SILENT SERVICE II
DOCUMENTATION
BY "THE JET"
INTRODUCTION
WORLD WAR II WAS THE LARGEST AND MOST DESTRUCTIVE WAR IN HISTORY.
MOST AMERICANS REMEMBER IT AS THE LAST "GOOD" WAR, FOUGHT FOR
FREEDOM AND JUSTICE AGAINST EVIL TYRANNIES SEEKING TO CONQUER THE
WORLD. THERE IS SOME TRUTH IN THIS: FEW DEFEND ADOLF HITLER'S NAZI
FASCISM, THE WAY VIOLENT MILITARY MEN LITERALLY ASSASSINATED THEIR
WAY TO POWER IN JAPAN, OR THE INSENSITIVE, REPRESSIVE AND OFTEN
BLOODY GOVERNMENTS THAT CRASSLY EXPLOITED WHOMEVER THEY
"LIBERATED" IN EUROPE, AFRICA, CHINA OR SOUTHEAST ASIA.
JAPAN WAS AMERICA'S MORTAL ENEMY FROM THE PEARL HARBOR RAID IN 1
94-1 TO THE ATOMIC BOMBINGS OF 1945. THE STRUGGLE WITH JAPAN WAS A
VAST AND BLOODY WAR THAT SPRAWLED ACROSS THE WESTERN HALF OF THE
PACIFIC. AMERICA FOUND NUMEROUS HEROES IN THAT WAR: SAILORS,
SOLDIERS AND AVIATORS. AMONG THEM WERE SUBMARINERS FROM THE
"SILENT SERVICE", MEN LIKE "MUSH" MORTON, DICK O'KANE, SAM DEALEY,
AND RED RAMAGE.
AMERICAN SUBMARINES PURSUED A DANGEROUS CALLING. THEY SAILED ALONE
FAR INTO ENEMY TERRITORY, SOMETIMES RIGHT TO THE JAPANESE COAST-
LINE, THOUSANDS OF MILES FROM A FRIENDLY BASE. THEY CHALLENGED THE
WORLD'S MOST SUCCESSFUL NAVY, THE POWER THAT HAD CAPTURED ALL OF
SOUTHEAST ASIA IN FOUR MONTHS. A SUBMARINE CAPTAIN WAS IN A LONELY
AND EXPOSED POSITION.
YET BY WAR'S END THESE SAME LONELY SUBMARINERS VIRTUALLY WIPED OUT
THE JAPANESE MERCHANT MARINE SINGLE-HANDEDLY. THEY ACCOMPLISHED
WHAT THE GERMAN U-BOATS ATTEMPTED AND FAILED: TOTAL STRANGULATION
OF A MARITIME ECONOMY.
THE EXPLOITS OF AMERICAN SUBMARINERS ARE STILL LEGENDARY. HOW SAM
DEALEY LOOKED "DOWN THE THROAT" AT DESTROYERS CHARGING TO RAM AND
EXPERTLY 'TORPEDOED THEM. HOW RED RAMAGE STORMED THROUGH ENEMY
CONVOYS AT NIGHT, ON THE SURFACE, GUNS AND TORPEDOES BLAZING,
LEAVING BURNING AND SINKING SHIPS IN HIS WAKE. HOW MUCH MORTON
BRAVELY CREPT INTO UNCHARTED, SHALLOW HARBORS, FOUGHT HIS WAY OUT
AGAIN, AND THEN CHASED DOWN AND SANK EVERY SHIP HE ENCOUNTERED.
HOW DICK O'KANE, IN PATROL AFTER PATROL SHOWED UNBELIEVABLE SKILL
IN STALKING AND ATTACKING WELL-GUARDED CONVOYS, AND THEN IN ESCAP-
ING THE INEVITABLE COUNTERATTACKS.
SUBMARINING WAS A DANGEROUS PROFESSION. CASUALTIES WERE HIGH: SIX
TIMES GREATER THAN THE WWII NAVY AS A WHOLE. BOATS WERE CRACKED
AND CRUSHED BY DEPTH CHARGING, TAKING DYING MEN TO A WATERY GRAVE.
OF THE FAMOUS SKIPPERS MENTIONED, SAM DEALEY AND "MUSH" MORTON
WERE KILLED IN ACTION,
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WHILE DICK O'KANE WAS TAKEN PRISONER. ONLY RED RAMAGE AND HIS BOAT
SURVIVED THE WAR INTACT.
ALL THIS ACTION, HEROISM AND GLORY MAKES FOR A GREAT SIMULATION.
MANY PEOPLE OVER THE YEARS HAVE ATTEMPTED SUCH PRODUCTS, AND MOST
FEEL THE FINEST WAS MICROPROSE'S 1985 SILENT SERVICE.
TODAY COMPUTER POWER AND GRAPHICS ARE FAR BETTER THAN 1985. THE 1
NEW SILENT SERVICE II TAKES FULL ADVANTAGE OF THE BEST IN MICRO-
COMPUTER TECHNOLOGY TO GIVE YOU GREATER REALISM AND A BETTER
SIMULATION EXPERIENCE. EVERY ASPECT OF THE ORIGINAL BEST-SELLER
HAS BEEN ENHANCED AND REDESIGNED. YOU HAVE OPTIONS AND SITUATIONS
NEVER BEFORE AVAILABLE, INCLUDING A "WAR CAREER" THAT COVERS THE
ENTIRE PACIFIC WAR. BEST OF ALL, LIKE ALL MICROPROSE PRODUCTS,
GAME IS INFINITELY PLAYABLE AND REPLAYABLE, GIVING YOU FRESH
CHALLENGES AND NEW SITUATIONS TO MASTER.
DO YOU HAVE THE STUFF TO BE A SUBMARINE HERO? WE LET YOU TAKE COMM
IN AMERICA'S WARTIME "SILENT SERVICE" AND FIND OUT!
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION.....................3
TABLE OF CONTENTS 5
QUICK START 6
TUTORIAL 8
COMBAT TUTORIAL 9
PATROL TUTORIAL 15
COMMANDING A SUBMARINE 18
INITIAL OPTIONS 19
TOURING THE BOAT 25
THE INFO PANEL 25
THE CHART 26
PERISCOPE 28
BRIDGE OUTLOOK 29
GAUGES 31
DAMAGE REPORT 33
CAPTAIN'S LOG 37
STATUS ICONS 37
WAR PATROLS 39
VIEWS 39
NAVIGATION CONTROLS 40
BATTLE CONTROLS 42
VIEW CONTROLS 42
CHART CONTROLS 44
CON & ENGINE CONTROLS 44
FIRING TORPEDOES 47
DECK GUN CONTROLS 50
LAUNCHING DEBRIS 53
END THIS BATTLE 53
COMPUTER CONTROLS 54
AFTERMATH OF BATTLE 56
SUBMARINE TACTICS & STRATEGY 60
BATTLE TACTICS 61
PATROL STRATEGY 77
AMERICAN COMMANDS 79
PATROL AREAS 81
STRATEGIES ON PATROL 85
THE PACIFIC WAR 87
HISTORICAL ENGAGEMENTS 98
TECHNICAL DATA 106
US SUBMARINES OF WWI 107
US TORPEDOES 114
JAPANESE SHIPS IN WWI 116
APPENDIX 122
DESIGN NOTES 122
FURTHER READING 124
CREDITS 127
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QUICK START
THE MATERIALS
THIS MANUAL PROVIDES A TUTORIAL, DETAILED OPERATING INSTRUCTIONS,
TECHNICAL DATA AND TACTICAL TIPS. IT APPLIES TO ALL COMPUTER
SYSTEMS.
THE TECHNICAL SUPPLEMENT GIVES SPECIFIC INSTRUCTIONS FOR YOUR
COMPUTER SYSTEM.
THE KEYBOARD OVERLAY(S) PRESENT ALL THE MAIN CONTROLS
AND ORDERS FOR YOUR SUB IN BATTLE. FOR STRATEGIC "WAR PATROL"
MOVEMENTS, REFER TO THE TECHNICAL SUPPLEMENT AND THIS MANUAL, NOT
THE KEYBOARD OVERLAY.
THE MAP OF THE WESTERN PACIFIC EXACTLY MATCHES THE INTERNAL "COM-
PUTER DATA" USED IN THIS SIMULATION (HENCE THE "JAGGED" COAST-
LINES, ETC.)
THE TECHNICAL SUPPLEMENT HAS COMPLETE INFORMATION ABOUT INSTALL-
ING SILENT SERVICE II ON EITHER FLOPPY OR HARD DISKS.
LEARNING SILENT SERVICE II
THERE ARE THREE BASIC APPROACHES TO LEARNING THIS SIMULATION.
PICK THE METHOD THAT SUITS YOU BEST:
(1) PLAY & SKIM: YOU CAN DIVE IN AND TRY THE GAME, SKIMMING WHAT
YOU
NEED FROM THIS MANUAL. BE SURE TO LOOK AT THE DESCRIPTIONS OF THE
VIEWS (P 25-38) AND THE CONTROLS (PAGES 42-53). FOR YOUR FIRST
GAMES, PICK TRAINING THEN THE FIRST TWO HISTORICAL BATTLES
("WHALES & DUDS" AND "MUSH OR LOOSE"). WHEN YOU'RE READY FOR MORE,
TRY THE THIRD AND FOURTH HISTORICAL BATTLES ("FLASHER'S TANKERS").
(2) TUTORIAL:HERE YOU FOLLOW THE TUTORIAL (PAGES 9-17) STEP BY
STEP. AS YOU FOLLOW ALONG , YOU'LL WANT TO SKIM "COMMANDING A
SUBMARINE" (PAGE 59) FOR MORE EXPLANATION.
(3) STUDY: IN REAL LIFE MOST NAVAL OFFICERS FIRST LEARN "FROM THE
BOOK", TRY TO SURVIVE IN REAL LIFE. TO DUPLICATE THIS, FIRST READ
"COMMANDING SUBMARINE" (PAGES 18-59). SKIM THROUGH "BATTLE TAC-
TICS" AND "PATROL STRATEGY" (PAGES 61-86) AS WELL. IF YOU STILL
WANT TO BE "IN CHARACTER", START ; CAREER. HOWEVER, FOR EASIER
LEARNING WE RECOMMEND A FEW HISTORICAL BATTLES OR A SINGLE WAR
PATROL FIRST.
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COMBAT TUTORIAL
START BY FOLLOWING THE INSTALLATION INSTRUCTIONS IN THE TECHNICAL
SUPPLEMENT. YOU SHOULD "INSTALL" (COPY) THE GAME ONTO FLOPPY
DISKS OR A HARD DISK,-" AND PLAY FROM THOSE. ALSO PUNCH OUT THE
APPROPRIATE KEYBOARD OVERLAY AND PLACE IT ON YOUR KEYBOARD. ALL
CONTROLS ARE REFERRED TO BY THE NAME ON THE OVERLAY, WHICH APPEARS
HERE IN ITALICS.
THIS TUTORIAL ACQUAINTS YOU WITH THE CONTROLS AND COMMANDS NEEDED
TO OPERATE YOUR SUBMARINE. THIS FIRST TUTORIAL OCCURS ON A PRAC-
TICE "RANGE" NEAR PEARL HARBOR. YOUR TARGETS ARE OLD HULKS UNABLE
TO MOVE OR SHOOT. THERE ARE NO "ENEMIES" TO DISTRACT YOU AND NO
TIME LIMIT.
INITIAL OPTIONS
AFTER THE TITLE SCREENS, YOU'RE SHOWN A JAPANESE SHIP. TO CORRECT-
LY INITIAL OPTIONS IDENTIFY IT, COMPARE THE PICTURE WITH THOSE IN
THIS MANUAL (PAGES 116-121), THEN SELECT THE NAME USING THE CURSOR
KEYS.
NEXT A SERIES OF OPTIONS APPEARS. PLEASE MAKE THESE CHOICES:
" "TRAINING" IS THE APPROPRIATE TYPE OF GAME.
" "INTRODUCTORY" IS THE APPROPRIATE DIFFICULTY LEVEL.
" TYPE YOUR NAME WHERE REQUESTED.
" "JANUARY 1,1944" IS A GOOD DATE, ALTHOUGH ANY DATE WILL DO.
" "GATO" IS THE RECOMMENDED SUBMARINE CLASS.
YOU'LL BE ASSIGNED A SUBMARINE FROM THE GATO CLASS. PRESS ANY KEY
TO CONTINUE AND SEE YOUR FIRST LOGBOOK ENTRY, WHICH NOTES THE
UPCOMING TRAINING EXERCISE.
FINALLY, CHECK THE KEYBOARD OVERLAY OR TECHNICAL SUPPLEMENT TO
FIND THE KEYBOARD CONTROLS THAT PAUSE THE GAME. THIS ALLOWS YOU TO
READ A FEW PARAGRAPHS OF THIS TUTORIAL, DO IT, THEN PAUSE SO YOU
CAN READ THE NEXT FEW PARAGRAPHS, ETC.
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AT THE START
AT THE START OF THE EXERCISE, YOU'RE VIEWING A CHART OF THE GENER-
AL AREA. TAKE A MOMENT AND EXAMINE YOUR KEYBOARD OVERLAY. DURING
BATTLE YOU FIND EVERY CONTROL HERE. ON SOME MACHINES A JOYSTICK
AND/OR MOUSE DUPLICATE SOME OF THESE CONTROLS (SEE THE TECHNICAL
SUPPLEMENT FOR DETAILS)
ON THE CHART YOU'RE A DOT IN THE MIDDLE OF A BOX. THERE ARE FOUR
SMALL DOTS NORTH OF YOU. THESE ARE FOUR TARGET HULKS, ANCHORED
HERE FOR TARGET PRACTICE. YOU CAN USE THE ZOOM AND UNZOOM KEYS TO
ENLARGE OR REDUCE THE SCALE. FOR MORE INFORMATION ABOUT CHARTS AND
SCALES, SEE PAGES 26-28;
BELOW THIS CHART IS THE "INFO PANEL" THAT SHOWS THE STATUS OF YOUR
1 THE START YOUR SPEED IS 0, YOUR DEPTH IS 000 (I.E., YOU'RE ON
THE SURFACE YOUR HEADING (HDG) IS 000 (DUE NORTH). YOUR VIEW
BEARING (BEARING) 000 (NORTH), YOU HAVE 6 TORPEDOES LOADED IN THE
BOW TUBES AND 4 TORPEDOES LOADED IN THE STERN TUBES. THE TARGET
INFORMATION TO THE RIGHT IS BLANK BECAUSE YOU'VE NOT "MARKED" A
TARGET.
TO THE RIGHT OF THE CHART IS A PANEL OF TEN TORPEDO TIMERS. THESE
SH LONG BEFORE A TORPEDO REACHES ITS TARGET (IF THE TDC LIGHT
BESIDE THE ' ON) , OR HOW LONG BEFORE THE TORPEDO RUNS OUT OF GAS
(IF THE TDC LIGHT IS OF NOW ALL THE TIMERS READ 0:00 BECAUSE NO
TORPEDOES ARE RUNNING.
FOR A LARGER CHART SCREEN, TAP THE INFO PANEL ON/OFF KEY. THIS
GIVES YOU A FULL-SCREEN CHART. TAP THE KEY AGAIN TO RESTORE THE
INFO PANEL.
HEADING VS. BEARING: TAP THE BRIDGE LOOK OUT KEY. YOU'RE NO LOOK-
OUT POSITION ON TOP OF THE SUB'S CONNING TOWER. YOU SEE THE OCEAN
AHEAD. THERE ARE SHIPS (THE TARGET HULKS) ON THE HORIZON. DO NOT
STALL SUB'S ENGINES. INSTEAD, TRY OUT VIEW LEFT AND VIEW RIGHT.
NOTICE HOW YOUR FIELD OF VISION MOVES LEFT AND RIGHT. WHEN YOUR
VIEW MOVES, YOUR VIEW (BEARING ON THE INFO PANEL) MOVES WITH IT.
HOWEVER, HEADING (HDI INFO PANEL) HAS NOT MOVED BECAUSE THE SUB'S
HULL HASN'T TURNED.
YOU MUST UNDERSTAND THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN HEADING AND BEARING IN
ORDER TO COMMAND EFFECTIVELY. HEADING IS THE DIRECTION YOUR BOAT
POSITION IN WHICH IT TRAVELS. BEARING IS THE DIRECTION OF YOUR
VIEW. THE LOOK( PERISCOPE, TBT (TARGET BEARING TRANSMITTER)
BINOCULARS, TORPEDOES ; GUN ARE ALL POINTED AND FIRED ALONG THE
BEARING, NOT THE BOAT'S HEADING.
THIS CAN BE CONFUSING. THERE ARE TWO KEYS TO ASSIST YOU. TAP SET
VIEW TO COURSE TO SWING YOUR BEARING AROUND SO IT POINTS "STRAIGHT
AHEAD( DIRECTION THE SUB POINTS). TAP SET COURSE TP VIEW TO TURN
THE SUB SO IT' HEADED IN THE SAME DIRECTION AS YOUR VIEW BEARING.
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FIND YOUR TARGETS: SELECT BRIDGE TBT. THIS IS A PAIR OF BINOCULARS
IN A SPECIAL MOUNTING. THEY HAVE A DARK SCALE ACROSS THE LOWER
CENTER. TURN YOUR VIEW LEFT AND RIGHT OVER THE TARGET HULKS. THE
SCALE BRIGHTENS WHEN IT IS OVER A SHIP. THIS MEANS THAT SHIP IS
"MARKED". THE TARGET INFORMATION ON THE INFO PANEL COMES TO LIFE,
SHOWING THE ENEMY'S RANGE (IN YARDS), SPEED (IN KNOTS), AND COURSE
(HEADING).
FOR A BETTER VIEW OF A TARGET, TAP ZOOM ONE OR MORE TIMES. TO
RETURN TO A NORMAL VIEW, TAP UNZOOM.
MOVE THE CENTER OF THE SCALE TO THE CENTER OF THE LEFTMOST ENEMY
SHIP AND TAP TDC ON/OFF. THE TDC LIGHT (ON THE INFO PANEL) TURNS
ON AND A SMALL BLACK POINTER APPEARS ON THE SCALE. THIS MEANS YOUR
TORPEDO DATA COMPUTER (TDC) IS "LOCKED" ON THE TARGET. WHILE THE
TDC IS RUNNING, YOUR VIEW AUTOMATICALLY ROTATES TO KEEP THE CUR-
RENT TARGET POINT CENTERED IN YOUR VIEW. YOU CAN TURN THE TDC OFF
BY TAPPING TDC ON/OFF AGAIN. YOU CAN ONLY TURN ON THE TDC WHEN A
TARGET IS "MARKED", BUT YOU CAN TURN IT OFF ANYTIME.
MAKE SURE YOUR HEADING (HDG) IS 000 AND THE TDC IS ON. TAP AHEAD
FULL (3). THIS STARTS YOUR SUB MOVING NORTH. YOUR SPEED WILL
INCREASE TO 1 5 KNOTS BUT THE HEADING WON'T CHANGE (BECAUSE YOU'RE
NOT TURNING). HOWEVER, AS THE TDC TRACKS THE TARGET, YOU'LL SEE
THE VIEW BEARING ROTATE AND THE TARGET RANGE GET SMALLER.
NOTE THAT WHEN THE TDC IS "OFF" (NOT RUNNING) THE VIEW LEFT AND
VIEW RIGHT KEYS SWING YOUR VIEW LEFT AND RIGHT. WHEN THE TDC IS
"ON" (RUNNING), YOUR VIEW IS LOCKED ON TARGET. THE KEYS NOW ADJUST
THE TORPEDO AIM LEFT OR RIGHT. YOU'LL SEE THE TORPEDO AIMING
POINTER MOVE ON THE SCALE AS YOU TAP VIEW LEFT AND VIEW RIGHT.
THE ATTACK
SINKING THE ENEMY: TAP SET COURSE TO VIEW. THIS SWINGS YOUR SUB
AROUND AND HEADS IT TOWARD THE TARGET SHIP. WHEN THE RANGE TO
TARGET DECREASES TO 1,000 YARDS, TAP ALL STOP (0). IT'S TIME TO
GIVE YOUR DECK GUN CREW A LITTLE PRACTICE.
TAP FIRE DECK GUN ONCE. YOU'LL HEAR THE GUN FIRE AND SEE EITHER AN
EXPLOSION OR SHELL SPLASH NEAR THE TARGET. THIS IS BECAUSE THE GUN
CREW DOES THEIR BEST TO AIM THE GUN AT THE "MARKED" TARGET THAT
YOU'RE TRACKING WITH THE TDC. IF THE TARGET WASN'T "MARKED", THE
CREW REFUSES TO SHOOT (THEY DON'T HAVE A TARGET!).
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IF THE SPLASH IS IN FRONT OF THE TARGET, YOU'RE FIRING TOO
"SHORT". YOU N TO ELEVATE THE GUN SLIGHTLY TO LENGTHEN THE FIRING
RANGE. TAP GUN UP (+) 1 DEGREE ONCE. YOU'LL SEE THE ELEVATION
INDICATOR AT THE TOP OF THE TBT CHANGE.
IF THE SPLASH IS BEHIND THE TARGET, YOU'RE FIRING TOO "LONG". YOU
NEED TO DEPRESS THE GUN SLIGHTLY. TAP GUN DOWN (-) 1 DEGREE ONCE.
ADJUST YOUR GUN ELEVATION UP OR DOWN UNTIL YOU'RE SCORING HITS.
SOME MAY SET THE HULK AFIRE, OR CAUSE SECONDARY EXPLOSIONS.
EVENTUALLY THE TARGET WILL SINK. YOU'VE SCORED YOUR FIRST KILL!
TORPEDOES AWAY: OBVIOUSLY, THE DECK GUN IS RARELY THE BEST WAY TO
A SHIP - IT TAKES MANY SHELLS AND A LONG TIME, AND ALL THE WHILE
YOU'RE ON SURFACE, VULNERABLE TO RETURN FIRE. IT'S TIME TO TRY THE
TRADITIONAL SUB; WEAPON: THE TORPEDO. TORPEDOES CAN BE FIRED
SURFACED OR SUBMERGED. HERE WE'LL MAKE A SUBMERGED ATTACK.
TAP THE DIVE KEY ONCE. ALMOST IMMEDIATELY YOU'LL BE REMOVED FROM
THE BRIDGE TBT AND GO TO THE CHARTS. AFTER ALL, WHEN A SUB DIVES,
ALL THE PERSONNEL MUST GO BELOW. ON THE CHART, WATCH THE DEPTH
CAREFULLY. WHEN YOU REACH 050 FEET, TAP RISE ONCE. THIS LEVELS
OUT THE SUBMARINE. IF YOU TAP AGAIN, YOUR SUB STARTS BACK UP. TO
LEVEL OUT AT A DEPTH, YOU CAN ALSO TAP STRAIGHT & LEVEL. HOWEVER,
THIS WOULD ALSO STRAIGHTEN OUT ANY TURNS.
YOU CAN ALSO DIVE OR RISE YOUR SUB TO PERISCOPE DEPTH (50 TO 55
FEET) TAPPING THE PERISCOPE DEPTH KEY. YOUR CREW WILL AUTOMATI-
CALLY TAKE YOU TO THE PROPER DEPTH, DIVING AS NECESSARY.
WHEN YOU'RE STEADY AT 055 FEET, TRY TAPPING PERISCOPE TO LOOK
THROUGH IT.
YOU CAN MOVE THE PERISCOPE VIEW LEFT OR RIGHT JUST LIKE THE BRIDGE
TBE. SINCE THE LAST SHIP IS SUNK, YOUR TDC IS OFF AND NO TARGET
IS MARKED. SWING THE SCOPE AROUND TO MARK A NEW TARGET, THEN TURN
ON THE TDC TO TRACK IT.
IN REAL BATTLE, THE TDC IS EXTREMELY USEFUL BECAUSE IT COMPUTES
THE ENEMY'S COURSE AND SPEED. IT THEN AUTOMATICALLY SETS THE
TORPEDO'S COURSE SO IT WILL INTERSECT WITH THE ENEMY. THE TDC
CONTINUALLY UPDATES THIS SETTING SO YOU CAN FIRE THE TORPEDO AT
ANY TIME. WITH THE TDC RUNNING, TORPEDOES ! ALWAYS HIT UNLESS
EITHER (A) THE ENEMY CHANGES SPEED OR COURSE (OR BOTH) YOU FIRE,
OR (B) THE TORPEDO MALFUNCTIONS. HERE THE ENEMY IS ANCHORED A
HAVE FLAWLESS TORPEDOES, SO EVERY "FISH" FIRED IS A HIT.
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TAP FIRE TORPEDO ONCE AND YOU'LL SEE WHAT HAPPENS. A "TIN FISH" IS
LAUNCHED, YOU SEE THE WAKE RUNNING TOWARD THE TARGET, AND BLAMMO!
A HIT. THE AMOUNT OF DAMAGE IS SOMEWHAT RANDOM, SO ONE HIT MAY OR
MAY NOT SINK THE TARGET. IF IT DOESN'T, KEEP FIRING UNTIL YOU SINK
THE HULK.
NOTE THAT WHEN THE TDC IS RUNNING YOUR VIEW IS "LOCKED" ONTO THE
MARKED TARGET. THE VIEW LEFT AND VIEW RIGHT KEYS ADJUST TORPEDO
AIM, NOT THE VIEW. YOU MUST TURN OFF THE TDC TO CHANGE YOUR VIEW.
FIRING STERN TUBES: SWING YOUR PERISCOPE ONTO THE THIRD TARGET
HULK TO "MARK" IT, THEN TURN ON YOUR TDC ONCE MORE.
NOW TAP AHEAD FULL (3). NOTICE THAT YOUR SUB IS MOVING AT A MUCH
SLOWER SPEED THAN ON THE SURFACE. IN REAL BATTLES, YOUR SLOWER
SUBMERGED SPEED CAN BE IMPORTANT. NOW PRESS TURN STARBD (RIGHT) OR
TURN PORT (LEFT). YOU'LL NOTICE YOUR SUB'S HEADING SWINGS AWAY
FROM YOUR BEARING. SHIFT TO THE CHARTS (TAP CHARTS) AND WATCH YOUR
SUB MOVING THERE. WHEN YOUR SUB IS TRAVELLING ALMOST EXACTLY AWAY
FROM THE ENEMY, TAP STRAIGHT & LEVEL AND THEN ALL STOP (0).
DURING ALL THIS, BECAUSE YOU LEFT YOUR PERISCOPE UP, THE CREW AND
TDC CONTINUED WATCHING THE TARGET. THE CURRENT TARGET RANGE,
SPEED AND COURSE SHOULD STILL BE VISIBLE ON THE INFO PANEL.
NOW TAP FIRE TORPEDO ONCE. YOU'LL SEE A TORPEDO LEAVE YOUR BOAT
AND HEAD TO THE TARGET. NOTICE THAT ON THE INFO PANEL YOU ONLY
HAVE THREE STERN TUBES LOADED NOW, INSTEAD OF THE ORIGINAL FOUR.
MEANWHILE THE "S1 " TIMER IS COUNTING DOWN THE SECONDS BEFORE THE
TORPEDO HITS.
YOUR CREW AUTOMATICALLY SELECTS EITHER BOW OR STERN TUBES TO FIRE,
WHICHEVER IS CLOSER TO THE TARGET. SINCE YOUR STERN WAS FACING
TOWARD THE TARGET, THEY FIRED A STERN TUBE.
IF YOU'RE QUICK YOU CAN GET BACK TO THE PERISCOPE AND WATCH THE
TORPEDO EXPLODE.
AT SOME POINT IN ALL THIS, YOU PROBABLY RECEIVED A MESSAGE THAT
ONE OF YOUR BOW TUBES HAS BEEN RELOADED. AS YOU FIRE YOUR TORPE-
DOES, YOUR CREW RELOADS THEM AS FAST AS POSSIBLE. HOWEVER,
YOUR TORPEDO SUPPLY IS LIMITED. TAP GAUGES AND LOOK IN THE UPPER
RIGHT CORNER. THE LIGHTED TORPEDO GRAPHICS SHOW :THE NUMBER OF
TUBES CURRENTLY LOADED. THE NUMBERS BELOW SHOW THE NUMBER OF
ADDITIONAL TORPEDOES AVAILABLE, BUT NOT YET LOADED INTO A TUBE.
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ENDING THE TRAINING CRUISE
YOU CAN END TRAINING BY SINKING THE LAST HULK WITH GUN FIRE AND/OR
TORPEDOES. WHEN THE LAST ENEMY SHIP IS SUNK, THE BATTLE ENDS
SHORTLY THEREAFTER, BATTLES ALSO END IF ALL SURVIVING ENEMY SHIPS
HAVE ESCAPED BEYOND 30,000 YARDS).
IN ADDITION, YOU CAN TAP END THIS BATTLE. YOU AREN'T ALLOWED TO
QUIT IF YOU'RE TOO CLOSE TO THE ENEMY, OR THEY DETECTED YOU
(IMPOSSIBLE IN THIS CASE!).
FURTHER BATTLE TRAINING
TO GET MORE EXPERIENCE IN BATTLE, PLAY SOME OF THE HISTORICAL
BATTLE SCENARIOS. FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION ON VIEWS REFER TO
PAGES 25-38, FOR CONTROLS REFER TO PAGES 42-55.
THE FIRST TWO SCENARIOS, "WHALES & DUDS" AND "MUSH ON THE LOOSE"
ONLY HAVE MERCHANT SHIPS. THREE OTHER SCENARIOS FEATURE BATTLES
AGAINST CONVOYS "FLASHER'S TANKERS (I)", "FLASHER'S TANKERS (II)",
AND "KILLER O'KANE".
THE MOST DIFFICULT SCENARIOS ARE THOSE AGAINST WARSHIPS, SINCE
THEY MOVE SO QUICKLY. THESE INCLUDE "SINK THE YAMATO!", "DEATH OF
THE SHINANO" AND "AN EMBARRASSMENT OF RICHES".
A GOOD FINAL PRACTICE - AND A FINE, QUICK GAME IN ITS OWN RIGHT IS
THE "RANDOM ENCOUNTER". THIS SCENARIO GENERATES AN INFINITE
VARIETY OF ALTERNATIVES APPROPRIATE FOR THE TIME PERIOD YOU SE-
LECT, INCLUDING SINGLE MERCHANT CONVOYS AND WARSHIP GROUPS,
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PATROL TUTORIAL
NOW IT'S TIME TO TRY OUT A WAR PATROL. IN A WAR PATROL YOU LEAVE
PORT, CRUISE TO TO YOUR PATROL ZONE, SEARCH OUT ENEMIES, AND SINK
THEM. WHEN YOU'RE OUT OF - TORPEDOES OR LOW ON FUEL, YOU RETURN TO
PORT.
AFTER THE TITLE SCREENS, YOU'RE SHOWN A JAPANESE SHIP. TO CORRECT-
LY IDENTIFY IT, COMPARE THE PICTURE WITH THOSE IN THIS MANUAL
(PAGES 116-121), THEN SELECT THE NAME USING THE CURSOR KEYS.
NEXT A SERIES OF OPTIONS APPEARS. PLEASE MAKE THESE CHOICES:
" "A SINGLE WAR PATROL" IS THE APPROPRIATE TYPE OF GAME.
" "INTRODUCTORY" IS THE APPROPRIATE DIFFICULTY LEVEL.
" TYPE YOUR NAME WHERE REQUESTED.
" "JANUARY 1 , 1 94-4" IS A GOOD DATE, ALTHOUGH ANY DATE WILL DO.
" "IMP. GATO" IS THE APPROPRIATE SUBMARINE CLASS.
NOW YOU'LL SEE A MAP OF THE WESTERN PACIFIC. USE THE CURSOR TO
SELECT AN APPROPRIATE STARTING BASE. KEEP TAPPING THE CURSOR UNTIL
"MIDWAY - SUBPAC" APPEARS. THIS WILL BE YOUR STARTING BASE.
PRESS THE RETURN KEY TO FINISH YOUR SELECTION.
NOW A BLACK BOX APPEARS. THIS IS A POSSIBLE PATROL ZONE. AGAIN,
USE THE CURSOR TO MOVE THROUGH THE APPROPRIATE SELECTIONS. STOP
WHEN YOU REACH THE "EAST CHINA SEA". THIS WILL BE YOUR PATROL
AREA. AGAIN, PRESS THE RETURN KEY TO FINISH YOUR SELECTION.
YOU'LL BE ASSIGNED A SUBMARINE FROM THE IMPROVED GATO CLASS, PRESS
ANY KEY TO CONTINUE AND SEE YOUR FIRST LOGBOOK ENTRY, WHICH SHOWS
YOUR OFFICIAL SAILING ORDERS. PRESS ANY KEY TO BEGIN YOUR WAR
PATROL.
PATROLLING
THE WAR PATROL BEGINS WITH A MAP VIEW OF THE ENTIRE WESTERN PACIF-
IC OCEAN. YOUR BOAT IS A BRIGHT DOT SURROUNDED BY A BRIGHT BOX.
YOUR WAR PATROL ZONE IS A DARK BOX OFF THE COAST OF CHINA, SOUTH-
ERN KOREA AND SOUTHERN JAPAN.
CONTROLS: THE KEYBOARD OVERLAY IS NOT USED DURING A WAR PATROL.
ONLY A VERY LIMITED NUMBER OF CONTROLS ARE USED WHILE PATROLLING.
THE CURSOR KEYS OR NUMERIC KEYPAD MOVE YOUR BOAT ACROSS THE PACIF-
IC TOWARD THE PATROL AREA (FOR JOYSTICK OR MOUSE CONTROLS, SEE
YOUR TECHNICAL SUPPLEMENT) LAND AND REEF AREAS ARE IMPASSABLE;
YOU'LL HAVE TO MOVE AROUND THOSE. A LARGER SCALE NAVIGATION MAP IS
INCLUDED TO HELP YOU NAVIGATE
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TRY EACH OF THE FOLLOWING KEYS, WHICH ARE AVAILABLE DURING A WAR
PATROL (AS WELL AS IN BATTLE):
CAPTAINS LOG PROVIDES SAILING ORDERS, INFORMATION ABOUT YOUR
BOAT'S PAST HISTORY.
DAMAGE REPORT ALLOWS YOU TO MONITOR DAMAGE REPAIRS.
GAUGES ALLOWS YOU TO MONITOR THE BOAT'S CURRENT STATUS IN C
ESPECIALLY THE NUMBER OF TORPEDO TUBES AND TORPEDOES AVAILABLE.
PORTS IS A SPECIAL KEY ONLY AVAILABLE DURING THE PATROL. IT
TOGGLES ON AND OFF FOR ALL FRIENDLY AND ENEMY PORTS/BASES. NOTE
THAT THESE VARY WITH TIME.
THE COMPUTER CONTROLS (PAUSE,BOSS, SAVE GAME, EXIT TO DOS,
JOYSTICK ADJUST, VOLUME ADJUST, RESTART GAME. ETC/) ARE ALL AVAIL-
ABLE WHILE PATROLLING.
TIME & FUEL: AS YOU MOVE, YOU'LL SEE THE INFO PANEL IN THE UPPER
LEFT CHANGE. THE PANEL SHOWS THE CURRENT DATE AND TIME. TIME IS
KEPT USING A MILITARY CLOCK. THIS MEANS 01 00 IS 1 AM, 1 200 IS
NOON, I 300 IS 1 PM IS 9 PM, AND 24-00 IS MIDNIGHT. BELOW THE
TIME IS THE NUMBER OF DAYS CRUISING YOU HAVE LEFT. MOST SUB TYPES
(INCLUDING THE GATO CLASS) HAVE 60 DAYS (
MOVE YOUR SUB ACROSS THE PACIFIC AND INTO THE PATROL ZONE. AS S(
YOU ENTER THE ZONE, NOTE HOW MANY DAYS OF FUEL REMAIN. THE DIF-
FERENCE AMOUNT OF FUEL IT TOOK YOU TO REACH YOUR ZONE. A WISE
CAPTAIN ENDS HIS PATROL WHEN HIS FUEL IS DOWN TO ABOUT 1 1/2 TIMES
(150%) OF THIS AMOUNT.
FOR EXAMPLE, YOUR PATROL FROM MIDWAY STARTS WITH 60 DAYS AVAIL-
ABLE. WHEN YOU REACH THE EAST CHINA SEA, YOU'RE DOWN TO 45 DAYS
THEREFORE, IT TOOK YOU 1 5 DAYS TO REACH YOUR PATROL AREA. TO BE
SAFE, YOU END YOUR PATROL WHEN YOU HAVE ABOUT 22-23 DAYS OF FUEL
REMAINING (15 * 1.5 = 22.5). IF YOU REMAIN ON PATROL SO LONG THAT
YOU HAVE LESS THAN 15 DAYS OF FUEL LEFT, YOU WON'T HAVE ENOUGH TO
GET BACK TO MIDWAY. HOWEVER, YOU CAN LOOK FOR NEARER PORTS BY
TAPPING THE PORTS KEY.
TIME: CONTINUE CRUISING AND YOU'LL NOTICE THAT EVERY MOVES, TIME
FLIPS PAST. ALSO NOTICE THAT EVEN IF YOU DON'T MOVE, TIME CONTIN-
UES TO PASS. YOU BOAT CRUISES AROUND AT ITS CURRENT LOCATION IF
YOU DON'T MOVE IT. TO FREEZE THE PATROL, YOU MUST PRESS THE PAUSE
KEY.
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CONTACTS: EVENTUALLY YOUR BOAT ENCOUNTERS THE ENEMY. MOST CON-
TACTS OCCUR IN YOUR PATROL ZONE, BUT AN ENCOUNTER IS POSSIBLE
ALMOST ANYWHERE. SOME CONTACTS OCCUR WHEN THE ENEMY SPOTS YOU.
OTHER TIMES YOU SPOT THEM WITH RADAR OR VISUALLY.
BE SURE TO NOTE THE TIME OF THE CONTACT. A NIGHT CONTACT MEANS A
NIGHT BATTLE, WHERE YOU'LL PROBABLY WANT TO FIGHT ON THE SURFACE.
A DAY CONTACT MEANS YOU'LL PROBABLY WANT TO FIGHT SUBMERGED. A
RADAR CONTACT MEANS YOU WILL START FURTHER AWAY FROM THE ENEMY
WITH MORE TIME TO MANEUVER. A VISUAL CONTACT GIVES YOU LESS TIME.
A VISUAL CONTACT AT NIGHT RESULTS IN A BATTLE THAT STARTS AT
POINT-BLANK RANGE, PERHAPS WITH YOUR BOAT INSIDE THE CONVOY'S
FORMATION!
BATTLE TACTICS
IF YOU ENCOUNTER SPEEDY WARSHIPS, JUST GETTING INTO FIRING POSI-
TION IS HARD ENOUGH. WITH SLOWER MERCHANT SHIPS OR CONVOYS YOU CAN
CIRCLE AROUND AND ATTACK THEM FROM WHATEVER DIRECTION SEEMS MOST
FAVORABLE.
AS SOON AS YOU HAVE TIME, IT'S WISE TO CHECK THE GAUGES FOR THE
CURRENT WATER TEMPERATURE AND DEPTH UNDER KEEL. THERE'S NOTHING
MORE EMBARRASSING THAN MAKING A CRASH DIVE STRAIGHT INTO THE OCEAN
BOTTOM!
IN DAYLIGHT YOU NORMALLY ATTACK SUBMERGED. AT NIGHT YOUR SUB IS SO
HARD TO SEE THAT YOU CAN MAKE SURFACE ATTACKS. HOWEVER, AT NIGHT
DECK GUN FLASHES GIVE AWAY YOUR POSITION. AVOID USING THE DECK GUN
AT NIGHT IF RETURN GUNFIRE IS A THREAT.
IF ENEMY DESTROYERS PURSUE YOU, DON'T RELY ON WEAPONS TO SAVE
YOURSELF. DESTROYERS ARE HARD TO HIT WITH TORPEDOES. THEIR GUNS
ARE MORE POWERFUL THAN YOURS. YOUR BEST BET IS TO CRASH DIVE, IF
POSSIBLE BELOW THE TEMPERATURE LAYER (TO COLDER WATER) , THEN MOVE
AWAY. THE FASTER YOU MOVE , THE BETTER THE ENEMY CAN HEAR YOU.
WHEN EVADING ATTACK, IT'S BEST TO SNEAK AWAY AT SLOW SPEED.
MORE INFORMATION
FOR DETAILED INFORMATION ABOUT CONTROLS AVAILABLE DURING A PATROL,
SEE PAGES 39-41. FOR MORE INFORMATION ABOUT STRATEGY AND TACTICS,
SEE PAGES 77-86.
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19
COMMANDING A SUBMARINE
INITIAL OPTIONS
AT THE START SILENT SERVICE II PRESENTS YOU WITH VARIOUS OPTIONS.
USING THESE YOU CAN SELECT ANYTHING FROM AN INDIVIDU-
AL BATTLE TO REFIGHTING ALL OF WORLD WAR II. YOU ALSO SELECT THE
TYPE OF SUBMARINE YOU WISH TO COMMAND AND AN
APPROPRIATE LEVEL OF REALISM AND DIFFICULTY.
SHIP IDENTIFICATION
HERE YOU SEE A PAGE FROM YOUR BOAT'S SHIP ID BOOK. COMPARE THE
PICTURE SHOWN WITH THE VARIOUS SHIP PICTURES IN THIS MANUAL (PAGES
116-121 ). THEN USE THE CURSOR KEYS SELECT THE CORRECT NAME. IF
YOU FAIL TO MAKE A CORRECT IDENTIFICATION, YOU'RE LIMITED TO THE
TRAINING SCENARIO.
GAME TYPE
TRAINING: THIS IS A SINGLE LEARNING "BATTLE" AGAINST FOUR MOTION-
LESS, UNARMED FREIGHTER HULKS. YOU'RE FREE TO CRUISE AROUND AND
ATTACK THEM WITH TORPEDOES AND/OR GUNS. TRAINING TAKES AN HOUR OR
TWO, MAINLY BECAUSE YOU'LL CONSTANTLY REFER TO THIS MANUAL AND THE
TECHNICAL SUPPLEMENT.
A SINGLE BATTLE: HERE YOU TO SELECT ONE OF EIGHT ACTUAL SUBMARINE
ENGAGEMENTS, OR A NINTH RANDOM ENGAGEMENT AGAINST AN UNPREDICTABLE
FORCE OF JAPANESE SHIPS. INDIVIDUAL BATTLES TAKE A HALF HOUR TO
TWO HOURS, DEPENDING ON THE NUMBER OF SHIPS INVOLVED AND YOUR
COMMAND STYLE. FOR A SUMMARY OF EACH HISTORICAL ENGAGEMENT, SEE
PAGES 98-1 05.
* SINGLE WAR PATROL: HERE YOU TAKE A SUBMARINE ON A COMPLETE WAR
PATROL INTO THE WESTERN PACIFIC, SEARCHING FOR ENEMIES, ENGAGING
THEM, AND (HOPEFULLY) RETURNING BACK TO A FRIENDLY BASE ALIVE. A
WAR PATROL CAN TAKE A FEW HOURS TO AN EVENING OR TWO , DEPENDING
ON HOW MANY CONTACTS YOU MAKE, AND THE SIZE OF THE RESULTING
BATTLES.
A WAR CAREER: HERE YOU JOIN THE US NAVY AS A SUBMARINE SKIPPER
ANY TIME DURING WORLD WAR II. YOU SAIL ON A SERIES OF WAR PATROLS
IN ONE OR MORE
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TYPES OF SUBS UNTIL EITHER YOU'RE KILLED OR THE WAR ENDS. THIS IS
THE LONGEST MOST ELABORATE VERSION OF SILENT SERVICE II. IT MAY
TAKE HUNDREDS OF HOURS IF YOU START AT THE BEGINNING OF THE WAR
(DECEMBER 7, 1941).
RESUME A SAVED GAME: THIS ALLOWS YOU TO CONTINUE A GAME PREVI-
OUSLY SAVED TO DISK.
SEE THE HALL OF FAME: THIS SHOWS THE SUBMARINER'S "HALL OF FAME".
QUIT GAME: THIS EXITS THE GAME, RETURNING YOU TO THE COMPUTERS
OPERATING SYSTEM.
RECOMMENDED CHOICES: TRY "TRAIN ADVANCE TO ONE OF THE FIRST TWO
SINGLE BATTLES ("WHALES & DUDS" OR "MUSH THE LOOSE"). AFTER THAT
TRY MORE SINGLE BATTLES OR A SINGLE WAR PATROL. SELECT DATES IN
1943 OR 1944 FOR GOOD GAMING VARIETY. FINALLY YOU'LL BE READY FOR
THE ULTIMATE TEST: A WAR CAREER STARTING DECEMBER 7TH, 1941!
DIFFICULTY LEVEL
INTRODUCTION: THIS DIFFICULTY LEVEL IS DESIGNED PURELY FOR BEGIN-
NERS. JAPANESE CONVOYS DO NOT ZIP-ZAG, YOUR DECK GUN AND TORPE-
DOES DO LARGE AMOUNTS OF DAMAGE AND YOUR SUBMARINE ALWAYS HAS
RADAR (EVEN BEFORE IT WAS REALLY INTRODUCED!). JAPANESE WARSHIP
COMMANDERS ARE SLOW TO REACT, AND IF THEY DO YOUR SUBMARINE CAN
WITHSTAND A REMARKABLE AMOUNT OF PUNISHMENT. FINALLY, WHENEVER
YOU USE THE SHIP ID BOOK, YOUR CREW WILL AUTOMATICALLY SHOW
YOU THE CORRECT PAGE.
THIS VERSION IS CONSIDERED "EASY" BY EXPERIENCE PLAYERS. CONSE-
QUENTLY, POINT SCORING IS GREATLY REDUCED.
NORMAL: THIS LEVEL INTRODUCES YOU TO THE DANGERS OF REAL COMBAT.
JAPANESE WARSHIPS ARE A BIT MORE ALERT AND ALL JAPANESE SHIPS MAY
ZIGZAG. YOU ONLY HAVE RADAR IF IT'S HISTORICALLY APPROPRIATE.
YOUR SUBMARINE MORE VULNERABLE TO DAMAGE. YOU HAVE A CHOICE BE-
TWEEN "FLAWLESS AND "HISTORICAL" TORPEDOES.
THIS VERSION IS SUGGESTED FOR "NORMAL" PLAYERS FAMILIAR WITH THE
GAME. IT'S A BIT EASIER THAN THE REALITY FACED BY SKIPPERS DURING
THE WAR (A LOT EASIER IF YOU SELECT FLAWLESS TORPEDOES)
ADVANCED: THIS LEVEL IS SIMILAR TO "NORMAL", BUT THE JAPANESE ARE
YET MORE SKILLFUL AND FREQUENTLY ZIG-ZAG, WHILE YOUR SUBMARINE'S
ABILITY STAND DAMAGE IS FAIRLY REALISTIC. YOU CAN STILL PICK
BETWEEN "FLAWLESS "HISTORICAL" TORPEDOES.
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THIS VERSION IS SUGGESTED FOR "EXPERIENCED" PLAYERS WHO ROUTINELY
DO VERY WELL IN THE "NORMAL" VERSION. WITH HISTORICAL TORPEDOES,
THIS VERSION IS A CLOSE APPROXIMATION OF WWII REALITY.
ULTIMATE: THIS IS THE MOST DIFFICULT SETTING FOR THE GAME. THE
JAPANESE ARE SHARP-EYED SCOUNDRELS WHO CAN SMELL YOU COMING AT
LONG RANGES. YOUR SUBMARINE WAS BUILT SLAP-DASH, SO IT'S A BIT
WEAKER THAN NORMAL, YOU'RE FORCED TO USE HISTORICAL TORPEDOES,
THIS VERSION IS DESIGNED FOR PLAYERS WHO HAVE EXHAUSTED THE CHAL-
LENGE OF "ADVANCED" PLAY. IT'S PROBABLY A BIT HARDER THAN REAL
LIFE. ON THE OTHER HAND, THE POINT SCORING AWARDS ARE THE HIGH-
EST.
