility and actuality of the      
series. Now, as this regress is infinite, all the members (parts) to        
which it attains must be contained in the given whole as an aggregate.      
But the complete series of division is not contained therein. For this      
series, being infinite in succession and always incomplete, cannot          
represent an infinite number of members, and still less a                   
composition of these members into a whole.                                  
  To apply this remark to space. Every limited part of space presented      
to intuition is a whole, the parts of which are always spaces- to           
whatever extent subdivided. Every limited space is hence divisible          
to infinity.                                                                
                                                  {BK_2|CH_2 ^paragraph 340}
  Let us again apply the remark to an external phenomenon enclosed          
in limits, that is, a body. The divisibility of a body rests upon           
the divisibility of space, which is the condition of the possibility        
of the body as an extended whole. A body is consequently divisible          
to infinity, though it does not, for that reason, consist of an             
infinite number of parts.                                                   
  It certainly seems that, as a body must be cogitated as substance in      
space, the law of divisibility would not be applicable to it as             
substance. For we may and ought to grant, in the case of space, that        
division or decomposition, to any extent, never can utterly annihilate      
composition (that is to say, the smallest part of space must still          
consist of spaces); otherwise space would entirely cease to exist-          
which is impossible. But, the assertion on the other band that when         
all composition in matter is annihilated in thought, nothing                
remains, does not seem to harmonize with the conception of                  
substance, which must be properly the subject of all composition and        
must remain, even after the conjunction of its attributes in space-         
which constituted a body- is annihilated in thought. But this is not        
the case with substance in the phenomenal world, which is not a             
thing in itself cogitated by the pure category. Phenomenal substance        
is not an absolute subject; it is merely a permanent sensuous image,        
and nothing more than an intuition, in which the unconditioned is           
not to be found.                                                            
  But, although this rule of progress to infinity is legitimate and         
applicable to the subdivision of a phenomenon, as a mere occupation or      
filling of space, it is not applicable to a whole consisting of a           
number of distinct parts and constituting a quantum discretum- that is      
to say, an organized body. It cannot be admitted that every part in an      
organized whole is itself organized, and that, in analysing it to           
infinity, we must always meet with organized parts; although we may         
allow that the parts of the matter which we decompose in infinitum,         
may be organized. For the infinity of the division of a phenomenon          
in space rests altogether on the fact that the divisibility of a            
phenomenon is given only in and through this infinity, that is, an          
undetermined number of parts is given, while the parts themselves           
are given and determined only in and through the subdivision; in a          
word, the infinity of the division necessarily presupposes that the         
whole is not already divided in se. Hence our division determines a         
number of parts in the whole- a number which extends just as far as         
the actual regress in the division; while, on the other hand, the very      
notion of a body organized to infinity represents the whole as already      
and in itself divided. We expect, therefore, to find in it a                
determinate, but at the same time, infinite, number of parts- which is      
self-contradictory. For we should thus have a whole containing a            
series of members which could not be completed in any regress- which        
is infinite, and at the same time complete in an organized                  
composite. Infinite divisibility is applicable only to a quantum            
continuum, and is based entirely on the infinite divisibility of            
space, But in a quantum discretum the multitude of parts or units is        
always determined, and hence always equal to some number. To what           
extent a body may be organized, experience alone can inform us; and         
although, so far as our experience of this or that body has                 
extended, we may not have discovered any inorganic part, such parts         
must exist in possible experience. But how far the transcendental           
division of a phenomenon must extend, we cannot know from                   
experience- it is a question which experience cannot answer; it is          
answered only by the principle of reason which forbids us to                
consider the empirical regress, in the analysis of extended body, as        
ever absolutely complete.                                                   
-                                                                           
     Concluding Remark on the Solution of the Transcendental                
                                                  {BK_2|CH_2 ^paragraph 345}
          Mathematical Ideas- and Introductory to the                       
               Solution of the Dynamical Ideas.                             
-                                                                           
  We presented the antinomy of pure reason in a tabular form, and we        
endeavoured to show the ground of this self-contradiction on the            
part of reason, and the only means of bringing it to a conclusion-          
znamely, by declaring both contradictory statements to be false. We         
represented in these antinomies the conditions of phenomena as              
belonging to the conditioned according to relations of space and time-      
which is the usual supposition of the common understanding. In this         
respect, all dialectical representations of totality, in the series of      
conditions to a given conditioned, were perfectly homogeneous. The          
condition was always a member of the series along with the                  
conditioned, and thus the homogeneity of the whole series was assured.      
In this case the regress could never be cogitated as complete; or,          
if this was the case, a member really conditioned was falsely regarded      
as a primal member, consequently as unconditioned. In such an               
antinomy, therefore, we did not consider the object, that is, the           
conditioned, but the series of conditions belonging to the object, and      
the magnitude of that series. And thus arose the difficulty- a              
difficulty not to be settled by any decision regarding the claims of        
the two parties, but simply by cutting the knot- by declaring the           
series proposed by reason to be either too long or too short for the        
understanding, which could in neither case make its conceptions             
adequate with the ideas.                                                    
  But we have overlooked, up to this point, an essential difference         
existing between the conceptions of the understanding which reason          
endeavours to raise to the rank of ideas- two of these indicating a         
mathematical, and two a dynamical synthesis of phenomena. Hitherto, it      
was necessary to signalize this distinction; for, just as in our            
general representation of all transcendental ideas, we considered them      
under phenomenal conditions, so, in the two mathematical ideas, our         
discussion is concerned solely with an object in the world of               
phenomena. But as we are now about to proceed to the consideration          
of the dynamical conceptions of the understanding, and their                
adequateness with ideas, we must not lose sight of this distinction.        
We shall find that it opens up to us an entirely new view of the            
conflict in which reason is involved. For, while in the first two           
antinomies, both parties were dismissed, on the ground of having            
advanced statements based upon false hypothesis; in the present case        
the hope appears of discovering a hypothesis which may be consistent        
with the demands of reason, and, the judge completing the statement of      
the grounds of claim, which both parties had left in an unsatisfactory      
state, the question may be settled on its own merits, not by                
dismissing the claimants, but by a comparison of the arguments on both      
sides. If we consider merely their extension, and whether they are          
adequate with ideas, the series of conditions may be regarded as all        
homogeneous. But the conception of the understanding which lies at the      
basis of these ideas, contains either a synthesis of the homogeneous        
(presupposed in every quantity- in its composition as well as in its        
division) or of the heterogeneous, which is the case in the                 
dynamical synthesis of cause and effect, as well as of the necessary        
and the contingent.                                                         
                                                  {BK_2|CH_2 ^paragraph 350}
  Thus it happens that in the mathematical series of phenomena no           
other than a sensuous condition is admissible- a condition which is         
itself a member of the series; while the dynamical series of                
sensuous conditions admits a heterogeneous condition, which is not a        
member of the series, but, as purely intelligible, lies out of and          
beyond it. And thus reason is satisfied, and an unconditioned placed        
at the head of the series of phenomena, without introducing                 
confusion into or discontinuing it, contrary to the principles of           
the understanding.                                                          
  Now, from the fact that the dynamical ideas admit a condition of          
phenomena which does not form a part of the series of phenomena,            
arises a result which we should not have expected from an antinomy. In      
former cases, the result was that both contradictory dialectical            
statements were declared to be false. In the present case, we find the      
conditioned in the dynamical series connected with an empirically           
unconditioned, but non-sensuous condition; and thus satisfaction is         
done to the understanding on the one hand and to the reason on the          
other.* While, moreover, the dialectical arguments for unconditioned        
totality in mere phenomena fall to the ground, both propositions of         
reason may be shown to be true in their proper signification. This          
could not happen in the case of the cosmological ideas which                
demanded a mathematically unconditioned unity; for no condition             
could be placed at the head of the series of phenomena, except one          
which was itself a phenomenon and consequently a member of the series.      
-                                                                           
  *For the understanding cannot admit among phenomena a condition           
which is itself empirically unconditioned. But if it is possible to         
cogitate an intelligible condition- one which is not a member of the        
series of phenomena- for a conditioned phenomenon, without breaking         
the series of empirical conditions, such a condition may be admissible      
as empirically unconditioned, and the empirical regress continue            
regular, unceasing, and intact.                                             
-                                                                           
                                                  {BK_2|CH_2 ^paragraph 355}
    III. Solution of the Cosmological Idea of the Totality of               
       the Deduction of Cosmical Events from their Causes.                  
-                                                                           
  There are only two modes of causality cogitable- the causality of         
nature or of freedom. The first is the conjunction of a particular          
state with another preceding it in the world of sense, the former           
following the latter by virtue of a law. Now, as the causality of           
phenomena is subject to conditions of time, and the preceding state,        
if it had always existed, could not have produced an effect which           
would make its first appearance at a particular time, the causality of      
a cause must itself be an effect- must itself have begun to be, and         
therefore, according to the principle of the understanding, itself          
requires a cause.                                                           
  We must understand, on the contrary, by the term freedom, in the          
cosmological sense, a faculty of the spontaneous origination of a           
state; the causality of which, therefore, is not subordinated to            
another cause determining it in time. Freedom is in this sense a            
pure transcendental idea, which, in the first place, contains no            
empirical element; the object of which, in the second place, cannot be      
given or determined in any experience, because it is a universal law        
of the very possibility of experience, that everything which happens        
must have a cause, that consequently the causality of a cause, being        
itself something that has happened, must also have a cause. In this         
view of the case, the whole field of experience, how far soever it may      
extend, contains nothing that is not subject to the laws of nature.         
But, as we cannot by this means attain to an absolute totality of           
conditions in reference to the series of causes and effects, reason         
creates the idea of a spontaneity, which can begin to act of itself,        
and without any external cause determining it to action, according          
to the natural law of causality.                                            
                                                  {BK_2|CH_2 ^paragraph 360}
  It is especially remarkable that the practical conception of freedom      
is based upon the transcendental idea, and that the question of the         
possibility of the former is difficult only as it involves the              
consideration of the truth of the latter. Freedom, in the practical         
sense, is the independence of the will of coercion by sensuous              
impulses. A will is sensuous, in so far as it is pathologically             
affected (by sensuous impulses); it is termed animal (arbitrium             
brutum), when it is pathologically necessitated. The human will is          
certainly an arbitrium sensitivum, not brutum, but liberum; because         
sensuousness does not necessitate its action, a faculty existing in         
man of self-determination, independently of all sensuous coercion.          
  It is plain that, if all causality in the world of sense were             
natural- and natural only- every event would be determined by               
another according to necessary laws, and that, consequently,                
phenomena, in so far as they determine the will, must necessitate           
every action as a natural effect from themselves; and thus all              
practical freedom would fall to the ground with the transcendental          
idea. For the latter presupposes that although a certain thing has not      
happened, it ought to have happened, and that, consequently, its            
phenomenal cause was not so powerful and determinative as to exclude        
the causality of our will- a causality capable of producing effects         
independently of and even in opposition to the power of natural             
causes, and capable, consequently, of spontaneously originating a           
series of events.                                                           
  Here, too, we find it to be the case, as we generally found in the        
self-contradictions and perplexities of a reason which strives to pass      
the bounds of possible experience, that the problem is properly not         
physiological, but transcendental. The question of the possibility          
of freedom does indeed concern psychology; but, as it rests upon            
dialectical arguments of pure reason, its solution must engage the          
attention of transcendental philosophy. Before attempting this              
solution, a task which transcendental philosophy cannot decline, it         
will be advisable to make a remark with regard to its procedure in the      
settlement of the question.                                                 
  If phenomena were things in themselves, and time and space forms          
of the existence of things, condition and conditioned would always          
be members of the same series; and thus would arise in the present          
case the antinomy common to all transcendental ideas- that their            
series is either too great or too small for the understanding. The          
dynamical ideas, which we are about to discuss in this and the              
following section, possess the peculiarity of relating to an object,        
not considered as a quantity, but as an existence; and thus, in the         
discussion of the present question, we may make abstraction of the          
quantity of the series of conditions, and consider merely the               
dynamical relation of the condition to the conditioned. The                 
question, then, suggests itself, whether freedom is possible; and,          
if it is, whether it can consist with the universality of the               
natural law of causality; and, consequently, whether we enounce a           
proper disjunctive proposition when we say: "Every effect must have         
its origin either in nature or in freedom," or whether both cannot          
exist together in the same event in different relations. The principle      
of an unbroken connection between all events in the phenomenal              
world, in accordance with the unchangeable laws of nature, is a             
well-established principle of transcendental analytic which admits          
of no exception. The question, therefore, is: "Whether an effect,           
determined according to the laws of nature, can at the same time be         
produced by a free agent, or whether freedom and nature mutually            
exclude each other?" And here, the common but fallacious hypothesis of      
the absolute reality of phenomena manifests its injurious influence in      
embarrassing the procedure of reason. For if phenomena are things in        
themselves, freedom is impossible. In this case, nature is the              
complete and all-sufficient cause of every event; and condition and         
conditioned, cause and effect are contained in the same series, and         
necessitated by the same law. If, on the contrary, phenomena are            
held to be, as they are in fact, nothing more than mere                     
representations, connected with each other in accordance with               
empirical laws, they must have a ground which is not phenomenal. But        
the causality of such an intelligible cause is not determined or            
determinable by phenomena; although its effects, as phenomena, must be      
determined by other phenomenal existences. This cause and its               
causality exist therefore out of and apart from the series of               
phenomena; while its effects do exist and are discoverable in the           
series of empirical conditions. Such an effect may therefore be             
considered to be free in relation to its intelligible cause, and            
necessary in relation to the phenomena from which it is a necessary         
consequence- a distinction which, stated in this perfectly general and      
abstract manner, must appear in the highest degree subtle and obscure.      
The sequel will explain. It is sufficient, at present, to remark that,      
as the complete and unbroken connection of phenomena is an unalterable      
law of nature, freedom is impossible- on the supposition that               
phenomena are absolutely real. Hence those philosophers who adhere          
to the common opinion on this subject can never succeed in reconciling      
the ideas of nature and freedom.                                            
-                                                                           
                                                  {BK_2|CH_2 ^paragraph 365}
     Possibility of Freedom in Harmony with the Universal Law               
                     of Natural Necessity.                                  
-                                                                           
  That element in a sensuous object which is not itself sensuous, I         
may be allowed to term intelligible. If, accordingly, an object             
which must be regarded as a sensuous phenomenon possesses a faculty         
which is not an object of sensuous intuition, but by means of which it      
is capable of being the cause of phenomena, the causality of an object      
or existence of this kind may be regarded from two different points of      
view. It may be considered to be intelligible, as regards its               
action- the action of a thing which is a thing in itself, and               
sensuous, as regards its effects- the effects of a phenomenon               
belonging to the sensuous world. We should accordingly, have to form        
both an empirical and an intellectual conception of the causality of        
such a faculty or power- both, however, having reference to the same        
effect. This twofold manner of cogitating a power residing in a             
sensuous object does not run counter to any of the conceptions which        
we ought to form of the world of phenomena or of a possible                 
experience. Phenomena- not being things in themselves- must have a          
transcendental object as a foundation, which determines them as mere        
representations; and there seems to be no reason why we should not          
ascribe to this transcendental object, in addition to the property          
of self-phenomenization, a causality whose effects are to be met            
with in the world of phenomena, although it is not itself a                 
phenomenon. But every effective cause must possess a character, that        
is to say, a law of its causality, without which it would cease to          
be a cause. In the above case, then, every sensuous object would            
possess an empirical character, which guaranteed that its actions,          
as phenomena, stand in complete and harmonious connection, conformably      
to unvarying natural laws, with all other phenomena, and can be             
deduced from these, as conditions, and that they do thus, in                
connection with these, constitute a series in the order of nature.          
This sensuous object must, in the second place, possess an                  
intelligible character, which guarantees it to be the cause of those        
actions, as phenomena, although it is not itself a phenomenon nor           
subordinate to the conditions of the world of sense. The former may be      
termed the character of the thing as a phenomenon, the latter the           
character of the thing as a thing in itself.                                
  Now this active subject would, in its character of intelligible           
subject, be subordinate to no conditions of time, for time is only a        
condition of phenomena, and not of things in themselves. No action          
would begin or cease to be in this subject; it would consequently be        
free from the law of all determination of time- the law of change,          
namely, that everything which happens must have a cause in the              
phenomena of a preceding state. In one word, the causality of the           
subject, in so far as it is intelligible, would not form part of the        
series of empirical conditions which determine and necessitate an           
event in the world of sense. Again, this intelligible character of a        
thing cannot be immediately cognized, because we can perceive               
nothing but phenomena, but it must be capable of being cogitated in         
harmony with the empirical character; for we always find ourselves          
compelled to place, in thought, a transcendental object at the basis        
of phenomena although we can never know what this object is in itself.      
                                                  {BK_2|CH_2 ^paragraph 370}
  In virtue of its empirical character, this subject would at the same      
time be subordinate to all the empirical laws of causality, and, as         
a phenomenon and member of the sensuous world, its effects would            
have to be accounted for by a reference to preceding phenomena.             
Eternal phenomena must be capable of influencing it; and its                
actions, in accordance with natural laws, must explain to us how its        
empirical character, that is, the law of its causality, is to be            
cognized in and by means of experience. In a word, all requisites           
for a complete and necessary determination of these actions must be         
presented to us by experience.                                              
  In virtue of its intelligible character, on the other hand (although      
we possess only a general conception of this character), the subject        
must be regarded as free from all sensuous influences, and from all         
phenomenal determination. Moreover, as nothing happens in this              
subject- for it is a noumenon, and there does not consequently exist        
in it any change, demanding the dynamical determination of time, and        
for the same reason no connection with phenomena as causes- this            
active existence must in its actions be free from and independent of        
natural necessity, for or necessity exists only in the world of             
phenomena. It would be quite correct to say that it originates or           
begins its effects in the world of sense from itself, although the          
action productive of these effects does not begin in itself. We should      
not be in this case affirming that these sensuous effects began to          
exist of themselves, because they are always determined by prior            
empirical conditions- by virtue of the empirical character, which is        
the phenomenon of the intelligible character- and are possible only as      
constituting a continuation of the series of natural causes. And            
thus nature and freedom, each in the complete and absolute                  
signification of these terms, can exist, without contradiction or           
disagreement, in the same action to                                         
-                                                                           
    Exposition of the Cosmological Idea of Freedom in Harmony               
        with the Universal Law of Natural Necessity.                        
                                                  {BK_2|CH_2 ^paragraph 375}
-                                                                           
  I have thought it advisable to lay before the reader at first merely      
a sketch of the solution of this transcendental problem, in order to        
enable him to form with greater ease a clear conception of the              
course which reason must adopt in the solution. I shall now proceed to      
exhibit the several momenta of this solution, and to consider them          
in their order.                                                             
  The natural law that everything which happens must have a cause,          
that the causality of this cause, that is, the action of the cause          
(which cannot always have existed, but must be itself an event, for it      
precedes in time some effect which it has originated), must have            
itself a phenomenal cause, by which it is determined and, and,              
consequently, all events are empirically determined in an order of          
nature- this law, I say, which lies at the foundation of the                
possibility of experience, and of a connected system of phenomena or        
nature is a law of the understanding, from which no departure, and          
to which no exception, can be admitted. For to except even a single         
phenomenon from its operation is to exclude it from the sphere of           
possible experience and thus to admit it to be a mere fiction of            
thought or phantom of the brain.                                            
  Thus we are obliged to acknowledge the existence of a chain of            
causes, in which, however, absolute totality cannot be found. But we        
need not detain ourselves with this question, for it has already            
been sufficiently answered in our discussion of the antinomies into         
which reason falls, when it attempts to reach the unconditioned in the      
series of phenomena. If we permit ourselves to be deceived by the           
illusion of transcendental idealism, we shall find that neither nature      
nor freedom exists. Now the question is: "Whether, admitting the            
existence of natural necessity in the world of phenomena, it is             
possible to consider an effect as at the same time an effect of nature      
and an effect of freedom- or, whether these two modes of causality are      
contradictory and incompatible?"                                            
  No phenomenal cause can absolutely and of itself begin a series.          
Every action, in so far as it is productive of an event, is itself          
an event or occurrence, and presupposes another preceding state, in         
which its cause existed. Thus everything that happens is but a              
continuation of a series, and an absolute beginning is impossible in        
the sensuous world. The actions of natural causes are, accordingly,         
themselves effects, and presuppose causes preceding them in time. A         
primal action which forms an absolute beginning, is beyond the              
causal power of phenomena.                                                  
                                                  {BK_2|CH_2 ^paragraph 380}
  Now, is it absolutely necessary that, granting that all effects           
are phenomena, the causality of the cause of these effects must also        
be a phenomenon and belong to the empirical world? Is it not rather         
possible that, although every effect in the phenomenal world must be        
connected with an empirical cause, according to the universal law of        
nature, this empirical causality may be itself the effect of a              
non-empirical and intelligible causality- its connection with               
natural causes remaining nevertheless intact? Such a causality would        
be considered, in reference to phenomena, as the primal action of a         
cause, which is in so far, therefore, not phenomenal, but, by reason        
of this faculty or power, intelligible; although it must, at the            
same time, as a link in the chain of nature, be regarded as                 
belonging to the sensuous world.                                            
  A belief in the reciprocal causality of phenomena is necessary, if        
we are required to look for and to present the natural conditions of        
natural events, that is to say, their causes. This being admitted as        
unexceptionably valid, the requirements of the understanding, which         
recognizes nothing but nature in the region of phenomena, are               
satisfied, and our physical explanations of physical phenomena may          
proceed in their regular course, without hindrance and without              
opposition. But it is no stumbling-block in the way, even assuming the      
idea to be a pure fiction, to admit that there are some natural causes      
in the possession of a faculty which is not empirical, but                  
intelligible, inasmuch as it is not determined to action by                 
empirical conditions, but purely and solely upon grounds brought            
forward by the understanding- this action being still, when the             
cause is phenomenized, in perfect accordance with the laws of               
empirical causality. Thus the acting subject, as a causal                   
phenomenon, would continue to preserve a complete connection with           
nature and natural conditions; and the phenomenon only of the               
subject (with all its phenomenal causality) would contain certain           
conditions, which, if we ascend from the empirical to the                   
transcendental object, must necessarily be regarded as intelligible.        
For, if we attend, in our inquiries with regard to causes in the world      
of phenomena, to the directions of nature alone, we need not trouble        
ourselves about the relation in which the transcendental subject,           
which is completely unknown to us, stands to these phenomena and their      
connection in nature. The intelligible ground of phenomena in this          
subject does not concern empirical questions. It has to do only with        
pure thought; and, although the effects of this thought and action          
of the pure understanding are discoverable in phenomena, these              
phenomena must nevertheless be capable of a full and complete               
explanation, upon purely physical grounds and in accordance with            
natural laws. And in this case we attend solely to their empirical and      
omit all consideration of their intelligible character (which is the        
transcendental cause of the former) as completely unknown, except in        
so far as it is exhibited by the latter as its empirical symbol. Now        
let us apply this to experience. Man is a phenomenon of the sensuous        
world and, at the same time, therefore, a natural cause, the causality      
of which must be regulated by empirical laws. As such, he must possess      
an empirical character, like all other natural phenomena. We remark         
this empirical character in his actions, which reveal the presence          
of certain powers and faculties. If we consider inanimate or merely         
animal nature, we can discover no reason for ascribing to ourselves         
any other than a faculty which is determined in a purely sensuous           
manner. But man, to whom nature reveals herself only through sense,         
cognizes himself not only by his senses, but also through pure              
apperception; and this in actions and internal determinations, which        
he cannot regard as sensuous impressions. He is thus to himself, on         
the one hand, a phenomenon, but on the other hand, in respect of            
certain faculties, a purely intelligible object- intelligible, because      
its action cannot be ascribed to sensuous receptivity. These faculties      
are understanding and reason. The latter, especially, is in a peculiar      
manner distinct from all empirically-conditioned faculties, for it          
employs ideas alone in the consideration of its objects, and by             
means of these determines the understanding, which then proceeds to         
make an empirical use of its own conceptions, which, like the ideas of      
reason, are pure and non-empirical.                                         
  That reason possesses the faculty of causality, or that at least          
we are compelled so to represent it, is evident from the                    
imperatives, which in the sphere of the practical we impose on many of      
our executive powers. The words I ought express a species of                
necessity, and imply a connection with grounds which nature does not        
and cannot present to the mind of man. Understanding knows nothing          
in nature but that which is, or has been, or will be. It would be           
absurd to say that anything in nature ought to be other than it is          
in the relations of time in which it stands; indeed, the ought, when        
we consider merely the course of nature, bas neither application nor        
meaning. The question, "What ought to happen in the sphere of nature?"      
is just as absurd as the question, "What ought to be the properties of      
a circle?" All that we are entitled to ask is, "What takes place in         
nature?" or, in the latter case, "What are the properties of a              
circle?"                                                                    
  But the idea of an ought or of duty indicates a possible action, the      
ground of which is a pure conception; while the ground of a merely          
natural action is, on the contrary, always a phenomenon. This action        
must certainly be possible under physical conditions, if it is              
prescribed by the moral imperative ought; but these physical or             
natural conditions do not concern the determination of the will             
itself, they relate to its effects alone, and the consequences of           
the effect in the world of phenomena. Whatever number of motives            
nature may present to my will, whatever sensuous impulses- the moral        
ought it is beyond their power to produce. They may produce a               
volition, which, so far from being necessary, is always conditioned- a      
volition to which the ought enunciated by reason, sets an aim and a         
standard, gives permission or prohibition. Be the object what it            
may, purely sensuous- as pleasure, or presented by pure reason- as          
good, reason will not yield to grounds which have an empirical origin.      
Reason will not follow the order of things presented by experience,         
but, with perfect spontaneity, rearranges them according to ideas,          
with which it compels empirical conditions to agree. It declares, in        
the name of these ideas, certain actions to be necessary which              
nevertheless have not taken place and which perhaps never will take         
place; and yet presupposes that it possesses the faculty of                 
causality in relation to these actions. For, in the absence of this         
supposition, it could not expect its ideas to produce certain               
effects in the world of experience.                                         
  Now, let us stop here and admit it to be at least possible that           
reason does stand in a really causal relation to phenomena. In this         
case it must- pure reason as it is- exhibit an empirical character.         
For every cause supposes a rule, according to which certain                 
phenomena follow as effects from the cause, and every rule requires         
uniformity in these effects; and this is the proper ground of the           
conception of a cause- as a faculty or power. Now this conception           
(of a cause) may be termed the empirical character of reason; and this      
character is a permanent one, while the effects produced appear, in         
conformity with the various conditions which accompany and partly           
limit them, in various forms.                                               
                                                  {BK_2|CH_2 ^paragraph 385}
  Thus the volition of every man has an empirical character, which          
is nothing more than the causality of his reason, in so far as its          
effects in the phenomenal world manifest the presence of a rule,            
according to which we are enabled to examine, in their several kinds        
and degrees, the actions of this causality and the rational grounds         
for these actions, and in this way to decide upon the subjective            
principles of the volition. Now we learn what this empirical character      
is only from phenomenal effects, and from the rule of these which is        
presented by experience; and for this reason all the actions of man in      
the world of phenomena are determined by his empirical character,           
and the co-operative causes of nature. If, then, we could                   
investigate all the phenomena of human volition to their lowest             
foundation in the mind, there would be no action which we could not         
anticipate with certainty, and recognize to be absolutely necessary         
from its preceding conditions. So far as relates to this empirical          
character, therefore, there can be no freedom; and it is only in the        
light of this character that we can consider the human will, when we        
confine ourselves to simple observation and, as is the case in              
anthropology, institute a physiological investigation of the motive         
causes of human actions.                                                    
  But when we consider the same actions in relation to reason- not for      
the purpose of explaining their origin, that is, in relation to             
speculative reason, but to practical reason, as the producing cause of      
these actions- we shall discover a rule and an order very different         
from those of nature and experience. For the declaration of this            
mental faculty may be that what has and could not but take place in         
the course of nature, ought not to have taken place. Sometimes, too,        
we discover, or believe that we discover, that the ideas of reason did      
actually stand in a causal relation to certain actions of man; and          
that these actions have taken place because they were determined,           
not by empirical causes, but by the act of the will upon grounds of         
reason.                                                                     
  Now, granting that reason stands in a causal relation to                  
phenomena; can an action of reason be called free, when we know             
that, sensuously, in its empirical character, it is completely              
determined and absolutely necessary? But this empirical character is        
itself determined by the intelligible character. The latter we              
cannot cognize; we can only indicate it by means of phenomena, which        
enable us to have an immediate cognition only of the empirical              
character.* An action, then, in so far as it is to be ascribed to an        
intelligible cause, does not result from it in accordance with              
empirical laws. That is to say, not the conditions of pure reason, but      
only their effects in the internal sense, precede the act. Pure             
reason, as a purely intelligible faculty, is not subject to the             
conditions of time. The causality of reason in its intelligible             
character does not begin to be; it does not make its appearance at a        
certain time, for the purpose of producing an effect. If this were not      
the case, the causality of reason would be subservient to the               
natural law of phenomena, which determines them according to time, and      
as a series of causes and effects in time; it would consequently cease      
to be freedom and become a part of nature. We are therefore                 
justified in saying: "If reason stands in a causal relation to              
phenomena, it is a faculty which originates the sensuous condition          
of an empirical series of effects." For the condition, which resides        
in the reason, is non-sensuous, and therefore cannot be originated, or      
begin to be. And thus we find- what we could not discover in any            
empirical series- a condition of a successive series of events              
itself empirically unconditioned. For, in the present case, the             
condition stands out of and beyond the series of phenomena- it is           
intelligible, and it consequently cannot be subjected to any                
sensuous condition, or to any time-determination by a preceding cause.      
-                                                                           
  *The real morality of actions- their merit or demerit, and even that      
of our own conduct, is completely unknown to us. Our estimates can          
relate only to their empirical character. How much is the result of         
the action of free will, how much is to be ascribed to nature and to        
blameless error, or to a happy constitution of temperament (merito          
fortunae), no one can discover, nor, for this reason, determine with        
perfect justice.                                                            
                                                  {BK_2|CH_2 ^paragraph 390}
-                                                                           
  But, in another respect, the same cause belongs also to the series        
of phenomena. Man is himself a phenomenon. His will has an empirical        
character, which is the empirical cause of all his actions. There is        
no condition- determining man and his volition in conformity with this      
character- which does not itself form part of the series of effects in      
nature, and is subject to their law- the law according to which an          
empirically undetermined cause of an event in time cannot exist. For        
this reason no given action can have an absolute and spontaneous            
origination, all actions being phenomena, and belonging to the world        
of experience. But it cannot be said of reason, that the state in           
which it determines the will is always preceded by some other state         
determining it. For reason is not a phenomenon, and therefore not           
subject to sensuous conditions; and, consequently, even in relation to      
its causality, the sequence or conditions of time do not influence          
reason, nor can the dynamical law of nature, which determines the           
sequence of time according to certain rules, be applied to it.              
  Reason is consequently the permanent condition of all actions of the      
human will. Each of these is determined in the empirical character          
of the man, even before it has taken place. The intelligible                
character, of which the former is but the sensuous schema, knows no         
before or after; and every action, irrespective of the time-relation        
in which it stands with other phenomena, is the immediate effect of         
the intelligible character of pure reason, which, consequently, enjoys      
freedom of action, and is not dynamically determined either by              
internal or external preceding conditions. This freedom must not be         
described, in a merely negative manner, as independence of empirical        
conditions, for in this case the faculty of reason would cease to be a      
cause of phenomena; but it must be regarded, positively, as a               
faculty which can spontaneously originate a series of events. At the        
same time, it must not be supposed that any beginning can take place        
in reason; on the contrary, reason, as the unconditioned condition          
of all action of the will, admits of no time-conditions, although           
its effect does really begin in a series of phenomena- a beginning          
which is not, however, absolutely primal.                                   
  I shall illustrate this regulative principle of reason by an              
example, from its employment in the world of experience; proved it          
cannot be by any amount of experience, or by any number of facts,           
for such arguments cannot establish the truth of transcendental             
propositions. Let us take a voluntary action- for example, a                
falsehood- by means of which a man has introduced a certain degree          
of confusion into the social life of humanity, which is judged              
according to the motives from which it originated, and the blame of         
which and of the evil consequences arising from it, is imputed to           
the offender. We at first proceed to examine the empirical character        
of the offence, and for this purpose we endeavour to penetrate to           
the sources of that character, such as a defective education, bad           
company, a shameless and wicked disposition, frivolity, and want of         
reflection- not forgetting also the occasioning causes which prevailed      
at the moment of the transgression. In this the procedure is exactly        
the same as that pursued in the investigation of the series of              
causes which determine a given physical effect. Now, although we            
believe the action to have been determined by all these circumstances,      
we do not the less blame the offender. We do not blame him for his          
unhappy disposition, nor for the circumstances which influenced him,        
nay, not even for his former course of life; for we presuppose that         
all these considerations may be set aside, that the series of               
preceding conditions may be regarded as having never existed, and that      
the action may be considered as completely unconditioned in relation        
to any state preceding, just as if the agent commenced with it an           
entirely new series of effects. Our blame of the offender is                
grounded upon a law of reason, which requires us to regard this             
faculty as a cause, which could have and ought to have otherwise            
determined the behaviour of the culprit, independently of all               
empirical conditions. This causality of reason we do not regard as a        
co-operating agency, but as complete in itself. It matters not whether      
the sensuous impulses favoured or opposed the action of this                
causality, the offence is estimated according to its intelligible           
character- the offender is decidedly worthy of blame, the moment he         
utters a falsehood. It follows that we regard reason, in spite of           
the empirical conditions of the act, as completely free, and                
therefore, therefore, as in the present case, culpable.                     
  The above judgement is complete evidence that we are accustomed to        
think that reason is not affected by sensuous conditions, that in it        
no change takes place- although its phenomena, in other words, the          
mode in which it appears in its effects, are subject to change- that        
in it no preceding state determines the following, and,                     
consequently, that it does not form a member of the series of sensuous      
conditions which necessitate phenomena according to natural laws.           
Reason is present and the same in all human actions and at all              
times; but it does not itself exist in time, and therefore does not         
enter upon any state in which it did not formerly exist. It is,             
relatively to new states or conditions, determining, but not                
determinable. Hence we cannot ask: "Why did not reason determine            
itself in a different manner?" The question ought to be thus stated:        
"Why did not reason employ its power of causality to determine certain      
phenomena in a different manner?" "But this is a question which admits      
of no answer. For a different intelligible character would have             
exhibited a different empirical character; and, when we say that, in        
spite of the course which his whole former life has taken, the              
offender could have refrained from uttering the falsehood, this             
means merely that the act was subject to the power and authority-           
permissive or prohibitive- of reason. Now, reason is not subject in         
its causality to any conditions of phenomena or of time; and a              
difference in time may produce a difference in the relation of              
phenomena to each other- for these are not things and therefore not         
causes in themselves- but it cannot produce any difference in the           
relation in which the action stands to the faculty of reason.               
                                                  {BK_2|CH_2 ^paragraph 395}
  Thus, then, in our investigation into free actions and the causal         
power which produced them, we arrive at an intelligible cause,              
beyond which, however, we cannot go; although we can recognize that it      
is free, that is, independent of all sensuous conditions, and that, in      
this way, it may be the sensuously unconditioned condition of               
phenomena. But for what reason the intelligible character generates         
such and such phenomena and exhibits such and such an empirical             
character under certain circumstances, it is beyond the power of our        
reason to decide. The question is as much above the power and the           
sphere of reason as the following would be: "Why does the                   
transcendental object of our external sensuous intuition allow of no        
other form than that of intuition in space?" But the problem, which we      
were called upon to solve, does not require us to entertain any such        
questions. The problem was merely this- whether freedom and natural         
necessity can exist without opposition in the same action. To this          
question we have given a sufficient answer; for we have shown that, as      
the former stands in a relation to a different kind of condition            
from those of the latter, the law of the one does not affect the law        
of the other and that, consequently, both can exist together in             
independence of and without interference with each other.                   
-                                                                           
  The reader must be careful to remark that my intention in the             
above remarks has not been to prove the actual existence of freedom,        
as a faculty in which resides the cause of certain sensuous phenomena.      
For, not to mention that such an argument would not have a                  
transcendental character, nor have been limited to the discussion of        
pure conceptions- all attempts at inferring from experience what            
cannot be cogitated in accordance with its laws, must ever be               
unsuccessful. Nay, more, I have not even aimed at demonstrating the         
possibility of freedom; for this too would have been a vain endeavour,      
inasmuch as it is beyond the power of the mind to cognize the               
possibility of a reality or of a causal power by the aid of mere a          
priori conceptions. Freedom has been considered in the foregoing            
remarks only as a transcendental idea, by means of which reason aims        
at originating a series of conditions in the world of phenomena with        
the help of that which is sensuously unconditioned, involving               
itself, however, in an antinomy with the laws which itself                  
prescribes for the conduct of the understanding. That this antinomy is      
based upon a mere illusion, and that nature and freedom are at least        
not opposed- this was the only thing in our power to prove, and the         
question which it was our task to solve.                                    
-                                                                           
    IV. Solution of the Cosmological Idea of the Totality of                
                                                  {BK_2|CH_2 ^paragraph 400}
          the Dependence of Phenomenal Existences.                          
-                                                                           
  In the preceding remarks, we considered the changes in the world          
of sense as constituting a dynamical series, in which each member is        
subordinated to another- as its cause. Our present purpose is to avail      
ourselves of this series of states or conditions as a guide to an           
existence which may be the highest condition of all changeable              
phenomena, that is, to a necessary being. Our endeavour to reach,           
not the unconditioned causality, but the unconditioned existence, of        
substance. The series before us is therefore a series of                    
conceptions, and not of intuitions (in which the one intuition is           
the condition of the other).                                                
  But it is evident that, as all phenomena are subject to change and        
conditioned in their existence, the series of dependent existences          
cannot embrace an unconditioned member, the existence of which would        
be absolutely necessary. It follows that, if phenomena were things          
in themselves, and- as an immediate consequence from this supposition-      
condition and conditioned belonged to the same series of phenomena,         
the existence of a necessary being, as the condition of the                 
existence of sensuous phenomena, would be perfectly impossible.             
  An important distinction, however, exists between the dynamical           
and the mathematical regress. The latter is engaged solely with the         
combination of parts into a whole, or with the division of a whole          
into its parts; and therefore are the conditions of its series parts        
of the series, and to be consequently regarded as homogeneous, and for      
this reason, as consisting, without exception, of phenomena. If the         
former regress, on the contrary, the aim of which is not to                 
establish the possibility of an unconditioned whole consisting of           
given parts, or of an unconditioned part of a given whole, but to           
demonstrate the possibility of the deduction of a certain state from        
its cause, or of the contingent existence of substance from that which      
exists necessarily, it is not requisite that the condition should form      
part of an empirical series along with the conditioned.                     
                                                  {BK_2|CH_2 ^paragraph 405}
  In the case of the apparent antinomy with which we are at present         
dealing, there exists a way of escape from the difficulty; for it is        
not impossible that both of the contradictory statements may be true        
in different relations. All sensuous phenomena may be contingent,           
and consequently possess only an empirically conditioned existence,         
and yet there may also exist a non-empirical condition of the whole         
series, or, in other words, a necessary being. For this necessary           
being, as an intelligible condition, would not form a member- not even      
the highest member- of the series; the whole world of sense would be        
left in its empirically determined existence uninterfered with and          
uninfluenced. This would also form a ground of distinction between the      
modes of solution employed for the third and fourth antinomies. For,        
while in the consideration of freedom in the former antinomy, the           
thing itself- the cause (substantia phaenomenon)- was regarded as           
belonging to the series of conditions, and only its causality to the        
intelligible world- we are obliged in the present case to cogitate          
this necessary being as purely intelligible and as existing entirely        
apart from the world of sense (as an ens extramundanum); for otherwise      
it would be subject to the phenomenal law of contingency and                
dependence.                                                                 
  In relation to the present problem, therefore, the regulative             
principle of reason is that everything in the sensuous world possesses      
an empirically conditioned existence- that no property of the sensuous      
world possesses unconditioned necessity- that we are bound to               
expect, and, so far as is possible, to seek for the empirical               
condition of every member in the series of conditions- and that             
there is no sufficient reason to justify us in deducing any                 
existence from a condition which lies out of and beyond the                 
empirical series, or in regarding any existence as independent and          
self-subsistent; although this should not prevent us from                   
recognizing the possibility of the whole series being based upon a          
being which is intelligible, and for this reason free from all              
empirical conditions.                                                       
  But it has been far from my intention, in these remarks, to prove         
the existence of this unconditioned and necessary being, or even to         
evidence the possibility of a purely intelligible condition of the          
existence or all sensuous phenomena. As bounds were set to reason,          
to prevent it from leaving the guiding thread of empirical                  
conditions and losing itself in transcendent theories which are             
incapable of concrete presentation; so it was my purpose, on the other      
band, to set bounds to the law of the purely empirical                      
understanding, and to protest against any attempts on its part at           
deciding on the possibility of things, or declaring the existence of        
the intelligible to be impossible, merely on the ground that it is not      
available for the explanation and exposition of phenomena. It has been      
shown, at the same time, that the contingency of all the phenomena          
of nature and their empirical conditions is quite consistent with           
the arbitrary hypothesis of a necessary, although purely                    
intelligible condition, that no real contradiction exists between them      
and that, consequently, both may be true. The existence of such an          
absolutely necessary being may be impossible; but this can never be         
demonstrated from the universal contingency and dependence of sensuous      
phenomena, nor from the principle which forbids us to discontinue           
the series at some member of it, or to seek for its cause in some           
sphere of existence beyond the world of nature. Reason goes its way in      
the empirical world, and follows, too, its peculiar path in the sphere      
of the transcendental.                                                      
  The sensuous world contains nothing but phenomena, which are mere         
representations, and always sensuously conditioned; things in               
themselves are not, and cannot be, objects to us. It is not to be           
wondered at, therefore, that we are not justified in leaping from some      
member of an empirical series beyond the world of sense, as if              
empirical representations were things in themselves, existing apart         
from their transcendental ground in the human mind, and the cause of        
whose existence may be sought out of the empirical series. This             
would certainly be the case with contingent things; but it cannot be        
with mere representations of things, the contingency of which is            
itself merely a phenomenon and can relate to no other regress than          
that which determines phenomena, that is, the empirical. But to             
cogitate an intelligible ground of phenomena, as free, moreover,            
from the contingency of the latter, conflicts neither with the              
unlimited nature of the empirical regress, nor with the complete            
contingency of phenomena. And the demonstration of this was the only        
thing necessary for the solution of this apparent antinomy. For if the      
condition of every conditioned- as regards its existence- is sensuous,      
and for this reason a part of the same series, it must be itself            
conditioned, as was shown in the antithesis of the fourth antinomy.         
The embarrassments into which a reason, which postulates the                
unconditioned, necessarily falls, must, therefore, continue to              
exist; or the unconditioned must be placed in the sphere of the             
intelligible. In this way, its necessity does not require, nor does it      
even permit, the presence of an empirical condition: and it is,             
consequently, unconditionally necessary.                                    
  The empirical employment of reason is not affected by the assumption      
of a purely intelligible being; it continues its operations on the          
principle of the contingency of all phenomena, proceeding from              
empirical conditions to still higher and higher conditions, themselves      
empirical. just as little does this regulative principle exclude the        
assumption of an intelligible cause, when the question regards              
merely the pure employment of reason- in relation to ends or aims.          
For, in this case, an intelligible cause signifies merely the               
transcendental and to us unknown ground of the possibility of sensuous      
phenomena, and its existence, necessary and independent of all              
sensuous conditions, is not inconsistent with the contingency of            
phenomena, or with the unlimited possibility of regress which exists        
in the series of empirical conditions.                                      
                                                  {BK_2|CH_2 ^paragraph 410}
-                                                                           
       Concluding Remarks on the Antinomy of Pure Reason.                   
-                                                                           
  So long as the object of our rational conceptions is the totality of      
conditions in the world of phenomena, and the satisfaction, from            
this source, of the requirements of reason, so long are our ideas           
transcendental and cosmological. But when we set the unconditioned-         
which is the aim of all our inquiries- in a sphere which lies out of        
the world of sense and possible experience, our ideas become                
transcendent. They are then not merely serviceable towards the              
completion of the exercise of reason (which remains an idea, never          
executed, but always to be pursued); they detach themselves completely      
from experience and construct for themselves objects, the material          
of which has not been presented by experience, and the objective            
reality of which is not based upon the completion of the empirical          
series, but upon pure a priori conceptions. The intelligible object of      
these transcendent ideas may be conceded, as a transcendental               
object. But we cannot cogitate it as a thing determinable by certain        
distinct predicates relating to its internal nature, for it has no          
connection with empirical conceptions; nor are we justified in              
affirming the existence of any such object. It is, consequently, a          
mere product of the mind alone. Of all the cosmological ideas,              
however, it is that occasioning the fourth antinomy which compels us        
to venture upon this step. For the existence of phenomena, always           
conditioned and never self-subsistent, requires us to look for an           
object different from phenomena- an intelligible object, with which         
all contingency must cease. But, as we have allowed ourselves to            
assume the existence of a self-subsistent reality out of the field          
of experience, and are therefore obliged to regard phenomena as merely      
a contingent mode of representing intelligible objects employed by          
beings which are themselves intelligences- no other course remains for      
us than to follow an alogy and employ the same mode in forming some         
conception of intelligible things, of which we have not the least           
knowledge, which nature taught us to use in the formation of empirical      
conceptions. Experience made us acquainted with the contingent. But we      
are at present engaged in the discussion of things which are not            
objects of experience; and must, therefore, deduce our knowledge of         
them from that which is necessary absolutely and in itself, that is,        
from pure conceptions. Hence the first step which we take out of the        
world of sense obliges us to begin our system of new cognition with         
the investigation of a necessary being, and to deduce from our              
conceptions of it all our conceptions of intelligible things. This          
we propose to attempt in the following chapter.                             
