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**BIND 9.x**  
**SECURITY TECHNICAL IMPLEMENTATION GUIDE**  
**(STIG) OVERVIEW**

**Version 2, Release 3**

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**Developed by DISA for the DOD**

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## 1. INTRODUCTION

### 1.1 Executive Summary

The Berkeley Internet Name Domain (BIND) 9.x Security Technical Implementation Guide (STIG) is published as a tool to improve the security of the Department of Defense (DOD) Domain Name System (DNS) infrastructure. The requirements were developed from Federal and DOD consensus based on the Domain Name System Security Requirements Guide (DNS SRG). The vulnerabilities discussed in this document are applicable to a BIND 9.x DNS implementation installed on a UNIX/Linux Operating System (OS). This document should be applied to all DOD DNS implementations that are running BIND 9.x as an external name server, an internal name server, or as a caching (recursive) name server.

### 1.2 Authority

Department of Defense Instruction (DODI) 8500.01 requires that “all IT [information technology] that receives, processes, stores, displays, or transmits DOD information will be [...] configured [...] consistent with applicable DOD cybersecurity policies, standards, and architectures.” The instruction tasks that DISA “develops and maintains control correlation identifiers (CCIs), security requirements guides (SRGs), security technical implementation guides (STIGs), and mobile code risk categories and usage guides that implement and are consistent with DOD cybersecurity policies, standards, architectures, security controls, and validation procedures, with the support of the NSA/CSS [National Security Agency/Central Security Service], using input from stakeholders, and using automation whenever possible.” This document is provided under the authority of DODI 8500.01.

Although the use of the principles and guidelines in these SRGs/STIGs provides an environment that contributes to the security requirements of DOD systems, applicable NIST SP 800-53 cybersecurity controls must be applied to all systems and architectures based on the Committee on National Security Systems (CNSS) Instruction (CNSSI) 1253.

### 1.3 Vulnerability Severity Category Code Definitions

Severity Category Codes (referred to as CAT) are a measure of vulnerabilities used to assess a facility or system security posture. Each security policy specified in this document is assigned a Severity Category Code of CAT I, II, or III.

Table 1-1: Vulnerability Severity Category Code Definitions

Category	DISA Category Code Guidelines
CAT I	Any vulnerability, the exploitation of which will <b>directly and immediately</b> result in loss of Confidentiality, Availability, or Integrity.
CAT II	Any vulnerability, the exploitation of which <b>has a potential</b> to result in loss of Confidentiality, Availability, or Integrity.
CAT III	Any vulnerability, the existence of which <b>degrades measures</b> to protect against loss of Confidentiality, Availability, or Integrity.

## 1.4 STIG Distribution

Parties within the DOD and federal government's computing environments can obtain the applicable STIG from the Cyber Exchange website at <https://cyber.mil/>. This site contains the latest copies of STIGs, SRGs, and other related security information. Those without a Common Access Card (CAC) that has DOD Certificates can obtain the STIG from <https://public.cyber.mil/>.

## 1.5 Document Revisions

Comments or proposed revisions to this document should be sent via email to the following address: [disa.stig\\_spt@mail.mil](mailto:disa.stig_spt@mail.mil). DISA will coordinate all change requests with the relevant DOD organizations before inclusion in this document. Approved changes will be made in accordance with the DISA maintenance release schedule.

## 1.6 Other Considerations

DISA accepts no liability for the consequences of applying specific configuration settings made on the basis of the SRGs/STIGs. It must be noted that the configuration settings specified should be evaluated in a local, representative test environment before implementation in a production environment, especially within large user populations. The extensive variety of environments makes it impossible to test these configuration settings for all potential software configurations.

For some production environments, failure to test before implementation may lead to a loss of required functionality. Evaluating the risks and benefits to a system's particular circumstances and requirements is the system owner's responsibility. The evaluated risks resulting from not applying specified configuration settings must be approved by the responsible AO. Furthermore, DISA implies no warranty that the application of all specified configurations will make a system 100 percent secure.

Security guidance is provided for the DOD. While other agencies and organizations are free to use it, care must be given to ensure that all applicable security guidance is applied at both the device hardening level and the architectural level due to the fact that some settings may not be configurable in environments outside the DOD architecture.

## 1.7 Product Approval Disclaimer

The existence of a STIG does not equate to DOD approval for the procurement or use of a product.

STIGs provide configurable operational security guidance for products being used by the DOD. STIGs, along with vendor confidential documentation, also provide a basis for assessing compliance with cybersecurity controls/control enhancements, which supports system assessment and authorization (A&A) under the DOD Risk Management Framework (RMF). Department of Defense AOs may request available vendor confidential documentation for a product that has a STIG for product evaluation and RMF purposes from [disa.stig\\_spt@mail.mil](mailto:disa.stig_spt@mail.mil). This documentation is not published for general access to protect the vendor's proprietary information.

AOs have the purview to determine product use/approval in accordance with (IAW) DOD policy and through RMF risk acceptance. Inputs into acquisition or pre-acquisition product selection include such processes as:

- National Information Assurance Partnership (NIAP) evaluation for National Security Systems (NSS) (<https://www.niap-ccevs.org/>) IAW CNSSP #11.
- National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) Cryptographic Module Validation Program (CMVP) (<https://csrc.nist.gov/groups/STM/cmvp/>) IAW federal/DOD mandated standards.
- DOD Unified Capabilities (UC) Approved Products List (APL) (<https://www.disa.mil/network-services/ucco>) IAW DODI 8100.04.

## 2. ASSESSMENT CONSIDERATIONS

### 2.1 Security Assessment Information

The primary objective of a DNS review is to examine the site's name servers and the zones those name servers support. The review should cover not only the authoritative name servers, but all supporting name servers as well. In some cases, this may not be feasible (e.g., the name server is remotely located); however, if any server supporting a zone is not assessed, this should be clearly documented in the final assessment report. Organizations may also have several caching name servers (i.e., servers that can resolve client queries) that are not authoritative for any DNS records. These are the servers listed in the DNS configuration of the computers on the internal network. A DNS review should also evaluate all of the organization's caching name servers. Client DNS configuration is outside the scope of the review, which focuses on DNS servers and related technical and physical controls.

To satisfy the requirements listed in the DNS SRG, the BIND 9.x STIG implements security features and configurations that are only available in BIND 9.7.x and greater. If the BIND 9.x implementation under assessment is running a version earlier than 9.7.x, it is recommended that the server under assessment be upgraded in order to fully implement the security features and configurations listed in this STIG.

### 2.2 DNSSEC Applicability to Classified Networks

FRAGO1 to TASKORD 11-0410-2 specified that all CC/S/FAs must implement DNSSEC on their respective second-level .mil domain by 01 May 2013. DNSSEC for all lower level .mil subdomains was directed to be implemented by 03 Jun 2014. This requirement is for Unclassified networks only; Classified networks are exempt from the DNSSEC requirements and those requirements may be marked N/A for such systems.