ENTER YOUR NAME
TYPING YOUR NAME HERE MEANS THAT ALL ORDERS AND RECORDS REFLECT
YOUR NAME. TYPICAL MILITARY FORM IS A FIRST INITIAL AND A FULL
LAST NAME, BUT MANY SUBMARINER SKIPPERS WERE KNOWN BY A NICKNAME
AND A LAST NAME (SUCH AS "MUSH" MORTON OR "DICK" O'KANE).
SELECT STARTING DATE
THIS OPTION DOES NOT APPEAR IN SINGLE HISTORICAL BATTLES, SINCE
THE DATE FIXED HISTORICALLY.
OTHERWISE, THIS DETERMINES THE DATE YOU TAKE COMMAND OF YOUR NEW
BOAT. USE THE CURSOR KEYS TO SELECT THE MONTH, DAY AND YEAR. THE
DATE AFFECTS SUBMARINES AVAILABLE, WHETHER YOU HAVE RADAR (AT
"NORMAL" DIFFICULTY AND HIGHER), AND WHAT'S HAPPENING IN THE WAR.
IN A WAR PATROL OR WAR CAREER, IT DETERMINES YOUR CHOICE OF START-
ING BASE. FINALLY, IN A WAR CAREER IT DETERMINES HOW LONG THE WAR
WILL LAST - THE LATER THE DATE, THE SOONER THE WAR WILL END.
RECOMMENDED CHOICE: ALL AMERICAN SUBMARINES HAD RADAR BY THE
START OF 1943, AND HAD FIXED ALL TORPEDO DEFECTS BY THE START OF
1944. NEW PLAYERS ARE ADVISED TO SELECT A DATE IN EARLY 1944 - THE
"HAPPY HUNTING TIME" FOR AMERICAN SUBMARINES. WAR PATROLS FROM
NOVEMBER 1944 ONWARD CAN BE FRUSTRATING BECAUSE MOST JAPANESE
SHIPPING WAS ALREADY SUNK!
SELECT SUBMARINE CLASS
SUBMARINES ARE LISTED IN ASCENDING ORDER. THAT IS, THE FURTHER
DOWN THE LIST, THE BETTER THE BOAT. NATURALLY, POINT SCORING IS
IMPROVED IF YOU HAVE A POORER BOAT. SEE PAGES 107-113 FOR COMPLETE
DATA ON ALL CLASSES. A COPY OF THESE "TECHNICAL SPECS" ALSO AP-
PEARS IN YOUR LOGBOOK FOR EASY REFERENCE.
OLD `S' CLASS: THIS IS THE WORST POSSIBLE BOAT, WITH A VERY SLOW
SURFACED SPEED, FEW TORPEDO TUBES, AND VERY FEW TORPEDOES. IT ALSO
HAS EXCEPTIONALLY SHORT RANGE (35 DAYS). ONLY EXPERIENCED PLAYER
SHOULD CHOOSE THIS CLASS, AND
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22
THEN BE CAREFUL TO STAY WITHIN THE OPERATIONAL LIMITS OF THIS
TYPE.
BARRACUDA CLASS: THIS IS A MODEST IMPROVEMENT OVER THE "S" CLASS.
THE BIGGEST GAIN IS A LONGER RANGE (50 DAYS), MAKING WAR PATROLS
EASIER. IT'S ALSO A LARGE, STRONG SUBMARINE. ASIDE FROM THE NAR-
WHALS, NOT UNTIL THE GATO CLASS DID THE US NAVY PRODUCE A SUBMA-
RINE OF EQUIVALENT STRENGTH.
NARWHAL CLASS: THIS CLASS IS VERY SLOW SUBMERGED, AND NOT VERY
MANEUVERABLE. ITS ONLY REDEEMING FEATURES ARE EXTREMELY POWERFUL
DECKGUNS AND A LARGE CAPACITY TO WITHSTAND DAMAGE (BECAUSE OF ITS
GREAT SIZE). IT IS THE FIRST OF THE FULL-RANGED (60-DAY) SUBMARINE
CLASSES.
'P' CLASS: THIS CLASS IS THE FIRST OF THE "FLEET BOATS". IT HAS
GOOD SPEED, FULL-RANGED ENDURANCE, BUT FEWER TORPEDOES AND TORPEDO
TUBES THAN YOU MIGHT DESIRE. ASIDE FROM THE OLD `S', THIS CLASS IS
THE SMALLEST AND MOST VULNERABLE TO
DAMAGE.
NEW `S' CLASS: THIS CLASS IS FASTER THAN THE P'S AND HAS BETTER
STERN TORPEDO ARMAMENT. IT IS ALSO SLIGHTLY STRONGER.
'T' CLASS: THIS CLASS IS VERY SIMILAR TO THE "GATO". THE MAIN
DIFFERENCE IS A SLIGHTLY SLOWER SPEED SUBMERGED, AND SOMEWHAT LESS
STRENGTH (THE `T'S WERE NO STRONGER THAN THE`S'S).
GATO CLASS: THIS IS THE "STANDARD" CLASS OF US SUBMARINES. IT WAS
USED THROUGHOUT THE WAR IN GREAT NUMBERS. DURING 1942 AND EARLY 4-
3 MANY OLDER TYPES WERE RETIRED, WITH THEIR CAPTAINS AND CREWS
GOING TO THE NEWER GATOS.
IMPROVED GATO CLASS: THE MAIN IMPROVEMENTS ARE A SLIGHTLY DEEPER
DIVING DEPTH AND A MORE POWERFUL DECK GUN. THESE BEGAN IN 1943.
TENCH CLASS: THIS CLASS IS VIRTUALLY IDENTICAL TO THE IMPROVED
GATO IN OPERATING CHARACTERISTICS. IT IS SLIGHTLY HARDER TO SINK.
RECOMMENDED CHOICE: NEW PLAYERS ARE STRONGLY URGED TO SELECT THE
GATO CLASS OR IMPROVED GATO CLASS. ONE OR THE OTHER IS AVAILABLE
THROUGHOUT THE WAR, AND GIVES YOU A STRONG, WELL-ARMED SUBMARINE
SELECT TORPEDO TYPE
THE SPECIFIC TYPE OF TORPEDO CARRIED (MARK 10, 14, 18-1 OR 18-2)
DEPENDS ON YOUR BOAT AND THE TIME PERIOD. OLD `S' BOATS
AUTOMATICALLY GET MARK 10S. LATER SUBS AUTOMATICALLY GET MARK 14S
UNTIL THE MARK 18S ARRIVE. THEN YOU HAVE YOUR CHOICE OF 14S OR
18S. SEE PAGES 114--115 FOR DETAILED TORPEDO SPECIFICATIONS.
FLAWLESS TORPEDOES: THESE TORPEDOES HAVE NO FAULTS. THEY ALWAYS
EXPLODE WHEN THEY HIT A TARGET. HOWEVER, THEY ARE STILL GOVERNED
BY REALISTIC
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VALUES FOR MAXIMUM RANGE AND SPEED. THE AMOUNT OF DAMAGE CAUSED IS
REALISTICALLY VARIABLE AS WELL.
IN ADDITION, AT THE "INTRODUCTORY" DIFFICULTY LEVEL THE TORPEDO
HAS A MORE POWERFUL WARHEAD WHICH DOES EXTRA DAMAGE.
HISTORICAL TORPEDOES: THESE TORPEDOES HAVE REALISTIC FAULTS. ALL
TORPEDOES MAY BE DUDS OCCASIONALLY, EVEN THE LATE-WAR MODEL 18S.
THIS IS REALISTIC, BUT SOMETIMES FRUSTRATING TO GAME PLAYERS.
IN ADDITION THE MARK 14S HAVE ALL THEIR HISTORICAL FAULTS IN
APPROPRIATE HISTORICAL PERIODS. THIS MEANS AN INCREASED CHANCE OF
PREMATURE EXPLOSIONS UNTIL THE MAGNETIC EXPLODER IS DISCARDED
OR DISABLED, AND AN INCREASED CHANCE OF DUDS (DEPENDING ON CONTACT
ANGLE) UNTIL THE CONTACT EXPLODER IS FIXED.
WARNING: THE MARK 14-TORPEDO FAULTS ARE VERY REALISTIC, AND ARE
CORRECTED PIECEMEAL (AS THEY WERE IN REAL LIFE). HISTORICAL GAMERS
WILL UNDOUBTEDLY ENJOY THIS CHALLENGE. HOWEVER, REMEMBER THAT
THESE FAULTS CAN BE FRUSTRATING. NOBODY LIKES TO SEE A BIG TARGET
ESCAPE JUST BECAUSE THE SILLY TORPEDOES MALFUNCTIONED. IF THE
PROSPECT OF THIS BOTHERS YOU, CHOOSE FLAWLESS TORPEDOES.
SELECT YOUR STARTING BASE
THIS OPTION IS AVAILABLE IF YOU'RE STARTING A WAR PATROL OR A WAR
CAREER. YOUR STARTING BASE AFFECTS WHICH SUBMARINE COMMAND DI-
RECTS YOUR OPERATIONS (SUBPAC OR SUBSOWESPAC), WHICH IN TURN
AFFECTS THE WAR PATROL ZONES AVAILABLE TO YOU. EQUIPMENT UPGRADES
AND SOLUTIONS TO MARK 14 TORPEDO PROBLEMS ARE ALSO AFFECTED.
ON MOST COMPUTERS YOU USE THE CURSOR KEYS TO TOGGLE THROUGH THE
BASE POSSIBILITIES. PRESS THE "ENTER" KEY TO SELECT THE BASE OF
YOUR CHOICE.
SELECT WAR PATROL ZONE
THIS OPTION APPEARS WHENEVER YOU START A WAR PATROL (INCLUDING
EACH PATROL IN A WAR CAREER). YOUR STARTING PORT AND HIGH COMMAND
(SUBPAC OR SUBSOWESPAC) AFFECT THE WAR PATROL ZONES AVAILABLE. IF
YOU'RE USING AN OLD'S' BOAT, BE SURE TO SELECT A ZONE CLOSE TO
YOUR BASE - OTHERWISE YOUR LIMITED FUEL MAY MAKE A SUCCESSFUL
PATROL IMPOSSIBLE.
ON MOST COMPUTERS YOU USE THE CURSOR KEYS TO TOGGLE THROUGH THE
ZONE
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YOUR COMMAND ASSIGNMENT
THIS IS THE NAME OF A REAL US NAVY SUBMARINE OF THE APPROPRIATE
CLASS. AFTER THE OLD `S' CLASS (WHICH USED NUMBERS), AMERICAN
SUBMARINE NAMED AFTER FISH.
SAILING ORDERS
THIS IS A SUMMARY OF YOUR ORDERS FOR THE UPCOMING WAR PATROL. IT
THE PATROL ZONE YOU SELECTED, SAILING DATE, AND OTHER PERTINENT
DATA. IT'S PLACED IN YOUR LOGBOOK FOR EASY REFERENCE.
24
TOURING THE BOAT
THE FOLLOWING SECTION IS A GUIDED TOUR TO ALL THE STATIONS ON
YOUR BOAT. LIKE A REAL SUBMARINE SKIPPER, YOU SHOULD BE FAMILIAR
WITH ALL THE DETAILS OF YOUR COMMAND!
THE INFO PANEL
THIS READOUT PANEL APPEARS OVER THE BOTTOM OF YOUR CHARTS, BRIDGE,
AND PERISCOPE VIEWS. ON THE CHARTS IT CAN BE SWITCHED ON AND OFF
BY PRESSING THE INFO PANEL ON/OFF KEY.
DEPTH: YOUR CURRENT DEPTH, IN FEET. A DEPTH OF "000" MEANS YOU'RE
ON THE SURFACE. "RADAR DEPTH" IS 025 OR LESS - AT THESE DEPTHS
YOUR RADAR IS ABOVE WATER AND FUNCTIONAL. "PERISCOPE DEPTH" IS 055
OR LESS - AT THESE DEPTHS YOUR PERISCOPE CAN BE RAISED ABOVE
WATER.
SPEED: YOUR CURRENT SPEED, IN KNOTS. ONE KNOT IS 2002 YARDS PER
HOUR, OR 33.3 YARDS PER MINUTE. THEREFORE, A BOAT AT 10 KNOTS
TRAVELS 333 YARDS PER MINUTE, AT 20 KNOTS 666 YARDS PER INCH.
HDG (HEADING): YOUR CURRENT COURSE AS A COMPASS DIRECTION. ON A
COMPASS, NORTH IS 000, EAST 090, SOUTH 180, AND WEST 270.
BEARING: THE CURRENT BEARING TO THE ENEMY. EFFECTIVELY, IT IS THE
DIRECTION YOU'RE LOOKING (AS A LOOKOUT, WITH TBT, OR WITH THE
PERISCOPE). NOTE THAT YOUR BEARING AND HEADING CAN BE QUITE
DIFFERENT, LEADING TO PECULIAR OPTICAL ILLUSIONS.
LOADED BOW: THE NUMBER OF BOW TORPEDO TUBES LOADED AND READING
FOR ACTION. THE MAXIMUM VARIES WITH THE TYPE OF SUB YOU COMMAND.
LOADED STERN: THE NUMBER OF STERN TORPEDO TUBES LOADED AND READY
FOR ACTION. THE MAXIMUM VARIES WITH THE TYPE OF SUB YOU COMMAND.
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26
TARGET COURSE: THE COURSE, IN COMPASS DEGREES, OF THE TARGET LAST
"MARKED" BY A LOOKOUT, IN YOUR PERISCOPE, OR IN YOUR TBT.
TDC LIGHT: THIS LIGHT IS "ON" WHEN THE TDC (TORPEDO DATA COMPUTER)
IS RUNNING. IT IS "OFF" WHEN THE COMPUTER IS TURNED OFF. THE TDC
COMPUTES TORPEDO COURSES AND AUTOMATICALLY "PROGRAMS" YOUR TORPE-
DOES.
TORPEDOES RUNNING: THIS SECONDARY PANEL ONLY APPEARS ON YOUR
CHARTS (SEE BELOW). IT SHOWS WHICH TORPEDOES (IF ANY) ARE RUNNING,
PREDICTED "HIT" OR "OUT OF FUEL" TIME.
TORPEDO ID: TORPEDOES FIRED FROM THE BOW TUBES ARE LABELED B1
THROUGH B6. THOSE FIRED FROM THE STERN TUBES ARE LABELLED S1
THROUGH S4.
TORPEDO TDC LIGHT: THIS LIGHT IS ON IF THE TORPEDO WAS FIRED TDC.
IT IS OFF IF THE TORPEDO WAS FIRED MANUALLY.
TORPEDO TIMER: WHEN THIS READS 0:00, NO TORPEDO IS RUNNING.
OTHERWISE, IT SHOWS THE MINUTES OF THE TORPEDO RUN.
IF THE TDC LIGHT IS ON FOR THAT TORPEDO, THE TIMER IS COUNTING
TOWARD THE PREDICTED INTERCEPTION POINT.
IF THE TDC LIGHT IS OFF FOR THAT TORPEDO, THE TIMER COUNTS DOWN
THE TORPEDO'S FUEL (I.E., WHEN IT REACHES ZERO, THE TORPEDO RUNS
OUT OF FUEL).
THE CHART
YOUR SUBMARINE HAS A COMPLETE SET OF CHARTS FOR THE ENTIRE WESTERN
PACIFIC OCEAN AT FOUR DIFFERENT SCALES. THE LARGEST SCALE SHOWS
THE ENTIRE OCEAN ON ONE CHART. SMALLER SCALES SHOW A LARGE,
MEDIUM OR SMALL AMOUNT OF ARE . YOU CHANGE CHART SCALE BY TAPPING
THE ZOOM KEYS.
ALL CHARTS SHOW AREAS OF LAND AND SEA. LIGHTER-COLORED SEA AREAS
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27
ARE SHALLOW WATER. THE DEPTH VARIES
FROM 50 TO 200 FEET EXCEPT CLOSE TO
LAND OR REEFS, WHERE IT MAY BE EVEN
SHALLOWER.
YOUR POSITION ON THE PACIFIC OCEAN (LARGEST SCALE) CHART IS A
SINGLE DOT. ON ALL SMALLER SCALE CHARTS YOUR POSITION IS REPRE-
SENTED BY A SMALL LINE AND A WAKE SHOWING YOUR SPEED AND DIRECTION
OF TRAVEL.
THE ZOOM BOX APPEARS AROUND YOUR POSITION ON ALL CHARTS EXCEPT THE
SMALLEST. IT REPRESENTS THE AREA IN THE NEXT SMALLER CHART. HOWEV-
ER, THE BOX ON THE PACIFIC OCEAN CHART IS OVERSIZED, SINCE AN
ACCURATELY SIZED BOX WOULD BE A SINGLE DOT!
CHART PLOTS
CHART SCALES: THE AMOUNT OF AREA COVERED BY EACH CHART VARIES,
DEPENDING ON WHETHER THE INFORMATION PANEL IS PRESENT ACROSS THE
BOTTOM.
YOUR CREW AUTOMATICALLY UPDATES ("PLOTS") EACH CHART WITH THE
POSITION OF YOUR BOAT, ALL ENEMY SHIPS, AND ALL TORPEDOES. EACH
OF THESE APPEARS AS A SHORT COLORED LINE. THE COLOR VARIES WITH
THE TYPE OF CONTACT (RADAR, SONAR OR VISUAL, IN ASCENDING PRIORI-
TY). EACH HAS A "TAIL", OR WAKE. THE SIZE OF THE WAKE
ROUGHLY REPRESENTS THE SPEED OF THE SHIP OR TORPEDO. THE DIRECTION
OF THE SHIP AND WAKE TOGETHER APPROXIMATE THE DIRECTION OF TRAVEL.
SEE THE TECHNICAL SUPPLEMENT FOR SYMBOLS AND COLORS.
NORMALLY THE CHART BEGINS CENTERED ON YOUR SUBMARINE. HOWEVER, IF
THE TDC (TORPEDO DATA COMPUTER, SEE PAGES 47-50) IS RUNNING, THE
CHART IS CENTERED HALFWAY BETWEEN YOUR SUB AND THE "MARKED" TARGET
(BUT ONLY IF BOTH CAN FIT ON THE CHART AT THAT SCALE).
YOUR CREW CONSTANTLY UPDATES THE POSITION OF YOUR BOAT AND ALL
YOUR TORPEDOES. THEY ALSO UPDATE ALL ENEMY SHIPS WITH THE BEST
AVAILABLE INFORMATION. IF YOUR BOAT CAN SEE THE ENEMY, OR IS USING
RADAR, ENEMY POSITIONS ARE VERY ACCURATE. IF YOUR BOAT IS USING
SONAR ONLY, ENEMY POSITIONS ARE FAIRLY GOOD,BUT NOT PERFECT.
IF THE CREW HAS NO NEW INFORMATION AN A SHIP, THEY REMOVE IT FROM
THE PLOT. OF COURSE, THE ENEMY IS PROBABLY STILL BE THERE, JUST
OUTSIDE OF DETECTION RANGE!
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28
THIS IS ESPECIALLY IMPORTANT IF YOU'RE SURFACING AFTER RUNNING
DEEP. IT PAYS TO RAISE THE PERISCOPE AND LOOK AROUND FIRST!
THE CREW ALSO PLOTS SINKING SHIPS FOR A WHILE AFTER THEY DISAPPEAR
BENEATH THE SURFACE. THIS HELPS REMIND YOU THAT A SLOWLY SINKING
HULK CAN BE A NAVIGATION HAZARD.
PERISCOPE
THE PERISCOPE MUST BE RAISED ("UP") BEFORE YOU CAN USE THIS VIEW.
YOUR DEPTH MUST BE 55' OR LESS TO USE THE PERISCOPE. YOU CANNOT
USE THE PERISCOPE IF IT'S LOWERED. IF YOU PRESS PERISCOPE AND
NOTHING HAPPENS THE PERISCOPE IS PROBABLY DOWN. TRY TAPPING PERI-
SCOPE UP/DOWN ONCE TO RAISE THE SCOPE.
THE DIRECTION YOUR VIEW FACES APPEARS IN BEARING ON THE INFO
PANEL. THE PERISCOPE CAN BE ROTATED TO LOOK IN ANY DIRECTION.
THE VIEW LEFT, VIEW LEFT FAST, VIEW RIGHT AND VIEW RIGHT FAST KEYS
CONTROL ROTATION.
VIEW AREA: THIS IS THE SEASCAPE VISIBLE THROUGH THE PERISCOPE
LENS. THE VIEW CAN BE ROTATED LEFT OR RIGHT. THE VIEW LEFT, VIEW
LEFT FAST, VIEW RIGHT AND VIEW RIGHT FAST KEYS CONTROL ROTATION.
HOWEVER, THESE ONLY WORK IF THE TDC IS OFF. IF THE TDC IS RUNNING
THESE KEYS CONTROL THE TORPEDO AIMING POINTER.
AIMING SCALE: THIS SCALE IN THE BOTTOM OF THE VIEW AREA IS USED TO
"MARK" TARGETS AND AIM TORPEDOES. WHENEVER THE SCALE BRIGHTENS
YOU HAVE "MARKED" A TARGET. YOUR CREW AUTOMATICALLY UPDATES ALL
TORPEDO FIRING DATA TO THE LAST "MARK" GIVEN. THIS DATA ALSO
APPEARS ON THE INFO PANEL.
YOUR CREW CAN ONLY TRACK ON TARGET A A TIME. WHEN EVER YOU GIVE A
NEW "MARK" (BY MOVING THE SCALE ONTO A TARGET UNTIL IT BRIGHTENS)
YOU ERASE ALL EARLIER INFORMATION.
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TORPEDO AIMING POINTER: THIS APPEARS ON THE BRIGHTENED SCALE ONLY
WHEN THE TDC IS ON (RUNNING). IT AIMS TORPEDOES LEFT, RIGHT OR
DIRECTLY AT THE TARGET. THE VIEW LEFT AND VIEW RIGHT KEYS
ADJUST THE AIMING POINTER, NOT YOUR VIEW AREA.
MAGNIFICATION: YOUR PERISCOPE HAS FOUR MAGNIFICATION LEVELS: "1 "
(NORMAL VISION) TO "4" (MAXIMUM MAGNIFICATION). THESE ARE CON-
TROLLED BY THE ZOOM AND UNZOOM KEYS.
INFO PANEL: SEE ABOVE.
BRIDGE LOOKOUT
THE BRIDGE LOOKOUT IS AVAILABLE ONLY IF YOU'RE ON THE SURFACE (AT
DEPTH 000). IT SHOWS THE VIEW FROM THE TOP OF THE CONNING TOWER
("BRIDGE"), AS SEEN BY A LOOKOUT. IT SHOWS ONE QUARTER (ABOUT 90")
OF THE HORIZON AROUND YOUR BOAT. THE DIRECTION YOU'RE FACING
APPEARS IN BEARING ON THE INFO PANEL.
THE VIEW CAN BE ROTATED LEFT OR RIGHT.
THE VIEW LEFT, VIEW LEFT FAST, VIEW RIGHT AND VIEW RIGHT FAST KEYS
CONTROL ROTATION.
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THIS IS AVAILABLE ONLY IF YOU'RE ON THE SURFACE (AT DEPTH 000).
IT SHOWS THE THE VIEW FROM THE TOP OF THE CONNING TOWER (BRIDGE)
AS YOU LOOK THROUGH BINOCULARS MOUNTED IN THE TBT (TARGET BEARING
TRANSMITTER).
THE TBT (TARGET BEARING TRANSMITTER) IS USED TO AIM YOUR TORPEDOES
AND DECK GUN WHILE YOU'RE ON THE SURFACE. THE DIRECTION YOU'VE
LOOKING APPEARS IN BEARING ON THE INFO PANEL.
VIEW AREA: THIS IS THE SEASCAPE VISIBLE THROUGH THE BINOCULAR
LENSES. THE VIEW CAN BE ROTATED LEFT OR RIGHT. THE VIEW LEFT,
VIEW LEFT FAST, VIEW RIGHT, AND VIEW RIGHT FAST KEYS CONTROL
ROTATION. THESE KEYS WORK WHILE THE TDC IS OFF. IF THE TDC IS
RUNNING, THESE KEYS CONTROL THE TORPEDO AIMING POINTER INSTEAD.
DECK GUN ELEVATION ADJUSTMENT: THIS INDICATES HOW MUCH EXTRA
ELEVATION OR DEPRESSION YOU'RE ORDERING TO THE DECK GUN CREW. A
"0" MEANS THE GUN IS ELEVATED CORRECTLY FOR THE TARGET'S CURRENT
RANGE. A "+1" OR MORE MEANS THE GUN IS ELEVATED ESPECIALLY HIGH
(USEFUL IF THE TARGET IS OPENING THE RANGE TO YOU), WHILE "-1" OR
LESS MEANS THE GUN IS DEPRESSED MORE THAN NORMAL (USEFUL IF THE
TARGET IS CLOSING THE RANGE). NOTE: "0" DOES NOT MEAN THE DECK
GUN IS SHOOTING AT "0" RANGE.
DECK GUN ELEVATION IS CONTROLLED BY ADDING OR SUBTRACTING DEGREES
USING THE GUN DOWN (-) 1 DEGREE AND THE GUN UP (+) 1 DEGREE KEYS.
IMPORTANT NOTE: YOU CANNOT USE THE DECK GUN UNLESS YOUR TDC IS
ALREADY TRACKING A TARGET. SEE TDC ON/OFF (PAGE 51) FOR DETAILS.
AIMING SCALE: THIS SCALE IN THE BOTTOM OF THE VIEW AREA "MARKS"
TARGETS AND AIMS THE DECK GUN AND TORPEDOES. WHENEVER THE SCALE
BRIGHTENS YOU HAVE "MARKED" A TARGET.
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YOUR CREW AUTOMATICALLY UPDATES ALL FIRING DATA TO THE LAST "MARK"
GIVEN. THIS DATA ALSO APPEARS ON THE INFO PANEL.
YOUR CREW TRACKS ONLY ONE TARGET AT A TIME. WHENEVER YOU GIVE A
NEW "MARK" (BY MOVING THE SCALE ONTO A TARGET UNTIL IT BRIGHTENS)
YOU DROP THE PREVIOUS TARGET.
TORPEDO AIMING POINTER: THIS APPEARS ON THE BRIGHTENED SCALE WHEN
THE TDC IS ON (RUNNING). IT AIMS TORPEDOES LEFT, RIGHT OR DIRECTLY
AT THE TARGET. VIEW LEFT AND VIEW RIGHT KEYS ADJUST THE AIMING
POINTER, NOT YOUR VIEW AREA.
MAGNIFICATION: THE TBT BINOCULARS HAVE FOUR MAGNIFICATION LEVELS:
"1" (NORMAL VISION) TO "4" (MAXIMUM MAGNIFICATION). THESE ARE
CONTROLLED BY THE ZOOM AND UNZOOM KEYS.
INFO PANEL: SEE ABOVE.
GAUGES
BY TAPPING THE GAUGES KEY, YOU
CAN SEE ALL THE IMPORTANT GAUGES THAT
REPORT ON THE CONDITIONS OF YOUR BOAT
AND THE SURROUNDING ENVIRONMENT.\
CRITICAL GAUGES
THESE GAUGES PROVIDE INFORMATION USEFUL IN BATTLE AND UNAVAILABLE
ELSEWHERE. YOU SHOULD CONSULT THE GAUGES PERIODICALLY.
DEPT UNDER KEEL (DUK): THIS INDICATES THE DEPTH OF THE WATER (IN
FEET) BETWEEN THE KEEL (BOTTOM) OF YOUR SUB AND SEA BOTTOM. KEEP
A CLOSE EYE ON THE DUK IF YOU'RE IN SHALLOW WATER OR UNDERTAKING
A DEEP DIVE. HITTING THE BOTTOM CAN SERIOUSLY DAMAGE YOUR SUB.
WATER TEMPERATURE (TEMP): THIS INDICATES THE TEMPERATURE OF THE
WATER OUTSIDE THE HULL. THIS IS VERY IMPORTANT IF YOU'RE TRYING
TO EVADE
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DETECTION BY ENEMY SONAR. AT A MIDDLE DEPTH (USUALLY BETWEEN 100'
AND 200') THE WATER TEMPERATURE SUDDENLY DROPS, THE BOUNDARY
BETWEEN THE WARM SURFACE WATER AND THE COLD DEEPER WATER IS "THE
LAYER". THIS BOUNDARY LINE DEFLECTS SONAR, WHICH HELPS HIDE YOU
FROM SURFACE SHIPS.
BATTERY LEVEL: WHEN SUBMERGED YOUR SUB IS POWERED BY BATTERIES,
WHICH DISCHARGE SLOWLY. MOVING SUBMERGED INCREASES THE AMOUNT OF
DISCHARGE. THE FASTER YOU GO, THE FASTER YOUR BATTERIES DISCHARGE.
WHILE SITTING STATIONARY, YOUR BATTERY CAN LAST ABOUT 24 HOURS, AT
QUARTER SPEED ABOUT 12 HOURS, HALF SPEED ABOUT 5 HOURS, AT FULL
SPEED ABOUT 2 1/4 HOURS, AND AT FLANK SPEED ABOUT 1 1/4-HOURS.
YOUR BATTERIES CAN ONLY BE RECHARGED WHILE ON THE SURFACE.
WHENEVER YOU'RE SURFACED, ANY DIESEL ENGINES NOT USED FOR MOVEMENT
ARE USED INSTEAD TO RECHARGE THE BATTERIES. IT TAKES ALL FOUR
DIESEL ENGINES A COUPLE OF HOURS TO COMPLETELY RECHARGE THE BAT-
TERIES. HOWEVER, YOU MUST BE AT "ALL STOP" TO USE FOUR DIESELS
FOR RECHARGING. IF YOU HAVE SOME ENGINES MOVING THE BOAT, IT TAKES
PROPORTIONATELY LONGER TO RECHARGE THE BATTERIES (WITH TWO ENGINES
MOVING THE BOAT AND TWO RECHARGING, IT TAKES TWICE AS LONG, WITH
THREE MOVING THE BOAT AND ONE RECHARGING, FOUR TIMES AS LONG). NO
RECHARGING OCCURS IF YOU'RE MOVING AT FLANK (MAXIMUM) SPEED.
CLOCK: THIS IS A 24-HOUR MILITARY CLOCK. AS ON ALL CLOCKS, THE
SMALL HAND SHOWS THE HOURS, THE LARGE HAND THE MINUTES. ON A
MILITARY CLOCK TIME RUNS FROM 0000 TO 2400. FOR EXAMPLE 8 AM IS
0800; NOON IS 1200, 3 PM IS 1500, 10 PM IS 2200 AND MIDNIGHT IS
2400.
USEFUL GAUGES
THESE GAUGES EITHER REPEAT INFORMATION ON THE INFO PANEL OR ARE
LESS CRITICAL IN BATTLE.
SPEED: THIS SHOWS YOUR CURRENT SPEED IN KNOTS (NAUTICAL MILES PER
HOUR).
ENGINE ROOM TELEGRAPH: THIS SHOWS WHICH OF THE FOUR ENGINES ARE
MOVING THE SUB. IF "4" IS LIT, ALL ENGINES ARE RUNNING FOR MAXI-
MUM SPEED. WHEN "2" IS LIT, TWO ARE RUNNING FOR HALF SPEED, ETC.
"STOP" MEANS NONE ARE RUNNING. "BACK" MEANS ALL ENGINES ARE
MOVING THE BOAT SLOWLY IN REVERSE.
IF YOU'RE ON THE SURFACE, ANY ENGINE NOT CURRENTLY DRIVING THE SUB
IS RECHARGING THE BATTERIES - IF THEY NEED RECHARGING.
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DEPTH: THIS INDICATES THE CURRENT DEPTH (IN FEET) OF YOUR SUBMA-
RINE. ONCE YOU BEGIN TO SUBMERGE (GO TO A DEPTH OF 1' OR MORE) ALL
HATCHES ARE CLOSED AND LOCKED. THIS PREVENTS YOU FROM GETTING TO
THE BRIDGE LOOKOUT AND BRIDGE TBT. HOWEVER, AT DEPTHS UP TO 25'
YOUR RADAR CAN STILL OPERATE. AT DEPTHS UP TO 55' YOUR PERISCOPE
CAN STILL REACH THE SURFACE.
LEVELING BUBBLE: THIS IS MUCH LIKE A CARPENTER'S LEVEL. IT INDI-
CATES WHETHER THE SUB IS DIVING, RISING, OR RUNNING STEADY. WHEN
THE BUBBLE FLOATS TO THE RIGHT, YOU'RE DIVING; WHEN TO THE LEFT,
YOU'RE CLIMBING. WHEN THE BUBBLE IS IN THE MIDDLE, YOUR SUB IS
LEVEL.
COMPASS: THIS INDICATING THE DIRECTION YOU'RE TRAVELING. NORTH IS
000, EAST IS 090, SOUTH IS 180, AND WEST IS 270.
FORWARD TORPEDO TUBE INDICATORS SHOW THE NUMBER OF FORWARD TORPEDO
TUBES CURRENTLY LOADED. A TUBE THAT'S LOADED AND READY IS ILLUMI-
NATED, A TUBE THAT'S EMPTY OR RELOADING IS DARK.
AFT TORPEDO TUBE INDICATORS SHOW THE NUMBER OF AFT TORPEDO TUBES
CURRENTLY LOADED. A TUBE THAT'S LOADED AND READY IS ILLUMINATED, A
TUBE THAT'S EMPTY OR RELOADING IS DARK.
FORWARD TORPEDO RELOADS INDICATES THE NUMBER OF TORPEDOS AVAILABLE
FOR RELOADING IN FORWARD TUBES. THEREFORE, THE TOTAL NUMBER OF
FORWARD-FIRING TORPEDOS ON YOUR BOAT IS THE NUMBER OF LOADED TUBES
PLUS THESE RELOADS.
AFT TORPEDO RELOADS INDICATES THE NUMBER OF TORPEDOS AVAILABLE FOR
RELOADING IN AFT TUBES. THEREFORE, THE TOTAL NUMBER OF AFT-FIRING
TORPEDOS ON YOUR BOAT IS THE NUMBER OF LOADED TUBES PLUS THESE
RELOADS.
FUEL GAUGE: THIS "COLUMN" GAUGE SHOWS YOUR REMAINING FUEL OIL. IT
HAS THREE COLUMNS, WITH EACH DIVIDED INTO A NUMBER OF SECTIONS.
SINCE OIL IS BLACK, THE DARK AREAS SHOW FUEL REMAINING, WHILE
LIGHTER SECTIONS SHOW WATER. NOTE -THAT OIL FLOATS ON WATER, AND
IS THEREFORE ALWAYS AT THE TOP PART OF THE GAUGE.
CHRISTMAS TREE: THIS AREA SHOWS WHICH HATCHES AND OTHER OPENINGS
ARE OPEN (RED) OR CLOSED (GREEN). THE "TREE" IS GREEN WHEN YOU
DIVE.
DAMAGE REPORT
THIS DISPLAY SHOWS THE MAJOR SYSTEMS ON YOUR SUBMARINE, AND THEIR
DAMAGE STATUS. WHENEVER A SYSTEM IS DAMAGED, ITS CURRENT CONDI-
TION IS LIGHTED. IF A SYSTEM IS UNDAMAGED OR COMPLETELY RE-
PAIRED, IT'S DARK.
SOME DAMAGE IS TEMPORARY. IF SO, "REPAIRING" MAY BE LIGHTED ALSO.
REPAIRS CAN TAKE A FEW MINUTES TO A FEW DAYS, DEPENDING ON THE
SYSTEM.
SOME DAMAGE IS PERMANENT. IT CANNOT BE REPAIRED UNTIL YOU RETURN
TO BASE. ONCE AT A FRIENDLY BASE, ALL DAMAGE IS AUTOMATICALLY
REPAIRED.
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DAMAGE PERCENTAGE: YOUR SUB CANNOT TAKE DAMAGE FOREVER. EVENTU-
ALLY THE ACCUMULATED DAMAGE WILL WEAKEN YOUR HULL SO MUCH THAT THE
SUBMARINE SINKS IN FACT, A QUICK SERIES OF VERY BAD HITS COULD DO
THIS ALMOST INSTANTLY. THE DAMAGE PERCENTAGE IS AN ESTIMATE FROM
YOUR CREW OF HOW CLOSE YOU'VE COME TO A CATASTROPHIC COLLAPSE AND
SINKING. SOMETIMES YOU MAY FINS THE PERCENTAGE BECOMES LESS.
THIS OCCURS AS THE CREW REPAIRS DAMAGE. IF DAMAGE DOES NOT
THREATEN THE WATERTIGHT INTEGRITY OF THE BOAST THE CREW MAY IGNORE
IT FOR PERCENTAGE PURPOSES. AS A RESULT YOU MAY HAVE A PIECE OF
EQUIPMENT MALFUNCTIONING WHILE THE DAMAGE READS 00%.
SOME DAMAGE IS UNREPAIRABLE EXCEPT AT A BASE. AS CAPTAIN YOU MUST
JUDGE WHEN YOU SHOULD BREAK OFF THE BATTLE OR THE PATROL AND
RETURN FOR REPAIRS.
PERISCOPE
YOU CANNOT LOOK THROUGH A DAMAGED PERISCOPE--USUALLY BECAUSE THE
TUBE IS BENT AND/OR JAMMED. THIS MAKES UNDERWATER ATTACKS SO
DIFFICULT AND INACCURATE THAT YOU'RE ADVISED TO ATTACK ONLY FROM
THE SURFACE.
PERISCOPE DAMAGE CAN BE REPAIRED ONLY AT A BASE.
RADAR
WRECKED RADAR DOES NOT FUNCTION AT ALL. AS A RESULT, YOUR CON-
TACTS ARE AT CLOSER RANGES. YOU'LL HAVE TO RELY ON EYESIGHT,
PERISCOPE OBSERVATIONS AND SONAR, WHICH ARE USUALLY SHORTER RANGED
THAN RADAR.
IN 1944 AND 1945 WRECKED RADAR IS ESPECIALLY DISADVANTAGEOUS AT
NIGHT SINCE THE JAPANESE MAY HAVE THEIR OWN RADARS, AND THEREFORE
COULD (ON THEIR RADAR) BEFORE YOU SPOT THEM (WITH YOUR LOOKOUTS).
WRECKED RADAR CAN BE REPAIRED ONLY AT A BASE.
DECK GUN
A WRECKED DECK GUN CANNOT FIRE. NOW YOUR ONLY WEAPON IS TORPE-
DOES. ONCE WRECKED, A DECK GUN CAN BE REPAIRED ONLY AT A BASE.
TORPEDO ROOMS
THESE ARE THE CREW AREAS THAT RELOAD AND CONTROL THE TORPEDO
TUBES. MOST SPARE TORPEDOES ARE ALSO STORED HERE.
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FLOODING/REPAIRING: WHEN A TORPEDO ROOM IS DAMAGED IT BEGINS TO
FLOOD. THE CREW IMMEDIATELY BEGINS REPAIRS. WHILE REPAIRS ARE IN
PROGRESS THE TUBES CANNOT BE FIRED. ONCE THE CREW HAS COMPLETED
REPAIRS, THE EFFICIENCY OF THE TORPEDO ROOM RETURNS TO NORMAL.
HALF OUT: IF A FLOODING TORPEDO ROOM SUFFERS FURTHER DAMAGE, HALF
OR ALL OF THE TUBES MAY BE PERMANENTLY OUT OF ACTION.
ENGINES
YOUR SUB HAS FOUR DIESEL ENGINES. THESE PROVIDE POWER FOR MOVING
ON THE SURFACE AND FOR RECHARGING BATTERIES. WHENEVER AN ENGINE IS
WRECKED YOUR MAXIMUM SPEED IS REDUCED (AND BATTERY RECHARGING IS
MADE MORE DIFFICULT).
DAMAGED/REPAIRING: A DAMAGED ENGINE IS OUT OF ACTION UNTIL THE
CREW REPAIRS IT. ONCE REPAIRED, IT FUNCTIONS NORMALLY AGAIN.
ENGINE REPAIRS ARE OFTEN LENGTHY - DON'T EXPECT RESULTS IN JUST A
FEW MINUTES.
WRECKED: A WRECKED ENGINE IS BEYOND REPAIR BY YOUR CREW. IT
CANNOT BE USED FOR THE REST OF THE VOYAGE. IT CAN BE REPAIRED
ONLY AT A BASE.
FUEL TANKS
THE FUEL TANKS CARRY OIL FOR YOUR DIESEL ENGINES. IF A FUEL TANK
IS DAMAGED, YOU IMMEDIATELY LOSE A LARGE AMOUNT OF OIL. THIS LOSS
CAN SERIOUSLY AFFECT YOUR CRUISING RANGE.
THE CREW AUTOMATICALLY SHUTS OFF VALVES TO ISOLATE THE DAMAGE.
HOWEVER, SMALL LEAKS CONTINUE. THE LEAKAGE MAY REVEAL YOUR POSI-
TION TO A NEARBY ENEMY, BUT ISN'T LARGE ENOUGH TO CAUSE ANY FUR-
THER REDUCTIONS IN YOUR CRUISING RANGE.
YOU CAN SUFFER MULTIPLE HIS IN YOUR FUEL TANKS, WITH A ONE-TIME
LOSS IN CRUISING RANGE WITH EACH HIT. LEAKING FUEL TANKS CAN BE
REPAIRED ONLY AT A BASE.
BATTERIES
YOUR SUB USES TWO LARGE BANKS OF BATTERIES, ON FORWARD, ONE AFT,
TO POWER ITS ELECTRIC ENGINES FOR UNDERWATER TRAVEL. IF ONE
BATTER IS DAMAGED YOU'RE REDUCED TO HALF SPEED SUBMERGED. IF BOTH
ARE DAMAGED YOU'RE IMMOBILIZED UNTIL AT LEAST ONE IS REPAIRED, OR
UNTIL YOU SURFACE. YOU CAN STILL SURFACE AND DIVE, REGARDLESS OF
BATTERY DAMAGE.
DAMAGED/REPAIRING: THE BATTER IS OUT OF ACTION UNTIL THE CREW
REPAIRS IT. ONCE REPAIRED, IT FUNCTIONS NORMALLY AGAIN.
FLOODED, SURFACE: IF A DAMAGED BATTERY SUFFERS FURTHER DAMAGE,
FLOODING REACHES LEAKING BATTERY ACIDS, GENERATING DEADLY CHLORINE
GAS. YOU MUST SURFACE IMMEDIATELY, BEFORE THE GAS KILLS YOU AND
YOUR CREW. IN THIS SITUATION YOU SHOULD HIT THE BLOW ALL TANKS
KEY AND SURFACE AS FAST AS POSSIBLE.
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ONCE SURFACED YOUR CREW IMMEDIATELY VENTS THE GAS FUMES. YOU CAN
DIVE AGAIN IF YOU WISH. MEANWHILE, REPAIRS CONTINUE ON THE DAMAGED
BATTERY.
DIVE PLANES
THE DIVE PLANES ALLOW YOUR BOAT TO DIVE AND SURFACE QUICKLY: THEY
ACT AS "WINGS," GUIDING THE SHIP SMOOTHLY UP OR DOWN. IF THE DIVE
PLANES ARE DAMAGED YOUR ABILITY TO CONTROL THE SHIP WHEN DIVING OR
CLIMBING IS REDUCED. @ IT TAKES LONGER TO DIVE AND LONGER TO
SURFACE.
ADDITIONAL DAMAGE TO THE DIVE PLANES CAN WRECK THEM. IF THE PLANES
ARE WRECKED YOU CANNOT DIVE AT ALL, AND CAN RISE ONLY BY "BLOWING
ALL TANK THE SURFACE. REPAIRING WRECKED PLANES IS VIRTUALLY IMPOS-
SIBLE AT SEA TO BE STUCK ON THE SURFACE UNTIL YOU REACH A BASE FOR
REPAIRS.
FIRE MIDSHIPS
SOMETIMES DAMAGE CAUSES FIRES. THE MOST LIKELY AREA IS THE WHERE
MANY ELECTRICAL CONNECTIONS MEET IN THE CONTROL PANELS. WHEN A
OCCURS THE CREW WORKS QUICKLY TO EXTINGUISH IT. HOWEVER, UNTIL
IT'S OUT OF THE CREW REACTS SLOWLY TO ALL YOUR COMMANDS. IN FACT,
DON'T BE SURPRISED IF SEEMS TO IGNORE YOUR COMMANDS (YOU MAY NEED
TO PRESS A KEY MULTIPLE TIMES TO "GET THROUGH" TO YOUR DISTRACTED
CREW).
A CONTINUING FIRE CAUSES DAMAGE TO YOUR STRUCTURAL STRENGTH AND
THE SUBMARINE'S OVERALL SURVIVABILITY.
BULKHEADS
YOUR SUBMARINE'S STRUCTURAL STRENGTH LARGELY DEPENDS ON ITS BULK-
HEADS. THESE ARE THE BASIC SKELETAL STRUCTURE OF THE VESSEL. IF
A BULKHEAD BUCKLES OR CRACKS, THE ENTIRE HULL IS WEAKENED. THIS
PRODUCES PERMANENT DAMAGE.
WEAKENED/REPAIRING: WHEN A BULKHEAD IS DAMAGED, THE CREW IMMEDI-
ATELY STARTS REPAIRS. THESE REPAIRS ARE MAINLY "SHORING UP" THE
WEAKENED MEMBER WITH BEAMS CARRIED ESPECIALLY FOR THIS PURPOSE.
ONCE A BULKHEAD IS WEAKENED AND UNDER REPAIR, YOUR MAXIMUM SAFE
DIVING DEPTH IS REDUCED TO HALF(50%) OF THE NORMAL VALUE. FUR-
THERMORE YOUR BOAT CANNOT TURN AS FAST.
SHORED UP: IF REPAIRS ARE SUCCESSFUL, THE BULKHEAD IS "SHORED UP"
TURNING ABILITY BECOMES SOMEWHAT BETTER, BUT THE SAFE DIVING DEPTH
IS STILL (50%) OF THE NORMAL VALUE . FURTHERMORE, THE OVERALL
STRENGTH OF THE SUBMARINE REMAINS LESS THAN BEFORE.
MULTIPLE BULKHEAD HITS GREATLY WEAKEN THE HULL OF YOUR SUBMARINE,
UNTIL EVENTUALLY IT CRUMPLES. THIS IS TRUE EVEN IF THE BULKHEADS
ARE SHORE( OR MORE BULKHEADS HAVE BEEN WEAKENED, HEAD FOR BASE
IMMEDIATE--EVEN
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IF THEY'RE SHORED UP YOU'RE STILL IN GREAT" DANGER.
SINKING: MULTIPLE BULKHEAD
DAMAGE CAN CRACK YOUR HULL. THE SUB
BEGINS TO BREAK UP AND SINK. IF YOU'RE
VERY QUICK AND VERY LUCKY, SOMETIMES
BLOWING ALL TANKS WILL RELIEVE THE PRESSURE
ON THE HULL AND STOP THIS. BUT THIS
IS A LAST AND OFTEN FORLORN HOPE. USUALLY
YOUR DOOMED.
CAPTAIN'S LOG
TAP THE CAPTAINS LOG KEY. AT ANY TIME DURING PLAY, YOU CAN CON-
SULT THE CAPTAIN'S LOG BOOK. IT CONTAINS CURRENT DATA ABOUT YOUR
BOAT, YOUR SAILING ORDERS AND OTHER RECORDS. USE THE CURSOR KEYS
TO PAGE BACK AND FORTH IN THE LOG BOOK.
STATUS ICONS
THE ICONS APPEAR AT THE BOTTOM RIGHT CORNER OF MOST VIEWS. THEY
REMIND YOU OF VARIOUS OPTIONS CURRENTLY SELECTED.
TIME RATE: DEFAULT SETTING IS "1" WHICH MEANS TIME PASSES AT
"READ LIFE" SPEEDS. HOWEVER, TIME CAN BE SET AS HIGH AS "8" WHERE
TIME PASSES MUCH FASTER.