                                                                            
BK_2|CH_3                                                                   
           CHAPTER III. The Ideal of Pure Reason.                           
-                                                                           
            SECTION I. Of the Ideal in General.                             
-                                                                           
  We have seen that pure conceptions do not present objects to the          
mind, except under sensuous conditions; because the conditions of           
objective reality do not exist in these conceptions, which contain, in      
fact, nothing but the mere form of thought. They may, however, when         
applied to phenomena, be presented in concreto; for it is phenomena         
that present to them the materials for the formation of empirical           
conceptions, which are nothing more than concrete forms of the              
conceptions of the understanding. But ideas are still further               
removed from objective reality than categories; for no phenomenon           
can ever present them to the human mind in concreto. They contain a         
certain perfection, attainable by no possible empirical cognition; and      
they give to reason a systematic unity, to which the unity of               
experience attempts to approximate, but can never completely attain.        
  But still further removed than the idea from objective reality is         
the Ideal, by which term I understand the idea, not in concreto, but        
in individuo- as an individual thing, determinable or determined by         
the idea alone. The idea of humanity in its complete perfection             
supposes not only the advancement of all the powers and faculties,          
which constitute our conception of human nature, to a complete              
attainment of their final aims, but also everything which is requisite      
for the complete determination of the idea; for of all contradictory        
predicates, only one can conform with the idea of the perfect man.          
What I have termed an ideal was in Plato's philosophy an idea of the        
divine mind- an individual object present to its pure intuition, the        
most perfect of every kind of possible beings, and the archetype of         
all phenomenal existences.                                                  
  Without rising to these speculative heights, we are bound to confess      
that human reason contains not only ideas, but ideals, which                
possess, not, like those of Plato, creative, but certainly practical        
power- as regulative principles, and form the basis of the                  
perfectibility of certain actions. Moral conceptions are not perfectly      
pure conceptions of reason, because an empirical element- of                
pleasure or pain- lies at the foundation of them. In relation,              
however, to the principle, whereby reason sets bounds to a freedom          
which is in itself without law, and consequently when we attend merely      
to their form, they may be considered as pure conceptions of reason.        
Virtue and wisdom in their perfect purity are ideas. But the wise           
man of the Stoics is an ideal, that is to say, a human being                
existing only in thought and in complete conformity with the idea of        
wisdom. As the idea provides a rule, so the ideal serves as an              
archetype for the perfect and complete determination of the copy. Thus      
the conduct of this wise and divine man serves us as a standard of          
action, with which we may compare and judge ourselves, which may            
help us to reform ourselves, although the perfection it demands can         
never be attained by us. Although we cannot concede objective               
reality to these ideals, they are not to be considered as chimeras; on      
the contrary, they provide reason with a standard, which enables it to      
estimate, by comparison, the degree of incompleteness in the objects        
presented to it. But to aim at realizing the ideal in an example in         
the world of experience- to describe, for instance, the character of        
the perfectly wise man in a romance- is impracticable. Nay more, there      
is something absurd in the attempt; and the result must be little           
edifying, as the natural limitations, which are continually breaking        
in upon the perfection and completeness of the idea, destroy the            
illusion in the story and throw an air of suspicion even on what is         
good in the idea, which hence appears fictitious and unreal.                
                                                    {BK_2|CH_3 ^paragraph 5}
  Such is the constitution of the ideal of reason, which is always          
based upon determinate conceptions, and serves as a rule and a model        
for limitation or of criticism. Very different is the nature of the         
ideals of the imagination. Of these it is impossible to present an          
intelligible conception; they are a kind of monogram, drawn                 
according to no determinate rule, and forming rather a vague                
picture- the production of many diverse experiences- than a                 
determinate image. Such are the ideals which painters and                   
physiognomists profess to have in their minds, and which can serve          
neither as a model for production nor as a standard for                     
appreciation. They may be termed, though improperly, sensuous               
ideals, as they are declared to be models of certain possible               
empirical intuitions. They cannot, however, furnish rules or standards      
for explanation or examination with                                         
  In its ideals, reason aims at complete and perfect determination          
according to a priori rules; and hence it cogitates an object, which        
must be completely determinable in conformity with principles,              
although all empirical conditions are absent, and the conception of         
the object is on this account transcendent.                                 
-                                                                           
       SECTION II. Of the Transcendental Ideal (Prototypon                  
                       Trancendentale).                                     
                                                   {BK_2|CH_3 ^paragraph 10}
-                                                                           
  Every conception is, in relation to that which is not contained in        
it, undetermined and subject to the principle of determinability. This      
principle is that, of every two contradictorily opposed predicates,         
only one can belong to a conception. It is a purely logical principle,      
itself based upon the principle of contradiction; inasmuch as it makes      
complete abstraction of the content and attends merely to the               
logical form of the cognition.                                              
  But again, everything, as regards its possibility, is also subject        
to the principle of complete determination, according to which one          
of all the possible contradictory predicates of things must belong          
to it. This principle is not based merely upon that of                      
contradiction; for, in addition to the relation between two                 
contradictory predicates, it regards everything as standing in a            
relation to the sum of possibilities, as the sum total of all               
predicates of things, and, while presupposing this sum as an a              
priori condition, presents to the mind everything as receiving the          
possibility of its individual existence from the relation it bears to,      
and the share it possesses in, the aforesaid sum of possibilities.*         
The principle of complete determination relates the content and not to      
the logical form. It is the principle of the synthesis of all the           
predicates which are required to constitute the complete conception of      
a thing, and not a mere principle analytical representation, which          
enounces that one of two contradictory predicates must belong to a          
conception. It contains, moreover, a transcendental presupposition-         
that, namely, of the material for all possibility, which must               
contain a priori the data for this or that particular possibility.          
-                                                                           
  *Thus this principle declares everything to possess a relation to         
a common correlate- the sum-total of possibility, which, if discovered      
to exist in the idea of one individual thing, would establish the           
affinity of all possible things, from the identity of the ground of         
their complete determination. The determinability of every                  
conception is subordinate to the universality (Allgemeinheit,               
universalitas) of the principle of excluded middle; the                     
determination of a thing to the totality (Allheit, universitas) of all      
possible predicates.                                                        
                                                   {BK_2|CH_3 ^paragraph 15}
-                                                                           
  The proposition, Everything which exists is completely determined,        
means not only that one of every pair of given contradictory                
attributes, but that one of all possible attributes, is always              
predicable of the thing; in it the predicates are not merely                
compared logically with each other, but the thing itself is                 
transcendentally compared with the sum-total of all possible                
predicates. The proposition is equivalent to saying: "To attain to a        
complete knowledge of a thing, it is necessary to possess a                 
knowledge of everything that is possible, and to determine it               
thereby in a positive or negative manner." The conception of                
complete determination is consequently a conception which cannot be         
presented in its totality in concreto, and is therefore based upon          
an idea, which has its seat in the reason- the faculty which                
prescribes to the understanding the laws of its harmonious and perfect      
exercise relates                                                            
  Now, although this idea of the sum-total of all possibility, in so        
far as it forms the condition of the complete determination of              
everything, is itself undetermined in relation to the predicates which      
may constitute this sum-total, and we cogitate in it merely the             
sum-total of all possible predicates- we nevertheless find, upon            
closer examination, that this idea, as a primitive conception of the        
mind, excludes a large number of predicates- those deduced and those        
irreconcilable with others, and that it is evolved as a conception          
completely determined a priori. Thus it becomes the conception of an        
individual object, which is completely determined by and through the        
mere idea, and must consequently be termed an ideal of pure reason.         
  When we consider all possible predicates, not merely logically,           
but transcendentally, that is to say, with reference to the content         
which may be cogitated as existing in them a priori, we shall find          
that some indicate a being, others merely a non-being. The logical          
negation expressed in the word not does not properly belong to a            
conception, but only to the relation of one conception to another in a      
judgement, and is consequently quite insufficient to present to the         
mind the content of a conception. The expression not mortal does not        
indicate that a non-being is cogitated in the object; it does not           
concern the content at all. A transcendental negation, on the               
contrary, indicates non-being in itself, and is opposed to                  
transcendental affirmation, the conception of which of itself               
expresses a being. Hence this affirmation indicates a reality, because      
in and through it objects are considered to be something- to be             
things; while the opposite negation, on the other band, indicates a         
mere want, or privation, or absence, and, where such negations alone        
are attached to a representation, the non-existence of anything             
corresponding to the representation.                                        
  Now a negation cannot be cogitated as determined, without cogitating      
at the same time the opposite affirmation. The man born blind has           
not the least notion of darkness, because he has none of light; the         
vagabond knows nothing of poverty, because he has never known what          
it is to be in comfort;* the ignorant man has no conception of his          
ignorance, because he has no conception of knowledge. All                   
conceptions of negatives are accordingly derived or deduced                 
conceptions; and realities contain the data, and, so to speak, the          
material or transcendental content of the possibility and complete          
determination of all things.                                                
                                                   {BK_2|CH_3 ^paragraph 20}
-                                                                           
  *The investigations and calculations of astronomers have taught us        
much that is wonderful; but the most important lesson we have received      
from them is the discovery of the abyss of our ignorance in relation        
to the universe- an ignorance the magnitude of which reason, without        
the information thus derived, could never have conceived. This              
discovery of our deficiencies must produce a great change in the            
determination of the aims of human reason.                                  
-                                                                           
  If, therefore, a transcendental substratum lies at the foundation of      
the complete determination of things- a substratum which is to form         
the fund from which all possible predicates of things are to be             
supplied, this substratum cannot be anything else than the idea of a        
sum-total of reality (omnitudo realitatis). In this view, negations         
are nothing but limitations- a term which could not, with propriety,        
be applied to them, if the unlimited (the all) did not form the true        
basis of our conception.                                                    
  This conception of a sum-total of reality is the conception of a          
thing in itself, regarded as completely determined; and the conception      
of an ens realissimum is the conception of an individual being,             
inasmuch as it is determined by that predicate of all possible              
contradictory predicates, which indicates and belongs to being. It is,      
therefore, a transcendental ideal which forms the basis of the              
complete determination of everything that exists, and is the highest        
material condition of its possibility- a condition on which must            
rest the cogitation of all objects with respect to their content. Nay,      
more, this ideal is the only proper ideal of which the human mind is        
capable; because in this case alone a general conception of a thing is      
completely determined by and through itself, and cognized as the            
representation of an individuum.                                            
                                                   {BK_2|CH_3 ^paragraph 25}
  The logical determination of a conception is based upon a                 
disjunctive syllogism, the major of which contains the logical              
division of the extent of a general conception, the minor limits            
this extent to a certain part, while the conclusion determines the          
conception by this part. The general conception of a reality cannot be      
divided a priori, because, without the aid of experience, we cannot         
know any determinate kinds of reality, standing under the former as         
the genus. The transcendental principle of the complete                     
determination of all things is therefore merely the representation          
of the sum-total of all reality; it is not a conception which is the        
genus of all predicates under itself, but one which comprehends them        
all within itself. The complete determination of a thing is                 
consequently based upon the limitation of this total of reality, so         
much being predicated of the thing, while all that remains over is          
excluded- a procedure which is in exact agreement with that of the          
disjunctive syllogism and the determination of the objects in the           
conclusion by one of the members of the division. It follows that           
reason, in laying the transcendental ideal at the foundation of its         
determination of all possible things, takes a course in exact               
analogy with that which it pursues in disjunctive syllogisms- a             
proposition which formed the basis of the systematic division of all        
transcendental ideas, according to which they are produced in complete      
parallelism with the three modes of syllogistic reasoning employed          
by the human mind.                                                          
  It is self-evident that reason, in cogitating the necessary complete      
determination of things, does not presuppose the existence of a             
being corresponding to its ideal, but merely the idea of the ideal-         
for the purpose of deducing from the unconditional totality of              
complete determination, The ideal is therefore the prototype of all         
things, which, as defective copies (ectypa), receive from it the            
material of their possibility, and approximate to it more or less,          
though it is impossible that they can ever attain to its perfection.        
  The possibility of things must therefore be regarded as derived-          
except that of the thing which contains in itself all reality, which        
must be considered to be primitive and original. For all negations-         
and they are the only predicates by means of which all other things         
can be distinguished from the ens realissimum- are mere limitations of      
a greater and a higher- nay, the highest reality; and they                  
consequently presuppose this reality, and are, as regards their             
content, derived from it. The manifold nature of things is only an          
infinitely various mode of limiting the conception of the highest           
reality, which is their common substratum; just as all figures are          
possible only as different modes of limiting infinite space. The            
object of the ideal of reason- an object existing only in reason            
itself- is also termed the primal being (ens originarium); as having        
no existence superior to him, the supreme being (ens summum); and as        
being the condition of all other beings, which rank under it, the           
being of all beings (ens entium). But none of these terms indicate the      
objective relation of an actually existing object to other things, but      
merely that of an idea to conceptions; and all our investigations into      
this subject still leave us in perfect uncertainty with regard to           
the existence of this being.                                                
  A primal being cannot be said to consist of many other beings with        
an existence which is derivative, for the latter presuppose the             
former, and therefore cannot be constitutive parts of it. It follows        
that the ideal of the primal being must be cogitated as simple.             
  The deduction of the possibility of all other things from this            
primal being cannot, strictly speaking, be considered as a limitation,      
or as a kind of division of its reality; for this would be regarding        
the primal being as a mere aggregate- which has been shown to be            
impossible, although it was so represented in our first rough               
sketch. The highest reality must be regarded rather as the ground than      
as the sum-total of the possibility of all things, and the manifold         
nature of things be based, not upon the limitation of the primal being      
itself, but upon the complete series of effects which flow from it.         
And thus all our powers of sense, as well as all phenomenal reality,        
phenomenal reality, may be with propriety regarded as belonging to          
this series of effects, while they could not have formed parts of           
the idea, considered as an aggregate. Pursuing this track, and              
hypostatizing this idea, we shall find ourselves authorized to              
determine our notion of the Supreme Being by means of the mere              
conception of a highest reality, as one, simple, all-sufficient,            
eternal, and so on- in one word, to determine it in its                     
unconditioned completeness by the aid of every possible predicate. The      
conception of such a being is the conception of God in its                  
transcendental sense, and thus the ideal of pure reason is the              
object-matter of a transcendental theology.                                 
                                                   {BK_2|CH_3 ^paragraph 30}
  But, by such an employment of the transcendental idea, we should          
be over stepping the limits of its validity and purpose. For reason         
placed it, as the conception of all reality, at the basis of the            
complete determination of things, without requiring that this               
conception be regarded as the conception of an objective existence.         
Such an existence would be purely fictitious, and the hypostatizing of      
the content of the idea into an ideal, as an individual being, is a         
step perfectly unauthorized. Nay, more, we are not even called upon to      
assume the possibility of such an hypothesis, as none of the                
deductions drawn from such an ideal would affect the complete               
determination of things in general- for the sake of which alone is the      
idea necessary.                                                             
  It is not sufficient to circumscribe the procedure and the dialectic      
of reason; we must also endeavour to discover the sources of this           
dialectic, that we may have it in our power to give a rational              
explanation of this illusion, as a phenomenon of the human mind. For        
the ideal, of which we are at present speaking, is based, not upon          
an arbitrary, but upon a natural, idea. The question hence arises: How      
happens it that reason regards the possibility of all things as             
deduced from a single possibility, that, to wit, of the highest             
reality, and presupposes this as existing in an individual and              
primal being?                                                               
  The answer is ready; it is at once presented by the procedure of          
transcendental analytic. The possibility of sensuous objects is a           
relation of these objects to thought, in which something (the               
empirical form) may be cogitated a priori; while that which                 
constitutes the matter- the reality of the phenomenon (that element         
which corresponds to sensation)- must be given from without, as             
otherwise it could not even be cogitated by, nor could its possibility      
be presentable to the mind. Now, a sensuous object is completely            
determined, when it has been compared with all phenomenal                   
predicates, and represented by means of these either positively or          
negatively. But, as that which constitutes the thing itself- the            
real in a phenomenon, must be given, and that, in which the real of         
all phenomena is given, is experience, one, sole, and all-embracing-        
the material of the possibility of all sensuous objects must be             
presupposed as given in a whole, and it is upon the limitation of this      
whole that the possibility of all empirical objects, their distinction      
from each other and their complete determination, are based. Now, no        
other objects are presented to us besides sensuous objects, and             
these can be given only in connection with a possible experience; it        
follows that a thing is not an object to us, unless it presupposes the      
whole or sum-total of empirical reality as the condition of its             
possibility. Now, a natural illusion leads us to consider this              
principle, which is valid only of sensuous objects, as valid with           
regard to things in general. And thus we are induced to hold the            
empirical principle of our conceptions of the possibility of things,        
as phenomena, by leaving out this limitative condition, to be a             
transcendental principle of the possibility of things in general.           
  We proceed afterwards to hypostatize this idea of the sum-total of        
all reality, by changing the distributive unity of the empirical            
exercise of the understanding into the collective unity of an               
empirical whole- a dialectical illusion, and by cogitating this             
whole or sum of experience as an individual thing, containing in            
itself all empirical reality. This individual thing or being is             
then, by means of the above-mentioned transcendental subreption,            
substituted for our notion of a thing which stands at the head of           
the possibility of all things, the real conditions of whose complete        
determination it presents.*                                                 
-                                                                           
                                                   {BK_2|CH_3 ^paragraph 35}
  *This ideal of the ens realissimum- although merely a mental              
representation- is first objectivized, that is, has an objective            
existence attributed to it, then hypostatized, and finally, by the          
natural progress of reason to the completion of unity, personified, as      
we shall show presently. For the regulative unity of experience is not      
based upon phenomena themselves, but upon the connection of the             
variety of phenomena by the understanding in a consciousness, and thus      
the unity of the supreme reality and the complete determinability of        
all things, seem to reside in a supreme understanding, and,                 
consequently, in a conscious intelligence.                                  
-                                                                           
   SECTION III. Of the Arguments employed by Speculative Reason in          
            Proof of the Existence of a Supreme Being.                      
-                                                                           
                                                   {BK_2|CH_3 ^paragraph 40}
  Notwithstanding the pressing necessity which reason feels, to form        
some presupposition that shall serve the understanding as a proper          
basis for the complete determination of its conceptions, the                
idealistic and factitious nature of such a presupposition is too            
evident to allow reason for a moment to persuade itself into a              
belief of the objective existence of a mere creation of its own             
thought. But there are other considerations which compel reason to          
seek out some resting place in the regress from the conditioned to the      
unconditioned, which is not given as an actual existence from the mere      
conception of it, although it alone can give completeness to the            
series of conditions. And this is the natural course of every human         
reason, even of the most uneducated, although the path at first             
entered it does not always continue to follow. It does not begin            
from conceptions, but from common experience, and requires a basis          
in actual existence. But this basis is insecure, unless it rests            
upon the immovable rock of the absolutely necessary. And this               
foundation is itself unworthy of trust, if it leave under and above it      
empty space, if it do not fill all, and leave no room for a why or a        
wherefore, if it be not, in one word, infinite in its reality.              
  If we admit the existence of some one thing, whatever it may be,          
we must also admit that there is something which exists necessarily.        
For what is contingent exists only under the condition of some other        
thing, which is its cause; and from this we must go on to conclude the      
existence of a cause which is not contingent, and which consequently        
exists necessarily and unconditionally. Such is the argument by             
which reason justifies its advances towards a primal being.                 
  Now reason looks round for the conception of a being that may be          
admitted, without inconsistency, to be worthy of the attribute of           
absolute necessity, not for the purpose of inferring a priori, from         
the conception of such a being, its objective existence (for if reason      
allowed itself to take this course, it would not require a basis in         
given and actual existence, but merely the support of pure                  
conceptions), but for the purpose of discovering, among all our             
conceptions of possible things, that conception which possesses no          
element inconsistent with the idea of absolute necessity. For that          
there must be some absolutely necessary existence, it regards as a          
truth already established. Now, if it can remove every existence            
incapable of supporting the attribute of absolute necessity, excepting      
one- this must be the absolutely necessary being, whether its               
necessity is comprehensible by us, that is, deducible from the              
conception of it alone, or not.                                             
  Now that, the conception of which contains a therefore to every           
wherefore, which is not defective in any respect whatever, which is         
all-sufficient as a condition, seems to be the being of which we can        
justly predicate absolute necessity- for this reason, that, possessing      
the conditions of all that is possible, it does not and cannot              
itself require any condition. And thus it satisfies, in one respect at      
least, the requirements of the conception of absolute necessity. In         
this view, it is superior to all other conceptions, which, as               
deficient and incomplete, do not possess the characteristic of              
independence of all higher conditions. It is true that we cannot infer      
from this that what does not contain in itself the supreme and              
complete condition- the condition of all other things- must possess         
only a conditioned existence; but as little can we assert the               
contrary, for this supposed being does not possess the only                 
characteristic which can enable reason to cognize by means of an a          
priori conception the unconditioned and necessary nature of its             
existence.                                                                  
  The conception of an ens realissimum is that which best agrees            
with the conception of an unconditioned and necessary being. The            
former conception does not satisfy all the requirements of the latter;      
but we have no choice, we are obliged to adhere to it, for we find          
that we cannot do without the existence of a necessary being; and even      
although we admit it, we find it out of our power to discover in the        
whole sphere of possibility any being that can advance wellgrounded         
claims to such a distinction.                                               
                                                   {BK_2|CH_3 ^paragraph 45}
  The following is, therefore, the natural course of human reason.          
It begins by persuading itself of the existence of some necessary           
being. In this being it recognizes the characteristics of                   
unconditioned existence. It then seeks the conception of that which is      
independent of all conditions, and finds it in that which is itself         
the sufficient condition of all other things- in other words, in            
that which contains all reality. But the unlimited all is an                
absolute unity, and is conceived by the mind as a being one and             
supreme; and thus reason concludes that the Supreme Being, as the           
primal basis of all things, possesses an existence which is absolutely      
necessary.                                                                  
  This conception must be regarded as in some degree satisfactory,          
if we admit the existence of a necessary being, and consider that           
there exists a necessity for a definite and final answer to these           
questions. In such a case, we cannot make a better choice, or rather        
we have no choice at all, but feel ourselves obliged to declare in          
favour of the absolute unity of complete reality, as the highest            
source of the possibility of things. But if there exists no motive for      
coming to a definite conclusion, and we may leave the question              
unanswered till we have fully weighed both sides- in other words, when      
we are merely called upon to decide how much we happen to know about        
the question, and how much we merely flatter ourselves that we know-        
the above conclusion does not appear to be so great advantage, but, on      
the contrary, seems defective in the grounds upon which it is               
supported.                                                                  
  For, admitting the truth of all that has been said, that, namely,         
the inference from a given existence (my own, for example) to the           
existence of an unconditioned and necessary being is valid and              
unassailable; that, in the second place, we must consider a being           
which contains all reality, and consequently all the conditions of          
other things, to be absolutely unconditioned; and admitting too,            
that we have thus discovered the conception of a thing to which may be      
attributed, without inconsistency, absolute necessity- it does not          
follow from all this that the conception of a limited being, in             
which the supreme reality does not reside, is therefore incompatible        
with the idea of absolute necessity. For, although I do not discover        
the element of the unconditioned in the conception of such a being- an      
element which is manifestly existent in the sum-total of all                
conditions- I am not entitled to conclude that its existence is             
therefore conditioned; just as I am not entitled to affirm, in a            
hypothetical syllogism, that where a certain condition does not             
exist (in the present, completeness, as far as pure conceptions are         
concerned), the conditioned does not exist either. On the contrary, we      
are free to consider all limited beings as likewise unconditionally         
necessary, although we are unable to infer this from the general            
conception which we have of them. Thus conducted, this argument is          
incapable of giving us the least notion of the properties of a              
necessary being, and must be in every respect without result.               
  This argument continues, however, to possess a weight and an              
authority, which, in spite of its objective insufficiency, it has           
never been divested of. For, granting that certain responsibilities         
lie upon us, which, as based on the ideas of reason, deserve to be          
respected and submitted to, although they are incapable of a real or        
practical application to our nature, or, in other words, would be           
responsibilities without motives, except upon the supposition of a          
Supreme Being to give effect and influence to the practical laws: in        
such a case we should be bound to obey our conceptions, which,              
although objectively insufficient, do, according to the standard of         
reason, preponderate over and are superior to any claims that may be        
advanced from any other quarter. The equilibrium of doubt would in          
this case be destroyed by a practical addition; indeed, Reason would        
be compelled to condemn herself, if she refused to comply with the          
demands of the judgement, no superior to which we know- however             
defective her understanding of the grounds of these demands might be.       
  This argument, although in fact transcendental, inasmuch as it rests      
upon the intrinsic insufficiency of the contingent, is so simple and        
natural, that the commonest understanding can appreciate its value. We      
see things around us change, arise, and pass away; they, or their           
condition, must therefore have a cause. The same demand must again          
be made of the cause itself- as a datum of experience. Now it is            
natural that we should place the highest causality just where we place      
supreme causality, in that being, which contains the conditions of all      
possible effects, and the conception of which is so simple as that          
of an all-embracing reality. This highest cause, then, we regard as         
absolutely necessary, because we find it absolutely necessary to            
rise to it, and do not discover any reason for proceeding beyond it.        
Thus, among all nations, through the darkest polytheism glimmer some        
faint sparks of monotheism, to which these idolaters have been led,         
not from reflection and profound thought, but by the study and natural      
progress of the common understanding.                                       
                                                   {BK_2|CH_3 ^paragraph 50}
  There are only three modes of proving the existence of a Deity, on        
the grounds of speculative reason.                                          
  All the paths conducting to this end begin either from determinate        
experience and the peculiar constitution of the world of sense, and         
rise, according to the laws of causality, from it to the highest cause      
existing apart from the world- or from a purely indeterminate               
experience, that is, some empirical existence- or abstraction is            
made of all experience, and the existence of a supreme cause is             
concluded from a priori conceptions alone. The first is the                 
physicotheological argument, the second the cosmological, the third         
the ontological. More there are not, and more there cannot be.              
  I shall show it is as unsuccessful on the one path- the empirical-        
as on the other- the transcendental- and that it stretches its wings        
in vain, to soar beyond the world of sense by the mere might of             
speculative thought. As regards the order in which we must discuss          
those arguments, it will be exactly the reverse of that in which            
reason, in the progress of its development, attains to them- the order      
in which they are placed above. For it will be made manifest to the         
reader that, although experience presents the occasion and the              
starting-point, it is the transcendental idea of reason which guides        
it in its pilgrimage and is the goal of all its struggles. I shall          
therefore begin with an examination of the transcendental argument,         
and afterwards inquire what additional strength has accrued to this         
mode of proof from the addition of the empirical element.                   
-                                                                           
  SECTION IV. Of the Impossibility of an Ontological Proof of               
                                                   {BK_2|CH_3 ^paragraph 55}
                    the Existence of God.                                   
-                                                                           
  It is evident from what has been said that the conception of an           
absolutely necessary being is a mere idea, the objective reality of         
which is far from being established by the mere fact that it is a need      
of reason. On the contrary, this idea serves merely to indicate a           
certain unattainable perfection, and rather limits the operations           
than, by the presentation of new objects, extends the sphere of the         
understanding. But a strange anomaly meets us at the very threshold;        
for the inference from a given existence in general to an absolutely        
necessary existence seems to be correct and unavoidable, while the          
conditions of the understanding refuse to aid us in forming any             
conception of such a being.                                                 
  Philosophers have always talked of an absolutely necessary being,         
and have nevertheless declined to take the trouble of conceiving            
whether- and how- a being of this nature is even cogitable, not to          
mention that its existence is actually demonstrable. A verbal               
definition of the conception is certainly easy enough: it is something      
the non-existence of which is impossible. But does this definition          
throw any light upon the conditions which render it impossible to           
cogitate the non-existence of a thing- conditions which we wish to          
ascertain, that we may discover whether we think anything in the            
conception of such a being or not? For the mere fact that I throw           
away, by means of the word unconditioned, all the conditions which the      
understanding habitually requires in order to regard anything as            
necessary, is very far from making clear whether by means of the            
conception of the unconditionally necessary I think of something, or        
really of nothing at all.                                                   
  Nay, more, this chance-conception, now become so current, many            
have endeavoured to explain by examples which seemed to render any          
inquiries regarding its intelligibility quite needless. Every               
geometrical proposition- a triangle has three angles- it was said,          
is absolutely necessary; and thus people talked of an object which lay      
out of the sphere of our understanding as if it were perfectly plain        
what the conception of such a being meant.                                  
                                                   {BK_2|CH_3 ^paragraph 60}
  All the examples adduced have been drawn, without exception, from         
judgements, and not from things. But the unconditioned necessity of         
a judgement does not form the absolute necessity of a thing. On the         
contrary, the absolute necessity of a judgement is only a                   
conditioned necessity of a thing, or of the predicate in a                  
judgement. The proposition above-mentioned does not enounce that three      
angles necessarily exist, but, upon condition that a triangle               
exists, three angles must necessarily exist- in it. And thus this           
logical necessity has been the source of the greatest delusions.            
Having formed an a priori conception of a thing, the content of             
which was made to embrace existence, we believed ourselves safe in          
concluding that, because existence belongs necessarily to the object        
of the conception (that is, under the condition of my positing this         
thing as given), the existence of the thing is also posited                 
necessarily, and that it is therefore absolutely necessary- merely          
because its existence has been cogitated in the conception.                 
  If, in an identical judgement, I annihilate the predicate in              
thought, and retain the subject, a contradiction is the result; and         
hence I say, the former belongs necessarily to the latter. But if I         
suppress both subject and predicate in thought, no contradiction            
arises; for there is nothing at all, and therefore no means of forming      
a contradiction. To suppose the existence of a triangle and not that        
of its three angles, is self-contradictory; but to suppose the              
non-existence of both triangle and angles is perfectly admissible. And      
so is it with the conception of an absolutely necessary being.              
Annihilate its existence in thought, and you annihilate the thing           
itself with all its predicates; how then can there be any room for          
contradiction? Externally, there is nothing to give rise to a               
contradiction, for a thing cannot be necessary externally; nor              
internally, for, by the annihilation or suppression of the thing            
itself, its internal properties are also annihilated. God is                
omnipotent- that is a necessary judgement. His omnipotence cannot be        
denied, if the existence of a Deity is posited- the existence, that         
is, of an infinite being, the two conceptions being identical. But          
when you say, God does not exist, neither omnipotence nor any other         
predicate is affirmed; they must all disappear with the subject, and        
in this judgement there cannot exist the least self-contradiction.          
  You have thus seen that when the predicate of a judgement is              
annihilated in thought along with the subject, no internal                  
contradiction can arise, be the predicate what it may. There is no          
possibility of evading the conclusion- you find yourselves compelled        
to declare: There are certain subjects which cannot be annihilated          
in thought. But this is nothing more than saying: There exist subjects      
which are absolutely necessary- the very hypothesis which you are           
called upon to establish. For I find myself unable to form the              
slightest conception of a thing which when annihilated in thought with      
all its predicates, leaves behind a contradiction; and contradiction        
is the only criterion of impossibility in the sphere of pure a              
priori conceptions.                                                         
  Against these general considerations, the justice of which no one         
can dispute, one argument is adduced, which is regarded as                  
furnishing a satisfactory demonstration from the fact. It is                
affirmed that there is one and only one conception, in which the            
non-being or annihilation of the object is self-contradictory, and          
this is the conception of an ens realissimum. It possesses, you say,        
all reality, and you feel yourselves justified in admitting the             
possibility of such a being. (This I am willing to grant for the            
present, although the existence of a conception which is not                
self-contradictory is far from being sufficient to prove the                
possibility of an object.)* Now the notion of all reality embraces          
in it that of existence; the notion of existence lies, therefore, in        
the conception of this possible thing. If this thing is annihilated in      
thought, the internal possibility of the thing is also annihilated,         
which is self-contradictory.                                                
-                                                                           
                                                   {BK_2|CH_3 ^paragraph 65}
  *A conception is always possible, if it is not self-contradictory.        
This is the logical criterion of possibility, distinguishing the            
object of such a conception from the nihil negativum. But it may be,        
notwithstanding, an empty conception, unless the objective reality          
of this synthesis, but which it is generated, is demonstrated; and a        
proof of this kind must be based upon principles of possible                
experience, and not upon the principle of analysis or contradiction.        
This remark may be serviceable as a warning against concluding, from        
the possibility of a conception- which is logical- the possibility          
of a thing- which is real.                                                  
-                                                                           
  I answer: It is absurd to introduce- under whatever term                  
disguised- into the conception of a thing, which is to be cogitated         
solely in reference to its possibility, the conception of its               
existence. If this is admitted, you will have apparently gained the         
day, but in reality have enounced nothing but a mere tautology. I ask,      
is the proposition, this or that thing (which I am admitting to be          
possible) exists, an analytical or a synthetical proposition? If the        
former, there is no addition made to the subject of your thought by         
the affirmation of its existence; but then the conception in your           
minds is identical with the thing itself, or you have supposed the          
existence of a thing to be possible, and then inferred its existence        
from its internal possibility- which is but a miserable tautology. The      
word reality in the conception of the thing, and the word existence in      
the conception of the predicate, will not help you out of the               
difficulty. For, supposing you were to term all positing of a thing         
reality, you have thereby posited the thing with all its predicates in      
the conception of the subject and assumed its actual existence, and         
this you merely repeat in the predicate. But if you confess, as             
every reasonable person must, that every existential proposition is         
synthetical, how can it be maintained that the predicate of                 
existence cannot be denied without contradiction?- a property which is      
the characteristic of analytical propositions, alone.                       
  I should have a reasonable hope of putting an end for ever to this        
sophistical mode of argumentation, by a strict definition of the            
conception of existence, did not my own experience teach me that the        
illusion arising from our confounding a logical with a real                 
predicate (a predicate which aids in the determination of a thing)          
resists almost all the endeavours of explanation and illustration. A        
logical predicate may be what you please, even the subject may be           
predicated of itself; for logic pays no regard to the content of a          
judgement. But the determination of a conception is a predicate, which      
adds to and enlarges the conception. It must not, therefore, be             
contained in the conception.                                                
  Being is evidently not a real predicate, that is, a conception of         
something which is added to the conception of some other thing. It          
is merely the positing of a thing, or of certain determinations in it.      
Logically, it is merely the copula of a judgement. The proposition,         
God is omnipotent, contains two conceptions, which have a certain           
object or content; the word is, is no additional predicate- it              
merely indicates the relation of the predicate to the subject. Now, if      
I take the subject (God) with all its predicates (omnipotence being         
one), and say: God is, or, There is a God, I add no new predicate to        
the conception of God, I merely posit or affirm the existence of the        
subject with all its predicates- I posit the object in relation to          
my conception. The content of both is the same; and there is no             
addition made to the conception, which expresses merely the                 
possibility of the object, by my cogitating the object- in the              
expression, it is- as absolutely given or existing. Thus the real           
contains no more than the possible. A hundred real dollars contain          
no more than a hundred possible dollars. For, as the latter indicate        
the conception, and the former the object, on the supposition that the      
content of the former was greater than that of the latter, my               
conception would not be an expression of the whole object, and would        
consequently be an inadequate conception of it. But in reckoning my         
wealth there may be said to be more in a hundred real dollars than          
in a hundred possible dollars- that is, in the mere conception of           
them. For the real object- the dollars- is not analytically                 
contained in my conception, but forms a synthetical addition to my          
conception (which is merely a determination of my mental state),            
although this objective reality- this existence- apart from my              
conceptions, does not in the least degree increase the aforesaid            
hundred dollars.                                                            
                                                   {BK_2|CH_3 ^paragraph 70}
  By whatever and by whatever number of predicates- even to the             
complete determination of it- I may cogitate a thing, I do not in           
the least augment the object of my conception by the addition of the        
statement: This thing exists. Otherwise, not exactly the same, but          
something more than what was cogitated in my conception, would              
exist, and I could not affirm that the exact object of my conception        
had real existence. If I cogitate a thing as containing all modes of        
reality except one, the mode of reality which is absent is not added        
to the conception of the thing by the affirmation that the thing            
exists; on the contrary, the thing exists- if it exist at all- with         
the same defect as that cogitated in its conception; otherwise not          
that which was cogitated, but something different, exists. Now, if I        
cogitate a being as the highest reality, without defect or                  
imperfection, the question still remains- whether this being exists or      
not? For, although no element is wanting in the possible real               
content of my conception, there is a defect in its relation to my           
mental state, that is, I am ignorant whether the cognition of the           
object indicated by the conception is possible a posteriori. And            
here the cause of the present difficulty becomes apparent. If the           
question regarded an object of sense merely, it would be impossible         
for me to confound the conception with the existence of a thing. For        
the conception merely enables me to cogitate an object as according         
with the general conditions of experience; while the existence of           
the object permits me to cogitate it as contained in the sphere of          
actual experience. At the same time, this connection with the world of      
experience does not in the least augment the conception, although a         
possible perception has been added to the experience of the mind.           
But if we cogitate existence by the pure category alone, it is not          
to be wondered at, that we should find ourselves unable to present any      
criterion sufficient to distinguish it from mere possibility.               
  Whatever be the content of our conception of an object, it is             
necessary to go beyond it, if we wish to predicate existence of the         
object. In the case of sensuous objects, this is attained by their          
connection according to empirical laws with some one of my                  
perceptions; but there is no means of cognizing the existence of            
objects of pure thought, because it must be cognized completely a           
priori. But all our knowledge of existence (be it immediately by            
perception, or by inferences connecting some object with a perception)      
belongs entirely to the sphere of experience- which is in perfect           
unity with itself; and although an existence out of this sphere cannot      
be absolutely declared to be impossible, it is a hypothesis the             
truth of which we have no means of ascertaining.                            
  The notion of a Supreme Being is in many respects a highly useful         
idea; but for the very reason that it is an idea, it is incapable of        
enlarging our cognition with regard to the existence of things. It          
is not even sufficient to instruct us as to the possibility of a being      
which we do not know to exist. The analytical criterion of                  
possibility, which consists in the absence of contradiction in              
propositions, cannot be denied it. But the connection of real               
properties in a thing is a synthesis of the possibility of which an         
a priori judgement cannot be formed, because these realities are not        
presented to us specifically; and even if this were to happen, a            
judgement would still be impossible, because the criterion of the           
possibility of synthetical cognitions must be sought for in the             
world of experience, to which the object of an idea cannot belong. And      
thus the celebrated Leibnitz has utterly failed in his attempt to           
establish upon a priori grounds the possibility of this sublime             
ideal being.                                                                
  The celebrated ontological or Cartesian argument for the existence        
of a Supreme Being is therefore insufficient; and we may as well            
hope to increase our stock of knowledge by the aid of mere ideas, as        
the merchant to augment his wealth by the addition of noughts to his        
cash account.                                                               
-                                                                           
                                                   {BK_2|CH_3 ^paragraph 75}
     SECTION V. Of the Impossibility of a Cosmological Proof                
                  of the Existence of God.                                  
-                                                                           
  It was by no means a natural course of proceeding, but, on the            
contrary, an invention entirely due to the subtlety of the schools, to      
attempt to draw from a mere idea a proof of the existence of an object      
corresponding to it. Such a course would never have been pursued, were      
it not for that need of reason which requires it to suppose the             
existence of a necessary being as a basis for the empirical regress,        
and that, as this necessity must be unconditioned and a priori, reason      
is bound to discover a conception which shall satisfy, if possible,         
this requirement, and enable us to attain to the a priori cognition of      
such a being. This conception was thought to be found in the idea of        
an ens realissimum, and thus this idea was employed for the attainment      
of a better defined knowledge of a necessary being, of the existence        
of which we were convinced, or persuaded, on other grounds. Thus            
reason was seduced from her natural courage; and, instead of                
concluding with the conception of an ens realissimum, an attempt was        
made to begin with it, for the purpose of inferring from it that            
idea of a necessary existence which it was in fact called in to             
complete. Thus arose that unfortunate ontological argument, which           
neither satisfies the healthy common sense of humanity, nor sustains        
the scientific examination of the philosopher.                              
  The cosmological proof, which we are about to examine, retains the        
connection between absolute necessity and the highest reality; but,         
instead of reasoning from this highest reality to a necessary               
existence, like the preceding argument, it concludes from the given.        
unconditioned necessity of some being its unlimited reality. The track      
it pursues, whether rational or sophistical, is at least natural,           
and not only goes far to persuade the common understanding, but             
shows itself deserving of respect from the speculative intellect;           
while it contains, at the same time, the outlines of all the arguments      
employed in natural theology- arguments which always have been, and         
still will be, in use and authority. These, however adorned, and hid        
under whatever embellishments of rhetoric and sentiment, are at bottom      
identical with the arguments we are at present to discuss. This proof,      
termed by Leibnitz the argumentum a contingentia mundi, I shall now         
lay before the reader, and subject to a strict examination.                 
                                                   {BK_2|CH_3 ^paragraph 80}
  It is framed in the following manner: If something exists, an             
absolutely necessary being must likewise exist. Now I, at least,            
exist. Consequently, there exists an absolutely necessary being. The        
minor contains an experience, the major reasons from a general              
experience to the existence of a necessary being.* Thus this                
argument really begins at experience, and is not completely a               
priori, or ontological. The object of all possible experience being         
the world, it is called the cosmological proof. It contains no              
reference to any peculiar property of sensuous objects, by which            
this world of sense might be distinguished from other possible worlds;      
and in this respect it differs from the physico-theological proof,          
which is based upon the consideration of the peculiar constitution          
of our sensuous world.                                                      
-                                                                           
  *This inference is too well known to require more detailed                
discussion. It is based upon the spurious transcendental law of             
causality, that everything which is contingent has a cause, which,          
if itself contingent, must also have a cause; and so on, till the           
series of subordinated causes must end with an absolutely necessary         
cause, without which it would not possess completeness.                     
-                                                                           
  The proof proceeds thus: A necessary being can be determined only in      
one way, that is, it can be determined by only one of all possible          
opposed predicates; consequently, it must be completely determined          
in and by its conception. But there is only a single conception of a        
thing possible, which completely determines the thing a priori: that        
is, the conception of the ens realissimum. It follows that the              
conception of the ens realissimum is the only conception by and in          
which we can cogitate a necessary being. Consequently, a Supreme Being      
necessarily exists.                                                         
                                                   {BK_2|CH_3 ^paragraph 85}
  In this cosmological argument are assembled so many sophistical           
propositions that speculative reason seems to have exerted in it all        
her dialectical skill to produce a transcendental illusion of the most      
extreme character. We shall postpone an investigation of this argument      
for the present, and confine ourselves to exposing the stratagem by         
which it imposes upon us an old argument in a new dress, and appeals        
to the agreement of two witnesses, the one with the credentials of          
pure reason, and the other with those of empiricism; while, in fact,        
it is only the former who has changed his dress and voice, for the          
purpose of passing himself off for an additional witness. That it           
may possess a secure foundation, it bases its conclusions upon              
experience, and thus appears to be completely distinct from the             
ontological argument, which places its confidence entirely in pure a        
priori conceptions. But this experience merely aids reason in making        
one step- to the existence of a necessary being. What the properties        
of this being are cannot be learned from experience; and therefore          
reason abandons it altogether, and pursues its inquiries in the sphere      
of pure conception, for the purpose of discovering what the properties      
of an absolutely necessary being ought to be, that is, what among           
all possible things contain the conditions (requisita) of absolute          
necessity. Reason believes that it has discovered these requisites          
in the conception of an ens realissimum- and in it alone, and hence         
concludes: The ens realissimum is an absolutely necessary being. But        
it is evident that reason has here presupposed that the conception          
of an ens realissimum is perfectly adequate to the conception of a          
being of absolute necessity, that is, that we may infer the                 
existence of the latter from that of the former- a proposition which        
formed the basis of the ontological argument, and which is now              
employed in the support of the cosmological argument, contrary to           
the wish and professions of its inventors. For the existence of an          
absolutely necessary being is given in conceptions alone. But if I          
say: "The conception of the ens realissimum is a conception of this         
kind, and in fact the only conception which is adequate to our idea of      
a necessary being," I am obliged to admit, that the latter may be           
inferred from the former. Thus it is properly the ontological argument      
which figures in the cosmological, and constitutes the whole                
strength of the latter; while the spurious basis of experience has          
been of no further use than to conduct us to the conception of              
absolute necessity, being utterly insufficient to demonstrate the           
presence of this attribute in any determinate existence or thing.           
For when we propose to ourselves an aim of this character, we must          
abandon the sphere of experience, and rise to that of pure                  
conceptions, which we examine with the purpose of discovering               
whether any one contains the conditions of the possibility of an            
absolutely necessary being. But if the possibility of such a being          
is thus demonstrated, its existence is also proved; for we may then         
assert that, of all possible beings there is one which possesses the        
attribute of necessity- in other words, this being possesses an             
absolutely necessary existence.                                             
  All illusions in an argument are more easily detected when they           
are presented in the formal manner employed by the schools, which we        
now proceed to do.                                                          
  If the proposition: "Every absolutely necessary being is likewise an      
ens realissimum," is correct (and it is this which constitutes the          
nervus probandi of the cosmological argument), it must, like all            
affirmative judgements, be capable of conversion- the conversio per         
accidens, at least. It follows, then, that some entia realissima are        
absolutely necessary beings. But no ens realissimum is in any               
respect different from another, and what is valid of some is valid          
of all. In this present case, therefore, I may employ simple                
conversion, and say: "Every ens realissimum is a necessary being." But      
as this proposition is determined a priori by the conceptions               
contained in it, the mere conception of an ens realissimum must             
possess the additional attribute of absolute necessity. But this is         
exactly what was maintained in the ontological argument, and not            
recognized by the cosmological, although it formed the real ground          
of its disguised and illusory reasoning.                                    