SOUND VOLUME: THIS INDICATES WETHER ALL, SOME OR NONE OF THE
SOUNDS ARE HEARD. SEE THE TECHNICAL SUPPLEMENT FOR THE DIFFERENT
SETTINGS AVAILABLE.
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ANIMATIONS ON/OFF: THIS INDICATES WHETHER THE GAME SHOW ANIMATIONS
OR NOT.
TORPEDO SPEED: THIS INDICATES WHETHER YOUR TORPEDOES ARE SET TO
RUN AT HIGH SPEED (SHORT RANGE) OR LOW SPEED (LONGER RANGE). THIS
ONLY APPLIES TO MARK 14 TORPEDOES. IF YOU HAVE MARK 10 OR MARK 18
THE SPEED IS ALWAYS HIGH.
RADAR RUNNING: THIS INDICATES THAT YOUR RADAR SET IS ABOVE WATER
AND FUNCTIONING
PERISCOPE: THIS INDICATES WHETHER THE PERISCOPE US UP OR DOWN.
YOU CANNOT LOOK THROUGH THE "SCOPE" UNLESS IT'S UP.
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WAR PATROL CONTROLS
WAR PATROLS ALLOW YOU TO SAIL YOUR SUBMARINE AROUND THE PACIFIC
OCEAN. THE BATTLE CONTROLS (SEE PAGES 42-53) ARE INACTIVE UNTIL
YOU MAKE CONTACT WITH ENEMY SHIPS.
WAR PATROL CONTROLS APPLY ONLY IF YOU SELECT A "WAR PATROL" OR
"WAR CAREER" OPTION, AND ONLY DURING NAVIGATION BETWEEN BATTLES.
WAR PATROL CONTROLS DO NOT APPLY IN "TRAINING" OR "SINGLE BAT-
TLES". (SEE INITIAL OPTIONS, PAGES 19-24, FOR MORE INFORMATION).
VIEWS
ONLY A LIMITED NUMBER OF VIEWS, OFTEN WITH SPECIAL CONTROLS ARE
AVAILABLE DURING WAR PATROL OPERATIONS. (FORE A MORE COMPLETE
DESCRIPTION OF EACH VIEW, SEE TOURING THE BOAT PAGES 23-28)
VIEWS AVAILABLE
CHARTS: ONLY THE TARGETS SCALE CHART IS AVAILABLE, SHOWING THE
ENTIRE INFO PANEL, A SPECIAL PANEL APPEARS IN THE UPPER LEFT
SHOWING CRUCIAL PATROL INFORMATION.
DAMAGE REPORT: THIS IS AVAILABLE SO YOU CAN VIEW THE STATUS OF
YOUR BOAT.
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CAPTAIN'S LOG: THIS IS AVAILABLE, WITH YOUR SAILING ORDERS,
RECENTLY RECEIVED RADIO MESSAGES, AND RECORDS OF YOUR ACCOMPLISH-
MENTS.
UNAVAILABLE VIEWS: BRIDGE LOOKOUT, PERISCOPE, AND BRIDGE TBT.
VIEW CONTROLS-CHART
IN WAR PATROLS, THE NORMAL ZOOM AND UNZOOM FUNCTIONS ARE UNAVAIL-
ABLE. INSTEAD YOU HAVE ONE SPECIAL OPTION.
PORTS: TOP THE PORTS KEY TO SEE ALL JAPANESE AND AMERICAN
PORTS/BASES ON THE MAP. JAPANESE BASES ARE AREAS OF LARGE NAVAL
ACTIVITY, AND ARE PROTECTED BY WIDE-RANGING ENEMY PATROLS. THE
BASE SYMBOLS AUTOMATICALLY DISAPPEAR WHENEVER YOU RESUME NAVIGA-
TION.
ENTER AN AMERICAN BASE ENDS A WAR PATROL IN A SINGLE WAR PATROL
THIS ALSO ENDS THE GAME. IN A WAR CAREER THE GAME CONTINUES WITH
VARIOUS OPTIONS FOR REFUELING, REPAIR OR EVEN GETTING A NEW SUB
FRESH FROM THE CONSTRUCTION YARDS.
VIEW CONTROLS-DAMAGE REPORT
AS IN BATTLES, THERE ARE NO SPECIAL CONTROLS ON THE DAMAGE REPORT
SCREEN. SELECT ANOTHER VIEW TO EXIT.
VIEW CONTROLS-CAPTAIN'S LOG
THE CONTROLS IN THE CAPTAIN'S LOG ARE THE SAME AS IN BATTLE. USE
THE CURSOR KEYS TO PAGE THROUGH THE LOGBOOK, EXAMINING YOUR SAIL-
ING ORDERS, CURRENT DATA, RECENT RADIO MESSAGES AND RECORDS.
NAVIGATION CONTROLS
DURING A WAR PATROL, SIMPLIFIED CONTROLS ARE USED TO "CON"
(MANEUVER) YOUR SUBMARINE ACROSS THE PACIFIC OCEAN. YOU MUST USE
THE CHART VIEW FOR NAVIGATION.
KEYBOARD: USE THE CURSOR KEYS TO MOVE YOUR SUB NORTH (UP), SOUTH
(DOWN), EAST (RIGHT), OR WEST (LEFT) ON THE MAP.
EACH TAP OF THE KEY MOVES YOUR SUB MANY MILES AND CAUSES THE CLOCK
TO ADVANCE A NUMBER OF HOURS.
ON MANY MACHINES WITH A NUMERIC KEYPAD, ALL THE KEYS ARE THE CON.
THIS ALLOWS DIAGONAL MOVEMENT (USING 1, 3, 7, AND 9 KEYS) AS WELL
AS LEFT-RIGHT AND UP-DOWN MOVEMENT.
JOYSTICK OR MOUSE: IF YOUR MACHINE HAS A JOYSTICK OR MOUSE AT-
TACHED IN SOME VERSIONS THIS CAN MOVE YOUR SUB. SEE THE TECHNICAL
SUPPLEMENT FOR DETAILS.
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TIME: DURING A WAR PATROL, A FEW HOURS ADVANCE EVERY FEW SECONDS.
IF YOU SIT IN PLACE AND WATCH THE CLOCK, YOU'LL SEE THE HOURS
ADVANCE. THEREFORE TO PAUSE THE GAME YOU MUST TAP THE PAUSE
(KEYS).
ENEMY ATTACK: WHEN YOU SUB ENCOUNTERS AN ENEMY FORCE, THE WAR
PATROL TEMPORARILY HALTS. IF THE ENEMY SIGHTED YOU FIRST, YOU'RE
FORCED INTO BATTLE. IF YOU SIGHT THE ENEMY FIRST, YOU'RE GIVEN
THE CHANCE TO ENGAGE OR AVOID THE ENEMY.
NOTE THAT IF YOU SUB HAS SJ RADAR (NORMAL AFTER THE MIDDLE OF
1942), MANY CONTACTS (ESPECIALLY AT NIGHT) ARE RADAR CONTACTS.
WHEN YOU GO TO BATTLE THESE ENEMIES ARE VISIBLE ON YOUR CHARTS,
BUT NOWHERE ELSE. THIS IS BECAUSE RADAR "SEES" FURTHER THAN
EYESIGHT, ALLOWING YOU TO DETECT THE ENEMY BEFORE YOU CAN SEE HIM
VISUALLY FROM THE BRIDGE LOOKOUT, PERISCOPE OR BRIDGE TBT.
BEFORE RADAR WAS INSTALLED (AND SOMETIMES AFTERWARD), SUBMARINES
COULD BLUNDER INTO THE ENEMY. DON'T BE SHOCKED IF SOMETIMES YOU
FIND ENEMY SHIPS ALL AROUND YOU.
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BATTLE CONTROLS/VIEW CONTROLS
EACH KEY OR CONTROL HAS A NAME IN ITALICS. THIS NAME IS USED ON
THE KEYBOARD OVERLAY. THE MASTER LIST OF ALL NAME AND KEYS AP-
PEARS IN THE TECHNICAL SUPPORT SUPPLEMENT (IN CASE YOUR OVERLAY IS
DAMAGED OR LOST)
VIEW CONTROLS
THESE CONTROLS DETERMINE WHICH VIEW IS ON YOUR SCREEN.
CHARTS: TAP THIS KEY TO VIEW YOUR BATTLE CHARTS. THIS VIEW IS
EXPLAINED ON PAGES 26-28.
BRIDGE LOOKOUT: TAP THIS KEY TO GO TO THE BRIDGE LOOKOUT POSITION.
THIS IS POSSIBLE ONLY IF YOU'RE ON THE SURFACE (AT 000' DEPTH).
THIS VIEW IS EXPLAINED ON PAGE 29.
BRIDGE TBT: TAP THIS KEY TO GO TO THE BRIDGE AND LOOK OUT THROUGH
BINOCULARS MOUNTED ON THE TBT (TARGET BEARING TRANSMITTER). AS IN
THE BRIDGE LOOKOUT, THIS IS POSSIBLE ONLY IF YOUR ON THE SURFACE
(AT 000' DEPTH). THIS VIEW IS EXPLAINED ON PAGE 30.
PERISCOPE: TAP THIS KEY TO LOOK THROUGH THE PERISCOPE. THIS IS
POSSIBLE ONLY IF YOUR AT PERISCOPE DEPTH (55' OR LESS) AND THE
PERISCOPE IS UP. THIS VIEW IS EXPLAINED ON PAGE 28.
SOMETIMES THIS VIEW SUDDENLY DISAPPEARS AND YOU'LL FIND YOURSELF
LOOKING AT YOUR CHARTS. THIS OCCURS IF YOUR PERISCOPE DROPS
BENEATH THE WATER--BECAUSE YOUR DEPTH DROPS BELOW 55', OR BECAUSE
YOU'VE LOWERED THE SCOPE.
GAUGES: TAP THIS KEY VIEW THE VARIOUS DIALS AND GAUGES IN THE
SUB. THIS VIEW IS EXPLAINED ON PAGES 31-33.
DAMAGE REPORT: TAP THIS KEY TO SEE A GRAPHIC DAMAGE REPORT ABOUT
YOUR SUB. THIS VIEW IS ON PAGES 33-36.
CAPTAIN'S LOG: TAP THIS KEY TO SEE YOUR LOGBOOK.
VIEW SCANNING CONTROLS
THESE CONTROLS ADJUST THE DIRECTION IN WHICH YOU ARE LOOKING. THEY
ONLY APPLY TO THE BRIDGE LOOKOUT, PERISCOPE AND BRIDGE TBT VIEWS.
VIEW RIGHT: THIS MOVES YOUR VIEWPOINT TO THE RIGHT ON THE BRIDGE
LOOKOUT, BRIDGE TBT OR PERISCOPE VIEW.
IF THE TDC IS ON (RUNNING), THIS KEY ADJUSTS YOUR TORPEDO AIM TO
THE RIGHT INSTEAD OF SHIFTING YOUR VIEW. TO CHANGE YOUR VIEW, YOU
MUST TURN OFF THE TDC.
VIEW LEFT: THIS MOVES YOUR VIEWPOINT TO THE LEFT ON THE BRIDGE
LOOKOUT, BRIDGE TBT AND PERISCOPE VIEW
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IF THE TDC IS ON (RUNNING), THIS KEY AIMS THE TORPEDO TO THE LEFT
INSTEAD OF SHIFTING YOUR VIEW. TO CHANGE YOUR VIEW, YOU MUST TURN
OFF THE TDC.
VIEW RIGHT FAST: THIS QUICKLY MOVES YOUR VIEWPOINT TO THE RIGHT
ON THE BRIDGE LOOKOUT, BRIDGE TBT OR PERISCOPE VIEW. YOUR VIEW-
POINT SKIPS IN LARGE 10 DEGREE JUMPS, SO JUST A FEW TAPS ARE
NEEDED TO SCAN THE ENTIRE HORIZON.
VIEW LEFT FAST: THIS QUICKLY MOVES YOUR VIEWPOINT TO THE LEFT ON
THE BRIDGE LOOKOUT, BRIDGE TBT OR PERISCOPE VIEW. YOUR VIEWPOINT
SKIPS IN LARGE 10 DEGREE JUMPS, SO JUST A FEW TAPS ARE NEEDED TO
SCAN THE ENTIRE HORIZON.
SET VIEW TO COURSE: THIS IMMEDIATELY MOVES YOUR VIEWPOINT TO
STRAIGHT AHEAD:THE BEARING CHANGES TO MATCH YOUR HEADING. YOUR
VIEW IS NOW OVER THE BOW OF YOUR BOAT, LOOKING WHATEVER DIRECTION
YOUR TRAVELLING.
TDC ON/OFF: THIS CAUSE YOUR PERISCOPE OR BRIDGE TBT TO "TRACK" A
TARGET. IT ALSO COMMUNICATES CORRECT FIRING INFO TO YOUR TORPE-
DOES. FOR A DETAILED EXPLANATION OF HOW TO USE THIS FEATURE, SEE
TORPEDO FIRING CONTROLS, PAGE 49 BELOW.
OTHER VIEWING CONTROLS
THESE CONTROLS ARE AVAILABLE ON A VARIETY OF SCREENS, AS APPROPRI-
ATE.
PERISCOPE UP/DOWN: THIS KEY RAISES AND LOWERS YOUR PERISCOPE.
YOU CAN TOGGLE YOUR PERISCOPE UP AND DOWN BY TAPPING THE PERISCOPE
UP/DOWN KEY. THE PERISCOPE IS ONLY FUNCTIONAL WHEN "UP" AND YOUR
DEPTH OF 55 FEET OR LESS. YOU CAN EVEN USE THE PERISCOPE ON THE
SURFACE.
ZOOM VIEW: THIS MAGNIFIES (ENLARGES) YOUR VIEW. AT THE BRIDGE
TBT OR PERISCOPE, IT SHOWS LESS AREA BUT WITH GREATER DETAIL. THE
TBT OR PERISCOPE MAGNIFICATION RANGES FROM "1" (NORMAL EYESIGHT)
TO "4" (MAXIMUM ZOOM). ON THE CHARTS, IT SENDS YOU TO A SMALLER
SCALE (MORE DETAIL BUT LESS AREA).
UNZOOM VIEW: THIS REDUCES YOUR VIEW. AT THE BRIDGE TBT OR PERI-
SCOPE IT SHOWS MORE BUT WITH LESS DETAIL. THE TBT OR PERISCOPE
MAGNIFICATION RANGES FROM "1" (NORMAL EYESIGHT) TO "4" (MAXIMUM
ZOOM). ON THE CHARTS, IT SENDS YOU TO A LARGER SCALE (LESS
DETAIL BUT MORE AREA).
SHIP ID BOOK
THE SHIP ID BOOK IS AVAILABLE WHILE YOU'RE EXAMINING CHARTS, ON
THE BRIDGE (EITHER AT THE LOOKOUT OR THE TBT), OR AT THE PERI-
SCOPE. THE BOOK SHOWS PICTURES OF ENEMY NAVAL VESSELS, WHICH
HELPS TO IDENTIFY TARGETS.
IF YOU SELECT "INTRODUCTORY" DIFFICULTY, YOUR CREW WILL POINT OUT
WHICH PAGE OF THE BOOK IS CORRECT. THIS IS, THEY IDENTIFY THE
TARGET FOR YOU!
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SHIP ID BOOK ON/OFF: THIS KEY TOGGLES THE BOOK ON AND OFF. WHEN
PRESENT, THE BOOK OVERLAYS THE INFO PANEL ON THE LOWER PART OF
YOUR VIEW.
CURSOR KEYS: THE UP/DOWN CURSOR KEYS PAGE THROUGH THE BOOK. THE
LEFT/RIGHT KEYS PAGE THROUGH DIFFERENT VIEWS OF A SHIP.
IMPORTANT: WHEN YOU HAVE THE BOOK OPEN THE CON (MOVEMENT) CON-
TROLS MAY BE INACTIVE. THIS IS BECAUSE IN SOME VERSIONS
(DEPENDING ON YOUR HARDWARE) THE CURSOR KEYS ARE ALSO THE CON
KEYS. SEE THE TECHNICAL SUPPLEMENT FOR DETAILS.
CHART CONTROLS
THE FOLLOWING VIEWING KEYS ARE AVAILABLE WHILE EXAMINING THE
CHARTS. SEE PAGES 26-48 FOR A COMPLETE DESCRIPTION OF THE
CHARTS.
INITIALLY THE CHART VIEW IS CENTERED ON YOUR BOAT. HOWEVER, IF
THE TDC (TORPEDO DATA COMPUTER) IS "ON", INSTEAD THE VIEW IS
CENTERED HALFWAY BETWEEN YOUR BOAT AND THE TDC TARGET IF BOTH FIT
ON THE CHART.
RE-CENTER CHART: TAP THIS KEY TO RE-CENTER YOUR BOAT IN THE
MIDDLE OF THE CHART. HOWEVER, IF THE TDC IS RUNNING THE VIEW IS
CENTERED HALFWAY BETWEEN YOUR BOAT AND THE TDC TARGET IF BOTH
FIT.
ZOOM: EACH TAP ENLARGES THE CHART, SHOWING A SMALLER AREA, BUT IN
MORE DETAIL. THE CHART ALSO RE-CENTERS AUTOMATICALLY.
UNZOOM: EACH TAP REDUCES THE CHART, SHOWING A LARGER AREA, BUT IN
LESS DETAIL. THE CHART ALSO RE-CENTERS AUTOMATICALLY.
INFO PANEL ON/OFF: THIS KEY SHOWS OR REMOVES THE INFO PANEL FORM
THE CHART.
SHIP ID BOOK ON/OFF: THIS KEY SHOWS OR REMOVES THE SHIP ID BOOK
FROM THE CHART
CON AND ENGINE CONTROLS
YOUR SUBMARINE AUTOMATICALLY USES DIESEL ENGINES WHEN SURFACED AND
SLOWER ELECTRIC ENGINES WHEN SUBMERGED. MANEUVERING AND SPEED
(ENGINES) CONTROLS ARE THE SAME IN BOTH SITUATIONS.
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THE CON - DEPTH CONTROLS
THE "CON" ARE THOSE CONTROLS USED TO STEER YOUR SUBMARINE. THE
DEPTH CONTROLS REGULATE YOUR OPERATING DEPTH--FROM SURFACED (0"
DEPTH) ON DOWN TO MAXIMUM DEPTH.
DIVE: TAP THIS KEY TO SEND YOUR SUB DOWNWARD. THIS WILL SUBMERGE
A SURFACED SUB, OR CAUSE A SUBMERGED SUB TO GO DEEPER. THE LEVEL
OFF, TAP EITHER THE STRAIGHT & LEVEL KEY, OR THE RISE KEY.
WARNING: IF YOU DON'T LEVEL OFF THE SUB EVENTUALLY EITHER HITS
THE BOTTOM OR IS CRUSHED BY THE OCEAN.
CRASH DIVE: TAP THIS KEY TO SEND YOUR SUB DOWNWARD QUICKLY. TO
LEVEL OFF TAP EITHER STRAIGHT & LEVEL OR RISE.
RISE: TAP THIS KEY TO SEND YOUR SUB UPWARD. THIS CAUSES A SUB-
MERGED SUBMARINE TO MOVE UPWARD. TO LEVEL OFF, TAP EITHER THE
STRAIGHT & LEVEL KEY OR THE DIVE KEY.
WARNING: IF YOU DON'T LEVEL OFF THE SUB EVENTUALLY SURFACES.
BLOW ALL TANKS: TAP THIS KEY TO SURFACE AT MAXIMUM SPEED. HOWEV-
ER, YOU CAN ONLY DO THIS ONCE IN A BATTLE. THAT'S BECAUSE THIS
COMMAND PUMPS ALL YOUR PRESSURIZED AIR INTO THE BALLAST TANKS
(PUSHING OUT THE WATER THAT KEEPS YOU SUBMERGED). AFTER GIVING
THIS COMMAND YOU CANNOT STOP YOUR RISE. YOU WILL SURFACE, REGARD-
LESS OF SUBSEQUENT COMMANDS.
USEFUL NOTE: THIS IS THE ONLY WAY TO SURFACE IF YOUR DIVING
PLANES ARE COMPLETELY WRECKED.
STRAIGHT & LEVEL: TAP THIS KEY TO "LEVEL OFF" YOUR SUB AT ITS
CURRENT DEPTH. IT ALSO STOPS ANY STARBOARD OR PORT TURNS AT THE
SAME TIME.
PERISCOPE DEPTH: TAP THIS KEY TO SENT YOUR BOAT TO PERISCOPE
DEPTH. IF YOU'VE SURFACED, THE BOAT WILL DIVE TO 55', THEN LEVEL
OUT. IF YOU'VE UNDERWATER, THE BOAT WILL RISE OR DIVE UNTIL IT
REACHES PERISCOPE DEPTH OF 55', THE LEVEL OUT.
NOTE THAT UNLIKE ALL OTHER DEPTH CONTROLS, THIS ONE AUTOMATICALLY
LEVELS YOU ONCE YOU REACH THE DESIRED DEPTH.
MAXIMUM DEPTH: THE "TEST DEPTH" OF YOUR SUB IS THE MAXIMUM SAFE
OPERATING DEPTH. THIS IS THE DEPTH TO WHICH YOUR SUB IS TESTED.
IN REALITY, MAY SUBS WENT DEEPER THAN THEIR TEST DEPTH--SOMETIMES
AS MUCH AS 50% DEEPER. HOWEVER, THE DEEPER YOU GO BELOW TEST
DEPTH, THE GREATER THE CHANCE OF DAMAGE. IF YOU'RE GOING BELOW
TEST, WATCH YOUR DAMAGE CONTROL CAREFULLY. YOU CAN SUFFER BULK-
HEAD DAMAGE IF YOU GO TOO DEEP, OR EVEN DISCOVER THE ENTIRE BOAT
COLLAPSING INWARD, KILLING BOTH YOU AND YOU CREW.
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ONCE YOUR BULKHEADS ARE DAMAGED (BY GOING TOO DEEP, OR BY ENEMY
DEPTH CHARGES) YOUR TEST DEPTH IS CUT IN HALF. IF YOUR TEST DEPTH
WAS NORMALLY 300', WITH DAMAGED BULKHEADS YOUR NEW TEST DEPTH IS
150'. IF YOU GOT BELOW THAT, YOU MAY SUFFER FURTHER DAMAGE OR BE
SUNK.
THE CON - HEADING (COURSE) CONTROLS
THE "CON" ALSO ALLOWS YOU TO CONTROL THE HEADING (COURSE) OF YOUR
SUB.
TURN PORT (LEFT): TAP THIS KEY TO START YOUR SUB TURNING LEFT.
THE BOAT CONTINUES TURNING UNTIL YOU ISSUE THE ORDER TO STOP . TO
STOP TURNING TAP EITHER TURN STARBOARD (RIGHT), TURN HARD STAR-
BOARD, OR STRAIGHT & LEVEL.
TURN HARD PORT (LEFT FAST): TAP THIS KEY TO TURN YOUR SUB HARD
LEFT. THIS PUTS THE SUB INTO THE TIGHTEST POSSIBLE TURN. TO STOP
TURNING YOU CAN TAP EITHER TURN STARBOARD(RIGHT), TURN HARD STAR-
BOARD OR STRAIGHT & LEVEL.
TURN STARBOARD (RIGHT): TAP THIS KEY TO START YOU SUB TURNING
RIGHT. THE BOAT CONTINUES TURNING UNTIL YOU ISSUE THE ORDER TO
STOP. TO STOP TURNING TAP EITHER TURN PORT (LEFT), TURN HARD PORT
OR STRAIGHT & LEVEL.
TURN HARD STARBOARD (RIGHT FAST): TAP THIS KEY TURN YOUR SUB HARD
RIGHT. THIS PUTS THE SUB INTO THE TIGHTEST POSSIBLE TURN. TO
STOP TURNING YOU CAN TAP EITHER TURN PORT (LEFT), TURN HARD PORT,
OR STRAIGHT & LEVEL.
SET COURSE TO VIEW: THIS KEY TURNS YOUR BOAT UNTIL ITS COURSE
MATCHES YOUR CURRENT VIEW (BEARING). IT'S A FAST AND CONVENIENT
WAY TO ORDER THE BOAT TO TURN ONTO A HEADING.
STRAIGHT AND LEVEL: THIS KEY STOPS ALL TURNS AND "STRAIGHTENS
OUT" YOUR COURSE. IT ALSO STOPS ANY DIVING OR RISING, SO YOUR SUB
WILL CRUISE AT THE CURRENT DEPTH.
THE ENGINES - SPEED CONTROL
THESE CONTROL THE SPEED OF YOUR SUB. YOU HAVE FOUR ENGINES. THE
NUMBER OF ENGINES "ON LINE" DETERMINES YOUR CURRENT SPEED. YOU
SELECT THIS WITH THE ENGINE KEYS. THE EXACT SPEED, IN KNOTS,
DEPENDS ON THE TYPE (CLASS) OF SUB.
DIESEL & ELECTRIC POWER: ON THE SURFACE YOUR SUBMARINE USES
DIESEL ENGINES, POWERED BY OIL FROM THE OIL TANKS. YOUR SUB HAS
ENOUGH OIL FOR 35, 50 OR 60 DAYS OF CRUISING, DEPENDING ON CLASS.
YOU CONSUME OIL ABOUT FOUR TIMES FASTER IN BATTLE, SINCE THE
ENGINES ARE NOT RUN AS ECONOMICALLY.
IN WAR PATROLS YOU SHOULD KEEP A CAREFUL EYE ON YOUR OIL CONSUMP-
TION AND REMAINING FUEL (SEE PAGES 39 AND 86).
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SUBMERGED, YOUR SUB USES BATTERIES TO POWER ELECTRIC ENGINES.
THIS IS BECAUSE DIESELS RUNNING IN A SUBMERGED SUB EXHAUST ALL THE
AIR WITHIN A FEW MINUTES, WHICH KILLS THE CREW BY ASPHYXIATION.
THE ELECTRIC ENGINES USE BATTLES THAT GRADUALLY RUN DOWN. THE
BATTERIES ARE RECHARGED BY RUNNING THE DIESEL ENGINES WHEN YOU'RE
BACK ON THE SURFACE. DIESELS NOT USED TO MOVE THE SUB ARE USED
INSTEAD TO RECHARGE THE BATTERIES.
AHEAD FLANK (4 ENGINES): THIS IS YOUR MAXIMUM FORWARD SPEED.
SUBMERGED IT USES UP YOUR BATTER POWER VERY QUICKLY. ON THE
SURFACE, ALL ENGINES ARE USED TO DRIVE THE SUB, SO THE BATTERIES
CANNOT BE RECHARGED.
AHEAD FULL (3 ENGINES): THIS IS A FAST FORWARD SPEED. SUBMERGED,
IT USED UP BATTERIES RATHER QUICKLY. ON THE SURFACE, THREE EN-
GINES DRIVE THE SUB, WHILE ONLY ONE RECHARGES THE BATTERIES.
AHEAD HALF (2 ENGINES) THIS IS A MODERATE FORWARD SPEED. SUB-
MERGED IT USES UP BATTERIES AT A MODERATE RATE. ON THE SURFACE,
TWO ENGINES DRIVE THE SUB AND TWO RECHARGE THE BATTERIES.
AHEAD SLOW (1 ENGINE): THIS IS YOUR SLOWEST FORWARD SPEED.
SUBMERGED, IT USED UP BATTERIES VERY SLOWLY. ON THE SURFACE, ONE
ENGINE DRIVES THE BOAT WHILE THREE RECHARGE BATTERIES.
ALL STOP (0 ENGINES): YOU SUBMARINE STOPS IN PLACE. SUBMERGED
YOUR BATTERIES ARE HARDLY REDUCED AT ALL (ONLY MINOR ELECTRICAL
SYSTEMS DRAW CURRENT). ON THE SURFACE, ALL DIESEL ENGINES ARE
USED TO RECHARGE THE BATTERIES.
REVERS (-4 ENGINES) YOUR SUB MOVES BACKWARDS AT A SLOW SPEED.
UNFORTUNATELY, DUE TO GEARING IMITATIONS ALL ENGINES MUST BE USED.
THEREFORE YOUR BATTERIES ARE REDUCED QUICKLY, AND ON THE SURFACE
ALL DIESEL ENGINES ARE USED FOR REVERSE MOVEMENT. HOWEVER, SUBS
RARELY MOVE IN REVERSE EXCEPT IN SHORT PERIODS.
FIRING TORPEDOES
TORPEDOES ARE YOUR MAIN WEAPON. THEY CAN BE FIRED EITHER AT A
"MARKED" TARGET OR USING A "MANUAL PLOT". MOST CAPTAINS PREFER TO
USE THE EASIER "MARKED" TECHNIQUE.
TORPEDO FIRING TECHNIQUES
"MARK" TARGET FIRING PROCEDURE: THIS TECHNIQUE IS THE EASIEST AND
MOST STRAIGHTFORWARD METHOD OF FIRING. IT USES YOUR BOAT'S TDC
(TORPEDO DATA COMPUTER) TO CORRECTLY SET YOUR TORPEDOES. YOU JUST
LINE UP A TARGET IN YOUR
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PERISCOPE OR TBE, TURN ON THE TDC, AND FIRE.
FIRST YOU GO TO THE PERISCOPE OR BRIDGE TBT VIEW AND ROTATE (USING
VIEW LEFT AND VIEW RIGHT) UNTIL YOU FIND A TARGET. WHEN THE
VESSEL IS CENTERED IN YOUR VIEW, THE AIMING SCALE BRIGHTENS AND
THE INFO PANEL DISPLAYS TARGET INFORMATION (RANGE, COURSE AND
SPEED). THIS MEANS THE TARGET IS "MARKED".
QUICKLY, WHILE THE TARGET IS STILL MARKED, TAP THE TDC ON/OFF KEY
TO TURN YOUR TDC. THIS CAUSES THE PERISCOPE OR TBT TO FOLLOW THE
TARGET AUTOMATICALLY WHILE THE INFO PANEL UPDATES THE TARGET DATA
AND TORPEDO FIRING SOLUTION CONTINUALLY. THE INFO PANEL TDC LIGHT
SHOWS THAT THE TDC IS RUNNING IN ADDITION, THE TORPEDO AIMING
POINTER APPEARS ON THE PERISCOPE OR TBT CROSSHAIRS.
WHEN THE RANGE AND FIRING POSITION SEEM GOOD TO YOU (AS CAPTAIN),
TAP FIRE TORPEDO.
TO FIRE A "SPREAD" OF TORPEDOES, USE THE VIEW LEFT AND VIEW RIGHT
KEYS TO MOVE THE TORPEDO AIMING POINTER LEFT AND RIGHT OF CENTER.
THIS SETS THE TORPEDO PATH SLIGHTLY LEFT OR RIGHT OF CENTER,
CREATING A "SPREAD". YOU MUST DO THIS WHILE THE TDC IS ON. THIS
TECHNIQUE DOESN'T WORK IF THE TDC IS OFF.
TO SWITCH TARGETS, TURN OFF THE TDC BY PRESSING TDC ON/OFF AGAIN.
ROTATE YOUR VIEW, "MARK" ANOTHER TARGET AND TURN ON THE TDC ONCE
MORE.
AFTER FIRING, YOU'LL SEE ON THE CHARTS VIEW THE TORPEDO TIMER
COUNTING DOWN. THE TDC LIGHT BESIDE THE TIMER WILL BE ON IF THE
TORPEDO WAS FIRED UNDER TDC CONTROL. THE TIMER IS COUNTING DOWN
TO THE ANTICIPATED CONTACT WITH THE TARGET.
"MANUAL PLOT" FIRING PROCEDURE: IN THIS TECHNIQUE YOU COMPUTER
FIRING ANGLES YOURSELF. THIS TECHNIQUES DOES NOT USE THE TDC.
MAKE SURE THE TDC IS NOT RUNNING (THE TDC LIGHT IS OFF ON THE INFO
PANEL) BEFORE USING MANUAL FIRING.
THIS METHOD IS EASIEST TO PLAN FORM THE CHARTS. YOU DECIDE WHAT
ANGLE TO FIRE A TORPEDO SO IT INTERCEPTS THE ENEMY SHIP'S COURSE.
TO DO THIS, YOU'LL NEED TO ESTIMATE HOW QUICKLY THE TORPEDO TRAV-
ELS IN RELATION TO HOW FAST THE TARGET IS MOVING, AND THEN FIRE AT
THE APPROPRIATE INSTANT. FOR A DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF HOW TO
PLAN A MANUAL SHOT, SEE PAGES 69-72.
IN MANUAL PLOTTING, THE TORPEDO FIRES IN YOUR VIEW DIRECTION
(BEARING). THE CREW SELECTS BOW OR STERN TUBERS, WHICHEVER
IS CLOSER TO YOUR VIEW BEARING. IF THE TUBES ARE EMPTY, THE CREW
REPORTS THIS FACT AND DOESN'T SHOOT. YOU MUST EITHER CHANGE YOUR
HEADING OR BEARING TO USE THE OTHER TUBES.
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FIRING RANGES: MINIMUM TORPEDO RANGE IS 300 YARDS. A GOOD FIRING
RANGE IS 600 TO 1200 YARDS, DEPENDING ON TORPEDO MODEL AND SITUA-
TION. AT RANGES OVER 2000 YARDS TORPEDOES ARE UNLIKELY TO HIT A
MOVING TARGET. MAXIMUM RANGE IS 3500 TO 9000 YARDS, DEPENDING ON
THE TORPEDO MODEL. SEE PAGES 114-115 FOR DETAILED INFO ON ALL
TORPEDOES.
FIRING POSITION: NORMALLY THE IDEAL FIRING POSITION IS STRAIGHT
INTO THE SIDE OF A SHIP. FIRING AT AN ANGLE TOWARD THE BROADSIDE
IS THE NEXT BEST (AND GIVES EARLY MARK 14S A BETTER CHANCE OF
EXPLODING). SHOOTING AT THE BOW OF AN ONCOMING SHIP IS TRICKY
BECAUSE THE TARGET AREA IS QUITE NARROW. SHOOTING AT THE STERN OF
A SHIP IS THE WORST POSSIBLE SHOT, SINCE THE TORPEDO MUST OVERTAKE
ITS TARGET.
EARLY VERSIONS OF THE MARK 14 SOMETIMES EXPLODED PREMATURELY.
THIS WAS GENERALLY CAUSED BY THE DEFECTIVE MAGNETIC EXPLODER.
DEPENDING ON THE SUBMARINE COMMAND, THIS DEFECT IS IDENTIFIED AND
FIXED SOMETIME IN 1943.
TORPEDO FIRING COMMANDS
MARKING A TARGET: YOU DO THIS BY CENTERING THE TARGET IN YOUR
PERISCOPE OR TBT. THE TARGET IS "MARKED" WHEN THE AIMING SCALE IS
LIGHTED AND TARGET DATA APPEARS IN THE INFO PANEL.
TDC ON/OFF: THIS TOGGLES THE TDC (TORPEDO DATA COMPUTER) ON AND
OFF. THE TDC CAN BE "TURNED ON" ONLY FROM THE PERISCOPE OR BRIDGE
TBT VIEW. FURTHERMORE, YOU MUST HAVE A TARGET "MARKED" OR ELSE
THE TDC WON'T START. A TARGET IS "MARKED" WHEN THE AIMING SCALE
BRIGHTENS AND THE INFO PANEL BEGINS DISPLAYING TARGET DATA.
YOU CAN ADJUST YOUR VIEW WHILE THE TDC IS RUNNING. THIS MOVES
THE TORPEDO AIMING PINT LEFT OR RIGHT, CAUSING THE TDC TO AIM THE
TORPEDO LEFT OR RIGHT OF THE TARGET. IF YOU MOVE THE VIEW SO FAR
THAT THE TARGET IS NO LONGER VISIBLE THE TDC AUTOMATICALLY TURNS
OFF.
YOU CAN MANUALLY TURN OFF THE TDC BY TAPPING TDC ON/OFF AGAIN.
TO SWITCH A NEW TARGET, TURN OFF THE TDC, "MARK" A NEW TARGET,
THEN TURN ON THE TDC ONCE MORE.
CHANGE TORPEDO SPEED: NORMALLY YOUR TORPEDOES ARE SET FOR THE
FASTEST POSSIBLE SPEED. IN ALL NORMAL FIRING CIRCUMSTANCES THIS
IS THE CORRECT.
CHANGE TORPEDO SPEED: NORMALLY YOUR TORPEDOES ARE SET FOR THE
FASTEST POSSIBLE SPEED. IN ALL NORMAL FIRING CIRCUMSTANCES THIS
IS THE CORRECT CHOICE. HOWEVER, THE MARK 14 TORPEDO HAS SLOWER
SPEED THAT GIVES IT MUCH MORE RANGE THAN THE 4500 AT HIGH SPEED.
IF YOU THINK THE TORPEDO NEEDS TO TRAVEL FURTHER, TAP THIS KEY TO
SET THE TORPEDOES TO LOW SPEED (31.5 KTS) AND 9000 YARDS RANGE.
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THIS KEY HAS NOT EFFECT ON MARK 10 AND MARK 18 TORPEDOES, WHICH
ONLY HAVE ONE SPEED.
AIM TORPEDOES: YOU MUST HAVE THE TDC ON (SEE ABOVE) TO AIM TORPE-
DOES. USE THE VIEW LEFT AND VIEW RIGHT TO MOVE TORPEDO AIMING
POINTER LEFT OR RIGHT OF THE TARGET.
FIRE TORPEDO: THIS FIRES A LOADED TORPEDO TUBE. BOW TUBES ARE USED
FOR FIRING AT TARGETS IN THE 180 DEGREE ARC AHEAD OF THE BOAT,
STERN TUBES FOR TARGETS IN THE 180 DEGREE ARC BEHIND THE BOAT. IF
ALL TUBES IN THE APPROPRIATE DIRECTION ARE EMPTY AND/OR RELOADING,
YOU CANNOT FIRE IN THAT DIRECTION.
IF YOU FIRE WHILE THE TDC IS RUNNING (INFO PANEL TDC LIGHT IS
"ON") THE TDC (TORPEDO DATA COMPUTER) AUTOMATICALLY COMPUTES THE
CORRECT COURSE FOR THE TORPEDO. AFTER THE TORPEDO LEAVES THE TUBE
IF TURNS ONTO COURSE AND HEADS FOR A PRE-CALCULATED INTERCEPTION
POINT WITH THE TARGET.
ON THE CHARTS VIEW YOU'LL SEE A TIMER FOR THAT TORPEDO COUNTING
DOWN TO THE PREDICTED INTERCEPTION TIME. THE TDC LIGHT BESIDE THE
TIMER WILL BE ON INDICATING THE TORPEDO FIRED UNDER TDC CONTROL.
IF YOU FIRE WHEN THE TDC IS OFF (INFO PANEL TDC LIGHT IS "OFF"),
THE TORPEDO FIRES STRAIGHT OUT OF THE BOW OR STERN. IT CONTINUES
STRAIGHT AHEAD UNTIL IT RUNS OUT OF FUEL OR HITS A TARGET. THE BOW
TUBES FIRE IF YOUR CURRENT VIEW BEARING IS CLOSER TO THE BOW THAN
THE STERN. THE STERN TUBES TIRE IF YOUR CURRENT VIEW BEARING IS
CLOSER TO THE STERN THAN THE BOW.
ON THE CHARTS VIEW YOU'LL SEE A TIMER FOR THE TORPEDO COUNTING
DOWN THE PREDICTED TIME WHEN THE TORPEDO'S FUEL IS EXHAUSTED. THE
TDC LIGHT BESIDE THE TIMER WILL BE OFF, INDICATING THE TORPEDO WAS
FIRED UNDER MANUAL CONTROL.
DECK GUN CONTROLS
YOUR DECK GUN IS SECONDARY ARMAMENT. ITS SHELLS ARE NOWHERE NEAR
AS POWERFUL AS YOUR TORPEDOES. MORE IMPORTANTLY, YOU MUST SURFACE
TO USE THE DECK GUN, WHICH EXPOSES YOUR SUB TO HOSTILE GUNFIRE.
ANY WARSHIP LARGER THAN A PATROL BOAT (PC) HAS BETTER GUN ARMA-
MENT. THEREFORE, MOST SUBMARINES ONLY USE THEIR DECK GUN TO
"POLISH OFF" DAMAGED MERCHANTMEN, OR IF THEY'RE EXTREMELY DESPER-
ATE.
DECK GUN FIRING TECHNIQUES
YOU CAN FIRE YOUR DECK GUN WHENEVER THE SUBMARINE IS ON THE SUR-
FACE. YOU SHOULD USE THE TBT VIEW WHEN FIRING, SINCE THE GUN
CONTROLS ARE VISIBLE THERE. TO FIRE THE DECK GUN, AIM AT THE
TARGET UNTIL IT IS "MARKED", TURN ON THE
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TDC, ADJUST THE GUN ELEVATION, THEN FIRE. ON SUBSEQUENT SHOTS YOU
SIMPLY ADJUST THE ELEVATION IF NECESSARY AND FIRE AGAIN.
MAXIMUM RANGE OF YOU DECK GUN IS 4000 YARDS. THIS LIMIT IS DUE TO
THE SUBMARINE'S GUN-MOUNTING AND SIGHTS; THE SIZE OF THE GUN HAS
NO EFFECT ON MAXIMUM RANGE.
UNMARKED TARGETS CANNOT BE HIT BY YOUR DECK GUN. THE TARGET MUST
BE MARKED AND TRACKED BY THE TDC BEFORE YOUR CAN FIRE. THIS
REPRESENTS THE GUN CREW RANGING AND FOLLOWING THE TARGET.
MARKED TARGETS: A TARGET IS "MARKED" WHEN THE AIMING SCALE IS
HIGHLIGHTED AND TARGET DATA APPEARS IN THE INFO PANEL.
TDC AND GUNFIRE: YOU MUST USE YOUR TDC TO CONTINUALLY TRACK A
"MARKED" TARGET. WHEN THE TARGETS IS "MARKED", TAP TDC ON/OFF.
THIS AUTOMATICALLY KEEPS YOU AIMED AT THE TARGET. YOUR GUN CREW
ELEVATES THE GUN TO THE CURRENT RANGE OF THE TARGET (AS SHOWN IN
"TARGET RANGE" ON THE INFO PANEL). TO STOP TRACKING JUST TURN OFF
THE TDC BY TAPPING TDC ON/OFF AGAIN
ADJUSTING FIRE: YOUR GUN CREW AIMS AT THE TARGET'S LOCATION,
TAKING INTO ACCOUNT WHETHER IT'S MOVING LEFT OR RIGHT ACROSS YOUR
VIEW. HOWEVER, THE CREW DOES NOT ADJUST FOR THE TARGET'S MOTION
TOWARD OR AWAY FROM YOU.
IF YOU FEEL THE ENEMY IS MOVING TOWARD YOU, DEPRESS THE GUN ONE OR
MORE DEGREES (-1 OR MORE). IF THE ENEMY IS MOVING AWAY, ELEVATE
THE GUN ONE OR MORE DEGREES MORE (+1 OR MORE). THE FASTER ENEMY
IS CLOSING OR OPENING THE RANGE, THE MORE DEPRESSION OR ELEVATION
YOU NEED.
NOTE THAT IF A TARGET IS CLOSING FAST, EVEN THOUGH YOU DEPRESS THE
GUN A LARGE AMOUNT, YOU MAY FIND SHOTS STILL LANDING BEHIND THE
TARGET (BECAUSE OF HIS HIGH SPEED). CONVERSELY, IF A TARGET IS
FLEEING FAST, YOUR SHOTS FREQUENTLY LAND BEHIND HIM UNTIL YOU
APPLY SUFFICIENT ELEVATION.
DECK GUN FIRING CONTROLS
MARKING A TARGET: CENTER THE TARGET IN YOU TBT. THE TARGET IS
"MARKED" WHEN THE CROSSHAIRS ARE LIGHTED AND TARGET DATA APPEARS
IN THE INFO PANEL.
TDC ON/OFF: THIS TOGGLES THE TDC ON AND OFF. YOU MUST HAVE A
TARGET "MARKED" IN THE TBT VIEW TO TURN ON THE TDC.
WHILE THE TDC IS RUNNING YOUR VIEW AND THE DECK GUN CREW'S AIM
ROTATES TO FOLLOW THE TARGET. FURTHERMORE, THE GUN CREW AUTOMATI-
CALLY ELEVATES THE GUN TO HIT AT THE CURRENT RANGE (SHOWN ON THE
INFO PANEL). THE CREW DOES NOT TAKE INTO ACCOUNT RANGE CHANGES.
YOU MUST ESTIMATE HOW FAST THE RANGE IS
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CHANGING, AND MAKE THE APPROPRIATE ADJUSTMENT TO ELEVA-
TION/DEPRESSION. ALTHOUGH THE TORPEDO AIMING POINTER IS PRESENT
TO ADJUST I DON'T NEED IT WITH THE DECK GUN (THE GUN CREW AUTOMAT-
ICALLY ROTATES TO TRACK THE TARGET).
YOU CAN MANUALLY TURN OFF THE TDC BY TAPPING TDC ON/OFF A SECOND
TIME.
TO SWITCH TO A NEW TARGET, TURN OFF THE TDC, "MARK" A NEW TARGET,
THEN TURN ON THE TDC ONCE MORE.
GUN DOWN (-) 1 DEGREE: EACH TAP OF THIS KEY DEPRESSES (LOWERS) THE
GUN BARREL BY ONE DEGREE. THIS DECREASES THE DISTANT TRAVELLED BY
THE SHELL.
WHEN FIRING AT A MARKED TARGET, THE BARREL IS LOWERED IN RELATION
TO THE CREW'S NORMAL FIRING ANGLE. YOU LOWER THE GUN ONLY IF
YOU'RE FIRING AT A "MARKED" TARGET THAT'S MOVING TOWARD YOU.
GUN UP (+) 1 DEGREE:EACH TAP OF THIS KEY ELEVATES (RAISES) THE GUN
BARREL BY ONE DEGREE. THIS INCREASES THE DISTANCE TRAVELLED BY THE
SHELL.
WHEN FIRING AT A MARKED TARGET, THE BARREL IS RAISED IN RELATION
TO THE CREW'S NORMAL FIRING ANGLE. YOU RAISE THE GUN ONLY IF
YOU'RE FIRING AT A "MARKED" TARGET THAT'S MOVING AWAY FROM YOU.
FIRE DECK GUN : THIS FIRES ONE SHELL AT THE ENEMY (ON NARWHAL
CLASS SUBS IT FIRES A BROADSIDE OF BOTH GUNS IN CLOSE SUCCESSION).
THE GUN ONLY FIRES IT A TARGET IS "MARKED" AND/OR THE TDC IS ON
AND FOLLOWING A TARGET.
THE SHELL FIRES AT THE MARKED TARGET'S CURRENT POSITION PLUS OR
MINUS A CERTAIN DISTANCE DEPENDING ON THE AMOUNT OF ELEVATION OR
DEPRESSION CURRENTLY SET.
IF THE SHELL HITS, YOU'LL SEE AN EXPLOSION ON THE TARGET SHIP. IF
IT MISSES YOU'LL SEE A WATER-SPOUT.
ENEMY GUNFIRE
WHILE YOU'RE ON THE SURFACE, ENEMY WARSHIPS OR ARMED MERCHANTMEN
MAY FIRE BACK AT YOUR SUB. IF WATER-SPOUTS APPEAR, ENEMY SHELLS
ARE LANDING NEAR YOUR BOAT. EVENTUALLY HE'LL FIND THE RANGE AND
BEGIN SCORING HITS, CAUSING DAMAGE AND EVENTUALLY SINKING YOU. THE
ONLY DEFENSES ARE TO (A) DAMAGE THE ENEMY SO BADLY HIS AIM OR GUNS
ARE DESTROYED, OR (B) SUBMERGE. ONCE YOU REACH PERISCOPE DEPTH
(50-55') YOU'RE INVULNERABLE TO ENEMY GUNFIRE.
BEWARE OF ENEMY CRUISERS AND BATTLESHIPS. THEIR GUNS ARE SO POWER-
FUL THAT ONE HIT COULD BLOW YOUR BOAT RIGHT OUT OF THE WATER!
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LAUNCHING DEBRIS
WHEN YOU'RE SUBMERGED AND UNDER DEPTH CHARGE ATTACK, YOU MAY WANT
TO DECEIVE THE ENEMY INTO THINKING YOU'RE DEAD. ONE TRICK IS
TO LOAD YOUR TORPEDO TUBES WITH VARIOUS EXTRA ITEMS (DEBRIS), AND
LAUNCH IT. WHEN THIS FLOATS TO THE SURFACE, THE ENEMY MAY THINK
YOU'RE SUNK.
TO ATTEMPT THIS DECEPTION, TAP THE LAUNCH DEBRIS KEY.
YOU CAN DO THIS ONLY ONCE PER BATTLE, AND IT MAY NOT WORK.
END THIS BATTLE
TAP THIS KEY TO END A BATTLE. YOU CANNOT USE THIS TO ESCAPE
POSSIBLE ATTACKS -- IF ENEMIES ARE STILL IN REASONABLE PROXIMITY,
YOU CANNOT END THE BATTLE. IN THIS CASE, SAIL AWAY FROM THE
ENEMY AS QUICKLY AS YOU FELL PRUDENT, THEN TRY AGAIN
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COMPUTER CONTROLS
THIS SPECIAL SET OF CONTROLS ADJUST THE OPERATION OF YOUR COMPUT-
ER. THESE CONTROLS MAY VARY WITH SPECIFIC SYSTEMS; SEE YOUR
TECHNICAL SUPPLEMENT FOR DETAILS.
PAUSE
THIS PAUSES (FREEZES) THE ACTION. PRESS ANY KEY AGAIN TO RESUME
THE GAME ACTION.
ANIMATION ON/OFF
THIS TOGGLES ON AND OFF THE GRAPHIC ANIMATIONS OF TORPEDO FIRING
AND DEPTH CHARGE ATTACKS. TURNING OFF THE ANIMATION HELPS SPEED
UP THE GAME ON SMALLER OR SLOWER COMPUTERS. IT ALSO REDUCES THE
AMOUNT OF RAM TO RUN THE GAME.
"BOSS" HIDE GAME
THIS TEMPORARILY HIDES THE GAME BEHIND THE BLANK SCREEN. THE
COMPUTER IS INOPERATIVE UNTIL YOU HIT THE "BOSS" HIDE GAME KEY
AGAIN. USE THIS FEATURE WHEN YOUR WORK OR HOME BOSS APPROACHES,
THEN COMPLAIN THAT YOU'RE TRYING TO FIGURE OUT WHY THE COMPUTER
ISN'T WORKING!
SAVE GAME
THIS SAVES THE CURRENT GAME TO DISK, INCLUDING BOTH THE CURRENT
SITUATION AND ANY WAR CAREER OR WAR PATROL INFORMATION. YOU CAN
SELECT WHICH "SAVE GAME" FILE TO USE. IF YOU REUSE A FILE, YOU'LL
OVERWRITE THE GAME PREVIOUSLY SAVED THERE. ON FLOPPY DISK SYSTEMS
YOU MAY NEED A FORMATTED DISK FOR THE SAVE GAME FILES.
RESTART GAME
THIS ENDS THE CURRENT GAME AND SENDS YOU BACK TO THE VERY START
BUT WITHOUT RELOADING LOTS OF FILES FROM DISK.
WARNING: THE GAME IS NOT SAVED WHEN YOU DO THIS. IF YOU WANT TO
SAVE THE GAME, MAKE SURE YOU DO THAT BEFORE HITTING RESTART GAME.
JOYSTICK ADJUST
THIS READJUSTS YOUR JOYSTICK. USE IT IF THE BOAT OR VIEW SEEMS TO
"WANDER" LEFT OR RIGHT, AS IF THE JOYSTICK WAS IN USE (EVEN THOUGH
IT ISN'T).
VOLUME ADJUST
THIS ADJUSTS THE SOUND EFFECTS IN YOUR GAME. IT'S A MULTI-POSITION
SWITCH. EACH TAP OF THE KEY CHANGES YOU TO THE NEXT LOWER LEVEL.
AFTER THE LOWEST YOU CYCLE TO THE HIGHEST AGAIN.
MOST SYSTEMS HAVE FOUR POSITIONS: ALL SOUNDS, ALL SOUNDS EXCEPT A
FEW VERY COMMON ONES, CRITICAL (ONLY) SOUNDS, AND NO SOUND. HOWEV-
ER, THE EXACT NUMBER CAN VARY. SEE THE TECHNICAL SUPPLEMENT FOR
DETAILS.
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QUIT GAME (TO DOS)
THIS IMMEDIATELY QUITS THE GAME AND RETURNS YOU TO THE OPERATING
SYSTEM (DOS ON IBM-COMPATIBLE SYSTEMS).
WARNING: THE GAME IS NOTE SAVED WHEN YOU DO THIS. IF YOU WANT TO
SAVE THE GAME, MAKE SURE YOU DO THAT BEFORE HITTING QUIT GAME
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AFTERMATH OF BATTLE
REPLAY
AT THE END OF EACH BATTLE, YOU HAVE THE OPTION TO VIEW A "REPLAY".
THIS IS AN EXACT REPRODUCTION OF WHAT HAPPENED, INSTANT BY IN-
STANT, VIEW BY VIEW.
THE EXACT FEATURES AND CAPABILITIES OF THE REPLAY VARY FROM ONE
COMPUTER SYSTEM TO ANOTHER, AND MAY VARY DEPENDING ON HOW YOU HAVE
(OR HAVE NOT) INSTALLED THE GAME. SEE THE TECHNICAL SUPPLEMENT
FOR DETAILS.
AFTER A SINGLE BATTLE
AFTER THE BATTLE YOU SEE A LOGBOOK ENTRY LISTING THE SHIPS YOU
ENGAGED AND THE RESULTS. AN ENEMY SHIP MAY HAVE ESCAPED YOUR
ATTACK, BEEN DAMAGED (AND ESCAPED), OR BEEN SUNK. YOU RECEIVE A
POINT SCORE FOR DAMAGED AS WELL AS SUNKEN SHIPS. YOU RECEIVE
TONNAGE CREDIT ONLY FOR SHIPS SUNK.
PRESS ANY KEY TO EXIT THIS AND SEE WHAT AWARDS OR COMMENDATIONS
YOU RECEIVED (IF ANY). PRESS ANY KEY AGAIN TO SEE THE SUBMARINER'S
HALL OF FAME.
AFTER A WAR PATROL
A WAR PATROL ENDS WHENEVER YOU SAIL INTO A FRIENDLY BASE YOUR
PERFORMANCE DURING THE PATROL DETERMINES YOUR RECEPTION AT THE
PIER. THEN PRESS ANY KEY TO SEE WHAT PRAISE (OR COMPLAINTS) YOU
EARNED ON THE PATROL. PRESS AGAIN TO SEE THE SUBMARINER'S HALL OF
FAME.
AFTER A WAR CAREER
A WAR CAREER ENDS ONLY WHEN JAPAN SURRENDERS (ENDING THE PACIFIC
WAR) OR IF YOU'RE KILLED IN ACTION. JAPAN ALWAYS SURRENDERS ON
THE HISTORICAL DATE IN AUGUST, 1945. YOUR CAREER THEN ENDS WITH A
FINAL RETURN TO PORT. AS IN A NORMAL WAR PATROL, PRESS ANY KEY TO
SEE WHAT YOU EARNED FOR THE PATROL. PRESS AGAIN TO SEE THE SUBMA-
RINER'S HALL OF FAME.
SCORING
TONNAGE: DURING WWII THE US NAVY USED TONNAGE SUNK AS A METHOD
OF MEASURING SUCCESS IN THE SUBMARINE FORCE. THE MOST SUCCESSFUL
CAPTAIN WAS THE ONE WHO SANK THE MOST TONNAGE. MERCHANT AND
MILITARY TONNAGE ARE RATED EQUALLY. NOTE THAT THIS RATING DOES
NO@ TAKE INTO ACCOUNT ENEMIES DAMAGED BUT NOT SUNK, OR THE DIFFI-
CULTY OF ACHIEVING THOSE SINKINGS.
POINT SCORE: AS IN MOST MICROPROSE SIMULATIONS, SILENT SERVICE II
HAS A COMPLEX FORMULA FOR SCORING YOUR PERFORMANCE. YOU RECEIVE A
"POINT VALUE" FOR EACH ENEMY SHIP DAMAGED OR SUNK.
THE VALUE OF ASW(ANTI-SUBMARINE WARFARE) VESSELS IS BASED ON THEIR
CAPABILITIES. THE MORE POWERFUL THE SHIP, THE MORE IT IS WORTH.
THEREFORE DDS AND DDAAS ARE WORTH MORE THAN DES, WHO IN TURN ARE
WORTH MORE THAN PCS.
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THE VALUE OF DAMAGING OTHER SHIPS DEPENDS ON THEIR INTRINSIC
STRENGTH (A STRONG BATTLESHIP IS WORTH MORE THAN A SMALL CARGO
SHIP). IF YOU SINK THE SHIP, YOU GET A BONUS BASED ON THE THE
TARGET'S VALUE. TARGET VALUE IS DETERMINED BY THE STRENGTH OF THE
SHIPS GUARDING IT. A WELL-GUARDED TARGET IS OBVIOUSLY IMPORTANT,
AND THEREFORE IS QUITE VALUABLE IF SUNK. A POORLY GUARDED TARGET
IS LESS IMPORTANT AND THEREFORE EARNS A SMALLER BONUS IF SUNK. A
LARGE WELL-PROTECTED TROOP TRANSPORT COULD BE WORTH AS MUCH AS A
CRUISER, OR EVEN AN OLD, UNGUARDED BATTLESHIP!
YOUR POINT SCORE IS ADJUSTED BASED ON THE DIFFICULTY LEVEL SE-
LECTED, THE CLASS OF BOAT YOU COMMAND AND IF YOU HAVE HISTORICAL
OR FLAWLESS TORPEDOES.
POINT SCORES ARE MOST USEFUL FOR EVALUATING WAR PATROLS OR A WAR
CAREER. A HIGHER TOTAL SCORE FOR EITHER INDICATES BETTER ABILI-
TIES AS A SUBMARINE CAPTAIN. SCORES ARE ALSO GIVEN FOR INDIVIDUAL
BATTLES, BUT THESE ARE SMALL COMPARED TO WHAT'S POSSIBLE IN A WAR
PATROL OR WAR CAREER.
THE SUBMARINER'S HALL OF FAME
THE HALL OF FAME LISTS YOUR TOP SCORES. THE HALL OF FAME ALSO
LISTS VARIOUS REAL CAPTAINS AND THEIR TONNAGE SCORE FOR HISTORICAL
INTEREST. SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON THE SCREEN FOR HOW TO CLEAR THE
HALL OF FAME.
PROMOTIONS, MEDALS AND CITATIONS
PROMOTION: IT WAS US NAVY POLICY TO ASSIGN COMMAND OF A SUBMARINE
TO EITHER A LIEUTENANT COMMANDER (LT. CMDR) OR A COMMANDER (CMDR).
OFFICERS OF A LOWER RANK SERVED IN JUNIOR (NON-SKIPPER) POSITION
ON A SUBMARINE. OFFICERS OF A HIGHER RANK (CAPTAIN OR ABOVE) NO
LONGER COMMANDED A BOAT IN COMBAT; INSTEAD THEY RECEIVED A STAFF,
COMMAND OR SIMILAR JOB ASHORE.
YOU BEGIN THE GAME AS A LIEUTENANT COMMANDER. IF YOUR RECORD
AFTER A SERIES OF PATROLS IS GOOD, WHENEVER YOU FINISH AN ESPE-
CIALLY SUCCESSFUL PATROL YOU MAY BE PROMOTED TO COMMANDER. THIS
IS THE ONLY PROMOTION YOU CAN EARN DURING THE WAR. HOWEVER, IF
YOU SELECTED A HIGH DIFFICULTY LEVEL AND SURVIVE AN ENTIRE WAR
CAREER (STARTING DECEMBER 7, 1941), YOU ARE PROMOTED TO CAPTAIN
(AT ADVANCED DIFFICULTY) REAR ADMIRAL (AT ULTIMATE DIFFICULTY) AT
THE WAR'S END.
MEDALS FOR VALOR: YOU RECEIVE THESE BASED ON YOUR SCORE FOR A
SINGLE WAR PATROL. EACH WAR PATROL IS A NEW OPPORTUNITY TO GAIN
MEDALS, REGARDLESS OF YOUR PAST RECORD (JUST AS IT WAS IN THE REAL
WAR). THE MOST DIFFICULT TO ACHIEVE IS THE MEDAL OF HONOR, THE
LEAST DIFFICULT IS THE BRONZE STAR FOR VALOR.
IN REALITY, MANY OF THESE MEDALS (ESPECIALLY THE NAVY CROSS AND
SILVER STAR) WERE AWARDED FOR TONNAGE SUNK IN A SINGLE PATROL.
HOWEVER, THE NAVY
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MADE EXCEPTIONS, BASED ON VARIOUS EXTENUATING CIRCUMSTANCES.
THEREFORE, THE FAIREST METHOD IS TO USE SCORES RATHER THAN TON-
NAGE.
UNIT CITATIONS: THESE ARE AWARDED TO ESPECIALLY DESERVING VES-
SELS. TO ACHIEVE A UNIT CITATION, YOUR SUB MUST HAVE AN OUTSTAND-
ING OVERALL RECORD, AND IN ADDITION MUST HAVE JUST FINISHED AN
OUTSTANDING WAR PATROL. AS A RESULT, UNIT CITATIONS ARE MORE
DIFFICULT TO GET THAN ANY MEDAL (EXCEPT PERHAPS THE MEDAL OF
HONOR).
THE PRESIDENTIAL UNIT CITATION (PUC) IS THE MOST DIFFICULT TO
ACHIEVE. IT MEANS THE PRESIDENT OF THE US IS PERSONALLY AWARE OF
YOUR ACCOMPLISHMENTS.
THE NAVY UNIT COMMENDATION (NUC) IS SLIGHTLY LESS DIFFICULT TO
ACHIEVE. IT MEANS THAT EVEN IF THE PRESIDENT DIDN'T NOTICE YOUR
EFFORTS, THE NAVY CERTAINLY DID!
ASIATIC-PACIFIC CAMPAIGN MEDAL (AP): THIS IS AWARDED TO THE
SKIPPERS WHO SURVIVE A WAR CAREER THAT BEGAN ON DECEMBER 7TH,
1941--IN OTHER WORDS, SURVIVE THE ENTIRE WAR.
IF REALITY THIS MEDAL WAS AWARDED TO THOSE WHO SURVIVED THE WAR,
REGARDLESS OF STARTING DATE. THE 12-7-41 START REQUIREMENT LENDS
SPECIAL VALUE TO THIS MEDAL IN SILENT SERVICE II.
ALSO NOTE THAT HOSE SKIPPERS WHO SELECTED "ADVANCED' OR "ULTIMATE"
DIFFICULTY WILL RECEIVE A FINAL PROMOTION TO CAPTAIN OR REAR
ADMIRAL AFTER RECEIVING THIS MEDAL.
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3 TACTICS AND STRATEGY
BATTLE TACTICS
BASIC CONCEPTS
A SUBMARINE'S MAIN WEAPON IS THE TORPEDO. TORPEDOES DELIVER
POWERFUL EXPLOSIVES INTO THE ENEMY'S HULL BELOW THE WATERLINE.
THE EXPLOSION OCCURS BENEATH THE ARMOR, OFTEN IN THE VITALS OF THE
SHIP, AND IS FOLLOWED BY MASSIVE FLOODING. TORPEDOES CAN SINK THE
LARGEST WARSHIPS, INCLUDING BATTLESHIPS AND AIRCRAFT CARRIERS.
IT'S THE GREAT EQUALIZER THAT MAKES SUBMARINES SO EFFECTIVE.
THE OTHER STRENGTH OF WWII SUBMARINE IS STEALTH. IT CAN SNEAK
INTO ENEMY WATERS AND STRIKE FROM HIDING. SUBMARINES CAN TRAVEL
INTO AREAS TOO DANGEROUS FOR ANY SURFACE WARSHIP. UNLIKE SURFACE
SHIPS, SUBMERGED SUBMARINES CAN ESCAPE AIR AND SURFACE ATTACK.
EVEN ENEMY SONAR CANNOT DETECT THEM EXCEPT AT CLOSE RANGE. ALMOST
ALWAYS, THE FIRST WARNING OF A SUBMARINE'S PRESENCE IS A TORPEDO
WAKE OR TORPEDO EXPLOSION.
A SUBMARINE'S INVISIBILITY ISN'T RESTRICTED TO SUBMERGED OPERA-
TIONS. EVEN ON THE SURFACE A SUBMARINE IS HARD TO SEE. THE
NEARLY-AWASH HULL IS NOTHING MORE THAN A SHADOW TO DISTANT SHIPS.
THE CONNING TOWER IS SMALL; WHEN SEEN BOW- OR STERN-ON, IT LOOKS
LIKE A DARK LINE. SUBMARINES INVARIABLY SEE THEIR TARGETS BEFORE
THEY'RE SPOTTED. THIS ALLOWS THE SUB TO "STALK" THE TARGETS,
ESPECIALLY IF THEY ARE SLOWER MERCHANTMEN.
A SUBMARINE'S INVISIBILITY IS ESPECIALLY POWERFUL AT NIGHT. OFTEN
MERCHANT SHIPS CAN'T SPOT SURFACED SUBS UNTIL THEY'RE INSIDE
TORPEDO RANGE. THIS ALLOWS SUBS TO CRUISE IN, ATTACK, AND ESCAPE
ON THE SURFACE, ALL WITHOUT BEING SPOTTED.
THE CONTACT
EVALUATING CONTACT: MOST CONTACTS ARE AT LONG RANGE, WITH EITHER
RADAR (IF AVAILABLE) OR EYESIGHT. AS SKIPPER YOUR FIRST TASK IS
TO "DEVELOP" THE SITUATION. FIRST. DETERMINE THE ENEMY'S COURSE
AND RANGE. IF YOUR WITHIN VISUAL RANGE, USE THE TBT OR PERISCOPE
TO "MARK" TARGETS AND NOTE THEIR COURSE SPEED AND RANGE. IF YOU
HAVE RADAR AND THE ENEMY IS DISTANT, MAKE
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SURE YOUR AT RADAR DEPTH(25') OR LESS, SINCE RADAR "SEES" FURTHER
THAN HUMAN EYESIGHT.
DON'T BE SURPRISED IF YOUR CONTACTS SEEM TO APPEAR AND DISAPPEAR.
IF THE ENEMY TURNS HOW BOW OR STERN TOWARD YOUR BOAT, HE'S MUCH
HARDER TO SEE BOTH ON RADAR AND WITH EYESIGHT. BY KNOWING THIS
YOU CAN GUESS WHAT DIRECTION HE'S TURNED TOWARD.
SOMETIMES YOU'LL BE SURPRISED BY EVERY CLOSE ENCOUNTER. THIS
ESPECIALLY COMMON AT NIGHT IF YOU'VE WITHOUT RADAR. AS IN REAL
LIFE, YOU COULD FIND YOURSELF INSIDE AN ENEMY CONVOY OR TASK
FORCE!
SITUATIONS: THE BEST POSSIBLE SITUATION IS WHEN YOU'RE ALREADY
WITHIN THE ENEMY'S FORMATION, OR DIRECTLY IN THEIR PATH. IN
EITHER CASE, YOU NEED ONLY POSITION YOURSELF FOR GOOD TORPEDO
SHOTS AND OPEN FIRE.
UNFORTUNATELY, OFTEN YOU'RE THOUSANDS OF YARDS AWAY FROM THE
ENEMY'S COURSE! HERE YOU MUST PLAN AN INTERCEPT THAT PLACES YOU
AHEAD OF THEM.
SOMETIMES ALL YOU SEE IS ENEMY ANTI-SUBMARINE SHIPS (DESTROYERS
AND PATROL BOATS). THEY COULD BE GUARDIANS OF A LARGER, MORE
DISTANT TARGET. ALTERNATIVELY, THEY COULD BE JUST AN ASW PATROL.
ONLY A VERY BRAVE (OR VERY FOOLHARDY CAPTAIN TANGLES WITH ASW
PATROLS. UNLESS YOU SPOT A GOOD TARGET SOON, YOUR ADVISED TO
AVOID THEM.
INTERCEPTIONS AND CHASES: WHEN PURSUING AN ENEMY,REMEMBER THAT
HE'S MOVING TOO. HEADING TOWARD HIS CURRENT POSITION ONLY RESULTS
IN YOUR SUB ARRIVING AT WHERE HE WAS, NOT WHERE HE'S GOING.
UNLESS HE'S ALREADY HEADED AWAY FROM YOU AT HIGH SPEED, AVOID A
"STERN CHASE". YOU'RE MORE LIKELY TO BE SPOTTED AND NEED TO GET
MUCH CLOSER FOR A GOOD TORPEDO SHOT.
THE STANDARD MANEUVER TO ACHIEVE A GOOD FIRING POSITION IS THE
"END AROUND" (SEE BOX). THE SUB SWINGS AROUND THE CONVOY ON THE
SURFACE AT MAXIMUM SPEED, POSITIONS ITSELF AHEAD OF THE TARGET,
SUBMERGES, AND LIES IN WAIT. THIS ALLOWS THE SUB TO MANEUVER INTO
A PERFECT FIRING POSITION AS THE ENEMY SHIPS SAIL PAST IT. IF THE
SUB DOESN'T SINK EVERYONE, IT CAN SNEAK AWAY, DO ANOTHER END
AROUND AND ATTACKS AGAIN.
INTERCEPTING ENEMY WARSHIPS IS A GREATER CHALLENGE. TASK FORCES
WITH CRUISERS, BATTLESHIPS, AND/OR AIRCRAFT CARRIERS TRAVEL FASTER
(21-27 KNOTS) THAN A SUB. THE SUB HAS ONE CHANCE TO INTERCEPT
THESE TARGETS, AND ONE CHANCE TO FIRE. AFTERWARD ESCORTING DE-
STROYERS "WORK OVER" THE SUB, ALLOWING THE WARSHIPS TO ESCAPE
(ASSUMING THEY'RE NOT TOO HEAVILY DAMAGED.)
(BOX)
INITIALLY THE SUBMARINE SPOTS A NORTHBOUND CONVOY. TO MAKE AN
"END AROUND", THE SUB TURNS PARALLEL TO THE CONVOY AND MOVES
NORTHWARD ON THE SURFACE. AS THE SUB PULLS AHEAD OF THE CONVOY,
IT BEGINS TO CURVE INWARD, KEEPING THE ENEMY IN SIGHT. EVENTUALLY
THE SUB MOVE FAR ENOUGH AHEAD THAT IT TURNS EAST AND MOVES TO A
POSITION IN FRONT OF THE ONCOMING CONVOY. AS THE ENEMY AP-
PROACHES, THE SUB SUBMERGES AND PREPARES A TORPEDO ATTACK.
THROUGHOUT THE SUB KEEPS THE CONVOY AT THE EDGE OF VISIBILITY,
AND/OR MAKES PERIODIC RADAR SWEEPS. SINCE SUBS ARE HARDER TO SEE,
THIS POSSIBLE WITHOUT DETECTION.
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COPING WITH ZIG-ZAGS: THE JAPANESE OFTEN USE ZIG-ZAG TACTICS. THE
PROBABILITY OF ZIG-ZAGS INCREASES WITH DIFFICULTY LEVEL.
A SHIP OR GROUP THAT ZIG-ZAGS ALMOST NEVER SAILS ALONG ITS "REAL"
COURSE (THE "BASE COURSE"). INSTEAD IT SAILS SOMEWHAT TO THE
RIGHT, THEN SOMEWHAT TO THE LEFT. THE RIGHT AND LEFT TURNS ARE AT
IRREGULAR TIMES TO FURTHER CONFUSE THE ENEMY.
THE BEST WAY TO GUESS WHETHER THE ENEMY IS ZIG-ZAGGING IS TO
CONSIDER WHERE HE MIGHT BE GOING. IF HIS CURRENT COURSE ISN'T
AIMED AT ANY PORT, BASE, OR COMMON SHIPPING LANE, THEN HE MAY BE
ON A "ZIG" OR A "ZAG". IF HE MAKES A SUDDEN, LARGE TURN THEN HE'S
ALMOST CERTAINLY ZIG-ZAGGING.
IF YOU SUSPECT ZIG-ZAG TACTICS, TRY TO DETERMINE THE ENEMY'S BASE
COURSE. A ZIG-ZAGGING ENEMY MUST CROSS AND RECROSS THE BASE
COURSE. YOU CAN BE SURE OF INTERCEPTING THEM AT THOSE POINTS.
SURVIVING AN AMBUSH: SOMETIME A CONTACT BEGINS AS AN AMBUSH. THE
ENEMY HAS ALREADY SPOTTED YOUR SUB:DESTROYERS, DESTROYER ESCORTS,
AND/OR PATROL CRAFT ARE HEADED STRAIGHT AT YOU! THE STANDARD
TACTIC IS TO EVADE AND ESCAPE, NORMALLY BY GOING DEEP AND MOVING
AWAY SLOWLY. A FEW BRAVE SKIPPERS FIRED TORPEDOES "DOWN THE
THROAT" AT THE APPROACHING ENEMY. HOWEVER, THESE SHOTS ARE DIFFI-
CULT. FURTHERMORE, FAILURE MEANS THE ENEMY IS QUITE LIKELY TO
SCORE A DAMAGING RAM OR DEPTH CHARGE ATTACK
VISIBILITY AND TACTICS
CONCEALMENT IS A SUBMARINE'S BEST TACTICAL TOOL. IT'S IMPORTANT
TO KNOW WHAT TENDS TO HIDE YOUR BOAT AND WHAT TENDS TO REVEAL IT.
SPEED:ON THE SURFACE, THE FASTER YOU TRAVEL, THE BIGGER YOUR
FOAMING WAKE. THE WAKE OFTEN GIVES AWAY YOUR POSITION FIRST.
WHEN MANEUVERING TO ATTACK THE ENEMY, TRAVEL AT THE MINIMUM POSSI-
BLE SPEED TO ACCOMPLISH YOUR PURPOSE. IF YOU MUST MAKE A DASH, DO
IT AT THE LAST MOMENT, TO AVOID GIVING YOURSELF AWAY EARLY.
SUBMERGED, THE FASTER YOU TRAVEL, THE MORE NOISE YOU MAKE AND THE
CORRECT THE EFFECTIVE RANGE OF ENEMY LISTENING EQUIPMENT. WHEN
LYING IN AMBUSH YOU MAY FIND IT EFFECTIVE TO STOP ALL ENGINES.
WHEN TRYING TO ESCAPE DEPTH CHARGE ATTACKS, SNEAKING AWAY AT LOW
SPEED IS OFTEN MORE EFFECTIVE THAN TRYING TO DASH AWAY.
SILHOUETTE: A SUB IS EASIER TO SPOT IF YOU PRESENT YOUR BROADSIDE
TO ENEMY. IF JUST THE BOW AND STERN IS FACING THE ENEMY (END-ON),
THE SUB MUCH HARDER TO SEE: THE HULL AND CONNING TOWER ARE LONG,
BUT NOT WIDE. THIS
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IS TRUE OF RADAR AND SONAR AS WELL AS EYESIGHT. A GOOD SKIPPER
TRIES TO FACE TOWARD OR AWAY FROM THE ENEMY AS MUCH AS POSSIBLE.
DEPTH & VISIBILITY: A SUBMARINE IS MOST VISIBLE WHEN SURFACED
A SUBMARINE AT "RADAR DEPTH" (25') HAS THE HULL AND CONNING TOWER
SUBMERGED BUT THE MASS OF MASTS (INCLUDING THE RADAR SET) ARE
ABOVE WATER. THE SUB IS HARDER TO SPOT THAN A SURFACED BOAT, AND
YET HAS BOTH RADAR AND PERISCOPE AVAILABLE FOR USE. THE MAIN
DRAWBACK IS THAT THE BOAT MUST USE ITS SLOWER ELECTRIC ENGINES.
A SUBMARINE AT PERISCOPE DEPTH (50-55') IS EVEN LESS VISIBLE. WITH
THE PERISCOPE DOWN IT'S INVISIBLE TO ALL DETECTION EXCEPT SONAR.
IF THE SCOPE IS UP, THE SEA STATE AND SUB SPEED DETERMINE VISIBIL-
ITY. THE CALMER THE SEA AND THE FASTER THE SUB, THE MORE VISIBLE
THE PERISCOPE.
AS A SUBMARINE DIVES DEEPER, IT EVENTUALLY DROPS BELOW A TEMPERA-
TURE "LAYER" INTO COLDER WATER. SONAR WAVES DON'T PENETRATE THE
"LAYER" VERY WELL, REDUCING DETECTION RANGE EVEN MORE.
RADAR: IF YOUR SUB HAS RADAR, YOUR HAVE A SIGNIFICANT TACTICAL
ADVANTAGE. A SUBMARINE USING RADAR CAN TRACK THE ENEMY BEYOND THE
NORMAL EYESIGHT. THIS IS ESPECIALLY TRUE IN 1942 AND 1943, BEFORE
THE JAPANESE DEVELOPED RADAR RECEIVERS AND THEIR OWN RADAR SETS.
RADAR IS MOST USEFUL AT NIGHT OR IN BAD WEATHER. WHILE THESE
CONDITIONS GREATLY REDUCE HUMAN EYESIGHT, THEY DON'T AFFECT RADAR.
AS A RESULT, THE SUB CAN SEE MUCH FURTHER.
THE RADAR SPOTS DIFFERENT SHIPS AT DIFFERENT RANGES. THE LARGER
THE SHIP THE FURTHER AWAY RADAR "SEES" IT. SUBMARINES ARE VERY
SMALL. THEY DON'T REGISTER ON RADAR UNTIL FAIRLY SHORT RANGES
(4,000 TO 5,000 YARDS).
EYESIGHT: IF YOUR SUB LACKS RADAR, TACTICS ARE MORE COMPLEX. SINCE
YOUR SUB IS LESS VISIBLE THAN A SHIP, YOU'LL PROBABLY SEE THE
ENEMY BEFORE HE SEES YOU. HOWEVER, YOU MUST REMAIN AT THE "EDGE"
OF VISIBILITY. IF YOU VENTURE TOO CLOSE, HE'LL SPOT YOU.
THE USUAL TECHNIQUE IS AN "END AROUND" WHILE REMAINING AT THE
VISIBILITY LIMIT, THEN SUBMERGE AND ATTACK.
NIGHT VISIBILITY RANGE IS USUALLY QUITE SHORT. A SUBMARINE CAN
"STALK" A CONVOY ON THE SURFACE, LOOKING FOR GAPS IN THE ESCORT
SCREEN WHERE IT CAN STREAK IN UNOBSERVED, FIRE TORPEDOES INTO THE
MERCHANTMEN, AND STREAK OUT. AGAIN, UNLESS YOU HAVE RADAR, IT'S
BEST TO STAY AT THE EDGE OF VISIBILITY TO MINIMIZE THE CHANCE OF
THE ENEMY SPOTTING YOUR SUB.
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IN BOTH CASES ROVING ENEMY ESCORTS CAUSE PROBLEMS. THEY OFTEN MAKE
SWEEPS AROUND THEIR CHARGES, FORCING YOU TO SUBMERGE BRIEFLY, THEN
SURFACE WHEN THEY MOVE AWAY.
ANOTHER PROBLEM IS FACING. REMEMBER THAT IF THE ENEMY TURNS THEIR
BOW OR STERN TOWARD YOUR BOAT, YOUR ABILITY TO SEE THEM IS RE-
DUCED, BOTH WITH EYESIGHT AND RADAR. IF YOU KEEP YOUR BROADSIDE
TOWARD THEM, THEY MAY JUST SEE YOU BEFORE YOU SEE THEM! THIS IS
MOSTLY A PROBLEM IN AMBUSH SITUATIONS. IN AN "END AROUND" YOU ARE
USUALLY EITHER RUNNING PARALLEL TO THEIR COURSE, OR SHOWING THE
ENEMY YOUR BOW OR STERN.
SONAR: IF YOUR SUB IS SUBMERGED, UNLESS YOU'VE AT RADAR DEPTH OR
USING A PERISCOPE, YOU MUST USE LISTENING HYDROPHONES AND SONAR TO
DETECT ENEMY SHIPS. MAXIMUM RANGE IS A FEW THOUSAND YARDS.
THEREFORE, DON'T BE SURPRISED WHEN ALL BUT THE CLOSEST TARGETS ARE
LIKELY TO DISAPPEAR. HOWEVER, YOUR SONAR DETECTION RANGE IS
BETTER THAN THE ENEMY'S IN MOST ALL SITUATIONS. THE SOLE EXCEP-
TION AGAIN IS WHEN YOUR BROADSIDE FACES THE ENEMY BOW OR STERN.
ONE SPECIAL LIMITATION OF SONAR IS "THE BAFFLES". IF YOUR SUB IS
MOVING QUICKLY, THE DISTURBED WATER ASTERN BLINDS YOUR SONAR.
ENEMIES DIRECTLY BEHIND YOUR SUB MAY DISAPPEAR FROM YOUR CHARTS.
JAPANESE CAPABILITIES: JAPANESE WARSHIPS ARE INVARIABLY BETTER AT
SPOTTING SUBMARINES THAN MERCHANT SHIPS. WARSHIPS HAVE A LARGER
AND BETTER DISCIPLINED CREW, INCLUDING LOOKOUTS IN ALL DIRECTIONS.
MERCHANT SHIPS HAVE FEWER LOOKOUTS, AND OFTEN FORGET TO LOOK
ASTERN.
IN 1943 THE JAPANESE BEGAN USING RADAR AND BY 1944 IT WAS FAIRLY
COMMON. HOWEVER, THEIR RADAR SETS WERE MUCH INFERIOR TO THE US
MODEL, WITH A MUCH SHORTER RANGE.
THE JAPANESE ALSO HAD RADAR RECEIVERS, WHICH DETECTED AMERICAN
RADAR EMISSIONS. HOWEVER, THEY WERE EXTREMELY UNRELIABLE. AFTER
CHASING INNUMERABLE "BAD CONTACTS" THE JAPANESE LOST FAITH IN THIS
DEVICE, ESPECIALLY SINCE AMERICAN SUBS TENDED TO SWITCH THEIR
RADAR ON AND OFF. THE MOST SUCCESSFUL SUB SKIPPERS USED THEIR
RADAR FULLY DESPITE RADAR RECEIVERS. THEREFORE, IT IS ALWAYS
AVAILABLE IN SILENCE SERVICE II.
SEE EVADING ASW ATTACKS (BELOW, PAGE 75) FOR INFORMATION ABOUT
JAPANESE SONAR.
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THE SETUP
THE BIGGEST PROBLEM FOR A SUBMARINE SKIPPER IS ACHIEVING A GOOD
FIRING POSITION OR "SETUP".
IDEAL TORPEDO FIRING RANGE IS 800 TO 1200 YARDS FOR MARK 14 AND
18-2 TORPEDOES, ABOUT 600 TO 1000 FOR MARK 10 OR 18-1 (BECAUSE
THEY'RE SLOWER).
MAXIMUM EFFECTIVE TORPEDO RANGE IS ABOUT 2000 YARDS AGAINST A SHIP
MOVING 10 KNOTS OR FASTER. IF THE TARGET IS STATIONARY, YOU CAN
FIRE UP TO THE MAXIMUM RANGE OF THE TORPEDO (3500 TO 9000 YARDS,
DEPENDING ON THE TORPEDO MODEL).
THE MARK 14 HAS TWO RANGE SETTINGS. HOWEVER, THE SHORTER RANGE IS
4500 YARDS - MORE THAN ENOUGH FOR ANY DECENT SHOT. THE LONG RANGE
GIVES YOU 9,000 YARDS RANGE, BUT THE TORPEDO TRAVELS MUCH TOO
SLOWLY (31.5 KNOTS). THE LONG RANGE SETTING IS USED PRIMARILY FOR
DESPERATE SHOTS.
THE MARK 10S AND 14S ARE STEAM TORPEDOES. THEIR BUBBLING WAKE IS
EASY TO SPOT. THIS GIVES THE TARGET TIME TO MANEUVER BEFORE THE
TORPEDO HITS. MOST SHIPS CAN OUTMANEUVER A SINGLE TORPEDO. HOWEV-
ER, A "SPREAD" OF TORPEDOES RUNNING SIDE BY SIDE IS MUCH HARDER TO
AVOID.
MARK 18 TORPEDOES ARE ELECTRIC. THEIR WAKE ISN'T AS OBVIOUS,
GIVING THE TARGET MUCH LESS TIME TO MANEUVER. UNFORTUNATELY, THE
MARK 18-1 IS SO SLOW (27 KNOTS) THAT THE ADVANTAGE IS MOOT. THE
MARK 18-2 IS FAST ENOUGH (4-0 KNOTS) TO BE A POTENT WEAPON.
ARMING DISTANCE: TORPEDOES ARE SET TO "ARM" THEIR WARHEADS AFTER
300 YARDS. UNARMED TORPEDOES ARE HARMLESS. SOME DENT A HULL AND
BOUNCE OFF, OTHERS PENETRATE THE HULL AND JAM THEMSELVES INTO
THEIR OWN HOLE, CAUSING TRIVIAL LEAKS.
IN ADDITION, THE TORPEDO ARMING DEVICE IS ONLY GENERALLY RELI-
ABLE. THE SAFE DISTANCE COULD BE A OF DISTANCE COULD BE A LITTLE
MORE OR A LITTLE LESS. WISE SKIPPERS ADDED A BIT OF "KENTUCKY
WINDAGE" AND DIDN'T FIRE UNLESS THE TORPEDO WOULD TRAVEL AT LEAST
400 YARDS TO TARGET.
BROADSIDE SHOTS: THE IDEAL TORPEDO IS INTO THE SIDE OF A SHIP
MOVING PERPENDICULAR TO THE TORPEDO'S PATH (SEE ILLUSTRATION).
NOTE THAT THE SUB MUST FIRE A BIT BEFORE THE SHIP IS RIGHT IN
FRONT OF HIM. ALSO NOTE THAT THE SUB IS BETTER OFF FACING IN THE
DIRECTION OF FIRE. OTHERWISE THE TORPEDOES MUST CURVE AROUND
BEFORE RUNNING TOWARD THE TARGET. THIS MAKES THE TORPEDO RUN
LONGER, INCREASING THE CHANCE THEY'LL BE SEEN, AS WELL AS MAKING
IT EASIER FOR THE TARGET SHIP TO EVADE.
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UNTIL LATE IN 1943 MARK 14S HAD CONTACT EXPLODER FAULTS THAT
CAUSED MANY BROADSIDE HITS TO "DUD" (NOT EXPLODE). THE EARLY MARK
14-S WERE MORE LIKELY TO EXPLODE ON A GLANCING HIT. IN SILENT
SERVICE II THIS PROBLEM OCCURS ONLY IF YOU SELECT "HISTORICAL
TORPEDOES".
BOW SHOTS: SHOOTING AT A SHIP'S BOW ("DOWN THE THROAT") IS MORE
DIFFICULT. SHIPS ARE NARROW, SO THE CHANCE OF A MISS IS MUCH
GREATER. FURTHERMORE, THE FIRER MUST SHOOT FASTER. REMEMBER THAT
THE TORPEDO AND TARGET WILL MOVE TOWARD EACH OTHER, SO THE TORPEDO
MIGHT NOT ARM ITSELF BEFORE IT HITS THE TARGET.
THE "DOWN THE THROAT" SHOT COMMONLY OCCURS WHEN AN ESCORTING
WARSHIP SPOTS THE SUBMARINE AND HEADS STRAIGHT FOR IT. THE SUBMA-
RINE IS NOW LOOKING AT THE WARSHIP'S ONCOMING BOW. DO YOU DIVE
AND TRY TO HIDE, OR WAIT AND SHOOT TORPEDOES? THE PROBLEM IS THAT
AFTER SHOOTING A SUB IS STILL AT A FAIRLY SHALLOW DEPTH, WHICH
INCREASES YOUR CHANCE OF SUFFERING DAMAGE.
STERN SHOTS: SHOOTING AT A SHIP'S STERN IS THE WORST POSSIBLE
SETUP. THE TARGET IS JUST AS NARROW AS IN A BOW SHOT. WORSE, THE
TARGET IS MOVING AWAY, SO THE TORPEDO MUST CATCH UP. AS A RESULT
THE TORPEDO "CLOSES" ON THE TARGET MORE SLOWLY. THIS GIVES THE
TARGET MORE TIME TO SEE AND REACT TO THE TORPEDO.
ONE SMALL, MITIGATING FACTOR IS THAT MERCHANT SHIPS USUALLY KEEP
VERY POOR LOOKOUT ASTERN. A TORPEDO ATTACK FROM THE REAR IS LESS
LIKELY TO BE NOTICED. FURTHERMORE, IT THE MERCHANTMAN IS MOVING
SLOWLY (10 KNOTS OR LESS), A FAST TORPEDO (A MARK 14 OR 18-2)
APPROACHES FAIRLY QUICKLY.
PREMATURES AND DUDS: NO MUNITION IS PERFECT. ALL TORPEDOES SOME-
TIMES BLEW UP PREMATURELY OR WERE DUDS (FAILED TO GO OFF). THIS
OCCURS IN SILENT SERVICE II FOR ALL "HISTORICAL" TORPEDOES.
MARK 14 TORPEDOES HAD A NUMBER OF SPECIAL FLAWS THAT MADE THEM
MUCH LESS RELIABLE THAN MOST. THEIR CONTACT EXPLODER WAS FAULTY.
STRAIGHT-ON BROADSIDE HITS TENDED TO DUD, WHILE TORPEDOES THAT HIT
AT GLANCING ANGLES WERE MORE LIKELY TO EXPLODE CORRECTLY. IN THE
LATE 1943 THE EXPLODER WAS REDESIGNED, MAKING IT MUCH MORE RELI-
ABLE.
THE MARK 14 TORPEDOES ALSO HAD A MAGNETIC EXPLODER. WHEN ARMED,
THIS DEVICE TENDED TO CAUSE TORPEDOES TO EXPLODE PREMATURELY, OR
TO IGNORE THE COMMANDS FINALLY REALIZED THIS PROBLEM AND ORDERED
THE MAGNETIC EXPLODERS DEACTIVATED (WHICH MEANT THE TORPEDO RELIED
EXCLUSIVELY ON THE CONTACT EXPLODER).
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TDC TORPEDO FIRING
THE TDC: AMERICAN SUBMARINES HAD A ANALOG "TORPEDO DATA COMPUTER"
(TDC) THAT CALCULATED A TORPEDO'S CORRECT COURSE. THE CREW HAD TO
INPUT THE TARGET'S COURSE, SPEED AND RANGE.
WHEN YOU "TURN ON" THE TDC THE CREW CONSTANTLY UPDATES THE FIRING
SOLUTIONS TO THE COMPUTER, SO YOUR TORPEDO IS ALWAYS READY TO
FIRE.
THE TDC FIRING SOLUTION ASSUMES THE TARGET WILL NEITHER TURN NOR
CHANGE SPEED. UNFORTUNATELY, ONCE THE ENEMY SPOTS THE TORPEDO, HE
USUALLY TURNS AND FREQUENTLY INCREASES SPEED AS WELL.
SPREADS: GOOD CAPTAINS COMPENSATED FOR TARGET MANEUVERS BY FIRING
A "SPREAD" OF THREE OR FOUR TORPEDOES. WHEN FIRING AT A SHIP'S
BROADSIDE, THE RULE OF THUMB WAS TO SPACE OUT THE "SPREAD" ALONG
THE LENGTH OF THE SHIP, WITH THE FIRST TORPEDO "MARKED" AT THE BOW
AND THE LAST TORPEDO "MARKED" AT THE STERN. MORE ENTERPRISING
COMMANDERS VISUALIZED IN THEIR MIND THE PATH OF A PERFECT TORPEDO,
IMAGINED POSSIBLE ENEMY MANEUVERS, THE IMAGINED AIMING ADJUSTMENTS
THAT WOULD HIT THOSE MANEUVERS.
AIMING TDC SPREADS: TO AIM A TDC SPREAD YOU FIRST "MARK" A TAR-
GET. WHILE STILL TRACKING (I.E. THE TDC LIGHT IS STILL ON) USE
THE VIEW LEFT AND VIEW RIGHT KEYS TO MOVE THE TORPEDO AIMING
POINTER LEFT OR RIGHT. THE TDC USES THE CURRENT COURSE, SPEED AND
RANGE DATA TO SET THE TORPEDO, BUT IT FIRES TOWARD A SPOT SLIGHTLY
TO THE RIGHT OR LEFT OF THE REAL TARGET POSITION, DEPENDING ON THE
POSITION OF THE AIMING POINTER WHEN THE TORPEDO IS FIRED.
AIMING AT THE BOW OF A SHIP HELPS IF THE ENEMY INCREASES SPEED
AND/OR TURNS TOWARD YOU. THE TIGHTER THE TURN AND/OR HIGHER THE
SPEED, THE MORE YOU MUST LEAD THE TARGET.
AIMING AT THE STERN OF A SHIP HELPS IF THE ENEMY DECREASES SPEED
AND/OR TURNS AWAY FROM YOU. AGAIN, THE SLOWER THE SPEED AND/OR
THE TIGHTER THE TURN, THE MORE YOU MUST AIM BEHIND THE TARGET.
WHEN AIMING AT THE BOW OR STERN OF A SHIP, YOU MUST FIRE THE
SPREAD TO EITHER SIDE. THE HARDER THE ENEMY COULD TURN, THE WIDER
YOU SHOULD "OPEN OUT" THE SPREAD. ENEMY DESTROYERS AND PATROL
BOATS ARE THE MOST MANEUVERABLE, WHILE LARGE TRANSPORTS AND BAT-
TLESHIPS ARE THE LEAST MANEUVERABLE.
REMEMBER THAT WHEN THE TDC IS ON, THE VIEW LEFT AND VIEW RIGHT
KEYS CONTROL THE AIMING POINTER ONLY, NOT THE VIEW. YOU MUST TURN
OFF THE TDC TO MOVE YOUR VIEW.
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MANUAL TORPEDO FIRE
IN REAL LIFE SOME CAPTAINS FIRED TORPEDOES WITHOUT USING THE TDC.
INSTEAD THEY USED THE CHARTS, PLOTTED THE PROSPECTIVE COURSE OF
THE ENEMY SHIP, AND SET UP THE APPROPRIATE TORPEDO INTERCEPT
COURSE. YOU CAN DO THIS TOO. A RULER, PROTRACTOR (TO MEASURE
ANGLES), AND SCRATCH PAPER WERE THE TRADITIONAL TOOLS USED BY THE
"PLOT CREW" IN REAL SUBMARINES. WITH A RULER YOU'LL FIND THAT 1"
EQUALS = 1000 YDS IS A USEFUL SCALE (THAT IS, 1/2" EQUALS 500
YARDS, 1/4 EQUALS 250 YDS, 1/8" EQUALS 125 YDS AND 1/16" EQUALS
67.5 YDS).
AS YOU'LL SEE, MANUAL COMPUTATION TAKES TIME AND WORK, AND IS
SOMEWHAT INACCURATE. THE TDC SOLVES MOST OF THESE PROBLEMS FOR
YOU. FURTHERMORE, THE METHOD BELOW IS DESIGNED FOR GOOD SETUPS--
FIRING STRAIGHT INTO THE BROADSIDE OF A SHIP. HOWEVER, YOU CAN
USE VARIANTS OF THIS METHOD TO CALCULATE SHOTS AT ANY ANGLE.
PLOT: YOU START BY MARKING YOUR POSITION, A BEARING LINE TO THE
ENEMY'S INITIAL POSITION, AND BY MEASURING THE RANGE. THIS GIVES
YOU THE ENEMY'S STARTING LOCATION. NOW DRAW A LINE FROM THERE
ALONG THE ENEMY'S COURSE.