  Thus the second mode employed by speculative reason of demonstrating      
the existence of a Supreme Being, is not only, like the first,              
illusory and inadequate, but possesses the additional blemish of an         
ignoratio elenchi- professing to conduct us by a new road to the            
desired goal, but bringing us back, after a short circuit, to the           
old path which we had deserted at its call.                                 
  I mentioned above that this cosmological argument contains a perfect      
nest of dialectical assumptions, which transcendental criticism does        
not find it difficult to expose and to dissipate. I shall merely            
enumerate these, leaving it to the reader, who must by this time be         
well practised in such matters, to investigate the fallacies                
residing therein.                                                           
                                                   {BK_2|CH_3 ^paragraph 90}
  The following fallacies, for example, are discoverable in this            
mode of proof: 1. The transcendental principle: "Everything that is         
contingent must have a cause"- a principle without significance,            
except in the sensuous world. For the purely intellectual conception        
of the contingent cannot produce any synthetical proposition, like          
that of causality, which is itself without significance or                  
distinguishing characteristic except in the phenomenal world. But in        
the present case it is employed to help us beyond the limits of its         
sphere. 2. "From the impossibility of an infinite ascending series          
of causes in the world of sense a first cause is inferred"; a               
conclusion which the principles of the employment of reason do not          
justify even in the sphere of experience, and still less when an            
attempt is made to pass the limits of this sphere. 3. Reason allows         
itself to be satisfied upon insufficient grounds, with regard to the        
completion of this series. It removes all conditions (without which,        
however, no conception of Necessity can take place); and, as after          
this it is beyond our power to form any other conceptions, it               
accepts this as a completion of the conception it wishes to form of         
the series. 4. The logical possibility of a conception of the total of      
reality (the criterion of this possibility being the absence of             
contradiction) is confound. ed with the transcendental, which requires      
a principle of the practicability of such a synthesis- a principle          
which again refers us to the world of experience. And so on.                
  The aim of the cosmological argument is to avoid the necessity of         
proving the existence of a necessary being priori from mere                 
conceptions- a proof which must be ontological, and of which we feel        
ourselves quite incapable. With this purpose, we reason from an actual      
existence- an experience in general, to an absolutely necessary             
condition of that existence. It is in this case unnecessary to              
demonstrate its possibility. For after having proved that it exists,        
the question regarding its possibility is superfluous. Now, when we         
wish to define more strictly the nature of this necessary being, we do      
not look out for some being the conception of which would enable us to      
comprehend the necessity of its being- for if we could do this, an          
empirical presupposition would be unnecessary; no, we try to                
discover merely the negative condition (conditio sine qua non),             
without which a being would not be absolutely necessary. Now this           
would be perfectly admissible in every sort of reasoning, from a            
consequence to its principle; but in the present case it unfortunately      
happens that the condition of absolute necessity can be discovered          
in but a single being, the conception of which must consequently            
contain all that is requisite for demonstrating the presence of             
absolute necessity, and thus entitle me to infer this absolute              
necessity a priori. That is, it must be possible to reason conversely,      
and say: The thing, to which the conception of the highest reality          
belongs, is absolutely necessary. But if I cannot reason thus- and I        
cannot, unless I believe in the sufficiency of the ontological              
argument- I find insurmountable obstacles in my new path, and am            
really no farther than the point from which I set out. The                  
conception of a Supreme Being satisfies all questions a priori              
regarding the internal determinations of a thing, and is for this           
reason an ideal without equal or parallel, the general conception of        
it indicating it as at the same time an ens individuum among all            
possible things. But the conception does not satisfy the question           
regarding its existence- which was the purpose of all our inquiries;        
and, although the existence of a necessary being were admitted, we          
should find it impossible to answer the question: What of all things        
in the world must be regarded as such?                                      
  It is certainly allowable to admit the existence of an                    
all-sufficient being- a cause of all possible effects- for the purpose      
of enabling reason to introduce unity into its mode and grounds of          
explanation with regard to phenomena. But to assert that such a             
being necessarily exists, is no longer the modest enunciation of an         
admissible hypothesis, but the boldest declaration of an apodeictic         
certainty; for the cognition of that which is absolutely necessary          
must itself possess that character.                                         
  The aim of the transcendental ideal formed by the mind is either          
to discover a conception which shall harmonize with the idea of             
absolute necessity, or a conception which shall contain that idea.          
If the one is possible, so is the other; for reason recognizes that         
alone as absolutely necessary which is necessary from its                   
conception. But both attempts are equally beyond our power- we find it      
impossible to satisfy the understanding upon this point, and as             
impossible to induce it to remain at rest in relation to this               
incapacity.                                                                 
  Unconditioned necessity, which, as the ultimate support and stay          
of all existing things, is an indispensable requirement of the mind,        
is an abyss on the verge of which human reason trembles in dismay.          
Even the idea of eternity, terrible and sublime as it is, as                
depicted by Haller, does not produce upon the mental vision such a          
feeling of awe and terror; for, although it measures the duration of        
things, it does not support them. We cannot bear, nor can we rid            
ourselves of the thought that a being, which we regard as the greatest      
of all possible existences, should say to himself: I am from                
eternity to eternity; beside me there is nothing, except that which         
exists by my will; whence then am I? Here all sinks away from under         
us; and the greatest, as the smallest, perfection, hovers without stay      
or footing in presence of the speculative reason, which finds it as         
easy to part with the one as with the other.                                
                                                   {BK_2|CH_3 ^paragraph 95}
  Many physical powers, which evidence their existence by their             
effects, are perfectly inscrutable in their nature; they elude all our      
powers of observation. The transcendental object which forms the basis      
of phenomena, and, in connection with it, the reason why our                
sensibility possesses this rather than that particular kind of              
conditions, are and must ever remain hidden from our mental vision;         
the fact is there, the reason of the fact we cannot see. But an             
ideal of pure reason cannot be termed mysterious or inscrutable,            
because the only credential of its reality is the need of it felt by        
reason, for the purpose of giving completeness to the world of              
synthetical unity. An ideal is not even given as a cogitable object,        
and therefore cannot be inscrutable; on the contrary, it must, as a         
mere idea, be based on the constitution of reason itself, and on            
this account must be capable of explanation and solution. For the very      
essence of reason consists in its ability to give an account, of all        
our conceptions, opinions, and assertions- upon objective, or, when         
they happen to be illusory and fallacious, upon subjective grounds.         
-                                                                           
     Detection and Explanation of the Dialectical Illusion in               
       all Transcendental Arguments for the Existence of a                  
       Necessary Being.                                                     
                                                  {BK_2|CH_3 ^paragraph 100}
-                                                                           
  Both of the above arguments are transcendental; in other words, they      
do not proceed upon empirical principles. For, although the                 
cosmological argument professed to lay a basis of experience for its        
edifice of reasoning, it did not ground its procedure upon the              
peculiar constitution of experience, but upon pure principles of            
reason- in relation to an existence given by empirical                      
consciousness; utterly abandoning its guidance, however, for the            
purpose of supporting its assertions entirely upon pure conceptions.        
Now what is the cause, in these transcendental arguments, of the            
dialectical, but natural, illusion, which connects the conceptions          
of necessity and supreme reality, and hypostatizes that which cannot        
be anything but an idea? What is the cause of this unavoidable step on      
the part of reason, of admitting that some one among all existing           
things must be necessary, while it falls back from the assertion of         
the existence of such a being as from an abyss? And how does reason         
proceed to explain this anomaly to itself, and from the wavering            
condition of a timid and reluctant approbation- always again                
withdrawn- arrive at a calm and settled insight into its cause?             
  It is something very remarkable that, on the supposition that             
something exists, I cannot avoid the inference that something exists        
necessarily. Upon this perfectly natural- but not on that account           
reliable- inference does the cosmological argument rest. But, let me        
form any conception whatever of a thing, I find that I cannot cogitate      
the existence of the thing as absolutely necessary, and that nothing        
prevents me- be the thing or being what it may- from cogitating its         
non-existence. I may thus be obliged to admit that all existing things      
have a necessary basis, while I cannot cogitate any single or               
individual thing as necessary. In other words, I can never complete         
the regress through the conditions of existence, without admitting the      
existence of a necessary being; but, on the other hand, I cannot            
make a commencement from this being.                                        
  If I must cogitate something as existing necessarily as the basis of      
existing things, and yet am not permitted to cogitate any individual        
thing as in itself necessary, the inevitable inference is that              
necessity and contingency are not properties of things themselves-          
otherwise an internal contradiction would result; that consequently         
neither of these principles are objective, but merely subjective            
principles of reason- the one requiring us to seek for a necessary          
ground for everything that exists, that is, to be satisfied with no         
other explanation than that which is complete a priori, the other           
forbidding us ever to hope for the attainment of this completeness,         
that is, to regard no member of the empirical world as                      
unconditioned. In this mode of viewing them, both principles, in their      
purely heuristic and regulative character, and as concerning merely         
the formal interest of reason, are quite consistent with each other.        
The one says: "You must philosophize upon nature," as if there existed      
a necessary primal basis of all existing things, solely for the             
purpose of introducing systematic unity into your knowledge, by             
pursuing an idea of this character- a foundation which is                   
arbitrarily admitted to be ultimate; while the other warns you to           
consider no individual determination, concerning the existence of           
things, as such an ultimate foundation, that is, as absolutely              
necessary, but to keep the way always open for further progress in the      
deduction, and to treat every determination as determined by some           
other. But if all that we perceive must be regarded as conditionally        
necessary, it is impossible that anything which is empirically given        
should be absolutely necessary.                                             
  It follows from this that you must accept the absolutely necessary        
as out of and beyond the world, inasmuch as it is useful only as a          
principle of the highest possible unity in experience, and you              
cannot discover any such necessary existence in the would, the              
second rule requiring you to regard all empirical causes of unity as        
themselves deduced.                                                         
                                                  {BK_2|CH_3 ^paragraph 105}
  The philosophers of antiquity regarded all the forms of nature as         
contingent; while matter was considered by them, in accordance with         
the judgement of the common reason of mankind, as primal and                
necessary. But if they had regarded matter, not relatively- as the          
substratum of phenomena, but absolutely and in itself- as an                
independent existence, this idea of absolute necessity would have           
immediately disappeared. For there is nothing absolutely connecting         
reason with such an existence; on the contrary, it can annihilate it        
in thought, always and without self-contradiction. But in thought           
alone lay the idea of absolute necessity. A regulative principle must,      
therefore, have been at the foundation of this opinion. In fact,            
extension and impenetrability- which together constitute our                
conception of matter- form the supreme empirical principle of the           
unity of phenomena, and this principle, in so far as it is empirically      
unconditioned, possesses the property of a regulative principle.            
But, as every determination of matter which constitutes what is real        
in it- and consequently impenetrability- is an effect, which must have      
a cause, and is for this reason always derived, the notion of matter        
cannot harmonize with the idea of a necessary being, in its                 
character of the principle of all derived unity. For every one of           
its real properties, being derived, must be only conditionally              
necessary, and can therefore be annihilated in thought; and thus the        
whole existence of matter can be so annihilated or suppressed. If this      
were not the case, we should have found in the world of phenomena           
the highest ground or condition of unity- which is impossible,              
according to the second regulative principle. It follows that               
matter, and, in general, all that forms part of the world of sense,         
cannot be a necessary primal being, nor even a principle of                 
empirical unity, but that this being or principle must have its             
place assigned without the world. And, in this way, we can proceed          
in perfect confidence to deduce the phenomena of the world and their        
existence from other phenomena, just as if there existed no                 
necessary being; and we can at the same time, strive without ceasing        
towards the attainment of completeness for our deduction, just as if        
such a being- the supreme condition of all existences- were                 
presupposed by the mind.                                                    
  These remarks will have made it evident to the reader that the ideal      
of the Supreme Being, far from being an enouncement of the existence        
of a being in itself necessary, is nothing more than a regulative           
principle of reason, requiring us to regard all connection existing         
between phenomena as if it had its origin from an all-sufficient            
necessary cause, and basing upon this the rule of a systematic and          
necessary unity in the explanation of phenomena. We cannot, at the          
same time, avoid regarding, by a transcendental subreptio, this formal      
principle as constitutive, and hypostatizing this unity. Precisely          
similar is the case with our notion of space. Space is the primal           
condition of all forms, which are properly just so many different           
limitations of it; and thus, although it is merely a principle of           
sensibility, we cannot help regarding it as an absolutely necessary         
and self-subsistent thing- as an object given a priori in itself. In        
the same way, it is quite natural that, as the systematic unity of          
nature cannot be established as a principle for the empirical               
employment of reason, unless it is based upon the idea of an ens            
realissimum, as the supreme cause, we should regard this idea as a          
real object, and this object, in its character of supreme condition,        
as absolutely necessary, and that in this way a regulative should be        
transformed into a constitutive principle. This interchange becomes         
evident when I regard this supreme being, which, relatively to the          
world, was absolutely (unconditionally) necessary, as a thing per           
se. In this case, I find it impossible to represent this necessity          
in or by any conception, and it exists merely in my own mind, as the        
formal condition of thought, but not as a material and hypostatic           
condition of existence.                                                     
-                                                                           
  SECTION VI. Of the Impossibility of a Physico-Theological Proof.          
-                                                                           
                                                  {BK_2|CH_3 ^paragraph 110}
  If, then, neither a pure conception nor the general experience of an      
existing being can provide a sufficient basis for the proof of the          
existence of the Deity, we can make the attempt by the only other           
mode- that of grounding our argument upon a determinate experience          
of the phenomena of the present world, their constitution and               
disposition, and discover whether we can thus attain to a sound             
conviction of the existence of a Supreme Being. This argument we shall      
term the physico-theological argument. If it is shown to be                 
insufficient, speculative reason cannot present us with any                 
satisfactory proof of the existence of a being corresponding to our         
transcendental idea.                                                        
  It is evident from the remarks that have been made in the                 
preceding sections, that an answer to this question will be far from        
being difficult or unconvincing. For how can any experience be              
adequate with an idea? The very essence of an idea consists in the          
fact that no experience can ever be discovered congruent or adequate        
with it. The transcendental idea of a necessary and all-sufficient          
being is so immeasurably great, so high above all that is empirical,        
which is always conditioned, that we hope in vain to find materials in      
the sphere of experience sufficiently ample for our conception, and in      
vain seek the unconditioned among things that are conditioned, while        
examples, nay, even guidance is denied us by the laws of empirical          
synthesis.                                                                  
  If the Supreme Being forms a link in the chain of empirical               
conditions, it must be a member of the empirical series, and, like the      
lower members which it precedes, have its origin in some higher member      
of the series. If, on the other hand, we disengage it from the              
chain, and cogitate it as an intelligible being, apart from the series      
of natural causes- how shall reason bridge the abyss that separates         
the latter from the former? All laws respecting the regress from            
effects to causes, all synthetical additions to our knowledge relate        
solely to possible experience and the objects of the sensuous world,        
and, apart from them, are without significance.                             
  The world around us opens before our view so magnificent a spectacle      
of order, variety, beauty, and conformity to ends, that whether we          
pursue our observations into the infinity of space in the one               
direction, or into its illimitable divisions in the other, whether          
we regard the world in its greatest or its least manifestations-            
even after we have attained to the highest summit of knowledge which        
our weak minds can reach, we find that language in the presence of          
wonders so inconceivable has lost its force, and number its power to        
reckon, nay, even thought fails to conceive adequately, and our             
conception of the whole dissolves into an astonishment without power        
of expression- all the more eloquent that it is dumb. Everywhere            
around us we observe a chain of causes and effects, of means and ends,      
of death and birth; and, as nothing has entered of itself into the          
condition in which we find it, we are constantly referred to some           
other thing, which itself suggests the same inquiry regarding its           
cause, and thus the universe must sink into the abyss of                    
nothingness, unless we admit that, besides this infinite chain of           
contingencies, there exists something that is primal and                    
self-subsistent- something which, as the cause of this phenomenal           
world, secures its continuance and preservation.                            
  This highest cause- what magnitude shall we attribute to it? Of           
the content of the world we are ignorant; still less can we estimate        
its magnitude by comparison with the sphere of the possible. But            
this supreme cause being a necessity of the human mind, what is             
there to prevent us from attributing to it such a degree of perfection      
as to place it above the sphere of all that is possible? This we can        
easily do, although only by the aid of the faint outline of an              
abstract conception, by representing this being to ourselves as             
containing in itself, as an individual substance, all possible              
perfection- a conception which satisfies that requirement of reason         
which demands parsimony in principles, which is free from                   
self-contradiction, which even contributes to the extension of the          
employment of reason in experience, by means of the guidance                
afforded by this idea to order and system, and which in no respect          
conflicts with any law of experience.                                       
                                                  {BK_2|CH_3 ^paragraph 115}
  This argument always deserves to be mentioned with respect. It is         
the oldest, the clearest, and that most in conformity with the              
common reason of humanity. It animates the study of nature, as it           
itself derives its existence and draws ever new strength from that          
source. It introduces aims and ends into a sphere in which our              
observation could not of itself have discovered them, and extends           
our knowledge of nature, by directing our attention to a unity, the         
principle of which lies beyond nature. This knowledge of nature             
again reacts upon this idea- its cause; and thus our belief in a            
divine author of the universe rises to the power of an irresistible         
conviction.                                                                 
  For these reasons it would be utterly hopeless to attempt to rob          
this argument of the authority it has always enjoyed. The mind,             
unceasingly elevated by these considerations, which, although               
empirical, are so remarkably powerful, and continually adding to their      
force, will not suffer itself to be depressed by the doubts                 
suggested by subtle speculation; it tears itself out of this state          
of uncertainty, the moment it casts a look upon the wondrous forms          
of nature and the majesty of the universe, and rises from height to         
height, from condition to condition, till it has elevated itself to         
the supreme and unconditioned author of all.                                
  But although we have nothing to object to the reasonableness and          
utility of this procedure, but have rather to commend and encourage         
it, we cannot approve of the claims which this argument advances to         
demonstrative certainty and to a reception upon its own merits,             
apart from favour or support by other arguments. Nor can it injure the      
cause of morality to endeavour to lower the tone of the arrogant            
sophist, and to teach him that modesty and moderation which are the         
properties of a belief that brings calm and content into the mind,          
without prescribing to it an unworthy subjection. I maintain, then,         
that the physico-theological argument is insufficient of itself to          
prove the existence of a Supreme Being, that it must entrust this to        
the ontological argument- to which it serves merely as an                   
introduction, and that, consequently, this argument contains the            
only possible ground of proof (possessed by speculative reason) for         
the existence of this being.                                                
  The chief momenta in the physico-theological argument are as follow:      
1. We observe in the world manifest signs of an arrangement full of         
purpose, executed with great wisdom, and argument in whole of a             
content indescribably various, and of an extent without limits. 2.          
This arrangement of means and ends is entirely foreign to the things        
existing in the world- it belongs to them merely as a contingent            
attribute; in other words, the nature of different things could not of      
itself, whatever means were employed, harmoniously tend towards             
certain purposes, were they not chosen and directed for these purposes      
by a rational and disposing principle, in accordance with certain           
fundamental ideas. 3. There exists, therefore, a sublime and wise           
cause (or several), which is not merely a blind, all-powerful               
nature, producing the beings and events which fill the world in             
unconscious fecundity, but a free and intelligent cause of the              
world. 4. The unity of this cause may be inferred from the unity of         
the reciprocal relation existing between the parts of the world, as         
portions of an artistic edifice- an inference which all our                 
observation favours, and all principles of analogy support.                 
  In the above argument, it is inferred from the analogy of certain         
products of nature with those of human art, when it compels Nature          
to bend herself to its purposes, as in the case of a house, a ship, or      
a watch, that the same kind of causality- namely, understanding and         
will- resides in nature. It is also declared that the internal              
possibility of this freely-acting nature (which is the source of all        
art, and perhaps also of human reason) is derivable from another and        
superhuman art- a conclusion which would perhaps be found incapable of      
standing the test of subtle transcendental criticism. But to neither        
of these opinions shall we at present object. We shall only remark          
that it must be confessed that, if we are to discuss the subject of         
cause at all, we cannot proceed more securely than with the guidance        
of the analogy subsisting between nature and such products of               
design- these being the only products whose causes and modes of             
organization are completely known to us. Reason would be unable to          
satisfy her own requirements, if she passed from a causality which she      
does know, to obscure and indemonstrable principles of explanation          
which she does not know.                                                    
                                                  {BK_2|CH_3 ^paragraph 120}
  According to the physico-theological argument, the connection and         
harmony existing in the world evidence the contingency of the form          
merely, but not of the matter, that is, of the substance of the world.      
To establish the truth of the latter opinion, it would be necessary to      
prove that all things would be in themselves incapable of this harmony      
and order, unless they were, even as regards their substance, the           
product of a supreme wisdom. But this would require very different          
grounds of proof from those presented by the analogy with human art.        
This proof can at most, therefore, demonstrate the existence of an          
architect of the world, whose efforts are limited by the                    
capabilities of the material with which he works, but not of a creator      
of the world, to whom all things are subject. Thus this argument is         
utterly insufficient for the task before us- a demonstration of the         
existence of an all-sufficient being. If we wish to prove the               
contingency of matter, we must have recourse to a transcendental            
argument, which the physicotheological was constructed expressly to         
avoid.                                                                      
  We infer, from the order and design visible in the universe, as a         
disposition of a thoroughly contingent character, the existence of a        
cause proportionate thereto. The conception of this cause must contain      
certain determinate qualities, and it must therefore be regarded as         
the conception of a being which possesses all power, wisdom, and so         
on, in one word, all perfection- the conception, that is, of an             
all-sufficient being. For the predicates of very great, astonishing,        
or immeasurable power and excellence, give us no determinate                
conception of the thing, nor do they inform us what the thing may be        
in itself. They merely indicate the relation existing between the           
magnitude of the object and the observer, who compares it with himself      
and with his own power of comprehension, and are mere expressions of        
praise and reverence, by which the object is either magnified, or           
the observing subject depreciated in relation to the object. Where          
we have to do with the magnitude (of the perfection) of a thing, we         
can discover no determinate conception, except that which                   
comprehends all possible perfection or completeness, and it is only         
the total (omnitudo) of reality which is completely determined in           
and through its conception alone.                                           
  Now it cannot be expected that any one will be bold enough to             
declare that he has a perfect insight into the relation which the           
magnitude of the world he contemplates bears (in its extent as well as      
in its content) to omnipotence, into that of the order and design in        
the world to the highest wisdom, and that of the unity of the world to      
the absolute unity of a Supreme Being. Physico-theology is therefore        
incapable of presenting a determinate conception of a supreme cause of      
the world, and is therefore insufficient as a principle of theology- a      
theology which is itself to be the basis of religion.                       
  The attainment of absolute totality is completely impossible on           
the path of empiricism. And yet this is the path pursued in the             
physicotheological argument. What means shall we employ to bridge           
the abyss?                                                                  
  After elevating ourselves to admiration of the magnitude of the           
power, wisdom, and other attributes of the author of the world, and         
finding we can advance no further, we leave the argument on                 
empirical grounds, and proceed to infer the contingency of the world        
from the order and conformity to aims that are observable in it.            
From this contingency we infer, by the help of transcendental               
conceptions alone, the existence of something absolutely necessary;         
and, still advancing, proceed from the conception of the absolute           
necessity of the first cause to the completely determined or                
determining conception thereof- the conception of an all-embracing          
reality. Thus the physico-theological, failing in its undertaking,          
recurs in its embarrassment to the cosmological argument; and, as this      
is merely the ontological argument in disguise, it executes its design      
solely by the aid of pure reason, although it at first professed to         
have no connection with this faculty and to base its entire                 
procedure upon experience alone.                                            
                                                  {BK_2|CH_3 ^paragraph 125}
  The physico-theologians have therefore no reason to regard with such      
contempt the transcendental mode of argument, and to look down upon         
it, with the conceit of clear-sighted observers of nature, as the           
brain-cobweb of obscure speculatists. For, if they reflect upon and         
examine their own arguments, they will find that, after following           
for some time the path of nature and experience, and discovering            
themselves no nearer their object, they suddenly leave this path and        
pass into the region of pure possibility, where they hope to reach          
upon the wings of ideas what had eluded all their empirical                 
investigations. Gaining, as they think, a firm footing after this           
immense leap, they extend their determinate conception- into the            
possession of which they have come, they know not how- over the             
whole sphere of creation, and explain their ideal, which is entirely a      
product of pure reason, by illustrations drawn from experience- though      
in a degree miserably unworthy of the grandeur of the object, while         
they refuse to acknowledge that they have arrived at this cognition or      
hypothesis by a very different road from that of experience.                
  Thus the physico-theological is based upon the cosmological, and          
this upon the ontological proof of the existence of a Supreme Being;        
and as besides these three there is no other path open to                   
speculative reason, the ontological proof, on the ground of pure            
conceptions of reason, is the only possible one, if any proof of a          
proposition so far transcending the empirical exercise of the               
understanding is possible at all.                                           
-                                                                           
    SECTION VII. Critique of all Theology based upon Speculative            
                     Principles of Reason.                                  
                                                  {BK_2|CH_3 ^paragraph 130}
-                                                                           
  If by the term theology I understand the cognition of a primal            
being, that cognition is based either upon reason alone (theologia          
rationalis) or upon revelation (theologia revelata). The former             
cogitates its object either by means of pure transcendental                 
conceptions, as an ens originarium, realissimum, ens entium, and is         
termed transcendental theology; or, by means of a conception derived        
from the nature of our own mind, as a supreme intelligence, and must        
then be entitled natural theology. The person who believes in a             
transcendental theology alone, is termed a deist; he who                    
acknowledges the possibility of a natural theology also, a theist. The      
former admits that we can cognize by pure reason alone the existence        
of a Supreme Being, but at the same time maintains that our conception      
of this being is purely transcendental, and that all we can say of          
it is that it possesses all reality, without being able to define it        
more closely. The second asserts that reason is capable of                  
presenting us, from the analogy with nature, with a more definite           
conception of this being, and that its operations, as the cause of all      
things, are the results of intelligence and free will. The former           
regards the Supreme Being as the cause of the world- whether by the         
necessity of his nature, or as a free agent, is left undetermined; the      
latter considers this being as the author of the world.                     
  Transcendental theology aims either at inferring the existence of         
a Supreme Being from a general experience, without any closer               
reference to the world to which this experience belongs, and in this        
case it is called cosmotheology; or it endeavours to cognize the            
existence of such a being, through mere conceptions, without the aid        
of experience, and is then termed ontotheology.                             
  Natural theology infers the attributes and the existence of an            
author of the world, from the constitution of, the order and unity          
observable in, the world, in which two modes of causality must be           
admitted to exist- those of nature and freedom. Thus it rises from          
this world to a supreme intelligence, either as the principle of all        
natural, or of all moral order and perfection. In the former case it        
is termed physico-theology, in the latter, ethical or moral-theology.*      
-                                                                           
                                                  {BK_2|CH_3 ^paragraph 135}
  *Not theological ethics; for this science contains ethical laws,          
which presuppose the existence of a Supreme Governor of the world;          
while moral-theology, on the contrary, is the expression of a               
conviction of the existence of a Supreme Being, founded upon ethical        
laws.                                                                       
-                                                                           
  As we are wont to understand by the term God not merely an eternal        
nature, the operations of which are insensate and blind, but a Supreme      
Being, who is the free and intelligent author of all things, and as it      
is this latter view alone that can be of interest to humanity, we           
might, in strict rigour, deny to the deist any belief in God at all,        
and regard him merely as a maintainer of the existence of a primal          
being or thing- the supreme cause of all other things. But, as no           
one ought to be blamed, merely because he does not feel himself             
justified in maintaining a certain opinion, as if he altogether denied      
its truth and asserted the opposite, it is more correct- as it is less      
harsh- to say, the deist believes in a God, the theist in a living God      
(summa intelligentia). We shall now proceed to investigate the sources      
of all these attempts of reason to establish the existence of a             
Supreme Being.                                                              
  It may be sufficient in this place to define theoretical knowledge        
or cognition as knowledge of that which is, and practical knowledge as      
knowledge of that which ought to be. In this view, the theoretical          
employment of reason is that by which I cognize a priori (as                
necessary) that something is, while the practical is that by which I        
cognize a priori what ought to happen. Now, if it is an indubitably         
certain, though at the same time an entirely conditioned truth, that        
something is, or ought to happen, either a certain determinate              
condition of this truth is absolutely necessary, or such a condition        
may be arbitrarily presupposed. In the former case the condition is         
postulated (per thesin), in the latter supposed (per hypothesin).           
There are certain practical laws- those of morality- which are              
absolutely necessary. Now, if these laws necessarily presuppose the         
existence of some being, as the condition of the possibility of             
their obligatory power, this being must be postulated, because the          
conditioned, from which we reason to this determinate condition, is         
itself cognized a priori as absolutely necessary. We shall at some          
future time show that the moral laws not merely presuppose the              
existence of a Supreme Being, but also, as themselves absolutely            
necessary in a different relation, demand or postulate it- although         
only from a practical point of view. The discussion of this argument        
we postpone for the present.                                                
  When the question relates merely to that which is, not to that which      
ought to be, the conditioned which is presented in experience is            
always cogitated as contingent. For this reason its condition cannot        
be regarded as absolutely necessary, but merely as relatively               
necessary, or rather as needful; the condition is in itself and a           
priori a mere arbitrary presupposition in aid of the cognition, by          
reason, of the conditioned. If, then, we are to possess a                   
theoretical cognition of the absolute necessity of a thing, we              
cannot attain to this cognition otherwise than a priori by means of         
conceptions; while it is impossible in this way to cognize the              
existence of a cause which bears any relation to an existence given in      
experience.                                                                 
                                                  {BK_2|CH_3 ^paragraph 140}
  Theoretical cognition is speculative when it relates to an object or      
certain conceptions of an object which is not given and cannot be           
discovered by means of experience. It is opposed to the cognition of        
nature, which concerns only those objects or predicates which can be        
presented in a possible experience.                                         
  The principle that everything which happens (the empirically              
contingent) must have a cause, is a principle of the cognition of           
nature, but not of speculative cognition. For, if we change it into an      
abstract principle, and deprive it of its reference to experience           
and the empirical, we shall find that it cannot with justice be             
regarded any longer as a synthetical proposition, and that it is            
impossible to discover any mode of transition from that which exists        
to something entirely different- termed cause. Nay, more, the               
conception of a cause likewise that of the contingent- loses, in            
this speculative mode of employing it, all significance, for its            
objective reality and meaning are comprehensible from experience            
alone.                                                                      
  When from the existence of the universe and the things in it the          
existence of a cause of the universe is inferred, reason is proceeding      
not in the natural, but in the speculative method. For the principle        
of the former enounces, not that things themselves or substances,           
but only that which happens or their states- as empirically                 
contingent, have a cause: the assertion that the existence of               
substance itself is contingent is not justified by experience, it is        
the assertion of a reason employing its principles in a speculative         
manner. If, again, I infer from the form of the universe, from the way      
in which all things are connected and act and react upon each other,        
the existence of a cause entirely distinct from the universe- this          
would again be a judgement of purely speculative reason; because the        
object in this case- the cause- can never be an object of possible          
experience. In both these cases the principle of causality, which is        
valid only in the field of experience- useless and even meaningless         
beyond this region, would be diverted from its proper destination.          
  Now I maintain that all attempts of reason to establish a theology        
by the aid of speculation alone are fruitless, that the principles          
of reason as applied to nature do not conduct us to any theological         
truths, and, consequently, that a rational theology can have no             
existence, unless it is founded upon the laws of morality. For all          
synthetical principles of the understanding are valid only as immanent      
in experience; while the cognition of a Supreme Being necessitates          
their being employed transcendentally, and of this the understanding        
is quite incapable. If the empirical law of causality is to conduct us      
to a Supreme Being, this being must belong to the chain of empirical        
objects- in which case it would be, like all phenomena, itself              
conditioned. If the possibility of passing the limits of experience be      
admitted, by means of the dynamical law of the relation of an effect        
to its cause, what kind of conception shall we obtain by this               
procedure? Certainly not the conception of a Supreme Being, because         
experience never presents us with the greatest of all possible              
effects, and it is only an effect of this character that could witness      
to the existence of a corresponding cause. If, for the purpose of           
fully satisfying the requirements of Reason, we recognize her right to      
assert the existence of a perfect and absolutely necessary being, this      
can be admitted only from favour, and cannot be regarded as the result      
or irresistible demonstration. The physico-theological proof may add        
weight to others- if other proofs there are- by connecting speculation      
with experience; but in itself it rather prepares the mind for              
theological cognition, and gives it a right and natural direction,          
than establishes a sure foundation for theology.                            
  It is now perfectly evident that transcendental questions admit only      
of transcendental answers- those presented a priori by pure                 
conceptions without the least empirical admixture. But the question in      
the present case is evidently synthetical- it aims at the extension of      
our cognition beyond the bounds of experience- it requires an               
assurance respecting the existence of a being corresponding with the        
idea in our minds, to which no experience can ever be adequate. Now it      
has been abundantly proved that all a priori synthetical cognition          
is possible only as the expression of the formal conditions of a            
possible experience; and that the validity of all principles depends        
upon their immanence in the field of experience, that is, their             
relation to objects of empirical cognition or phenomena. Thus all           
transcendental procedure in reference to speculative theology is            
without result.                                                             
                                                  {BK_2|CH_3 ^paragraph 145}
  If any one prefers doubting the conclusiveness of the proofs of           
our analytic to losing the persuasion of the validity of these old and      
time honoured arguments, he at least cannot decline answering the           
question- how he can pass the limits of all possible experience by the      
help of mere ideas. If he talks of new arguments, or of improvements        
upon old arguments, I request him to spare me. There is certainly no        
great choice in this sphere of discussion, as all speculative               
arguments must at last look for support to the ontological, and I           
have, therefore, very little to fear from the argumentative                 
fecundity of the dogmatical defenders of a non-sensuous reason.             
Without looking upon myself as a remarkably combative person, I             
shall not decline the challenge to detect the fallacy and destroy           
the pretensions of every attempt of speculative theology. And yet           
the hope of better fortune never deserts those who are accustomed to        
the dogmatical mode of procedure. I shall, therefore, restrict              
myself to the simple and equitable demand that such reasoners will          
demonstrate, from the nature of the human mind as well as from that of      
the other sources of knowledge, how we are to proceed to extend our         
cognition completely a priori, and to carry it to that point where          
experience abandons us, and no means exist of guaranteeing the              
objective reality of our conceptions. In whatever way the                   
understanding may have attained to a conception, the existence of           
the object of the conception cannot be discovered in it by analysis,        
because the cognition of the existence of the object depends upon           
the object's being posited and given in itself apart from the               
conception. But it is utterly impossible to go beyond our                   
conception, without the aid of experience- which presents to the            
mind nothing but phenomena, or to attain by the help of mere                
conceptions to a conviction of the existence of new kinds of objects        
or supernatural beings.                                                     
  But although pure speculative reason is far from sufficient to            
demonstrate the existence of a Supreme Being, it is of the highest          
utility in correcting our conception of this being- on the supposition      
that we can attain to the cognition of it by some other means- in           
making it consistent with itself and with all other conceptions of          
intelligible objects, clearing it from all that is incompatible with        
the conception of an ens summun, and eliminating from it all                
limitations or admixtures of empirical elements.                            
  Transcendental theology is still therefore, notwithstanding its           
objective insufficiency, of importance in a negative respect; it is         
useful as a test of the procedure of reason when engaged with pure          
ideas, no other than a transcendental standard being in this case           
admissible. For if, from a practical point of view, the hypothesis          
of a Supreme and All-sufficient Being is to maintain its validity           
without opposition, it must be of the highest importance to define          
this conception in a correct and rigorous manner- as the                    
transcendental conception of a necessary being, to eliminate all            
phenomenal elements (anthropomorphism in its most extended                  
signification), and at the same time to overflow all contradictory          
assertions- be they atheistic, deistic, or anthropomorphic. This is of      
course very easy; as the same arguments which demonstrated the              
inability of human reason to affirm the existence of a Supreme Being        
must be alike sufficient to prove the invalidity of its denial. For it      
is impossible to gain from the pure speculation of reason                   
demonstration that there exists no Supreme Being, as the ground of all      
that exists, or that this being possesses none of those properties          
which we regard as analogical with the dynamical qualities of a             
thinking being, or that, as the anthropomorphists would have us             
believe, it is subject to all the limitations which sensibility             
imposes upon those intelligences which exist in the world of                
experience.                                                                 
  A Supreme Being is, therefore, for the speculative reason, a mere         
ideal, though a faultless one- a conception which perfects and              
crowns the system of human cognition, but the objective reality of          
which can neither be proved nor disproved by pure reason. If this           
defect is ever supplied by a moral theology, the problematic                
transcendental theology which has preceded, will have been at least         
serviceable as demonstrating the mental necessity existing for the          
conception, by the complete determination of it which it has                
furnished, and the ceaseless testing of the conclusions of a reason         
often deceived by sense, and not always in harmony with its own ideas.      
The attributes of necessity, infinitude, unity, existence apart from        
the world (and not as a world soul), eternity (free from conditions of      
time), omnipresence (free from conditions of space), omnipotence,           
and others, are pure transcendental predicates; and thus the                
accurate conception of a Supreme Being, which every theology requires,      
is furnished by transcendental theology alone.                              
                                                                            
APPENDIX                                                                    
                        APPENDIX.                                           
-                                                                           
        Of the Regulative Employment of the Ideas of                        
                      Pure Reason.                                          
-                                                                           
  The result of all the dialectical attempts of pure reason not only        
confirms the truth of what we have already proved in our                    
Transcendental Analytic, namely, that all inferences which would            
lead us beyond the limits of experience are fallacious and groundless,      
but it at the same time teaches us this important lesson, that human        
reason has a natural inclination to overstep these limits, and that         
transcendental ideas are as much the natural property of the reason as      
categories are of the understanding. There exists this difference,          
however, that while the categories never mislead us, outward objects        
being always in perfect harmony therewith, ideas are the parents of         
irresistible illusions, the severest and most subtle criticism being        
required to save us from the fallacies which they induce.                   
  Whatever is grounded in the nature of our powers will be found to be      
in harmony with the final purpose and proper employment of these            
powers, when once we have discovered their true direction and aim.          
We are entitled to suppose, therefore, that there exists a mode of          
employing transcendental ideas which is proper and immanent; although,      
when we mistake their meaning, and regard them as conceptions of            
actual things, their mode of application is transcendent and delusive.      
For it is not the idea itself, but only the employment of the idea          
in relation to possible experience, that is transcendent or                 
immanent. An idea is employed transcendently, when it is applied to an      
object falsely believed to be adequate with and to correspond to it;        
imminently, when it is applied solely to the employment of the              
understanding in the sphere of experience. Thus all errors of               
subreptio- of misapplication, are to be ascribed to defects of              
judgement, and not to understanding or reason.                              
                                                     {APPENDIX ^paragraph 5}
  Reason never has an immediate relation to an object; it relates           
immediately to the understanding alone. It is only through the              
understanding that it can be employed in the field of experience. It        
does not form conceptions of objects, it merely arranges them and           
gives to them that unity which they are capable of possessing when the      
sphere of their application has been extended as widely as possible.        
Reason avails itself of the conception of the understanding for the         
sole purpose of producing totality in the different series. This            
totality the understanding does not concern itself with; its only           
occupation is the connection of experiences, by which series of             
conditions in accordance with conceptions are established. The              
object of reason is, therefore, the understanding and its proper            
destination. As the latter brings unity into the diversity of               
objects by means of its conceptions, so the former brings unity into        
the diversity of conceptions by means of ideas; as it sets the final        
aim of a collective unity to the operations of the understanding,           
which without this occupies itself with a distributive unity alone.         
  I accordingly maintain that transcendental ideas can never be             
employed as constitutive ideas, that they cannot be conceptions of          
objects, and that, when thus considered, they assume a fallacious           
and dialectical character. But, on the other hand, they are capable of      
an admirable and indispensably necessary application to objects- as         
regulative ideas, directing the understanding to a certain aim, the         
guiding lines towards which all its laws follow, and in which they all      
meet in one point. This point- though a mere idea (focus imaginarius),      
that is, not a point from which the conceptions of the understanding        
do really proceed, for it lies beyond the sphere of possible                
experience- serves, notwithstanding, to give to these conceptions           
the greatest possible unity combined with the greatest possible             
extension. Hence arises the natural illusion which induces us to            
believe that these lines proceed from an object which lies out of           
the sphere of empirical cognition, just as objects reflected in a           
mirror appear to be behind it. But this illusion- which we may              
hinder from imposing upon us- is necessary and unavoidable, if we           
desire to see, not only those objects which lie before us, but those        
which are at a great distance behind us; that is to say, when, in           
the present case, we direct the aims of the understanding, beyond           
every given experience, towards an extension as great as can                
possibly be attained.                                                       
  If we review our cognitions in their entire extent, we shall find         
that the peculiar business of reason is to arrange them into a system,      
that is to say, to give them connection according to a principle. This      
unity presupposes an idea- the idea of the form of a whole (of              
cognition), preceding the determinate cognition of the parts, and           
containing the conditions which determine a priori to every part its        
place and relation to the other parts of the whole system. This             
idea, accordingly, demands complete unity in the cognition of the           
understanding- not the unity of a contingent aggregate, but that of         
a system connected according to necessary laws. It cannot be                
affirmed with propriety that this idea is a conception of an object;        
it is merely a conception of the complete unity of the conceptions          
of objects, in so far as this unity is available to the                     
understanding as a rule. Such conceptions of reason are not derived         
from nature; on the contrary, we employ them for the interrogation and      
investigation of nature, and regard our cognition as defective so long      
as it is not adequate to them. We admit that such a thing as pure           
earth, pure water, or pure air, is not to be discovered. And yet we         
require these conceptions (which have their origin in the reason, so        
far as regards their absolute purity and completeness) for the purpose      
of determining the share which each of these natural causes has in          
every phenomenon. Thus the different kinds of matter are all ref erred      
to earths, as mere weight; to salts and inflammable bodies, as pure         
force; and finally, to water and air, as the vehicula of the former,        
or the machines employed by them in their operations- for the               
purpose of explaining the chemical action and reaction of bodies in         
accordance with the idea of a mechanism. For, although not actually so      
expressed, the influence of such ideas of reason is very observable in      
the procedure of natural philosophers.                                      
  If reason is the faculty of deducing the particular from the              
general, and if the general be certain in se and given, it is only          
necessary that the judgement should subsume the particular under the        
general, the particular being thus necessarily determined. I shall          
term this the demonstrative or apodeictic employment of reason. If,         
however, the general is admitted as problematical only, and is a            
mere idea, the particular case is certain, but the universality of the      
rule which applies to this particular case remains a problem.               
Several particular cases, the certainty of which is beyond doubt,           
are then taken and examined, for the purpose of discovering whether         
the rule is applicable to them; and if it appears that all the              
particular cases which can be collected follow from the rule, its           
universality is inferred, and at the same time, all the causes which        
have not, or cannot be presented to our observation, are concluded          
to be of the same character with those which we have observed. This         
I shall term the hypothetical employment of the reason.                     
  The hypothetical exercise of reason by the aid of ideas employed          
as problematical conceptions is properly not constitutive. That is          
to say, if we consider the subject strictly, the truth of the rule,         
which has been employed as an hypothesis, does not follow from the use      
that is made of it by reason. For how can we know all the possible          
cases that may arise? some of which may, however, prove exceptions          
to the universality of the rule. This employment of reason is merely        
regulative, and its sole aim is the introduction of unity into the          
aggregate of our particular cognitions, and thereby the                     
approximating of the rule to universality.                                  
                                                    {APPENDIX ^paragraph 10}
  The object of the hypothetical employment of reason is therefore the      
systematic unity of cognitions; and this unity is the criterion of the      
truth of a rule. On the other hand, this systematic unity- as a mere        
idea- is in fact merely a unity projected, not to be regarded as            
given, but only in the light of a problem- a problem which serves,          
however, as a principle for the various and particular exercise of the      
understanding in experience, directs it with regard to those cases          
which are not presented to our observation, and introduces harmony and      
consistency into all its operations.                                        
  All that we can be certain of from the above considerations is            
that this systematic unity is a logical principle, whose aim is to          
assist the understanding, where it cannot of itself attain to rules,        
by means of ideas, to bring all these various rules under one               
principle, and thus to ensure the most complete consistency and             
connection that can be attained. But the assertion that objects and         
the understanding by which they are cognized are so constituted as          
to be determined to systematic unity, that this may be postulated a         
priori, without any reference to the interest of reason, and that we        
are justified in declaring all possible cognitions- empirical and           
others- to possess systematic unity, and to be subject to general           
principles from which, notwithstanding their various character, they        
are all derivable such an assertion can be founded only upon a              
transcendental principle of reason, which would render this systematic      
unity not subjectively and logically- in its character of a method,         
but objectively necessary.                                                  
  We shall illustrate this by an example. The conceptions of the            
understanding make us acquainted, among many other kinds of unity,          
with that of the causality of a substance, which is termed power.           