FIRING RANGE: NEXT PLOT A LINE FROM YOUR SUB TO THE ENEMY'S
COURSE. IF YOU HAVE A TRIANGLE, SLIDE IT ALONG THE ENEMY'S COURSE
UNTIL THE RIGHT-ANGLE SIDE INTERSECTS WITH YOUR SUB. THE LINE
ALONG THAT SIDE IS THE TORPEDO'S PATH FROM YOUR SHIP TO THE TAR-
GET. MEASURE THIS LINE TO DETERMINE THE FIRING RANGE.
ALSO MEASURE WITH A PROTRACTOR THE DIRECTION OF FIRE. TURN YOUR
SUB UNTIL IT'S HEADING IN THIS DIRECTION. THIS MEANS THE TORPE-
DOES DON'T HAVE TO TURN LEFT OR RIGHT AFTER THEY LEAVE YOUR BOAT.
IF THE FIRING RANGE SEEMS TOO LONG, MOVE YOUR SUB ALONG THE LINE
OF FIRE, CLOSING THE RANGE.
FIRING BEARING: ONCE YOU HAVE YOUR FIRING RANGE AND HEADING, YOU
NEED TO CALCULATE WHEN TO FIRE. YOU START BY COMPUTING HOW LONG
THE TORPEDO TAKES TO RUN FROM YOUR SUB TO THE INTERCEPTION POINT.
ONE KNOT OF SPEED MEANS MOVEMENT OF 0.555 YARDS PER SECOND. (SEE
THE BOX TO THE BELOW FOR SPEEDS OF ALL TORPEDOES.)
U.S. TORPEDO SPEEDS
MARK 10 20 YDS/SEC @ 36 KTS
MARK 14 25.5 YDS/SEC @ 46 KTS; OR
17.5 YDS/SEC @ 31.5 KTS
MARK 18-1 15 YDS/SEC @ 27 KTS
MARK 18-2 22.2 YDS/SEC @ 40 KTS
HOW CALCULATE HOW LONG (IN SECONDS) THE TORPEDO TAKES TO ARRIVE AT
THE INTERCEPTION POINT. (DIVIDE THE TOTAL DISTANCE BY THE YDS/SEC
VALUE BELOW).
NEXT CALCULATE HOW FAR THE ENEMY SHIP WILL TRAVEL DURING THAT SAME
PERIOD IN TIME. DO THIS BY MULTIPLYING TOGETHER THE ENEMY'S SPEED
IN KNOTS TIMES THE TORPEDO TIME IN SECONDS TIMES 0.555.
FINALLY, MEASURE FROM THE INTERCEPTION POINT BACK ALONG THE ENE-
MY'S COURSE THE APPROPRIATE DISTANCE. WHEN THE ENEMY SHIP REACHES
THIS POINT, YOU
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SHOULD FIRE YOUR TORPEDO--SO THAT THE ENEMY SHIP AND THE TORPEDO
ARRIVE AT THE SAME POINT AT THE SAME TIME.
DRAW A LINE TO THIS POINT AND USE THE PROTRACTOR TO DETERMINE ITS
BEARING. THIS IS THE "FIRING BEARING". ROTATE YOUR TBT PERISCOPE
TO THIS BEARING. WHEN THE ENEMY MOVES CLOSE TO THE CENTER OF THE
VIEW, SPIN YOUR SCOPE OR TBT TO THE COURSE YOU PRE-CALCULATED FOR
THE TORPEDO AND SHOOT (THE TORPEDO FIRES ALONG YOUR VIEW BEARING).
MATHEMATICAL SOLUTIONS: IF YOU'RE FAMILIAR WITH TRIGONOMETRY,
YOU'LL REALIZE THAT FIRING RANGE AND BEARING CAN BE CALCULATED
MATHEMATICALLY.
SOLVING THE PROBLEM WITH MATH YIELDS MORE ACCURATE FIRING HEADINGS
AND BEARING, BUT UNLESS YOU'RE THOROUGHLY FAMILIAR WITH THE MATHE-
MATICAL PRINCIPLES, YOU'LL PROBABLY MAKE A FATAL ERROR THAT INVAL-
IDATES THE WHOLE EFFORT. ERRORS WITH A RULER AND A PROTRACTOR ARE
USUALLY CAUSED BY IMPRECISE MEASUREMENTS, AND ARE FAIRLY SMALL.
DURING WWII THE FIRE CONTROL CREW ON A SUB ALWAYS CALCULATED
MANUAL SOLUTIONS AS A "BACK UP" IN CASE OF PROBLEMS WITH THE TDC.
THEY USED THE RULER AND PROTRACTOR METHOD, RATHER THAN PURE MATHE-
MATICS.
EXAMPLE: (SEE PAGES 71-72 FOR ILLUSTRATIONS) YOUR SUBMARINE SPOTS
AN ENEMY MERCHANTMAN AT BEARING 243, 5,000 YARDS AWAY MOVING
NORTHEAST COURSE 050 AT 9 KNOTS. YOUR SUBMARINE HAS MADE AN END-
AROUND AND GOTTEN CLOSE TO HIS PROJECTED COURSE.
YOU PLOT HIS COURSE AND AN APPROPRIATE TORPEDO INTERCEPT FOR A
BROADSIDE HIT (SEE ILLUSTRATION). YOU DISCOVER THE TORPEDO NEEDS
TO TRAVEL ABOUT 1125 YARDS, WHICH YOUR 46-KNOT MARK 14 WILL COVER
AT 25.5 YARDS PER SECOND. THEREFORE, THE TORPEDO NEEDS 44 SECONDS
TO REACH THE INTERCEPTION POINT (1125 / 25.5 = 44.1 , ROUNDED OFF
TO 44 SECONDS).
MEANWHILE, THE 9 KNOT FREIGHTER WILL COVER ABOUT 200 YDS (9 X 44 X
0.555 = 220). THEREFORE, YOU BACK UP 220 YARDS ALONG THE FREIGHT-
ER'S COURSE FROM THE INTERCEPTION POINT. WHEN HE REACHES THIS
POSITION, YOU MUST SHOOT.
USING YOUR PROTRACTOR, YOU'LL FIND THAT THE FIRING BEARING IS 309
DEGREES AND THE ACTUAL TORPEDO PATH IS 320 DEGREES.
YOU ROTATE THE TBT OR SCOPE TO 309 DEGREES AND WAIT FOR THE
FREIGHTER TO APPEAR. A SECOND OR TWO BEFORE HIS MIDSHIPS CROSS
THE MIDDLE OF THE SCOPE YOU SWING YOUR VIEW TO 320 DEGREES AND
FIRE.
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TO FIRE A SPREAD, YOU MIGHT SHOOT AT 319 DEGREES, 320 DEGREES AND
321 DEGREES. A ONE-OR TWO DEGREE SPREAD BETWEEN TORPEDOES IS FINE
FOR A SLOW SHIP LIKE THIS. A FASTER SHIP, LIKE A DESTROYER, MIGHT
REQUIRE A WIDER SPREAD WITH MORE TORPEDOES.
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SURFACE ENGAGEMENTS
WHOM TO ENGAGE: THE ORIGINAL PURPOSE OF DECK GUNS WAS TO THREATEN
PEACEFUL MERCHANTMEN, FORCING THEM TO SURRENDER. HOWEVER, AMERI-
CA'S "UNRESTRICTED" SUBMARINE WAR AGAINST JAPAN DISPENSED WITH
SUCH NICETIES. DECK GUNS ARE USED TO FINISH OFF TARGETS UNWORTHY
OF ANOTHER TORPEDO. THEY ARE ALSO USED ON TARGETS TOO SMALL FOR A
TORPEDO, AND AS A WEAPON OF LAST RESORT BY A SUBMARINE FORCED TO
SURFACE OR WITHOUT TORPEDOES.
MOST JAPANESE MERCHANTMEN STARTED THE WAR UNARMED. DECK GUNS WERE
ADDED GRADUALLY. BY 1944 THE MAJORITY OF SHIPS CARRIED THEM.
THOSE WHICH DIDN'T OFTEN BUILT "DUMMY" GUNS TO DISCOURAGE SURFACE
ATTACKS BY SUBMARINES AND OTHER SMALL CRAFT.
MERCHANT SIPS TYPICALLY HAVE TWO TO FOUR 3" TO 5" GUNS, WHILE MOST
SUBMARINES HAVE JUST ONE. HOWEVER, MERCHANT GUNS ARE MANNED BY
LESS SKILLFUL CREWS, WHICH MEANS SLOWER AND LESS ACCURATE SHOOT-
ING. IF THE SUB TORPEDOES THE MERCHANT FIRST, THE CREW IS FURTHER
DISTRACTED. HOWEVER, SOME MERCHANTMEN HAVE EXCEPTIONAL CAPTAINS
AND CREWS. ON THE SURFACE THESE SHIPS CAN FIGHT A SUBMARINE TO A
DRAW, OR POSSIBLY WIN.
PATROL BOATS NORMALLY HAVE ONE OR TWO 3" TO 5" GUNS. THEY ARE
VERY SMALL AND LIGHTLY BUILT, AND THUS EASILY PUT OUT OF ACTION.
THEIR CREWS ARE BETTER THAN MERCHANTMEN, BUT INFERIOR TO MAJOR
WARSHIPS. OVERALL, A PATROL BOAT IS AT BEST A MATCH FOR A SUBMA-
RINE, BUT AGAIN, EVEN WINNING A GUN DUEL CAN CAUSE SERIOUS DAMAGE
TO THE SUB.
JAPANESE WARSHIPS (DESTROYERS AND LARGER) ARE MORE POWERFUL THAN A
SUBMARINE. NOT ONLY IS THE SHIP LARGER, STRONGER AND FASTER, BUT
THE GUN TURRETS ARE FAR MORE STABLE, WITH HIGH QUALITY FIRE CON-
TROL EQUIPMENT. DESTROYER GUNS HAVE A MAXIMUM RANGE OF 14,000 TO
20,000 YARDS, ALTHOUGH EFFECTIVE RANGE IS UNDER 10,000.
CRUISERS AND BATTLESHIPS GROSSLY OUTGUN A SUBMARINE. ONE SHELL
FROM THEIR PRIMARY BATTERIES CAN CRIPPLE OR SINK A SUB. THE
SECONDARY OR TERTIARY BATTERIES ARE AS POWERFUL AS AN ENTIRE
DESTROYER'S BROADSIDE! HEAVY CRUISERS AND BATTLESHIPS CAN FIRE TO
THE VISUAL HORIZON.
HOW TO SCORE HITS: THE ONLY SENSIBLE WAY TO USE A DECK GUN IS
FROM THE BRIDGE TBT, WITH TDC TRACKING YOUR TARGET. IN THIS
SITUATION THE GUN CREW AUTOMATICALLY ROTATES AND ELEVATES THE GUN
FOR THE TARGET'S CURRENT POSITION. YOU NEED ONLY ADJUST THE
ELEVATION FOR THE TARGET'S MOTION. SINCE SHELLS TRAVEL QUICKLY,
THE ADJUSTMENTS ARE FAIRLY SMALL.
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IF THE TARGET IS STATIONARY, SCORING HITS IS EASY. NO ADJUSTMENTS
ARE NEEDED AND MOST SHELLS HIT. MINUSCULE IMPERFECTIONS IN YOUR
GUN, AMMUNITION, OR CREW CAN CAUSE A FEW DUDS OR MISSES.
IF THE ENEMY IS MOVING, COMPARE THE ENEMY'S COURSE TO YOUR VIEW
BEARING. IF HE'S MOVING TOWARD OR AWAY FROM YOU, DEPRESS OR
ELEVATE THE GUN SLIGHTLY.
THE EXACT AMOUNT OF DEPRESSION/ELEVATION DEPENDS ON THE ENEMY'S
SPEED. EXPECT YOUR FIRST FEW SHOTS TO MISS. OBSERVE WHETHER THE
SHELLS FALL SHORT OR LONG AND CORRECT ACCORDINGLY. REMEMBER, IT A
FAST ENEMY (SUCK AS A DESTROYER) IS CHARGING TOWARD YOU, YOUR
SHELLS WILL PROBABLY FALL BEHIND HIM. CONVERSELY, IF HE'S FLEEING
RAPIDLY, YOUR SHOTS FREQUENTLY LAND SHORT.
EVADING ASW DETECTION & SEARCH
JAPANESE SHIPS CAN SPOT A SUBMARINE VARIOUS WAYS: VISUALLY, WITH
RADAR OR WITH SONAR. A TORPEDO WAKE OR TORPEDO EXPLOSION CAN ALSO
ALERT THEM. ONCE ONE SHOPS SPOTS A SUB, HE RADIOS ALL SHIPS IN
THE FORCE, CALLING IN AVAILABLE HELP AND WARNING AWAY POTENTIAL
TARGETS.
WHEN JAPANESE SHIPS PURSUE A CONTACT, THEY EXPECT THE SUBMARINE TO
SUBMERGE (WHICH IT USUALLY DOES). THE SITUATION IS NOW A DUEL
BETWEEN THE ASW (ANTI-SUBMARINE WARFARE) SHIP'S ABILITY TO FIND
AND TRACK A TARGET WITH SONAR VERSUS THE SUBMARINE'S ABILITY TO
ESCAPE.
JAPANESE SONAR HAS SHORT RANGE. THE BEST DEFENSE IS AVOIDING ASW
SHIPS: LIGHT CRUISERS, DESTROYERS, DESTROYER-ESCORTS AND PATROL
BOATS.
THE SINGLE MOST USEFUL TACTIC IS DIVING BELOW THE THERMAL LAYER.
AT A CERTAIN DEPTH (USUALLY 150' AND 250') OCEAN WATER GETS MUCH
COLDER. THE AREA WHERE THE CHANGE OCCURS IS THE "THERMAL LAYER".
SONAR SIGNALS "BEND" OR "BOUNCE" ON THIS LAYER. THEREFORE, IF
YOU'RE BENEATH THE LAYER, IN COLD WATER, ENEMY SONAR IS LESS
LIKELY TO DETECT YOU. OF COURSE, IN SHALLOW WATER THERE IS RARELY
ENOUGH DEPTH TO CREATE A THERMAL LAYER.
THE OTHER STANDARD TACTIC IS TO MOVE QUIETLY. THE SLOWER YOUR SUB
MOVES THE QUIETER IT IS. OF COURSE, NO MOVEMENT AT ALL IS QUIET-
IST, BUT HIS GETS YOU LITERALLY NOWHERE. THE STANDARD TECHNIQUE
IS TO CREEP AWAY AT YOUR SLOWEST.
A SMALL FACTOR IN SONAR DETECTION IS THE FACING OF YOUR SUB.
ENEMY SONAR IS MORE EFFECTIVE WHEN IT BOUNCES OFF YOUR BROADSIDE,
LESS EFFECTIVE IF IT BOUNCES OFF YOUR BOW OR STERN (I.E. WHEN YOUR
SUB FACES TOWARD OR AWAY FROM THAT ENEMY).
ONE FACTOR UNKNOWN TO YOU IS THE QUALITY OF THE SONAR OPERATOR ON
THE JAPANESE SHIP. INTERPRETING SONAR SIGNALS IS A FINE TARGET.
A SKILLFUL, EXPERIENCED
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OPERATOR CAN FIND AND TRACK TARGETS AT MUCH GREATER RANGES THAN
GREENHORNS. ALL SONAR OPERATORS STARTED THE WAR WITH LITTLE EXPE-
RIENCE. WARSHIP CREWS DEVELOPED GOOD SKILLS OVER THE YEARS.
PATROL BOATS WERE LESS WELL TRAINED, AND MANY NEW ONES WERE ADDED
IN 1943, 1944 AND 1945. THEREFORE SOME PCS ARE VERY GOOD, WHILE
OTHERS ARE VERY POOR.
BAFFLES: AS A SHIP MOVES IT CREATES A WAKE OF DISTURBED WATER.
SONAR SIGNALS CANNOT TRAVEL CLEARLY THROUGH THIS WAKE. AS A RE-
SULT, THE SHIP IS "BLIND" IN AN ARC ACROSS ITS STERN. THIS BLIND
SPOT IS CALLED "THE BAFFLES". A SUBMARINE IN THE "BAFFLES" OF A
SHIP IS COMPLETELY INVISIBLE TO THE SONAR OF THAT SHIP.
ASW SHIPS MINIMIZE BAFFLES PROBLEMS BY CONSTANTLY TURNING. THIS
ROTATES THE BAFFLES ARC, MAKING IT DIFFICULT FOR A SUBMARINE TO
REMAIN HIDDEN.
ASW SHIPS ALSO OPERATE IN PAIRS: EACH CAN WATCH THE OTHER'S BAT-
TLES.
EVADING ASW ATTACKS
ONCE A JAPANESE ASW SHIP HAS SONAR CONTACT, IT BEGINS MAKING DEPTH
CHARGE ATTACKS. THE ASW SHIPS DRIVES DIRECTLY OVER THE SUBMA-
RINE'S LAST POSITION (OR CLOSE TO IT) AND DROPS A "PATTERN" OF
DEPTH CHARGES TO EITHER SIDE AND BEHIND IT. THE DEPTH CHARGES ARE
FUSED TO EXPLODE AT A CERTAIN DEPTH.
HOWEVER, THE ASW SHIP LOSES SONAR CONTACT JUST BEFORE IT DROPS THE
DEPTH CHARGES (SONAR HAS A MINIMUM RANGE). THE SHIP DOESN'T
REGAIN CONTACT UNTIL SOME SECONDS AFTER THE CHARGES EXPLODE.
FURTHERMORE, JAPANESE SONAR PROVIDES INACCURATE DEPTH DATA. THE
SHIP'S CAPTAIN USUALLY GUESSES WHAT DEPTH TO SET THE CHARGES,
WHILE THE SUB SKIPPER TRIES TO OUTGUESS HIM.
EVADING DEPTH CHARGES: A GOOD SUBMARINES CAPTAIN EXPLOITS THESE
WEAKNESSES TO EVADE ATTACK. JUST BEFORE THE ASW SHIP PASSES
OVERHEAD A SUBMARINE SHOULD QUICKLY TURN ONTO A NEW COURSE. BOLD
CAPTAINS MAY EVEN RING UP HIGHER SPEEDS FOR A SHORT TIME, KNOWING
THE ENEMY WON'T HEAR THEIR ENGINES. IN ANY CASE, UNLESS THE ENEMY
MAKES THE RIGHT GUESS, THE DEPTH CHARGE ATTACK WILL BE OFF TARGET.
IF YOUR BOAT IS TAKING DAMAGE FROM A DEPTH CHARGE ATTACK, MAKE A
RADICAL CHANGE IN DEPTH. THIS TOO MAY THROW OFF THE ENEMY'S AIM.
ULTIMATELY THE SUB SEEKS TO ESCAPE ATTACKS ENTIRELY. THE BEST WAY
IS TO DIVE BELOW THE LAYER AND SNEAK AWAY AT 3-5 KNOTS. WITH A
FEW GOOD GUESSES YOU CAN SLIP OUTSIDE THE ENEMY'S SONAR RANGE.
TORPEDO COUNTERATTACKS: ATTEMPTING TO TORPEDO AN ASW WARSHIP IS
RARELY WORTHWHILE. COMING TO PERISCOPE DEPTH TO AIM IS A VERY BAD
IDEA. THE PERISCOPE NOT ONLY GIVES AWAY YOUR POSITION, IT ALSO
MEANS THE ENEMY HAS
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BETTER INFORMATION ABOUT YOUR DEPTH. FIRING FROM A DEEPER DEPTH,
USING JUST YOUR CHARTS, IS MUCH SAFER.
DETERMINING A GOOD FIRING SOLUTION IS DIFFICULT BECAUSE THE ENEMY
IS CONSTANTLY TURNING AT HIGH SPEED. EVEN IF YOU LINE UP A SHOT,
YOU MUST INSURE THAT THE TORPEDO WILL RUN OVER 300 YARDS. OTHER-
WISE ITS UNARMED WARHEAD WILL "DUD" INTO THE ENEMY'S SIDE. NEED-
LESS TO SAY, ACHIEVING ALL THIS IN A FEW SECONDS IS VERY DIFFI-
CULT.
BEING RAMMED: ENEMY WARSHIPS AND EVEN BRAVE MERCHANTMEN ARE PER-
FECTLY WILLING TO RAM YOUR SUB. THE THING MOST CAPTAINS FORGET IS
THAT SUBMERGING DOES NOT ELIMINATE THIS DANGER. AT PERISCOPE DEPTH
(55' OR LESS), THE CONNING TOWER AND PERISCOPE SHEERS ARE TALL
ENOUGH THAT RAM CONTACT IS STILL POSSIBLE. TO MAKE SURE YOU'RE
SAFE FROM RAMMING, DIVE TO 60' OR MORE AND LOWER YOUR PERISCOPE.
BEWARE THAT EVEN IF THE ENEMY MISSES RAMMING YOUR BOAT, IF THEY
HAVE DEPTH CHARGES THEY'LL TOSS A FEW ONTO YOU WITH A VERY GOOD
CHANCE OF CAUSING SERIOUS DAMAGE.
RAMMING ATTACKS OFTEN CAUSE MASSIVE AMOUNTS OF DAMAGE--MORE THAN A
DEPTH CHARGE HIT. THEREFORE IT'S WORTHWHILE TO AVOID GETTING
RAMMED EVEN THAT MEANS YOU'LL SUFFER DEPTH CHARGE DAMAGE.
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PATROL STRATEGY
THE FIRST STEP TO GOOD STRATEGY IS KNOWING THE ENEMY. THEN EVALU-
ATE YOUR OWN CAPABILITIES, EXAMINE THE COMBINATIONS, AND CREATE A
PLAN FOR SINKING THE MOST ENEMY SHIPS AT THE LEAST RISK. MANY
WERE SUCCESSFUL, BUT FEW SURVIVED THE WAR.
JAPANESE NAVAL TRAFFIC
JAPANESE WARSHIP ANCHORED IN PROTECTED HARBORS UNTIL A MAJOR
MILITARY OPERATION BEGAN. EVERY FEW YEARS, OR AFTER MAJOR BATTLE
DAMAGE A SHIP WOULD RETURN TO THE NAVAL YARDS IN JAPAN FOR OVER-
HAUL. IN JAPAN THE LARGE FLEET ANCHORAGES WERE TOKYO BAY AND THE
KURE NAVY YARD. DURING 1942 AND EARLY 1943 TRUK AND RABAUL WERE
THE FRONT-LINE BASES. LATER IN 1943 THROUGH MIDDLE 1944 THE FLEET
FELL BACK TO YAP AND PALAU. LATER IN 1944 IT FELL BACK AGAIN TO
BRUNEI AND BALIKPAPAN. AFTER LEYTE GULF THE FLEET WAS LARGELY
DESTROYED, WITH THE REMNANTS FLEEING EITHER TO JAPAN, OR SOUTH TO
SINGAPORE AND CAM RANH BAY ON THE INDOCHINA COAST.
AT VARIOUS TIMES IN THE WAR THE JAPANESE FLEET LEFT PORT TO GIVE
BATTLE. IT WAS ESPECIALLY ACTIVE IN EARLY 1942, SECURING THE
CONQUEST OF THE SOUTHWESTERN PACIFIC FROM BURMA TO NEW GUINEA,
THEN IN LATER 1942 SUPPORTING THE FIGHTING IN THE SOLOMONS. THERE
WERE NO MAJOR NAVAL BATTLES IN 1943. IN 1944 BOTH THE FLEET AND
NAVAL AIR FORCES WERE WIPED OUT IN TWO MAJOR BATTLES (THE FILIPI-
NO SEA AND LEYTE GULF).
THE SOLOMONS CAMPAIGN FROM AUGUST TO NOVEMBER 1942 WAS AN ADDI-
TIONAL EXCEPTION TO THE NORMAL PATTERN OF JAPANESE MOVEMENTS.
HERE THE "TOKYO EXPRESS", COMPOSED OF DESTROYERS AND SOMETIMES A
LIGHT CRUISER, RACED AT HIGH SPEED FROM RABAUL OR THE SHORTLANDS
TO GUADALCANAL, THEN BACK AGAIN. AT ITS PEAK THE TOKYO EXPRESS
RAN TWO OR THREE TIMES A WEEK.
JAPANESE MERCHANT SHIPPING AND ASW FORCES
THE IMPERIAL JAPANESE NAVY APPROACHED THE PROBLEM OF SUBMARINE
QUITE DIFFERENTLY FROM THE ALLIES.
IN THE FIRST YEAR OR TWO OF WAR, AMERICAN SUBMARINE PERFORMANCE
WAS POOR. THIS WAR PARTLY DUE TO FEW FLEET BOATS ON PATROL AND
PARTLY BECAUSE OF POOR MARK 14 TORPEDO PERFORMANCE. AS A RESULT,
THE JAPANESE LOST FEW SHIPS, WHICH INSPIRED NO MORE THAN MODEST
ASW (ANTI-SUBMARINE WARFARE) EFFORTS. AS AMERICAN SUBS BECAME
MORE EFFECTIVE THE JAPANESE TRIED TO INCREASE THEIR ANTI-SUBMARINE
MEASURES.
PORT PATROLS: JAPAN'S FIRST ASW POLICY WAS REGULAR ANTI-SUBMARINE
PATROLS AROUND MAJOR PORTS. PORTS ARE NATURAL "CONGREGATION
POINTS" FOR SHIPS.
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OBVIOUSLY IT WAS IMPORTANT TO DISCOURAGE AMERICAN SUBMARINES FROM
HANGING AROUND PORTS, TORPEDOING SHIPS THAT ENTERED AND LEFT!
ESCORT GROUPS: DURING 1942 THE JAPANESE NAVY CREATED THE "FIRST
CONVOY ESCORT FLEET" OF COASTAL ESCORTS. THE FLEET WAS DIVIDED
INTO MANY SMALL UNITS SCATTERED AMONG THE COASTAL PORTS OF
INDOCHINA, SOUTHERN CHINA AND THE HOME ISLANDS OF JAPAN. AS ONE OR
MORE MERCHANTMEN ARRIVED IN OR NEAR AN ESCORT UNIT'S PORT, THE
ESCORTS JOINED THE MERCHANTS AND TRAVELLED WITH THEM UP THE COAST
FOR A DAY OR TWO, UNTIL THEY REACHED ANOTHER PORT OR TURN-OVER
POINT. THE ESCORTS THEN RELEASED THE MERCHANTS AND TRAVELED BACK
AGAIN, HOPEFULLY ESCORTING MERCHANTS GOING THE OTHER DIRECTION.
IN OTHER WORDS, MERCHANTSHIPS WERE "HANDED ALONG" FROM ONE ESCORT
GROUP TO ANOTHER AS THEY MOVED.
UNFORTUNATELY FOR JAPAN, THESE COASTAL ESCORT GROUPS RECEIVED LOW
PRIORITY IN SHIP ALLOCATIONS. A FEW ANCIENT DESTROYERS, OLD MINE-
SWEEPERS, AND VARIOUS SMALL CRAFT WERE USED, CAPTAINED BY OVERAGE
OFFICERS WITH LITTLE OR NO EXPERIENCE IN ANTI-SUBMARINE WARFARE.
SOME BECAME QUITE GOOD, BUT OTHERS -WERE
ALMOST USELESS.
CONVOYS: UNTIL LATE 1943 THE JAPANESE NAVY DID NOT FORCE MERCHANT
SHIPS INTO CONVOYS. MERCHANTMEN WERE FREE TO SAIL ALONE OR IN
GROUPS, AS THEY DESIRED. MERCHANT SKIPPERS PREFERRED TO SAIL
ALONE. THEY COULD TRAVEL FASTER AND RETAIN MORE CONTROL OVER
THEIR FATE. THIS RESULTED IN MERCHANTMEN SCATTERING ACROSS THE
SEAS, INCREASING THE PROBABILITY OF A SUB FINDING A TARGET.
IN AREAS OF KNOWN DANGER NEAR "FRONT LINE" WAR ZONES MERCHANTMEN
WERE GROUPED TOGETHER AND PLACED UNDER THE COMMAND OF A JAPANESE
NAVAL OFFICER. THIS "CONVOY LEADER" HAD DECK GUNS AND FREQUENTLY
SOME DEPTH CHARGES (BUT NO SONAR) ON HIS SHIP, WHICH HELPED PRO-
TECT THE GROUP FROM SURFACE ATTACK. DEFENSES INCREASED AS MORE
MERCHANTMEN RECEIVED DECK GUNS, EVEN IF THEIR GUN CREWS WERE NOT
ESPECIALLY SKILLFUL.!
IN LATE 1943 THE JAPANESE NAVY BECAME ALARMED AT RISING MERCHANT
LOSSES AND ORGANIZED A NEW "GRAND ESCORT COMMAND" THAT INCLUDED
AIRCRAFT AND HUNTER-KILLER DESTROYER GROUPS. ALTHOUGH THE COAST
ESCORTS CONTINUED, MOST OF THEIR BETTER SHIPS WERE TRANSFERRED TO
THE NEW COMMAND.
MORE IMPORTANTLY, MOST MERCHANT SHIPS WERE REQUIRED TO SAIL IN
CONVOYS. THESE CONVOYS WERE ESCORTED BY WARSHIPS, INCLUDING AT
LEAST ONE DESTROYER OR DESTROYER ESCORT WHEREVER POSSIBLE. THE
RATIO OF ESCORTS TO MERCHANTS VARIED WIDELY, DEPENDING ON THE
SHIPS AVAILABLE AND THE IMPORTANCE OF THE CARGO. BY MID 1944
VIRTUALLY ALL SURVIVING JAPANESE SHIPS SAILED IN CONVOYS.
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THROUGHOUT WWII, AMERICAN SUBMARINES IN THE PACIFIC WERE DIVIDED
BETWEEN TWO COMMANDS: SUBPAC AT PEARL HARBOR, AND A SECOND COMMAND
THAT STARTED IN MANILA, MOVED TO AUSTRALIA FOR MOST OF THE WAR,
THEN RETURNED TO MANILA JUST BEFORE THE WAR ENDED. THE SECOND
COMMAND WAS ORIGINALLY KNOWN AS SUBSASIATIC, BUT IN EARLY 1 942
WAS REORGANIZED AS SUBSOWESPAC.
THIS DIVISION EXISTED BECAUSE THE US PACIFIC FLEET AFTER PEARL
HARBOR WAS CONTROLLED BY ADMIRAL NIMITZ. GENERAL MACARTHUR,
ORIGINALLY COMMANDING THE US ARMY IN THE PHILIPPINES, RETREATED TO
AUSTRALIA AND LOBBIED HARD TO BE THE OVERALL COMMANDER IN THE
PACIFIC. HE AND NIMITZ DISAGREED COMPLETELY ON PLANS AND STRATEGY.
IN WASHINGTON THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF WERE ALSO DIVIDED, MOSTLY
ALONG "ARMY VS. NAVY" LINES. PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT RESOLVED THE
CONFLICT WITH A COMPROMISE. THE ARMY (MACARTHUR) WOULD CONTROL AN
OFFENSIVE FROM AUSTRALIA INTO THE SOUTH PACIFIC AND THE PHILIP-
PINES. THIS WOULD BE THE SOUTHWEST PACIFIC COMMAND. THE NAVY
(NIMITZ) WOULD CONTROL AN OFFENSIVE ACROSS THE CENTRAL PACIFIC.
THIS WOULD BE THE PACIFIC COMMAND. THEY WOULD RACE EACH OTHER TO
THE JAPANESE HOME ISLANDS!
EACH COMMAND DIRECTED A MAJOR OFFENSIVE, AND THEREFORE COMMANDED
AIR FORCES, NAVAL SURFACE FORCES AND GROUND TROOPS, AS WELL AS
SUBMARINES.
THEATERS AND TRANSFERS
AS A SUBMARINE COMMANDER, YOU CAN CHOOSE BETWEEN OPERATIONAL
COMMANDS, AS WELL AS SWITCHING BETWEEN THEM. IN A WAR CAREER, THE
BASE TO WHICH YOU RETURN DETERMINES WHICH THEATER COMMANDS CON-
TROLS YOUR BOAT IN THE NEXT PATROL: SUBPAC OR SUBSASIATIC-
SUBSOWESTPAC. THIS IN TURN AFFECTS WHICH PATROL ZONES ARE AVAIL-
ABLE.
SUBPAC IS LIMITED TO WAR PATROLS IN THE NORTHERN AREAS. IN THE
EARLY WAR THIS INCLUDES AREAS NEAR MIDWAY AND PEARL HARBOR WHERE
YOU GUARD AGAINST PATROLS AROUND THE JAPANESE HOME ISLANDS AND IN
THE RICHEST CONVOY AREAS: THE FORMOSA & LUZON STRAITS AND THE
EAST CHINA SEA.
SUBPAC IS BASED AT PEARL HARBOR, WHICH ALWAYS GETS THE LATEST
EQUIPMENT FIRST. DURING LATE 1942 THIS MEANS YOU'LL PROBABLY GET
THE NEW SJ RADAR FASTER. SUBPAC USES MIDWAY ISLAND AS A FORWARD
BASE STARTING IN JULY 1942. FINALLY, ALL "NEW CONSTRUCTION" BOATS
ARRIVE FIRST AT PEARL HARBOR (IN SUBPAC).
FROM JANUARY 1943 ONWARD ADMIRAL LOCKWOOD COMMANDS SUBPAC. HE
SOLVES PROBLEMS WITH THE MARK 14 TORPEDO FASTER THAN HIS COUNTER-
PART IN SUBSOWESPAC.
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DURING 1944 SUBPAC SETS UP ADVANCE BASES AT MANJURO IN THE MAR-
SHALLS (IN MAY), THEN AT SAIPAN (IN AUGUST). THE LATTER IS VERY
USEFUL.
SUBSASIATIC AND SUBSOWESPAC ARE LIMITED TO WAR PATROLS IN SOUTHERN
AREAS. INITIALLY THE COMMAND IS "SUBSASIATIC" AND BASED AT MANILA
IN THE PHILIPPINES. HOWEVER, BY CHRISTMAS 1 941 THIS IS ABANDONED
IN FAVOR OF TJILATJAP ON THE SOUTH COAST OF JAVA. HOWEVER, THE
RAPID JAPANESE CONQUESTS FORCE THE ALLIES TO ABANDON THAT IN EARLY
MARCH, 1942. THE SUBS RETREAT TO FREMANTLE, AND SHORTLY AFTER
SUBSOWESPAC TAKES OVER FROM SUBSASIATIC.
BRISBANE ON AUSTRALIA'S OTHER COAST OPENS FOR BUSINESS IN APRIL
1942. IT INITIALLY OPERATES TASK FORCE 42 (TF 42), DEDICATED TO
SUBMARINES OPERATING IN THE SOLOMONS AND NEW GUINEA. MANY OF THE
OLD "S" BOATS FROM THE PHILIPPINES END UP IN TF42, WHILE THE NEWER
FLEET BOATS OPERATE FROM FREMANTLE.
DURING 1943 DARWIN (ON AUSTRALIA'S NORTH COAST) OPENS AS A TEMPO-
RARY PORT IN SEPTEMBER. IN LATE OCTOBER A TENDER MOVES TO MILNE
BAY AT THE SOUTH EAST TIP OF NEW GUINEA, ALL DOING TF42 A BASE IN
THE NEW GUINEA AREA. BRISBANE AND MILNE BAY CLOSE IN EARLY 1944
BECAUSE THE FRONT IS MOVING WESTWARD. SHORTLY THEREAFTER TF42 IS
DISBANDED AND ITS BOATS REINTEGRATED INTO SUBSOWESPAC. MEANWHILE,
MANUS HARBOR IN THE ADMIRALTIES BECOMES OPERATIONAL IN APRIL, THEN
MIOS WOENDI IN NORTHWEST NEW GUINEA IN SEPTEMBER, FINALLY, AFTER
MACARTHUR RECONQUERS LUZON AND MANILA, A SUBMARINE BASE IS ESTAB-
LISHED THERE IN MARCH 1945.
BASES & OPERATIONAL AREAS
SUBPAC
BASES WAR PATROL AREAS
PEARL HARBOR 12/41-8/45 CENTRAL PACIFIC 12/41-6/42
MIDWAY 7/42-8/45 WESTERN PACIFIC 12/41-2/45
MANJURO 5/44-8/45 MARIANA ISLAND 12/41-6/44
SAIPAN 8/44-8/45 TRUK & MARSHALLS 12/41-3/44
PALAU ISLANDS 12/41-9/44
NORTHERN JAPAN 12/41-8/45
SOUTHERN JAPAN 12/41-8/45
SEA OF JAPAN 6/43-10/43
SEA OF JAPAN 1/45-8/45
YELLOW SEA 12/41-8/45
EAST CHINA SEA 12/41-8/45
FORMOSA/LUZON STR 12/41-8/45
SUBSASIATIC & SUBSOWESPAC
BASES WAR PATROL AREAS
MANILA 12/41 PHILIPPINES 12/41-10/44
TIJILATJAP 12/41-3/42 SOUTH CHINA SEA 12/41-8/45
FREMANTLE 4/42-8/45 MALAYA 12/41-8/45
DARWIN 9/43-8/45 CELEBES 1/42-8/45
MANUS HARBOR 4/44-8/45 JAVA SEA 1/42-8/45
MIOS WOENDI 9/44-8/45
MANILA 3/45-8/45
TASK FORCE 42
BASES WAR PATROL AREAS
BRISBANE 4/42-5/44 SOLOMON ISLANDS 4/42-11/43
MILNE BAY 10/43-3/44 NEW GUINEA 4/42-4/44
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DURING 1941 AND 1942 THIS COMMAND GIVES YOU EXCELLENT HUNTING
AGAINST THE ADVANCING JAPANESE FORCES. DURING 1943 THE LEADERSHIP
OF SUBSOWESPAC CONTINUED TO IGNORE THE COMPLAINTS ABOUT THE MARK
14 TORPEDO'S DEFECTIVE WARHEAD. IF YOU PICK HISTORICAL TORPEDOES,
YOU'LL BE STUCK WITH INFERIOR WEAPONS SLIGHTLY LONGER. IN 1944 AND
45 MERCHANTSHIPPING IS LESS PREVALENT HERE THAN IN SUBPAC, BUT
MORE JAPANESE WARSHIPS OPERATE IN THE SUBSOWESPAC ZONE.
PATROL AREAS SUBPAC PATROL AREAS
PATROL AREAS ARE DIVIDED INTO TWO GENERAL GROUPS: THOSE PATROLLED
SUBPAC BOATS, AND THOSE BY SUBSASIATIC/SUBSOWESPAC BOATS.
THE RICHEST SUBPAC PATROL AREAS ARE, IN ORDER OF PRIORITY, FORMOSA
& LUZON STRAITS, SOUTHERN JAPAN, SEA OF JAPAN, AND THE EAST CHINA
SEA. OTHER AREAS CAN BE TEMPORARILY RICH IN TARGETS IN CERTAIN
SPOTS, NOTABLY TRUK IN 1942 AND EARLY IN 1943.
THE CENTRAL PACIFIC: THIS AREA INCLUDES MIDWAY ISLAND AND THE
APPROACHES TO PEARL HARBOR. IN THE FIRST MONTHS OF THE WAR THERE
IS A SERIOUS THREAT OF JAPANESE WARSHIP RAIDS OR AMPHIBIOUS INVA-
SIONS, ESPECIALLY AGAINST WAKE AND MIDWAY ISLAND. AFTER THE MIDDLE
OF 1942 THIS THREAT DISAPPEARS AND SUBS ARE NO LONGER ASSIGNED TO
THIS AREA.
THE WESTERN PACIFIC: THIS AREA INCLUDES IWO JIMA AND THE SOUTHERN
APPROACHES TO THE JAPANESE HOME ISLANDS. DURING THE EARLY MONTHS
OF THE WAR MAJOR ELEMENTS OF THE JAPANESE FLEET TRAVEL THROUGH THE
AREA ON THEIR WAY TO AND FROM THE CENTRAL PACIFIC. THEREAFTER THE
AREA IS VERY QUIET, ALTHOUGH SOME CONVOY ROUTES EXIST ALONG THE
SOUTHWESTERN BORDER.
NORTHERN JAPAN: THIS AREA COVERS THE EAST COAST OF NORTHERN JAPAN.
A VARIETY OF GENERAL CARGO TRAFFIC CAN BE FOUND ALONG THE JAPANESE
COAST. THE OPEN SEA FURTHER EAST IS VERY QUIET, WITH ALMOST NO
NAVAL TRAFFIC. A WISE CAPTAIN WILL HUNT CLOSE TO THE COAST,
ESPECIALLY THE SOUTHEASTERN AREAS.
SEA OF JAPAN: DUE TO NARROW ENTRANCES AND EXITS, SUBPAC NORMALLY
PROHIBITS OPERATIONS IN THIS AREA. HOWEVER, BETWEEN JUNE AND
OCTOBER 1943, AND THROUGHOUT MOST OF 1945, ADMIRAL LOCKWOOD DE-
CIDES THE POTENTIAL GAINS OUTWEIGH THE RISKS. IN THESE SHORT
PERIODS SUBMARINE PATROLS ARE ALLOWED.
DURING 1945 THIS IS ABOUT THE ONLY ZONE WITH SIGNIFICANT JAPANESE
NAVAL TRAFFIC.
THIS AREA HAS A LARGE AMOUNT OF TRAFFIC ALONG THE JAPANESE COAST-
LINE AND BETWEEN SHIMMINATO AND MAINLAND ASIA. UNFORTUNATELY, THE
ENTRANCES ARE HEAVILY GUARDED. THE KOREA (TSUSHIMA) STRAITS IN THE
SOUTH ARE HEAVILY
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MINED AND PATROLLED AS IS THE TSUGARU STRAIT BETWEEN JAPANESE
ISLANDS OF HOKKAIDO AND HONSHU. THE NORTHERMOST ENTRANCE, THE LA
PEROUSE STRAIT BETWEEN HOKKAIDO AND SAKHALIN ISLAND, IS THE EASI-
EST TO PASS. DURING 1943 ADMIRAL LOCKWOOD ORDERED ALL RAIDS TO
USE THIS STRAIT.
SOUTHERN JAPAN: THIS AREA INCLUDES THE HEAVILY TRAFFICKED SOUTHERN
COAST OF JAPAN. PASSAGE INTO THE SHALLOW AND HEAVILY DEFENDED
INLAND SEA IS NOT RECOMMENDED, BUT PATROLLING CLOSE INTO THE
ENTRANCES (THE KII SUIDO TO THE NORTH, THE BUNGO SUIDO TO THE
SOUTH) CAN BE VERY PROFITABLE. IN ADDITION, OPEN SEA TO THE SOUTH
HAS MILITARY CONVOYS TO AND FROM IWO JIMA, THE MARIANAS, AND
POINTS BEYOND.
MARIANA ISLANDS: THIS AREA THE PACIFIC ISLAND CAROLINES TO THE
SOUTH. MOST SUPPLY AND TROOP CONVOYS TO THE PACIFIC ISLAND BASES
OF THE EMPIRE PASS ALONG THE WESTERN EDGE OF THE MARIANAS. FLEET
WARSHIPS FOLLOW A SIMILAR PATH FROM TOKYO OR KURE TO SAIPAN AND
GUAM, THEN TO YAP OR TRUK. AFTER THE FIRST FEW MONTHS OF 1944-
TRUK AND RABAUL CEASE TO BE USEFUL BASES. WARSHIPS ARE BASED
FURTHER WEST, BUT TROOP AND SUPPLY REINFORCEMENTS CONTINUE INTO
THE MARIANAS UNTIL THE AMERICAN SUMMER INVASIONS.
YELLOW SEA: THIS AREA IS EXTREMELY SHALLOW AND DANGEROUS. THE
LARGEST CONCENTRATION OF JAPANESE SHIPPING IS ALONG THE SOUTHWEST
COAST OF KOREA, TRAVELLING BETWEEN SEOUL AND THE JAPANESE HOME
ISLANDS. THEY CARRY TROOPS AND SUPPLIES TO AND FROM THE JAPANESE
ARMY IN MANCHURIA (MANCHUKUO).
EAST CHINA SEA: THIS AREA STRADDLES THE MAIN SHIPPING ROUTE BE-
TWEEN THE JAPANESE HOME ISLANDS AND THE EMPIRE'S POSSESSIONS TO
THE SOUTH. VIRTUALLY ALL RAW MATERIAL SHIPMENTS TO JAPAN TRAVEL
FROM THE FORMOSA AND LUZON STRAITS TO THE HOME ISLANDS. DURING THE
FIRST MONTHS OF THE WAR, WARSHIPS AND TROOP TRANSPORTS MOVE SOUTH
TO CONQUER THESE AREAS. THEREAFTER, LARGE AMOUNTS OF RAW MATERI-
ALS COMING TO JAPAN PASS THROUGH. MILITARY SUPPLIES AND SOME
TROOPS WENT THE OTHER DIRECTION, SUPPORTING THE GARRISONS TO THE
SOUTH, AS WELL AS THE CAMPAIGNS IN BURMA AND SOUTHERN CHINA. FROM
LATE 1943 TO LATE 1944 MILITARY TRAFFIC GROWS AS THE JAPANESE MOVE
REINFORCEMENTS INTO THE PHILIPPINES AND CHINA.
FORMOSA & LUZON STRAITS: VIRTUALLY ALL JAPANESE SHIPPING TRAFFIC
FROM ITS SOUTHERN POSSESSIONS TO THE HOME ISLANDS TRAVELLED
THROUGH THESE TWO STRAITS. THE SAME "GOOD HUNTING" POSSIBLE IN
THE EAST CHINA SEA IS FOUND HERE, BUT THERE'S MUCH LESS AREA TO
SEARCH. OF COURSE, THESE STRAITS ARE ALSO
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PATROLLED BY JAPANESE ANTI-SUBMARINE FORCES. AMERICAN FLEET VICTO-
RIES IN THE PHILIPPINES IN LATE 1944 CLOSE THE LUZON STRAIT. THE
FORMOSA STRAIT REMAINS IN USE, BUT BY 1945 NUMBERS ARE MUCH FEW-
ER.
PALAU ISLANDS: THESE ISLANDS ARE THE MAIN FLEET BASES OF THE
IMPERIAL JAPANESE NAVY IN THE WESTERN CAROLINES. NAVAL TRAFFIC IN
AND OUT OF YAP AND ULITHI IS ESPECIALLY HEAVY. MERCHANT CONVOYS
ALSO RUN TO THESE BASES. DURING 1942 AND EARLY '43 CONVOYS USE
THEM AS STOPOVER POINTS ON THEIR WAY TO NEW GUINEA, RABAUL AND THE
SOLOMONS.
TRUK & MARSHALL ISLANDS: TRUK IS THE GREAT ISLAND FORTRESS GUARD-
ING THE EASTERN BORDER OF THE JAPANESE EMPIRE. TRUK IS THE ORIGIN
AND DESTINATION OF NUMEROUS MILITARY TROOP AND SUPPLY CONVOYS,
UNTIL AIR RAIDS IN EARLY 1944 DESTROY ITS NAVAL CAPACITY.
THROUGHOUT 1942 AND 1943 WARSHIPS FIGHTING IN THE SOLOMONS ARE
BASED AT TRUK. HOWEVER, IT LACKS MAJOR SHIPYARD FACILITIES. SHIPS
IN NEED OF MAJOR REPAIR OR OVERHAUL MOVE FROM TRUK TO JAPAN
(USUALLY VIA SAIPAN), AND WHEN REPAIRED RETURN TO TRUK AGAIN.
THE MARSHALLS ARE JAPANESE TERRITORY, BUT HAVE VERY LITTLE SHIP-
PING OR MILITARY ACTIVITY UNTIL THE AMERICAN INVASIONS IN LATE
1943. THEY ARE ALWAYS A SIDESHOW: MORE IMPORTANT TARGETS ARE
AVAILABLE AT TRUK.
SUBSASUATIC AND SUBSOWESPAC PATROLS AREAS
NO AREAS HERE ARE AS CONSISTENTLY RICH IN TARGETS AS THE BEST
SUBPAC AREAS. HOWEVER, AT SPECIFIC TIMES INDIVIDUAL AREASCAN
PROVIDE BETTER HUNTING, SUCH AS THE SOUTHWESTERN SEAS IN LATE '41
AND EARLY '42, OR THE SOLOMONS IN LATE '42. THE PHILIPPINES,
ESPECIALLY AROUND MANILA AND THE NORTHWEST COAST OF LUZON, ARE
QUITE ATTRACTIVE IN `43 AND '44.
SOLOMON ISLANDS: THROUGHOUT THE LAST HALF OF 1942 THIS AREA IS
THE SCENE OF INTENSE NAVAL COMBAT, AS THE JAPANESE ATTEMPT TO
DESTROY THE AMERICAN MARINES ON GUADALCANAL. JAPANESE MAJOR FLEET
UNITS STATIONED IN TRUK SWING DOWN PERIODICALLY IN MAJOR OFFEN-
SIVES, WHILE CRUISERS AT RABAUL AND DESTROYERS IN THE SHORTLANDS
MAKE RUNS DOWN "THE SLOT" BETWEEN THE ISLANDS TO "LRONBOTTOM
SOUND" ON THE NORTHEAST SIDE OF GUADALCANAL.
AFTER THE JAPANESE EVACUATION OF GUADALCANAL IN FEBRUARY 1943 THE
TEMPO OF COMBAT DECLINES. STILL, THROUGHOUT 1943 JAPANESE CRUIS-
ERS, DESTROYERS, AND SMALL TRANSPORTS CONTINUE OPERATING IN THE
UPPER SOLOMONS.
NEW GUINEA: IN THE SUMMER OF 1942 A SMALL JAPANESE ARMY MARCHES
OVERLAND FROM BUNA TO ATTACK PORT MORESBY. THE FAIL, BUT THE
AUSTRALIAN AND AMERICAN COUNTEROFFENSIVE TAKES UNTIL EARLY 1944 TO
RECAPTURE NEW GUINEA.
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UNTIL THE END JAPANESE TRANSPORTS AND SUPPLY SHIPS SAIL FROM THE
CELEBES, THE PALAUS, THE MARIANAS AND RABAUL TO VARIOUS PORTS
ALONG THE NORTH COAST.
VIRTUALLY NO JAPANESE SHIPS OPERATE ALONG THE SOUTH COAST. TRAFFIC
IN THE SHALLOW ARAFURA AND VERY DEEP BANDAN SEAS IS ALSO LIGHT.
CELEBES: THROUGHOUT THE WAR THIS AREA WAS A SECONDARY SOURCE OF
RAW MATERIALS FOR THE JAPANESE EMPIRE. THE GREAT PORTS ARE
MAKASSAR AND BALIKPAPAN ON THE MAKASSAR STRAIT. DURING THE EARLY
MONTHS OF 1942, CRUISERS, BATTLESHIPS AND CARRIERS INHABIT THIS
AREA, SUPPORTING INVASIONS INTO THE DUTCH EAST INDIES. THEN IN
LATE 1944 LARGE WARSHIP GROUPS MUSTER AT BALIKPAPAN, A MAJOR
SOURCE OF FUEL OIL, IN PREPARATION FOR THE GREAT NAVAL BATTLES IN
THE FILIPINO SEA AND LEYTE GULF.
JAVA SEA: THIS AREA IS ONE OF THE MAJOR RAW MATERIAL SOURCES FOR
THE JAPANESE EMPIRE. INDIVIDUAL SHIPS AND SMALL CONVOYS SAIL
CONSTANTLY FROM SURABAYA ON JAVA, AND FROM SINGAPORE TO WORK THEIR
WAY ALONG THE SOUTHERN COAST OF BORNEO. ALL HEAD FOR ROUTES
THROUGH THE SOUTH CHINA SEA TOWARD THE FORMOSA AND LUZON STRAITS.
THIS AREA ONLY SEES LARGE WARSHIPS DURING THE FIRST MONTHS OF 1942
(DURING THE JAPANESE CONQUEST), AND THEN AGAIN IN 1945, AS REM-
NANTS OF THE JAPANESE FLEET FLEE TO SINGAPORE.
PHILIPPINES: INVADED BY JAPAN IN DECEMBER OF 1941 , THE PHILIP-
PINES ARE NOT COMPLETELY RECAPTURED UNTIL THE BEGINNING OF 1945.
MANILA, ON THE LARGE NORTHERN ISLAND OF LUZON, IS A MAJOR PORT. IN
ADDITION TO FILIPINO EXPORTS LEAVING HERE FOR JAPAN, MANILA IS THE
KEY ARRIVAL POINT FOR REINFORCING TROOPS AND SUPPLIES. HOWEVER IT
IS NEVER A MAJOR NAVAL BASE WHILE IN JAPANESE HANDS.
THE MORE SOUTHERN AREAS OF THE PHILIPPINES LIE ALONG IMPORTANT
SHIPPING ROUTES, WITH BRUNEI TANKERS SKIRTING THE PALAWANS IN THE
SOUTHWEST, WHILE VARIOUS SUPPLY CONVOYS TO THE PALAUS PASS AROUND
MINDANO.
DURING THE 1944 NAVAL BATTLES FOR THE MARIANAS AND THE PHILIP-
PINES, TAWITAWI, JUST OFF THE NORTHEAST COAST OF BORNEO, SERVES
BRIEFLY AS A MAJOR FLEET ANCHORAGE. FROM HERE WARSHIPS SALLY
EASTWARD ACROSS THE CELEBES SEA, OR NORTHEAST TOWARD LEYTE.
SOUTH CHINA SEA: THIS AREA BRIEFLY SEES WARFLEETS STEAMING SOUTH-
WARD TO INDONESIA AND MALAYA IN EARLY 1942. THEREAFTER IT IS
ALMOST ENTIRELY OCCUPIED BY MERCHANT SHIPPING MOVING ALONG THE
COAST OF INDOCHINA AND SOUTHERN CHINA. A SIMILAR AMOUNT OF MER-
CHANT SHIPPING PASSES THROUGH THE SOUTHEAST CORNER OF THIS AREA,
TRAVELING BETWEEN THE FORMOSA AND LUZON
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STRAITS AND THE INDONESIAN SOURCES OF RAW MATERIAL. AFTER THE
AMERICAN CONQUEST OF THE PHILIPPINES IN LATE 1944 MOST OF THE
OPEN-OCEAN ROUTES ARE ELIMINATED BY CARRIER STRIKES, BUT THE
INDOCHINESE AND CHINESE COASTAL TRAFFIC CONTINUES.
MALAYA: THIS AREA, JUST SOUTH OF THE SOUTH CHINA SEA, HAS TWO
MAJOR SHIPPING ROUTES. ONE CROSSES THE GULF OF SIAM FROM SINGAPORE
TO CAM RANH BAY, THE OTHER RUNS ALONG THE NORTHWEST COAST OF
BORNEO AND UP ALONG THE PALAWANS. ALONG THIS LATTER ROUTE IS THE
OIL PORT OF BRUNEI, THE SINGLE BEST SOURCE OF FUEL OIL TO JAPAN.
JAPANESE WARSHIPS FREQUENT THIS AREA ONLY TWICE. THE FIRST IS
EARLY IN 1942, AS THE INVASION FORCES PASS SOUTHWARD TO MALAYA,
SINGAPORE AND THE DUTCH EAST LNDIES. THE SECOND IS IN LATE 1944-
AND EARLY 1945, WHEN BRUNEI BECOMES A MAJOR FLEET ANCHORAGE FOR
WARSHIPS UNABLE TO FIND FUEL ELSEWHERE.
STRATEGIES ON PATROL
YOUR GOAL WHEN PATROLLING AN AREA IS TO GENERATE THE MAXIMUM
NUMBER OF ENEMY CONTACTS. MORE CONTACTS MEANS MORE CHANCES TO
REACH A GOOD FIRING POSITION. SINCE YOUR JOB IS TO SINK SHIPS, YOU
SHOULD INVESTIGATE ALL CONTACTS. DECIDING WHICH CONTACTS TO
PURSUE AND ATTACK, AND WHICH TO AVOID, DEPENDS ON WHETHER YOU'RE
IN A "RICH" AREA WITH PLENTY OF "GOOD FISHING", OR A RELATIVELY
POOR AREA WHERE TARGETS ARE RARE.
THE PATROL ZONE: YOUR BEST CHANCE OF MAKING CONTACTS IS WITHIN
THE PATROL ZONE. SEARCHING FOR ENEMIES OUTSIDE YOUR ZONE YIELDS A
LOWER PROBABILITY OF SUCCESS. HOWEVER, YOU MAY STILL RUN INTO GOOD
TARGETS IF YOU STUMBLE ONTO A SHIPPING LANE, A MILITARY OPERATION,
OR A PORT AREA.
SHIPPING LANES: JAPANESE SUPPLY LINES AND MERCHANT TRAFFIC RUN
ALONG COMMON ROUTES. IF YOUR SUB IS ON ONE OF THESE LANES, THE
CHANCES OF MAKING CONTACT WITH A "JUICY" TARGET ARE MUCH IN-
CREASED.
JAPANESE SHIPPING, BY AND LARGE, PREFERRED TO MOVE ALONG COASTAL
WATERS AND THROUGH NARROW PASSAGES, RATHER THAN MAKE BIG OPEN-
OCEAN VOYAGES.
MILITARY OPERATIONS: JAPANESE WARSHIPS OPERATED IN VARIOUS AREAS
AT VARIOUS TIMES DURING THE WAR. LIKE SHIPPING, MILITARY OPERA-
TIONS USUALLY DICTATED TRAVEL ALONG CERTAIN PATHS. UNLIKE SHIP-
PING, WARSHIPS USUALLY PREFERRED "SEA ROOM" AND OFTEN SAILED
FURTHER OUT TO SEA WHERE POSSIBLE.
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PORT AREAS: THE WATERS AROUND MAJOR PORTS AND BASES ARE OBVIOUS
SPOTS TO LOOK FOR ALL TYPES OF SHIPS, CIVILIAN AND MILITARY, AS
THEY ENTER AND LEAVE. UNFORTUNATELY, PORT AREAS ARE ALSO PRO-
TECTED BY LOTS OF ANTI-SUBMARINE PATROLS.
YOUR CHANCE OF FINDING TARGETS IS SOMEWHAT INCREASED NEAR PORTS,
BUT YOUR CHANCE OF BEING SURPRISED BY ENEMY ASW SHIPS IS MUCH
GREATER. OVERALL, HANGING AROUND PORTS MODERATELY INCREASES CON-
TACTS AND GREATLY INCREASES YOUR RISKS.
OVERSTAYING YOUR WELCOME: WHEREVER YOU CONTACT JAPANESE SHIPS IN
AN AREA, THE JAPANESE ALERT SHIPPING ABOUT YOUR SUBMARINE. FOR A
SHORT PERIOD MERCHANT AND MILITARY TRAFFIC AVOIDS THE AREA, WHILE
LOCAL ASW SHIPS SEEK YOU OUT. THEREFORE, IT'S VERY DANGEROUS TO
KEEP PATROLLING THE SPOT WHERE YOU RECENTLY MADE AN ATTACK.
FUEL SUPPLY: WHEN YOU SAIL FROM YOUR HOME BASE TO THE PATROL AREA,
NOTE HOW MANY DAYS OF FUEL YOU USED. TO BE SAFE, WHEN YOUR SUPPLY
REACHES 150 DEGREES (3/2 YDS) OF THAT VALUE, HEAD FOR HOME. THIS
GIVES YOU A "SAFETY CUSHION". EVEN IF YOU SUFFER BATTLE DAMAGE IN
YOUR FUEL TANKS ON THE WAY HOME (WHICH EMPTIES 1/5TH OF YOUR
TANKS), YOU'LL STILL HAVE FUEL TO SPARE.
BE ESPECIALLY CAREFUL AT THE START OF THE WAR WHEN SAILING FROM
MANILA OR JAVA. THESE BASES WILL SOON FALL TO THE ENEMY, WHICH
FORCES YOU TO SAIL FURTHER TO REACH HOME. KEEP AN EXTRA 7 TO 10
DAY FUEL RESERVE FOR SUCH EMERGENCIES.
IGNORING YOUR FUEL STATUS IS A GOOD WAY TO EARN THE WRATH OF YOUR
COMMANDER. NOTHING IS MORE EMBARRASSING THAN BEING TOWED INTO
PORT. IF YOU DO IT TOO OFTEN, AND DON'T HAVE A GOOD EXCUSE (LIKE A
VERY SUCCESSFUL WAR PATROL OTHERWISE), YOU COULD BE KICKED OUT OF
ACTIVE COMMAND PERMANENTLY!
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THE PACIFIC WAR A BRIEF CHRONOLOGICAL HISTORY OF THE PACIFIC WAR
PEARL HARBOR-DECEMBER 7, 1941: THE JAPANESE SURPRISE CARRIER
STRIKE ON PEARL HARBOR DESTROYED OR DAMAGED SEVEN BATTLESHIPS AND
OVER HALF THE PLANES ON THEIR AIRFIELDS. EIGHT HOURS LATER THE US
NAVY DEPARTMENT ORDERED "EXECUTE UNRESTRICTED AIR AND SUBMARINE
WARFARE AGAINST JAPAN".
FALL OF THE PHILIPPINES & INDONESIA - DECEMBER '41 TO APRIL '42:
IN THE PHILIPPINES, MACARTHUR'S FORCES WERE OUTMANEUVERED BY
JAPANESE INVASIONS IN DECEMBER. MANILA WAS ABANDONED BY CHRISTMAS.
MAINLAND FORCES IN THE MOUNTAINS OF BATAAN SURRENDERED APRIL 8,
'42. CORREGIDOR (THE ISLAND FORTRESS IN MANILA BAY) SURRENDERED
MAY 6, '42.
DURING DECEMBER AND JANUARY ALL REMAINING AMERICAN ISLANDS IN THE
WESTERN PACIFIC FELL, INCLUDING GUAM AND WAKE ISLAND.
THE JAPANESE QUICKLY CAPTURED HONG KONG IN DECEMBER 1941, SIN-
GAPORE AND SUMATRA IN FEBRUARY 1942. AFTER A NAVAL BATTLE IN THE
JAVA SEA (2/27/4-2) THE VICTORIOUS JAPANESE CONQUERED JAVA AND
BORNEO IN MARCH. THE REMAINING SMALL ISLANDS OF THE DUTCH EAST
LNDIES FELL SOON AFTERWARD.
BATTLE OF CORAL SEA - MAY 3-8, 1942: THE JAPANESE ATTEMPT TO
INVADE PORT MORESBY ON NEW GUINEA, INCLUDING A THREE-CARRIER
COVERING FORCE, WAS INTERCEPTED BY TWO AMERICAN CARRIERS. THE
AMERICANS LOST ONE FLEET CARRIER, THE JAPANESE ONE LIGHT CARRIER.
ALL SURVIVING CARRIERS SUFFERED BATTLE DAMAGE, PREVENTING THE
INVASION. AMERICA SUFFERED A TACTICAL DEFEAT BUT WON A STRATEGIC
VICTORY BY SAVING PORT MORESBY.
BATTLE OF MIDWAY--JUNE 4-6, 1942: THE JAPANESE ATTEMPT TO INVADE
MIDWAY AND DRAW THE US FLEET INTO A DECISIVE ENGAGEMENT BACKFIRED
WHEN THREE US CARRIERS AMBUSHED THE FOUR JAPANESE CARRIERS, SINK-
ING ALL FOUR. JAPANESE COUNTERSTRIKES SANK JUST ONE US CARRIER.
THIS DECISIVE ENGAGEMENT TURNED THE TIDE OF THE PACIFIC WAR.
GUADALCANAL CAMPAIGN - AUGUST '42 TO FEBRUARY '43: THE JAPANESE,
OPERATING FROM RABAUL AND TRUK, STARTED AN AIRBASE ON GUADALCANAL.
THE AMERICANS COUNTER-INVADED WITH A FULL DIVISION OF MARINES
(16,000 MEN) AND FINISHED THE AIRFIELD FOR THEMSELVES. BOTH SIDES
REINFORCED ON LAND WHILE SURFACE AND CARRIER GROUPS DUELED FOR
NAVAL SUPREMACY. THIS INCLUDED TWO CARRIER BATTLES (THE EASTERN
SOLOMONS: 8/24/42, AND THE SANTA CRUZ ISLANDS:10/26-27/42) AND
FIVE NIGHT SURFACE BATTLES (SAVO ISLAND: 8/9/42; CAPE ESPERANCE:
10/11-12/42; FIRST BATTLE OF GUADALCANAL: 11/12-13/42; SECOND
BATTLE OF GUADALCANAL: 11/14-15/42; TASSAFARONGA: 11/30/42).
THESE BATTLES
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HINDERED REINFORCEMENT BY BOTH SIDES, AND WERE EFFECTIVELY A DRAW.
ON LAND THE JAPANESE ARMY GROSSLY UNDERESTIMATED THE AMERICAN
MARINES AND WERE DECISIVELY DEFEATED. IN FEBRUARY THE JAPANESE
EVACUATED THE FEW SURVIVORS.
LATER SOLOMON CAMPAIGNS - JUNE TO NOVEMBER '43 : THE AMERICAN
FORCES INVADED THEIR WAY UP THE SOLOMONS ISLANDS, GAINING GROUND
SLOWLY AND AT HIGH COST. THE JAPANESE RESISTED WITH LAND TROOPS,
LAND-BASED AIRCRAFT, AND LOCAL LIGHT NAVAL FORCES, CAUSING A
SERIES OF CRUISER/DESTROYER NIGHT SURFACE BATTLES (KOLOMBANGARA:
7/12-13/43, VELLA GULF: 8/6-7/43, AND EMPRESS AUGUSTA BAY:
(11/2/43). NO LARGE JAPANESE FLEET UNITS WERE COMMITTED.
DURING EARLY 1944 THE ADMIRALTY ISLANDS WERE OCCUPIED. AMERICAN
BASES THERE, ON NEW GUINEA, AND IN THE SOLOMONS HAD SURROUNDED
THE JAPANESE AT RABAUL AND KAVIENG. CONSTANT AIR STRIKES REDUCED
BOTH TO WRECKAGE, BUT THE LAND FORTIFICATIONS WERE TOO STRONG TO
ASSAULT. THEY REMAINED SURROUNDED AND POWERLESS FOR THE REST OF
THE WAR.
NEW GUINEA CAMPAIGN - JUNE '42 TO MAY '44: IN JULY '42 THE
JAPANESE MARCHED FROM THE NORTH COAST PORT OF BUNA OVER THE RUG-
GED, JUNGLE OWEN-STANLEY MOUNTAINS TO PORT MORESBY ON THE SOUTH
COAST. THERE THEY WERE FINALLY HALTED BY THE AUSTRALIANS. WITH US
REINFORCEMENTS THE ALLIES COUNTER-ATTACKED BACK OVER THE MOUNTAINS
AND CAPTURED BUNA IN JANUARY 1943. THROUGHOUT 1943 ALLIED FORCES
SLOWLY MARCHED UP THE NORTH COAST, CAPTURING LAE IN SEPTEMBER '43.
MACARTHUR LEAPFROGGED AROUND THE POWERFUL GARRISON AT WEWAK TO
AITAPE (APRIL 1944) AND ULTIMATELY BIAK ISLAND (MAY
1944).
THE GILBERTS--TARAWA--NOVEMBER '43: THE GILBERT ISLANDS WERE
JAPAN'S FURTHEST CENTRAL PACIFIC OUTPOST, AND THEREFORE THE FIRST
BY SEA (ON NOVEMBER 19, 1943). ON TARAWA THE VICTORIOUS AMERICAN
MARINES SUFFERED ENORMOUS CASUALTIES FROM THE VASTLY OUTNUMBERED
JAPANESE DEFENDERS (WHO WERE ELIMINATED BY NOVEMBER 23RD). THE
LOSSES WERE CAUSED BY OPERATIONAL ERRORS, POOR EQUIPMENT AND
IGNORANT COMMANDERS. THE REMAINING GILBERT ISLANDS WERE VIRTUALLY
UNGARRISONED AND EASILY OCCUPIED. THE "VICTORY" AT TARAWA WAS SO
COSTLY THAT AMERICA OVERHAULED AND REORGANIZED ITS AMPHIBIOUS
WARFARE DOCTRINE.
THE MARSHALLS - KWAJALEIN & ENIWETOK - JANUARY & FEBRUARY '44
THE AMERICAN MARINES ELECTED TO BYPASS THE STRONGLY HELD EASTERN
ISLANDS OF MALOELAP, WOTJE AND MILI, AND INVADE THE CENTRAL IS-
LANDS, NOTABLY KWAJALEIN, THE WORLD'S LARGEST CORAL ATOLL, WHILE
CARRIER RAIDS DESTROYED THE AIRBASES ON THE
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EASTERN ISLANDS. INVADED JANUARY 31, 1944, KWAJALEIN WAS SECURED
BY FEBRUARY 7. ENIWETOK WAS INVADED ON FEBRUARY 17TH AND SECURED
BY THE 21ST.
MEANWHILE, THE COVERING CARRIER FORCE MADE MASSIVE STRIKES AGAINST
THE ENORMOUSLY STRONG JAPANESE BASE AT TRUK. THE MAIN JAPANESE
FLEET ESCAPED JUST WEEKS BEFORE THE ATTACK (AFTER OPERATING FROM
TRUK THROUGHOUT '42 AND '43), BUT MANY LIGHT UNITS AND MERCHANT
SHIPS WERE SUNK IN THE HARBOR-LAGOON. HOWEVER, TRUK'S DEFENSES
WERE SO STRONG THAT NO INVASION WAS CONSIDERED. SINKING ALL ITS
SHIPS AND WRECKING ITS AIR FORCE WAS CONSIDERED SUFFICIENT. LIKE
RABAUL, IT WAS BYPASSED FOR THE REST OF THE WAR.
THE MARIANAS - SAIPAN & THE BATTLE OF THE PHILIPPINE SEA - JUNE TO
AUGUST '44: ONLY THE SOUTHERN MARIANA ISLANDS HAD MILITARY VALUE.
THE JAPANESE REGARDED THE MARIANAS AS THEIR MAIN LINE OF DEFENSE.
WHEN SAIPAN WAS INVADED JUNE 15, 1944, THE JAPANESE MAIN FLEET
SORTIED TO COUNTERATTACK. AMERICAN CARRIER/BATTLESHIP TASK FORCES
SAILED WESTWARD INTO THE PHILIPPINE SEA TO SCREEN THE INVASION.
THE BATTLE WAS JOINED JUNE 19, 1944 WHEN JAPANESE CARRIER RAIDS
ARRIVED OVER THE AMERICAN FLEET. AMERICAN VETERANS FLYING THE NEW
F6F HELLCAT FIGHTER MASSACRED THE RAW, INEXPERIENCED JAPANESE
PILOTS. THE BATTLE WAS UNOFFICIALLY KNOWN AS "THE GREAT MARIANAS
TURKEY SHOOT". UNFORTUNATELY, THE AMERICAN CARRIER COMMANDER
(ADMIRAL SPRUANCE) FAILED TO PURSUE QUICKLY ENOUGH THE NEXT DAY.
THIS ALLOWED THE VIRTUALLY PLANELESS JAPANESE CARRIERS TO ESCAPE
(EXCEPT FOR THOSE SUNK BY SUBMARINES).
MEANWHILE, SAIPAN WAS NOT CONQUERED FOR TWO WEEKS THE ENTIRE
GARRISON OF OVER 24,000 FOUGHT FROM MOUNTAIN CAVES WITH A SAMURAI
MENTALITY THAT PREFERRED DEATH TO "DISHONORABLE" SURRENDER. AS
THE AMERICANS MOVED FORWARD, JAPANESE WOMEN AND CHILDREN JUMPED
FROM THE CLIFFS RATHER THAN BE CAPTURED. AMERICAN CASUALTIES WERE
HUGE: ABOUT ONE-THIRD OF THE INITIAL INVASION FORCE WAS WOUNDED
OR KILLED.
TINIAN AND GUAM, WITH WEAKER DEFENSES, WERE OVERRUN IN JULY AND
AUGUST AFTER LOR@G NAVAL BOMBARDMENTS. THE JAPANESE CORRECTLY
UNDERSTOOD THAT THE LOSS OF THESE ISLANDS MEANT DEFEAT. HOWEVER,
IN THE MILITARY DOMINATED JAPANESE GOVERNMENT, NO GENERAL WAS
WILLING TO RISK THE PERSONAL DISHONOR OF URGING A NEGOTIATED
SURRENDER.
SOON AMERICAN AIRBASES ON SAIPAN AND NEIGHBORING GUAM HOSTED B-
29 BOMBERS, WHO BEGAN RAINING DEATH AND DESTRUCTION ON THE JAPA-
NESE HOME ISLANDS.
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THE PALAUS - SEPTEMBER TO NOVEMBER '44: THESE ISLANDS WERE MAJOR
JAPANESE FLEET BASES, WITH EXCELLENT ANCHORAGES BUT WEAKER DE-
FENSES THAN THE MARIANAS. NOW ISOLATED, THEY WERE INVADED ON
SEPTEMBER 15. THE AMERICANS PROCEEDED SLOWLY AND CAREFULLY, ELIMI-
NATING OPPOSITION ON PELELIU (THE MAIN JAPANESE GARRISON) BY
NOVEMBER 25. NEARBY ANGAUR FELL MORE EASILY, WHILE ULITHI ATOLL
WAS VIRTUALLY UNGARRISONED.
MEANWHILE, DURING THE WEEK OF OCTOBER 10-17, 1944, THE AMERICAN
CARRIER FLEET (TF38 UNDER ADMIRAL "BULL" HALSEY) SAILED PAST THE
PHILIPPINES TO FORMOSA AND BACK, LAUNCHING MASSIVE AIR RAIDS
DAILY. THE REMAINING JAPANESE AIR POWER IN THE PACIFIC WAS MUS-
TERED AGAINST THIS RAID AND VIRTUALLY DESTROYED. FROM THAT POINT
ONWARD THE JAPANESE GAVE UP FIGHTING CONVENTIONAL AIR BATTLES AND
CONCENTRATED ON DEVELOPING KAMIKAZE SUICIDE-TACTICS
(WHERE THE ATTACKING PLANE FLEW STRAIGHT INTO THE SHIP). THE
ENTIRE AIRFORCE WAS GRADUALLY TURNED INTO MISSILES GUIDED BY
ONBOARD HUMANS.
LEYTE GULF & THE PHILIPPINES - OCTOBER 1944: DESPITE A DARING
PLAN TO BYPASS THE PHILIPPINES AND INVADE FORMOSA, POLITICAL
CONSIDERATIONS DICTATED RECAPTURE OF THIS GIGANTIC ISLAND CHAIN.
THE FIRST LANDINGS WERE IN THE PROTECTED WATERS OF LEYTE GULF ON
OCTOBER 20, 1944. MEANWHILE, THE JAPANESE MUSTERED THEIR REMAIN-
ING NAVAL STRENGTH TO STOP THE INVASION. A PLANELESS CARRIER FLEET
SORTIED FROM JAPAN AND SUCCESSFULLY DREW OFF THE AMERICAN CARRI-
ERS, WHO SANK THESE "DECOYS" OFF CAPE ENGANO ON OCTOBER 25, 1944.
MEANWHILE THE FULL BATTLESHIP POWER OF JAPAN SORTIED FROM SINGA-
PORE AND INDONESIA, STRIKING FROM THE SOUTH. ONE GROUP WAS
INTERCEPTED BY AMERICAN SHORE-BOMBARDMENT BATTLESHIPS (INCLUDING
SHIPS RAISED AND REBUILT AFTER PEARL HARBOR) IN THE SURIGAO
STRAIT. THEIR RADAR-CONTROLLED GUNS DESTROYED THE RADARLESS
JAPANESE IN LESS THAN ONE HOUR OF NIGHT BATTLE.
THE SECOND AND STRONGER GROUP SUFFERED AIR RAIDS ON THE 24TH THAT
SANK THE SUPER-BATTLESHIP MUSASHI (WITH 18 TORPEDO HITS!). AFTER A
FAKE RETREAT JUST BEFORE NIGHTFALL THE GROUP RUSHED FORWARD,
SURPRISING THE AMERICAN SHIPS COVERING THE INVASION THE NEXT
MORNING. IN THE FAMOUS BATTLE OFF SAMAR ON OCTOBER 25TH, A GROUP
OF SLOW AMERICAN ESCORT CARRIERS WAS OVERTAKEN BY THE JAPANESE
FORCE OF 4 BATTLESHIPS, 6 CRUISERS AND 11 DESTROYERS. THEY VIRTU-
ALLY WIPED OUT "TAFFY 3'S" ESCORT CARRIERS, DESTROYERS AND DE-
STROYER ESCORTS. BUT THE TINY AMERICAN SHIPS, SUPPORTED BY ANY
PLANE THAT COULD FLY, SANK A FEW CRUISERS
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AND SO DEMORALIZED THE JAPANESE THAT THEY RETIRED INSTEAD OF
PRESSING AHEAD. THIS HEROIC FIGHT SAVED THE AMERICAN INVASION
FORCE.
OVERALL THE BATTLE OF LEYTE GULF, OCTOBER 24-25, 1944, WAS THE
GREATEST NAVAL BATTLE IN WORLD HISTORY. IT WAS A DECISIVE JAPANESE
DEFEAT. THE REMNANTS OF THE IMPERIAL NAVY SCATTERED TO PROTECTED
ANCHORAGES. THEY NEVER REFORMED AS A BATTLE FLEET. MACARTHUR'S
TROOPS SECURED LEYTE ISLAND IN DECEMBER 1944, THEN INVADED LUZON
ON JANUARY 9, 1945, CAPTURING MANILA BY MARCH. HOWEVER, MOPPING UP
OPERATIONS ON VARIOUS ISLANDS LASTED ALMOST TO THE END OF THE
WAR.
IWO JIMA & OKINAWA - SPRING 1945: AMERICAN PLANNERS, IMPRESSED BY
THE FANATICAL AND UNYIELDING RESISTANCE OF JAPANESE SOLDIERS AND
CIVILIANS, DID NOT BELIEVE THE JAPANESE WOULD SURRENDER UNTIL
THEIR HOMELAND WAS INVADED AND CONQUERED (LIKE GERMANY). TO PRE-
PARE OUTLYING ASSAULT BASES, IWO JIMA WAS INVADED ON FEBRUARY 19,
1945. THIS RESULTED IN A MONTH OF UNBELIEVABLY BLOODY FIGHTING.
IWO WAS SECURED ON MARCH 16TH, 1945.
OKINAWA WAS INVADED ON APRIL 1ST, 1945. THE JAPANESE CONSIDERED
THIS ISLAND PART OF THEIR HOMELAND. THE FIGHTING HERE FULLY
EQUALED THAT JUST FINISHED IN IWO JIMA, WHILE CONTINUAL KAMIKAZE
ATTACKS CAUSED HEAVY LOSSES TO THE AMERICAN FLEET. THE REMAINING
JAPANESE SUPER-BATTLESHIP YAMATO MADE A HOPELESS SORTIE (THE LAST
JAPANESE WARSHIP SORTIE OF THE WAR) BUT WAS SUNK BY MASSIVE CARRI-
ER STRIKES ON APRIL 7TH, 1945. AFTER APRIL THE JAPANESE AIR
COUNTERATTACKS FADED AWAY, BUT THE CONQUEST OF OKINAWA WAS NOT
FINISHED UNTIL JULY 3RD, 1945.
ATOMIC BOMBS & SURRENDER - AUGUST, 1945: AFTER IWO JIMA AND
OKINAWA, AMERICAN PLANNERS BEGAN ORGANIZING THE INVASION OF THE
JAPANESE HOME ISLANDS. A REPEAT OF THE FANATICAL RESISTANCE ON IWO
JIMA AND OKINAWA, COUPLED WITH THE DAMAGING KAMIKAZE ATTACKS,
WOULD MAKE AN INVASION EXTREMELY COSTLY TO BOTH SIDES. THE CASUAL-
TIES FROM THE INVASION CAMPAIGN COULD EXCEED ALL AMERICAN LOSSES
SUFFERED IN EUROPE FOR THE WHOLE WAR.
THROUGHOUT 1945 AMERICAN CARRIERS RANGED ALONG THE JAPANESE AND
CHINESE COASTS, WRECKING EVERYTHING OF MILITARY VALUE THEY COULD
FIND. BY JULY AMERICAN BATTLESHIPS WERE CRUISING OFF COASTAL
CITIES, BOMBARDING ANYTHING IN RANGE. MEANWHILE B-29S MOUNTED
FIRESTORM RAIDS THAT DESTROYED TOKYO AND OTHER MAJOR CITIES,
BURNING TO DEATH TENS OF THOUSANDS OF JAPANESE CIVILIANS.
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ON AUGUST 6TH, 1945, A LONE B-29 DROPPED AN ATOMIC BOMB OVER THE
CITY OF HIROSHIMA. THE 2000' AIRBURST DESTROYED THE ENTIRE CITY,
KILLING OVER 72,000 OUTRIGHT AND WOUNDING ANOTHER 68,000, MANY
FATALLY WITH RADIATION. ON AUGUST 9TH A SECOND BOMB LANDED ON
NAGASAKI WITH ROUGHLY EQUIVALENT RESULTS. STUPIFIED BY DESTRUC-
TION OF SO MUCH WITH JUST TWO BOMBS, THE JAPANESE FINALLY
ABANDONED THE SAMURAI CODE AND SURRENDERED ON AUGUST 15TH, 1945.
A BRIEF HISTORY OF SUBMARINE OPERATIONS
1941-1942: SUBSASIATIC LOST ONLY ONE BOAT AND ONE SUBTENDER TO
JAPANESE AIR RAIDS ON MANILA HARBOR. THE REST ESCAPED AND AT-
TEMPTED TO ATTACK JAPANESE WARSHIPS AND TRANSPORTS CONVERGING ON
THE PHILIPPINES. HOWEVER, COMMANDERS WERE CAUTIOUS (CONDITIONED
BY PEACETIME EXERCISES THAT PENALIZED RISK-TAKING OR INDIVIDUAL
INITIATIVE). VERY FEW BOATS ACHIEVED GOOD SET-UP POSITIONS. WHEN
MANILA FELL THE COMMAND RETREATED TO JAVA, THEN AGAIN TO AUSTRA-
LIA.
SUBSASIATIC WAS REORGANIZED INTO SUBSOWESPAC IN SPRING 1942, WITH
MAJOR BASES AT FREMANTLE (NEAR PERTH IN SOUTHWESTERN AUSTRALIA)
AND BRISBANE (IN EASTERN AUSTRALIA). THE FREMANTLE SUBS OPERATED
AGAINST JAPANESE SHIPPING IN THE RAW-MATERIALS HEADLAND OF THE NEW
EMPIRE. THEY ALSO RESCUED SURVIVORS AND SUPPORTED GUERILLAS IN THE
PHILIPPINES. THE BRISBANE SUBS OPERATED IN THE SOLOMONS AND ALONG
THE NEW GUINEA COAST, FREQUENTLY COMMITTED TO SPECIAL MISSIONS AND
WARSHIP INTERCEPTION, WITH MERCHANT SHIPPING ATTACKS A LOW PRIORI-
TY. SUBMARINE COMMANDERS DEEMED INSUFFICIENTLY AGGRESSIVE WERE
REMOVED AND REPLACED BY OTHER OFFICERS, USUALLY
SLIGHTLY YOUNGER ONES. IF THEY WEREN'T SUCCESSFUL AFTER TWO OR
THREE PATROLS, THEY TOO WERE REPLACED.
SUBPAC OPERATING OUT OF PEARL HARBOR AND LATER MIDWAY USED MUCH
OF ITS STRENGTH IN SPECIAL OPERATIONS, INCLUDING ISLAND RAIDS,
SCOUTING DURING THE BATTLE OF MIDWAY (JUNE, 1942), OR ATTEMPTING
TO INTERCEPT JAPANESE WARSHIPS. THE REMAINDER PATROLLED ALONG THE
JAPANESE, KOREA, AND NORTHERN CHINESE COASTS. AS IN
SUBSASIATIC!SUBSOWESPAC, UNAGGRESSIVE SKIPPERS WERE REPLACED BY
NEW MEN.
1943: SUBSOWESPAC, FRUSTRATED WITH MEAGER RESULTS IN 1942, GAVE
ITS BOATS MORE FREEDOM BY ENCOURAGING CAPTAINS TO SEEK MERCHANT
SHIPPING LANES, RATHER THAN WAITING NEAR PORTS. GENERAL MACARTHUR
STILL DEMANDED A LARGE NUMBER OF SPECIAL MISSIONS, SO THE OVERALL
NUMBER OF SUBMARINES AVAILABLE FOR USE AGAINST SHIPPING REMAINED
SMALL. FURTHERMORE, THROUGHOUT THE YEAR SUBSOWESPAC CONTINUED TO
IGNORE COMPLAINTS ABOUT THE MARK 14,
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SO MUCH SO THAT CAPTAINS WERE SPECIFICALLY ORDERED TO CONTINUE
USING THEIR MAGNETIC EXPLODERS. THIS IS PROBABLY BECAUSE KEY
SUBSOWESPAC COMMANDERS WERE INVOLVED IN THE ORIGINAL DEVELOPMENT
OF THE MARK 14 TORPEDO, AND REFUSED TO ADMIT THAT THEIR EARLIER
WORK WAS IN ANY WAY FLAWED.
MEANWHILE, SUBPAC UNDER THE NEW LOCKWOOD ADMINISTRATION WAS FREE
TO SEND HEAVY CONCENTRATIONS OF SUBMARINES INTO JAPANESE HOME
WATERS. USING RADAR, SUBPAC BOATS SANK LARGE AMOUNTS OF RAW MATE-
RIAL EN ROUTE TO JAPAN. ADMIRAL LOCKWOOD WAS ALSO IN THE FOREFRONT
OF SOLVING TORPEDO PROBLEMS. FIRST HE INVESTIGATED THE MAGNETIC
EXPLODERS AND DEEMED THEM UNRELIABLE.
AFTER THE TINOSA'S EXPERIENCE (SEE "WHALES & DUDS", PAGE 98) HE
DISCOVERED AND FIXED THE FLAWS IN THE CONTACT EXPLODER. SUBPAC WAS
ALSO THE FIRST TO GET THE IMPROVED GATO CLASS BOATS, AND THESE NEW
BOATS WERE FREQUENTLY SKIPPERED BY NEWLY PROMOTED MEN WHO HAD MADE
WAR PATROLS IN '41 AND '42. THEIR WAR EXPERIENCE BEFORE CAPTAIN-
SHIP GAVE THEM KNOWLEDGE AND INSIGHTS QUITE DIFFERENT FROM THOSE
CONDITIONED BY PEACETIME.
SUBPAC ATTEMPTED RAIDS INTO THE SEA OF JAPAN DURING THIS YEAR.
AFTER THE LOSS OF THE FAMOUS "MUSH" MORTON AND HIS BOAT, THE
WAHOO, LOCKWOOD GAVE UP THESE MISSIONS AS TOO DANGEROUS.
1944: SUBSOWESPAC OPERATIONS CONTINUED MUCH AS THEY HAD IN 1943,
WITH NO APPRECIABLE INCREASE IN RESULTS (ALTHOUGH THE MARK 14
TORPEDO PROBLEMS WERE NOW FIXED). PART OF THE REASON WAS THE
CONTINUING HIGH DEMAND FOR SPECIAL OPERATIONS IN SUPPORT OF
THE GROUND FIGHTING. THE REMAINDER WAS THAT THE SUBS WERE AT-
TEMPTING TO INTERCEPT SCATTERED FREIGHTERS IN THE VAST SOUTHERN
AREAS, RATHER THAN THE TRAFFIC CHOKE-POINTS FURTHER NORTH.
MEANWHILE, SUBPAC HAD FINALLY FIGURED OUT THAT THE LUZON AND
FORMOSA STRAITS WERE JAPAN'S SHIPPING BOTTLENECK. VIRTUALLY ALL
MERCHANT TRAFFIC BETWEEN THE HOME ISLANDS AND THE SOUTHERN SOURCES
OF MATERIAL PASSED THROUGH BASE AT SAIPAN GREATLY REDUCED CRUISING
TIME TO THE PATROL ZONE, WHICH MEANT MORE SUBMARINES WERE ON
PATROL LONGER. JAPANESE MERCHANT SHIPPING SUFFERED CRIPPLING
LOSSES, DESPITE A CRASH BUILDING PROGRAM OF NEW MERCHANTMEN AND
ASW SHIPS.
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BOTH COMMANDS USED INFORMAL WOLFPACKS, COMMANDED BY SUBMARINERS ON
THE SPOT. THESE PATROLS HELPED "SWEEP" THE SEAS AND FIND CONVOYS
OR MERCHANTMEN. ATTACKS WERE NOT COORDINATED, SINCE THIS REQUIRED
FREQUENT RADIO MESSAGES THAT GAVE AWAY A SUB'S POSITION. SIMULTA-
NEOUS ATTACKS ON CONVOYS WERE USUALLY ACCIDENTAL, RATHER THAN
DELIBERATE. MANY SUBS WERE STILL SENT ON INDEPENDENT CRUISES.
1945: IN THE FINAL HALF-YEAR OF THE WAR SUBMARINES HAD FEW TAR-
GETS. THE JAPANESE FLEET WAS VIRTUALLY ELIMINATED. SHIPPING WAS
ALL BUT GONE AS WELL. BY THE SUMMER SUBMARINE SKIPPERS WERE RE-
DUCED TO SINKING SAMPANS, JUNKS AND FISHING BOATS FOR LACK OF
ANYTHING LARGER. BY THE END OF THE WAR THE JAPANESE MERCHANT
MARINE HAD BEEN VIRTUALLY DESTROYED.
RESULTS OF THE SUBMARINE WAR
THE SCORE: AMERICAN SUBMARINES HAD A DEVASTATING EFFECT ON THE
JAPANESE MERCHANT MARINE DURING WORLD WAR II IN THE PACIFIC. AT
THE START OF WWII SUBSASIATIC HAD 29 BOATS, SUBPAC HAD 22. IN
DECEMBER 1941 THESE BOATS MANAGED ONLY 281 DAYS OF WAR PATROLS IN
THEIR ASSIGNED AREAS. DURING LATE 1944, WHEN THE AMERICAN SUBMA-
RINE WAR REACHED ITS PEAK, THERE WERE AN AVERAGE OF 43 BOATS IN
WAR PATROL ZONES PRODUCING OVER 1,300 DAYS OF WAR PATROLLING PER
MONTH.
MEANWHILE, THE JAPANESE MERCHANT MARINE STARTED THE WAR WITH ABOUT
6.0 MILLION TONS OF CAPACITY. DURING THE WAR ANOTHER 3.2 MILLION
TONS WERE BUILT. YET AT WAR'S END JAPAN HAD JUST 1.8 MILLION TONS
AFLOAT. JAPANESE PLANTS WERE QUIET FOR LACK OF RAW MATERIAL,
JAPANESE CIVILIANS RECEIVED STARVATION RATIONS. OF THE 8.1 MIL-
LION TONS OF JAPANESE MERCHANTMEN LOST, AMERICAN SUBMARINES SANK
ABOUT 60%. MOST OF THE REMAINDER WERE DESTROYED BY AIR RAIDS ON
JAPANESE BASES AND HARBORS IN LATE 1944 AND 1945. AMERICAN SUBMA-
RINES ALSO SANK 201 WARSHIPS, BUT 127 OF THESE WERE SMALL PATROL
BOATS AND OTHER AUXILIARIES OF MODEST MILITARY VALUE.
US SUBMARINES VS JAPANESE WARSHIPS
JAPANESE FLEET SUNK BY PERCENTAGE
TYPE OF SHIP STRENGTH SUBMARINES SUNK
CV FLEET CARRIER 13 4 31%
CVL LIGHT CARRIER 8 0 -
CVE ESCORT CARRIER 6 5 83%
BBH SPR BATTLESHIP 2 0 -
BB BATTLESHIP 6 0 -
BC BATTLE CRUISER 4 1 25%
CA HEAVY CRUISER 18 3 17%
CL LIGHT CRUISER 27 7 26%
DD DESTROYER 173 37 21%
SS SUBMARINE 247 22 9%
JAPANESE FLEET STRENGTH INCLUDES ALL SHIPS AT THE START OF THE
WAR, PLUS SHIPS COMPLETED BEFORE THE END OF THE WAR. THE
"DESTROYER" CATEGORY INCLUDES DDAA'S AND LARGE DES, AS WELL AS ALL
DESTROYERS USED AS SUCH DURING THE WAR.
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JAPANESE MERCHANT SEAMEN SUFFERED GREATLY IN THE CAMPAIGN. CON-
SERVATIVE AMERICAN ESTIMATES PUT THEIR LOSSES AT 69,600 (16,200
KILLED, 53,400 WOUNDED). MANY WERE BADLY BURNED WHEN THEY ABAN-
DONED SHIP INTO SEAS COATED WITH BURNING OIL. OTHERS WERE EATEN
BY SHARKS. CREWS ON SMALL COASTAL STEAMERS (UNDER 500 TONS) AND
FISHERMEN ARE NOT INCLUDED IN THESE FIGURES. THEIR LOSSES ARE
CERTAINLY THOUSANDS MORE.
THE US NAVY LOST ONLY 41 SUBMARINES TO ENEMY ACTION. A TOTAL OF
374 OFFICERS AND 3,131 MEN WERE KILLED IN SUBMARINES.
CONCLUSIONS: THE AMERICAN SUBMARINE WAR AGAINST JAPAN WAS THE
MOST RAPACIOUS AND DEADLY ASSAULT ON MERCHANT SHIPPING IN THE
HISTORY OF MANKIND. BY THE END OF 1944 SUBMARINES WERE DOING SO
MUCH DAMAGE THAT THEY WOULD HAVE PROBABLY DESTROYED THE ENTIRE
MERCHANT MARINE SINGLE-HANDED, GIVEN ANOTHER ENTIRE YEAR. WHAT
THE U-BOATS ATTEMPTED AND FAILED IN THE ATLANTIC, THE AMERICANS
ACHIEVED IN THE PACIFIC.
AT THE SAME TIME THE AMERICAN SUBMARINE SERVICE HAD TRIED ITS
HARDEST TO INTERCEPT AND SINK JAPANESE WARSHIPS. ARMED WITH
DECODED COPIES OF ALL JAPANESE SHIP MOVEMENTS, SUBMARINES WERE
VECTORED TO INTERCEPT POSITIONS WITH UNBELIEVABLE ACCURACY.
HOWEVER, THE RESULTS WERE
US SUBMARINES VS JAPANESE MERCHANT SHIPS
TONNAGE* PERCENT
INITIAL MERCHANT TONNAGE 5,996,607 65%
TONNAGE BUILT DURING WAR 3,231,509 35%
TOTAL WARTIME MERCHANT MARINE 9,228,116 100%
SUNK BY SUBMARINES 4,859,634 60%
SUNK BY AIRCRAFT** 2,467,382 30%
SUNK BY MINES 397,412 5%
SUNK BY SURFACE GUNFIRE 77,145 1%
OTHER LOSSES 340.018 4%
TOTAL LOST 8,141,591 100%
*LIMITED TO SHIPS OF 500 TONS OR MORE
**INCLUDES US ARMY AIR FORCE (SUBSEQUENTLY RENAMED US AIR FORCE)
AND US NAVY AIRCRAFT BASED ON AIRCRAFT CARRIERS AND AT LAND BASES
US SUBMARINES VS JAPANESE ECONOMY
DATE BULK COMMODITIES* ARRIVING IN JAPAN
1940 24.2 MILLION TONS
1941 22.0 MILLION TONS
1942 21.3 MILLION TONS
1943 18.0 MILLION TONS
1944 11.1 MILLION TONS
1945 5.5 MILLION TONS**
*INCLUDES COAL, IRON ORE, IRON, SCRAP IRON, STEEL, BAUXITE, LEAD,
TIN, ZINC, PHOSPHORITE, DOLOMITE, MAGNESITE, RUBBER, SALT, SOYBEAN
CAKE, SOYBEANS, RICE, OTHER GRAINS AND FLOURS
**ANNUALIZED FIGURE BASED ON 3.0 MILLION TONS RECEIVED BY 8/15/45
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NOT ESPECIALLY IMPRESSIVE. SUBMARINES DID NOT "TURN THE TIDE" IN
ANY MAJOR NAVAL BATTLE OR CAMPAIGN. THEIR ACHIEVEMENTS WERE VERY
MUCH "HIT AND MISS", WITH MOST ATTACKS RESULTING IN MINOR DAMAGE,
RATHER THAN A SINKING. TRADITIONAL SURFACE BATTLES AND THE NEW
CARRIER AIR BATTLES PROVED MUCH MORE DECISIVE IN WINNING (OR
LOSING) MILITARY CAMPAIGNS.