The different phenomenal manifestations of the same substance appear        
at first view to be so very dissimilar that we are inclined to              
assume the existence of just as many different powers as there are          
different effects- as, in the case of the human mind, we have feeling,      
consciousness, imagination, memory, wit, analysis, pleasure, desire         
and so on. Now we are required by a logical maxim to reduce these           
differences to as small a number as possible, by comparing them and         
discovering the hidden identity which exists. We must inquire, for          
example, whether or not imagination (connected with consciousness),         
memory, wit, and analysis are not merely different forms of                 
understanding and reason. The idea of a fundamental power, the              
existence of which no effort of logic can assure us of, is the problem      
to be solved, for the systematic representation of the existing             
variety of powers. The logical principle of reason requires us to           
produce as great a unity as is possible in the system of our                
cognitions; and the more the phenomena of this and the other power are      
found to be identical, the more probable does it become, that they are      
nothing but different manifestations of one and the same power,             
which may be called, relatively speaking, a fundamental power. And          
so with other cases.                                                        
  These relatively fundamental powers must again be compared with each      
other, to discover, if possible, the one radical and absolutely             
fundamental power of which they are but the manifestations. But this        
unity is purely hypothetical. It is not maintained, that this unity         
does really exist, but that we must, in the interest of reason, that        
is, for the establishment of principles for the various rules               
presented by experience, try to discover and introduce it, so far as        
is practicable, into the sphere of our cognitions.                          
  But the transcendental employment of the understanding would lead us      
to believe that this idea of a fundamental power is not problematical,      
but that it possesses objective reality, and thus the systematic unity      
of the various powers or forces in a substance is demanded by the           
understanding and erected into an apodeictic or necessary principle.        
For, without having attempted to discover the unity of the various          
powers existing in nature, nay, even after all our attempts have            
failed, we notwithstanding presuppose that it does exist, and may           
be, sooner or later, discovered. And this reason does, not only, as in      
the case above adduced, with regard to the unity of substance, but          
where many substances, although all to a certain extent homogeneous,        
are discoverable, as in the case of matter in general. Here also            
does reason presuppose the existence of the systematic unity of             
various powers- inasmuch as particular laws of nature are                   
subordinate to general laws; and parsimony in principles is not merely      
an economical principle of reason, but an essential law of nature.          
                                                    {APPENDIX ^paragraph 15}
  We cannot understand, in fact, how a logical principle of unity           
can of right exist, unless we presuppose a transcendental principle,        
by which such a systematic unit- as a property of objects                   
themselves- is regarded as necessary a priori. For with what right can      
reason, in its logical exercise, require us to regard the variety of        
forces which nature displays, as in effect a disguised unity, and to        
deduce them from one fundamental force or power, when she is free to        
admit that it is just as possible that all forces should be                 
different in kind, and that a systematic unity is not conformable to        
the design of nature? In this view of the case, reason would be             
proceeding in direct opposition to her own destination, by setting          
as an aim an idea which entirely conflicts with the procedure and           
arrangement of nature. Neither can we assert that reason has                
previously inferred this unity from the contingent nature of                
phenomena. For the law of reason which requires us to seek for this         
unity is a necessary law, inasmuch as without it we should not possess      
a faculty of reason, nor without reason a consistent and                    
self-accordant mode of employing the understanding, nor, in the             
absence of this, any proper and sufficient criterion of empirical           
truth. In relation to this criterion, therefore, we must suppose the        
idea of the systematic unity of nature to possess objective validity        
and necessity.                                                              
  We find this transcendental presupposition lurking in different           
forms in the principles of philosophers, although they have neither         
recognized it nor confessed to themselves its presence. That the            
diversities of individual things do not exclude identity of species,        
that the various species must be considered as merely different             
determinations of a few genera, and these again as divisions of             
still higher races, and so on- that, accordingly, a certain systematic      
unity of all possible empirical conceptions, in so far as they can          
be deduced from higher and more general conceptions, must be sought         
for, is a scholastic maxim or logical principle, without which              
reason could not be employed by us. For we can infer the particular         
from the general, only in so far as general properties of things            
constitute the foundation upon which the particular rest.                   
  That the same unity exists in nature is presupposed by                    
philosophers in the well-known scholastic maxim, which forbids us           
unnecessarily to augment the number of entities or principles (entia        
praeter necessitatem non esse multiplicanda). This maxim asserts            
that nature herself assists in the establishment of this unity of           
reason, and that the seemingly infinite diversity of phenomena              
should not deter us from the expectation of discovering beneath this        
diversity a unity of fundamental properties, of which the aforesaid         
variety is but a more or less determined form. This unity, although         
a mere idea, thinkers have found it necessary rather to moderate the        
desire than to encourage it. It was considered a great step when            
chemists were able to reduce all salts to two main genera- acids and        
alkalis; and they regard this difference as itself a mere variety,          
or different manifestation of one and the same fundamental material.        
The different kinds of earths (stones and even metals) chemists have        
endeavoured to reduce to three, and afterwards to two; but still,           
not content with this advance, they cannot but think that behind these      
diversities there lurks but one genus- nay, that even salts and earths      
have a common principle. It might be conjectured that this is merely        
an economical plan of reason, for the purpose of sparing itself             
trouble, and an attempt of a purely hypothetical character, which,          
when successful, gives an appearance of probability to the principle        
of explanation employed by the reason. But a selfish purpose of this        
kind is easily to be distinguished from the idea, according to which        
every one presupposes that this unity is in accordance with the laws        
of nature, and that reason does not in this case request, but               
requires, although we are quite unable to determine the proper              
limits of this unity.                                                       
  If the diversity existing in phenomena- a diversity not of form (for      
in this they may be similar) but of content- were so great that the         
subtlest human reason could never by comparison discover in them the        
least similarity (which is not impossible), in this case the logical        
law of genera would be without foundation, the conception of a              
genus, nay, all general conceptions would be impossible, and the            
faculty of the understanding, the exercise of which is restricted to        
the world of conceptions, could not exist. The logical principle of         
genera, accordingly, if it is to be applied to nature (by which I mean      
objects presented to our senses), presupposes a transcendental              
principle. In accordance with this principle, homogeneity is                
necessarily presupposed in the variety of phenomena (although we are        
unable to determine a priori the degree of this homogeneity),               
because without it no empirical conceptions, and consequently no            
experience, would be possible.                                              
  The logical principle of genera, which demands identity in                
phenomena, is balanced by another principle- that of species, which         
requires variety and diversity in things, notwithstanding their             
accordance in the same genus, and directs the understanding to              
attend to the one no less than to the other. This principle (of the         
faculty of distinction) acts as a check upon the reason and reason          
exhibits in this respect a double and conflicting interest- on the one      
hand, the interest in the extent (the interest of generality) in            
relation to genera; on the other, that of the content (the interest of      
individuality) in relation to the variety of species. In the former         
case, the understanding cogitates more under its conceptions, in the        
latter it cogitates more in them. This distinction manifests itself         
likewise in the habits of thought peculiar to natural philosophers,         
some of whom- the remarkably speculative heads- may be said to be           
hostile to heterogeneity in phenomena, and have their eyes always           
fixed on the unity of genera, while others- with a strong empirical         
tendency- aim unceasingly at the analysis of phenomena, and almost          
destroy in us the hope of ever being able to estimate the character of      
these according to general principles.                                      
                                                    {APPENDIX ^paragraph 20}
  The latter mode of thought is evidently based upon a logical              
principle, the aim of which is the systematic completeness of all           
cognitions. This principle authorizes me, beginning at the genus, to        
descend to the various and diverse contained under it; and in this way      
extension, as in the former case unity, is assured to the system.           
For if we merely examine the sphere of the conception which                 
indicates a genus, we cannot discover how far it is possible to             
proceed in the division of that sphere; just as it is impossible, from      
the consideration of the space occupied by matter, to determine how         
far we can proceed in the division of it. Hence every genus must            
contain different species, and these again different subspecies; and        
as each of the latter must itself contain a sphere (must be of a            
certain extent, as a conceptus communis), reason demands that no            
species or sub-species is to be considered as the lowest possible. For      
a species or sub-species, being always a conception, which contains         
only what is common to a number of different things, does not               
completely determine any individual thing, or relate immediately to         
it, and must consequently contain other conceptions, that is, other         
sub-species under it. This law of specification may be thus expressed:      
entium varietates non temere sunt minuendae.                                
  But it is easy to see that this logical law would likewise be             
without sense or application, were it not based upon a                      
transcendental law of specification, which certainly does not               
require that the differences existing phenomena should be infinite          
in number, for the logical principle, which merely maintains the            
indeterminateness of the logical sphere of a conception, in relation        
to its possible division, does not authorize this statement; while          
it does impose upon the understanding the duty of searching for             
subspecies to every species, and minor differences in every                 
difference. For, were there no lower conceptions, neither could             
there be any higher. Now the understanding cognizes only by means of        
conceptions; consequently, how far soever it may proceed in                 
division, never by mere intuition, but always by lower and lower            
conceptions. The cognition of phenomena in their complete                   
determination (which is possible only by means of the understanding)        
requires an unceasingly continued specification of conceptions, and         
a progression to ever smaller differences, of which abstraction bad         
been made in the conception of the species, and still more in that          
of the genus.                                                               
  This law of specification cannot be deduced from experience; it           
can never present us with a principle of so universal an                    
application. Empirical specification very soon stops in its                 
distinction of diversities, and requires the guidance of the                
transcendental law, as a principle of the reason- a law which               
imposes on us the necessity of never ceasing in our search for              
differences, even although these may not present themselves to the          
senses. That absorbent earths are of different kinds could only be          
discovered by obeying the anticipatory law of reason, which imposes         
upon the understanding the task of discovering the differences              
existing between these earths, and supposes that nature is richer in        
substances than our senses would indicate. The faculty of the               
understanding belongs to us just as much under the presupposition of        
differences in the objects of nature, as under the condition that           
these objects are homogeneous, because we could not possess                 
conceptions, nor make any use of our understanding, were not the            
phenomena included under these conceptions in some respects                 
dissimilar, as well as similar, in their character.                         
  Reason thus prepares the sphere of the understanding for the              
operations of this faculty: 1. By the principle of the homogeneity          
of the diverse in higher genera; 2. By the principle of the variety of      
the homogeneous in lower species; and, to complete the systematic           
unity, it adds, 3. A law of the affinity of all conceptions which           
prescribes a continuous transition from one species to every other          
by the gradual increase of diversity. We may term these the principles      
of the homogeneity, the specification, and the continuity of forms.         
The latter results from the union of the two former, inasmuch as we         
regard the systematic connection as complete in thought, in the ascent      
to higher genera, as well as in the descent to lower species. For           
all diversities must be related to each other, as they all spring from      
one highest genus, descending through the different gradations of a         
more and more extended determination.                                       
  We may illustrate the systematic unity produced by the three logical      
principles in the following manner. Every conception may be regarded        
as a point, which, as the standpoint of a spectator, has a certain          
horizon, which may be said to enclose a number of things that may be        
viewed, so to speak, from that centre. Within this horizon there            
must be an infinite number of other points, each of which has its           
own horizon, smaller and more circumscribed; in other words, every          
species contains sub-species, according to the principle of                 
specification, and the logical horizon consists of smaller horizons         
(subspecies), but not of points (individuals), which possess no             
extent. But different horizons or genera, which include under them          
so many conceptions, may have one common horizon, from which, as            
from a mid-point, they may be surveyed; and we may proceed thus,            
till we arrive at the highest genus, or universal and true horizon,         
which is determined by the highest conception, and which contains           
under itself all differences and varieties, as genera, species, and         
subspecies.                                                                 
                                                    {APPENDIX ^paragraph 25}
  To this highest standpoint I am conducted by the law of homogeneity,      
as to all lower and more variously-determined conceptions by the law        
of specification. Now as in this way there exists no void in the whole      
extent of all possible conceptions, and as out of the sphere of             
these the mind can discover nothing, there arises from the                  
presupposition of the universal horizon above mentioned, and its            
complete division, the principle: Non datur vacuum formarum. This           
principle asserts that there are not different primitive and highest        
genera, which stand isolated, so to speak, from each other, but all         
the various genera are mere divisions and limitations of one highest        
and universal genus; and hence follows immediately the principle:           
Datur continuum formarum. This principle indicates that all                 
differences of species limit each other, and do not admit of                
transition from one to another by a saltus, but only through smaller        
degrees of the difference between the one species and the other. In         
one word, there are no species or sub-species which (in the view of         
reason) are the nearest possible to each other; intermediate species        
or sub-species being always possible, the difference of which from          
each of the former is always smaller than the difference existing           
between these.                                                              
  The first law, therefore, directs us to avoid the notion that             
there exist different primal genera, and enounces the fact of               
perfect homogeneity; the second imposes a check upon this tendency          
to unity and prescribes the distinction of sub-species, before              
proceeding to apply our general conceptions to individuals. The             
third unites both the former, by enouncing the fact of homogeneity          
as existing even in the most various diversity, by means of the             
gradual transition from one species to another. Thus it indicates a         
relationship between the different branches or species, in so far as        
they all spring from the same stem.                                         
  But this logical law of the continuum specierum (formarum logicarum)      
presupposes a transcendental principle (lex continui in natura),            
without which the understanding might be led into error, by                 
following the guidance of the former, and thus perhaps pursuing a path      
contrary to that prescribed by nature. This law must, consequently, be      
based upon pure transcendental, and not upon empirical,                     
considerations. For, in the latter case, it would come later than           
the system; whereas it is really itself the parent of all that is           
systematic in our cognition of nature. These principles are not mere        
hypotheses employed for the purpose of experimenting upon nature;           
although when any such connection is discovered, it forms a solid           
ground for regarding the hypothetical unity as valid in the sphere          
of nature- and thus they are in this respect not without their use.         
But we go farther, and maintain that it is manifest that these              
principles of parsimony in fundamental causes, variety in effects, and      
affinity in phenomena, are in accordance both with reason and               
nature, and that they are not mere methods or plans devised for the         
purpose of assisting us in our observation of the external world.           
  But it is plain that this continuity of forms is a mere idea, to          
which no adequate object can be discovered in experience. And this for      
two reasons. First, because the species in nature are really                
divided, and hence form quanta discreta; and, if the gradual                
progression through their affinity were continuous, the intermediate        
members lying between two given species must be infinite in number,         
which is impossible. Secondly, because we cannot make any                   
determinate empirical use of this law, inasmuch as it does not present      
us with any criterion of affinity which could aid us in determining         
how far we ought to pursue the graduation of differences: it merely         
contains a general indication that it is our duty to seek for and,          
if possible, to discover them.                                              
  When we arrange these principles of systematic unity in the order         
conformable to their employment in experience, they will stand thus:        
Variety, Affinity, Unity, each of them, as ideas, being taken in the        
highest degree of their completeness. Reason presupposes the existence      
of cognitions of the understanding, which have a direct relation to         
experience, and aims at the ideal unity of these cognitions- a unity        
which far transcends all experience or empirical notions. The affinity      
of the diverse, notwithstanding the differences existing between its        
parts, has a relation to things, but a still closer one to the mere         
properties and powers of things. For example, imperfect experience may      
represent the orbits of the planets as circular. But we discover            
variations from this course, and we proceed to suppose that the             
planets revolve in a path which, if not a circle, is of a character         
very similar to it. That is to say, the movements of those planets          
which do not form a circle will approximate more or less to the             
properties of a circle, and probably form an ellipse. The paths of          
comets exhibit still greater variations, for, so far as our                 
observation extends, they do not return upon their own course in a          
circle or ellipse. But we proceed to the conjecture that comets             
describe a parabola, a figure which is closely allied to the                
ellipse. In fact, a parabola is merely an ellipse, with its longer          
axis produced to an indefinite extent. Thus these principles conduct        
us to a unity in the genera of the forms of these orbits, and,              
proceeding farther, to a unity as regards the cause of the motions          
of the heavenly bodies- that is, gravitation. But we go on extending        
our conquests over nature, and endeavour to explain all seeming             
deviations from these rules, and even make additions to our system          
which no experience can ever substantiate- for example, the theory, in      
affinity with that of ellipses, of hyperbolic paths of comets,              
pursuing which, these bodies leave our solar system and, passing            
from sun to sun, unite the most distant parts of the infinite               
universe, which is held together by the same moving power.                  
                                                    {APPENDIX ^paragraph 30}
  The most remarkable circumstance connected with these principles          
is that they seem to be transcendental, and, although only                  
containing ideas for the guidance of the empirical exercise of reason,      
and although this empirical employment stands to these ideas in an          
asymptotic relation alone (to use a mathematical term), that is,            
continually approximate, without ever being able to attain to them,         
they possess, notwithstanding, as a priori synthetical propositions,        
objective though undetermined validity, and are available as rules for      
possible experience. In the elaboration of our experience, they may         
also be employed with great advantage, as heuristic* principles. A          
transcendental deduction of them cannot be made; such a deduction           
being always impossible in the case of ideas, as has been already           
shown.                                                                      
-                                                                           
  *From the Greek, eurhioko.                                                
-                                                                           
  We distinguished, in the Transcendental Analytic, the dynamical           
principles of the understanding, which are regulative principles of         
intuition, from the mathematical, which are constitutive principles of      
intuition. These dynamical laws are, however, constitutive in relation      
to experience, inasmuch as they render the conceptions without which        
experience could not exist possible a priori. But the principles of         
pure reason cannot be constitutive even in regard to empirical              
conceptions, because no sensuous schema corresponding to them can be        
discovered, and they cannot therefore have an object in concreto. Now,      
if I grant that they cannot be employed in the sphere of experience,        
as constitutive principles, how shall I secure for them employment and      
objective validity as regulative principles, and in what way can            
they be so employed?                                                        
                                                    {APPENDIX ^paragraph 35}
  The understanding is the object of reason, as sensibility is the          
object of the understanding. The production of systematic unity in all      
the empirical operations of the understanding is the proper occupation      
of reason; just as it is the business of the understanding to               
connect the various content of phenomena by means of conceptions,           
and subject them to empirical laws. But the operations of the               
understanding are, without the schemata of sensibility,                     
undetermined; and, in the same manner, the unity of reason is               
perfectly undetermined as regards the conditions under which, and           
the extent to which, the understanding ought to carry the systematic        
connection of its conceptions. But, although it is impossible to            
discover in intuition a schema for the complete systematic unity of         
all the conceptions of the understanding, there must be some                
analogon of this schema. This analogon is the idea of the maximum of        
the division and the connection of our cognition in one principle. For      
we may have a determinate notion of a maximum and an absolutely             
perfect, all the restrictive conditions which are connected with an         
indeterminate and various content having been abstracted. Thus the          
idea of reason is analogous with a sensuous schema, with this               
difference, that the application of the categories to the schema of         
reason does not present a cognition of any object (as is the case with      
the application of the categories to sensuous schemata), but merely         
provides us with a rule or principle for the systematic unity of the        
exercise of the understanding. Now, as every principle which imposes        
upon the exercise of the understanding a priori compliance with the         
rule of systematic unity also relates, although only in an indirect         
manner, to an object of experience, the principles of pure reason will      
also possess objective reality and validity in relation to experience.      
But they will not aim at determining our knowledge in regard to any         
empirical object; they will merely indicate the procedure, following        
which the empirical and determinate exercise of the understanding           
may be in complete harmony and connection with itself- a result             
which is produced by its being brought into harmony with the principle      
of systematic unity, so far as that is possible, and deduced from it.       
  I term all subjective principles, which are not derived from              
observation of the constitution of an object, but from the interest         
which Reason has in producing a certain completeness in her                 
cognition of that object, maxims of reason. Thus there are maxims of        
speculative reason, which are based solely upon its speculative             
interest, although they appear to be objective principles.                  
  When principles which are really regulative are regarded as               
constitutive, and employed as objective principles, contradictions          
must arise; but if they are considered as mere maxims, there is no          
room for contradictions of any kind, as they then merely indicate           
the different interests of reason, which occasion differences in the        
mode of thought. In effect, Reason has only one single interest, and        
the seeming contradiction existing between her maxims merely indicates      
a difference in, and a reciprocal limitation of, the methods by             
which this interest is satisfied.                                           
  This reasoner has at heart the interest of diversity- in                  
accordance with the principle of specification; another, the                
interest of unity- in accordance with the principle of aggregation.         
Each believes that his judgement rests upon a thorough insight into         
the subject he is examining, and yet it has been influenced solely          
by a greater or less degree of adherence to some one of the two             
principles, neither of which are objective, but originate solely            
from the interest of reason, and on this account to be termed maxims        
rather than principles. When I observe intelligent men disputing about      
the distinctive characteristics of men, animals, or plants, and even        
of minerals, those on the one side assuming the existence of certain        
national characteristics, certain well-defined and hereditary               
distinctions of family, race, and so on, while the other side maintain      
that nature has endowed all races of men with the same faculties and        
dispositions, and that all differences are but the result of                
external and accidental circumstances- I have only to consider for a        
moment the real nature of the subject of discussion, to arrive at           
the conclusion that it is a subject far too deep for us to judge of,        
and that there is little probability of either party being able to          
speak from a perfect insight into and understanding of the nature of        
the subject itself. Both have, in reality, been struggling for the          
twofold interest of reason; the one maintaining the one interest,           
the other the other. But this difference between the maxims of              
diversity and unity may easily be reconciled and adjusted; although,        
so long as they are regarded as objective principles, they must             
occasion not only contradictions and polemic, but place hinderances in      
the way of the advancement of truth, until some means is discovered of      
reconciling these conflicting interests, and bringing reason into           
union and harmony with itself.                                              
  The same is the case with the so-called law discovered by                 
Leibnitz, and supported with remarkable ability by Bonnet- the law          
of the continuous gradation of created beings, which is nothing more        
than an inference from the principle of affinity; for observation           
and study of the order of nature could never present it to the mind as      
an objective truth. The steps of this ladder, as they appear in             
experience, are too far apart from each other, and the so-called petty      
differences between different kinds of animals are in nature                
commonly so wide separations that no confidence can be placed in            
such views (particularly when we reflect on the great variety of            
things, and the ease with which we can discover resemblances), and          
no faith in the laws which are said to express the aims and purposes        
of nature. On the other hand, the method of investigating the order of      
nature in the light of this principle, and the maxim which requires us      
to regard this order- it being still undetermined how far it                
extends- as really existing in nature, is beyond doubt a legitimate         
and excellent principle of reason- a principle which extends farther        
than any experience or observation of ours and which, without giving        
us any positive knowledge of anything in the region of experience,          
guides us to the goal of systematic unity.                                  
                                                    {APPENDIX ^paragraph 40}
-                                                                           
  Of the Ultimate End of the Natural Dialectic of Human Reason.             
-                                                                           
  The ideas of pure reason cannot be, of themselves and in their own        
nature, dialectical; it is from their misemployment alone that              
fallacies and illusions arise. For they originate in the nature of          
reason itself, and it is impossible that this supreme tribunal for all      
the rights and claims of speculation should be itself undeserving of        
confidence and promotive of error. It is to be expected, therefore,         
that these ideas have a genuine and legitimate aim. It is true, the         
mob of sophists raise against reason the cry of inconsistency and           
contradiction, and affect to despise the government of that faculty,        
because they cannot understand its constitution, while it is to its         
beneficial influences alone that they owe the position and the              
intelligence which enable them to criticize and to blame its                
procedure.                                                                  
  We cannot employ an a priori conception with certainty, until we          
have made a transcendental deduction therefore. The ideas of pure           
reason do not admit of the same kind of deduction as the categories.        
But if they are to possess the least objective validity, and to             
represent anything but mere creations of thought (entia rationis            
ratiocinantis), a deduction of them must be possible. This deduction        
will complete the critical task imposed upon pure reason; and it is to      
this part Of our labours that we now proceed.                               
                                                    {APPENDIX ^paragraph 45}
  There is a great difference between a thing's being presented to the      
mind as an object in an absolute sense, or merely as an ideal               
object. In the former case I employ my conceptions to determine the         
object; in the latter case nothing is present to the mind but a mere        
schema, which does not relate directly to an object, not even in a          
hypothetical sense, but which is useful only for the purpose of             
representing other objects to the mind, in a mediate and indirect           
manner, by means of their relation to the idea in the intellect.            
Thus I say the conception of a supreme intelligence is a mere idea;         
that is to say, its objective reality does not consist in the fact          
that it has an immediate relation to an object (for in this sense we        
have no means of establishing its objective validity), it is merely         
a schema constructed according to the necessary conditions of the           
unity of reason- the schema of a thing in general, which is useful          
towards the production of the highest degree of systematic unity in         
the empirical exercise of reason, in which we deduce this or that           
object of experience from the imaginary object of this idea, as the         
ground or cause of the said object of experience. In this way, the          
idea is properly a heuristic, and not an ostensive, conception; it          
does not give us any information respecting the constitution of an          
object, it merely indicates how, under the guidance of the idea, we         
ought to investigate the constitution and the relations of objects          
in the world of experience. Now, if it can be shown that the three          
kinds of transcendental ideas (psychological, cosmological, and             
theological), although not relating directly to any object nor              
determining it, do nevertheless, on the supposition of the existence        
of an ideal object, produce systematic unity in the laws of the             
empirical employment of the reason, and extend our empirical                
cognition, without ever being inconsistent or in opposition with it-        
it must be a necessary maxim of reason to regulate its procedure            
according to these ideas. And this forms the transcendental                 
deduction of all speculative ideas, not as constitutive principles          
of the extension of our cognition beyond the limits of our experience,      
but as regulative principles of the systematic unity of empirical           
cognition, which is by the aid of these ideas arranged and emended          
within its own proper limits, to an extent unattainable by the              
operation of the principles of the understanding alone.                     
  I shall make this plainer. Guided by the principles involved in           
these ideas, we must, in the first place, so connect all the                
phenomena, actions, and feelings of the mind, as if it were a simple        
substance, which, endowed with personal identity, possesses a               
permanent existence (in this life at least), while its states, among        
which those of the body are to be included as external conditions, are      
in continual change. Secondly, in cosmology, we must investigate the        
conditions of all natural phenomena, internal as well as external,          
as if they belonged to a chain infinite and without any prime or            
supreme member, while we do not, on this account, deny the existence        
of intelligible grounds of these phenomena, although we never employ        
them to explain phenomena, for the simple reason that they are not          
objects of our cognition. Thirdly, in the sphere of theology, we            
must regard the whole system of possible experience as forming an           
absolute, but dependent and sensuously-conditioned unity, and at the        
same time as based upon a sole, supreme, and all-sufficient ground          
existing apart from the world itself- a ground which is a                   
self-subsistent, primeval and creative reason, in relation to which we      
so employ our reason in the field of experience, as if all objects          
drew their origin from that archetype of all reason. In other words,        
we ought not to deduce the internal phenomena of the mind from a            
simple thinking substance, but deduce them from each other under the        
guidance of the regulative idea of a simple being; we ought not to          
deduce the phenomena, order, and unity of the universe from a               
supreme intelligence, but merely draw from this idea of a supremely         
wise cause the rules which must guide reason in its connection of           
causes and effects.                                                         
  Now there is nothing to hinder us from admitting these ideas to           
possess an objective and hyperbolic existence, except the cosmological      
ideas, which lead reason into an antinomy: the psychological and            
theological ideas are not antinomial. They contain no contradiction;        
and how, then, can any one dispute their objective reality, since he        
who denies it knows as little about their possibility as we who             
affirm? And yet, when we wish to admit the existence of a thing, it is      
not sufficient to convince ourselves that there is no positive              
obstacle in the way; for it cannot be allowable to regard mere              
creations of thought, which transcend, though they do not                   
contradict, all our conceptions, as real and determinate objects,           
solely upon the authority of a speculative reason striving to               
compass its own aims. They cannot, therefore, be admitted to be real        
in themselves; they can only possess a comparative reality- that of         
a schema of the regulative principle of the systematic unity of all         
cognition. They are to be regarded not as actual things, but as in          
some measure analogous to them. We abstract from the object of the          
idea all the conditions which limit the exercise of our understanding,      
but which, on the other hand, are the sole conditions of our                
possessing a determinate conception of any given thing. And thus we         
cogitate a something, of the real nature of which we have not the           
least conception, but which we represent to ourselves as standing in a      
relation to the whole system of phenomena, analogous to that in             
which phenomena stand to each other.                                        
  By admitting these ideal beings, we do not really extend our              
cognitions beyond the objects of possible experience; we extend merely      
the empirical unity of our experience, by the aid of systematic unity,      
the schema of which is furnished by the idea, which is therefore            
valid- not as a constitutive, but as a regulative principle. For            
although we posit a thing corresponding to the idea- a something, an        
actual existence- we do not on that account aim at the extension of         
our cognition by means of transcendent conceptions. This existence          
is purely ideal, and not objective; it is the mere expression of the        
systematic unity which is to be the guide of reason in the field of         
experience. There are no attempts made at deciding what the ground          
of this unity may be, or what the real nature of this imaginary being.      
  Thus the transcendental and only determinate conception of God,           
which is presented to us by speculative reason, is in the strictest         
sense deistic. In other words, reason does not assure us of the             
objective validity of the conception; it merely gives us the idea of        
something, on which the supreme and necessary unity of all                  
experience is based. This something we cannot, following the analogy        
of a real substance, cogitate otherwise than as the cause of all            
things operating in accordance with rational laws, if we regard it          
as an individual object; although we should rest contented with the         
idea alone as a regulative principle of reason, and make no attempt at      
completing the sum of the conditions imposed by thought. This               
attempt is, indeed, inconsistent with the grand aim of complete             
systematic unity in the sphere of cognition- a unity to which no            
bounds are set by reason.                                                   
                                                    {APPENDIX ^paragraph 50}
  Hence it happens that, admitting a divine being, I can have no            
conception of the internal possibility of its perfection, or of the         
necessity of its existence. The only advantage of this admission is         
that it enables me to answer all other questions relating to the            
contingent, and to give reason the most complete satisfaction as            
regards the unity which it aims at attaining in the world of                
experience. But I cannot satisfy reason with regard to this hypothesis      
itself; and this proves that it is not its intelligence and insight         
into the subject, but its speculative interest alone which induces          
it to proceed from a point lying far beyond the sphere of our               
cognition, for the purpose of being able to consider all objects as         
parts of a systematic whole.                                                
  Here a distinction presents itself, in regard to the way in which we      
may cogitate a presupposition- a distinction which is somewhat subtle,      
but of great importance in transcendental philosophy. I may have            
sufficient grounds to admit something, or the existence of                  
something, in a relative point of view (suppositio relativa),               
without being justified in admitting it in an absolute sense                
(suppositio absoluta). This distinction is undoubtedly requisite, in        
the case of a regulative principle, the necessity of which we               
recognize, though we are ignorant of the source and cause of that           
necessity, and which we assume to be based upon some ultimate               
ground, for the purpose of being able to cogitate the universality          
of the principle in a more determinate way. For example, I cogitate         
the existence of a being corresponding to a pure transcendental             
idea. But I cannot admit that this being exists absolutely and in           
itself, because all of the conceptions by which I can cogitate an           
object in a determinate manner fall short of assuring me of its             
existence; nay, the conditions of the objective validity of my              
conceptions are excluded by the idea- by the very fact of its being an      
idea. The conceptions of reality, substance, causality, nay, even that      
of necessity in existence, have no significance out of the sphere of        
empirical cognition, and cannot, beyond that sphere, determine any          
object. They may, accordingly, be employed to explain the                   
possibility of things in the world of sense, but they are utterly           
inadequate to explain the possibility of the universe itself                
considered as a whole; because in this case the ground of                   
explanation must lie out of and beyond the world, and cannot,               
therefore, be an object of possible experience. Now, I may admit the        
existence of an incomprehensible being of this nature- the object of a      
mere idea, relatively to the world of sense; although I have no ground      
to admit its existence absolutely and in itself. For if an idea             
(that of a systematic and complete unity, of which I shall presently        
speak more particularly) lies at the foundation of the most extended        
empirical employment of reason, and if this idea cannot be                  
adequately represented in concreto, although it is indispensably            
necessary for the approximation of empirical unity to the highest           
possible degree- I am not only authorized, but compelled, to realize        
this idea, that is, to posit a real object corresponding thereto.           
But I cannot profess to know this object; it is to me merely a              
something, to which, as the ground of systematic unity in cognition, I      
attribute such properties as are analogous to the conceptions employed      
by the understanding in the sphere of experience. Following the             
analogy of the notions of reality, substance, causality, and                
necessity, I cogitate a being, which possesses all these attributes in      
the highest degree; and, as this idea is the offspring of my reason         
alone, I cogitate this being as self-subsistent reason, and as the          
cause of the universe operating by means of ideas of the greatest           
possible harmony and unity. Thus I abstract all conditions that             
would limit my idea, solely for the purpose of rendering systematic         
unity possible in the world of empirical diversity, and thus                
securing the widest possible extension for the exercise of reason in        
that sphere. This I am enabled to do, by regarding all connections and      
relations in the world of sense, as if they were the dispositions of a      
supreme reason, of which our reason is but a faint image. I then            
proceed to cogitate this Supreme Being by conceptions which have,           
properly, no meaning or application, except in the world of sense. But      
as I am authorized to employ the transcendental hypothesis of such a        
being in a relative respect alone, that is, as the substratum of the        
greatest possible unity in experience- I may attribute to a being           
which I regard as distinct from the world, such properties as belong        
solely to the sphere of sense and experience. For I do not desire, and      
am not justified in desiring, to cognize this object of my idea, as it      
exists in itself; for I possess no conceptions sufficient for or task,      
those of reality, substance, causality, nay, even that of necessity in      
existence, losing all significance, and becoming merely the signs of        
conceptions, without content and without applicability, when I attempt      
to carry them beyond the limits of the world of sense. I cogitate           
merely the relation of a perfectly unknown being to the greatest            
possible systematic unity of experience, solely for the purpose of          
employing it as the schema of the regulative principle which directs        
reason in its empirical exercise.                                           
  It is evident, at the first view, that we cannot presuppose the           
reality of this transcendental object, by means of the conceptions          
of reality, substance, causality, and so on, because these conceptions      
cannot be applied to anything that is distinct from the world of            
sense. Thus the supposition of a Supreme Being or cause is purely           
relative; it is cogitated only in behalf of the systematic unity of         
experience; such a being is but a something, of whose existence in          
itself we have not the least conception. Thus, too, it becomes              
sufficiently manifest why we required the idea of a necessary being in      
relation to objects given by sense, although we can never have the          
least conception of this being, or of its absolute necessity.               
  And now we can clearly perceive the result of our transcendental          
dialectic, and the proper aim of the ideas of pure reason- which            
become dialectical solely from misunderstanding and inconsiderateness.      
Pure reason is, in fact, occupied with itself, and not with any             
object. Objects are not presented to it to be embraced in the unity of      
an empirical conception; it is only the cognitions of the                   
understanding that are presented to it, for the purpose of receiving        
the unity of a rational conception, that is, of being connected             
according to a principle. The unity of reason is the unity of               
system; and this systematic unity is not an objective principle,            
extending its dominion over objects, but a subjective maxim, extending      
its authority over the empirical cognition of objects. The                  
systematic connection which reason gives to the empirical employment        
of the understanding not only advances the extension of that                
employment, but ensures its correctness, and thus the principle of a        
systematic unity of this nature is also objective, although only in an      
indefinite respect (principium vagum). It is not, however, a                
constitutive principle, determining an object to which it directly          
relates; it is merely a regulative principle or maxim, advancing and        
strengthening the empirical exercise of reason, by the opening up of        
new paths of which the understanding is ignorant, while it never            
conflicts with the laws of its exercise in the sphere of experience.        
  But reason cannot cogitate this systematic unity, without at the          
same time cogitating an object of the idea- an object that cannot be        
presented in any experience, which contains no concrete example of a        
complete systematic unity. This being (ens rationis ratiocinatae) is        
therefore a mere idea and is not assumed to be a thing which is real        
absolutely and in itself. On the contrary, it forms merely the              
problematical foundation of the connection which the mind introduces        
among the phenomena of the sensuous world. We look upon this                
connection, in the light of the above-mentioned idea, as if it drew         
its origin from the supposed being which corresponds to the idea.           
And yet all we aim at is the possession of this idea as a secure            
foundation for the systematic unity of experience- a unity                  
indispensable to reason, advantageous to the understanding, and             
promotive of the interests of empirical cognition.                          
                                                    {APPENDIX ^paragraph 55}
  We mistake the true meaning of this idea when we regard it as an          
enouncement, or even as a hypothetical declaration of the existence of      
a real thing, which we are to regard as the origin or ground of a           
systematic constitution of the universe. On the contrary, it is left        
completely undetermined what the nature or properties of this               
so-called ground may be. The idea is merely to be adopted as a point        
of view, from which this unity, so essential to reason and so               
beneficial to the understanding, may be regarded as radiating. In           
one word, this transcendental thing is merely the schema of a               
regulative principle, by means of which Reason, so far as in her lies,      
extends the dominion of systematic unity over the whole sphere of           
experience.                                                                 
  The first object of an idea of this kind is the ego, considered           
merely as a thinking nature or soul. If I wish to investigate the           
properties of a thinking being, I must interrogate experience. But I        
find that I can apply none of the categories to this object, the            
schema of these categories, which is the condition of their                 
application, being given only in sensuous intuition. But I cannot thus      
attain to the cognition of a systematic unity of all the phenomena          
of the internal sense. Instead, therefore, of an empirical                  
conception of what the soul really is, reason takes the conception          
of the empirical unity of all thought, and, by cogitating this unity        
as unconditioned and primitive, constructs the rational conception          
or idea of a simple substance which is in itself unchangeable,              
possessing personal identity, and in connection with other real things      
external to it; in one word, it constructs the idea of a simple             
self-subsistent intelligence. But the real aim of reason in this            
procedure is the attainment of principles of systematic unity for           
the explanation of the phenomena of the soul. That is, reason               
desires to be able to represent all the determinations of the internal      
sense as existing in one subject, all powers as deduced from one            
fundamental power, all changes as mere varieties in the condition of a      
being which is permanent and always the same, and all phenomena in          
space as entirely different in their nature from the procedure of           
thought. Essential simplicity (with the other attributes predicated of      
the ego) is regarded as the mere schema of this regulative                  
principle; it is not assumed that it is the actual ground of the            
properties of the soul. For these properties may rest upon quite            
different grounds, of which we are completely ignorant; just as the         
above predicates could not give us any knowledge of the soul as it          
is in itself, even if we regarded them as valid in respect of it,           
inasmuch as they constitute a mere idea, which cannot be represented        
in concreto. Nothing but good can result from a psychological idea          
of this kind, if we only take proper care not to consider it as more        
than an idea; that is, if we regard it as valid merely in relation          
to the employment of reason, in the sphere of the phenomena of the          
soul. Under the guidance of this idea, or principle, no empirical laws      
of corporeal phenomena are called in to explain that which is a             
phenomenon of the internal sense alone; no windy hypotheses of the          
generation, annihilation, and palingenesis of souls are admitted. Thus      
the consideration of this object of the internal sense is kept pure,        
and unmixed with heterogeneous elements; while the investigation of         
reason aims at reducing all the grounds of explanation employed in          
this sphere of knowledge to a single principle. All this is best            
effected, nay, cannot be effected otherwise than by means of such a         
schema, which requires us to regard this ideal thing as an actual           
existence. The psychological idea is, therefore, meaningless and            
inapplicable, except as the schema of a regulative conception. For, if      
I ask whether the soul is not really of a spiritual nature- it is a         
question which has no meaning. From such a conception has been              
abstracted, not merely all corporeal nature, but all nature, that           
is, all the predicates of a possible experience; and consequently, all      
the conditions which enable us to cogitate an object to this                
conception have disappeared. But, if these conditions are absent, it        
is evident that the conception is meaningless.                              
  The second regulative idea of speculative reason is the conception        
of the universe. For nature is properly the only object presented to        
us, in regard to which reason requires regulative principles. Nature        
is twofold- thinking and corporeal nature. To cogitate the latter in        
regard to its internal possibility, that is, to determine the               
application of the categories to it, no idea is required- no                
representation which transcends experience. In this sphere, therefore,      
an idea is impossible, sensuous intuition being our only guide; while,      
in the sphere of psychology, we require the fundamental idea (I),           
which contains a priori a certain form of thought namely, the unity of      
the ego. Pure reason has, therefore, nothing left but nature in             
general, and the completeness of conditions in nature in accordance         
with some principle. The absolute totality of the series of these           
conditions is an idea, which can never be fully realized in the             
empirical exercise of reason, while it is serviceable as a rule for         
the procedure of reason in relation to that totality. It requires           
us, in the explanation of given phenomena (in the regress or ascent in      
the series), to proceed as if the series were infinite in itself, that      
is, were prolonged in indefinitum,; while on the other hand, where          
reason is regarded as itself the determining cause (in the region of        
freedom), we are required to proceed as if we had not before us an          
object of sense, but of the pure understanding. In this latter case,        
the conditions do not exist in the series of phenomena, but may be          
placed quite out of and beyond it, and the series of conditions may be      
regarded as if it had an absolute beginning from an intelligible            
cause. All this proves that the cosmological ideas are nothing but          
regulative principles, and not constitutive; and that their aim is not      
to realize an actual totality in such series. The full discussion of        
this subject will be found in its proper place in the chapter on the        
antinomy of pure reason.                                                    
  The third idea of pure reason, containing the hypothesis of a             
being which is valid merely as a relative hypothesis, is that of the        
one and all-sufficient cause of all cosmological series, in other           
words, the idea of God. We have not the slightest ground absolutely to      
admit the existence of an object corresponding to this idea; for            
what can empower or authorize us to affirm the existence of a being of      
the highest perfection- a being whose existence is absolutely               
necessary- merely because we possess the conception of such a being?        
The answer is: It is the existence of the world which renders this          
hypothesis necessary. But this answer makes it perfectly evident            
that the idea of this being, like all other speculative ideas, is           
essentially nothing more than a demand upon reason that it shall            
regulate the connection which it and its subordinate faculties              
introduce into the phenomena of the world by principles of                  
systematic unity and, consequently, that it shall regard all phenomena      
as originating from one all-embracing being, as the supreme and             
all-sufficient cause. From this it is plain that the only aim of            
reason in this procedure is the establishment of its own formal rule        
for the extension of its dominion in the world of experience; that          
it does not aim at an extension of its cognition beyond the limits          
of experience; and that, consequently, this idea does not contain           
any constitutive principle.                                                 
  The highest formal unity, which is based upon ideas alone, is the         
unity of all things- a unity in accordance with an aim or purpose; and      
the speculative interest of reason renders it necessary to regard           
all order in the world as if it originated from the intention and           
design of a supreme reason. This principle unfolds to the view of           
reason in the sphere of experience new and enlarged prospects, and          
invites it to connect the phenomena of the world according to               
teleological laws, and in this way to attain to the highest possible        
degree of systematic unity. The hypothesis of a supreme                     
intelligence, as the sole cause of the universe- an intelligence which      
has for us no more than an ideal existence- is accordingly always of        
the greatest service to reason. Thus, if we presuppose, in relation to      
the figure of the earth (which is round, but somewhat flattened at the      
poles),* or that of mountains or seas, wise designs on the part of          
an author of the universe, we cannot fail to make, by the light of          
this supposition, a great number of interesting discoveries. If we          
keep to this hypothesis, as a principle which is purely regulative,         
even error cannot be very detrimental. For, in this case, error can         
have no more serious consequences than that, where we expected to           
discover a teleological connection (nexus finalis), only a                  
mechanical or physical connection appears. In such a case, we merely        
fail to find the additional form of unity we expected, but we do not        
lose the rational unity which the mind requires in its procedure in         
experience. But even a miscarriage of this sort cannot affect the           
law in its general and teleological relations. For although we may          
convict an anatomist of an error, when he connects the limb of some         
animal with a certain purpose, it is quite impossible to prove in a         
single case that any arrangement of nature, be it what it may, is           
entirely without aim or design. And thus medical physiology, by the         
aid of a principle presented to it by pure reason, extends its very         
limited empirical knowledge of the purposes of the different parts          
of an organized body so far that it may be asserted with the utmost         
confidence, and with the approbation of all reflecting men, that every      
organ or bodily part of an animal has its use and answers a certain         
design. Now, this is a supposition which, if regarded as of a               
constitutive character, goes much farther than any experience or            
observation of ours can justify. Hence it is evident that it is             
nothing more than a regulative principle of reason, which aims at           
the highest degree of systematic unity, by the aid of the idea of a         
causality according to design in a supreme cause- a cause which it          
regards as the highest intelligence.                                        
                                                    {APPENDIX ^paragraph 60}
-                                                                           
  *The advantages which a circular form, in the case of the earth, has      
over every other, are well known. But few are aware that the slight         
flattening at the poles, which gives it the figure of a spheroid, is        
the only cause which prevents the elevations of continents or even          
of mountains, perhaps thrown up by some internal convulsion, from           
continually altering the position of the axis of the earth- and that        
to some considerable degree in a short time. The great protuberance of      
the earth under the Equator serves to overbalance the impetus of all        
other masses of earth, and thus to preserve the axis of the earth,          
so far as we can observe, in its present position. And yet this wise        
arrangement has been unthinkingly explained from the equilibrium of         
the formerly fluid mass.                                                    
-                                                                           
  If, however, we neglect this restriction of the idea to a purely          
regulative influence, reason is betrayed into numerous errors. For          
it has then left the ground of experience, in which alone are to be         
found the criteria of truth, and has ventured into the region of the        
incomprehensible and unsearchable, on the heights of which it loses         
its power and collectedness, because it has completely severed its          
connection with experience.                                                 
  The first error which arises from our employing the idea of a             
Supreme Being as a constitutive (in repugnance to the very nature of        
an idea), and not as a regulative principle, is the error of                
inactive reason (ignava ratio).* We may so term every principle             
which requires us to regard our investigations of nature as absolutely      
complete, and allows reason to cease its inquiries, as if it had fully      
executed its task. Thus the psychological idea of the ego, when             
employed as a constitutive principle for the explanation of the             
phenomena of the soul, and for the extension of our knowledge               
regarding this subject beyond the limits of experience- even to the         
condition of the soul after death- is convenient enough for the             
purposes of pure reason, but detrimental and even ruinous to its            
interests in the sphere of nature and experience. The dogmatizing           
spiritualist explains the unchanging unity of our personality               
through all changes of condition from the unity of a thinking               
substance, the interest which we take in things and events that can         
happen only after our death, from a consciousness of the immaterial         
nature of our thinking subject, and so on. Thus he dispenses with           
all empirical investigations into the cause of these internal               
phenomena, and with all possible explanations of them upon purely           
natural grounds; while, at the dictation of a transcendent reason,          
he passes by the immanent sources of cognition in experience,               
greatly to his own ease and convenience, but to the sacrifice of            
all, genuine insight and intelligence. These prejudicial                    
consequences become still more evident, in the case of the                  
dogmatical treatment of our idea of a Supreme Intelligence, and the         
theological system of nature (physico-theology) which is falsely based      
upon it. For, in this case, the aims which we observe in nature, and        
often those which we merely fancy to exist, make the investigation          
of causes a very easy task, by directing us to refer such and such          
phenomena immediately to the unsearchable will and counsel of the           
Supreme Wisdom, while we ought to investigate their causes in the           
general laws of the mechanism of matter. We are thus recommended to         
consider the labour of reason as ended, when we have merely                 
dispensed with its employment, which is guided surely and safely            
only by the order of nature and the series of changes in the world-         
which are arranged according to immanent and general laws. This             
error may be avoided, if we do not merely consider from the view-point      
of final aims certain parts of nature, such as the division and             
structure of a continent, the constitution and direction of certain         
mountain-chains, or even the organization existing in the vegetable         
and animal kingdoms, but look upon this systematic unity of nature          
in a perfectly general way, in relation to the idea of a Supreme            
Intelligence. If we pursue this advice, we lay as a foundation for all      
investigation the conformity to aims of all phenomena of nature in          
accordance with universal laws, for which no particular arrangement of      
nature is exempt, but only cognized by us with more or less                 
difficulty; and we possess a regulative principle of the systematic         
unity of a teleological connection, which we do not attempt to              
anticipate or predetermine. All that we do, and ought to do, is to          
follow out the physico-mechanical connection in nature according to         
general laws, with the hope of discovering, sooner or later, the            
teleological connection also. Thus, and thus only, can the principle        
of final unity aid in the extension of the employment of reason in the      
sphere of experience, without being in any case detrimental to its          
interests.                                                                  
                                                    {APPENDIX ^paragraph 65}
-                                                                           
  *This was the term applied by the old dialecticians to a sophistical      
argument, which ran thus: If it is your fate to die of this disease,        
you will die, whether you employ a physician or not. Cicero says            
that this mode of reasoning has received this appellation, because, if      
followed, it puts an end to the employment of reason in the affairs of      
life. For a similar reason, I have applied this designation to the          
sophistical argument of pure reason.                                        
-                                                                           
  The second error which arises from the misconception of the               
principle of systematic unity is that of perverted reason (perversa         
ratio, usteron roteron rationis). The idea of systematic unity is           
available as a regulative principle in the connection of phenomena          
according to general natural laws; and, how far soever we have to           
travel upon the path of experience to discover some fact or event,          
this idea requires us to believe that we have approached all the            
more nearly to the completion of its use in the sphere of nature,           
although that completion can never be attained. But this error              
reverses the procedure of reason. We begin by hypostatizing the             
principle of systematic unity, and by giving an anthropomorphic             
determination to the conception of a Supreme Intelligence, and then         
proceed forcibly to impose aims upon nature. Thus not only does             
teleology, which ought to aid in the completion of unity in accordance      
with general laws, operate to the destruction of its influence, but it      
hinders reason from attaining its proper aim, that is, the proof, upon      
natural grounds, of the existence of a supreme intelligent cause. For,      
if we cannot presuppose supreme finality in nature a priori, that           
is, as essentially belonging to nature, how can we be directed to           
endeavour to discover this unity and, rising gradually through its          
different degrees, to approach the supreme perfection of an author          
of all- a perfection which is absolutely necessary, and therefore           
cognizable a priori? The regulative principle directs us to presuppose      
systematic unity absolutely and, consequently, as following from the        
essential nature of things- but only as a unity of nature, not              
merely cognized empirically, but presupposed a priori, although only        
in an indeterminate manner. But if I insist on basing nature upon           
the foundation of a supreme ordaining Being, the unity of nature is in      
effect lost. For, in this case, it is quite foreign and unessential to      
the nature of things, and cannot be cognized from the general laws          
of nature. And thus arises a vicious circular argument, what ought          
to have been proved having been presupposed.                                
  To take the regulative principle of systematic unity in nature for a      
constitutive principle, and to hypostatize and make a cause out of          
that which is properly the ideal ground of the consistent and               
harmonious exercise of reason, involves reason in inextricable              
embarrassments. The investigation of nature pursues its own path under      
the guidance of the chain of natural causes, in accordance with the         
general laws of nature, and ever follows the light of the idea of an        
author of the universe- not for the purpose of deducing the                 
finality, which it constantly pursues, from this Supreme Being, but to      
attain to the cognition of his existence from the finality which it         
seeks in the existence of the phenomena of nature, and, if possible,        
in that of all things to cognize this being, consequently, as               
absolutely necessary. Whether this latter purpose succeed or not,           
the idea is and must always be a true one, and its employment, when         
merely regulative, must always be accompanied by truthful and               
beneficial results.                                                         
                                                    {APPENDIX ^paragraph 70}
  Complete unity, in conformity with aims, constitutes absolute             
perfection. But if we do not find this unity in the nature of the           
things which go to constitute the world of experience, that is, of          
objective cognition, consequently in the universal and necessary            
laws of nature, how can we infer from this unity the idea of the            
supreme and absolutely necessary perfection of a primal being, which        
is the origin of all causality? The greatest systematic unity, and          
consequently teleological unity, constitutes the very foundation of         
the possibility of the most extended employment of human reason. The        
idea of unity is therefore essentially and indissolubly connected with      
the nature of our reason. This idea is a legislative one; and hence it      
is very natural that we should assume the existence of a legislative        
reason corresponding to it, from which the systematic unity of nature-      
the object of the operations of reason- must be derived.                    
  In the course of our discussion of the antinomies, we stated that it      
is always possible to answer all the questions which pure reason may        
raise; and that the plea of the limited nature of our cognition, which      
is unavoidable and proper in many questions regarding natural               
phenomena, cannot in this case be admitted, because the questions           
raised do not relate to the nature of things, but are necessarily           
originated by the nature of reason itself, and relate to its own            
internal constitution. We can now establish this assertion, which at        
first sight appeared so rash, in relation to the two questions in           
which reason takes the greatest interest, and thus complete our             
discussion of the dialectic of pure reason.                                 
  If, then, the question is asked, in relation to transcendental            
theology,* first, whether there is anything distinct from the world,        
which contains the ground of cosmical order and connection according        
to general laws? The answer is: Certainly. For the world is a sum of        
phenomena; there must, therefore, be some transcendental basis of           
these phenomena, that is, a basis cogitable by the pure                     
understanding alone. If, secondly, the question is asked whether            
this being is substance, whether it is of the greatest reality,             
whether it is necessary, and so forth? I answer that this question          
is utterly without meaning. For all the categories which aid me in          
forming a conception of an object cannot be employed except in the          
world of sense, and are without meaning when not applied to objects of      
actual or possible experience. Out of this sphere, they are not             
properly conceptions, but the mere marks or indices of conceptions,         
which we may admit, although they cannot, without the help of               
experience, help us to understand any subject or thing. If, thirdly,        
the question is whether we may not cogitate this being, which is            
distinct from the world, in analogy with the objects of experience?         
The answer is: Undoubtedly, but only as an ideal, and not as a real         
object. That is, we must cogitate it only as an unknown substratum          
of the systematic unity, order, and finality of the world- a unity          
which reason must employ as the regulative principle of its                 
investigation of nature. Nay, more, we may admit into the idea certain      
anthropomorphic elements, which are promotive of the interests of this      
regulative principle. For it is no more than an idea, which does not        
relate directly to a being distinct from the world, but to the              
regulative principle of the systematic unity of the world, by means,        
however, of a schema of this unity- the schema of a Supreme                 
Intelligence, who is the wisely-designing author of the universe. What      
this basis of cosmical unity may be in itself, we know not- we              
cannot discover from the idea; we merely know how we ought to employ        
the idea of this unity, in relation to the systematic operation of          
reason in the sphere of experience.                                         
-                                                                           
  *After what has been said of the psychological idea of the ego and        
its proper employment as a regulative principle of the operations of        
reason, I need not enter into details regarding the transcendental          
illusion by which the systematic unity of all the various phenomena of      
the internal sense is hypostatized. The procedure is in this case very      
similar to that which has been discussed in our remarks on the              
theological ideal.                                                          
                                                    {APPENDIX ^paragraph 75}
-                                                                           
  But, it will be asked again, can we on these grounds, admit the           
existence of a wise and omnipotent author of the world? Without doubt;      
and not only so, but we must assume the existence of such a being. But      
do we thus extend the limits of our knowledge beyond the field of           
possible experience? By no means. For we have merely presupposed a          
something, of which we have no conception, which we do not know as          
it is in itself; but, in relation to the systematic disposition of the      
universe, which we must presuppose in all our observation of nature,        
we have cogitated this unknown being in analogy with an intelligent         
existence (an empirical conception), that is to say, we have endowed        
it with those attributes, which, judging from the nature of our own         
reason, may contain the ground of such a systematic unity. This idea        
is therefore valid only relatively to the employment in experience          
of our reason. But if we attribute to it absolute and objective             
validity, we overlook the fact that it is merely an ideal being that        
we cogitate; and, by setting out from a basis which is not                  
determinable by considerations drawn from experience, we place              
ourselves in a position which incapacitates us from applying this           
principle to the empirical employment of reason.                            
  But, it will be asked further, can I make any use of this conception      
and hypothesis in my investigations into the world and nature? Yes,         
for this very purpose was the idea established by reason as a               
fundamental basis. But may I regard certain arrangements, which seemed      
to have been made in conformity with some fixed aim, as the                 
arrangements of design, and look upon them as proceeding from the           
divine will, with the intervention, however, of certain other               
particular arrangements disposed to that end? Yes, you may do so;           
but at the same time you must regard it as indifferent, whether it          
is asserted that divine wisdom has disposed all things in conformity        
with his highest aims, or that the idea of supreme wisdom is a              
regulative principle in the investigation of nature, and at the same        
time a principle of the systematic unity of nature according to             
general laws, even in those cases where we are unable to discover that      
unity. In other words, it must be perfectly indifferent to you whether      
you say, when you have discovered this unity: God has wisely willed it      
so; or: Nature has wisely arranged this. For it was nothing but the         
systematic unity, which reason requires as a basis for the                  
investigation of nature, that justified you in accepting the idea of a      
supreme intelligence as a schema for a regulative principle; and,           
the farther you advance in the discovery of design and finality, the        
more certain the validity of your idea. But, as the whole aim of            
this regulative principle was the discovery of a necessary and              
systematic unity in nature, we have, in so far as we attain this, to        
attribute our success to the idea of a Supreme Being; while, at the         
same time, we cannot, without involving ourselves in contradictions,        
overlook the general laws of nature, as it was in reference to them         
alone that this idea was employed. We cannot, I say, overlook the           
general laws of nature, and regard this conformity to aims                  
observable in nature as contingent or hyperphysical in its origin;          
inasmuch as there is no ground which can justify us in the admission        
of a being with such properties distinct from and above nature. All         
that we are authorized to assert is that this idea may be employed          
as a principle, and that the properties of the being which is               
assumed to correspond to it may be regarded as systematically               
connected in analogy with the causal determination of phenomena.            
  For the same reasons we are justified in introducing into the idea        
of the supreme cause other anthropomorphic elements (for without these      
we could not predicate anything of it); we may regard it as                 
allowable to cogitate this cause as a being with understanding, the         
feelings of pleasure and displeasure, and faculties of desire and will      
corresponding to these. At the same time, we may attribute to this          
being infinite perfection- a perfection which necessarily transcends        
that which our knowledge of the order and design in the world               
authorize us to predicate of it. For the regulative law of                  
systematic unity requires us to study nature on the supposition that        
systematic and final unity in infinitum is everywhere discoverable,         
even in the highest diversity. For, although we may discover little of      
this cosmical perfection, it belongs to the legislative prerogative of      
reason to require us always to seek for and to expect it; while it          
must always be beneficial to institute all inquiries into nature in         
accordance with this principle. But it is evident that, by this idea        
of a supreme author of all, which I place as the foundation of all          
inquiries into nature, I do not mean to assert the existence of such a      
being, or that I have any knowledge of its existence; and,                  
consequently, I do not really deduce anything from the existence of         
this being, but merely from its idea, that is to say, from the              
nature of things in this world, in accordance with this idea. A             
certain dim consciousness of the true use of this idea seems to have        
dictated to the philosophers of all times the moderate language used        
by them regarding the cause of the world. We find them employing the        
expressions wisdom and care of nature, and divine wisdom, as                
synonymous- nay, in purely speculative discussions, preferring the          
former, because it does not carry the appearance of greater                 
pretensions than such as we are entitled to make, and at the same time      
directs reason to its proper field of action- nature and her                
phenomena.                                                                  
  Thus, pure reason, which at first seemed to promise us nothing            
less than the extension of our cognition beyond the limits of               
experience, is found, when thoroughly examined, to contain nothing but      
regulative principles, the virtue and function of which is to               
introduce into our cognition a higher degree of unity than the              
understanding could of itself. These principles, by placing the goal        
of all our struggles at so great a distance, realize for us the most        
thorough connection between the different parts of our cognition,           
and the highest degree of systematic unity. But, on the other hand, if      
misunderstood and employed as constitutive principles of                    
transcendent cognition, they become the parents of illusions and            
contradictions, while pretending to introduce us to new regions of          
knowledge.                                                                  
                                                    {APPENDIX ^paragraph 80}
-                                                                           
  Thus all human cognition begins with intuitions, proceeds from            
thence to conceptions, and ends with ideas. Although it possesses,          
in relation to all three elements, a priori sources of cognition,           
which seemed to transcend the limits of all experience, a                   
thoroughgoing criticism demonstrates that speculative reason can            
never, by the aid of these elements, pass the bounds of possible            
experience, and that the proper destination of this highest faculty of      
cognition is to employ all methods, and all the principles of these         
methods, for the purpose of penetrating into the innermost secrets          
of nature, by the aid of the principles of unity (among all kinds of        
which teleological unity is the highest), while it ought not to             
attempt to soar above the sphere of experience, beyond which there          
lies nought for us but the void inane. The critical examination, in         
our Transcendental Analytic, of all the propositions which professed        
to extend cognition beyond the sphere of experience, completely             
demonstrated that they can only conduct us to a possible experience.        
If we were not distrustful even of the clearest abstract theorems,          
if we were not allured by specious and inviting prospects to escape         
from the constraining power of their evidence, we might spare               
ourselves the laborious examination of all the dialectical arguments        
which a transcendent reason adduces in support of its pretensions; for      
we should know with the most complete certainty that, however honest        
such professions might be, they are null and valueless, because they        
relate to a kind of knowledge to which no man can by any possibility        
attain. But, as there is no end to discussion, if we cannot discover        
the true cause of the illusions by which even the wisest are deceived,      
and as the analysis of all our transcendent cognition into its              
elements is of itself of no slight value as a psychological study,          
while it is a duty incumbent on every philosopher- it was found             
necessary to investigate the dialectical procedure of reason in its         
primary sources. And as the inferences of which this dialectic is           
the parent are not only deceitful, but naturally possess a profound         
interest for humanity, it was advisable at the same time, to give a         
full account of the momenta of this dialectical procedure, and to           
deposit it in the archives of human reason, as a warning to all future      
metaphysicians to avoid these causes of speculative error.                  
                                                                            
METHOD                                                                      
                           II.                                              
-                                                                           
             TRANSCENDENTAL DOCTRINE OF METHOD.                             
-                                                                           
  If we regard the sum of the cognition of pure speculative reason          
as an edifice, the idea of which, at least, exists in the human             
mind, it may be said that we have in the Transcendental Doctrine of         
Elements examined the materials and determined to what edifice these        
belong, and what its height and stability. We have found, indeed,           
that, although we had purposed to build for ourselves a tower which         
should reach to Heaven, the supply of materials sufficed merely for         
a habitation, which was spacious enough for all terrestrial                 
purposes, and high enough to enable us to survey the level plain of         
experience, but that the bold undertaking designed necessarily              
failed for want of materials- not to mention the confusion of tongues,      
which gave rise to endless disputes among the labourers on the plan of      
the edifice, and at last scattered them over all the world, each to         
erect a separate building for himself, according to his own plans           
and his own inclinations. Our present task relates not to the               
materials, but to the plan of an edifice; and, as we have had               
sufficient warning not to venture blindly upon a design which may be        
found to transcend our natural powers, while, at the same time, we          
cannot give up the intention of erecting a secure abode for the             
mind, we must proportion our design to the material which is presented      
to us, and which is, at the same time, sufficient for all our wants.        
  I understand, then, by the transcendental doctrine of method, the         
determination of the formal conditions of a complete system of pure         
reason. We shall accordingly have to treat of the discipline, the           
canon, the architectonic, and, finally, the history of pure reason.         
This part of our Critique will accomplish, from the transcendental          
point of view, what has been usually attempted, but miserably               
executed, under the name of practical logic. It has been badly              
executed, I say, because general logic, not being limited to any            
particular kind of cognition (not even to the pure cognition of the         
understanding) nor to any particular objects, it cannot, without            
borrowing from other sciences, do more than present merely the              
titles or signs of possible methods and the technical expressions,          
which are employed in the systematic parts of all sciences; and thus        
the pupil is made acquainted with names, the meaning and application        
of which he is to learn only at some future time.                           
                                                                            
CH_1                                                                        
            CHAPTER I. The Discipline of Pure Reason.                       
-                                                                           
  Negative judgements- those which are so not merely as regards             
their logical form, but in respect of their content- are not                
commonly held in especial respect. They are, on the contrary, regarded      
as jealous enemies of our insatiable desire for knowledge; and it           
almost requires an apology to induce us to tolerate, much less to           
prize and to respect them.                                                  
  All propositions, indeed, may be logically expressed in a negative        
form; but, in relation to the content of our cognition, the peculiar        
province of negative judgements is solely to prevent error. For this        
reason, too, negative propositions, which are framed for the purpose        
of correcting false cognitions where error is absolutely impossible,        
are undoubtedly true, but inane and senseless; that is, they are in         
reality purposeless and, for this reason, often very ridiculous.            
Such is the proposition of the schoolman that Alexander could not have      
subdued any countries without an army.                                      
  But where the limits of our possible cognition are very much              
contracted, the attraction to new fields of knowledge great, the            
illusions to which the mind is subject of the most deceptive                
character, and the evil consequences of error of no inconsiderable          
magnitude- the negative element in knowledge, which is useful only          
to guard us against error, is of far more importance than much of that      
positive instruction which makes additions to the sum of our                
knowledge. The restraint which is employed to repress, and finally          
to extirpate the constant inclination to depart from certain rules, is      
termed discipline. It is distinguished from culture, which aims at the      
formation of a certain degree of skill, without attempting to               
repress or to destroy any other mental power, already existing. In the      
cultivation of a talent, which has given evidence of an impulse             
towards self-development, discipline takes a negative,* culture and         
doctrine a positive, part.                                                  
-                                                                           
  *I am well aware that, in the language of the schools, the term           
discipline is usually employed as synonymous with instruction. But          
there are so many cases in which it is necessary to distinguish the         
notion of the former, as a course of corrective training, from that of      
the latter, as the communication of knowledge, and the nature of            
things itself demands the appropriation of the most suitable                
expressions for this distinction, that it is my desire that the former      
terms should never be employed in any other than a negative                 
signification.                                                              
                                                         {CH_1 ^paragraph 5}
-                                                                           
  That natural dispositions and talents (such as imagination and with,      
which ask a free and unlimited development, require in many respects        
the corrective influence of discipline, every one will readily              
grant. But it may well appear strange that reason, whose proper duty        
it is to prescribe rules of discipline to all the other powers of           
the mind, should itself require this corrective. It has, in fact,           
hitherto escaped this humiliation, only because, in presence of its         
magnificent pretensions and high position, no one could readily             
suspect it to be capable of substituting fancies for conceptions,           
and words for things.                                                       
  Reason, when employed in the field of experience, does not stand          
in need of criticism, because its principles are subjected to the           
continual test of empirical observations. Nor is criticism requisite        
in the sphere of mathematics, where the conceptions of reason must          
always be presented in concreto in pure intuition, and baseless or          
arbitrary assertions are discovered without difficulty. But where           
reason is not held in a plain track by the influence of empirical or        
of pure intuition, that is, when it is employed in the                      
transcendental sphere of pure conceptions, it stands in great need          
of discipline, to restrain its propensity to overstep the limits of         
possible experience and to keep it from wandering into error. In fact,      
the utility of the philosophy of pure reason is entirely of this            
negative character. Particular errors may be corrected by particular        
animadversions, and the causes of these errors may be eradicated by         
criticism. But where we find, as in the case of pure reason, a              
complete system of illusions and fallacies, closely connected with          
each other and depending upon grand general principles, there seems to      
be required a peculiar and negative code of mental legislation, which,      
under the denomination of a discipline, and founded upon the nature of      
reason and the objects of its exercise, shall constitute a system of        
thorough examination and testing, which no fallacy will be able to          
withstand or escape from, under whatever disguise or concealment it         
may lurk.                                                                   
  But the reader must remark that, in this the second division of           
our transcendental Critique the discipline of pure reason is not            
directed to the content, but to the method of the cognition of pure         
reason. The former task has been completed in the doctrine of               
elements. But there is so much similarity in the mode of employing the      
faculty of reason, whatever be the object to which it is applied,           
while, at the same time, its employment in the transcendental sphere        
is so essentially different in kind from every other, that, without         
the warning negative influence of a discipline specially directed to        
that end, the errors are unavoidable which spring from the                  
unskillful employment of the methods which are originated by reason         
but which are out of place in this sphere.                                  
-                                                                           
                                                        {CH_1 ^paragraph 10}
     SECTION I. The Discipline of Pure Reason in the Sphere                 
                       of Dogmatism.                                        
-                                                                           
  The science of mathematics presents the most brilliant example of         
the extension of the sphere of pure reason without the aid of               
experience. Examples are always contagious; and they exert an especial      
influence on the same faculty, which naturally flatters itself that it      
will have the same good fortune in other case as fell to its lot in         
one fortunate instance. Hence pure reason hopes to be able to extend        
its empire in the transcendental sphere with equal success and              
security, especially when it applies the same method which was              
attended with such brilliant results in the science of mathematics. It      
is, therefore, of the highest importance for us to know whether the         
method of arriving at demonstrative certainty, which is termed              
mathematical, be identical with that by which we endeavour to attain        
the same degree of certainty in philosophy, and which is termed in          
that science dogmatical.                                                    
  Philosophical cognition is the cognition of reason by means of            
conceptions; mathematical cognition is cognition by means of the            
construction of conceptions. The construction of a conception is the        
presentation a priori of the intuition which corresponds to the             
conception. For this purpose a non-empirical intuition is requisite,        
which, as an intuition, is an individual object; while, as the              
construction of a conception (a general representation), it must be         
seen to be universally valid for all the possible intuitions which          
rank under that conception. Thus I construct a triangle, by the             
presentation of the object which corresponds to this conception,            
either by mere imagination, in pure intuition, or upon paper, in            
empirical intuition, in both cases completely a priori, without             
borrowing the type of that figure from any experience. The                  
individual figure drawn upon paper is empirical; but it serves,             
notwithstanding, to indicate the conception, even in its universality,      
because in this empirical intuition we keep our eye merely on the           
act of the construction of the conception, and pay no attention to the      
various modes of determining it, for example, its size, the length          
of its sides, the size of its angles, these not in the least affecting      
the essential character of the conception.                                  
                                                        {CH_1 ^paragraph 15}
  Philosophical cognition, accordingly, regards the particular only in      
the general; mathematical the general in the particular, nay, in the        
individual. This is done, however, entirely a priori and by means of        
pure reason, so that, as this individual figure is determined under         
certain universal conditions of construction, the object of the             
conception, to which this individual figure corresponds as its schema,      
must be cogitated as universally determined.                                
  The essential difference of these two modes of cognition consists,        
therefore, in this formal quality; it does not regard the difference        
of the matter or objects of both. Those thinkers who aim at                 
distinguishing philosophy from mathematics by asserting that the            
former has to do with quality merely, and the latter with quantity,         
have mistaken the effect for the cause. The reason why mathematical         
cognition can relate only to quantity is to be found in its form            
alone. For it is the conception of quantities only that is capable          
of being constructed, that is, presented a priori in intuition;             
while qualities cannot be given in any other than an empirical              
intuition. Hence the cognition of qualities by reason is possible only      
through conceptions. No one can find an intuition which shall               
correspond to the conception of reality, except in experience; it           
cannot be presented to the mind a priori and antecedently to the            
empirical consciousness of a reality. We can form an intuition, by          
means of the mere conception of it, of a cone, without the aid of           
experience; but the colour of the cone we cannot know except from           
experience. I cannot present an intuition of a cause, except in an          
example which experience offers to me. Besides, philosophy, as well as      
mathematics, treats of quantities; as, for example, of totality,            
infinity, and so on. Mathematics, too, treats of the difference of          
lines and surfaces- as spaces of different quality, of the                  
continuity of extension- as a quality thereof. But, although in such        
cases they have a common object, the mode in which reason considers         
that object is very different in philosophy from what it is in              
mathematics. The former confines itself to the general conceptions;         
the latter can do nothing with a mere conception, it hastens to             
intuition. In this intuition it regards the conception in concreto,         
not empirically, but in an a priori intuition, which it has                 
constructed; and in which, all the results which follow from the            
general conditions of the construction of the conception are in all         
cases valid for the object of the constructed conception.                   
  Suppose that the conception of a triangle is given to a                   
philosopher and that he is required to discover, by the                     
philosophical method, what relation the sum of its angles bears to a        
right angle. He has nothing before him but the conception of a              
figure enclosed within three right lines, and, consequently, with           
the same number of angles. He may analyse the conception of a right         
line, of an angle, or of the number three as long as he pleases, but        
he will not discover any properties not contained in these                  
conceptions. But, if this question is proposed to a geometrician, he        
at once begins by constructing a triangle. He knows that two right          
angles are equal to the sum of all the contiguous angles which proceed      
from one point in a straight line; and he goes on to produce one            
side of his triangle, thus forming two adjacent angles which are            
together equal to two right angles. He then divides the exterior of         
these angles, by drawing a line parallel with the opposite side of the      
triangle, and immediately perceives that be has thus got an exterior        
adjacent angle which is equal to the interior. Proceeding in this way,      
through a chain of inferences, and always on the ground of                  
intuition, he arrives at a clear and universally valid solution of the      
question.                                                                   
  But mathematics does not confine itself to the construction of            
quantities (quanta), as in the case of geometry; it occupies itself         
with pure quantity also (quantitas), as in the case of algebra,             
where complete abstraction is made of the properties of the object          
indicated by the conception of quantity. In algebra, a certain              
method of notation by signs is adopted, and these indicate the              
different possible constructions of quantities, the extraction of           
roots, and so on. After having thus denoted the general conception          
of quantities, according to their different relations, the different        
operations by which quantity or number is increased or diminished           
are presented in intuition in accordance with general rules. Thus,          
when one quantity is to be divided by another, the signs which              
denote both are placed in the form peculiar to the operation of             
division; and thus algebra, by means of a symbolical construction of        
quantity, just as geometry, with its ostensive or geometrical               
construction (a construction of the objects themselves), arrives at         
results which discursive cognition cannot hope to reach by the aid          
of mere conceptions.                                                        
  Now, what is the cause of this difference in the fortune of the           
philosopher and the mathematician, the former of whom follows the path      
of conceptions, while the latter pursues that of intuitions, which          
he represents, a priori, in correspondence with his conceptions? The        
cause is evident from what has been already demonstrated in the             
introduction to this Critique. We do not, in the present case, want to      
discover analytical propositions, which may be produced merely by           
analysing our conceptions- for in this the philosopher would have           
the advantage over his rival; we aim at the discovery of synthetical        
propositions- such synthetical propositions, moreover, as can be            
cognized a priori. I must not confine myself to that which I                
actually cogitate in my conception of a triangle, for this is               
nothing more than the mere definition; I must try to go beyond that,        
and to arrive at properties which are not contained in, although            
they belong to, the conception. Now, this is impossible, unless I           
determine the object present to my mind according to the conditions,        
either of empirical, or of pure, intuition. In the former case, I           
should have an empirical proposition (arrived at by actual measurement      
of the angles of the triangle), which would possess neither                 
universality nor necessity; but that would be of no value. In the           
latter, I proceed by geometrical construction, by means of which I          
collect, in a pure intuition, just as I would in an empirical               
intuition, all the various properties which belong to the schema of         
a triangle in general, and consequently to its conception, and thus         
construct synthetical propositions which possess the attribute of           
universality.                                                               
                                                        {CH_1 ^paragraph 20}
  It would be vain to philosophize upon the triangle, that is, to           
reflect on it discursively; I should get no further than the                
definition with which I had been obliged to set out. There are              
certainly transcendental synthetical propositions which are framed          
by means of pure conceptions, and which form the peculiar                   
distinction of philosophy; but these do not relate to any particular        
thing, but to a thing in general, and enounce the conditions under          
which the perception of it may become a part of possible experience.        
But the science of mathematics has nothing to do with such                  
questions, nor with the question of existence in any fashion; it is         
concerned merely with the properties of objects in themselves, only in      
so far as these are connected with the conception of the objects.           
  In the above example, we merely attempted to show the great               
difference which exists between the discursive employment of reason in      
the sphere of conceptions, and its intuitive exercise by means of           
the construction of conceptions. The question naturally arises: What        
is the cause which necessitates this twofold exercise of reason, and        
how are we to discover whether it is the philosophical or the               
mathematical method which reason is pursuing in an argument?                
  All our knowledge relates, finally, to possible intuitions, for it        
is these alone that present objects to the mind. An a priori or             
non-empirical conception contains either a pure intuition- and in this      
case it can be constructed; or it contains nothing but the synthesis        
of possible intuitions, which are not given a priori. In this latter        
case, it may help us to form synthetical a priori judgements, but only      
in the discursive method, by conceptions, not in the intuitive, by          
means of the construction of conceptions.                                   
  The only a priori intuition is that of the pure form of phenomena-        
space and time. A conception of space and time as quanta may be             
presented a priori in intuition, that is, constructed, either alone         
with their quality (figure), or as pure quantity (the mere synthesis        
of the homogeneous), by means of number. But the matter of                  
phenomena, by which things are given in space and time, can be              
presented only in perception, a posteriori. The only conception             
which represents a priori this empirical content of phenomena is the        
conception of a thing in general; and the a priori synthetical              
cognition of this conception can give us nothing more than the rule         
for the synthesis of that which may be contained in the                     
corresponding a posteriori perception; it is utterly inadequate to          
present an a priori intuition of the real object, which must                
necessarily be empirical.                                                   
  Synthetical propositions, which relate to things in general, an a         
priori intuition of which is impossible, are transcendental. For            
this reason transcendental propositions cannot be framed by means of        
the construction of conceptions; they are a priori, and based entirely      
on conceptions themselves. They contain merely the rule, by which we        
are to seek in the world of perception or experience the synthetical        
unity of that which cannot be intuited a priori. But they are               
incompetent to present any of the conceptions which appear in them          
in an a priori intuition; these can be given only a posteriori, in          
experience, which, however, is itself possible only through these           
synthetical principles.                                                     
                                                        {CH_1 ^paragraph 25}
  If we are to form a synthetical judgement regarding a conception, we      
must go beyond it, to the intuition in which it is given. If we keep        
to what is contained in the conception, the judgement is merely             
analytical- it is merely an explanation of what we have cogitated in        
the conception. But I can pass from the conception to the pure or           
empirical intuition which corresponds to it. I can proceed to               
examine my conception in concreto, and to cognize, either a priori          
or a posterio, what I find in the object of the conception. The             
former- a priori cognition- is rational-mathematical cognition by           
means of the construction of the conception; the latter- a                  
posteriori cognition- is purely empirical cognition, which does not         
possess the attributes of necessity and universality. Thus I may            
analyse the conception I have of gold; but I gain no new information        
from this analysis, I merely enumerate the different properties             
which I had connected with the notion indicated by the word. My             
knowledge has gained in logical clearness and arrangement, but no           
addition has been made to it. But if I take the matter which is             
indicated by this name, and submit it to the examination of my senses,      
I am enabled to form several synthetical- although still empirical-         
propositions. The mathematical conception of a triangle I should            
construct, that is, present a priori in intuition, and in this way          
attain to rational-synthetical cognition. But when the                      
transcendental conception of reality, or substance, or power is             
presented to my mind, I find that it does not relate to or indicate         
either an empirical or pure intuition, but that it indicates merely         
the synthesis of empirical intuitions, which cannot of course be given      
a priori. The synthesis in such a conception cannot proceed a               
priori- without the aid of experience- to the intuition which               
corresponds to the conception; and, for this reason, none of these          
conceptions can produce a determinative synthetical proposition,            
they can never present more than a principle of the synthesis* of           
possible empirical intuitions. A transcendental proposition is,             
therefore, a synthetical cognition of reason by means of pure               
conceptions and the discursive method, and it renders possible all          
synthetical unity in empirical cognition, though it cannot present          
us with any intuition a priori.                                             
-                                                                           
  *In the case of the conception of cause, I do really go beyond the        
empirical conception of an event- but not to the intuition which            
presents this conception in concreto, but only to the time-conditions,      
which may be found in experience to correspond to the conception. My        
procedure is, therefore, strictly according to conceptions; I cannot        
in a case of this kind employ the construction of conceptions, because      
the conception is merely a rule for the synthesis of perceptions,           
which are not pure intuitions, and which, therefore, cannot be given a      
priori.                                                                     
-                                                                           
  There is thus a twofold exercise of reason. Both modes have the           
properties of universality and an a priori origin in common, but            
are, in their procedure, of widely different character. The reason          
of this is that in the world of phenomena, in which alone objects           
are presented to our minds, there are two main elements- the form of        
intuition (space and time), which can be cognized and determined            
completely a priori, and the matter or content- that which is               
presented in space and time, and which, consequently, contains a            
something- an existence corresponding to our powers of sensation. As        
regards the latter, which can never be given in a determinate mode          
except by experience, there are no a priori notions which relate to         
it, except the undetermined conceptions of the synthesis of possible        
sensations, in so far as these belong (in a possible experience) to         
the unity of consciousness. As regards the former, we can determine         
our conceptions a priori in intuition, inasmuch as we are ourselves         
the creators of the objects of the conceptions in space and time-           
these objects being regarded simply as quanta. In the one case, reason      
proceeds according to conceptions and can do nothing more than subject      
phenomena to these- which can only be determined empirically, that is,      
a posteriori- in conformity, however, with those conceptions as the         
rules of all empirical synthesis. In the other case, reason proceeds        
by the construction of conceptions; and, as these conceptions relate        
to an a priori intuition, they may be given and determined in pure          
intuition a priori, and without the aid of empirical data. The              
examination and consideration of everything that exists in space or         
time- whether it is a quantum or not, in how far the particular             
something (which fills space or time) is a primary substratum, or a         
mere determination of some other existence, whether it relates to           
anything else- either as cause or effect, whether its existence is          
isolated or in reciprocal connection with and dependence upon               
others, the possibility of this existence, its reality and necessity        
or opposites- all these form part of the cognition of reason on the         
ground of conceptions, and this cognition is termed philosophical. But      
to determine a priori an intuition in space (its figure), to divide         
time into periods, or merely to cognize the quantity of an intuition        
in space and time, and to determine it by number- all this is an            
operation of reason by means of the construction of conceptions, and        
is called mathematical.                                                     
                                                        {CH_1 ^paragraph 30}
  The success which attends the efforts of reason in the sphere of          
mathematics naturally fosters the expectation that the same good            
fortune will be its lot, if it applies the mathematical method in           
other regions of mental endeavour besides that of quantities. Its           
success is thus great, because it can support all its conceptions by a      
priori intuitions and, in this way, make itself a master, as it             
were, over nature; while pure philosophy, with its a priori discursive      
conceptions, bungles about in the world of nature, and cannot accredit      
or show any a priori evidence of the reality of these conceptions.          
Masters in the science of mathematics are confident of the success          
of this method; indeed, it is a common persuasion that it is capable        
of being applied to any subject of human thought. They have hardly          
ever reflected or philosophized on their favourite science- a task          
of great difficulty; and the specific difference between the two modes      
of employing the faculty of reason has never entered their thoughts.        
Rules current in the field of common experience, and which common           
sense stamps everywhere with its approval, are regarded by them as          
axiomatic. From what source the conceptions of space and time, with         
which (as the only primitive quanta) they have to deal, enter their         
minds, is a question which they do not trouble themselves to answer;        
and they think it just as unnecessary to examine into the origin of         
the pure conceptions of the understanding and the extent of their           
validity. All they have to do with them is to employ them. In all this      
they are perfectly right, if they do not overstep the limits of the         
sphere of nature. But they pass, unconsciously, from the world of           
sense to the insecure ground of pure transcendental conceptions             
(instabilis tellus, innabilis unda), where they can neither stand           
nor swim, and where the tracks of their footsteps are obliterated by        
time; while the march of mathematics is pursued on a broad and              
magnificent highway, which the latest posterity shall frequent without      
fear of danger or impediment.                                               
  As we have taken upon us the task of determining, clearly and             
certainly, the limits of pure reason in the sphere of                       
transcendentalism, and as the efforts of reason in this direction           
are persisted in, even after the plainest and most expressive               
warnings, hope still beckoning us past the limits of experience into        
the splendours of the intellectual world- it becomes necessary to           
cut away the last anchor of this fallacious and fantastic hope. We          
shall, accordingly, show that the mathematical method is unattended in      
the sphere of philosophy by the least advantage- except, perhaps, that      
it more plainly exhibits its own inadequacy- that geometry and              
philosophy are two quite different things, although they go band in         
hand in hand in the field of natural science, and, consequently,            
that the procedure of the one can never be imitated by the other.           
  The evidence of mathematics rests upon definitions, axioms, and           
demonstrations. I shall be satisfied with showing that none of these        
forms can be employed or imitated in philosophy in the sense in             
which they are understood by mathematicians; and that the                   
geometrician, if he employs his method in philosophy, will succeed          
only in building card-castles, while the employment of the                  
philosophical method in mathematics can result in nothing but mere          
verbiage. The essential business of philosophy, indeed, is to mark out      
the limits of the science; and even the mathematician, unless his           
talent is naturally circumscribed and limited to this particular            
department of knowledge, cannot turn a deaf ear to the warnings of          
philosophy, or set himself above its direction.                             
  I. Of Definitions. A definition is, as the term itself indicates,         
the representation, upon primary grounds, of the complete conception        
of a thing within its own limits.* Accordingly, an empirical                
conception cannot be defined, it can only be explained. For, as             
there are in such a conception only a certain number of marks or            
signs, which denote a certain class of sensuous objects, we can             
never be sure that we do not cogitate under the word which indicates        
the same object, at one time a greater, at another a smaller number of      
signs. Thus, one person may cogitate in his conception of gold, in          
addition to its properties of weight, colour, malleability, that of         
resisting rust, while another person may be ignorant of this                
quality. We employ certain signs only so long as we require them for        
the sake of distinction; new observations abstract some and add new         
ones, so that an empirical conception never remains within permanent        
limits. It is, in fact, useless to define a conception of this kind.        
If, for example, we are speaking of water and its properties, we do         
not stop at what we actually think by the word water, but proceed to        
observation and experiment; and the word, with the few signs                
attached to it, is more properly a designation than a conception of         
the thing. A definition in this case would evidently be nothing more        
than a determination of the word. In the second place, no a priori          
conception, such as those of substance, cause, right, fitness, and          
so on, can be defined. For I can never be sure, that the clear              
representation of a given conception (which is given in a confused          
state) has been fully developed, until I know that the                      
representation is adequate with its object. But, inasmuch as the            
conception, as it is presented to the mind, may contain a number of         
obscure representations, which we do not observe in our analysis,           
although we employ them in our application of the conception, I can         
never be sure that my analysis is complete, while examples may make         
this probable, although they can never demonstrate the fact. instead        
of the word definition, I should rather employ the term exposition-         
a more modest expression, which the critic may accept without               
surrendering his doubts as to the completeness of the analysis of           
any such conception. As, therefore, neither empirical nor a priori          
conceptions are capable of definition, we have to see whether the only      
other kind of conceptions- arbitrary conceptions- can be subjected          
to this mental operation. Such a conception can always be defined; for      
I must know thoroughly what I wished to cogitate in it, as it was I         
who created it, and it was not given to my mind either by the nature        
of my understanding or by experience. At the same time, I cannot say        
that, by such a definition, I have defined a real object. If the            
conception is based upon empirical conditions, if, for example, I have      
a conception of a clock for a ship, this arbitrary conception does not      
assure me of the existence or even of the possibility of the object.        
My definition of such a conception would with more propriety be termed      
a declaration of a project than a definition of an object. There            
are no other conceptions which can bear definition, except those which      
contain an arbitrary synthesis, which can be constructed a priori.          
Consequently, the science of mathematics alone possesses                    
definitions. For the object here thought is presented a priori in           
intuition; and thus it can never contain more or less than the              
conception, because the conception of the object has been given by the      
definition- and primarily, that is, without deriving the definition         
from any other source. Philosophical definitions are, therefore,            
merely expositions of given conceptions, while mathematical                 
definitions are constructions of conceptions originally formed by           
the mind itself; the former are produced by analysis, the completeness      
of which is never demonstratively certain, the latter by a                  
synthesis. In a mathematical definition the conception is formed, in a      
philosophical definition it is only explained. From this it follows:        
-                                                                           
                                                        {CH_1 ^paragraph 35}
  *The definition must describe the conception completely that is,          
omit none of the marks or signs of which it composed; within its own        
limits, that is, it must be precise, and enumerate no more signs            
than belong to the conception; and on primary grounds, that is to say,      
the limitations of the bounds of the conception must not be deduced         
from other conceptions, as in this case a proof would be necessary,         
and the so-called definition would be incapable of taking its place at      
the bead of all the judgements we have to form regarding an object.         
-                                                                           
  (a) That we must not imitate, in philosophy, the mathematical             
usage of commencing with definitions- except by way of hypothesis or        
experiment. For, as all so-called philosophical definitions are merely      
analyses of given conceptions, these conceptions, although only in a        
confused form, must precede the analysis; and the incomplete                
exposition must precede the complete, so that we may be able to draw        
certain inferences from the characteristics which an incomplete             
analysis has enabled us to discover, before we attain to the                
complete exposition or definition of the conception. In one word, a         
full and clear definition ought, in philosophy, rather to form the          
conclusion than the commencement of our labours.* In mathematics, on        
the contrary, we cannot have a conception prior to the definition;          
it is the definition which gives us the conception, and it must for         
this reason form the commencement of every chain of mathematical            
reasoning.                                                                  
-                                                                           
  *Philosophy abounds in faulty definitions, especially such as             
contain some of the elements requisite to form a complete                   
definition. If a conception could not be employed in reasoning              
before it had been defined, it would fare ill with all philosophical        
thought. But, as incompletely defined conceptions may always be             
employed without detriment to truth, so far as our analysis of the          
elements contained in them proceeds, imperfect definitions, that is,        
propositions which are properly not definitions, but merely                 
approximations thereto, may be used with great advantage. In                
mathematics, definition belongs ad esse, in philosophy ad melius esse.      
It is a difficult task to construct a proper definition. Jurists are        
still without a complete definition of the idea of right.                   
                                                        {CH_1 ^paragraph 40}
-                                                                           
  (b) Mathematical definitions cannot be erroneous. For the conception      
is given only in and through the definition, and thus it contains only      
what has been cogitated in the definition. But although a definition        
cannot be incorrect, as regards its content, an error may sometimes,        
although seldom, creep into the form. This error consists in a want of      
precision. Thus the common definition of a circle- that it is a curved      
line, every point in which is equally distant from another point            
called the centre- is faulty, from the fact that the determination          
indicated by the word curved is superfluous. For there ought to be a        
particular theorem, which may be easily proved from the definition, to      
the effect that every line, which has all its points at equal               
distances from another point, must be a curved line- that is, that not      
even the smallest part of it can be straight. Analytical                    
definitions, on the other hand, may be erroneous in many respects,          
either by the introduction of signs which do not actually exist in the      
conception, or by wanting in that completeness which forms the              
essential of a definition. In the latter case, the definition is            
necessarily defective, because we can never be fully certain of the         
completeness of our analysis. For these reasons, the method of              
definition employed in mathematics cannot be imitated in philosophy.        
  2. Of Axioms. These, in so far as they are immediately certain,           
are a priori synthetical principles. Now, one conception cannot be          
connected synthetically and yet immediately with another; because,          
if we wish to proceed out of and beyond a conception, a third               
mediating cognition is necessary. And, as philosophy is a cognition of      
reason by the aid of conceptions alone, there is to be found in it          
no principle which deserves to be called an axiom. Mathematics, on the      
other hand, may possess axioms, because it can always connect the           
predicates of an object a priori, and without any mediating term, by        
means of the construction of conceptions in intuition. Such is the          
case with the proposition: Three points can always lie in a plane.          
On the other hand, no synthetical principle which is based upon             
conceptions, can ever be immediately certain (for example, the              
proposition: Everything that happens has a cause), because I require a      
mediating term to connect the two conceptions of event and cause-           
namely, the condition of time-determination in an experience, and I         
cannot cognize any such principle immediately and from conceptions          
alone. Discursive principles are, accordingly, very different from          
intuitive principles or axioms. The former always require deduction,        
which in the case of the latter may be altogether dispensed with.           