MORALITY AND SUBMARINE WARFARE
IN 1922 THE UNITED STATES, BRITAIN AND JAPAN SIGNED THE LONDON
NAVAL TREATY AMONG OTHER PROVISIONS, THE TREATY OUTLAWED UNRE-
STRICTED SUBMARINE WARFARE AGAINST CIVILIAN VESSELS. SUBMARINES
WERE SUPPOSED TO ACT LIKE SURFACE SHIPS. THEY WERE OBLIGED TO
REMOVE THE CREW TO A SAFE PLACE BEFORE CAPTURING OR SINKING A
SHIP.
HOWEVER, FROM THE START OF WORLD WAR II AMERICAN SUBMARINE COM-
MANDERS, INCLUDING THE COMMANDERS OF BOTH SUBSASIATIC AND SUBPAC,
ORDERED THEIR BOATS TO WAGE UNRESTRICTED WARFARE ON ALL JAPANESE
SHIPS, INCLUDING MERCHANT SHIPS. SOME COMMANDERS
(SUCH AS "MUSH" MORTON) EVEN WENT SO FAR AS TO SURFACE AND MA-
CHINE-GUN BOATS AND SURVIVORS AFTER SINKING THEIR SHIP! BY 1945
AMERICAN SUBS HAD SO MUCH TROUBLE FINDING MERCHANT SHIPS TO SINK
THAT THEY TOOK TO SINKING FISHING BOATS WITH DECK GUNS, MACHINE
GUNS, EVEN RIFLES AND HAND GRENADES! THIS INCLUDED ANY VESSEL
CREWED BY PEOPLE WITH ORIENTAL FEATURES OPERATING OF JAPANESE-
CONTROLLED COASTS, EVEN THOUGH THE CREW MIGHT BE CHINESE, VIETNAM-
ESE, CAMBODIAN OR MALAYSIAN.
BY COMPARISON, JAPANESE SUBS MOUNTED NO CAMPAIGN AGAINST CIVILIAN
VESSELS. THEIR SUBMARINES WERE USED AGAINST SURFACE WARSHIPS, AS
SCOUTS, AND ON OCCASIONAL POLITICAL MISSIONS (SUCH AS A TOKEN
BOMBARDMENT OF THE US WEST COAST, OR A PLAN TO TRANSPORT SEA-
THE LONDON NAVAL TREATY OF 1922
THE DOCUMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW GUIDING WWII PACIFIC SUBMARINE
OPERATIONS, SIGNED BY THE UNITED STATES, BRITAIN AND JAPAN READS
AS FOLLOWS:
(1) IN THEIR ACTIONS WITH REGARD TO MERCHANT SHIPS, SUBMARINES
MUST INFORM TO THE RULES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW TO WHICH SURFACE
VESSELS ARE SUBJECT.
(2) IN PARTICULAR, EXCEPT IN THE CASE OF PERSISTENT REFUSAL TO
STOP ON BEING DULY SUMMONED, OR OF ACTIVE RESISTANCE TO VISIT OR
SEARCH, A WARSHIP, WHETHER SURFACE VESSEL OR SUBMARINE, MAY NOT
SINK OR RENDER INCAPABLE OF NAVIGATION A MERCHANT VESSEL WITHOUT
HAVING FIRST PLACED PASSENGERS, CREW AND SHIP'S PAPERS IN A PLACE
OF SAFETY. FOR THIS PURPOSE THE SHIP'S BOATS ARE NOT REGARDED AS A
PLACE OF SAFETY UNLESS THE SAFETY OF THE PASSENGERS AND CREW IS
ASSURED, IN THE EXISTING SEA AND WEATHER CONDITIONS, BY PROXIMITY
OF LAND, OR THE PRESENCE OF ANOTHER VESSEL WHICH IS IN A POSITION
TO TAKE THEM ON BOARD.
THE UNITED STATES DID NOT FORMALLY ABROGATE THIS TREATY AT THE
START OF THE WAR. INSTEAD, WITHIN EIGHT HOURS OF THE PEARL HARBOR
ATTACK, THE US NAVY DEPARTMENT ORDERED ALL PACIFIC SUBMARINE
COMMANDS TO "EXECUTE UNRESTRICTED AIR AND SUBMARINE WARFARE
AGAINST JAPAN." IN GENERAL AMERICAN SUBMARINERS AGREED WITH THIS
ORDER, MANY OF THEM WITH GUSTO AND ENTHUSIASM.
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PLANES FOR A RAID ON THE PANAMA CANAL). THIS POLICY CAN BE VIEWED
EITHER AS DELIBERATELY LAW-ABIDING OR AS COINCIDENTAL WITH JAPAN'S
MILITARY THEORIES AND PLANS, DEPENDING ON YOUR VIEWPOINT.
GERMANY WAS THE ONLY OTHER NATION IN WWII TO WAGE LARGE-SCALE
UNRESTRICTED SUBMARINE WARFARE. ALTHOUGH ALLIED PROPAGANDISTS
PORTRAYED U-BOAT SKIPPERS AS CRAZED MANIACS WHO GLEEFULLY MACHINE-
GUNNED SURVIVORS IN THE WATER, THERE ARE NUMEROUS CASES OF U-BOATS
BEFORE SINKING THE VESSEL. IN SOME CASES COURTEOUS U-BOAT CAP-
TAINS EVEN GAVE THE CREW FOOD, A MAP, AND A COMPASS TO HELP THEM
REACH LAND. IT IS VIRTUALLY IMPOSSIBLE TO FIND SIMILAR EXAMPLES
OF AMERICAN COURTESY TOWARD JAPANESE MERCHANT SEAMEN.
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HISTORICAL ENGAGEMENTS WHALES AND DUDS
THE SITUATION: YOU RANDALL "DAN" DASPIT, COMMANDING THE TINOSA, A
GATO-CLASS SUBMARINE. IT'S 0930 (MORNING), JULY 24TH, 1943, WEST
OF TURK. YOU INVESTIGATE A RADAR CONTACT AND DISCOVER A SINGLE,
UNESCORTED TARGET--A HUGE WHALING FACTORY SHIP, NOW SERVING AS AN
OIL TANKER. YOU HAVE MARK 14 TORPEDOES WITH THEIR WORTHLESS
MAGNETIC EXPLODERS DEACTIVATED.
TACTICAL ADVICE: YOU'RE IN A FAIRLY GOOD POSITION, BUT BEYOND
GOOD SHOOTING RANGE. THE ENEMY IS MAKING 13 KNOTS ON THE SURFACE.
YOU HAVE THREE TACTICAL OPTIONS.
FIRST YOU CAN TAKE A QUICK SHOT IMMEDIATELY. THIS MIGHT SLOW DOWN
THE TARGET, ALLOWING YOU TO APPROACH SUBMERGED AND FINISH HIM
OFF.
SECOND, YOU CAN PULL BACK TO RADAR CONTACT RANGE (OVER 10,000
YARDS), SURFACE AND "END AROUND" AHEAD OF HIM USING YOUR SUPERIOR
20-KNOT SPEED, THEN SUBMERGE AND ATTACK.
THIRD, YOU CAN SURFACE RIGHT NOW AND SHOOT IT OUT. YOU'LL PROBA-
BLY TAKE DAMAGE, BUT A FEW HITS MIGHT SLOW HIM DOWN SO YOU CAN
SUBMERGE AND APPROACH FOR A GOOD TORPEDO SHOT.
WHAT REALLY HAPPENED: DAN DASPIT FIRED A SINGLE TORPEDO IMMEDI-
ATELY. IT HIT THE TARGET (TONAN MARU #3) IN THE STERN AND DIS-
ABLED HER PROPELLERS. THE SHIP QUICKLY COASTED TO A STOP AND
DASPIT SAILED UP, SUBMERGED, TO 800 YARDS. HE THEN PROCEEDED TO
FIRE, ONE AT A TIME, ELEVEN TORPEDOES INTO THE BROADSIDE OF THE
TONAN MARU #3. THE FIRST WAS A DUD, SO BEFORE EACH SUBSEQUENT
SHOT THE TORPEDO ROOM CREW COMPLETELY "MAINTENANCED" THE TORPEDO
TO MAKE SURE IT WAS IN PERFECT OPERATING ORDER.
ALL ELEVEN SHOTS WERE DUDS OR FAILURES. NOT ONE EXPLODED AGAINST
THE SIP. EVENTUALLY A DESTROYER ARRIVED AND TOWED THE TONAN MARU
#3 INTO TRUK. THE OUTRAGED DASPIT SAVED HIS LAST TORPEDO AND
RETURNED TO PEARL HARBOR. ADMIRAL LOCKWOOD WAS SIMILARLY OUT-
RAGED. HE ORDERED TESTS THAT FINALLY IDENTIFIED THE DESIGN FLAWS
IN THE MARK 14'S CONTACT EXPLODER.
MUSH ON THE LOOSE
THE SITUATION: YOU'RE DUDLY "MUSH" MORTON, COMMANDING THE WAHOO,
A GATO-CLASS SUBMARINE. IT'S 0845 (MORNING), JANUARY 26, 1943,
NORTHWEST OF WEWAK, NEW GUINEA. YOU INVESTIGATE SMOKE ON THE
HORIZON AND FIND THREE JAPANESE MERCHANT SHIPS, WITH AN ESCORT.
YOU APPROACH AS CLOSELY AS POSSIBLE ON THE SURFACE.
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TACTICAL ADVICE: YOU'LL BE SEEN IF YOU MOVE MUCH CLOSER ON THE
SURFACE. YOU CAN SUBMERGE AND MOVE INTO A GOOD ATTACK POSITION
SLIGHTLY AHEAD OF THE ENEMY, OR YOU CAN TURN DUE EAST AND RUN
AHEAD OF THEM A BIT ON THE SURFACE BEFORE TURNING NORTH, SUBMERG-
ING, AND MOVING TO AN ATTACK POSITION. THE LATTER METHOD GENERALLY
YIELDS A BETTER TORPEDO-FIRING SOLUTION.
IF YOU'RE USING HISTORICAL TORPEDOES, BEAR IN MIND THAT YOUR MARK
14S USE THE UNRELIABLE MAGNETIC EXPLODER AS WELL AS THE TERRIBLE
CONTACT EXPLODER.
WHAT REALLY HAPPENED: MORTON DIVED AND CHARGED STRAIGHT IN, GIVING
HIM REAR QUARTER SHOTS ON THE ENEMY. HE HIT ALL THREE TARGETS,
SINKING ONE, IMMOBILIZING A SECOND, AND SLOWING A THIRD. THE
IMMOBILIZED SHIP WAS A TRANSPORT, WHICH HE POLISHED OFF WITH
ANOTHER TORPEDO, THEN SURFACED AND GUNNED DOWN THE SOLDIERS IN THE
WATER WITH HIS LIGHT AA GUNS. IT TOOK HIM ABOUT A HOUR TO DESTROY
ALL THE BOATS AND LIFE RAFTS, AS WELL AS KILLING MANY OF THE
SOLDIERS.
MORTON THEN SAILED IN PURSUIT OF THE ESCAPING FREIGHTER, WHICH HAD
SINCE JOINED UP WITH A TANKER. AFTER A LONG, TEN-HOUR CHASE HE
TORPEDOED THE TANKER AT DUSK, SURFACED AND CLOSED. THE SURVIVING
FREIGHTER HAD MANNED ITS GUNS, CAUSED A HEATED GUN DUEL THAT
MORTON RESOLVED BY FIRING HIS LAST TORPEDOES TO SINK THE ENEMY.
THIS ALONG WITH EARLIER EXPLOITS IN THE PATROL, MADE MORTON A "WAR
HERO". HE RECEIVED THE NAVY CROSS WHILE THE PRESS CALLED THE
WAHOO "THE ONE-BOAST WOLF PACK". GIVEN THE GROSS UNRELIABILITY OF
HIS TORPEDOES. MUSH WAS AN EXTREMELY LUCKY GUY.
FLASHER'S TANKERS (I)
THE SITUATION: YOU'RE GEORGE GRIDER COMMANDING THE FLASTHER, AN
IMPROVED GATO-CLASS SUBMARINE. IT'S 0900 (MORNING), DECEMBER 4TH,
1944. YOUR SWEEPING THROUGH THE PHILIPPINES WITH A WOLFPACK. YOU
MAKE RADAR CONTACT WITH A THREE-SHIP CONVOY THAT'S HEADED STRAIGHT
TOWARD YOUR CURRENT POSITION. IT'S STARTING TO RAIN, WHICH LOWERS
VISIBILITY SIGNIFICANTLY.
TACTICAL ADVICE: SUBMERGE AND LET THEM APPROACH. YOU MAY NOT SEE
ANYTHING UNTIL THEY GET WITHIN 4,000 TO 5,000 YARDS, DUE TO POOR
VISIBILITY. YOU CHOOSE WHETHER TO ATTACK THE ESCORT FIRST AND THEN
THE TANKER, OR VICE VERSA.
WHAT REALLY HAPPENED: GRIDER DISCOVERED THAT HE WAS FACING A
SINGLE TANKER ESCORTED BY TWO DESTROYERS. HE TOOK THE BOLD AP-
PROACH AND DECIDED TO ATTACK A DESTROYER FIRST, THEN THE TANKER.
HIS FIRST SLAVO OF FOUR TORPEDOES HIT ONE OF THE DESTROYERS,
WRECKING IT. HOWEVER, HE'D LINED UP HIS SHOTS SO THE
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TANKER WAS BEHIND THE DESTROYER. LO AND BEHOLD, THE OTHER TWO
TORPEDOES HIT THE TANKER, SETTING IT AFIRE.
GRIDER EVADED A DEPTH CHARGE COUNTERATTACK FROM THE UNDAMAGED
DESTROYER, RETURNED TO PERISCOPE DEPTH, AND SAW IT STOPPED TO
RESCUE SURVIVORS FROM THE BURNING TANKER AND NOW SUNKEN DESTROYER.
GRIDER LAUNCHED ANOTHER SALVO OF FOUR TORPEDOES, THREE OF WHICH
HIT THE DESTROYER, SINKING IT ALMOST INSTANTLY. THEN HE POLISHED
OFF THE STILL-BURNING TANKER
FLASHER'S TANKERS (II)
THE SITUATION: YOU'RE GEORGE GRIDER, COMMANDING THE FLASHER, AN
IMPROVED GATO-CLASS SUBMARINE. IT;S 0100 ( AN HOUR AFTER MID-
NIGHT), DECEMBER 22ND, 1944, OFF THE INDOCHINA COAST -- 18 DAYS
AFTER THE ENCOUNTER ABOVE. YOU'VE BEEN CHASING ONE TANKER CONVOY
OR ANOTHER UP AND DOWN THIS COAST FOR DAYS, FRUSTRATED BY SEAS SO
HEAVY YOU COULDN'T FIRE TORPEDOES. JUST AS YOU'RE ABOUT TO GIVE
UP, IN WEATHER LULL YOUR RADAR OPERATOR FINDS THE ENEMY. HE'S
TRYING TO "HUG THE COAST" AND DISCOURAGE SUB ATTACKS BY SAILING IN
SHALLOW WATER. YOU DECIDE TO OUTWIT THEM BY MOVING EVEN CLOSER TO
THE COAST FOR A NIGHT SURFACE ATTACK. THE WATER IS SO SHALLOW
THAT YOU COULD HIT BOTTOM BEFORE REACHING PERISCOPE DEPTH!
TACTICAL ADVICE: YOU'RE IN AN EXCELLENT ATTACK POSITION. LET THE
CONVOY COME UP, KEEPING YOUR BOW TOWARD THEM (TO MINIMIZE YOUR
VISIBILITY TO THEM) AND SLOWLY APPROACH. THE LEADING SHIPS ARE
PROBABLY ESCORTS, FURTHERMORE BEWARE OF SMALL PCS HOVERING ABOUT.
THE CENTRAL COLUMN IS THE TANKERS. IF YOU SET WITHIN 800 TO 1000
YARDS OF ONE, TORPEDO SALVOS IN ALL DIRECTIONS COULD CLEANUP
PLENTY. ONCE THEY SPOT YOU, CRANK UP TO MAXIMUM SPEED AND RUN
AWAY FROM THE NEAREST ESCORT. IF THEY'RE TOO CLOSE, YOU MAY HAVE
TO SUBMERGE. BEWARE OF BEING RAMMED EVEN WHEN SUBMERGED BECAUSE
OF THE SHALLOW WATER.
WHAT REALLY HAPPENED: GRIDER LET THE LEADING ESCORTS GO PAST AS HE
CLOSED ON THE TANKERS. THEN HE FIRED ALL HIS BOW TUBES, SPUN
AROUND, AND FIRED ALL THE STERN TUBES INTO THE TANKER COLUMN. THE
THREE SHIPS EXPLODED IN VAST FLAMES. GRIDER THEN EASED THE @/AS@E@
AWAY, BUT THERE WAS NO PURSUIT. APPARENTLY THE ESCORTS THOUGHT THE
CONVOY HAD BLUNDERED INTO A MINEFIELD.
SINK THE YAMATOGATO
THE SITUATION: YOU'RE EUGENE MCKINNEY, COMMANDING THE SKATE, A
GATO-CLASS SUBMARINE. IT'S 0430 (JUST BEFORE DAWN), CHRISTMAS
DAY, 1943, OUTSIDE TRUK HARBOR. THANKS TO AN ULTRA MESSAGE,
YOU'RE IN THE RIGHT POSITION TO FIND A HUGE BLIP TO THE NORTHWEST
ON THE SJ RADAR, MOVING TOWARD YOU AT 23 KNOTS.
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TACTICAL ADVICE: AS YOU CAN GUESS FROM THE TITLE, THE BIG BABY
HEADED YOUR WAY IS THE YAMATO, LARGEST BATTLESHIP IN THE WORLD AND
FLAGSHIP OF THE IMPERIAL JAPANESE NAVY. DON'T BE SURPRISED IF
ADDITIONAL SHIPS APPEAR - THE YAMATO IS PROBABLY ESCORTED BY
SMALLER SHIPS NOT VISIBLE AT THIS RANGE.
GET RIGHT IN FRONT OF THE YAMATO AND SUBMERGE. AT JUST UNDER 1000
YARDS FIRE EVERYTHING YOU'VE GOT FROM THE BOW, SPIN AROUND, AND
EMPTY THE STERN TUBES INTO HIM AS WELL. YOUR ONLY HOPE IS TO SCORE
ENOUGH HITS TO SLOW OR TEMPORARILY STOP THE YAMATO. AFTER YOU
ACHIEVE THAT YOU MUST THEN ESCAPE THE ESCORTING DESTROYERS'
COUNTERATTACK. THEN YOU CAN RETURN AND HOPEFULLY POLISH OFF A
CRIPPLED MONSTER.
THIS IS HARDER THAN IT SOUNDS BECAUSE THE YAMATO IS COMING ON LIKE
A FREIGHT TRAIN. SHE'S BIG ENOUGH TO SHRUG OFF A COUPLE HITS AND
KEEP ON GOING. ABOVE ALL, DON'T TRY A SURFACE BATTLE. SUBMARINES
AREN'T BUILT TO "SLUG IT OUT" WITH SUPER-BATTLESHIPS !
WHAT REALLY HAPPENED: MCKINNEY HAD DIFFICULTY WITH THE
YAMATO'S ZIGZAGS UNTIL SHE SUDDENLY MADE A TURN STRAIGHT AT HIM.
HE MISSED SETTING UP A GOOD SHOT FROM HIS BOW, BUT DID FIRE ALL
FOUR STERN TUBES. TWO HIT THE BATTLESHIP IN THE BOW, CAUSING
TRIVIAL DAMAGE. THE YAMATO STEAMED ONWARD AT FULL SPEED INTO TRUK,
WHERE THE DAMAGE WAS PATCHED.
DEATH OF THE SHINANO
THE SITUATION: YOU'RE JOSEPH ENRIGHT, COMMANDING THE ARCHERFISH,
AN IMPROVED GATO-CLASS SUBMARINE. IT'S 1715 (EARLY EVENING),
NOVEMBER 28TH, 1944, OFF TOKYO BAY. AFTER A BORING DAY WAITING TO
PICK UP ANY DOWNED B-29 CREWS FALLING OUT OF THE SKY (NONE DID)
YOU'RE RELEASED FOR HUNTING. ABOUT DINNERTIME YOUR RADAR PICKS UP
A HUGE BLIP LEAVING TOKYO BAY.
TACTICAL ADVICE: THIS CONTACT MUST BE A SUPER-SHIP (LIKE THE
YAMATO). ALSO LIKE THE YAMATO, EXPECT ESCORTS. GET AHEAD OF THE
GROUP AND MAKE A NIGHT ATTACK. IT'S USEFUL TO REMAIN ON THE SUR-
FACE AND USE YOUR TOP SPEED UNTIL THE LAST MINUTE. AS WITH THE
YAMATO, THE KEY TO VICTORY IS SCORING ENOUGH HITS IN THE FIRST
ATTACK TO SLOW OR STOP THE TARGET. THEN YOU CAN RETURN TO SINK IT
LATER.
WHAT REALLY HAPPENED: ENRIGHT SPENT A FRUSTRATING EVENING DEALING
WITH ENEMY ZIG-ZAGS. HE'D RACE TOWARD TO A GOOD INTERCEPT, ONLY TO
SEE THE ENEMY ZIG AWAY. THIS WAS COMPLICATED BY THE FACT THAT THE
ENEMY DIDN'T KEEP ON THE SAME BASE COURSE, BUT WAS INSTEAD SWING-
ING WESTWARD TOWARD THE INLAND SEA.
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FINALLY, ABOUT 0300 ENRIGHT WAS AHEAD OF THE ONCOMING TARGET AND
INSIDE ITS PROTECTING DESTROYERS. HE SUBMERGED AND FIRED FOUR BOW
TUBES AT 1500 YARDS RANGE, THEN SWUNG AROUND AND FIRED TWO STERN
TUBES. FOUR OF THE TORPEDOES HIT. NORMALLY THE SHINANO WOULD HAVE
SURVIVED, BUT IT WASN'T FINISHED FITTING OUT. THE WATERTIGHT DOORS
LEAKED AND THE CREW WAS TOTALLY UNTRAINED. AS A RESULT, FLOODING
GOT WORSE AND WORSE UNTIL SEVEN HOURS LATER THE JAPANESE WERE
FORCED TO ABANDON SHIP.
THE SHINANO WAS THE LARGEST AIRCRAFT CARRIER BUILT DURING WWII. IT
WAS ORIGINALLY INTENDED TO BE A YAMATO-CLASS SUPER-BATTLESHIP.
DURING THE WAR IT WAS REDESIGNED AS AN AIRCRAFT CARRIER AND COM-
PLETED AS SUCH.
KILLER O'KANE
THE SITUATION: YOU'RE RICHARD "DICK" O'KANE COMMANDING THE
TANG, AN IMPROVED GATO-CLASS SUBMARINE. IT'S 30 MINUTES PAST
MIDNIGHT IN THE SHALLOW FORMOSA STRAIT, OCTOBER 23RD, 1944. YOUR
RADAR PICKS UP TEN BLIPS OF VARYING SIZE. IT LOOKS LIKE A CONVOY
OF FIVE MERCHANTMEN WITH FIVE ESCORTS.
IF YOU'RE PLAYING WITH HISTORICAL TORPEDOES, THE TANG HAS SHIPPED
THE VERY SLOW MARK 18-1S (O'KANE REQUESTED MARK 14S, BUT NONE WERE
AVAILABLE). YOU'LL NEED TO GET WITHIN 1000 YARDS FOR ACCURATE
SHOOTING.
TACTICAL ADVICE: THE CONVOY IS HEADED AWAY FROM YOU. YOU CAN
EITHER TRY TO OVERHAUL THEM FROM ASTERN, OR RUN AROUND
THEIR FLANK AND LIE INWAIT AHEAD. THE LATTER IS BETTER, SINCE YOUR
SLOW MARK 18-1S ARE WORTHLESS IN STERN ATTACKS.
AS IN MOST NIGHT BATTLES, DON'T OPEN FIRE WITH YOUR DECK GUN
UNLESS ABSOLUTELY NECESSARY. FIRING THE GUN GIVES AWAY YOUR POSI-
TION TO EVERY SHIP WITHIN DOZENS OF MILES.
WHAT REALLY HAPPENED: O'KANE MADE AN "END AROUND" AND POSITIONED
HIMSELF IN FRONT OF THE ONCOMING CONVOY. HE THROTTLED DOWN TO LOW
SPEED AND LET THE MERCHANTMEN COME UP PAST HIM, ALL ON THE SAME
COURSE. NOW IN THE MIDDLE OF THE CONVOY, HE OPENED FIRE WITH BOW
AND STERN TUBES, FIRING NINE TORPEDOES. THE JAPANESE SCATTERED IN
CONFUSION, WITH THE CONVOY COMMANDER (ON BOARD ONE OF THE MER-
CHANTMEN) ACCIDENTALLY RAMMING ANOTHER SHIP DURING A RAMMING RUN
ON THE TANG. THREE JAPANESE SHIPS WENT DOWN AND THE TANG ESCAPED
UNTOUCHED.
THE NEXT NIGHT THE TANG FOUND ANOTHER CONVOY, SINKING TWO SHIPS
AND DAMAGING A THIRD. O'KANE CLOSED ON THE CRIPPLE AND FIRED, ONLY
TO WATCH THE TORPEDO MALFUNCTION AND CIRCLE AROUND. DESPITE EMER-
GENCY MANEUVERS, THE TORPEDO HIT THE TANG IN THE STERN AND SANK
HER. O'KANE AND SOME OF THE BRIDGE
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OFFICERS WERE BLOWN OVERBOARD AND SURVIVED. A FEW CREWMEN FORWARD
ALSO ESCAPED BECAUSE THE SUB SANK IN SHALLOW WATER. O'KANE SUR-
VIVED JAPANESE POW CAMPS AND EVENTUALLY RECEIVED THE MEDAL OF
HONOR FOR HIS EXPLOITS.
AN EMBARRASSMENT OF RICHES
THE SITUATION: YOU'RE HERMAN KOSSLER, COMMANDING THE CAVALLA, AN
IMPROVED GATO-CLASS SUBMARINE. AFTER DAYS OF REPORTING AND CHAS-
ING VARIOUS OF JAPANESE WARSHIP AND OIL TANKER GROUPS IN THE
SOUTHERN PHILIPPINE SEA, YOU'VE BEEN VECTORED TO AN INTERCEPT
POSITION. ON JUNE 19TH, 1944, YOU "UP-SCOPE" AT 1048 FOR A ROU-
TINE CHECK AND WOW! -JAPANESE CARRIERS! IN FACT, YOU CAN SEE IT'S
THE SHOKAKU FLYING OFF AND LANDING AIRCRAFT. THAT REQUIRES THE
CARRIER TO STEAM STEADILY INTO THE WIND - RIGHT PAST YOUR SUB!
TACTICAL ADVICE: POSITION YOUR BOAT SO THE SHOKAKU WILL PASS
CLOSELY. WHEN SHE DOES, LET HER HAVE IT WITH ALL YOU'VE GOT. AS
THE SITUATION DEVELOPS, YOU'LL DISCOVER THAT THE SHOKAKU IS ACCOM-
PANIED BY OTHER ATTRACTIVE TARGETS. HOW MANY TORPEDOES DO YOU
ASSIGN TO EACH? WHATEVER YOU DO, MAKE YOUR FIRST SALVO COUNT.
ALL THESE TARGETS ARE WARSHIPS WITH A MAXIMUM SPEED OVER 30 KNOTS.
IF YOU DON'T SLOW THEM DOWN WITH THE FIRST SALVO, THEY'LL CER-
TAINLY RUN.
ONE THING KOSSLER FORGOT WAS TO MAKE A RADAR CHECK. IF YOU COME UP
TO RADAR DEPTH AND DO THIS, YOU'LL FIND THAT THE SHOKAKU ISN'T THE
ONLY JUICY TARGET AROUND. NOW YOU'VE GOT REAL PROBLEMS - IS IT
POSSIBLE TO GET THEM ALL?
WHAT REALLY HAPPENED: KOSSLER GOT INTO PERFECT POSITION ON THE
SHOKAKU AND FIRED ALL HIS BOW TUBES (SIX FISH) AT 1200 YARDS, THE
ESCORTING DESTROYERS IMMEDIATELY POUNCED ON HIM, KEEPING HIM DEEP
AND EVADING FOR HOURS. MEANWHILE, THE SHOKAKU TOOK FOUR HITS,
SETTING HER AFIRE, WITH PLANES, FUEL AND BOMBS EXPLODING EVERY-
WHERE. BY THE MIDAFTERNOON THE BURNING WRECKAGE TURNED OVER AND
SANK.
MEANWHILE, THREE HOURS EARLIER, JIM BLANCHARD COMMANDING THE
ALBACORE HIT ANOTHER JAPANESE CARRIER, THE FLEET FLAGSHIP TAIHO,
WITH ONE TORPEDO. IT JAMMED THE FORWARD ELEVATOR, BUT THERE WAS NO
OTHER SERIOUS DAMAGE. HOWEVER, THE DAMAGE CONTROL OFFICER MADE A
SERIOUS ERROR THAT SPREAD GASOLINE FUMES THROUGHOUT THE SHIP.
JUST AFTER THE SHOKAKU SANK, THE GASOLINE-ADEN AIR WAS FINALLY
IGNITED AND TAIHO BLEW UP.
THE PLANES FROM THESE CARRIERS, AS WELL AS OTHERS, WERE DESTROYED
BY FIGHTERS FROM SEVEN US CARRIERS (ALL THIS OCCURRED DURING THE
BATTLE OF THE PHILIPPINE SEA). HOWEVER, THE ONLY JAPANESE CARRIERS
SUNK IN THE BATTLE WERE THE TAIHO AND SHOKAKU.
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RANDOM ENGAGEMENT
THE SITUATION: HERE YOU CAN SELECT THE DATE AND TYPE OF SUBMARINE
YOU WISH TO COMMAND. THIS SITUATION GENERATES A RANDOM ENGAGEMENT
BASED ON THE TYPES OF JAPANESE SHIPS OPERATING IN THAT TIME PERI-
OD AND FOLLOWING THEIR HISTORICAL TACTICS AND SAILING PATTERNS.
YOU COULD ENCOUNTER WARSHIPS OR MERCHANTMEN. THESE ENGAGEMENTS ARE
SIMILAR TO THOSE YOU'LL EXPERIENCE DURING A WAR PATROL OR A WAR
CAREER
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4 TECHNICAL DATA
US SUBMARINES OF WORLD WAR II
DESIGN THEORIES
AFTER WORLD WAR I (1914-18) THE US NAVY BEGAN EXPERIMENTING WITH
NEW SUBMARINE DESIGNS. BEFORE THE SUCCESS OF GERMAN U-BOATS IN
WWI, NAVAL STRATEGISTS REGARDED SUBMARINES AS COASTAL DEFENSE
VESSELS THAT COULD AMBUSH ENEMY WARSHIPS THAT VENTURED TOO NEAR A
COASTLINE, PORT, OR BAY. GRADUALLY THIS CONCEPT WAS EXTENDED TO
WARSHIP AMBUSHES IN ANY WATERS, INCLUDING ENEMY WATERS.
ALTHOUGH SUBMARINES WERE USED AGAINST MERCHANTMEN IN WWI, MANY
POWERS FELT ITS MORALITY WAS EQUIVALENT TO USING POISON GAS. THERE
WAS CONSIDERABLE POPULAR SENTIMENT FOR EITHER BANNING SUBMARINES
ENTIRELY, OR THE LONDON NAVAL TREATY OF 1922, AGREEING NOT TO
PERFORM UNRESTRICTED OF HEARTS THAT UNRESTRICTED SUBMARINE WARFARE
WAS LIKELY, FOR POLITICAL REASONS THEY FELT OBLIGED TO DESIGN
SUBMARINES FOR USE AGAINST SURFACE WARSHIPS.
THIS CAUSED THE US NAVY TO EVOLVE THE "FLEET BOAT" CONCEPT. THIS
SUBMARINE WOULD CRUISE WITH THE SURFACE BATTLE FLEET. FOR EXAMPLE,
THE AMERICAN CONTINGENCY PLAN FOR WAR AGAINST JAPAN ASSUMED THE
MAIN BATTLE FLEET AT PEARL HARBOR WOULD SAIL WEST TO RESCUE THE
PHILIPPINES FROM JAPANESE INVASION. THE BATTLE FLEET WAS COMPOSED
MAINLY OF LATE WWI-VINTAGE BATTLESHIPS WITH A CRUISING SPEED OF
17 KNOTS AND A MAXIMUM SPEED OF 20-21 KNOTS.
A "FLEET BOAT" WITH A TOP SPEED OF 20-21 KNOTS COULD TRAVEL WITH
THE BATTLESHIPS AND BE USED IN REGULAR BATTLES, AS WELL AS IN
AMBUSHES.
THE "P" CLASS WAS THE FIRST OF THESE DESIGNS. EXPERIMENTATION
CONTINUED UNTIL THE MIDDLE OF 1941 , WHEN THE NAVY FINALLY PUT THE
GATO CLASS INTO MASS PRODUCTION.
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RATING SUBMARINES
BY TRADITION ALL SUBMARINES ARE REFERRED TO AS "BOATS". A SUBMA-
RINE NEVER A "SHIP" IN US NAVY TERMINOLOGY.
LAUNCHED: THE DATE OF LAUNCH GIVES AN APPROXIMATE MEASURE OF A
SUBMARINE'S AGE. IT NORMALLY TOOK TWO TO SIX MONTHS TO "FIT OUT" A
SUBMARINE EVERY AFTER LAUNCHING. IN PEACETIME SUBMARINES RECEIVED
AN OVERHAUL EVERY SEVEN TO FIFTEEN YEARS. IN WARTIME IT WAS EVERY
TWO TO THREE YEARS.
TONNAGE & LENGTH: THE TONNAGE AND LENGTH OF A BOAT GIVE AN APPROX-
IMATE IDEA OF ITS SIZE. ALL THINGS BEING EQUAL (WHICH THEY RARELY
ARE), TONNAGE ALSO MEASURES THE DAMAGE A BOAT CAN ABSORB BEFORE
SINKING.
SPEED: THE REPORTED MAXIMUM SPEED OF THE SUBMARINE ON THE SURFACE
(USING DIESEL POWER) AND SUBMERGED (USING ELECTRIC POWER). THE
1920S AND '30S CLASSES USUALLY HAD A "DESIGNED" SPEED 1-2 KNOTS
HIGHER THAN THE FIGURES HERE (WHICH ARE SPEEDS ACTUALLY ACHIEVED).
AMERICAN PROPULSION TECHNOLOGY OF THIS ERA ALMOST NEVER ACHIEVED
DESIGN SPECIFICATIONS.
TEST DEPTH: THE MAXIMUM "SAFE" DIVING DEPTH OF THE SUBMARINE,
BASED ON THE DESIGN SPECIFICATIONS. AMERICAN STRUCTURAL TECHNOLOGY
WAS ALMOST ALWAYS SUPERIOR TO SPECIFICATION, ALLOWING A BOAT TO
DIVE BELOW THE TEST DEPTH. TRUE MAXIMUM DEPTH WAS 10% TO 50%
GREATER THAN THE TEST DEPTH, DEPENDING ON THE SPECIFIC BOAT.
TORPEDOES: THESE ARE PRIMARY WEAPON OF A SUBMARINE. THEREFORE,
THE MAXIMUM NUMBER OF LAUNCHING TUBES AND THE OVERALL MAXIMUM
NUMBER OF TORPEDOES ARE IMPORTANT STATISTICS. DUE TO THEIR BULK,
TORPEDOES CANNOT BE TRANSFERRED BETWEEN BOW AND STERN AREAS WHILE
A SUBMARINE IS AT SEA.
DECK GUN: DUE TO MUZZLE VELOCITY, AMERICAN 3" AND 4" SUBMARINE
DECK GUNS WERE ROUGHLY EQUIVALENT IN POWER (THE 3" GUN HAD A
SMALLER SHELL, BUT WAS MORE ACCURATE). THE 5" DECK GUN, @SUCH
DESIRED BUT ALMOST UNIVERSALLY DENIED UNTIL LATE IN THE WAR, HAD
GREATER POWER AND ACCURACY. THE 6" GUNS ON THE NARWHAL CLASS WERE
AS LARGE AS THOSE ON A LIGHT CRUISER, BUT HAD LESS RANGE.
ENDURANCE: THIS REPRESENTS THE NUMBER OF DAYS THE SUBMARINE CAN
RUN AT ECONOMICAL SPEED (10-15 KNOTS) USING ITS DIESELS. IN SHORT,
ENDURANCE REPRESENTS THE AMOUNT OF FUEL OIL ON BOARD.
CREW: A SUBMARINE'S CREW IS BASED ON ITS SIZE. DESIGNERS PROVIDED
SPACE FOR THE MAXIMUM POSSIBLE CREW WITHIN THE HULL. AS IN SOME
MODERN SUBS (INCLUDING CURRENT ARNERICAN ATTACK SUBS), THE CREW-
MEN WERE "HOT BUNKED", TWO MEN SHARED THE SAME BUNK BED, ONE
SLEEPING WHILE THE OTHER WAS "ON WATCH" (WORKING AT HIS DUTIES).
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OLD "S" CLASS'
LAUNCHED:OCTOBER 1918 THROUGH NOVEMBER 1922
TONNAGE:840-870 TONS SURFACED, 1090-1135 TONS SUBMERGED
LENGTH:219-231'
SPEED:15 KTS SURFACED, 11 KTS SUBMERGED
TEST DEPTH:200
TORPEDOES:4 BOW TUBES AND 10 TORPEDOES, 1 STERN TUBE AND 2 TORPE-
DOES
DECK GUN:ONE 4" (OR ONE 3" ON SOME)
ENDURANCE:35 DAYS
CREW:4-2 OFFICERS AND MEN
THE "S-BOATS" WERE THE FIRST LARGE CLASS OF SUBMARINES BUILT FOR
THE US NAVY. THEY WERE SIMILAR TO OR SLIGHTLY BETTER THAN SUBMA-
RINES BUILT BY THE EUROPEAN COMBATANTS DURING WWI. THEY WERE
NUMBERED ("S-1" THROUGH "S-48") RATHER THAN NAMED. BY 1941 THESE
BOATS WERE RIDICULOUSLY OUTDATED. MUCH OF THEIR EQUIPMENT WAS SO
OLD IT BROKE DOWN CONTINUALLY. THEIR LOW SURFACE SPEED AND SMALL
ENDURANCE MADE THEM USELESS LOR LONG-DISTANCE OPERATIONS. BY THE
END OF 1942 ALL "S" BOATS HAD BEEN RETIRED FROM ACTIVE OPERATIONS
IN FRONTLINE AREAS. A FEW CONTINUED PATROLLING THE ALEUTIANS AND
OTHER "MINOR" AREAS DURING 1943 BEFORE FINAL RETIREMENT.
BARRACUDA CLASS
LAUNCHED: AUGUST 1924 THROUGH JUNE 1924
TONNAGE:2000 TONS SURFACED, 2620 TONS SUBMERGED
LENGTH:341.5'
SPEED :16 KTS SURFACED, 8 KTS SUBMERGED
TEST DEPTH:225'
TORPEDOES:4 BOW TUBES AND 12 TORPEDOES, 2 STERN TUBES AND 4 TORPE-
DOES
DECK GUN:ONE 5"
ENDURANCE:50 DAYS
CREW:80 OFFICERS AND MEN
ORIGINALLY THE "V" CLASS, THESE BOATS WERE THE FIRST EXPERIMENT
WITH LARGE CRUISING SUBMARINES WITH SUFFICIENT SPEED TO KEEP UP
WITH WWI-STYLE BATTLESHIPS AND BATTLE FLEETS. COMPLETION WAS
DELAYED FROM 1921 TO 1924- BY POSTWAR CONGRESSIONAL CUTS IN MILI-
TARY BUDGETS. THE DESIGN WAS OVER-AMBITIOUS: THE DIESEL ENGINES
WERE UNABLE TO DEVELOP THE EXPECTED POWER, THE HULL LEAKED FUEL
OIL, DIVING SPEEDS WERE SLOW, AND UNDERWATER MANEUVERABILITY WAS
POOR. BY 1941 THESE BOATS WERE A MECHANICAL NIGHTMARE TO OPERATE.
ALL WERE WITHDRAWN BY THE END OF 1942
NARWHAL CLASS
LAUNCHED: DECEMBER 1929 THROUGH MARCH 1930
TONNAGE:2710 TONS SURFACED, 4080 TONS SUBMERGED
LENGTH:381'
SPEED:16 KTS SURFACED, 6 KTS SUBMERGED
TEST DEPTH:250'
TORPEDOES:4 BOW TUBES AND 12 TORPEDOES, 2 STERN AND 4 TORPEDOES
DECK GUN:TWO 6"
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ENDURANCE:60 DAYS
CREW:90 OFFICERS AND MEN
THESE BOATS WERE THE LARGEST CLASS OF SUBMARINES BUILT FOR THE US
NAVY BEFORE OR DURING WWII. THE GREAT SIZE WAS NEEDED FOR A NEW
AND MORE POWERFUL TYPE OF GERMAN DIESEL ENGINE. UNFORTUNATELY, THE
ENGINES WERE A FAILURE AND THE BOATS NEVER ACHIEVED THE DESIGN
SPEED OF 17 KTS SURFACED AND 8 KTS SUBMERGED. THEIR HUGE SIZE
MADE THEM SLOW TO DIVE AND SLUGGISH TO MANEUVER. HOWEVER, THE
BOATS WERE SPACIOUS AND HAD POWERFUL DECK GUN ARMAMENT. DURING THE
1930S ONE OF THE CLASS (THE ARGONAUT) HAD THE REAR TORPEDO TUBES
REPLACED BY MINE-LAYING GEAR. AFTER THE FIRST FEW MONTHS OF WWII
THE BOATS WERE USED PRIMARILY FOR COMMANDO RAIDS AND SIMILAR
CLANDESTINE MISSIONS BEHIND ENEMY LINES.
"P" CLASS
LAUNCHED:MAY 1935 THROUGH MARCH 1937
TONNAGE:1310-1330 TONS SURFACED. 1960-2210 TONS SUBMERGED
LENGTH:298-301'
SPEED :19 KTS SURFACED, 8 KTS SUBMERGED
TEST DEPTH:250'
TORPEDOES:4 BOW TUBES AND 12 TORPEDOES, 2 STERN TUBES AND 4 TORPE-
DOES
DECK GUN:ONE 3" OR 4"
ENDURANCE:60 DAYS
CREW:55 OFFICERS AND MEN
AFTER THREE UNSUCCESSFUL EXPERIMENTAL DESIGNS IN THE EARLY 1930S
(THE DOLPHIN, CACHALOT AND CUTTLEFISH), THE NAVY FINALLY SETTLED
ON THE NEW "FLEET BOAT" CONCEPT WITH NEW, LIGHTWEIGHT DIESEL
ENGINES ALONG WITH A BETTER ELECTRIC BATTERY. THE RESULTING "P"
CLASS, THE FIRST "FLEET BOATS", WERE LASTER, MORE MANEUVERABLE AND
QUICKER DIVING. THEY ALSO HAD THE FIRST ANALOG TORPEDO DATA
COMPUTERS (TDCS) AND THE FIRST AIR CONDITIONING SYSTEMS. THE
LATTER NOT ONLY IMPROVED CREW PERFORMANCE IN HOT WEATHER, BUT ALSO
GREATLY REDUCED ELECTRICAL FAULTS CAUSED BY CONDENSATION WITHIN
THE HULL.
NEW `"S" CLASS
LAUNCHED:JUNE 1937 THROUGH AUGUST 1939
TONNAGE:1435-1475 TONS SURFACED, 2210-2350 TONS SUBMERGED
LENGTH:308-310.5'
SPEED:20 KTS SURFACED, 9 KTS SUBMERGED
TEST DEPTH :300'
TORPEDOES:4 BOW TUBES AND 12 TORPEDOES, 4 STERN TUBES AND 8 TORPE-
DOES
DECK GUN:ONE 4" (OR ONE 3" ON SOME)
ENDURANCE:60 DAYS
CREW:70 OFFICERS AND MEN
THE NEW "S" (OR SALMON) CLASS WAS ACTUALLY A CONTINUATION OF THE
"P" CLASS, WITH A DIFFERENT AND SOMEWHAT SUPERIOR TYPE OF DIESEL
ENGINE. ALTHOUGH THE HOPED-FOR DESIGN SPEED WAS 21 KTS, IN REALI-
TY THE BOATS NEVER MADE MORE THAN 20. THE CLASS DID HAVE A PROBLEM
WITH THE DIESEL
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ENGINE AIR INTAKES. THESE WERE SUPPOSED TO SHUT AUTOMATICALLY
DURING A DIVE, BUT IN A TEST DIVE OF THE SQUALUS THE LIDS STAYED
OPEN, CAUSING THE BOAT TO FLOOD AND SINK. OVER ONE THIRD OF HER
CREW WERE DROWNED, BUT THE BOAT WAS RAISED, REFURBISHED AND RE-
NAMED THE SAILFISH (INFORMALLY KNOWN AS THE "SQUALFISH".)
"T" CLASS
LAUNCHED:DECEMBER 1939 THROUGH JANUARY 1941
TONNAGE:1475 TONS SURFACED 2370 TONS SUBMERGED
LENGTH: 307'
SPEED:20 KTS SURFACED 9 KTS SUBMERGED
TEST DEPTH:325'
TORPEDOES:6 BLOW TUBES AND 16 TORPEDOES, 4 STERN TUBES AND 8
TORPEDOES
DECK GUN: ONE 5"
ENDURANCE: 60 DAYS
CREW:85 OFFICERS AND MEN
ALS KNOWN AS THE TAMBOR CLASS, THESE WERE THE FIRST FLEET BOATS TO
CARRY THE ENLARGED ARMAMENT OF 6 BOW TUBES AND 4 SERTN TUBES.
OTHER INTERNAL EQUIPMENT WAS UPGRADED AND IMPROVED OVER THE "P"
AND "S" CLASSES. THE TEETHING PROBLEMS OF VARIOUS DIESEL ENGINE
DESIGNS HAD FINALLY BEEN RESOLVED. FOR THE FIRST TIME IN OVER 15
YEARS AN ENTIRE CLASS OF US SUBMARINES HAD A GOOD, RELIABLE POWER
PLANT.
GATO CLASS
LAUNCHED:MARCH 1941 THROUGH MAY 1943
TONNAGE: 1525 TONS SURFACED, 2415 TONS SUBMERGED
LENGTH:312'
SPEED:20 KTS SURFACED, 10 KTS SUBMERGED
TEST DEPTH: 350'
TORPEDOES:6 BOW TUBES AND 16 TORPEDOES, 4 STERN TUBES AND 8 TORPE-
DOES
DECK GUN: ONE 4" (ON SOME ONE 3" OR ONE 5")
ENDURANCE 60 DAYS
CREW: 80 OFFICERS AND MEN
THIS CLASS WAS THE FINAL REFINEMENT OF THE FLEET BOAT CONCEPT. IT
INCORPORATED ALL THE DESIGN PRODUCED, WITH OVER 200 BUILT DURING
THE WAR (INCLUDING THE IMPROVED GATOS, BELOW). THE CLASS WAS
PROBABLY THE MOST FORMIDABLE SUBMARINE BUILT BY ANY NATION IN THE
WAR, AND SUPERIOR IN MOST RESPECTS TO GERMAN U-BOAT DESIGNS.