Axioms are, for this reason, always self-evident, while                     
philosophical principles, whatever may be the degree of certainty they      
possess, cannot lay any claim to such a distinction. No synthetical         
proposition of pure transcendental reason can be so evident, as is          
often rashly enough declared, as the statement, twice two are four. It      
is true that in the Analytic I introduced into the list of                  
principles of the pure understanding, certain axioms of intuition; but      
the principle there discussed was not itself an axiom, but served           
merely to present the principle of the possibility of axioms in             
general, while it was really nothing more than a principle based            
upon conceptions. For it is one part of the duty of transcendental          
philosophy to establish the possibility of mathematics itself.              
Philosophy possesses, then, no axioms, and has no right to impose           
its a priori principles upon thought, until it has established their        
authority and validity by a thoroughgoing deduction.                        
  3. Of Demonstrations. Only an apodeictic proof, based upon                
intuition, can be termed a demonstration. Experience teaches us what        
is, but it cannot convince us that it might not have been otherwise.        
Hence a proof upon empirical grounds cannot be apodeictic. A priori         
conceptions, in discursive cognition, can never produce intuitive           
certainty or evidence, however certain the judgement they present           
may be. Mathematics alone, therefore, contains demonstrations, because      
it does not deduce its cognition from conceptions, but from the             
construction of conceptions, that is, from intuition, which can be          
given a priori in accordance with conceptions. The method of                
algebra, in equations, from which the correct answer is deduced by          
reduction, is a kind of construction- not geometrical, but by symbols-      
in which all conceptions, especially those of the relations of              
quantities, are represented in intuition by signs; and thus the             
conclusions in that science are secured from errors by the fact that        
every proof is submitted to ocular evidence. Philosophical cognition        
does not possess this advantage, it being required to consider the          
general always in abstracto (by means of conceptions), while                
mathematics can always consider it in concreto (in an individual            
intuition), and at the same time by means of a priori                       
representation, whereby all errors are rendered manifest to the             
senses. The former- discursive proofs- ought to be termed acroamatic        
proofs, rather than demonstrations, as only words are employed in           
them, while demonstrations proper, as the term itself indicates,            
always require a reference to the intuition of the object.                  
  It follows from all these considerations that it is not consonant         
with the nature of philosophy, especially in the sphere of pure             
reason, to employ the dogmatical method, and to adorn itself with           
the titles and insignia of mathematical science. It does not belong to      
that order, and can only hope for a fraternal union with that science.      
Its attempts at mathematical evidence are vain pretensions, which           
can only keep it back from its true aim, which is to detect the             
illusory procedure of reason when transgressing its proper limits, and      
by fully explaining and analysing our conceptions, to conduct us            
from the dim regions of speculation to the clear region of modest           
self-knowledge. Reason must not, therefore, in its transcendental           
endeavours, look forward with such confidence, as if the path it is         
pursuing led straight to its aim, nor reckon with such security upon        
its premisses, as to consider it unnecessary to take a step back, or        
to keep a strict watch for errors, which, overlooked in the                 
principles, may be detected in the arguments themselves- in which case      
it may be requisite either to determine these principles with               
greater strictness, or to change them entirely.                             
                                                        {CH_1 ^paragraph 45}
  I divide all apodeictic propositions, whether demonstrable or             
immediately certain, into dogmata and mathemata. A direct                   
synthetical proposition, based on conceptions, is a dogma; a                
proposition of the same kind, based on the construction of                  
conceptions, is a mathema. Analytical judgements do not teach us any        
more about an object than what was contained in the conception we           
had of it; because they do not extend our cognition beyond our              
conception of an object, they merely elucidate the conception. They         
cannot therefore be with propriety termed dogmas. Of the two kinds          
of a priori synthetical propositions above mentioned, only those which      
are employed in philosophy can, according to the general mode of            
speech, bear this name; those of arithmetic or geometry would not be        
rightly so denominated. Thus the customary mode of speaking confirms        
the explanation given above, and the conclusion arrived at, that            
only those judgements which are based upon conceptions, not on the          
construction of conceptions, can be termed dogmatical.                      
  Thus, pure reason, in the sphere of speculation, does not contain         
a single direct synthetical judgement based upon conceptions. By means      
of ideas, it is, as we have shown, incapable of producing                   
synthetical judgements, which are objectively valid; by means of the        
conceptions of the understanding, it establishes certain indubitable        
principles, not, however, directly on the basis of conceptions, but         
only indirectly by means of the relation of these conceptions to            
something of a purely contingent nature, namely, possible                   
experience. When experience is presupposed, these principles are            
apodeictically certain, but in themselves, and directly, they cannot        
even be cognized a priori. Thus the given conceptions of cause and          
event will not be sufficient for the demonstration of the proposition:      
Every event has a cause. For this reason, it is not a dogma;                
although from another point of view, that of experience, it is capable      
of being proved to demonstration. The proper term for such a                
proposition is principle, and not theorem (although it does require to      
be proved), because it possesses the remarkable peculiarity of being        
the condition of the possibility of its own ground of proof, that           
is, experience, and of forming a necessary presupposition in all            
empirical observation.                                                      
  If then, in the speculative sphere of pure reason, no dogmata are to      
be found; all dogmatical methods, whether borrowed from mathematics,        
or invented by philosophical thinkers, are alike inappropriate and          
inefficient. They only serve to conceal errors and fallacies, and to        
deceive philosophy, whose duty it is to see that reason pursues a safe      
and straight path. A philosophical method may, however, be                  
systematical. For our reason is, subjectively considered, itself a          
system, and, in the sphere of mere conceptions, a system of                 
investigation according to principles of unity, the material being          
supplied by experience alone. But this is not the proper place for          
discussing the peculiar method of transcendental philosophy, as our         
present task is simply to examine whether our faculties are capable of      
erecting an edifice on the basis of pure reason, and how far they           
may proceed with the materials at their command.                            
-                                                                           
     SECTION II. The Discipline of Pure Reason in Polemics.                 
                                                        {CH_1 ^paragraph 50}
-                                                                           
  Reason must be subject, in all its operations, to criticism, which        
must always be permitted to exercise its functions without                  
restraint; otherwise its interests are imperilled and its influence         
obnoxious to suspicion. There is nothing, however useful, however           
sacred it may be, that can claim exemption from the searching               
examination of this supreme tribunal, which has no respect of persons.      
The very existence of reason depends upon this freedom; for the             
voice of reason is not that of a dictatorial and despotic power, it is      
rather like the vote of the citizens of a free state, every member          
of which must have the privilege of giving free expression to his           
doubts, and possess even the right of veto.                                 
  But while reason can never decline to submit itself to the                
tribunal of criticism, it has not always cause to dread the                 
judgement of this court. Pure reason, however, when engaged in the          
sphere of dogmatism, is not so thoroughly conscious of a strict             
observance of its highest laws, as to appear before a higher                
judicial reason with perfect confidence. On the contrary, it must           
renounce its magnificent dogmatical pretensions in philosophy.              
  Very different is the case when it has to defend itself, not              
before a judge, but against an equal. If dogmatical assertions are          
advanced on the negative side, in opposition to those made by reason        
on the positive side, its justification kat authrhopon is complete,         
although the proof of its propositions is kat aletheian                     
unsatisfactory.                                                             
  By the polemic of pure reason I mean the defence of its propositions      
made by reason, in opposition to the dogmatical counter-propositions        
advanced by other parties. The question here is not whether its own         
statements may not also be false; it merely regards the fact that           
reason proves that the opposite cannot be established with                  
demonstrative certainty, nor even asserted with a higher degree of          
probability. Reason does not hold her possessions upon sufferance;          
for, although she cannot show a perfectly satisfactory title to             
them, no one can prove that she is not the rightful possessor.              
                                                        {CH_1 ^paragraph 55}
  It is a melancholy reflection that reason, in its highest                 
exercise, falls into an antithetic; and that the supreme tribunal           
for the settlement of differences should not be at union with               
itself. It is true that we had to discuss the question of an                
apparent antithetic, but we found that it was based upon a                  
misconception. In conformity with the common prejudice, phenomena were      
regarded as things in themselves, and thus an absolute completeness in      
their synthesis was required in the one mode or in the other (it was        
shown to be impossible in both); a demand entirely out of place in          
regard to phenomena. There was, then, no real self-contradiction of         
reason in the propositions: The series of phenomena given in                
themselves has an absolutely first beginning; and: This series is           
absolutely and in itself without beginning. The two propositions are        
perfectly consistent with each other, because phenomena as phenomena        
are in themselves nothing, and consequently the hypothesis that they        
are things in themselves must lead to self-contradictory inferences.        
  But there are cases in which a similar misunderstanding cannot be         
provided against, and the dispute must remain unsettled. Take, for          
example, the theistic proposition: There is a Supreme Being; and on         
the other hand, the atheistic counter-statement: There exists no            
Supreme Being; or, in psychology: Everything that thinks possesses the      
attribute of absolute and permanent unity, which is utterly                 
different from the transitory unity of material phenomena; and the          
counter-proposition: The soul is not an immaterial unity, and its           
nature is transitory, like that of phenomena. The objects of these          
questions contain no heterogeneous or contradictory elements, for they      
relate to things in themselves, and not to phenomena. There would           
arise, indeed, a real contradiction, if reason came forward with a          
statement on the negative side of these questions alone. As regards         
the criticism to which the grounds of proof on the affirmative side         
must be subjected, it may be freely admitted, without necessitating         
the surrender of the affirmative propositions, which have, at least,        
the interest of reason in their favour- an advantage which the              
opposite party cannot lay claim to.                                         
  I cannot agree with the opinion of several admirable thinkers-            
Sulzer among the rest- that, in spite of the weakness of the arguments      
hitherto in use, we may hope, one day, to see sufficient                    
demonstrations of the two cardinal propositions of pure reason- the         
existence of a Supreme Being, and the immortality of the soul. I am         
certain, on the contrary, that this will never be the case. For on          
what ground can reason base such synthetical propositions, which do         
not relate to the objects of experience and their internal                  
possibility? But it is also demonstratively certain that no one will        
ever be able to maintain the contrary with the least show of                
probability. For, as he can attempt such a proof solely upon the basis      
of pure reason, he is bound to prove that a Supreme Being, and a            
thinking subject in the character of a pure intelligence, are               
impossible. But where will he find the knowledge which can enable           
him to enounce synthetical judgements in regard to things which             
transcend the region of experience? We may, therefore, rest assured         
that the opposite never will be demonstrated. We need not, then,            
have recourse to scholastic arguments; we may always admit the truth        
of those propositions which are consistent with the speculative             
interests of reason in the sphere of experience, and form, moreover,        
the only means of uniting the speculative with the practical interest.      
Our opponent, who must not be considered here as a critic solely, we        
can be ready to meet with a non liquet which cannot fail to disconcert      
him; while we cannot deny his right to a similar retort, as we have on      
our side the advantage of the support of the subjective maxim of            
reason, and can therefore look upon all his sophistical arguments with      
calm indifference.                                                          
  From this point of view, there is properly no antithetic of pure          
reason. For the only arena for such a struggle would be upon the field      
of pure theology and psychology; but on this ground there can appear        
no combatant whom we need to fear. Ridicule and boasting can be his         
only weapons; and these may be laughed at, as mere child's play.            
This consideration restores to Reason her courage; for what source          
of confidence could be found, if she, whose vocation it is to               
destroy error, were at variance with herself and without any                
reasonable hope of ever reaching a state of permanent repose?               
  Everything in nature is good for some purpose. Even poisons are           
serviceable; they destroy the evil effects of other poisons                 
generated in our system, and must always find a place in every              
complete pharmacopoeia. The objections raised against the fallacies         
and sophistries of speculative reason, are objections given by the          
nature of this reason itself, and must therefore have a destination         
and purpose which can only be for the good of humanity. For what            
purpose has Providence raised many objects, in which we have the            
deepest interest, so far above us, that we vainly try to cognize            
them with certainty, and our powers of mental vision are rather             
excited than satisfied by the glimpses we may chance to seize? It is        
very doubtful whether it is for our benefit to advance bold                 
affirmations regarding subjects involved in such obscurity; perhaps it      
would even be detrimental to our best interests. But it is undoubtedly      
always beneficial to leave the investigating, as well as the                
critical reason, in perfect freedom, and permit it to take charge of        
its own interests, which are advanced as much by its limitation, as by      
its extension of its views, and which always suffer by the                  
interference of foreign powers forcing it, against its natural              
tendencies, to bend to certain preconceived designs.                        
                                                        {CH_1 ^paragraph 60}
  Allow your opponent to say what he thinks reasonable, and combat him      
only with the weapons of reason. Have no anxiety for the practical          
interests of humanity- these are never imperilled in a purely               
speculative dispute. Such a dispute serves merely to disclose the           
antinomy of reason, which, as it has its source in the nature of            
reason, ought to be thoroughly investigated. Reason is benefited by         
the examination of a subject on both sides, and its judgements are          
corrected by being limited. It is not the matter that may give              
occasion to dispute, but the manner. For it is perfectly permissible        
to employ, in the presence of reason, the language of a firmly              
rooted faith, even after we have been obliged to renounce all               
pretensions to knowledge.                                                   
  If we were to ask the dispassionate David Hume- a philosopher             
endowed, in a degree that few are, with a well-balanced judgement:          
What motive induced you to spend so much labour and thought in              
undermining the consoling and beneficial persuasion that reason is          
capable of assuring us of the existence, and presenting us with a           
determinate conception of a Supreme Being?- his answer would be:            
Nothing but the desire of teaching reason to know its own powers            
better, and, at the same time, a dislike of the procedure by which          
that faculty was compelled to support foregone conclusions, and             
prevented from confessing the internal weaknesses which it cannot           
but feel when it enters upon a rigid self-examination. If, on the           
other hand, we were to ask Priestley- a philosopher who had no taste        
for transcendental speculation, but was entirely devoted to the             
principles of empiricism- what his motives were for overturning             
those two main pillars of religion- the doctrines of the freedom of         
the will and the immortality of the soul (in his view the hope of a         
future life is but the expectation of the miracle of resurrection)-         
this philosopher, himself a zealous and pious teacher of religion,          
could give no other answer than this: I acted in the interest of            
reason, which always suffers, when certain objects are explained and        
judged by a reference to other supposed laws than those of material         
nature- the only laws which we know in a determinate manner. It             
would be unfair to decry the latter philosopher, who endeavoured to         
harmonize his paradoxical opinions with the interests of religion, and      
to undervalue an honest and reflecting man, because he finds himself        
at a loss the moment he has left the field of natural science. The          
same grace must be accorded to Hume, a man not less well-disposed, and      
quite as blameless in his moral character, and who pushed his abstract      
speculations to an extreme length, because, as he rightly believed,         
the object of them lies entirely beyond the bounds of natural science,      
and within the sphere of pure ideas.                                        
  What is to be done to provide against the danger which seems in           
the present case to menace the best interests of humanity? The              
course to be pursued in reference to this subject is a perfectly plain      
and natural one. Let each thinker pursue his own path; if he shows          
talent, if be gives evidence of profound thought, in one word, if he        
shows that he possesses the power of reasoning- reason is always the        
gainer. If you have recourse to other means, if you attempt to              
coerce reason, if you raise the cry of treason to humanity, if you          
excite the feelings of the crowd, which can neither understand nor          
sympathize with such subtle speculations- you will only make                
yourselves ridiculous. For the question does not concern the advantage      
or disadvantage which we are expected to reap from such inquiries; the      
question is merely how far reason can advance in the field of               
speculation, apart from all kinds of interest, and whether we may           
depend upon the exertions of speculative reason, or must renounce           
all reliance on it. Instead of joining the combatants, it is your part      
to be a tranquil spectator of the struggle- a laborious struggle for        
the parties engaged, but attended, in its progress as well as in its        
result, with the most advantageous consequences for the interests of        
thought and knowledge. It is absurd to expect to be enlightened by          
Reason, and at the same time to prescribe to her what side of the           
question she must adopt. Moreover, reason is sufficiently held in           
check by its own power, the limits imposed on it by its own nature are      
sufficient; it is unnecessary for you to place over it additional           
guards, as if its power were dangerous to the constitution of the           
intellectual state. In the dialectic of reason there is no victory          
gained which need in the least disturb your tranquility.                    
  The strife of dialectic is a necessity of reason, and we cannot           
but wish that it had been conducted long ere this with that perfect         
freedom which ought to be its essential condition. In this case, we         
should have had at an earlier period a matured and profound criticism,      
which must have put an end to all dialectical disputes, by exposing         
the illusions and prejudices in which they originated.                      
  There is in human nature an unworthy propensity- a propensity which,      
like everything that springs from nature, must in its final purpose be      
conducive to the good of humanity- to conceal our real sentiments, and      
to give expression only to certain received opinions, which are             
regarded as at once safe and promotive of the common good. It is true,      
this tendency, not only to conceal our real sentiments, but to profess      
those which may gain us favour in the eyes of society, has not only         
civilized, but, in a certain measure, moralized us; as no one can           
break through the outward covering of respectability, honour, and           
morality, and thus the seemingly-good examples which we which we see        
around us form an excellent school for moral improvement, so long as        
our belief in their genuineness remains unshaken. But this disposition      
to represent ourselves as better than we are, and to utter opinions         
which are not our own, can be nothing more than a kind of provisionary      
arrangement of nature to lead us from the rudeness of an uncivilized        
state, and to teach us how to assume at least the appearance and            
manner of the good we see. But when true principles have been               
developed, and have obtained a sure foundation in our habit of              
thought, this conventionalism must be attacked with earnest vigour,         
otherwise it corrupts the heart, and checks the growth of good              
dispositions with the mischievous weed of air appearances.                  
                                                        {CH_1 ^paragraph 65}
  I am sorry to remark the same tendency to misrepresentation and           
hypocrisy in the sphere of speculative discussion, where there is less      
temptation to restrain the free expression of thought. For what can be      
more prejudicial to the interests of intelligence than to falsify           
our real sentiments, to conceal the doubts which we feel in regard          
to our statements, or to maintain the validity of grounds of proof          
which we well know to be insufficient? So long as mere personal vanity      
is the source of these unworthy artifices- and this is generally the        
case in speculative discussions, which are mostly destitute of              
practical interest, and are incapable of complete demonstration- the        
vanity of the opposite party exaggerates as much on the other side;         
and thus the result is the same, although it is not brought about so        
soon as if the dispute had been conducted in a sincere and upright          
spirit. But where the mass entertains the notion that the aim of            
certain subtle speculators is nothing less than to shake the very           
foundations of public welfare and morality- it seems not only prudent,      
but even praise worthy, to maintain the good cause by illusory              
arguments, rather than to give to our supposed opponents the advantage      
of lowering our declarations to the moderate tone of a merely               
practical conviction, and of compelling us to confess our inability to      
attain to apodeictic certainty in speculative subjects. But we ought        
to reflect that there is nothing, in the world more fatal to the            
maintenance of a good cause than deceit, misrepresentation, and             
falsehood. That the strictest laws of honesty should be observed in         
the discussion of a purely speculative subject is the least                 
requirement that can be made. If we could reckon with security even         
upon so little, the conflict of speculative reason regarding the            
important questions of God, immortality, and freedom, would have            
been either decided long ago, or would very soon be brought to a            
conclusion. But, in general, the uprightness of the defence stands          
in an inverse ratio to the goodness of the cause; and perhaps more          
honesty and fairness are shown by those who deny than by those who          
uphold these doctrines.                                                     
  I shall persuade myself, then, that I have readers who do not wish        
to see a righteous cause defended by unfair arguments. Such will now        
recognize the fact that, according to the principles of this Critique,      
if we consider not what is, but what ought to be the case, there can        
be really no polemic of pure reason. For how can two persons dispute        
about a thing, the reality of which neither can present in actual or        
even in possible experience? Each adopts the plan of meditating on his      
idea for the purpose of drawing from the idea, if he can, what is more      
than the idea, that is, the reality of the object which it                  
indicates. How shall they settle the dispute, since neither is able to      
make his assertions directly comprehensible and certain, but must           
restrict himself to attacking and confuting those of his opponent? All      
statements enounced by pure reason transcend the conditions of              
possible experience, beyond the sphere of which we can discover no          
criterion of truth, while they are at the same time framed in               
accordance with the laws of the understanding, which are applicable         
only to experience; and thus it is the fate of all such speculative         
discussions that while the one party attacks the weaker side of his         
opponent, he infallibly lays open his own weaknesses.                       
  The critique of pure reason may be regarded as the highest                
tribunal for all speculative disputes; for it is not involved in these      
disputes, which have an immediate relation to certain objects and           
not to the laws of the mind, but is instituted for the purpose of           
determining the rights and limits of reason.                                
  Without the control of criticism, reason is, as it were, in a             
state of nature, and can only establish its claims and assertions by        
war. Criticism, on the contrary, deciding all questions according to        
the fundamental laws of its own institution, secures to us the peace        
of law and order, and enables us to discuss all differences in the          
more tranquil manner of a legal process. In the former case,                
disputes are ended by victory, which both sides may claim and which is      
followed by a hollow armistice; in the latter, by a sentence, which,        
as it strikes at the root of all speculative differences, ensures to        
all concerned a lasting peace. The endless disputes of a dogmatizing        
reason compel us to look for some mode of arriving at a settled             
decision by a critical investigation of reason itself; just as              
Hobbes maintains that the state of nature is a state of injustice           
and violence, and that we must leave it and submit ourselves to the         
constraint of law, which indeed limits individual freedom, but only         
that it may consist with the freedom of others and with the common          
good of all.                                                                
  This freedom will, among other things, permit of our openly               
stating the difficulties and doubts which we are ourselves unable to        
solve, without being decried on that account as turbulent and               
dangerous citizens. This privilege forms part of the native rights          
of human reason, which recognizes no other judge than the universal         
reason of humanity; and as this reason is the source of all progress        
and improvement, such a privilege is to be held sacred and inviolable.      
It is unwise, moreover, to denounce as dangerous any bold assertions        
against, or rash attacks upon, an opinion which is held by the largest      
and most moral class of the community; for that would be giving them        
an importance which they do not deserve. When I hear that the               
freedom of the will, the hope of a future life, and the existence of        
God have been overthrown by the arguments of some able writer, I            
feel a strong desire to read his book; for I expect that he will add        
to my knowledge and impart greater clearness and distinctness to my         
views by the argumentative power shown in his writings. But I am            
perfectly certain, even before I have opened the book, that he has not      
succeeded in a single point, not because I believe I am in                  
possession of irrefutable demonstrations of these important                 
propositions, but because this transcendental critique, which has           
disclosed to me the power and the limits of pure reason, has fully          
convinced me that, as it is insufficient to establish the affirmative,      
it is as powerless, and even more so, to assure us of the truth of the      
negative answer to these questions. From what source does this              
free-thinker derive his knowledge that there is, for example, no            
Supreme Being? This proposition lies out of the field of possible           
experience, and, therefore, beyond the limits of human cognition.           
But I would not read at, all the answer which the dogmatical                
maintainer of the good cause makes to his opponent, because I know          
well beforehand, that he will merely attack the fallacious grounds          
of his adversary, without being able to establish his own                   
assertions. Besides, a new illusory argument, in the construction of        
which talent and acuteness are shown, is suggestive of new ideas and        
new trains of reasoning, and in this respect the old and everyday           
sophistries are quite useless. Again, the dogmatical opponent of            
religion gives employment to criticism, and enables us to test and          
correct its principles, while there is no occasion for anxiety in           
regard to the influence and results of his reasoning.                       
                                                        {CH_1 ^paragraph 70}
  But, it will be said, must we not warn the youth entrusted to             
academical care against such writings, must we not preserve them            
from the knowledge of these dangerous assertions, until their               
judgement is ripened, or rather until the doctrines which we wish to        
inculcate are so firmly rooted in their minds as to withstand all           
attempts at instilling the contrary dogmas, from whatever quarter they      
may come?                                                                   
  If we are to confine ourselves to the dogmatical procedure in the         
sphere of pure reason, and find ourselves unable to settle such             
disputes otherwise than by becoming a party in them, and setting            
counter-assertions against the statements advanced by our opponents,        
there is certainly no plan more advisable for the moment, but, at           
the same time, none more absurd and inefficient for the future, than        
this retaining of the youthful mind under guardianship for a time, and      
thus preserving it- for so long at least- from seduction into error.        
But when, at a later period, either curiosity, or the prevalent             
fashion of thought places such writings in their hands, will the            
so-called convictions of their youth stand firm? The young thinker,         
who has in his armoury none but dogmatical weapons with which to            
resist the attacks of his opponent, and who cannot detect the latent        
dialectic which lies in his own opinions as well as in those of the         
opposite party, sees the advance of illusory arguments and grounds          
of proof which have the advantage of novelty, against as illusory           
grounds of proof destitute of this advantage, and which, perhaps,           
excite the suspicion that the natural credulity of his youth has            
been abused by his instructors. He thinks he can find no better             
means of showing that he has out grown the discipline of his                
minority than by despising those well-meant warnings, and, knowing          
no system of thought but that of dogmatism, he drinks deep draughts of      
the poison that is to sap the principles in which his early years were      
trained.                                                                    
  Exactly the opposite of the system here recommended ought to be           
pursued in academical instruction. This can only be effected, however,      
by a thorough training in the critical investigation of pure reason.        
For, in order to bring the principles of this critique into exercise        
as soon as possible, and to demonstrate their perfect even in the           
presence of the highest degree of dialectical illusion, the student         
ought to examine the assertions made on both sides of speculative           
questions step by step, and to test them by these principles. It            
cannot be a difficult task for him to show the fallacies inherent in        
these propositions, and thus he begins early to feel his own power          
of securing himself against the influence of such sophistical               
arguments, which must finally lose, for him, all their illusory power.      
And, although the same blows which overturn the edifice of his              
opponent are as fatal to his own speculative structures, if such he         
has wished to rear; he need not feel any sorrow in regard to this           
seeming misfortune, as he has now before him a fair prospect into           
the practical region in which he may reasonably hope to find a more         
secure foundation for a rational system.                                    
  There is, accordingly, no proper polemic in the sphere of pure            
reason. Both parties beat the air and fight with their own shadows, as      
they pass beyond the limits of nature, and can find no tangible             
point of attack- no firm footing for their dogmatical conflict.             
Fight as vigorously as they may, the shadows which they hew down,           
immediately start up again, like the heroes in Walhalla, and renew the      
bloodless and unceasing contest.                                            
  But neither can we admit that there is any proper sceptical               
employment of pure reason, such as might be based upon the principle        
of neutrality in all speculative disputes. To excite reason against         
itself, to place weapons in the hands of the party on the one side          
as well as in those of the other, and to remain an undisturbed and          
sarcastic spectator of the fierce struggle that ensues, seems, from         
the dogmatical point of view, to be a part fitting only a malevolent        
disposition. But, when the sophist evidences an invincible obstinacy        
and blindness, and a pride which no criticism can moderate, there is        
no other practicable course than to oppose to this pride and obstinacy      
similar feelings and pretensions on the other side, equally well or         
ill founded, so that reason, staggered by the reflections thus              
forced upon it, finds it necessary to moderate its confidence in            
such pretensions and to listen to the advice of criticism. But we           
cannot stop at these doubts, much less regard the conviction of our         
ignorance, not only as a cure for the conceit natural to dogmatism,         
but as the settlement of the disputes in which reason is involved with      
itself. On the contrary, scepticism is merely a means of awakening          
reason from its dogmatic dreams and exciting it to a more careful           
investigation into its own powers and pretensions. But, as                  
scepticism appears to be the shortest road to a permanent peace in the      
domain of philosophy, and as it is the track pursued by the many who        
aim at giving a philosophical colouring to their contemptuous               
dislike of all inquiries of this kind, I think it necessary to present      
to my readers this mode of thought in its true light.                       
                                                        {CH_1 ^paragraph 75}
-                                                                           
     Scepticism not a Permanent State for Human Reason.                     
-                                                                           
  The consciousness of ignorance- unless this ignorance is                  
recognized to be absolutely necessary ought, instead of forming the         
conclusion of my inquiries, to be the strongest motive to the               
pursuit of them. All ignorance is either ignorance of things or of the      
limits of knowledge. If my ignorance is accidental and not                  
necessary, it must incite me, in the first case, to a dogmatical            
inquiry regarding the objects of which I am ignorant; in the second,        
to a critical investigation into the bounds of all possible knowledge.      
But that my ignorance is absolutely necessary and unavoidable, and          
that it consequently absolves from the duty of all further                  
investigation, is a fact which cannot be made out upon empirical            
grounds- from observation- but upon critical grounds alone, that is,        
by a thoroughgoing investigation into the primary sources of                
cognition. It follows that the determination of the bounds of reason        
can be made only on a priori grounds; while the empirical limitation        
of reason, which is merely an indeterminate cognition of an                 
ignorance that can never be completely removed, can take place only         
a posteriori. In other words, our empirical knowledge is limited by         
that which yet remains for us to know. The former cognition of our          
ignorance, which is possible only on a rational basis, is a science;        
the latter is merely a perception, and we cannot say how far the            
inferences drawn from it may extend. If I regard the earth, as it           
really appears to my senses, as a flat surface, I am ignorant how           
far this surface extends. But experience teaches me that, how far           
soever I go, I always see before me a space in which I can proceed          
farther; and thus I know the limits- merely visual- of my actual            
knowledge of the earth, although I am ignorant of the limits of the         
earth itself. But if I have got so far as to know that the earth is         
a sphere, and that its surface is spherical, I can cognize a priori         
and determine upon principles, from my knowledge of a small part of         
this surface- say to the extent of a degree- the diameter and               
circumference of the earth; and although I am ignorant of the               
objects which this surface contains, I have a perfect knowledge of its      
limits and extent.                                                          
  The sum of all the possible objects of our cognition seems to us          
to be a level surface, with an apparent horizon- that which forms           
the limit of its extent, and which has been termed by us the idea of        
unconditioned totality. To reach this limit by empirical means is           
impossible, and all attempts to determine it a priori according to a        
principle, are alike in vain. But all the questions raised by pure          
reason relate to that which lies beyond this horizon, or, at least, in      
its boundary line.                                                          
                                                        {CH_1 ^paragraph 80}
  The celebrated David Hume was one of those geographers of human           
reason who believe that they have given a sufficient answer to all          
such questions by declaring them to lie beyond the horizon of our           
knowledge- a horizon which, however, Hume was unable to determine. His      
attention especially was directed to the principle of causality; and        
he remarked with perfect justice that the truth of this principle, and      
even the objective validity of the conception of a cause, was not           
commonly based upon clear insight, that is, upon a priori cognition.        
Hence he concluded that this law does not derive its authority from         
its universality and necessity, but merely from its general                 
applicability in the course of experience, and a kind of subjective         
necessity thence arising, which he termed habit. From the inability of      
reason to establish this principle as a necessary law for the               
acquisition of all experience, he inferred the nullity of all the           
attempts of reason to pass the region of the empirical.                     
  This procedure of subjecting the facta of reason to examination,          
and, if necessary, to disapproval, may be termed the censura of             
reason. This censura must inevitably lead us to doubts regarding all        
transcendent employment of principles. But this is only the second          
step in our inquiry. The first step in regard to the subjects of            
pure reason, and which marks the infancy of that faculty, is that of        
dogmatism. The second, which we have just mentioned, is that of             
scepticism, and it gives evidence that our judgement has been improved      
by experience. But a third step is necessary- indicative of the             
maturity and manhood of the judgement, which now lays a firm                
foundation upon universal and necessary principles. This is the period      
of criticism, in which we do not examine the facta of reason, but           
reason itself, in the whole extent of its powers, and in regard to its      
capability of a priori cognition; and thus we determine not merely the      
empirical and ever-shifting bounds of our knowledge, but its necessary      
and eternal limits. We demonstrate from indubitable principles, not         
merely our ignorance in respect to this or that subject, but in regard      
to all possible questions of a certain class. Thus scepticism is a          
resting place for reason, in which it may reflect on its dogmatical         
wanderings and gain some knowledge of the region in which it happens        
to be, that it may pursue its way with greater certainty; but it            
cannot be its permanent dwelling-place. It must take up its abode only      
in the region of complete certitude, whether this relates to the            
cognition of objects themselves, or to the limits which bound all           
our cognition.                                                              
  Reason is not to be considered as an indefinitely extended plane, of      
the bounds of which we have only a general knowledge; it ought              
rather to be compared to a sphere, the radius of which may be found         
from the curvature of its surface- that is, the nature of a priori          
synthetical propositions- and, consequently, its circumference and          
extent. Beyond the sphere of experience there are no objects which          
it can cognize; nay, even questions regarding such supposititious           
objects relate only to the subjective principles of a complete              
determination of the relations which exist between the                      
understanding-conceptions which lie within this sphere.                     
  We are actually in possession of a priori synthetical cognitions, as      
is proved by the existence of the principles of the understanding,          
which anticipate experience. If any one cannot comprehend the               
possibility of these principles, he may have some reason to doubt           
whether they are really a priori; but he cannot on this account             
declare them to be impossible, and affirm the nullity of the steps          
which reason may have taken under their guidance. He can only say:          
If we perceived their origin and their authenticity, we should be able      
to determine the extent and limits of reason; but, till we can do           
this, all propositions regarding the latter are mere random                 
assertions. In this view, the doubt respecting all dogmatical               
philosophy, which proceeds without the guidance of criticism, is            
well grounded; but we cannot therefore deny to reason the ability to        
construct a sound philosophy, when the way has been prepared by a           
thorough critical investigation. All the conceptions produced, and all      
the questions raised, by pure reason, do not lie in the sphere of           
experience, but in that of reason itself, and hence they must be            
solved, and shown to be either valid or inadmissible, by that faculty.      
We have no right to decline the solution of such problems, on the           
ground that the solution can be discovered only from the nature of          
things, and under pretence of the limitation of human faculties, for        
reason is the sole creator of all these ideas, and is therefore             
bound either to establish their validity or to expose their illusory        
nature.                                                                     
  The polemic of scepticism is properly directed against the                
dogmatist, who erects a system of philosophy without having examined        
the fundamental objective principles on which it is based, for the          
purpose of evidencing the futility of his designs, and thus bringing        
him to a knowledge of his own powers. But, in itself, scepticism            
does not give us any certain information in regard to the bounds of         
our knowledge. All unsuccessful dogmatical attempts of reason are           
facia, which it is always useful to submit to the censure of the            
sceptic. But this cannot help us to any decision regarding the              
expectations which reason cherishes of better success in future             
endeavours; the investigations of scepticism cannot, therefore, settle      
the dispute regarding the rights and powers of human reason.                
                                                        {CH_1 ^paragraph 85}
  Hume is perhaps the ablest and most ingenious of all sceptical            
philosophers, and his writings have, undoubtedly, exerted the most          
powerful influence in awakening reason to a thorough investigation          
into its own powers. It will, therefore, well repay our labours to          
consider for a little the course of reasoning which he followed and         
the errors into which he strayed, although setting out on the path          
of truth and certitude.                                                     
  Hume was probably aware, although he never clearly developed the          
notion, that we proceed in judgements of a certain class beyond our         
conception if the object. I have termed this kind of judgement              
synthetical. As regard the manner in which I pass beyond my conception      
by the aid of experience, no doubts can be entertained. Experience          
is itself a synthesis of perceptions; and it employs perceptions to         
increment the conception, which I obtain by means of another                
perception. But we feel persuaded that we are able to proceed beyond a      
conception, and to extend our cognition a priori. We attempt this in        
two ways- either, through the pure understanding, in relation to            
that which may become an object of experience, or, through pure             
reason, in relation to such properties of things, or of the                 
existence of things, as can never be presented in any experience. This      
sceptical philosopher did not distinguish these two kinds of                
judgements, as he ought to have done, but regarded this augmentation        
of conceptions, and, if we may so express ourselves, the spontaneous        
generation of understanding and reason, independently of the                
impregnation of experience, as altogether impossible. The so-called         
a priori principles of these faculties he consequently held to be           
invalid and imaginary, and regarded them as nothing but subjective          
habits of thought originating in experience, and therefore purely           
empirical and contingent rules, to which we attribute a spurious            
necessity and universality. In support of this strange assertion, he        
referred us to the generally acknowledged principle of the relation         
between cause and effect. No faculty of the mind can conduct us from        
the conception of a thing to the existence of something else; and           
hence he believed he could infer that, without experience, we               
possess no source from which we can augment a conception, and no            
ground sufficient to justify us in framing a judgement that is to           
extend our cognition a priori. That the light of the sun, which shines      
upon a piece of wax, at the same time melts it, while it hardens clay,      
no power of the understanding could infer from the conceptions which        
we previously possessed of these substances; much less is there any         
a priori law that could conduct us to such a conclusion, which              
experience alone can certify. On the other hand, we have seen in our        
discussion of transcendental logic, that, although we can never             
proceed immediately beyond the content of the conception which is           
given us, we can always cognize completely a priori- in relation,           
however, to a third term, namely, possible experience- the law of           
its connection with other things. For example, if I observe that a          
piece of wax melts, I can cognize a priori that there must have been        
something (the sun's heat) preceding, which this law; although,             
without the aid of experience, I could not cognize a priori and in a        
determinate manner either the cause from the effect, or the effect          
from the cause. Hume was, therefore, wrong in inferring, from the           
contingency of the determination according to law, the contingency          
of the law itself; and the passing beyond the conception of a thing to      
possible experience (which is an a priori proceeding, constituting the      
objective reality of the conception), he confounded with our synthesis      
of objects in actual experience, which is always, of course,                
empirical. Thus, too, he regarded the principle of affinity, which has      
its seat in the understanding and indicates a necessary connection, as      
a mere rule of association, lying in the imitative faculty of               
imagination, which can present only contingent, and not objective           
connections.                                                                
  The sceptical errors of this remarkably acute thinker arose               
principally from a defect, which was common to him with the                 
dogmatists, namely, that he had never made a systematic review of           
all the different kinds of a priori synthesis performed by the              
understanding. Had he done so, he would have found, to take one             
example among many, that the principle of permanence was of this            
character, and that it, as well as the principle of causality,              
anticipates experience. In this way he might have been able to              
describe the determinate limits of the a priori operations of               
understanding and reason. But he merely declared the understanding          
to be limited, instead of showing what its limits were; he created a        
general mistrust in the power of our faculties, without giving us           
any determinate knowledge of the bounds of our necessary and                
unavoidable ignorance; he examined and condemned some of the                
principles of the understanding, without investigating all its              
powers with the completeness necessary to criticism. He denies, with        
truth, certain powers to the understanding, but he goes further, and        
declares it to be utterly inadequate to the a priori extension of           
knowledge, although he has not fully examined all the powers which          
reside in the faculty; and thus the fate which always overtakes             
scepticism meets him too. That is to say, his own declarations are          
doubted, for his objections were based upon facta, which are                
contingent, and not upon principles, which can alone demonstrate the        
necessary invalidity of all dogmatical assertions.                          
  As Hume makes no distinction between the well-grounded claims of the      
understanding and the dialectical pretensions of reason, against            
which, however, his attacks are mainly directed, reason does not            
feel itself shut out from all attempts at the extension of a priori         
cognition, and hence it refuses, in spite of a few checks in this or        
that quarter, to relinquish such efforts. For one naturally arms            
oneself to resist an attack, and becomes more obstinate in the resolve      
to establish the claims he has advanced. But a complete review of           
the powers of reason, and the conviction thence arising that we are in      
possession of a limited field of action, while we must admit the            
vanity of higher claims, puts an end to all doubt and dispute, and          
induces reason to rest satisfied with the undisturbed possession of         
its limited domain.                                                         
  To the uncritical dogmatist, who has not surveyed the sphere of           
his understanding, nor determined, in accordance with principles,           
the limits of possible cognition, who, consequently, is ignorant of         
his own powers, and believes he will discover them by the attempts          
he makes in the field of cognition, these attacks of scepticism are         
not only dangerous, but destructive. For if there is one proposition        
in his chain of reasoning which be he cannot prove, or the fallacy          
in which be cannot evolve in accordance with a principle, suspicion         
falls on all his statements, however plausible they may appear.             
                                                        {CH_1 ^paragraph 90}
  And thus scepticism, the bane of dogmatical philosophy, conducts          
us to a sound investigation into the understanding and the reason.          
When we are thus far advanced, we need fear no further                      
attacks; for the limits of our domain are clearly marked out, and we        
can make no claims nor become involved in any disputes regarding the        
region that lies beyond these limits. Thus the sceptical procedure          
in philosophy does not present any solution of the problems of reason,      
but it forms an excellent exercise for its powers, awakening its            
circumspection, and indicating the means whereby it may most fully          
establish its claims to its legitimate possessions.                         
-                                                                           
    SECTION III. The Discipline of Pure Reason in Hypothesis.               
-                                                                           
  This critique of reason has now taught us that all its efforts to         
extend the bounds of knowledge, by means of pure speculation, are           
utterly fruitless. So much the wider field, it may appear, lies open        
to hypothesis; as, where we cannot know with certainty, we are at           
liberty to make guesses and to form suppositions.                           
                                                        {CH_1 ^paragraph 95}
  Imagination may be allowed, under the strict surveillance of reason,      
to invent suppositions; but, these must be based on something that          
is perfectly certain- and that is the possibility of the object. If we      
are well assured upon this point, it is allowable to have recourse          
to supposition in regard to the reality of the object; but this             
supposition must, unless it is utterly groundless, be connected, as         
its ground of explanation, with that which is really given and              
absolutely certain. Such a supposition is termed a hypothesis.              
  It is beyond our power to form the least conception a priori of           
the possibility of dynamical connection in phenomena; and the category      
of the pure understanding will not enable us to ex. cogitate any            
such connection, but merely helps us to understand it, when we meet         
with it in experience. For this reason we cannot, in accordance with        
the categories, imagine or invent any object or any property of an          
object not given, or that may not be given in experience, and employ        
it in a hypothesis; otherwise, we should be basing our chain of             
reasoning upon mere chimerical fancies, and not upon conceptions of         
things. Thus, we have no right to assume the existence of new               
powers, not existing in nature- for example, an understanding with a        
non-sensuous intuition, a force of attraction without contact, or some      
new kind of substances occupying space, and yet without the property        
of impenetrability- and, consequently, we cannot assume that there          
is any other kind of community among substances than that observable        
in experience, any kind of presence than that in space, or any kind of      
duration than that in time. In one word, the conditions of possible         
experience are for reason the only conditions of the possibility of         
things; reason cannot venture to form, independently of these               
conditions, any conceptions of things, because such conceptions,            
although not self-contradictory, are without object and without             
application.                                                                
  The conceptions of reason are, as we have already shown, mere ideas,      
and do not relate to any object in any kind of experience. At the same      
time, they do not indicate imaginary or possible objects. They are          
purely problematical in their nature and, as aids to the heuristic          
exercise of the faculties, form the basis of the regulative principles      
for the systematic employment of the understanding in the field of          
experience. If we leave this ground of experience, they become mere         
fictions of thought, the possibility of which is quite indemonstrable;      
and they cannot, consequently, be employed as hypotheses in the             
explanation of real phenomena. It is quite admissible to cogitate           
the soul as simple, for the purpose of enabling ourselves to employ         
the idea of a perfect and necessary unity of all the faculties of           
the mind as the principle of all our inquiries into its internal            
phenomena, although we cannot cognize this unity in concreto. But to        
assume that the soul is a simple substance (a transcendental                
conception) would be enouncing a proposition which is not only              
indemonstrable- as many physical hypotheses are- but a proposition          
which is purely arbitrary, and in the highest degree rash. The              
simple is never presented in experience; and, if by substance is            
here meant the permanent object of sensuous intuition, the possibility      
of a simple phenomenon is perfectly inconceivable. Reason affords no        
good grounds for admitting the existence of intelligible beings, or of      
intelligible properties of sensuous things, although- as we have no         
conception either of their possibility or of their impossibility- it        
will always be out of our power to affirm dogmatically that they do         
not exist. In the explanation of given phenomena, no other things           
and no other grounds of explanation can be employed than those which        
stand in connection with the given phenomena according to the known         
laws of experience. A transcendental hypothesis, in which a mere            
idea of reason is employed to explain the phenomena of nature, would        
not give us any better insight into a phenomenon, as we should be           
trying to explain what we do not sufficiently understand from known         
empirical principles, by what we do not understand at all. The              
principles of such a hypothesis might conduce to the satisfaction of        
reason, but it would not assist the understanding in its application        
to objects. Order and conformity to aims in the sphere of nature            
must be themselves explained upon natural grounds and according to          
natural laws; and the wildest hypotheses, if they are only physical,        
are here more admissible than a hyperphysical hypothesis, such as that      
of a divine author. For such a hypothesis would introduce the               
principle of ignava ratio, which requires us to give up the search for      
causes that might be discovered in the course of experience and to          
rest satisfied with a mere idea. As regards the absolute totality of        
the grounds of explanation in the series of these causes, this can          
be no hindrance to the understanding in the case of phenomena;              
because, as they are to us nothing more than phenomena, we have no          
right to look for anything like completeness in the synthesis of the        
series of their conditions.                                                 
  Transcendental hypotheses are therefore inadmissible; and we              
cannot use the liberty of employing, in the absence of physical,            
hyperphysical grounds of explanation. And this for two reasons; first,      
because such hypothesis do not advance reason, but rather stop it in        
its progress; secondly, because this licence would render fruitless         
all its exertions in its own proper sphere, which is that of                
experience. For, when the explanation of natural phenomena happens          
to be difficult, we have constantly at hand a transcendental ground of      
explanation, which lifts us above the necessity of investigating            
nature; and our inquiries are brought to a close, not because we            
have obtained all the requisite knowledge, but because we abut upon         
a principle which is incomprehensible and which, indeed, is so far          
back in the track of thought as to contain the conception of the            
absolutely primal being.                                                    
  The next requisite for the admissibility of a hypothesis is its           
sufficiency. That is, it must determine a priori the consequences           
which are given in experience and which are supposed to follow from         
the hypothesis itself. If we require to employ auxiliary hypotheses,        
the suspicion naturally arises that they are mere fictions; because         
the necessity for each of them requires the same justification as in        
the case of the original hypothesis, and thus their testimony is            
invalid. If we suppose the existence of an infinitely perfect cause,        
we possess sufficient grounds for the explanation of the conformity to      
aims, the order and the greatness which we observe in the universe;         
but we find ourselves obliged, when we observe the evil in the world        
and the exceptions to these laws, to employ new hypothesis in               
support of the original one. We employ the idea of the simple nature        
of the human soul as the foundation of all the theories we may form of      
its phenomena; but when we meet with difficulties in our way, when          
we observe in the soul phenomena similar to the changes which take          
place in matter, we require to call in new auxiliary hypotheses. These      
may, indeed, not be false, but we do not know them to be true, because      
the only witness to their certitude is the hypothesis which they            
themselves have been called in to explain.                                  