IMPROVED GATO CLASS
LAUNCHED:MAY 1943 THROUGH JULY 1945
TONNAGE: 1525 TONS SURFACED, 2415 TONS SUBMERGED
LENGTH:312'
SPEED:20 KTS SURFACED, 10 KTS SUBMERGED
TEST DEPTH:400'
TORPEDOES:6 BOW TUBES AND 16 TORPEDOES, 4 STERN TUBES AND 8 TORPE-
DOES
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DECK GUN:ONE 5"
ENDURANCE:60 DAYS
CREW: 80 OFFICERS AND MEN
IT WAS VERY HARD TO IMPROVE SIGNIFICANTLY ON THE MAGNIFICENT GATO
DESIGN. HOWEVER, A NEW METHOD OF STRENGTHENING THE HULL PERMITTED
DEEPER DIVING, AND 5" DECK GUNS (LONG DESIRED BY SUBMARINERS) WERE
FINALLY FITTED AS STANDARD WEAPONS. MANY OTHER PIECES OF EQUIPMENT
RECEIVED SLIGHT IMPROVEMENT. THERE WAS NO OFFICIAL CHANGE FROM
"GATO" TO "IMPROVED GATO" CLASS. INSTEAD THE IMPROVEMENTS WERE
ADDED AS SOON AS THEY WERE AVAILABLE AT EACH SHIPYARD.
TENCH CLASS
LAUNCHED:JULY 1944 THROUGH JANUARY 1946
TONNAGE:1570 TONS SURFACED, 2415 SUBMERGED
LENGTH:312'
SPEED:20 KTS SURFACED, 10 KTS SUBMERGED
TEST DEPTH:400'
TORPEDOES :6 BOW TUBES AND 16 TORPEDOES, 4 STERN TUBES AND 8
TORPEDOES
DECK GUN:ONE 5"
ENDURANCE:60 DAYS
CREW:80 OFFICERS AND MEN
THIS WAS THE FINAL CLASS OF "FLEET SUBMARINES" BUILT DURING WWII.
A NUMBER WERE CANCELLED OR SCRAPPED UNFINISHED AT THE END OF THE
WAR. THE CLASS WAS SIMILAR TO THE IMPROVED GATOS, BUT WITH ENOUGH
REFINEMENTS AND ADJUSTMENTS TO MERIT A NEW CLASS NAME.
TYPE VII GERMAN U-BOAT
LAUNCHED:1937 THROUGH 1945
TONNAGE:626-769 TONS SURFACED, 745-871 TONS SUBMERGED
LENGTH:211-220'
SPEED:16-17 KTS SURFACED, 7,5 8 KTS SUBMERGED
TEST DEPTH:650'
TORPEDOES:4 BOW TUBES AND 12 TORPEDOES, 1 STERN TUBE AND 2 TORPE-
DOES
DECK GUN:ONE 3.5"
ENDURANCE:2ODAYS(AT 12KTS)
CREW:44 OFFICERS AND MEN
THIS DATA IS PROVIDED FOR COMPARATIVE INTEREST. THIS TYPE (VIIA, B
AND C) WAS THE STANDARD GERMAN U-BOAT USED IN THE NORTH ATLANTIC
THROUGHOUT THE WAR. IT HAD ONLY TWO DIESEL ENGINES, BUT WAS LESS
VISIBLE ON THE SURFACE (SMALLER CONNING TOWER) AND COULD "CRASH
DIVE" IN 30 SECONDS (FLEET BOATS TOOK 60 SECONDS). THE LARGER TYPE
IX WERE CONSIDERED TOO LARGE AND UNMANEUVERABLE FOR COMBAT OPERA-
TIONS, WHILE THE FIRST TYPE XXI (A HIGHLY ADVANCED SUCCESSOR TO
THE TYPE VII) MADE ITS `SHAKE DOWN' CRUISE IN THE LAST MONTH OF
THE WAR.
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US TORPEDOES
RATING TORPEDOES
PROPULSION: STEAM PROPULSION LEAVES A HIGHLY VISIBLE TRAIL OF
BUBBLES WHILE ELECTRIC PROPULSION LEAVES ONLY A WAKE OF DISTURBED
WATER, WHICH IS LESS VISIBLE.
SPEED/RANGE: AT A GIVEN SPEED, A TORPEDO CAN TRAVEL A GIVEN
DISTANCE. THE MARK 14 HAD TWO SPEED SETTINGS. AMERICAN TORPEDOES
WERE ABOUT AVERAGE IN THEIR SPEED AND RANGE CAPABILITIES.
WARHEAD: THE AMOUNT OF HIGH EXPLOSIVE IN THE WARHEAD. AMERICAN
TORPEDOES HAD SMALL WARHEADS. SOME TORPEDOES OF SIMILAR SIZE OF
OTHER NATIONS HAD 600 TO 900 LB. WARHEADS.
AVAILABLE: THE "IN SERVICE" TIME PERIOD FOR THE WEAPON.
MARK 10 TORPEDO
PROPULSION:STEAM
SPEED/RANGE:3500 YARDS AT 36 KTS
WARHEAD:500 LBS
AVAILABLE: UNTIL THE END OF 1943
DESIGNED DURING WWI AND CLOSELY BASED ON THE ORIGINAL WHITEHEAD
TORPEDO, THIS WEAPON WAS STANDARD ARMAMENT FOR ALL AMERICAN SUBMA-
RINES UNTIL THE LATE 1930S. ALL THE OLD "S" BOAT CLASS SUBMARINES
USED THIS MODEL BECAUSE THEIR TUBES AND FIRING CONTROLS COULDN'T
BE ADAPTED TO THE MARK 14. HOWEVER, LATER BOATS COULD STILL USE
THE MARK 10S.
MARK 14 TORPEDO
PROPULSION: STEAM
SPEED/RANGE:4500 YARDS AT 46 KNOTS
SPEED/RANGE:9000 YARDS AT 31.5 KNOTS
WARHEAD:500 LBS
AVAILABLE: THROUGHOUT THE WAR
DESIGNED IN THE 1930S, THIS TORPEDO WAS TO BE THE "WONDER WEAPON"
OF THE US NAVY. IT HAD A MAGNETIC PROXIMITY EXPLODER DESIGNED TO
EXPLODE BENEATH A SHIP AND BREAK ITS KEEL, AS WELL AS A "BACK-UP"
CONTACT EXPLODER. UNFORTUNATELY, THE NAVY DEPARTMENT PROHIBITED
ANY LIVE-FIRE TESTS OF THE TORPEDO. AS A RESULT, IT RAN 10-15'
TOO DEEP, AND ITS MAGNETIC
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EXPLODER RARELY WORKED (IT EITHER CAUSED PREMATURE EXPLOSIONS, OR
FAILED TO EXPLODE AT ALL). ITS CONTACT EXPLODER FREQUENTLY FAILED
WHEN THE TORPEDO HIT "STRAIGHT ON," BUT FUNCTIONED SOMEWHAT BETTER
AT GLANCING ANGLES.
THE DEPTH PROBLEM WAS DISCOVERED IN EARLY 1942 BY ADMIRAL LOCKWOOD
(THEN COMMANDING IN FREMANTLE) AND MOST SKIPPERS CORRECTED FOR IT.
OFFICIAL ACKNOWLEDGMENT DIDN'T OCCUR UNTIL JUNE 2OTH, 1942. NOT
UNTIL JUNE 1943 DID ADMIRAL LOCKWOOD (NOW AT SUBPAC) DISCOVER THAT
THE MAGNETIC EXPLODER WAS FAULTY, HOWEVER, THE SUBSOWESPAC HQ
STAFF INSISTED UNTIL THE END OF '43 THAT THE MAGNETIC EXPLODER WAS
FINE. THE CONTACT EXPLODER FAULT WAS NOT DISCOVERED UNTIL JULY-
AUGUST 1943, AND NEW EXPLODERS WEREN'T READY UNTIL SEPTEMBER.
AGAIN, ADMIRAL LOCKWOOD AT SUBPAC DISCOVERED THE PROBLEMS AND
SUBSOWESPAC AFTER CONSIDERABLE BUREAUCRATIC SKIRMISHING, GRUDGING-
LY AGREED THAT PROBLEMS MIGHT EXIST.
MARK 18 MOD 1 TORPEDO
PROPULSION: ELECTRIC
SPEED/RANGE 4000 YARDS AT 27 KNOTS
WARHEAD: 500 LBS
AVAILABLE: 1944 AND 1945 ONLY
POPULARLY KNOWN AS THE "18-1", THIS TORPEDO WAS ORIGINALLY DE-
SIGNED BY PRIVATE CONTRACTORS (NOT THE US NAVY). HOWEVER, LATER
DEVELOPMENT OF THIS WEAPON WAS GREATLY SLOWED BY THE INEPTITUDE OF
THE US NAVY BUREAU OF ORDNANCE, THE FIRST TORPEDOES DELIVERED RAN
POORLY, BUT AFTER EXTENSIVE TESTING THE FAULTS WERE FOUND AND
CORRECTED. THE WEAPON WAS EFFICIENT BUT NOT ESPECIALLY EFFECTIVE
DUE TO ITS VERY LOW SPEED, FOR EXAMPLE, A SUBMARINE ASTERN OF A
WARSHIP WAS HELPLESS, SINCE THIS TORPEDO COULD NOT OVERTAKE A
MAJOR WARSHIP MOVING AT HIGH SPEED.
MARK 18 MOD 2 TORPEDO
PROPULSION:ELECTRIC
SPEED/RANGE:4000 YARDS AT 40 KNOTS
WARHEAD:500 LBS
AVAILABLE:LATER 1944 AND 1945 ONLY
UPGRADES IN THE MARK 18 ENGINE DESIGN, COMBINED WITH NEW AND
IMPROVED MAINTENANCE PROCEDURES, INCREASED ITS SPEED CONSIDERABLY.
THE RESULT WAS POPULARLY KNOWN AS THE "18-2". THIS TORPEDO WAS
MORE EFFECTIVE THAN THE OLD MARK 14. HOWEVER HQ STAFFS, STILL
EMBARRASSED BY THIS TORPEDO FORCING SUB CAPTAINS TO USE THE FAULTY
FEATURES OF THE MARK 14, LET EACH SKIPPER SELECT HIS OWN TORPEDO
TYPES. MANY DISTRUSTED NEW WEAPONS FROM THE NAVY BUREAU OF ORD-
NANCE AND SELECTED MARK 14S INSTEAD.
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JAPANESE SHIPS IN WORLD WAR II
RATING SHIPS
TONNAGE: WARSHIP TONNAGE IS MEASURED IN MAY WAYS, INCLUDING
STANDARD LIGHT DISPLACEMENT (ONLY APPROPRIATE TO INTERNATIONAL
LAW, SUCH AS THE NAVAL LIMITATION TREATY OF 1922), NORMAL DIS-
PLACEMENT, AND FULL-LOAD DISPLACEMENT. NORMAL DISPLACEMENT IS
USED HERE, AND IS GENERALLY REPRESENTATIVE OF A SHIP'S SIZE.
MAX SPEED : THIS IS THE MAXIMUM SPEED THE SHIP'S ENGINES CAN
PRODUCE IN CALM WATERS. MOST WARSHIPS CRUISE AT A LOWER SPEED (17
TO 24 KNOTS) TO CONSERVE FUEL. MERCHANT SHIP ENGINES ARE DESIGNED
FOR A DIFFERENT RANGE OF SPEED OUTPUT AND CAPABILITY, AND THERE
FORE THEY CRUISE ECONOMICALLY AT SPEEDS VERY CLOSE TO THEIR MAXI-
MUM SPEED.
MAIN GUNS: THE NUMBER AND SIZE OF THE SHIP'S MAIN BATTER. MAJOR
WARSHIPS INVARIABLY HAVE SECONDARY OR EVEN TERTIARY BATTERIES, AS
WELL AS LIGHT AA GUNS. FOR EXAMPLE, THE YAMATO CLASS SUPER-BAT-
TLESHIP HAD 6.1" SECONDARY AND 5" TERTIARY TURRETS, AS WELL AS
NUMEROUS 25MM AA GUN MOUNTINGS.
ARMOR: THE MAXIMUM THICKNESS OF A WARSHIP STEEL ARMOR. BELT
ARMOR IS ALONG THE SIDE OF THE SIP, USUALLY JUST ABOVE THE WATER-
LINE. DECK ARMOR IS THE ALL OF VARIOUS ARMORED DECKS, THE THICK-
EST OF WHICH IS USUALLY WELL DOWN INSIDE THE SHIP, AT THE TOP OF
THE BELT, FORMING AN ARMORED BOX OVER THE SHIP'S VITALS.
ASW WEAPONS: THE ANTI-SUBMARINE WARFARE ARMAMENT OF THE SHIP.
MOST LARGER WARSHIPS DID NOT CARRY SONAR OR DEPTH CHARGES. A
FULLY SUBMERGED SUBMARINE CAN ONLY BE FOUND AND ATTACKED WITH ASW
WEAPONRY.
TORPS TO SINK: THIS IS A ROUGH, STATISTICAL ESTIMATE OF HOW MANY
TORPEDO EXPLOSIONS ARE NEEDED TO SINK THE SHIP. IT IS BASED ON THE
WEAK 500 LB. WARHEADS IN US TORPEDOES (TORPEDOES USED BY OTHER
WWII NAVIES WERE MORE POWERFUL). IT DOES NOT INCLUDE SECONDARY
DAMAGE SUCH AS FIRES, EXPLODING AMMUNITION OR FUEL, ETC. IT DOES
CONSIDER A NORMAL, EXPECTED FREQUENCY OF DUDS AND MALFUNCTIONS.
HOWEVER, THIS DOES NOT INCLUDE THE EXTRAORDINARY DEFECTS IN THE
MARK 14 (WHICH WERE GRADUALLY CORRECTED DURING 1943).
RADAR RANGE: THE MAXIMUM RANGE AT WHICH SUBMARINE-MOUNTED SJ
RADAR COULD DETECT THE SHIP, ASSUMING IDEAL OPERATING CONDITIONS.
THE RANGE VARIES DEPENDING ON WHETHER THE SHIP IS END- ON OR
BROADSIDE TO THE RADAR SET (THE BROADSIDE CAN BE SEEN FURTHER
AWAY).
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BBH SUPER BATTLESHIPS
TONNAGE:67,123 TONS
MAX SPEED:27 KNOTS
MAIN GUNS NINE 18.1
ARMOR:16.1 BELT, 9' DECK
ASW WEAPONS: NONE
TORPS TO SINK:ABOUT 12
RADAR RANGE:25000 TO 40000 YARDS
THE YAMATO CLASS OF SUPER-BATTLESHIPS WAS BEGUN IN 1937. THEY WERE
THE LARGEST, MOST HEAVILY ARMED AND ARMORED BATTLESHIPS EVER BUILT
IN HUMAN HISTORY (LARGER EVEN THAN THE AMERICAN /OWVACLASS, AL-
THOUGH THE IOWAS WERE FASTER). THEY WERE AMBUSHED MORE THAN ONCE
BY AMERICAN SUBMARINES, BUT SHRUGGED OFF THE ONE OR TWO TORPEDO
HITS AND SPED AWAY. ALL WERE EVENTUALLY SUNK BY AMERICAN AIR
ATTACKS IN LATE 1944 AND SUMMER OF 1945.
BB BATTLESHIPS
TONNAGE:30-35,000 TONS
MAX SPEED:25 KNOTS
MAIN GUNS:TWELVE 14" OR EIGHT 16"
ARMOR:12" BELT, 2' TO 7' DECK
ASW WEAPONS: NONE
TORPS TO SINK: ABOUT 9
RADAR RANGE: 20000 TO 32000 YARDS
THE FUSO CLASS OF BATTLESHIPS IS TYPICAL OF MANY JAPANESE BATTLE-
SHIP CLASSES. BUILT DURING OR IMMEDIATELY AFTER WWI, THEY WERE
EXTENSIVELY REBUILT AND MODIFIED DURING THE 1930S. THE ADDED
"PAGODA" SUPERSTRUCTURES WERE U5PQUELY JAPANESE. ALTHOUGH THESE
BATTLESHIPS NEVER ENGAGED IN A SURFACE BATTLE, SLIGHTLY SMALLER
BATTLECRUISERS ( KONGO CLASS) WITH EIGHT 14" GUNS SAW EXTENSIVE
ACTION IN THE SOLOMONS DURING 1942. THE ONLY JAPANESE
"BATTLESHIP" SUNK BY A SUBMARINE WAS ACTUALLY A KONGO CLASS SHIP.
CV AIRCRAFT CARRIER
TONNAGE:30-34000 TONS
MAX SPEED 28 TO 34 KNOTS
MAIN GUNS:SIXTEEN 5" GUNS (SOME HAD A FEW 8" GUNS ALSO)
ARMOR:VARIED 8.5" BELT, 6.7 DECK TYPICAL
ASW WEAPONS: NONE
TORPS TO SINK:ABOUT 6 (LESS IF VULNERABLE)
RADAR RANGE:20000 TO 31000 YARDS
IN 1941 THE JAPANESE NAVY HAD SIX POWERFUL "FLEET" CARRIERS, OF
WHICH THE KAGA WAS ONE. SOME WERE BUILT ON THE UNCOMPLETED HULLS
OF BATTLESHIPS OR BATTLECRUISERS, THE OTHERS WERE BUILT AS CARRI-
ERS FROM THE "KEEL UP". IF CAUGHT DURING FLIGHT OPERATIONS, ESPE-
CIALLY WITH MANY FUELED AND ARMED AIRCRAFT, THE CARRIERS WERE VERY
VULNERABLE. OTHERWISE THEY PROVED DIFFICULT TO SINK. THE SHOKAKU,
FOR EXAMPLE, WAS DAMAGED IN NUMEROUS BATTLES BEFORE BEING SUNK
LATE IN THE WAR.
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118
JAPAN ALSO HAD A VARIETY OF MEDIUM AND LIGHT CARRIERS OF SMALLER
DISPLACEMENT AND LOWER SPEED. DURING THE WAR A NUMBER OF ADDI-
TIONAL FLEET CARRIERS WERE COMPLETED. THE LARGEST WAS THE SHINANO.
BUILT ON A YAMATO CLASS BATTLESHIP HULL, IT WAS HUGE (68,059
TONS). UNFORTUNATELY, THE ARCHERFISH FOUND AND SANK HER WITH JUST
FOUR LUCKY TORPEDO HITS BEFORE THE SHIP WAS FITTED OUT OR ITS CREW
TRAINED.
THESE FAMOUS SHIPS SAW HEAVY SERVICE THROUGHOUT THE WAR, INCLUDING
NUMEROUS SURFACE BATTLES FROM THE JAVA SEA TO THE ALEUTIAN IS-
LANDS. THEY WERE ALSO USED EXTENSIVELY AS ESCORTS FOR FLEET CARRI-
ERS IN NAVAL AIR ACTIONS. LARGE AND POWERFUL, JAPANESE HEAVY
CRUISERS WERE SOMETIMES MISTAKEN FOR BATTLESHIPS BECAUSE OF THEIR
BIG SUPERSTRUCTURES.
BUILT BETWEEN 1918 AND 1925, THESE SHIPS WERE NEVER MODERNIZED OR
UPGRADED, PROBABLY BECAUSE THEIR SMALL SIZE MADE THEM UNSUITABLE
FOR WORK IN A BATTLE LINE. DURING WWII THEY WERE PRIMARILY USED AS
DESTROYER SQUADRON LEADERS. IN THE LATER PART OF THE WAR JAPAN
COMPLETED A FEW LARGER LIGHT CRUISERS WITH 6.1" GUNS, BUT MOST
WERE FINISHED TOO LATE TO SEE MAJOR ACTION.
DDAA DESTROYER
TONNAGE: 3500 TONS
MAX SPEED: 33 KNOTS
MAIN GUNS: EIGHT 3.9"
ARMOR: NONE
ASW WEAPONS: SONAR, DEPTH CHARGE RACKS AND THROWERS
TORPS TO SINK: ABOUT 2
RADAR RANGE: 10000 TO 15000 YARDS
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STARTED IN 1940, THESE SHIPS WERE ORIGINALLY INTENDED TO BE NATO-
AIRCRAFT CRUISERS. WHEN COMPLETED THEY WERE RE-RATED AS DESTROY-
ERS DUE TO THEIR SMALL DISPLACEMENT. THE 3.9" GUNS WERE FORMIDA-
BLE RAPID-FIRING WEAPONS WHOSE VOLUME OF FIRE WAS SUPERIOR TO THE
NORMAL 5" ARMAMENT OF A DESTROYER (ALTHOUGH MAXIMUM RANGE WAS
SOMEWHAT LESS). THE SHIPS WERE PRIMARILY USED AS DESTROYERS,
RATHER THAN IN THEIR INTENDED ROLE AS ANTI-AIRCRAFT SHIPS GUARDING
HEAVIER SURFACE WARSHIPS (SUCH AS CARRIERS).
DD DESTROYER
TONNAGE: 2000-2500 TONS
MAX SPEED: 24-38 KNOTS
MAIN GUNS: FOUR TO SIX 5"
ARMOR: NONE
ASW WEAPONS: SONAR, DEPTH CHARGE RACKS AND THROWERS
TORPS TO SINK: ABOUT 2
RADAR RANGE: 9000 TO 14000 YARDS
JAPAN HAD NUMEROUS CLASSES OF FLEET DESTROYERS, ALL BUILT ON
SIMILAR LINES. THEY PERFORMED A VARIETY OF FUNCTIONS. ALL MAJOR
FLEET TAK FORCES INCLUDED A SCREEN OF DESTROYERS. THEY ALSO
OPERATED ALONE IN SMALL SQUADRONS OF 4 TO 8 SHIPS, SOMETIMES WITH
A LIGHT CRUISER LEADING THEM. THE "TOKYO EXPRESS" THAT RAN ALMOST
NIGHTLY DOWN "THE SLOT" DURING THE SOLOMONS CAMPAIGN WAS A DE-
STROYER SQUADRON CARRYING TROOPS AND SUPPLIES. FINALLY, THESE
DESTROYERS WERE ASSIGNED TO MERCHANT ESCORT AND PROTECTION DUTIES,
ESPECIALLY FROM 1943 ONWARD WHEN JAPAN BEGAN USING CONVOYS.
DE DESTROYER ESCORT
TONNAGE: 1500 TONS
MAX SPEED: 28 KNOTS
MAIN GUNS: THREE 5"
ARMOR: NONE
ASW WEAPONS: SONAR, DEPTH CHARGE RACKS AND THROWERS
TORPS TO SINK: ABOUT 1
RADAR RANGE: 8000 TO 13000 YARDS
BEGUN IN 1943, THESE SHIPS WERE BUILT VERY QUICKLY (5 TO 9 MONTHS
EACH), AND USED TO REPLACE FLEET DESTROYERS IN A CONVOY ESCORT
ROLE. DUE TO AMERICAN BOMBING AND LACK OF RAW MATERIALS, MANY
WERE INCOMPLETE AT THE END OF WAR. TO A SUBMARINE THESE SHIPS
WERE ALMOST AS DANGEROUS AS A FULL FLEET DESTROYER, THE ONLY
DIFFERENCE BEING A SLIGHTLY SLOWER TOP SPEED.
PC PATROL CRAFT
TONNAGE: ABOUT 800 TONS
MAX SPEED: 16 TO 19 KNOTS
MAIN GUNS: TWO OR THREE 3" TO 4.7"
ARMOR: NONE
ASW WEAPONS: SONAR, DEPTH CHARGE RACKS AND THROWERS
TORPS TO SINK: USUALLY 1
RADAR RANGEL 7000 TO 11000 YARDS
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A VARIETY OF STEEL- AND WOOD-HULLED SMALL CRAFT WERE BUILT BY
JAPAN AS MERCHANT ESCORT BETWEEN 1943 AND 1945. THESE SUPPLE-
MENTED NUMEROUS MINESWEEPERS AND PATROL BOAT ALREADY FUNCTIONING
AS ESCORTS. MOST WERE USED TO ESCORT COASTAL CONVOYS, BUT THE
LARGER ONES (SUCH AS THE UKURU CLASS, TYPE CS AND TYPE DS) COULD
HANDLE THE OPEN SEA FOR SHORT OR MODERATE VOYAGES. THESE SHIPS
WERE NOWHERE NEAR AS FORMIDABLE AS DESTROYERS OR DESTROYER ES-
CORTS. IN FACT, IN ONE FAMOUS ACTION THE SUBMARINE SALMON, DAMAGED
BY DEPTH CHARGES, SURFACED AND DEFEATED TWO SUCH PATROL CRAFT IN A
GUN DUEL.
TROOP TRANSPORT
TONNAGE: 4000 TO 17000 TONS
MAX SPEED: 8 TO 17 KNOTS
MAIN GUNS: NONE TO FOUR 3" TO 5" GUNS
ARMOR: NONE
ASW WEAPONS: NONE
TORPS TO SINK: 1 TO 3 VARIES WITH SIZE
RADAR RANGE: 6000 TO 11000 YDS IF SMALL, 10000 TO 19000 YARDS IF
LARGE
JAPANESE TROOP TRANSPORTS CAME IN ALL TYPES AND SIZES. SOME WERE
CONVERTED PASSENGER BUT MANY WERE FREIGHTERS WITH CARGO SPACE
CONVERTED INTO BUNK AREAS. MOST CARRIED AMMUNITION AND STORES FOR
THE TROOPS ON BOARD, MAKING THEM QUITE VULNERABLE WHEN LOADED.
OIL TANKER
TONNAGE: 2000 TO 16000 TONS
MAX SPEED 6 TO 14 KNOTS
MAIN GUNS: NONE TO TWO 3" TO 5" GUNS
ARMOR: NONE
ASW WEAPONS: NONE
TORPS TO SINK: 1 TO 3 VARIES WITH SIZE, MORE IF EMPTY
RADAR RANGE: 5000 TO 10000 YDS IF SMALL, 10000 TO 19000 YARDS IF
LARGE
JAPANESE OIL TANKERS CAME IN ALL SIZES. ALTHOUGH SMALLER ONES
PREDOMINATED DURING WWII. TANKERS WERE VERY VULNERABLE WHEN
LOADED, ESPECIALLY SINCE MANY JAPANESE-CONTROLL OIL AREAS (SUCH AS
BRUNEI) PRODUCED HIGH-GRADE CRUDE THAT COULD BE TRANSPORTED AND
USED WITHOUT REFINING. UNFORTUNATELY, THIS OIL CONTAINED AN
UNUSUALLY HIGH CONCENTRATION OF VOLATILE GASES, RESULTING IN
SPECTACULAR EXPLOSIONS WITH A TORPEDO HIT IGNITED THEM. HOWEVER,
AN EMPTY OIL TANKER WAS VERY DIFFICULT TO SINK, SINCE A PUNCTURED
TANK COULD BE SEALED OFF AND TREATED LIKE A FULL ONE (A TANK
FILLED WITH WATER IS NOT UNLIKE A TANK FILLED WITH OIL!).
CONVERTED FACTORY SHIP
TONNAGE: 15000 TO 20000 TONS
MAX SPEED: 8 TO 16 KNOTS
MAIN GUNS: USUALLY TWO TO SIX 4.7" OR 5" GUNS
ARMOR: NONE
ASW WEAPONS: NONE
TORPS TO SINK: 2 TO 4, MORE IF EMPTY
RADAR RANGE: 10000 TO 20000 YDS
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GIANT JAPANESE WHALING FACTORY SHIPS AND SIMILAR VESSELS WERE
CONVERTED DURING WWII TO A VARIETY OF DUTIES, BUT OIL TRANSPORT
WAS THE MOST COMMON. THE ABOVE DATA IS BASED ON AN OIL TANKER
CONVERSION. BECAUSE OF THEIR LARGE SIZE, THE SHIPS WERE USUALLY
WELL ARMED.
LARGE FREIGHTERS
TONNAGE: 7000 TO 18000 TONS
MAX SPEED: 6 TO 15 KNOTS
MAIN GUNS: NONE TO FOUR 3" TO 5" GUNS
ARMOR: NONE
ASW WEAPONS: NONE
TORPS TO SINK: 2 OR 3, MORE IF LOADED BULK CARRIER
RADAR RANGE: 7000 TO 20000 YARDS
JAPANESE FREIGHTERS CARRIED RAW MATERIAL IN BULK, FOOD AND MILI-
TARY STORES OF ALL TYPES, INCLUDING HIGHLY VOLATILE AMMUNITION OR
GASOLINE (FOR GROUND VEHICLES AND AIRCRAFT). BULK AND STORES
CARRIERS ARE NOT ESPECIALLY VULNERABLE WHEN LOADED. IN FACT, BULK
CARRIERS ARE SOMEWHAT LESS VULNERABLE WHEN LOADED. HOWEVER, AMMO
AND GASOLINE SHIPS ALMOST ALWAYS SINK AFTER THE FIRST HIT IF
LOADED.
SMALL FREIGHTERS
TONNAGE: 1000 TO 8000 TONS
MAX SPEED: 6 TO 14 KNOTS
MAIN GUNS: NONE TO FOUR 3" TO 5" GUNS
ARMOR: NONE
ASW WEAPONS: NONE
TORPS TO SINK: 1 OR 2, MORE IF LOADED BULK CARRIER
RADAR RANGE: 4000 TO 15000 YARDS
MANY JAPANESE FREIGHTERS WERE SMALLER SIZED. LIKE THE LARGER ONES,
THEY CARRIED BULK RAW MATERIALS, STORES AND EQUIPMENT OF ALL
TYPES, AND SOMETIMES AMMO AND GASOLINE. IT WAS NOT EASY TO ESTI-
MATE DISPLACEMENT BASED ON SIZE, SINCE MANY DID NOT APPEAR SIGNIF-
ICANTLY SMALLER THAN THE LARGER ONES.
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5 APPENDIX
DESIGN NOTES
SILENT SERVICE II WAS THE BRAINCHILD OF BILL STEALEY, MICROPROSE'S
PRESIDENT. BACK IN 1985 SID MEIER'S ORIGINAL SILENT SERVICE WAS A
SMASH BESTSELLER FOR VARIOUS 8-BIT COMPUTERS, SUCH AS THE ATARI
800, COMMODORE C-64 AND APPLE II. IN 1990 THE COMMON MICROCOMPUT-
ER IS A 16 BIT MACHINE WITH MORE MEMORY, COMPUTING HORSEPOWER, AND
DISK SPACE. WE WANTED TO EXPLOIT THIS GREATER POWER TO MAKE
SILENT SERVICE INTO SOMETHING BIGGER AND BETTER THAN ITS ILLUSTRI-
OUS ANCESTOR.
IN LATE SUMMER 1989 THE CREATIVE TEAM ASSEMBLED IN MPS LABS.
LEAD PROGRAMMER ROY GIBSON AND ARTIST KIM BISCOE WERE BOTH BRIT-
ISH, WHICH LEFT AN AIR OF INTERNATIONALISM IN A GAME ABOUT AMERI-
CAN SUBMARINES FIGHTING THE JAPANESE ALONG THE PACIFIC RIM!
ORIGINALLY THE GAME DESIGNER/PROJECT MANAGER WAS BRUCE SHELLEY,
WHO DID MUCH OF THE ORIGINAL BRAINSTORMING AND RESEARCH WITH ROY.
HOWEVER, THE RAILROAD TYCOON PROJECT DERAILED HIS TIME AND ARNOLD
HENDRICK TOOK OVER IN MIDSTREAM. ARNOLD FINISHED UP THE HISTORICAL
KNIT-PICKING, WROTE THE MANUAL, AND GENTLY ENCOURAGED ROY AND KIM
TO FINISH THE PROJECT AS QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE. RUMORS THAT HE
CARRIED A BASEBALL BAT TO TIMETABLE MEETINGS ARE COMPLETELY UN-
FOUNDED, AS ARE THE RUMORS THAT MICROPROSE'S HIGHER MANAGEMENT
WISHED HE DID!
THE GREATEST TECHNOLOGICAL FEAT IN SILENT SERVICE II IS THE HIGHLY
REALISTIC PRESENTATION OF ENEMY SHIPS. WE ORIGINALLY WANTED
DIFFERENT PICTURES FOR EVERY TYPE OF WARSHIP IN THE IMPERIAL
JAPANESE NAVY (IJN). BRUCE AND ROY COMBED :THE US NAVAL ARCHIVES
SEARCHING FOR DETAILED VIEWS. WITH THE KIND HELP OF LIBRARIAN
KATHY LLOYD WE TRIED ACTUAL WWII SHIP RECOGNITION BOOKS, BUT FOUND
THEM INFERIOR TO A MAGNIFICENT RESOURCE ON THE OUTSKIRTS OF WASH-
INGTON D.C. THIS WAS DON MONTGOMERY, WHO SPENT YEARS MODELLING
EVERY WARSHIP OF THE
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IJN IN 1/700 SCALE. WHEN PHOTOGRAPHED FROM PERISCOPE PERSPECTIVE,
THESE :MODELS MADE SUPERLATIVE "RAW MATERIAL" FOR ARTIST KIM
BISCOE. AFTER EXTENSIVE ARTWORK TIED TO COMPLEX SCALING ALGORITHMS
BUILT BY ACE "TOOL-MAKER" DAVE MCKIBBIN, WE ACHIEVED SCREEN IMAGES
THAT CLOSELY MATCH WHAT REAL SUBMARINERS SAW THROUGH BINOCULARS OR
PERISCOPES.
OF COURSE, THE GAME DEVELOPMENT HAD MANY OTHER TRIUMPHS. WE EX-
PLOITED THE ADDITIONAL POWER OF 16-BIT MICROCOMPUTERS TO COMPLETE-
LY REWORK ALL THE BATTLE LOGIC, ADDING MORE DETAIL AND REALISM. WE
EXPECTED THE PLAY TEST DEPARTMENT TO COMPLAIN ABOUT THE NEW FEA-
TURES. INSTEAD, THEY URGED ON US EVEN MORE! THE ORIGINAL SILENT
SERVICE WAS AN OLD FAVORITE: EVERYBODY HAD IDEAS ON HOW TO IMPROVE
IT. SOON OUR PROBLEM WAS NOT WHAT TO INCLUDE, BUT WHAT WE WERE
OBLIGED TO LEAVE OUT!
SILENT SERVICE II IS A FINE GAME IN ANY 16-BIT COMPUTER ENVIRON-
MENT, HOWEVER, WE'D LIKE TO ESPECIALLY RECOMMEND IT FOR IBM MCGA
AND VGA 256- COLOR GRAPHICS (ALL PS/2S OR ANY MACHINE WITH A VGA
BOARD AND MONITOR). IT IS ONE OF THE FIRST SIMULATIONS DESIGNED TO
TAKE FULL ADVANTAGE OF 256-COLOR GRAPHICS. THE RESULTS ARE ABSO-
LUTELY AMAZING. ENHANCING AN IBM'S SOUND SYSTEM WITH ONE OF THE
ADD-ON BOARDS WE SUPPORT IS ALSO A GOOD IDEA.
IN THE FINAL STAGES OF DEVELOPMENT, WHILE PLAYING SILENT SERVICE
II, WE FOUND OURSELVES TRANSPORTED MENTALLY TO A TIME 50 YEARS
AGO, WHEN SMALL BANDS OF BRAVE MEN SET SAIL OVER THOUSANDS OF
MILES TO CHALLENGE THE MIGHT OF A SEEMINGLY INVINCIBLE EMPIRE.
TODAY AMERICA'S VICTORY IS TAKEN FOR GRANTED. BUT IT TOOK BRAVE
MEN TO STRUGGLE PAST THE FIRST DISASTERS AND DEFEATS, THEN EVENTU-
ALLY EMERGE VICTORIOUS. IN SILENT SERVICE II YOU'RE ONE OF THAT
BAND OF HEROES, SETTING SAIL TO VICTORY AND ETERNAL GLORY.
A NOTE ABOUT WAR
WAR IS PERHAPS THE MOST UNPLEASANT ATTRIBUTE OF THE HUMAN RACE.
HISTORIANS CAN LIST LITERALLY THOUSANDS OF WARS. CAUSES AND
RESULTS ARE LEGION, THE AMOUNT OF DEATH AND SUFFERING UNIMAGIN-
ABLE. WE AMERICANS SOMETIMES FORGET THIS BECAUSE IT'S BEEN 125
YEARS SINCE WAR HAS DEVASTATED OUR OWN LAND. SINCE THEN WE'VE
ALWAYS FOUGHT OVERSEAS. ON THE OTHER HAND, MEN (AND A FEW WOMEN)
ARE FASCINATED BY WARFARE, BY THE EXTREME RISKS AND SOMETIMES
WORLD-SHAKING RESULTS. YOUNG MEN ARE ESPECIALLY ENTRANCED BY TALES
OF ADVENTURE AND BRAVERY.
MANY MICROPROSE SIMULATIONS DEAL WITH WARFARE. IN A SIMULATION
YOU CAN VICARIOUSLY EXPERIENCE THE THRILLS OF WARFARE AND THE
RESPONSIBILITIES OF BATTLE-
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FIELD COMMAND WITHOUT ANYONE GETTING HURT, MUCH LESS KILLED. BUT
ALWAYS REMEMBER THAT THE REAL THING IS UNIMAGINABLY HORRIBLE, FULL
OF PAIN AND DEATH. SIMULATIONS ARE DECEIVING BECAUSE WE "EDIT OUT"
THE UNPLEASANT PARTS!
IT IS ALSO WORTH MENTIONING THAT JAPAN LEARNED A GREAT DEAL FROM
WWII. JAPAN HAS RENOUNCED THE USE OF MILITARY POWER AS AN INSTRU-
MENT OF FOREIGN POLICY. ITS ARMED FORCES ARE PURELY TO GUARD ITS
OWN BORDERS, AND ARE DELIBERATELY KEPT SMALL. THE OFFICER CORPS
ITSELF HAS A COMPLETELY DIFFERENT ATTITUDE FROM THE OVERCONFIDENT
RADICAL-RIGHTISTS WHO TOOK OVER THE GOVERNMENT IN THE 1920S AND
'30S. EVEN WHEN PROVOKED BY JAPAN'S MOST FAMOUS AND
POPULAR AUTHOR (MISHIMA), THEY REFUSED TO INVOLVE THEMSELVES IN
POLITICS. THE JAPAN OF TODAY IS VERY DIFFERENT FROM THE JAPAN OF
1941.
FURTHER READING
GENERAL HISTORIES
THE ARE MAY EXCELLENT SOURCES OF INFORMATION ABOUT AMERICAN SUBMA-
RINES IN THE PACIFIC DURING WWII. AS WITH ALL HISTORY, REMEMBER
THAT EACH WRITER HAS OPINIONS AND A VIEW POINT WHICH COLORS WHAT
HE PRESENTS.
THE PACIFIC WAR 1941-1945 BY JOHN COSTELLO. THIS IS AN EXCELLENT
ONE-VOLUME ACCOUNT THAT GIVES EQUAL WEIGHT AND CONSIDERABLE DETAIL
TO ALL NATIONAL PERSPECTIVES, INCLUDING JAPANESE, CHINESE AND
BRITISH, RATHER THAN THE RAHRAH-AMERICA STUFF USUALLY FOUND IN THE
USA. WHILE EXCELLENT FOR THE ENTIRE WAR, THE BOOK DOESN'T INCLUDE
MUCH ABOUT SUBMARINES PER SE.
THE SILENT VICTORY BY CLAY BLAIR, JR,, IS THE SINGLE BEST HISTORY
OF AMERICAN WWII SUBMARINES. IT COVERS ALL THE EVENTS, PERSONALI-
TIES, AND INDIVIDUAL PATROLS IN EXHAUSTIVE DETAIL. ALTHOUGH A
SUBMARINER HIMSELF, BLAIR IS REMARKABLY IMPARTIAL AND QUITE ENJOY-
ABLE TO READ. UNFORTUNATELY, AS WITH MANY SUPERLATIVE HISTORY
BOOKS, THE HARDCOVER VERSION IS NOW OUT OF PRINT.
US SUBMARINE OPERATIONS IN WWII BY THEODORE ROSCOE IS A DETAILED
OPERATIONAL HISTORY WITH SOME VERY USEFUL APPENDICES. WRITTEN
SHORTLY AFTER THE WAR, IT IS AN OFFICIAL HISTORY IN ALL BUT NAME,
AND EXTREMELY LAUDATORY TO THE US NAVY IN GENERAL, ITS OFFICERS,
AND ESPECIALLY THE MEN OF ITS SUBMARINE SERVICE. ALTHOUGH IT'S
GREAT READING, DON'T EXPECT A BALANCED VIEWPOINT.
HISTORY OF US NAVAL OPERATIONS IN WWII BY S.E. MORISON IS THE
CLASSIC 15-VOLUME HISTORY OF THE US NAVY. MORISON WAS ONE OF
AMERICA'S FINEST HISTORIANS AND AN EXCELLENT WRITER. IF YOU DON'T
WANT TO TACKLE ALL 15 VOLUMES, HE HAS A SUPERBLY READABLE ONE-
VOLUME SUMMARY TITLED THE TWO-OCEAN WAR.
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125
TECHNICAL SOURCES
FINDING DATA AND STATISTICS BOOKS TAKES TIME. MANY ARE OUT OF
PRINT, AND MOST LIBRARIES DON'T CARRY THEM. FORTUNATELY WE HAD
ACCESS TO VARIOUS LARGE PRIVATE COLLECTIONS. AMONG THE BEST BOOKS
WE ENCOUNTERED WERE THESE:
WARSHIPS OF THE IMPERIAL JAPANESE NAVY, 1869-1945 BY JETSCHURA,
JUNG AND MICKEL. TRANSLATED FROM GERMAN AND PUBLISHED BY THE US
NAVAL INSTITUTE, THIS IS THE SINGLE BEST VOLUME FOR DATA ON EVERY
JAPANESE WARSHIP, GIVEN IN EXHAUSTIVE DETAIL.
US WARSHIPS OF WORLD WAR II BY PAUL SILVERSTONE. ORIGINALLY PUB-
LISHED IN BRITAIN, THIS HANDY VOLUME PROVIDES BASIC DATA ON THE
HUGE US WWII FLEET, INCLUDING ITS SUBMARINES. SIMILAR VOLUMES BY
VARIOUS AUTHORS COVER OTHER WWII FLEETS. UNFORTUNATELY, ALL ARE
NOW OUT OF PRINT.
US SUBS IN ACTION BY ROBERT C. STERN. THIS SQUADRON/SIGNAL BOOK
WAS INTENDED FOR MODELERS, BUT INCLUDES A WEALTH OF ILLUSTRATIONS
AND VISUAL DETAIL THAT AIDED US IN DUPLICATION THE "LOOK" OF US
SUBMARINES.
USS TORSK. WE REPEATEDLY VISITED THIS TENCH-CLASS SUBMARINE (A
REAL BOAT!) AND USED ITS EQUIPMENT AS A MODEL FOR THAT SHOWN IN
THE GAME. WE TOOK INTO ACCOUNT THAT THE TENCH CLASS HAS REFINE-
MENTS NOT AVAILABLE ON EARLIER CLASSES.
OTHER BOOKS
CLEAR THE BRIDGE BY RICHARD H. O'KANE. THIS IS A VERY INTERESTING
AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL ACCOUNT OF O'KANE'S COMMAND OF THE USS TANG
DURING HER FIVE WAR PATROLS, IN WHICH THE BOAT EARNED TWO PRESI-
DENTIAL UNIT CITATIONS AND HER SKIPPER THE MEDAL OF HONOR.
WAHOO BY RICHARD O'KANE. THIS IS A HISTORY OF THE USS WAHOO'S WAR
PATROLS UNDER THE COMMAND OF "MUSH" MORTON. O'KANE WAS EXECUTIVE
OFFICER (SECOND IN COMMAND) FOR MANY OF THESE, AND THEREFORE
WRITES FROM PERSONAL EXPERIENCE.
TAKE HER DEEP BY L.J.GALANTIN RECOUNTS THE WAR PATROLS OF THE USS
HALIBUT UNDER HIS COMMAND. IT PROVIDES AN EXCELLENT INSIGHT INTO
"AVERAGE" WAR PATROLS UNDER A "MERELY" COMPETENT SKIPPER.
COMPARING GALANTIN TO O'KANE PROVIDES INTERESTING INSIGHTS INTO
WHAT MAKES A REALLY GREAT SUB SKIPPER: PERSONALITY, SKILL OR
LUCK?
SHINANO! BY JOSEPH F. ENRIGHT RECOUNTS THE FIRST AND FINAL VOYAGE
OF THAT AIRCRAFT CARRIER, AND HOW THE ARCHERFISH SANK HER. WHAT
THE BOOK DOESN'T REVEAL IS THAT THIS WAS ENRIGHT'S ONLY BIG SCORE
FOR THE ENTIRE WAR, DESPITE NUMEROUS WAR PATROLS.
125
126
BOWFIN BY E.P.HOYT DETAILS THE WAR PATROLS OF THAT BOAT. HOYT HAS
WRITTEN TONS OF WWII BOOKS, INCLUDING LOTS ABOUT SUBMARINES.
HOWEVER, MUCH OF HIS WORK IS DERIVATIVE.
RUN SILENT, RUN DEEP BY EDWARD BEACH, A WWII SUB SKIPPER, IS
FICTION. THE BOOK IS WELL WRITTEN, EXCITING AND TECHNICALLY
ACCURATE. THE NOVEL COMBINES IN ONE CHARACTER ALL THE GREAT US
SUB SKIPPERS OF THE WAR. IT'S VERY HIGHLY RECOMMENDED.
WAR UNDER THE PACIFIC BY KEITH WHEELER IS A TIME-LIFE "PICTURE
BOOK", ONE OF A SUBSCRIPTION SERIES. ITS MANY PHOTOGRAPHS HELPED
INSPIRE US ALL, ESPECIALLY ARTIST KIM BISCOE. WE RECOMMEND IT FOR
A "VISUAL FEEL" OF THE PERIOD, INCLUDING THE ERA, MEN, THE BOATS,
AND THE BATTLES.
ARNOLD HENDRICK, MAY 1990
126
127
CREDITS
GAME DESIGN
ARNOLD HENDRICK AND ROY GIBSON
BASED ON THE ORIGINAL SILENT SERVICE BY
SID MEIER
PROGRAMMING
ROY GIBSON
GRAPHICS
KIM BISCOE
MUSIC & SOUND EFFECTS
KEN LAGACE AND JIM MCCONKEY
WITH THEME MUSIC COMPOSED BY
DR. JEFFERY L. BRIGGS
QUALITY ASSURANCE 'CHRIS TAORMINO, ELAN ROIREAU AND RUSSELL
COONEY
MANUAL
WRITTEN BY ARNOLD HENDRICK
DIRECTION & DESIGN BY LRIS IDOKOGI
GRAPHICS BY BARBARA BENTS, MICHAEL REIS, LRIS IDOKOGI AND
CHERI GLOVER
LAYOUT BY MICHAEL REIS AND IRIS IDOKOGI
CHAPTER ILLUSTRATIONS BY KEN ZARUBA
PROJECT MANAGEMENT
ARNOLD HENDRICK AND BRUCE SHELLEY
PACKAGE DESIGN
CREATIVE DIRECTION BY MARK CIOLA
WITH JOHN EMORY, JUANITA BUSSARD AND JACK KAMMER
PHOTOGRAPHY BY FREDERICK SUTTER PHOTOGRAPHY
BASED ON COMPUTER ART BY KIM BISCOE
SPECIAL THANKS TO...
USS TORSK, BALTIMORE MARITIME MUSEUM.
KATHY LLOYD, LIBRARIAN OF THE OPERATIONAL ARCHIVES AT THE
WASHINGTON NAVY YARD.
DON MONTGOMERY, MASTER MODELER.
OPTIONS BACKDROP COURTESY OF THE ESTATE OF FRED FREEMAN,
CMDR, USN (RET).
THE JET OF INC FOR PUTTING THESE DOX IN COMPUTER FORMAT
127
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