                                                       {CH_1 ^paragraph 100}
  We are not discussing the above-mentioned assertions regarding the        
immaterial unity of the soul and the existence of a Supreme Being as        
dogmata, which certain philosophers profess to demonstrate a priori,        
but purely as hypotheses. In the former case, the dogmatist must            
take care that his arguments possess the apodeictic certainty of a          
demonstration. For the assertion that the reality of such ideas is          
probable is as absurd as a proof of the probability of a proposition        
in geometry. Pure abstract reason, apart from all experience, can           
either cognize nothing at all; and hence the judgements it enounces         
are never mere opinions, they are either apodeictic certainties, or         
declarations that nothing can be known on the subject. Opinions and         
probable judgements on the nature of things can only be employed to         
explain given phenomena, or they may relate to the effect, in               
accordance with empirical laws, of an actually existing cause. In           
other words, we must restrict the sphere of opinion to the world of         
experience and nature. Beyond this region opinion is mere invention;        
unless we are groping about for the truth on a path not yet fully           
known, and have some hopes of stumbling upon it by chance.                  
  But, although hypotheses are inadmissible in answers to the               
questions of pure speculative reason, they may be employed in the           
defence of these answers. That is to say, hypotheses are admissible in      
polemic, but not in the sphere of dogmatism. By the defence of              
statements of this character, I do not mean an attempt at                   
discovering new grounds for their support, but merely the refutation        
of the arguments of opponents. All a priori synthetical propositions        
possess the peculiarity that, although the philosopher who maintains        
the reality of the ideas contained in the proposition is not in             
possession of sufficient knowledge to establish the certainty of his        
statements, his opponent is as little able to prove the truth of the        
opposite. This equality of fortune does not allow the one party to          
be superior to the other in the sphere of speculative cognition; and        
it is this sphere, accordingly, that is the proper arena of these           
endless speculative conflicts. But we shall afterwards show that, in        
relation to its practical exercise, Reason has the right of                 
admitting what, in the field of pure speculation, she would not be          
justified in supposing, except upon perfectly sufficient grounds;           
because all such suppositions destroy the necessary completeness of         
speculation- a condition which the practical reason, however, does not      
consider to be requisite. In this sphere, therefore, Reason is              
mistress of a possession, her title to which she does not require to        
prove- which, in fact, she could not do. The burden of proof                
accordingly rests upon the opponent. But as he has just as little           
knowledge regarding the subject discussed, and is as little able to         
prove the non-existence of the object of an idea, as the philosopher        
on the other side is to demonstrate its reality, it is evident that         
there is an advantage on the side of the philosopher who maintains his      
proposition as a practically necessary supposition (melior est              
conditio possidentis). For he is at liberty to employ, in                   
self-defence, the same weapons as his opponent makes use of in              
attacking him; that is, he has a right to use hypotheses not for the        
purpose of supporting the arguments in favour of his own propositions,      
but to show that his opponent knows no more than himself regarding the      
subject under 'discussion and cannot boast of any speculative               
advantage.                                                                  
  Hypotheses are, therefore, admissible in the sphere of pure reason        
only as weapons for self-defence, and not as supports to dogmatical         
assertions. But the opposing party we must always seek for in               
ourselves. For speculative reason is, in the sphere of                      
transcendentalism, dialectical in its own nature. The difficulties and      
objections we have to fear lie in ourselves. They are like old but          
never superannuated claims; and we must seek them out, and settle them      
once and for ever, if we are to expect a permanent peace. External          
tranquility is hollow and unreal. The root of these contradictions,         
which lies in the nature of human reason, must be destroyed; and            
this can only be done by giving it, in the first instance, freedom          
to grow, nay, by nourishing it, that it may send out shoots, and            
thus betray its own existence. It is our duty, therefore, to try to         
discover new objections, to put weapons in the bands of our                 
opponent, and to grant him the most favourable position in the arena        
that he can wish. We have nothing to fear from these concessions; on        
the contrary, we may rather hope that we shall thus make ourselves          
master of a possession which no one will ever venture to dispute.           
  The thinker requires, to be fully equipped, the hypotheses of pure        
reason, which, although but leaden weapons (for they have not been          
steeled in the armoury of experience), are as useful as any that can        
be employed by his opponents. If, accordingly, we have assumed, from a      
non-speculative point of view, the immaterial nature of the soul,           
and are met by the objection that experience seems to prove that the        
growth and decay of our mental faculties are mere modifications of the      
sensuous organism- we can weaken the force of this objection by the         
assumption that the body is nothing but the fundamental phenomenon, to      
which, as a necessary condition, all sensibility, and consequently all      
thought, relates in the present state of our existence; and that the        
separation of soul and body forms the conclusion of the sensuous            
exercise of our power of cognition and the beginning of the                 
intellectual. The body would, in this view of the question, be              
regarded, not as the cause of thought, but merely as its restrictive        
condition, as promotive of the sensuous and animal, but as a hindrance      
to the pure and spiritual life; and the dependence of the animal            
life on the constitution of the body, would not prove that the whole        
life of man was also dependent on the state of the organism. We             
might go still farther, and discover new objections, or carry out to        
their extreme consequences those which have already been adduced.           
  Generation, in the human race as well as among the irrational             
animals, depends on so many accidents- of occasion, of proper               
sustenance, of the laws enacted by the government of a country of vice      
even, that it is difficult to believe in the eternal existence of a         
being whose life has begun under circumstances so mean and trivial,         
and so entirely dependent upon our own control. As regards the              
continuance of the existence of the whole race, we need have no             
difficulties, for accident in single cases is subject to general laws;      
but, in the case of each individual, it would seem as if we could           
hardly expect so wonderful an effect from causes so insignificant.          
But, in answer to these objections, we may adduce the transcendental        
hypothesis that all life is properly intelligible, and not subject          
to changes of time, and that it neither began in birth, nor will end        
in death. We may assume that this life is nothing more than a sensuous      
representation of pure spiritual life; that the whole world of sense        
is but an image, hovering before the faculty of cognition which we          
exercise in this sphere, and with no more objective reality than a          
dream; and that if we could intuite ourselves and other things as they      
really are, we should see ourselves in a world of spiritual natures,        
our connection with which did not begin at our birth and will not           
cease with the destruction of the body. And so on.                          
                                                       {CH_1 ^paragraph 105}
  We cannot be said to know what has been above asserted, nor do we         
seriously maintain the truth of these assertions; and the notions           
therein indicated are not even ideas of reason, they are purely             
fictitious conceptions. But this hypothetical procedure is in               
perfect conformity with the laws of reason. Our opponent mistakes           
the absence of empirical conditions for a proof of the complete             
impossibility of all that we have asserted; and we have to show him         
that be has not exhausted the whole sphere of possibility and that          
he can as little compass that sphere by the laws of experience and          
nature, as we can lay a secure foundation for the operations of reason      
beyond the region of experience. Such hypothetical defences against         
the pretensions of an opponent must not be regarded as declarations of      
opinion. The philosopher abandons them, so soon as the opposite             
party renounces its dogmatical conceit. To maintain a simply                
negative position in relation to propositions which rest on an              
insecure foundation, well befits the moderation of a true philosopher;      
but to uphold the objections urged against an opponent as proofs of         
the opposite statement is a proceeding just as unwarrantable and            
arrogant as it is to attack the position of a philosopher who advances      
affirmative propositions regarding such a subject.                          
  It is evident, therefore, that hypotheses, in the speculative             
sphere, are valid, not as independent propositions, but only                
relatively to opposite transcendent assumptions. For, to make the           
principles of possible experience conditions of the possibility of          
things in general is just as transcendent a procedure as to maintain        
the objective reality of ideas which can be applied to no objects           
except such as lie without the limits of possible experience. The           
judgements enounced by pure reason must be necessary, or they must not      
be enounced at all. Reason cannot trouble herself with opinions. But        
the hypotheses we have been discussing are merely problematical             
judgements, which can neither be confuted nor proved; while,                
therefore, they are not personal opinions, they are indispensable as        
answers to objections which are liable to be raised. But we must            
take care to confine them to this function, and guard against any           
assumption on their part of absolute validity, a proceeding which           
would involve reason in inextricable difficulties and contradictions.       
-                                                                           
     SECTION IV. The Discipline of Pure Reason in Relation                  
                       to Proofs.                                           
                                                       {CH_1 ^paragraph 110}
-                                                                           
  It is a peculiarity, which distinguishes the proofs of                    
transcendental synthetical propositions from those of all other a           
priori synthetical cognitions, that reason, in the case of the former,      
does not apply its conceptions directly to an object, but is first          
obliged to prove, a priori, the objective validity of these                 
conceptions and the possibility of their syntheses. This is not merely      
a prudential rule, it is essential to the very possibility of the           
proof of a transcendental proposition. If I am required to pass, a          
priori, beyond the conception of an object, I find that it is               
utterly impossible without the guidance of something which is not           
contained in the conception. In mathematics, it is a priori                 
intuition that guides my synthesis; and, in this case, all our              
conclusions may be drawn immediately from pure intuition. In                
transcendental cognition, so long as we are dealing only with               
conceptions of the understanding, we are guided by possible                 
experience. That is to say, a proof in the sphere of transcendental         
cognition does not show that the given conception (that of an event,        
for example) leads directly to another conception (that of a cause)-        
for this would be a saltus which nothing can justify; but it shows          
that experience itself, and consequently the object of experience,          
is impossible without the connection indicated by these conceptions.        
It follows that such a proof must demonstrate the possibility of            
arriving, synthetically and a priori, at a certain knowledge of             
things, which was not contained in our conceptions of these things.         
Unless we pay particular attention to this requirement, our proofs,         
instead of pursuing the straight path indicated by reason, follow           
the tortuous road of mere subjective association. The illusory              
conviction, which rests upon subjective causes of association, and          
which is considered as resulting from the perception of a real and          
objective natural affinity, is always open to doubt and suspicion. For      
this reason, all the attempts which have been made to prove the             
principle of sufficient reason, have, according to the universal            
admission of philosophers, been quite unsuccessful; and, before the         
appearance of transcendental criticism, it was considered better, as        
this principle could not be abandoned, to appeal boldly to the              
common sense of mankind (a proceeding which always proves that the          
problem, which reason ought to solve, is one in which philosophers          
find great difficulties), rather than attempt to discover new               
dogmatical proofs.                                                          
  But, if the proposition to be proved is a proposition of pure             
reason, and if I aim at passing beyond my empirical conceptions by the      
aid of mere ideas, it is necessary that the proof should first show         
that such a step in synthesis is possible (which it is not), before it      
proceeds to prove the truth of the proposition itself. The so-called        
proof of the simple nature of the soul from the unity of apperception,      
is a very plausible one. But it contains no answer to the objection,        
that, as the notion of absolute simplicity is not a conception which        
is directly applicable to a perception, but is an idea which must be        
inferred- if at all- from observation, it is by no means evident how        
the mere fact of consciousness, which is contained in all thought,          
although in so far a simple representation, can conduct me to the           
consciousness and cognition of a thing which is purely a thinking           
substance. When I represent to my mind the power of my body as in           
motion, my body in this thought is so far absolute unity, and my            
representation of it is a simple one; and hence I can indicate this         
representation by the motion of a point, because I have made                
abstraction of the size or volume of the body. But I cannot hence           
infer that, given merely the moving power of a body, the body may be        
cogitated as simple substance, merely because the representation in my      
mind takes no account of its content in space, and is consequently          
simple. The simple, in abstraction, is very different from the              
objectively simple; and hence the Ego, which is simple in the first         
sense, may, in the second sense, as indicating the soul itself, be a        
very complex conception, with a very various content. Thus it is            
evident that in all such arguments there lurks a paralogism. We             
guess (for without some such surmise our suspicion would not be             
excited in reference to a proof of this character) at the presence          
of the paralogism, by keeping ever before us a criterion of the             
possibility of those synthetical propositions which aim at proving          
more than experience can teach us. This criterion is obtained from the      
observation that such proofs do not lead us directly from the               
subject of the proposition to be proved to the required predicate, but      
find it necessary to presuppose the possibility of extending our            
cognition a priori by means of ideas. We must, accordingly, always use      
the greatest caution; we require, before attempting any proof, to           
consider how it is possible to extend the sphere of cognition by the        
operations of pure reason, and from what source we are to derive            
knowledge, which is not obtained from the analysis of conceptions, nor      
relates, by anticipation, to possible experience. We shall thus             
spare ourselves much severe and fruitless labour, by not expecting          
from reason what is beyond its power, or rather by subjecting it to         
discipline, and teaching it to moderate its vehement desires for the        
extension of the sphere of cognition.                                       
  The first rule for our guidance is, therefore, not to attempt a           
transcendental proof, before we have considered from what source we         
are to derive the principles upon which the proof is to be based,           
and what right we have to expect that our conclusions from these            
principles will be veracious. If they are principles of the                 
understanding, it is vain to expect that we should attain by their          
means to ideas of pure reason; for these principles are valid only          
in regard to objects of possible experience. If they are principles of      
pure reason, our labour is alike in vain. For the principles of             
reason, if employed as objective, are without exception dialectical         
and possess no validity or truth, except as regulative principles of        
the systematic employment of reason in experience. But when such            
delusive proof are presented to us, it is our duty to meet them with        
the non liquet of a matured judgement; and, although we are unable          
to expose the particular sophism upon which the proof is based, we          
have a right to demand a deduction of the principles employed in it;        
and, if these principles have their origin in pure reason alone,            
such a deduction is absolutely impossible. And thus it is                   
unnecessary that we should trouble ourselves with the exposure and          
confutation of every sophistical illusion; we may, at once, bring           
all dialectic, which is inexhaustible in the production of                  
fallacies, before the bar of critical reason, which tests the               
principles upon which all dialectical procedure is based. The second        
peculiarity of transcendental proof is that a transcendental                
proposition cannot rest upon more than a single proof. If I am drawing      
conclusions, not from conceptions, but from intuition corresponding to      
a conception, be it pure intuition, as in mathematics, or empirical,        
as in natural science, the intuition which forms the basis of my            
inferences presents me with materials for many synthetical                  
propositions, which I can connect in various modes, while, as it is         
allowable to proceed from different points in the intention, I can          
arrive by different paths at the same proposition.                          
  But every transcendental proposition sets out from a conception, and      
posits the synthetical condition of the possibility of an object            
according to this conception. There must, therefore, be but one ground      
of proof, because it is the conception alone which determines the           
object; and thus the proof cannot contain anything more than the            
determination of the object according to the conception. In our             
Transcendental Analytic, for example, we inferred the principle: Every      
event has a cause, from the only condition of the objective                 
possibility of our conception of an event. This is that an event            
cannot be determined in time, and consequently cannot form a part of        
experience, unless it stands under this dynamical law. This is the          
only possible ground of proof; for our conception of an event               
possesses objective validity, that is, is a true conception, only           
because the law of causality determines an object to which it can           
refer. Other arguments in support of this principle have been               
attempted- such as that from the contingent nature of a phenomenon;         
but when this argument is considered, we can discover no criterion          
of contingency, except the fact of an event- of something happening,        
that is to say, the existence which is preceded by the non-existence        
of an object, and thus we fall back on the very thing to be proved. If      
the proposition: "Every thinking being is simple," is to be proved, we      
keep to the conception of the ego, which is simple, and to which all        
thought has a relation. The same is the case with the transcendental        
proof of the existence of a Deity, which is based solely upon the           
harmony and reciprocal fitness of the conceptions of an ens                 
realissimum and a necessary being, and cannot be attempted in any           
other manner.                                                               
                                                       {CH_1 ^paragraph 115}
  This caution serves to simplify very much the criticism of all            
propositions of reason. When reason employs conceptions alone, only         
one proof of its thesis is possible, if any. When, therefore, the           
dogmatist advances with ten arguments in favour of a proposition, we        
may be sure that not one of them is conclusive. For if he possessed         
one which proved the proposition he brings forward to demonstration-        
as must always be the case with the propositions of pure reason-            
what need is there for any more? His intention can only be similar          
to that of the advocate who had different arguments for different           
judges; this availing himself of the weakness of those who examine his      
arguments, who, without going into any profound investigation, adopt        
the view of the case which seems most probable at first sight and           
decide according to it.                                                     
  The third rule for the guidance of pure reason in the conduct of a        
proof is that all transcendental proofs must never be apagogic or           
indirect, but always ostensive or direct. The direct or ostensive           
proof not only establishes the truth of the proposition to be               
proved, but exposes the grounds of its truth; the apagogic, on the          
other hand, may assure us of the truth of the proposition, but it           
cannot enable us to comprehend the grounds of its possibility. The          
latter is, accordingly, rather an auxiliary to an argument, than a          
strictly philosophical and rational mode of procedure. In one respect,      
however, they have an advantage over direct proofs, from the fact that      
the mode of arguing by contradiction, which they employ, renders our        
understanding of the question more clear, and approximates the proof        
to the certainty of an intuitional demonstration.                           
  The true reason why indirect proofs are employed in different             
sciences is this. When the grounds upon which we seek to base a             
cognition are too various or too profound, we try whether or not we         
may not discover the truth of our cognition from its consequences. The      
modus ponens of reasoning from the truth of its inferences to the           
truth of a proposition would be admissible if all the inferences            
that can be drawn from it are known to be true; for in this case there      
can be only one possible ground for these inferences, and that is           
the true one. But this is a quite impracticable procedure, as it            
surpasses all our powers to discover all the possible inferences            
that can be drawn from a proposition. But this mode of reasoning is         
employed, under favour, when we wish to prove the truth of an               
hypothesis; in which case we admit the truth of the conclusion-             
which is supported by analogy- that, if all the inferences we have          
drawn and examined agree with the proposition assumed, all other            
possible inferences will also agree with it. But, in this way, an           
hypothesis can never be established as a demonstrated truth. The modus      
tollens of reasoning from known inferences to the unknown proposition,      
is not only a rigorous, but a very easy mode of proof. For, if it           
can be shown that but one inference from a proposition is false,            
then the proposition must itself be false. Instead, then, of                
examining, in an ostensive argument, the whole series of the grounds        
on which the truth of a proposition rests, we need only take the            
opposite of this proposition, and if one inference from it be false,        
then must the opposite be itself false; and, consequently, the              
proposition which we wished to prove must be true.                          
  The apagogic method of proof is admissible only in those sciences         
where it is impossible to mistake a subjective representation for an        
objective cognition. Where this is possible, it is plain that the           
opposite of a given proposition may contradict merely the subjective        
conditions of thought, and not the objective cognition; or it may           
happen that both propositions contradict each other only under a            
subjective condition, which is incorrectly considered to be objective,      
and, as the condition is itself false, both propositions may be false,      
and it will, consequently, be impossible to conclude the truth of           
the one from the falseness of the other.                                    
  In mathematics such subreptions are impossible; and it is in this         
science, accordingly, that the indirect mode of proof has its true          
place. In the science of nature, where all assertion is based upon          
empirical intuition, such subreptions may be guarded against by the         
repeated comparison of observations; but this mode of proof is of           
little value in this sphere of knowledge. But the transcendental            
efforts of pure reason are all made in the sphere of the subjective,        
which is the real medium of all dialectical illusion; and thus              
reason endeavours, in its premisses, to impose upon us subjective           
representations for objective cognitions. In the transcendental sphere      
of pure reason, then, and in the case of synthetical propositions,          
it is inadmissible to support a statement by disproving the                 
counter-statement. For only two cases are possible; either, the             
counter-statement is nothing but the enouncement of the                     
inconsistency of the opposite opinion with the subjective conditions        
of reason, which does not affect the real case (for example, we cannot      
comprehend the unconditioned necessity of the existence of a being,         
and hence every speculative proof of the existence of such a being          
must be opposed on subjective grounds, while the possibility of this        
being in itself cannot with justice be denied); or, both propositions,      
being dialectical in their nature, are based upon an impossible             
conception. In this latter case the rule applies: non entis nulla sunt      
predicata; that is to say, what we affirm and what we deny, respecting      
such an object, are equally untrue, and the apagogic mode of                
arriving at the truth is in this case impossible. If, for example,          
we presuppose that the world of sense is given in itself in its             
totality, it is false, either that it is infinite, or that it is            
finite and limited in space. Both are false, because the hypothesis is      
false. For the notion of phenomena (as mere representations) which are      
given in themselves (as objects) is self-contradictory; and the             
infinitude of this imaginary whole would, indeed, be unconditioned,         
but would be inconsistent (as everything in the phenomenal world is         
conditioned) with the unconditioned determination and finitude of           
quantities which is presupposed in our conception.                          
                                                       {CH_1 ^paragraph 120}
  The apagogic mode of proof is the true source of those illusions          
which have always had so strong an attraction for the admirers of           
dogmatical philosophy. It may be compared to a champion who                 
maintains the honour and claims of the party he has adopted by              
offering battle to all who doubt the validity of these claims and           
the purity of that honour; while nothing can be proved in this way,         
except the respective strength of the combatants, and the advantage,        
in this respect, is always on the side of the attacking party.              
Spectators, observing that each party is alternately conqueror and          
conquered, are led to regard the subject of dispute as beyond the           
power of man to decide upon. But such an opinion cannot be                  
justified; and it is sufficient to apply to these reasoners the             
remark:                                                                     
-                                                                           
                  Non defensoribus istis                                    
        Tempus eget.                                                        
-                                                                           
                                                       {CH_1 ^paragraph 125}
  Each must try to establish his assertions by a transcendental             
deduction of the grounds of proof employed in his argument, and thus        
enable us to see in what way the claims of reason may be supported. If      
an opponent bases his assertions upon subjective grounds, he may be         
refuted with ease; not, however to the advantage of the dogmatist, who      
likewise depends upon subjective sources of cognition and is in like        
manner driven into a corner by his opponent. But, if parties employ         
the direct method of procedure, they will soon discover the                 
difficulty, nay, the impossibility of proving their assertions, and         
will be forced to appeal to prescription and precedence; or they will,      
by the help of criticism, discover with ease the dogmatical                 
illusions by which they had been mocked, and compel reason to renounce      
its exaggerated pretensions to speculative insight and to confine           
itself within the limits of its proper sphere- that of practical            
principles.                                                                 
                                                                            
CH_2                                                                        
            CHAPTER II. The Canon of Pure Reason.                           
-                                                                           
  It is a humiliating consideration for human reason that it is             
incompetent to discover truth by means of pure speculation, but, on         
the contrary, stands in need of discipline to check its deviations          
from the straight path and to expose the illusions which it                 
originates. But, on the other hand, this consideration ought to             
elevate and to give it confidence, for this discipline is exercised by      
itself alone, and it is subject to the censure of no other power.           
The bounds, moreover, which it is forced to set to its speculative          
exercise, form likewise a check upon the fallacious pretensions of          
opponents; and thus what remains of its possessions, after these            
exaggerated claims have been disallowed, is secure from attack or           
usurpation. The greatest, and perhaps the only, use of all                  
philosophy of pure reason is, accordingly, of a purely negative             
character. It is not an organon for the extension, but a discipline         
for the determination, of the limits of its exercise; and without           
laying claim to the discovery of new truth, it has the modest merit of      
guarding against error.                                                     
  At the same time, there must be some source of positive cognitions        
which belong to the domain of pure reason and which become the              
causes of error only from our mistaking their true character, while         
they form the goal towards which reason continually strives. How            
else can we account for the inextinguishable desire in the human            
mind to find a firm footing in some region beyond the limits of the         
world of experience? It hopes to attain to the possession of a              
knowledge in which it has the deepest interest. It enters upon the          
path of pure speculation; but in vain. We have some reason, however,        
to expect that, in the only other way that lies open to it- the path        
of practical reason- it may meet with better success.                       
  I understand by a canon a list of the a priori principles of the          
proper employment of certain faculties of cognition. Thus general           
logic, in its analytical department, is a formal canon for the              
faculties of understanding and reason. In the same way, Transcendental      
Analytic was seen to be a canon of the pure understanding; for it           
alone is competent to enounce true a priori synthetical cognitions.         
But, when no proper employment of a faculty of cognition is                 
possible, no canon can exist. But the synthetical cognition of pure         
speculative reason is, as has been shown, completely impossible. There      
cannot, therefore, exist any canon for the speculative exercise of          
this faculty- for its speculative exercise is entirely dialectical;         
and, consequently, transcendental logic, in this respect, is merely         
a discipline, and not a canon. If, then, there is any proper mode of        
employing the faculty of pure reason- in which case there must be a         
canon for this faculty- this canon will relate, not to the                  
speculative, but to the practical use of reason. This canon we now          
proceed to investigate.                                                     
-                                                                           
    SECTION I. Of the Ultimate End of the Pure Use of Reason.               
                                                         {CH_2 ^paragraph 5}
-                                                                           
  There exists in the faculty of reason a natural desire to venture         
beyond the field of experience, to attempt to reach the utmost              
bounds of all cognition by the help of ideas alone, and not to rest         
satisfied until it has fulfilled its course and raised the sum of           
its cognitions into a self-subsistent systematic whole. Is the              
motive for this endeavour to be found in its speculative, or in its         
practical interests alone?                                                  
  Setting aside, at present, the results of the labours of pure reason      
in its speculative exercise, I shall merely inquire regarding the           
problems the solution of which forms its ultimate aim, whether reached      
or not, and in relation to which all other aims are but partial and         
intermediate. These highest aims must, from the nature of reason,           
possess complete unity; otherwise the highest interest of humanity          
could not be successfully promoted.                                         
  The transcendental speculation of reason relates to three things:         
the freedom of the will, the immortality of the soul, and the               
existence of God. The speculative interest which reason has in those        
questions is very small; and, for its sake alone, we should not             
undertake the labour of transcendental investigation- a labour full of      
toil and ceaseless struggle. We should be loth to undertake this            
labour, because the discoveries we might make would not be of the           
smallest use in the sphere of concrete or physical investigation. We        
may find out that the will is free, but this knowledge only relates to      
the intelligible cause of our volition. As regards the phenomena or         
expressions of this will, that is, our actions, we are bound, in            
obedience to an inviolable maxim, without which reason cannot be            
employed in the sphere of experience, to explain these in the same way      
as we explain all the other phenomena of nature, that is to say,            
according to its unchangeable laws. We may have discovered the              
spirituality and immortality of the soul, but we cannot employ this         
knowledge to explain the phenomena of this life, nor the peculiar           
nature of the future, because our conception of an incorporeal              
nature is purely negative and does not add anything to our                  
knowledge, and the only inferences to be drawn from it are purely           
fictitious. If, again, we prove the existence of a supreme                  
intelligence, we should be able from it to make the conformity to aims      
existing in the arrangement of the world comprehensible; but we should      
not be justified in deducing from it any particular arrangement or          
disposition, or inferring any where it is not perceived. For it is a        
necessary rule of the speculative use of reason that we must not            
overlook natural causes, or refuse to listen to the teaching of             
experience, for the sake of deducing what we know and perceive from         
something that transcends all our knowledge. In one word, these             
three propositions are, for the speculative reason, always                  
transcendent, and cannot be employed as immanent principles in              
relation to the objects of experience; they are, consequently, of no        
use to us in this sphere, being but the valueless results of the            
severe but unprofitable efforts of reason.                                  
  If, then, the actual cognition of these three cardinal                    
propositions is perfectly useless, while Reason uses her utmost             
endeavours to induce us to admit them, it is plain that their real          
value and importance relate to our practical, and not to our                
speculative interest.                                                       
                                                        {CH_2 ^paragraph 10}
  I term all that is possible through free will, practical. But if the      
conditions of the exercise of free volition are empirical, reason           
can have only a regulative, and not a constitutive, influence upon it,      
and is serviceable merely for the introduction of unity into its            
empirical laws. In the moral philosophy of prudence, for example,           
the sole business of reason is to bring about a union of all the ends,      
which are aimed at by our inclinations, into one ultimate end- that of      
happiness- and to show the agreement which should exist among the           
means of attaining that end. In this sphere, accordingly, reason            
cannot present to us any other than pragmatical laws of free action,        
for our guidance towards the aims set up by the senses, and is              
incompetent to give us laws which are pure and determined completely a      
priori. On the other hand, pure practical laws, the ends of which have      
been given by reason entirely a priori, and which are not                   
empirically conditioned, but are, on the contrary, absolutely               
imperative in their nature, would be products of pure reason. Such are      
the moral laws; and these alone belong to the sphere of the                 
practical exercise of reason, and admit of a canon.                         
  All the powers of reason, in the sphere of what may be termed pure        
philosophy, are, in fact, directed to the three above-mentioned             
problems alone. These again have a still higher end- the answer to the      
question, what we ought to do, if the will is free, if there is a           
God and a future world. Now, as this problem relates to our in              
reference to the highest aim of humanity, it is evident that the            
ultimate intention of nature, in the constitution of our reason, has        
been directed to the moral alone.                                           
  We must take care, however, in turning our attention to an object         
which is foreign* to the sphere of transcendental philosophy, not to        
injure the unity of our system by digressions, nor, on the other hand,      
to fail in clearness, by saying too little on the new subject of            
discussion. I hope to avoid both extremes, by keeping as close as           
possible to the transcendental, and excluding all psychological,            
that is, empirical, elements.                                               
-                                                                           
  *All practical conceptions relate to objects of pleasure and pain,        
and consequently- in an indirect manner, at least- to objects of            
feeling. But as feeling is not a faculty of representation, but lies        
out of the sphere of our powers of cognition, the elements of our           
judgements, in so far as they relate to pleasure or pain, that is, the      
elements of our practical judgements, do not belong to                      
transcendental philosophy, which has to do with pure a priori               
cognitions alone.                                                           
                                                        {CH_2 ^paragraph 15}
-                                                                           
  I have to remark, in the first place, that at present I treat of the      
conception of freedom in the practical sense only, and set aside the        
corresponding transcendental conception, which cannot be employed as a      
ground of explanation in the phenomenal world, but is itself a problem      
for pure reason. A will is purely animal (arbitrium brutum) when it is      
determined by sensuous impulses or instincts only, that is, when it is      
determined in a pathological manner. A will, which can be determined        
independently of sensuous impulses, consequently by motives                 
presented by reason alone, is called a free will (arbitrium                 
liberum); and everything which is connected with this free will,            
either as principle or consequence, is termed practical. The existence      
of practical freedom can be proved from experience alone. For the           
human will is not determined by that alone which immediately affects        
the senses; on the contrary, we have the power, by calling up the           
notion of what is useful or hurtful in a more distant relation, of          
overcoming the immediate impressions on our sensuous faculty of             
desire. But these considerations of what is desirable in relation to        
our whole state, that is, is in the end good and useful, are based          
entirely upon reason. This faculty, accordingly, enounces laws,             
which are imperative or objective laws of freedom and which tell us         
what ought to take place, thus distinguishing themselves from the laws      
of nature, which relate to that which does take place. The laws of          
freedom or of free will are hence termed practical laws.                    
  Whether reason is not itself, in the actual delivery of these             
laws, determined in its turn by other influences, and whether the           
action which, in relation to sensuous impulses, we call free, may not,      
in relation to higher and more remote operative causes, really form         
a part of nature- these are questions which do not here concern us.         
They are purely speculative questions; and all we have to do, in the        
practical sphere, is to inquire into the rule of conduct which              
reason has to present. Experience demonstrates to us the existence          
of practical freedom as one of the causes which exist in nature,            
that is, it shows the causal power of reason in the determination of        
the will. The idea of transcendental freedom, on the contrary,              
requires that reason- in relation to its causal power of commencing         
a series of phenomena- should be independent of all sensuous                
determining causes; and thus it seems to be in opposition to the law        
of nature and to all possible experience. It therefore remains a            
problem for the human mind. But this problem does not concern reason        
in its practical use; and we have, therefore, in a canon of pure            
reason, to do with only two questions, which relate to the practical        
interest of pure reason: Is there a God? and, Is there a future             
life? The question of transcendental freedom is purely speculative,         
and we may therefore set it entirely aside when we come to treat of         
practical reason. Besides, we have already discussed this subject in        
the antinomy of pure reason.                                                
-                                                                           
   SECTION II. Of the Ideal of the Summum Bonum as a Determining            
                                                        {CH_2 ^paragraph 20}
           Ground of the Ultimate End of Pure Reason.                       
-                                                                           
  Reason conducted us, in its speculative use, through the field of         
experience and, as it can never find complete satisfaction in that          
sphere, from thence to speculative ideas- which, however, in the end        
brought us back again to experience, and thus fulfilled the purpose of      
reason, in a manner which, though useful, was not at all in accordance      
with our expectations. It now remains for us to consider whether            
pure reason can be employed in a practical sphere, and whether it will      
here conduct us to those ideas which attain the highest ends of pure        
reason, as we have just stated them. We shall thus ascertain                
whether, from the point of view of its practical interest, reason           
may not be able to supply us with that which, on the speculative side,      
it wholly denies us.                                                        
  The whole interest of reason, speculative as well as practical, is        
centred in the three following questions:                                   
-                                                                           
                                                        {CH_2 ^paragraph 25}
               1. WHAT CAN I KNOW?                                          
               2. WHAT OUGHT I TO DO?                                       
               3. WHAT MAY I HOPE?                                          
-                                                                           
  The first question is purely speculative. We have, as I flatter           
myself, exhausted all the replies of which it is susceptible, and have      
at last found the reply with which reason must content itself, and          
with which it ought to be content, so long as it pays no regard to the      
practical. But from the two great ends to the attainment of which           
all these efforts of pure reason were in fact directed, we remain just      
as far removed as if we had consulted our ease and declined the task        
at the outset. So far, then, as knowledge is concerned, thus much,          
at least, is established, that, in regard to those two problems, it         
lies beyond our reach.                                                      
                                                        {CH_2 ^paragraph 30}
  The second question is purely practical. As such it may indeed            
fall within the province of pure reason, but still it is not                
transcendental, but moral, and consequently cannot in itself form           
the subject of our criticism.                                               
  The third question: If I act as I ought to do, what may I then            
hope?- is at once practical and theoretical. The practical forms a          
clue to the answer of the theoretical, and- in its highest form-            
speculative question. For all hoping has happiness for its object           
and stands in precisely the same relation to the practical and the law      
of morality as knowing to the theoretical cognition of things and           
the law of nature. The former arrives finally at the conclusion that        
something is (which determines the ultimate end), because something         
ought to take place; the latter, that something is (which operates          
as the highest cause), because something does take place.                   
  Happiness is the satisfaction of all our desires; extensive, in           
regard to their multiplicity; intensive, in regard to their degree;         
and protensive, in regard to their duration. The practical law based        
on the motive of happiness I term a pragmatical law (or prudential          
rule); but that law, assuming such to exist, which has no other motive      
than the worthiness of being happy, I term a moral or ethical law. The      
first tells us what we have to do, if we wish to become possessed of        
happiness; the second dictates how we ought to act, in order to             
deserve happiness. The first is based upon empirical principles; for        
it is only by experience that I can learn either what inclinations          
exist which desire satisfaction, or what are the natural means of           
satisfying them. The second takes no account of our desires or the          
means of satisfying them, and regards only the freedom of a rational        
being, and the necessary conditions under which alone this freedom can      
harmonize with the distribution of happiness according to                   
principles. This second law may therefore rest upon mere ideas of pure      
reason, and may be cognized a priori.                                       
  I assume that there are pure moral laws which determine, entirely         
a priori (without regard to empirical motives, that is, to happiness),      
the conduct of a rational being, or in other words, to use which it         
makes of its freedom, and that these laws are absolutely imperative         
(not merely hypothetically, on the supposition of other empirical           
ends), and therefore in all respects necessary. I am warranted in           
assuming this, not only by the arguments of the most enlightened            
moralists, but by the moral judgement of every man who will make the        
attempt to form a distinct conception of such a law.                        
  Pure reason, then, contains, not indeed in its speculative, but in        
its practical, or, more strictly, its moral use, principles of the          
possibility of experience, of such actions, namely, as, in                  
accordance with ethical precepts, might be met with in the history          
of man. For since reason commands that such actions should take place,      
it must be possible for them to take place; and hence a particular          
kind of systematic unity- the moral- must be possible. We have              
found, it is true, that the systematic unity of nature could not be         
established according to speculative principles of reason, because,         
while reason possesses a causal power in relation to freedom, it has        
none in relation to the whole sphere of nature; and, while moral            
principles of reason can produce free actions, they cannot produce          
natural laws. It is, then, in its practical, but especially in its          
moral use, that the principles of pure reason possess objective             
reality.                                                                    
                                                        {CH_2 ^paragraph 35}
  I call the world a moral world, in so far as it may be in accordance      
with all the ethical laws- which, by virtue of the freedom of               
reasonable beings, it can be, and according to the necessary laws of        
morality it ought to be. But this world must be conceived only as an        
intelligible world, inasmuch as abstraction is therein made of all          
conditions (ends), and even of all impediments to morality (the             
weakness or pravity of human nature). So far, then, it is a mere idea-      
though still a practical idea- which may have, and ought to have, an        
influence on the world of sense, so as to bring it as far as                
possible into conformity with itself. The idea of a moral world has,        
therefore, objective reality, not as referring to an object of              
intelligible intuition- for of such an object we can form no                
conception whatever- but to the world of sense- conceived, however, as      
an object of pure reason in its practical use- and to a corpus              
mysticum of rational beings in it, in so far as the liberum                 
arbitrium of the individual is placed, under and by virtue of moral         
laws, in complete systematic unity both with itself and with the            
freedom of all others.                                                      
  That is the answer to the first of the two questions of pure              
reason which relate to its practical interest: Do that which will           
render thee worthy of happiness. The second question is this: If I          
conduct myself so as not to be unworthy of happiness, may I hope            
thereby to obtain happiness? In order to arrive at the solution of          
this question, we must inquire whether the principles of pure               
reason, which prescribe a priori the law, necessarily also connect          
this hope with it.                                                          
  I say, then, that just as the moral principles are necessary              
according to reason in its practical use, so it is equally necessary        
according to reason in its theoretical use to assume that every one         
has ground to hope for happiness in the measure in which he has made        
himself worthy of it in his conduct, and that therefore the system          
of morality is inseparably (though only in the idea of pure reason)         
connected with that of happiness.                                           
  Now in an intelligible, that is, in the moral world, in the               
conception of which we make abstraction of all the impediments to           
morality (sensuous desires), such a system of happiness, connected          
with and proportioned to morality, may be conceived as necessary,           
because freedom of volition- partly incited, and partly restrained          
by moral laws- would be itself the cause of general happiness; and          
thus rational beings, under the guidance of such principles, would          
be themselves the authors both of their own enduring welfare and            
that of others. But such a system of self-rewarding morality is only        
an idea, the carrying out of which depends upon the condition that          
every one acts as he ought; in other words, that all actions of             
reasonable beings be such as they would be if they sprung from a            
Supreme Will, comprehending in, or under, itself all particular wills.      
But since the moral law is binding on each individual in the use of         
his freedom of volition, even if others should not act in conformity        
with this law, neither the nature of things, nor the causality of           
actions and their relation to morality, determine how the consequences      
of these actions will be related to happiness; and the necessary            
connection of the hope of happiness with the unceasing endeavour to         
become worthy of happiness, cannot be cognized by reason, if we take        
nature alone for our guide. This connection can be hoped for only on        
the assumption that the cause of nature is a supreme reason, which          
governs according to moral laws.                                            
  I term the idea of an intelligence in which the morally most perfect      
will, united with supreme blessedness, is the cause of all happiness        
in the world, so far as happiness stands in strict } relation to            
morality (as the worthiness of being happy), the ideal of the               
supreme Good. supreme original good, that pure reason can find the          
ground of the practically necessary connection of both elements of the      
highest derivative good, and accordingly of an intelligible, that           
is, moral world. Now since we are necessitated by reason to conceive        
ourselves as belonging to such a world, while the senses present to us      
nothing but a world of phenomena, we must assume the former as a            
consequence of our conduct in the world of sense (since the world of        
sense gives us no hint of it), and therefore as future in relation          
to us. Thus God and a future life are two hypotheses which,                 
according to the principles of pure reason, are inseparable from the        
obligation which this reason imposes upon us.                               
                                                        {CH_2 ^paragraph 40}
  Morality per se constitutes a system. But we can form no system of        
happiness, except in so far as it is dispensed in strict proportion to      
morality. But this is only possible in the intelligible world, under a      
wise author and ruler. Such a ruler, together with life in such a           
world, which we must look upon as future, reason finds itself               
compelled to assume; or it must regard the moral laws as idle               
dreams, since the necessary consequence which this same reason              
connects with them must, without this hypothesis, fall to the               
ground. Hence also the moral laws are universally regarded as               
commands, which they could not be did they not connect a priori             
adequate consequences with their dictates, and thus carry with them         
promises and threats. But this, again, they could not do, did they not      
reside in a necessary being, as the Supreme Good, which alone can           
render such a teleological unity possible.                                  
  Leibnitz termed the world, when viewed in relation to the rational        
beings which it contains, and the moral relations in which they             
stand to each other, under the government of the Supreme Good, the          
kingdom of Grace, and distinguished it from the kingdom of Nature,          
in which these rational beings live, under moral laws, indeed, but          
expect no other consequences from their actions than such as follow         
according to the course of nature in the world of sense. To view            
ourselves, therefore, as in the kingdom of grace, in which all              
happiness awaits us, except in so far as we ourselves limit our             
participation in it by actions which render us unworthy of                  
happiness, is a practically necessary idea of reason.                       
  Practical laws, in so far as they are subjective grounds of actions,      
that is, subjective principles, are termed maxims. The judgements of        
moral according to in its purity and ultimate results are framed            
according ideas; the observance of its laws, according to according to      
maxims.                                                                     
  The whole course of our life must be subject to moral maxims; but         
this is impossible, unless with the moral law, which is a mere idea,        
reason connects an efficient cause which ordains to all conduct             
which is in conformity with the moral law an issue either in this or        
in another life, which is in exact conformity with our highest aims.        
Thus, without a God and without a world, invisible to us now, but           
hoped for, the glorious ideas of morality are, indeed, objects of           
approbation and of admiration, but cannot be the springs of purpose         
and action. For they do not satisfy all the aims which are natural          
to every rational being, and which are determined a priori by pure          
reason itself, and necessary.                                               
  Happiness alone is, in the view of reason, far from being the             
complete good. Reason does not approve of it (however much inclination      
may desire it), except as united with desert. On the other hand,            
morality alone, and with it, mere desert, is likewise far from being        
the complete good. To make it complete, he who conducts himself in a        
manner not unworthy of happiness, must be able to hope for the              
possession of happiness. Even reason, unbiased by private ends, or          
interested considerations, cannot judge otherwise, if it puts itself        
in the place of a being whose business it is to dispense all happiness      
to others. For in the practical idea both points are essentially            
combined, though in such a way that participation in happiness is           
rendered possible by the moral disposition, as its condition, and           
not conversely, the moral disposition by the prospect of happiness.         
For a disposition which should require the prospect of happiness as         
its necessary condition would not be moral, and hence also would not        
be worthy of complete happiness- a happiness which, in the view of          
reason, recognizes no limitation but such as arises from our own            
immoral conduct.                                                            
                                                        {CH_2 ^paragraph 45}
  Happiness, therefore, in exact proportion with the morality of            
rational beings (whereby they are made worthy of happiness),                
constitutes alone the supreme good of a world into which we absolutely      
must transport ourselves according to the commands of pure but              
practical reason. This world is, it is true, only an intelligible           
world; for of such a systematic unity of ends as it requires, the           
world of sense gives us no hint. Its reality can be based on nothing        
else but the hypothesis of a supreme original good. In it                   
independent reason, equipped with all the sufficiency of a supreme          
cause, founds, maintains, and fulfils the universal order of things,        
with the most perfect teleological harmony, however much this order         
may be hidden from us in the world of sense.                                
  This moral theology has the peculiar advantage, in contrast with          
speculative theology, of leading inevitably to the conception of a          
sole, perfect, and rational First Cause, whereof speculative                
theology does not give us any indication on objective grounds, far          
less any convincing evidence. For we find neither in transcendental         
nor in natural theology, however far reason may lead us in these,           
any ground to warrant us in assuming the existence of one only              
Being, which stands at the head of all natural causes, and on which         
these are entirely dependent. On the other band, if we take our             
stand on moral unity as a necessary law of the universe, and from this      
point of view consider what is necessary to give this law adequate          
efficiency and, for us, obligatory force, we must come to the               
conclusion that there is one only supreme will, which comprehends           
all these laws in itself. For how, under different wills, should we         
find complete unity of ends? This will must be omnipotent, that all         
nature and its relation to morality in the world may be subject to it;      
omniscient, that it may have knowledge of the most secret feelings and      
their moral worth; omnipresent, that it may be at hand to supply every      
necessity to which the highest weal of the world may give rise;             
eternal, that this harmony of nature and liberty may never fail; and        
so on.                                                                      
  But this systematic unity of ends in this world of intelligences-         
which, as mere nature, is only a world of sense, but, as a system of        
freedom of volition, may be termed an intelligible, that is, moral          
world (regnum gratiae)- leads inevitably also to the teleological           
unity of all things which constitute this great whole, according to         
universal natural laws- just as the unity of the former is according        
to universal and necessary moral laws- and unites the practical with        
the speculative reason. The world must be represented as having             
originated from an idea, if it is to harmonize with that use of reason      
without which we cannot even consider ourselves as worthy of reason-        
namely, the moral use, which rests entirely on the idea of the supreme      
good. Hence the investigation of nature receives a teleological             
direction, and becomes, in its widest extension, physico-theology. But      
this, taking its rise in moral order as a unity founded on the essence      
of freedom, and not accidentally instituted by external commands,           
establishes the teleological view of nature on grounds which must be        
inseparably connected with the internal possibility of things. This         
gives rise to a transcendental theology, which takes the ideal of           
the highest ontological perfection as a principle of systematic unity;      
and this principle connects all things according to universal and           
necessary natural laws, because all things have their origin in the         
absolute necessity of the one only Primal Being.                            
  What use can we make of our understanding, even in respect of             
experience, if we do not propose ends to ourselves? But the highest         
ends are those of morality, and it is only pure reason that can give        
us the knowledge of these. Though supplied with these, and putting          
ourselves under their guidance, we can make no teleological use of the      
knowledge of nature, as regards cognition, unless nature itself has         
established teleological unity. For without this unity we should not        
even possess reason, because we should have no school for reason,           
and no cultivation through objects which afford the materials for           
its conceptions. But teleological unity is a necessary unity, and           
founded on the essence of the individual will itself. Hence this will,      
which is the condition of the application of this unity in concreto,        
must be so likewise. In this way the transcendental enlargement of our      
rational cognition would be, not the cause, but merely the effect of        
the practical teleology which pure reason imposes upon us.                  
  Hence, also, we find in the history of human reason that, before the      
moral conceptions were sufficiently purified and determined, and            
before men had attained to a perception of the systematic unity of          
ends according to these conceptions and from necessary principles, the      
knowledge of nature, and even a considerable amount of intellectual         
culture in many other sciences, could produce only rude and vague           
conceptions of the Deity, sometimes even admitting of an astonishing        
indifference with regard to this question altogether. But the more          
enlarged treatment of moral ideas, which was rendered necessary by the      
extreme pure moral law of our religion, awakened the interest, and          
thereby quickened the perceptions of reason in relation to this             
object. In this way, and without the help either of an extended             
acquaintance with nature, or of a reliable transcendental insight (for      
these have been wanting in all ages), a conception of the Divine Being      
was arrived at, which we now bold to be the correct one, not because        
speculative reason convinces us of its correctness, but because it          
accords with the moral principles of reason. Thus it is to pure             
reason, but only in its practical use, that we must ascribe the             
merit of having connected with our highest interest a cognition, of         
which mere speculation was able only to form a conjecture, but the          
validity of which it was unable to establish- and of having thereby         
rendered it, not indeed a demonstrated dogma, but a hypothesis              
absolutely necessary to the essential ends of reason.                       
                                                        {CH_2 ^paragraph 50}
  But if practical reason has reached this elevation, and has attained      
to the conception of a sole Primal Being as the supreme good, it            
must not, therefore, imagine that it has transcended the empirical          
conditions of its application, and risen to the immediate cognition of      
new objects; it must not presume to start from the conception which it      
has gained, and to deduce from it the moral laws themselves. For it         
was these very laws, the internal practical necessity of which led          
us to the hypothesis of an independent cause, or of a wise ruler of         
the universe, who should give them effect. Hence we are not entitled        
to regard them as accidental and derived from the mere will of the          
ruler, especially as we have no conception of such a will, except as        
formed in accordance with these laws. So far, then, as practical            
reason has the right to conduct us, we shall not look upon actions          
as binding on us, because they are the commands of God, but we shall        
regard them as divine commands, because we are internally bound by          
them. We shall study freedom under the teleological unity which             
accords with principles of reason; we shall look upon ourselves as          
acting in conformity with the divine will only in so far as we hold         
sacred the moral law which reason teaches us from the nature of             
actions themselves, and we shall believe that we can obey that will         
only by promoting the weal of the universe in ourselves and in others.      
Moral theology is, therefore, only of immanent use. It teaches us to        
fulfil our destiny here in the world, by placing ourselves in               
harmony with the general system of ends, and warns us against the           
fanaticism, nay, the crime of depriving reason of its legislative           
authority in the moral conduct of life, for the purpose of directly         
connecting this authority with the idea of the Supreme Being. For this      
would be, not an immanent, but a transcendent use of moral theology,        
and, like the transcendent use of mere speculation, would inevitably        
pervert and frustrate the ultimate ends of reason.                          
-                                                                           
       SECTION III. Of Opinion, Knowledge, and Belief.                      
-                                                                           
  The holding of a thing to be true is a phenomenon in our                  
understanding which may rest on objective grounds, but requires, also,      
subjective causes in the mind of the person judging. If a judgement is      
valid for every rational being, then its ground is objectively              
sufficient, and it is termed a conviction. If, on the other hand, it        
has its ground in the particular character of the subject, it is            
termed a persuasion.                                                        
                                                        {CH_2 ^paragraph 55}
  Persuasion is a mere illusion, the ground of the judgement, which         
lies solely in the subject, being regarded as objective. Hence a            
judgement of this kind has only private validity- is only valid for         
the individual who judges, and the holding of a thing to be true in         
this way cannot be communicated. But truth depends upon agreement with      
the object, and consequently the judgements of all understandings,          
if true, must be in agreement with each other (consentientia uni            
tertio consentiunt inter se). Conviction may, therefore, be                 
distinguished, from an external point of view, from persuasion, by the      
possibility of communicating it and by showing its validity for the         
reason of every man; for in this case the presumption, at least,            
arises that the agreement of all judgements with each other, in             
spite of the different characters of individuals, rests upon the            
common ground of the agreement of each with the object, and thus the        
correctness of the judgement is established.                                
  Persuasion, accordingly, cannot be subjectively distinguished from        
conviction, that is, so long as the subject views its judgement simply      
as a phenomenon of its own mind. But if we inquire whether the grounds      
of our judgement, which are valid for us, produce the same effect on        
the reason of others as on our own, we have then the means, though          
only subjective means, not, indeed, of producing conviction, but of         
detecting the merely private validity of the judgement; in other            
words, of discovering that there is in it the element of mere               
persuasion.                                                                 
  If we can, in addition to this, develop the subjective causes of the      
judgement, which we have taken for its objective grounds, and thus          
explain the deceptive judgement as a phenomenon in our mind, apart          
altogether from the objective character of the object, we can then          
expose the illusion and need be no longer deceived by it, although, if      
its subjective cause lies in our nature, we cannot hope altogether          
to escape its influence.                                                    
  I can only maintain, that is, affirm as necessarily valid for             
every one, that which produces conviction. Persuasion I may keep for        
myself, if it is agreeable to me; but I cannot, and ought not, to           
attempt to impose it as binding upon others.                                
  Holding for true, or the subjective validity of a judgement in            
relation to conviction (which is, at the same time, objectively             
valid), has the three following degrees: opinion, belief, and               
knowledge. Opinion is a consciously insufficient judgement,                 
subjectively as well as objectively. Belief is subjectively                 
sufficient, but is recognized as being objectively insufficient.            
Knowledge is both subjectively and objectively sufficient.                  
Subjective sufficiency is termed conviction (for myself); objective         
sufficiency is termed certainty (for all). I need not dwell longer          
on the explanation of such simple conceptions.                              
                                                        {CH_2 ^paragraph 60}
  I must never venture to be of opinion, without knowing something, at      
least, by which my judgement, in itself merely problematical, is            
brought into connection with the truth- which connection, although not      
perfect, is still something more than an arbitrary fiction.                 
Moreover, the law of such a connection must be certain. For if, in          
relation to this law, I have nothing more than opinion, my judgement        
is but a play of the imagination, without the least relation to truth.      
In the judgements of pure reason, opinion has no place. For, as they        
do not rest on empirical grounds and as the sphere of pure reason is        
that of necessary truth and a priori cognition, the principle of            
connection in it requires universality and necessity, and consequently      
perfect certainty- otherwise we should have no guide to the truth at        
all. Hence it is absurd to have an opinion in pure mathematics; we          
must know, or abstain from forming a judgement altogether. The case is      
the same with the maxims of morality. For we must not hazard an action      
on the mere opinion that it is allowed, but we must know it to be so.       
  In the transcendental sphere of reason, on the other hand, the            
term opinion is too weak, while the word knowledge is too strong. From      
the merely speculative point of view, therefore, we cannot form a           
judgement at all. For the subjective grounds of a judgement, such as        
produce belief, cannot be admitted in speculative inquiries,                
inasmuch as they cannot stand without empirical support and are             
incapable of being communicated to others in equal measure.                 
  But it is only from the practical point of view that a theoretically      
insufficient judgement can be termed belief. Now the practical              
reference is either to skill or to morality; to the former, when the        
end proposed is arbitrary and accidental, to the latter, when it is         
absolutely necessary.                                                       
  If we propose to ourselves any end whatever, the conditions of its        
attainment are hypothetically necessary. The necessity is                   
subjectively, but still only comparatively, sufficient, if I am             
acquainted with no other conditions under which the end can be              
attained. On the other hand, it is sufficient, absolutely and for           
every one, if I know for certain that no one can be acquainted with         
any other conditions under which the attainment of the proposed end         
would be possible. In the former case my supposition- my judgement          
with regard to certain conditions- is a merely accidental belief; in        
the latter it is a necessary belief. The physician must pursue some         
course in the case of a patient who is in danger, but is ignorant of        
the nature of the disease. He observes the symptoms, and concludes,         
according to the best of his judgement, that it is a case of phthisis.      
His belief is, even in his own judgement, only contingent: another man      
might, perhaps come nearer the truth. Such a belief, contingent             
indeed, but still forming the ground of the actual use of means for         
the attainment of certain ends, I term Pragmatical belief.                  
  The usual test, whether that which any one maintains is merely his        
persuasion, or his subjective conviction at least, that is, his firm        
belief, is a bet. It frequently happens that a man delivers his             
opinions with so much boldness and assurance, that he appears to be         
under no apprehension as to the possibility of his being in error. The      
offer of a bet startles him, and makes him pause. Sometimes it turns        
out that his persuasion may be valued at a ducat, but not at ten.           
For he does not hesitate, perhaps, to venture a ducat, but if it is         
proposed to stake ten, he immediately becomes aware of the possibility      
of his being mistaken- a possibility which has hitherto escaped his         
observation. If we imagine to ourselves that we have to stake the           
happiness of our whole life on the truth of any proposition, our            
judgement drops its air of triumph, we take the alarm, and discover         
the actual strength of our belief. Thus pragmatical belief has              
degrees, varying in proportion to the interests at stake.                   
                                                        {CH_2 ^paragraph 65}
  Now, in cases where we cannot enter upon any course of action in          
reference to some object, and where, accordingly, our judgement is          
purely theoretical, we can still represent to ourselves, in thought,        
the possibility of a course of action, for which we suppose that we         
have sufficient grounds, if any means existed of ascertaining the           
truth of the matter. Thus we find in purely theoretical judgements          
an analogon of practical judgements, to which the word belief may           
properly be applied, and which we may term doctrinal belief. I              
should not hesitate to stake my all on the truth of the proposition-        
if there were any possibility of bringing it to the test of                 
experience- that, at least, some one of the planets, which we see,          
is inhabited. Hence I say that I have not merely the opinion, but           
the strong belief, on the correctness of which I would stake even many      
of the advantages of life, that there are inhabitants in other worlds.      
  Now we must admit that the doctrine of the existence of God               
belongs to doctrinal belief. For, although in respect to the                
theoretical cognition of the universe I do not require to form any          
theory which necessarily involves this idea, as the condition of my         
explanation of the phenomena which the universe presents, but, on           
the contrary, am rather bound so to use my reason as if everything          
were mere nature, still teleological unity is so important a condition      
of the application of my reason to nature, that it is impossible for        
me to ignore it- especially since, in addition to these                     
considerations, abundant examples of it are supplied by experience.         
But the sole condition, so far as my knowledge extends, under which         
this unity can be my guide in the investigation of nature, is the           
assumption that a supreme intelligence has ordered all things               
according to the wisest ends. Consequently, the hypothesis of a wise        
author of the universe is necessary for my guidance in the                  
investigation of nature- is the condition under which alone I can           
fulfil an end which is contingent indeed, but by no means unimportant.      
Moreover, since the result of my attempts so frequently confirms the        
utility of this assumption, and since nothing decisive can be               
adduced against it, it follows that it would be saying far too              
little to term my judgement, in this case, a mere opinion, and that,        
even in this theoretical connection, I may assert that I firmly             
believe in God. Still, if we use words strictly, this must not be           
called a practical, but a doctrinal belief, which the theology of           
nature (physico-theology) must also produce in my mind. In the              
wisdom of a Supreme Being, and in the shortness of life, so inadequate      
to the development of the glorious powers of human nature, we may find      
equally sufficient grounds for a doctrinal belief in the future life        
of the human soul.                                                          
  The expression of belief is, in such cases, an expression of modesty      
from the objective point of view, but, at the same time, of firm            
confidence, from the subjective. If I should venture to term this           
merely theoretical judgement even so much as a hypothesis which I am        
entitled to assume; a more complete conception, with regard to another      
world and to the cause of the world, might then be justly required          
of me than I am, in reality, able to give. For, if I assume                 
anything, even as a mere hypothesis, I must, at least, know so much of      
the properties of such a being as will enable me, not to form the           
conception, but to imagine the existence of it. But the word belief         
refers only to the guidance which an idea gives me, and to its              
subjective influence on the conduct of my reason, which forces me to        
hold it fast, though I may not be in a position to give a                   
speculative account of it.                                                  
  But mere doctrinal belief is, to some extent, wanting in                  
stability. We often quit our hold of it, in consequence of the              
difficulties which occur in speculation, though in the end we               
inevitably return to it again.                                              
  It is quite otherwise with moral belief. For in this sphere action        
is absolutely necessary, that is, I must act in obedience to the moral      
law in all points. The end is here incontrovertibly established, and        
there is only one condition possible, according to the best of my           
perception, under which this end can harmonize with all other ends,         
and so have practical validity- namely, the existence of a God and          
of a future world. I know also, to a certainty, that no one can be          
acquainted with any other conditions which conduct to the same unity        
of ends under the moral law. But since the moral precept is, at the         
same time, my maxim (as reason requires that it should be), I am            
irresistibly constrained to believe in the existence of God and in a        
future life; and I am sure that nothing can make me waver in this           
belief, since I should thereby overthrow my moral maxims, the               
renunciation of which would render me hateful in my own eyes.               
                                                        {CH_2 ^paragraph 70}
  Thus, while all the ambitious attempts of reason to penetrate beyond      
the limits of experience end in disappointment, there is still              
enough left to satisfy us in a practical point of view. No one, it          
is true, will be able to boast that he knows that there is a God and a      
future life; for, if he knows this, be is just the man whom I have          
long wished to find. All knowledge, regarding an object of mere             
reason, can be communicated; and I should thus be enabled to hope that      
my own knowledge would receive this wonderful extension, through the        
instrumentality of his instruction. No, my conviction is not                
logical, but moral certainty; and since it rests on subjective grounds      
(of the moral sentiment), I must not even say: It is morally certain        
that there is a God, etc., but: I am morally certain, that is, my           
belief in God and in another world is so interwoven with my moral           
nature that I am under as little apprehension of having the former          
torn from me as of losing the latter.                                       
  The only point in this argument that may appear open to suspicion is      
that this rational belief presupposes the existence of moral                
sentiments. If we give up this assumption, and take a man who is            
entirely indifferent with regard to moral laws, the question which          
reason proposes, becomes then merely a problem for speculation and          
may, indeed, be supported by strong grounds from analogy, but not by        
such as will compel the most obstinate scepticism to give way.* But in      
these questions no man is free from all interest. For though the            
want of good sentiments may place him beyond the influence of moral         
interests, still even in this case enough may be left to make him fear      
the existence of God and a future life. For he cannot pretend to any        
certainty of the non-existence of God and of a future life, unless-         
since it could only be proved by mere reason, and therefore                 
apodeictically- he is prepared to establish the impossibility of both,      
which certainly no reasonable man would undertake to do. This would be      
a negative belief, which could not, indeed, produce morality and            
good sentiments, but still could produce an analogon of these, by           
operating as a powerful restraint on the outbreak of evil                   
dispositions.                                                               
-                                                                           
  *The human mind (as, I believe, every rational being must of              
necessity do) takes a natural interest in morality, although this           
interest is not undivided, and may not be practically in                    
preponderance. If you strengthen and increase it, you will find the         
reason become docile, more enlightened, and more capable of uniting         
the speculative interest with the practical. But if you do not take         
care at the outset, or at least midway, to make men good, you will          
never force them into an honest belief.                                     
-                                                                           
                                                        {CH_2 ^paragraph 75}
  But, it will be said, is this all that pure reason can effect, in         
opening up prospects beyond the limits of experience? Nothing more          
than two articles of belief? Common sense could have done as much as        
this, without taking the philosophers to counsel in the matter!             
  I shall not here eulogize philosophy for the benefits which the           
laborious efforts of its criticism have conferred on human reason-          
even granting that its merit should turn out in the end to be only          
negative- for on this point something more will be said in the next         
section. But, I ask, do you require that that knowledge which concerns      
all men, should transcend the common understanding, and should only be      
revealed to you by philosophers? The very circumstance which has            
called forth your censure, is the best confirmation of the correctness      
of our previous assertions, since it discloses, what could not have         
been foreseen, that Nature is not chargeable with any partial               
distribution of her gifts in those matters which concern all men            
without distinction and that, in respect to the essential ends of           
human nature, we cannot advance further with the help of the highest        
philosophy, than under the guidance which nature has vouchsafed to the      
meanest understanding.                                                      
                                                                            
CH_3                                                                        
          CHAPTER III. The Architectonic of Pure Reason.                    
-                                                                           
  By the term architectonic I mean the art of constructing a system.        
Without systematic unity, our knowledge cannot become science; it will      
be an aggregate, and not a system. Thus architectonic is the                
doctrine of the scientific in cognition, and therefore necessarily          
forms part of our methodology.                                              
  Reason cannot permit our knowledge to remain in an unconnected and        
rhapsodistic state, but requires that the sum of our cognitions should      
constitute a system. It is thus alone that they can advance the ends        
of reason. By a system I mean the unity of various cognitions under         
one idea. This idea is the conception- given by reason- of the form of      
a whole, in so far as the conception determines a priori not only           
the limits of its content, but the place which each of its parts is to      
occupy. The scientific idea contains, therefore, the end and the            
form of the whole which is in accordance with that end. The unity of        
the end, to which all the parts of the system relate, and through           
which all have a relation to each other, communicates unity to the          
whole system, so that the absence of any part can be immediately            
detected from our knowledge of the rest; and it determines a priori         
the limits of the system, thus excluding all contingent or arbitrary        
additions. The whole is thus an organism (articulatio), and not an          
aggregate (coacervatio); it may grow from within (per                       
intussusceptionem), but it cannot increase by external additions            
(per appositionem). It is, thus, like an animal body, the growth of         
which does not add any limb, but, without changing their                    
proportions, makes each in its sphere stronger and more active.             
  We require, for the execution of the idea of a system, a schema,          
that is, a content and an arrangement of parts determined a priori          
by the principle which the aim of the system prescribes. A schema           
which is not projected in accordance with an idea, that is, from the        
standpoint of the highest aim of reason, but merely empirically, in         
accordance with accidental aims and purposes (the number of which           
cannot be predetermined), can give us nothing more than technical           
unity. But the schema which is originated from an idea (in which            
case reason presents us with aims a priori, and does not look for them      
to experience), forms the basis of architectonical unity. A science,        
in the proper acceptation of that term. cannot be formed                    
technically, that is, from observation of the similarity existing           
between different objects, and the purely contingent use we make of         
our knowledge in concreto with reference to all kinds of arbitrary          
external aims; its constitution must be framed on architectonical           
principles, that is, its parts must be shown to possess an essential        
affinity, and be capable of being deduced from one supreme and              
internal aim or end, which forms the condition of the possibility of        
the scientific whole. The schema of a science must give a priori the        
plan of it (monogramma), and the division of the whole into parts,          
in conformity with the idea of the science; and it must also                
distinguish this whole from all others, according to certain                
understood principles.                                                      
  No one will attempt to construct a science, unless he have some idea      
to rest on as a proper basis. But, in the elaboration of the                
science, he finds that the schema, nay, even the definition which he        
at first gave of the science, rarely corresponds with his idea; for         
this idea lies, like a germ, in our reason, its parts undeveloped           
and hid even from microscopical observation. For this reason, we ought      
to explain and define sciences, not according to the description which      
the originator gives of them, but according to the idea which we            
find based in reason itself, and which is suggested by the natural          
unity of the parts of the science already accumulated. For it will          
of ten be found that the originator of a science and even his latest        
successors remain attached to an erroneous idea, which they cannot          
render clear to themselves, and that they thus fail in determining the      
true content, the articulation or systematic unity, and the limits          
of their science.                                                           
  It is unfortunate that, only after having occupied ourselves for a        
long time in the collection of materials, under the guidance of an          
idea which lies undeveloped in the mind, but not according to any           
definite plan of arrangement- nay, only after we have spent much            
time and labour in the technical disposition of our materials, does it      
become possible to view the idea of a science in a clear light, and to      
project, according to architectonical principles, a plan of the whole,      
in accordance with the aims of reason. Systems seem, like certain           
worms, to be formed by a kind of generatio aequivoca- by the mere           
confluence of conceptions, and to gain completeness only with the           
progress of time. But the schema or germ of all lies in reason; and         
thus is not only every system organized according to its own idea, but      
all are united into one grand system of human knowledge, of which they      
form members. For this reason, it is possible to frame an                   
architectonic of all human cognition, the formation of which, at the        
present time, considering the immense materials collected or to be          
found in the ruins of old systems, would not indeed be very difficult.      
Our purpose at present is merely to sketch the plan of the                  
architectonic of all cognition given by pure reason; and we begin from      
the point where the main root of human knowledge divides into two, one      
of which is reason. By reason I understand here the whole higher            
faculty of cognition, the rational being placed in contradistinction        
to the empirical.                                                           
                                                         {CH_3 ^paragraph 5}
  If I make complete abstraction of the content of cognition,               
objectively considered, all cognition is, from a subjective point of        
view, either historical or rational. Historical cognition is                
cognitio ex datis, rational, cognitio ex principiis. Whatever may be        
the original source of a cognition, it is, in relation to the person        
who possesses it, merely historical, if he knows only what has been         
given him from another quarter, whether that knowledge was                  
communicated by direct experience or by instruction. Thus the Person        
who has learned a system of philosophy- say the Wolfian- although he        
has a perfect knowledge of all the principles, definitions, and             
arguments in that philosophy, as well as of the divisions that have         
been made of the system, possesses really no more than an historical        
knowledge of the Wolfian system; he knows only what has been told him,      
his judgements are only those which he has received from his teachers.      
Dispute the validity of a definition, and he is completely at a loss        
to find another. He has formed his mind on another's; but the               
imitative faculty is not the productive. His knowledge has not been         
drawn from reason; and although, objectively considered, it is              
rational knowledge, subjectively, it is merely historical. He has           
learned this or that philosophy and is merely a plaster cast of a           
living man. Rational cognitions which are objective, that is, which         
have their source in reason, can be so termed from a subjective             
point of view, only when they have been drawn by the individual             
himself from the sources of reason, that is, from principles; and it        
is in this way alone that criticism, or even the rejection of what has      
been already learned, can spring up in the mind.                            
  All rational cognition is, again, based either on conceptions, or on      
the construction of conceptions. The former is termed philosophical,        
the latter mathematical. I have already shown the essential difference      
of these two methods of cognition in the first chapter. A cognition         
may be objectively philosophical and subjectively historical- as is         
the case with the majority of scholars and those who cannot look            
beyond the limits of their system, and who remain in a state of             
pupilage all their lives. But it is remarkable that mathematical            
knowledge, when committed to memory, is valid, from the subjective          
point of view, as rational knowledge also, and that the same                
distinction cannot be drawn here as in the case of philosophical            
cognition. The reason is that the only way of arriving at this              
knowledge is through the essential principles of reason, and thus it        
is always certain and indisputable; because reason is employed in           
concreto- but at the same time a priori- that is, in pure and,              
therefore, infallible intuition; and thus all causes of illusion and        
error are excluded. Of all the a priori sciences of reason, therefore,      
mathematics alone can be learned. Philosophy- unless it be in an            
historical manner- cannot be learned; we can at most learn to               
philosophize.                                                               
  Philosophy is the system of all philosophical cognition. We must use      
this term in an objective sense, if we understand by it the                 
archetype of all attempts at philosophizing, and the standard by which      
all subjective philosophies are to be judged. In this sense,                
philosophy is merely the idea of a possible science, which does not         
exist in concreto, but to which we endeavour in various ways to             
approximate, until we have discovered the right path to pursue- a path      
overgrown by the errors and illusions of sense- and the image we            
have hitherto tried in vain to shape has become a perfect copy of           
the great prototype. Until that time, we cannot learn philosophy- it        
does not exist; if it does, where is it, who possesses it, and how          
shall we know it? We can only learn to philosophize; in other words,        
we can only exercise our powers of reasoning in accordance with             
general principles, retaining at the same time, the right of                
investigating the sources of these principles, of testing, and even of      
rejecting them.                                                             
  Until then, our conception of philosophy is only a scholastic             
conception- a conception, that is, of a system of cognition which we        
are trying to elaborate into a science; all that we at present know         
being the systematic unity of this cognition, and consequently the          
logical completeness of the cognition for the desired end. But there        
is also a cosmical conception (conceptus cosmicus) of philosophy,           
which has always formed the true basis of this term, especially when        
philosophy was personified and presented to us in the ideal of a            
philosopher. In this view philosophy is the science of the relation of      
all cognition to the ultimate and essential aims of human reason            
(teleologia rationis humanae), and the philosopher is not merely an         
artist- who occupies himself with conceptions- but a lawgiver,              
legislating for human reason. In this sense of the word, it would be        
in the highest degree arrogant to assume the title of philosopher, and      
to pretend that we had reached the perfection of the prototype which        
lies in the idea alone.                                                     
  The mathematician, the natural philosopher, and the logician- how         
far soever the first may have advanced in rational, and the two latter      
in philosophical knowledge- are merely artists, engaged in the              
arrangement and formation of conceptions; they cannot be termed             
philosophers. Above them all, there is the ideal teacher, who               
employs them as instruments for the advancement of the essential            
aims of human reason. Him alone can we call philosopher; but he             
nowhere exists. But the idea of his legislative power resides in the        
mind of every man, and it alone teaches us what kind of systematic          
unity philosophy demands in view of the ultimate aims of reason.            
This idea is, therefore, a cosmical conception.*                            
                                                        {CH_3 ^paragraph 10}
-                                                                           
  *By a cosmical conception, I mean one in which all men necessarily        
take an interest; the aim of a science must accordingly be                  
determined according to scholastic conceptions, if it is regarded           
merely as a means to certain arbitrarily proposed ends.                     
-                                                                           
  In view of the complete systematic unity of reason, there can only        
be one ultimate end of all the operations of the mind. To this all          
other aims are subordinate, and nothing more than means for its             
attainment. This ultimate end is the destination of man, and the            
philosophy which relates to it is termed moral philosophy. The              
superior position occupied by moral philosophy, above all other             
spheres for the operations of reason, sufficiently indicates the            
reason why the ancients always included the idea- and in an especial        
manner- of moralist in that of philosopher. Even at the present day,        
we call a man who appears to have the power of self-government, even        
although his knowledge may be very limited, by the name of                  
philosopher.                                                                
  The legislation of human reason, or philosophy, has two objects-          
nature and freedom- and thus contains not only the laws of nature, but      
also those of ethics, at first in two separate systems, which,              
finally, merge into one grand philosophical system of cognition. The        
philosophy of nature relates to that which is, that of ethics to            
that which ought to be.                                                     
                                                        {CH_3 ^paragraph 15}
  But all philosophy is either cognition on the basis of pure               
reason, or the cognition of reason on the basis of empirical                
principles. The former is termed pure, the latter empirical                 
philosophy.                                                                 
  The philosophy of pure reason is either propaedeutic, that is, an         
inquiry into the powers of reason in regard to pure a priori                
cognition, and is termed critical philosophy; or it is, secondly,           
the system of pure reason- a science containing the systematic              
presentation of the whole body of philosophical knowledge, true as          
well as illusory, given by pure reason- and is called metaphysic. This      
name may, however, be also given to the whole system of pure                
philosophy, critical philosophy included, and may designate the             
investigation into the sources or possibility of a priori cognition,        
as well as the presentation of the a priori cognitions which form a         
system of pure philosophy- excluding, at the same time, all                 
empirical and mathematical elements.                                        
  Metaphysic is divided into that of the speculative and that of the        
practical use of pure reason, and is, accordingly, either the               
metaphysic of nature, or the metaphysic of ethics. The former contains      
all the pure rational principles- based upon conceptions alone (and         
thus excluding mathematics)- of all theoretical cognition; the latter,      
the principles which determine and necessitate a priori all action.         
Now moral philosophy alone contains a code of laws- for the regulation      
of our actions- which are deduced from principles entirely a priori.        
Hence the metaphysic of ethics is the only pure moral philosophy, as        
it is not based upon anthropological or other empirical                     
considerations. The metaphysic of speculative reason is what is             
commonly called metaphysic in the more limited sense. But as pure           
moral philosophy properly forms a part of this system of cognition, we      
must allow it to retain the name of metaphysic, although it is not          
requisite that we should insist on so terming it in our present             
discussion.                                                                 
  It is of the highest importance to separate those cognitions which        
differ from others both in kind and in origin, and to take great            
care that they are not confounded with those with which they are            
generally found connected. What the chemist does in the analysis of         
substances, what the mathematician in pure mathematics, is, in a still      
higher degree, the duty of the philosopher, that the value of each          
different kind of cognition, and the part it takes in the operations        
of the mind, may be clearly defined. Human reason has never wanted a        
metaphysic of some kind, since it attained the power of thought, or         
rather of reflection; but it has never been able to keep this sphere        
of thought and cognition pure from all admixture of foreign                 
elements. The idea of a science of this kind is as old as                   
speculation itself; and what mind does not speculate- either in the         
scholastic or in the popular fashion? At the same time, it must be          
admitted that even thinkers by profession have been unable clearly          
to explain the distinction between the two elements of our                  
cognition- the one completely a priori, the other a posteriori; and         
hence the proper definition of a peculiar kind of cognition, and            
with it the just idea of a science which has so long and so deeply          
engaged the attention of the human mind, has never been established.        
When it was said: "Metaphysic is the science of the first principles        
of human cognition," this definition did not signalize a peculiarity        
in kind, but only a difference in degree; these first principles            
were thus declared to be more general than others, but no criterion of      
distinction from empirical principles was given. Of these some are          
more general, and therefore higher, than others; and- as we cannot          
distinguish what is completely a priori from that which is known to be      
a posteriori- where shall we draw the line which is to separate the         
higher and so-called first principles, from the lower and                   
subordinate principles of cognition? What would be said if we were          
asked to be satisfied with a division of the epochs of the world            
into the earlier centuries and those following them? "Does the              
fifth, or the tenth century belong to the earlier centuries?" it would      
be asked. In the same way I ask: Does the conception of extension           
belong to metaphysics? You answer, "Yes." Well, that of body too?           
"Yes." And that of a fluid body? You stop, you are unprepared to admit      
this; for if you do, everything will belong to metaphysics. From            
this it is evident that the mere degree of subordination- of the            
particular to the general- cannot determine the limits of a science;        
and that, in the present case, we must expect to find a difference          
in the conceptions of metaphysics both in kind and in origin. The           
fundamental idea of metaphysics was obscured on another side by the         
fact that this kind of a priori cognition showed a certain                  
similarity in character with the science of mathematics. Both have the      
property in common of possessing an a priori origin; but, in the            
one, our knowledge is based upon conceptions, in the other, on the          
construction of conceptions. Thus a decided dissimilarity between           
philosophical and mathematical cognition comes out- a dissimilarity         
which was always felt, but which could not be made distinct for want        
of an insight into the criteria of the difference. And thus it              
happened that, as philosophers themselves failed in the proper              
development of the idea of their science, the elaboration of the            
science could not proceed with a definite aim, or under trustworthy         
guidance. Thus, too, philosophers, ignorant of the path they ought          
to pursue and always disputing with each other regarding the                
discoveries which each asserted he had made, brought their science          
into disrepute with the rest of the world, and finally, even among          
themselves.                                                                 
  All pure a priori cognition forms, therefore, in view of the              
peculiar faculty which originates it, a peculiar and distinct unity;        
and metaphysic is the term applied to the philosophy which attempts to      
represent that cognition in this systematic unity. The speculative          
part of metaphysic, which has especially appropriated this                  
appellation- that which we have called the metaphysic of nature- and        
which considers everything, as it is (not as it ought to be), by means      
of a priori conceptions, is divided in the following manner.                
                                                        {CH_3 ^paragraph 20}
  Metaphysic, in the more limited acceptation of the term, consists of      
two parts- transcendental philosophy and the physiology of pure             
reason. The former presents the system of all the conceptions and           
principles belonging to the understanding and the reason, and which         
relate to objects in general, but not to any particular given               
objects (Ontologia); the latter has nature for its subject-matter,          
that is, the sum of given objects- whether given to the senses, or, if      
we will, to some other kind of intuition- and is accordingly                
physiology, although only rationalis. But the use of the faculty of         
reason in this rational mode of regarding nature is either physical or      
hyperphysical, or, more properly speaking, immanent or transcendent.        
The former relates to nature, in so far as our knowledge regarding          
it may be applied in experience (in concreto); the latter to that           
connection of the objects of experience, which transcends all               
experience. Transcendent physiology has, again, an internal and an          
external connection with its object, both, however, transcending            
possible experience; the former is the physiology of nature as a            
whole, or transcendental cognition of the world, the latter of the          
connection of the whole of nature with a being above nature, or             
transcendental cognition of God.                                            
  Immanent physiology, on the contrary, considers nature as the sum of      
all sensuous objects, consequently, as it is presented to us- but           
still according to a priori conditions, for it is under these alone         
that nature can be presented to our minds at all. The objects of            
immanent physiology are of two kinds: 1. Those of the external senses,      
or corporeal nature; 2. The object of the internal sense, the soul,         
or, in accordance with our fundamental conceptions of it, thinking          
nature. The metaphysics of corporeal nature is called physics; but, as      
it must contain only the principles of an a priori cognition of             
nature, we must term it rational physics. The metaphysics of                
thinking nature is called psychology, and for the same reason is to be      
regarded as merely the rational cognition of the soul.                      
  Thus the whole system of metaphysics consists of four principal           
parts: 1. Ontology; 2. Rational Physiology; 3. Rational cosmology; and      
4. Rational theology. The second part- that of the rational doctrine        
of nature- may be subdivided into two, physica rationalis* and              
psychologia rationalis.                                                     
-                                                                           
  *It must not be supposed that I mean by this appellation what is          
generally called physica general is, and which is rather mathematics        
than a philosophy of nature. For the metaphysic of nature is                
completely different from mathematics, nor is it so rich in results,        
although it is of great importance as a critical test of the                
application of pure understanding-cognition to nature. For want of its      
guidance, even mathematicians, adopting certain common notions-             
which are, in fact, metaphysical- have unconsciously crowded their          
theories of nature with hypotheses, the fallacy of which becomes            
evident upon the application of the principles of this metaphysic,          
without detriment, however, to the employment of mathematics in this        
sphere of cognition.                                                        
                                                        {CH_3 ^paragraph 25}
-                                                                           
  The fundamental idea of a philosophy of pure reason of necessity          
dictates this division; it is, therefore, architectonical- in               
accordance with the highest aims of reason, and not merely                  
technical, or according to certain accidentally-observed                    
similarities existing between the different parts of the whole              
science. For this reason, also, is the division immutable and of            
legislative authority. But the reader may observe in it a few points        
to which he ought to demur, and which may weaken his conviction of its      
truth and legitimacy.                                                       
  In the first place, how can I desire an a priori cognition or             
metaphysic of objects, in so far as they are given a posteriori? and        
how is it possible to cognize the nature of things according to a           
priori principles, and to attain to a rational physiology? The              
answer is this. We take from experience nothing more than is requisite      
to present us with an object (in general) of the external or of the         
internal sense; in the former case, by the mere conception of matter        
(impenetrable and inanimate extension), in the latter, by the               
conception of a thinking being- given in the internal empirical             
representation, I think. As to the rest, we must not employ in our          
metaphysic of these objects any empirical principles (which add to the      
content of our conceptions by means of experience), for the purpose of      
forming by their help any judgements respecting these objects.              
  Secondly, what place shall we assign to empirical psychology,             
which has always been considered a part of metaphysics, and from which      
in our time such important philosophical results have been expected,        
after the hope of constructing an a priori system of knowledge had          
been abandoned? I answer: It must be placed by the side of empirical        
physics or physics proper; that is, must be regarded as forming a part      
of applied philosophy, the a priori principles of which are                 
contained in pure philosophy, which is therefore connected, although        
it must not be confounded, with psychology. Empirical psychology            
must therefore be banished from the sphere of metaphysics, and is           
indeed excluded by the very idea of that science. In conformity,            
however, with scholastic usage, we must permit it to occupy a place in      
metaphysics- but only as an appendix to it. We adopt this course            
from motives of economy; as psychology is not as yet full enough to         
occupy our attention as an independent study, while it is, at the same      
time, of too great importance to be entirely excluded or placed             
where it has still less affinity than it has with the subject of            
metaphysics. It is a stranger who has been long a guest; and we make        
it welcome to stay, until it can take up a more suitable abode in a         
complete system of anthropology- the pendant to empirical physics.          
  The above is the general idea of metaphysics, which, as more was          
expected from it than could be looked for with justice, and as these        
pleasant expectations were unfortunately never realized, fell into          
general disrepute. Our Critique must have fully convinced the reader        
that, although metaphysics cannot form the foundation of religion,          
it must always be one of its most important bulwarks, and that human        
reason, which naturally pursues a dialectical course, cannot do             
without this science, which checks its tendencies towards dialectic         
and, by elevating reason to a scientific and clear self-knowledge,          
prevents the ravages which a lawless speculative reason would               
infallibly commit in the sphere of morals as well as in that of             
religion. We may be sure, therefore, whatever contempt may be thrown        
upon metaphysics by those who judge a science not by its own nature,        
but according to the accidental effects it may have produced, that          
it can never be completely abandoned, that we must always return to it      
as to a beloved one who has been for a time estranged, because the          
questions with which it is engaged relate to the highest aims of            
humanity, and reason must always labour either to attain to settled         
views in regard to these, or to destroy those which others have             
already established.                                                        
                                                        {CH_3 ^paragraph 30}
  Metaphysic, therefore- that of nature, as well as that of ethics,         
but in an especial manner the criticism which forms the propaedeutic        
to all the operations of reason- forms properly that department of          
knowledge which may be termed, in the truest sense of the word,             
philosophy. The path which it pursues is that of science, which,            
when it has once been discovered, is never lost, and never misleads.        
Mathematics, natural science, the common experience of men, have a          
high value as means, for the most part, to accidental ends- but at          
last also, to those which are necessary and essential to the existence      
of humanity. But to guide them to this high goal, they require the aid      
of rational cognition on the basis of pure conceptions, which, be it        
termed as it may, is properly nothing but metaphysics.                      
  For the same reason, metaphysics forms likewise the completion of         
the culture of human reason. In this respect, it is indispensable,          
setting aside altogether the influence which it exerts as a science.        
For its subject-matter is the elements and highest maxims of reason,        
which form the basis of the possibility of some sciences and of the         
use of all. That, as a purely speculative science, it is more useful        
in preventing error than in the extension of knowledge, does not            
detract from its value; on the contrary, the supreme office of              
censor which it occupies assures to it the highest authority and            
importance. This office it administers for the purpose of securing          
order, harmony, and well-being to science, and of directing its             
noble and fruitful labours to the highest possible aim- the                 
happiness of all mankind.                                                   
                                                                            
CH_4                                                                        
             CHAPTER IV. The History of Pure Reason.                        
-                                                                           
  This title is placed here merely for the purpose of designating a         
division of the system of pure reason of which I do not intend to           
treat at present. I shall content myself with casting a cursory             
glance, from a purely transcendental point of view- that of the nature      
of pure reason- on the labours of philosophers up to the present time.      
They have aimed at erecting an edifice of philosophy; but to my eye         
this edifice appears to be in a very ruinous condition.                     
  It is very remarkable, although naturally it could not have been          
otherwise, that, in the infancy of philosophy, the study of the nature      
of God and the constitution of a future world formed the commencement,      
rather than the conclusion, as we should have it, of the speculative        
efforts of the human mind. However rude the religious conceptions           
generated by the remains of the old manners and customs of a less           
cultivated time, the intelligent classes were not thereby prevented         
from devoting themselves to free inquiry into the existence and nature      
of God; and they easily saw that there could be no surer way of             
pleasing the invisible ruler of the world, and of attaining to              
happiness in another world at least, than a good and honest course          
of life in this. Thus theology and morals formed the two chief              
motives, or rather the points of attraction in all abstract inquiries.      
But it was the former that especially occupied the attention of             
speculative reason, and which afterwards became so celebrated under         
the name of metaphysics.                                                    
  I shall not at present indicate the periods of time at which the          
greatest changes in metaphysics took place, but shall merely give a         
hasty sketch of the different ideas which occasioned the most               
important revolutions in this sphere of thought. There are three            
different ends in relation to which these revolutions have taken            
place.                                                                      
  1. In relation to the object of the cognition of reason,                  
philosophers may be divided into sensualists and intellectualists.          
Epicurus may be regarded as the head of the former, Plato of the            
latter. The distinction here signalized, subtle as it is, dates from        
the earliest times, and was long maintained. The former asserted            
that reality resides in sensuous objects alone, and that everything         
else is merely imaginary; the latter, that the senses are the               
parents of illusion and that truth is to be found in the understanding      
alone. The former did not deny to the conceptions of the understanding      
a certain kind of reality; but with them it was merely logical, with        
the others it was mystical. The former admitted intellectual                
conceptions, but declared that sensuous objects alone possessed real        
existence. The latter maintained that all real objects were                 
intelligible, and believed that the pure understanding possessed a          
faculty of intuition apart from sense, which, in their opinion, served      
only to confuse the ideas of the understanding.                             
  2. In relation to the origin of the pure cognitions of reason, we         
find one school maintaining that they are derived entirely from             
experience, and another that they have their origin in reason alone.        
Aristotle may be regarded as the bead of the empiricists, and Plato of      
the noologists. Locke, the follower of Aristotle in modern times,           
and Leibnitz of Plato (although he cannot be said to have imitated him      
in his mysticism), have not been able to bring this question to a           
settled conclusion. The procedure of Epicurus in his sensual system,        
in which he always restricted his conclusions to the sphere of              
experience, was much more consequent than that of Aristotle and Locke.      
The latter especially, after having derived all the conceptions and         
principles of the mind from experience, goes so far, in the employment      
of these conceptions and principles, as to maintain that we can             
prove the existence of God and the existence of God and the                 
immortality of them objects lying beyond the soul- both of them of          
possible experience- with the same force of demonstration as any            
mathematical proposition.                                                   
                                                         {CH_4 ^paragraph 5}
  3. In relation to method. Method is procedure according to                
principles. We may divide the methods at present employed in the field      
of inquiry into the naturalistic and the scientific. The naturalist of      
pure reason lays it down as his principle that common reason,               
without the aid of science- which he calls sound reason, or common          
sense- can give a more satisfactory answer to the most important            
questions of metaphysics than speculation is able to do. He must            
maintain, therefore, that we can determine the content and                  
circumference of the moon more certainly by the naked eye, than by the      
aid of mathematical reasoning. But this system is mere misology             
reduced to principles; and, what is the most absurd thing in this           
doctrine, the neglect of all scientific means is paraded as a peculiar      
method of extending our cognition. As regards those who are                 
naturalists because they know no better, they are certainly not to          
be blamed. They follow common sense, without parading their                 
ignorance as a method which is to teach us the wonderful secret, how        
we are to find the truth which lies at the bottom of the well of            
Democritus.                                                                 
-                                                                           
            Quod sapio satis est mihi, non ego curo Esse quod               
  Arcesilas aerumnosique Solones. PERSIUS*                                  
-                                                                           
is their motto, under which they may lead a pleasant and praise worthy      
life, without troubling themselves with science or troubling science        
with them.                                                                  
-                                                                           
                                                        {CH_4 ^paragraph 10}
  *[Satirae, iii. 78-79. "What I know is enough for I don't care to be      
what Arcesilas was, and the wretched Solons."]                              
-                                                                           
  As regards those who wish to pursue a scientific method, they have        
now the choice of following either the dogmatical or the sceptical,         
while they are bound never to desert the systematic mode of procedure.      
When I mention, in relation to the former, the celebrated Wolf, and as      
regards the latter, David Hume, I may leave, in accordance with my          
present intention, all others unnamed. The critical path alone is           
still open. If my reader has been kind and patient enough to accompany      
me on this hitherto untravelled route, he can now judge whether, if he      
and others will contribute their exertions towards making this              
narrow footpath a high road of thought, that which many centuries have      
failed to accomplish may not be executed before the close of the            
present- namely, to bring Reason to perfect contentment in regard to        
that which has always, but without permanent results, occupied her          
powers and engaged her ardent desire for knowledge.                         
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                                -THE END-                                   
                                                                            
                                                                            

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